

tesi di laurea magistrale

Mechanisms to Protect Intellectual Properties: the Physically Unclonable Functions Technology Approach

Anno Accademico 2014/2015

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
Introduction

■ Problems:

- Theft of Intellectual Property (IP)
- Production of counterfeits components

■ Threats to hardware design:

- Reverse engineering
- Cloning
- Overbuilding
- Tampering





Physically Unclonable Functions

- Physical(ly) Unclonable Functions (PUFs) exploit physical properties of imperfections which are randomly introduced by the manufacturing processes
- The function maps a set of inputs (**challenges**) to a set of outputs (**responses**), defining an **unclonable** and **unique** challenge/response pairs (CRPs) set
- The PUF concept can be used also in Integrated Circuits (ICs), with the introduction of Silicon PUFs
 - the process is the photolithography;
 - challenges are the applied electrical stimuli;
 - responses are the PUF's outputs.



PUF Quality Factors

- **Uniqueness:**

$$U = \frac{2}{k(k-1)} \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^k \frac{HD(R_i, R_j)}{n} \cdot 100\%$$

- **Uniformity:**

$$RU(i) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{t=1}^n R_{i,t} \times 100$$


- **Reliability:**

$$HD_{intra} = \frac{1}{k} \sum_{j=1}^k \frac{HD(R_i, R'_{i,j})}{n} \times 100$$




Anderson PUF Cell

- A glitch is generated through 2 alternating sequences in counter-phase
- Due to manufacturing imperfections, the glitch has a different width for each cell
- The cell design perfectly matches the Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA structure
- We ported the Anderson PUF on the Spartan-3E FPGA, enabling protection mechanisms even on low-cost devices




Anderson PUF Qualities

- 15 different FPGAs (**XC3S1200E**)



Anderson PUF

Average Uniqueness value: 47.18%
Average Uniformity Value: 50.59%




Enhanced Anderson PUF

Average Uniqueness value: 49.37%
Average Uniformity Value: 50.99%

FSM-Based IP Licensing Mechanism

- Enables a protection mechanism for low-cost FPGAs
- A secure FSM is added into the original IP core design
- The FSM enables the IP core only if the PUF response and the license are valid




FPGA	Slices	Flip-flops
XC3S1200E	1.25%	0.43%
XC7Z020	0.26%	0.07%

60 bits case of study

Dynamic Hardware-IP Protection


- A **Security Module (SM)** is programmed into the device exploiting a secure boot procedure based on Trusted Platform Module (TPM)



- The **SM** includes the Anderson PUF and a SW decryption engine
- The **SM** decrypts an encrypted partial bitstream (HWIP) using as key a specific PUF response, then partially re-configures the FPGA with the decrypted bitstream

Primitive	Bitstream size (150 kBytes)	Bitstream size (600 kBytes)
AES-CBC	170 ms	682 ms
AES-GCM	280 ms	1122 ms

Implementation of a Trusted Platform Exploiting Android OS



- We developed a customized version of Android OS which checks and installs only valid applications (*apks*)
- The TPM boot procedure is exploited in order to build a secure and trusted platform
- The validity check is based on the XML manifest of an Android *app*, which comprises the **enciphered digest** of the application executable

NEXYS 2™

Connect: Nexys2
Product: Nexys2 - 1200

Config | Memory | Test | Register I/O | File I/O | I/O Ex | Settings

FPGA
XC3S1200E

put_00bit.bit

[Browse...]

[Program]

PROM
XCF045

[Browse...]

[Program]

Initialize Chain

Set Config file for XC3S1200E: "C:\Users\ Pierpaolo\Desktop\PLIF_noChallenge_DispositioneDiversa\put_00bit.bit"
Preparing to program XC3S1200E...
Programming...
Verifying programming of device...
Programming successful.

NEXYS 2™

Connect: Onboard USB
Product: Nexys2 - 1200

Config | Memory | Test | Register I/O | File I/O | I/O Ex | Settings

LPC48
XC3S1200E

put_00bit.bit

[Browse...]

[Program]



PTIM
XCF045


[Browse...]

[Program]



Initialize Chain

Found device ID: 21c2a003
Initialization Complete.
Device 1: XC3S1200E
Device 2: XCF045
Set Config file for XC3S1200E: "C:\Users\ Pierpaolo\Desktop\PLIF_noChallenge_DispositioneDiversa\put_00bit.bit"







```
Set Config file for XC7Z020: "C:\Users\lispernado\Dropbox\Tesi\Carica\PLIP_simple\top_module.bit"
Set Overlay file for XC7Z020: "C:\Users\lispernado\Dropbox\Tesi\Carica\PLIP_simple\top_module.bit"
Preparing to program XC7Z020...
Programming...
Verifying programming of device...
Programming successful.
```



```
Set Config file for XC7Z020: "C:\Users\lispernado\Dropbox\Tesi\Carica\PLIP_simple\top_module.bit"
Set Overlay file for XC7Z020: "C:\Users\lispernado\Dropbox\Tesi\Carica\PLIP_simple\top_module.bit"
Preparing to program XC7Z020...
Programming...
Verifying programming of device...
Programming successful.
```







Future Work

- Defining a model for the glitch generation of the Anderson PUF by varying the supply voltage
- Analyzing the impact on responses of the logic surrounding a PUF in order to mitigate its effect
- Implementing low-weight mechanisms to enhance PUFs reliability
- Implementing the Android check mechanism on the most recent Android version and on other operating systems