

The Anger Gap

Anger is a powerful mobilizing force in American politics on both sides of the political aisle, but does it motivate all groups equally? This book offers a new conceptualization of anger as a political resource that mobilizes black and white Americans differentially to exacerbate political inequality. Drawing on survey data from the last forty years, experiments, and rhetoric analysis, Phoenix finds that – from Reagan to Trump – black Americans register significantly less anger than their white counterparts and that anger (in contrast to pride) has a weaker mobilizing effect on their political participation. The book examines both the causes of this and the consequences. Pointing to black Americans' tempered expectations of politics and the stigmas associated with black anger, it shows how race and lived experience moderate the emergence of emotions and their impact on behavior. The book makes multiple theoretical contributions and offers important practical insights for political strategy.

Davin L. Phoenix is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. His research examines how race interacts with different spheres of American politics to shape the attitudes, emotions, and behavior of both everyday people and elites. He is a recipient of the 2016–2017 UC Hellman Fellowship and the 2017–2018 Dean's Honoree for Teaching Excellence Award.

The Anger Gap

How Race Shapes Emotion in Politics

DAVIN L. PHOENIX

University of California, Irvine



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108485906

DOI: [10.1017/9781108641906](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108641906)

© Cambridge University Press 2020

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2020

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-108-48590-6 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-108-72533-0 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

The Anger Gap

Anger is a powerful mobilizing force in American politics on both sides of the political aisle, but does it motivate all groups equally? This book offers a new conceptualization of anger as a political resource that mobilizes black and white Americans differentially to exacerbate political inequality. Drawing on survey data from the last forty years, experiments, and rhetoric analysis, Phoenix finds that – from Reagan to Trump – black Americans register significantly less anger than their white counterparts and that anger (in contrast to pride) has a weaker mobilizing effect on their political participation. The book examines both the causes of this and the consequences. Pointing to black Americans' tempered expectations of politics and the stigmas associated with black anger, it shows how race and lived experience moderate the emergence of emotions and their impact on behavior. The book makes multiple theoretical contributions and offers important practical insights for political strategy.

Davin L. Phoenix is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. His research examines how race interacts with different spheres of American politics to shape the attitudes, emotions, and behavior of both everyday people and elites. He is a recipient of the 2016–2017 UC Hellman Fellowship and the 2017–2018 Dean's Honoree for Teaching Excellence Award.

The Anger Gap

How Race Shapes Emotion in Politics

DAVIN L. PHOENIX

University of California, Irvine



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108485906

DOI: [10.1017/9781108641906](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108641906)

© Cambridge University Press 2020

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2020

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-108-48590-6 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-108-72533-0 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

The Anger Gap

Anger is a powerful mobilizing force in American politics on both sides of the political aisle, but does it motivate all groups equally? This book offers a new conceptualization of anger as a political resource that mobilizes black and white Americans differentially to exacerbate political inequality. Drawing on survey data from the last forty years, experiments, and rhetoric analysis, Phoenix finds that – from Reagan to Trump – black Americans register significantly less anger than their white counterparts and that anger (in contrast to pride) has a weaker mobilizing effect on their political participation. The book examines both the causes of this and the consequences. Pointing to black Americans' tempered expectations of politics and the stigmas associated with black anger, it shows how race and lived experience moderate the emergence of emotions and their impact on behavior. The book makes multiple theoretical contributions and offers important practical insights for political strategy.

Davin L. Phoenix is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. His research examines how race interacts with different spheres of American politics to shape the attitudes, emotions, and behavior of both everyday people and elites. He is a recipient of the 2016–2017 UC Hellman Fellowship and the 2017–2018 Dean's Honoree for Teaching Excellence Award.

The Anger Gap

How Race Shapes Emotion in Politics

DAVIN L. PHOENIX

University of California, Irvine



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06-04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of
education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108485906

DOI: [10.1017/9781108641906](https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108641906)

© Cambridge University Press 2020

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2020

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Clays Ltd, Elcograf S.p.A.

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978-1-108-48590-6 Hardback

ISBN 978-1-108-72533-0 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy
of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication
and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain,
accurate or appropriate.

*For my mom, who teaches and sustains me.
For my wife, who encourages and enhances me.
For my students, who challenge and inspire me.*

Contents

<i>List of Figures</i>	<i>page</i> viii
<i>List of Tables</i>	xii
<i>Preface</i>	xvii
1 Anger in Black and White	I
2 Anger (Mis)Management?	29
3 The Anger Gap and Turnout in American Politics	70
4 From Black Anger to Black Activism	110
5 The Racial Enthusiasm Advantage in Politics	153
6 The Anger Gap, beyond Black and White	195
7 On Dreams Deferred and Anger Inhibited	244
<i>Bibliography</i>	263
<i>Index</i>	279

Figures

1.1	Rates of black and white turnout in presidential elections, 1976–2016.	page 4
1.2	Mean reports of anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Democrats.	13
1.3	Mean reports of anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Republicans.	14
2.1	Illustrating the role of threat in decision making.	31
2.2	Illustrating the effect of exposure to the Rubio ad on decision making.	34
2.3	Illustrating the effect of exposure to the Helms ad on white viewers' decision making.	40
2.4	Comparing individual-level indicators of political agency across black and white participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.	47
2.5	Comparing group-level indicators of political agency across black and white participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.	48
2.6	Mean reports of enthusiasm toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Democrats.	62
2.7	Mean reports of enthusiasm toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Republicans.	63
3.1	Rates of black and white turnout in presidential elections, 1976–2016.	71
3.2	Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race.	75

3.3	Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates among self-identified Democrats, across respondent race.	77
3.4	Self-identified Democrats' mean approval of presidential incumbents from 1980 through 2012, across respondent race.	77
3.5	Predicted probabilities of reporting fear toward presidential incumbents and candidates among self-identified Democrats, across respondent race.	79
3.6	Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates across respondent race and party affiliation.	83
3.7	Marginal effects of gender, age and education attained on respondents' likelihoods of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race.	87
3.8	Marginal effect of anger expressed toward out-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation.	90
3.9	Mean reported anger felt during 2016 election, across reported favorability toward Trump and Clinton.	94
3.10	Odds ratios comparing black and white expressions of anger throughout 2016 election. Comparisons made across total sample, as well as between men and women, those under 30 and those 30 and older, and those with and without college degrees.	95
3.11	Marginal effect of favorability toward Trump on frequency of anger reported during 2016 election, across respondent race.	98
3.12	Marginal effect of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation.	99
4.1	Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihoods of donating, contacting a public official, and protesting and boycotting in the past year, across respondent race.	124
4.2	The influence of attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter movement on the relationship between reported anger and black respondents' likelihood of protesting.	128
4.3	Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and gender.	132

4.4	Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and age cohort.	134
4.5	Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and education level.	135
4.6	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across participant race.	138
4.7	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief that racial discrimination is a constant source of stress. Black participants only.	139
4.8	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief in the need to stay calm in the face of racial discrimination. Black participants only.	140
4.9	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief in racial group linked fate. Black participants only.	141
4.10	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief respondent's racial group has say in government. Results shown for black participants and white participants separately.	143
4.11	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across beliefs about how long discrimination will affect the lives of black people. Black participants only.	145
4.12	Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across frequency of church attendance. Results shown for black participants and white participants separately.	146
5.1	Predicted probabilities of reporting hope toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race.	155
5.2	Predicted probabilities of reporting pride toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race.	156
5.3	Mean reported hope in the opportunity condition, across participant race.	165

5.4	Mean likelihood of signing name to letter in control and opportunity conditions, across participant race.	165
5.5	Marginal effect of reported hope on likelihood of signing name to letter, across participant race.	166
5.6	Marginal effect of reported hope on likelihoods of attending a meeting on DWSD restructuring, discussing the issue with others and contacting elected officials over the issue, across participant race.	167
5.7	Marginal effect of church attendance on likelihood of expressing hope over DWSD, across participant race.	169
5.8	Marginal effect of hope expressed toward favored-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation.	172
5.9	Marginal effect of pride expressed toward favored-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation.	175
5.10	Marginal effects of hope, pride and anger during 2016 election on likelihoods of protesting and boycotting in the past year. Black respondents only.	179
5.11	Marginal effects of hope, pride and anger during 2016 election on likelihoods of protesting and boycotting in the past year. White respondents only.	180
5.12	Marginal effects of black respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election.	184
A5.1	Control condition flyer.	187
A5.2	Opportunity condition flyer.	188
6.1	Odds ratios comparing expressions of anger, fear, hope and pride throughout 2016 election, across respondent race.	209
6.2	Marginal effect of favorability toward Trump on frequency of anger reported during 2016 election, across respondent race.	210
6.3a	Marginal effects of AAPI respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election.	212
6.3b	Marginal effects of Latina/o respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election.	213

Tables

2.1	Comparing black and white opinion on racial and social issues. Data from multiple polls conducted by the Pew Research Center and Gallup.	page 43
2.2	Descriptive statistics on participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.	46
2.3	Black RAP Study participants' views on racial discrimination.	67
3.1	Effect of race on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates.	74
3.2	Effect of race on likelihood of self-identified Democrats expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates.	76
3.3	Effects of gender, age and education on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race.	84
3.4	Effect of out-partisan anger on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections.	88
3.5	Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of voting in presidential election.	98
3.6	Black and white Democrats' mean reported anger toward out-partisans, across race of interviewer.	101
A3.1	Sample characteristics of 2016 CMPS.	105
A3.2	Effect of race on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates.	105
A3.3	Effect of out-partisan anger on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation.	106

A3.4	Effect of respondent race on frequency of anger and fear reported during 2016 election.	107
A3.5	Effect of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of voting, across race and party affiliation.	109
4.1	Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	123
4.2	Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of participating in a protest in the past year, across respondent race, gender, age and education level.	131
A4.1	Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Black respondents only.	149
A4.2	Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. White respondents only.	150
A4.3	Logistic models regressing interactions between anger and views about BLM on likelihood of protesting. Black respondents only.	151
5.1	Descriptive statistics on participants in the 2013–2014 Detroit area water study.	163
5.2	Effect of hope toward favored partisan on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections.	171
5.3	Effect of pride toward favored partisan on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections.	175
5.4	Effect of hope expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	177
5.5	Effect of pride expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	177
A5.1	Effect of race on likelihood of expressing hope and pride toward presidential incumbents and candidates.	189
A5.2	Predicting the effects of assignment to the opportunity condition on participants' reports of hope over DWSD restructuring.	191
A5.3	Predicting the effect of race on participants' likelihood of signing a letter over DWSD restructuring, across treatment conditions.	191
A5.4	Predicting the effects of reported hope on participants' likelihood of participation regarding DWSD restructuring, across race.	192
A5.5	Effect of hope expressed toward favored partisans on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation.	193

A5.6	Effect of pride expressed toward favored partisans on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation.	194
6.1	Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	215
6.2	Effect of fear expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	216
6.3	Effect of hope expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	217
6.4	Effect of pride expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.	218
6.5	The influence of emotions on support for the BLM movement, across respondent race.	222
6.6	The influence of emotions on policy preferences toward undocumented Mexican immigrants, across respondent race.	223
6.7	The influence of emotions on views about racial profiling, across respondent race.	224
6.8	The influence of emotions on views about Latina/o culture, across respondent race.	226
6.9	The influence of emotions on Latina/o Americans' perceived importance of working with African Americans.	227
6.10	The influence of emotions on Asian American attitudes toward affirmative action in colleges.	229
A6.1	Effect of respondent race on reports of anger, fear, pride and hope throughout 2016 election.	232
A6.2	Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Latina/o respondents only.	234
A6.3	Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. AAPI respondents only.	236
A6.4	Influence of emotions on support for BLM movement, across respondent race.	238
A6.5	Influence of emotions on support for pathway to citizenship for undocumented Mexican immigrants, across respondent race.	239
A6.6	Influence of emotions on views about racial profiling, across respondent race.	240
A6.7	Influence of emotions on views about Latina/o culture, across respondent race.	241

A6.8	Influence of emotions on Latina/o Americans' perceived importance of working with African Americans.	242
A6.9	The influence of emotions on Asian American attitudes toward affirmative action in colleges.	243

Preface

I still remember the brief rush of exhilaration racing to my head as a college kid in Hampton, Virginia, paging through the Sunday edition of *The Daily Pilot* and coming across Aaron McGruder's comic strip "The Boondocks." The biting, acerbic and often uproariously hilarious send-ups of race, class and culture captured in those panels felt so vital to me. So urgent. So... *dangerous*. I did not at that time possess the language to convey the origins of my slight sense of disquiet that the palpable black political rage emanating from this strip was on full display for predominantly white audiences to see. All I could muster were the questions of ... *is this appropriate? Can we air this kind of thing in public?*

At the time, I had no idea that I was surfacing the very issues that would come to comprise the core of this book. What is to be made of the fact that black anger is so feared, so vilified within the American political imagination? What are the consequences of the stigmatization, the suppression, the smothering of black political rage? What would the black political landscape look like if the major actors and institutions of US politics recognized that black people possess – to borrow the title of one of McGruder's edited volumes of "The Boondocks" – *A right to be hostile?*

After devoting much of the past seven years of this project to grappling with the consequences of the inhibition of black anger for the politics of parties, turnout, activism and race, I find myself thinking back to those moments that I now view as prefaces for this exhausting, but enriching, journey; I reflect on the constellation of people serving as my guideposts along the way. I want to recognize just a few of those shining stars.

This project began as my dissertation, and I am enormously indebted to the investments made by my committee members at the University of Michigan. Ann Lin pushed me to consider the question – and the means to answer it – from more angles than I previously thought possible. Nancy Burns provided needed affirmation of the work, while challenging me to better position it as a continuation of an ongoing scholarly discourse – one to which she has made such vital contributions. Ted Brader had an unrivaled impact on my development as a scholar, exposing me to many of the ideas and lines of inquiry that shaped my research agenda for years. He employed helpful critiques to sharpen my toolset, while also sending the occasional life raft to keep me from drifting too far offshore. Finally, Vincent Hutchings was and is an influential mentor and role model. He has been my toughest critic and my most ardent champion. His keen eye for detail always illuminated weak spots in the project, and his encouragement gave me the confidence I needed to shore up those weaknesses.

Beyond my committee members, my work on this project was enriched by the tutelage, guidance and inspiration of a number of Michigan scholars: Nicholas Valentino, Donald Kinder, Rick Hall, Mary Corcoran, Al Young and Larry Rowley. I remain grateful to the Program in Intergroup Relations for providing me a second intellectual home and giving me a new language with which to grapple with race, power and possibility. I extend my deepest gratitude to Adrienne Dessel, whose compassion, wisdom and deep investments of time and energy in me made a uniquely remarkable impact on me at a most critical time in my development as a scholar and person.

I reflect with gratitude on the groundswell of support, friendship and helpful advice from the “Michigan Mafia” throughout all phases of this project, especially Nathan Kalmoe, Spencer Piston and Vanessa Cruz Nichols. I give special due to the friends labeled *We All We Got*, in particular Maria Johnson, Kenyatha Loftis and Andrea Benjamin. Keith Veal, Tonya Rice and LaFleur Stephans-Dougans, I cherish being a part of our *Fantastic Four*.

At UC Irvine, I have found a community that sustains and challenges me intellectually, while having offered me the space and support I needed to mature as a scholar. I am especially grateful to Heidi Hardt, who has always gifted me with sage insight and magnanimous warmth. I also thank Louis DeSipio and Michael Tesler, who each provided incredible guidance that helped steer me through the challenges of both book writing and book publishing. I thank Tiffany Willoughby Herard, who has consistently pushed me to expand my imagination as a researcher

and educator, and I thank Claire Kim, whose fierce support, constant demonstrations of care and incisive feedback have made me a better researcher and teacher. Finally, I thank Jeffrey Kopstein, who has always pushed the right buttons for me at just the right times.

I am grateful to Ahmad Hamza, Seul-Gee Kim, Alan Tan, Jennifer Kaplan and Chaz Briscoe for assisting with the emotion discourse analyses. I thank Nathan Chan for his diligent work alongside me to create the measures and treatments for the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation Study. I am indebted to the UCI Center for the Study of Democracy and the UC Hellman Fellows Program for providing vital funding to help these efforts.

There are so many scholars whom I count friends, colleagues and even #careergoals who have offered feedback, encouragement or support of some kind that helped sustain me throughout this project. I acknowledge and salute them. David Redlawsk. Samara Klar. Leonie Huddy. Gregory Huber. Antoine Banks. Camille Burge. Hahrie Han. Narayani Lasala-Blanco. Pei-te Lien. Lorrie Frasure-Yokley. Matt Barreto. Natalie Masuoka. Jessica Preece. Efren Perez. Lynn Vavreck. Shana Gadarian. Angela X. Ocampo. Ismail White. Lester Spence. Francisco Pedraza. Andra Gillespie. Maneesh Arora. Special recognition is due to my fellow “Bunchee” Chryl Laird, whose friendship is appreciated and whose work is stellar. I thank Paula McClain, to whom I am immensely grateful for her early investment in me, without which this project would never have been. To Jonathan Collins, who has been a much appreciated real one from our first encounter. To Nyron Crawford and LaFleur Stephans-Dougans, who provided concrete feedback on the manuscript and made it better.

From its birth, this project has been shepherded along with the spiritual guidance and support of my brothers in arms, the Men of Valor, especially Jamaal Matthews and Gbenga Olumolade. Finally, I offer my gratitude to my family, whose love, chastisement and steadfast grace have sustained me as I sojourned through many a valley on the long and arduous path to completing this work. Mrs. Gloria and Mr. Smith. Cousin Ann, Nete, Gina and Roosevelt. Bishop Francisco, Pastor Nat and Mother Naomi. Grandma and Uncle Ro, who shine down on me from above.

And then there’s mom, JoAnn Phoenix. My inquisitiveness and my desire to teach – it all goes back to her. From teaching me to read at the age of three to consistently pushing me to think about *whys* and *hows* that I had not previously considered, my mom has always pressed me to

expand the horizons of my intellectual curiosity. That, and she bought me that “Boondocks” collection. Mom has always been a step ahead.

Last, I thank and honor my wife Adriana Aldana. I am grateful to her and her family – Caro, Rene, Elias, Jesus and Eva – for helping make SoCal feel like a place I can call home. I can fill an entire book with reflections on her immeasurable impact on this project, and yet the words would still fail me. I am left to make this suffice. Thanks for dialoguing with me.

Everyone listed here – and many more unlisted – helped to make this project the best it could be. I know this work is far from perfect. But because of you, I know that my best is good enough.

Anger in Black and White

I Never Thought I'd See the Day: Black Joy in the Good Times

The sun barely peered through a sea of clouds on this frigid morning in January 2009, overlooking the expanse of people in front of the Capitol steps in Washington, DC. To this day I remember the sensations I felt as I stood in that crowd, frantically shifting my weight from one leg to the other in the vain hope of warming my feet on the cold brown dirt surface along the National Mall. The bitter wintry cold of that day was overwhelmed by the enveloping warmth I felt from the throngs of black folks that had been gathering since before dawn. They proudly displayed their elation at the historical moment that was about to unfold. Older people exclaimed to anyone within earshot that they had thought they would never see this moment in their lifetimes. Younger folks swayed in exuberance, alternating shouts of *yes we can!* and *yes we did!*

The emotions expressed by the gatherings of jubilant black people on the Mall were palpable. The pride in the sense of collective accomplishment. *We really did it. We elected a black president.* The surreal sense of joyous disbelief at a long-delayed dream finally realized. *Is this really happening? I almost can't believe it.* These feelings would undergird black people's longstanding support of Obama long after the honeymoon period would end for white members of Obama's support coalition.¹ These feelings would elevate black participation to new heights. In 2010, the first midterm election of the Obama era, African Americans were the

¹ Newport (2014).

only group whose turnout *increased* from the previous midterm in 2006.² When seizing the chance to reelect Obama in 2012, black people made history, marking the first occasion in which a minority group exceeded the turnout of whites in a presidential election.³

Indeed, while the Barack Obama era was a political touchstone celebrated by many people around the globe, it is clear black people possess a special claim to ownership over it. Obama's transcendent 2008 victory represented the apex of a decades-long black strategy to move "from protest to politics" in order to achieve political equity via the election of African Americans to office.⁴ And this moment ushered in an era of sustained and energized black participation. Would these higher levels of participation become the new norm, giving black people greater say in political decisions made by power holders? Or would the surge be only a short-lived artifact of the unique times?

The chaotic 2016 election may have provided some insight. During this time, black people assessed a political landscape that was unsettling on numerous fronts. Although Obama prepared to leave office with the smallest black-white unemployment gap since the Clinton era,⁵ other substantial markers of racial progress were few and far between.

Further, many African Americans may well have remembered the Obama era as much for the triumphant symbolism of a black family in the White House as for the seemingly endless stream of sobering images of black women and men slain in high-profile confrontations with civilians and police officers – often with the people by whose hands they died facing few or no legal repercussions. Not far from the minds of many black Americans throughout this time were the names and faces of Aiyana Stanley-Jones, Oscar Grant, Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, Rekia Boyd, Michael Brown, Sandra Bland, Philando Castile, Alton Sterling and countless others – unarmed black citizens felled by individuals and then failed by a phalanx of legal, sociopolitical and cultural systems that give the distinct impression that black lives do not matter.

As African Americans watched such instances of racialized violence unfold on repeat, they simultaneously witnessed the rise of an arch-conservative partisan movement fueled largely by white people's sense

² Lopez (2011).

³ File (2017).

⁴ See Browning, Marshall and Tabb (1984) and Tate (1994) for discussions on the causes and consequences of the shift in black political strategizing from counter-institutional to electoral activities in response to the post-1960s Civil Rights gains.

⁵ Luhby (2016).

of grievance over the perceived erosion of their sociopolitical dominance. The Tea Party quickly morphed from a grassroots movement to a force to be reckoned with, gaining access to national halls of power and effectively halting or disrupting much of the President's policy agenda.⁶

On another front, black people in many pivotal states were subject to new challenges on their ability to cast the ballot. After the surge in black turnout in 2008, states across the nation responded almost immediately with a barrage of voting restrictions and requirements. These new laws, from identification requirements to limitations on early voting, heightened the barriers to voting for disproportionately large numbers of black (and brown) voters.⁷

If the political climate for African Americans in 2008 was defined by historic opportunity (however symbolic), then the climate in 2016 was one marked by a seemingly unending series of threats to black economic, social and legal well-being. Enthusiastic feelings had appeared to boost black participation in previous years. Would black participation similarly be boosted in the present era by feelings of indignation over the prospect of a Trump presidency hostile to racial interests?

All indications suggest a resounding no. As displayed in Figure 1.1, black turnout – which had been on a steady upward swing since 1996 – tumbled precipitously from 2012 to 2016.

Now, it should surprise no one that the surge in black turnout would not be sustained once Obama no longer headed the Democratic ticket. But with so much at stake in an election surfacing racial fault lines, why did black voting plummet to its lowest levels in 16 years? Could this depressed turnout in the face of a barrage of political threats reflect something fundamentally distinct about how African Americans respond to times of political triumph and turmoil?

We Told You So: Black Resilience in the Down Times

On a cloud-darkened and damp January morning in 2017, millions of people gathered in the nation's capital to mark an inauguration few would have thought possible as recently as the day of the election. Adorned with bright pink pussy ribbon hats that injected a pop of color against the drab sky, this crowd was energetic and effusive. Yet, it carried none of

⁶ See Parker and Barreto (2014) for an analysis of the rise of the Tea Party movement as a politically viable conservative reactionary force in the US.

⁷ Sobel and Smith (2009).




FIGURE 1.1 Rates of black and white turnout in presidential elections, 1976–2016.
Data from US Census Current Population Study.

the joy or exuberance of the crowd gathered around me on the National Mall eight years ago. This group of participants in the Women’s March on Washington, just one of many groups protesting Donald Trump’s inauguration across the globe, maintained an air of indignation and (in what would be a buzz word of the ensuing year) resistance.

As I took in the sights, sounds and senses of this march, I was struck by the efforts of participants to reorient one another’s dismay to defiance. To transform their sadness into solidarity. To turn their anguish over the shocking election outcome to an anger that could mobilize them for the challenging work ahead. As I saw this unfold, my mind couldn’t help but wander to, of all things, a *Saturday Night Live* sketch that had aired the weekend immediately after the election. A far cry from the black jubilation of 2009, this sketch portrayed the black emotion state in 2017 as one of stoic acceptance.

In the sketch, Dave Chappelle and Chris Rock play black friends attending an election-night watching party. As the night unfolds, the white party guests – youngish, wide-eyed progressives – become increasingly more disillusioned and disgusted. The demeanor of the black guests throughout the night provides a sharp contrast; they are decidedly

unfazed as Trump continues to collect Electoral College votes. They show more bemusement at their white colleagues' displays of disbelief than over the election outcome. When one of the white guests despairingly pronounces what now seems inevitable, "Trump might *actually* win," Chris Rock replies matter-of-factly, "Of course! I mean, what are you talking about?" Here Chappelle chimes in – "I tried to tell 'em."

The subtext in this exchange is abundantly clear. The sense of idealism – and perhaps entitlement – leading the white viewers to expect positive outcomes from the political system is shattered. Their dashed hopes are juxtaposed with the sense of wary fatalism of the black guests. This subtext reaches its crescendo in the final joke of the sketch. After the last state is called for Trump, a white guest expresses an epiphany: "Oh my God. I think America is racist." Chappelle supplies the punchline, in the form of an exclamation exaggerated for sarcastic effect, followed by a casually rendered retort to the guest's naiveté about the state of race in the country: "Oh... my... God! You know, I remember my great-grandfather told me something like that. But, he was, like, a slave or somethin'. I dunno."

The main premise of this comedy sketch – that white and black Americans can view their political environment so differently – was not particularly novel. Yet I found it to be an effective illustration of an idea at the heart of this book. Yes, black and white Americans do view the political environment differently, as each group is informed by distinct sets of expectations, ideologies and narratives about their respective positioning within the political sphere. These viewpoints in turn shape how members of each group *feel* about the developments that occur within their environment. And those feelings do not just reflect where group members stand on these developments; they influence individuals' behavior.

The main endeavor of this book is to identify how those feelings shape the turnout trends seen in Figure 1.1, to offer a framework for assessing how racial differences in emotion translate to racial disparities in political participation.

Emotions and Political Behavior

What precisely is an emotion? Is it an impression formed internally? Something expressed outwardly? Social psychologists view emotions as a combination of these forces, defining them as bundles of feelings, physiological changes and psychological responses that are activated in

response to something specific.⁸ Emotions do not simply characterize one's feelings in response to an object, individual or event; they generate a motivation to respond with a particular action. In his seminal study *The Emotions*, Nico H. Frijda identified a total of 17 distinct emotions, each with their own corresponding action type.⁹ Indeed, understanding the role of emotions in shaping human behavior can illuminate why and how people choose to participate in politics.

In recent years the role of emotions in politics has received considerable attention from researchers. Scholars such as Leonie Huddy, George E. Marcus, Ted Brader and Nicholas Valentino have illuminated the diverse effects that emotion states such as anger, fear and enthusiasm have on individuals' policy preferences, as well as their decisions on whether and how to participate in politics.¹⁰ The emotion state of anger has emerged as a particularly strong mobilizer of political action. Defined as a feeling of belligerence over a perceived slight or injustice, anger has been demonstrated to make individuals more likely to take up costly political actions such as voting, donating to campaigns and canvassing.¹¹ Studies shifting the point of emphasis from individuals to groups demonstrate that members of social groups who feel angered over their perceived marginalized status are more likely to engage in collective action to advance the group's standing.¹²

On the other end of the spectrum, the positive emotions of pride and hope are typically linked under the umbrella term of enthusiasm. This emotion state typically stimulates creativity and problem solving.¹³ And in contexts of intergroup conflict, feelings of hope animating enthusiasm can facilitate group members' envisioning of a future free from strife.¹⁴ Whereas enthusiasm undoubtedly animates a change in behavior, the conventional wisdom stresses that anger translates more effectively to increased political action. The thinking largely follows that enthusiasm may inspire rigorous new ideas and innovative thinking, but anger

⁸ Halperin and Gross (2011).

⁹ Frijda (1986).

¹⁰ I will be referring more specifically to the work of these individuals throughout the book, especially in Chapter 2. Exemplary work by these scholars examining the effect of emotions on political decision making includes Brader (2006), Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007), Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000), Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk (2009) and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings (2011).

¹¹ Valentino et al. (2009); (2011).

¹² Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach (2004).

¹³ Isen, Daubman and Nowicki (1987).

¹⁴ Bar-Tal (2011).

inspires people to actually roll up their sleeves and engage in the work of advancing political change.

This logic is plainly apparent in the appeals to action regularly made to individuals and groups by various sets of political actors. While there are certainly appeals to enthusiasm, appeals to anger are predominant. Political anger has been particularly palpable in the post-Obama political landscape. It reverberated resoundingly throughout campaign rallies for Donald J. Trump during the 2016 election, as throngs of supporters repeated chants of “lock her up!” Since the 2016 election, multiple instances arose of people unleashing their ire directly at Trump administration officials, such as protesters interrupting the dinner of Department of Homeland Security Secretary Kristjen Nielsen by shouting “if kids don’t eat in peace, you don’t eat in peace.”¹⁵ This political climate appears to be summed up nicely in the iconic line from the 1976 classic satire film *Network*, in which disgruntled news anchor Howard Beale starts a social revolution with his unhinged declaration, *I’m mad as hell and I’m not going to take this anymore!*

But it is worth questioning whether this anger has been felt and expressed equally across social dividing lines – specifically the racial divide. Was the general collective emotional response of African Americans to the specter of Trump in the post-Obama era more aligned with the defiant and angry posture on display at the Women’s March and subsequent sites of the Resistance movement, or with the resigned shrug of Dave Chappelle in the *SNL* sketch? Thinking through the manner in which race shapes the general emotional dispositions of both black and white Americans provides insight to answer this question.

White Anger, Black Resignation: Racial Differences in Expectation, Entitlement and Emotional Sentiments

The emotions we feel at any point in time may appear to be born of the immediate moment. But, in fact, these emotions are anchored in our longstanding expectations, goals and beliefs. For instance, many African Americans’ jubilant expressions of hope and pride at Barack Obama’s election in 2008 were propelled in no small part by the puncturing of their long-held belief that a black individual would never ascend to the presidency. The immediate response of enthusiasm over this milestone cannot be untethered from the nagging belief often gnawing away at

¹⁵ Mervosh (2018).

many black Americans – that electoral politics simply will not produce the outcome most favored by the group. Indeed, that persistent sense of collective skepticism informed and shaped the excitement felt in the election’s aftermath, by making Obama’s accomplishment that much sweeter to a group often forced to soldier through rather than celebrate political developments.

That same sense of skepticism can also be expected to inform African Americans’ immediate emotional responses to negative or threatening political developments. In addition to making the good times sweeter, this disposition can make the tough times easier to swallow. Consider, for instance, the apparent divergence in the responses of black and white Americans to the severe economic downturn of the early twenty-first century. In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2009, if anyone had the most credible reason to take to the streets in protest of economic injustice, it was African Americans. During this time the black unemployment rate was double that of whites, while one-fourth of black people were under the poverty line.¹⁶ Median wealth in black households was cut by more than half in just a four-year period after the recession.¹⁷ Yet nationwide, black people made up less than 2 percent of the Occupy movement at its height.

So, why were African Americans by and large sitting out on Occupy? Black people are certainly no strangers to insurgent protest strategies.¹⁸ And the idea that the Occupy movement was “too white” ignores the widespread and diligent efforts by black community elites and popular figures to mobilize black people to take part.¹⁹ In her opinion column for the *Washington Post*, journalism professor Stacy Patton offered an illuminating take on what black people’s lack of participation signified:

Blacks have historically suffered the income inequality and job scarcity that the Wall Street protesters are now railing against. Perhaps Black America’s absence is

¹⁶ Taylor et al. (2011).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ See McAdam (1982) and Taeku Lee (2002) for examinations of African American insurgent movements.

¹⁹ Civil Rights trailblazer Rep. John Lewis hailed the movement as “grassroots democracy at its best” (Walsh 2011). Additionally, both rank-and-file black citizens and black indigenous institutions attempted to cultivate black-specific strands of the Occupy movement, from “Occupy the Hood,” spearheaded by two black activists from New York and Detroit (Ross and Lee 2011), to “Occupy the Dream,” a partnership between Occupy national leaders and black churches and civic organizations spearheaded by Benjamin Chavez, former Executive Director of both the NAACP and the Million Man March (Carmichael 2011).

sending a message to the Occupiers: “We told you so! Nothing will change. We’ve been here already. It’s hopeless.”

This argument sheds light on how the long-running expectations of African Americans inform their immediate responses to negative developments such as the great recession. A reaction of *I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore* simply cannot arise if one’s modal disposition is one of *nothing will change. It’s hopeless*. A useful distinction can be between the emotions felt and expressed by individuals in the moment and the broader emotional sentiments they hold. Social psychologists define sentiments as a stable set of emotional impressions directed toward specific objects, actors and symbols.²⁰ Whereas we tend to think of specific emotions as an individual-level construct, sentiments can be viewed as a collective phenomenon, one shaped by the major developments of a given sociopolitical climate. Accordingly, for any era in American history one can surmise the prevailing collective sentiment of the body politic.

For example, how would one characterize the collective American sentiment toward political institutions and leaders throughout the tumultuous period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, a time period marked by assassinations, unrest over an increasingly unpopular war, the exposure of massive government corruption and the boiling over of social tensions? I define it as a heightened and pervasive sense of cynicism and mistrust toward those wielding power, open hostility toward gatekeepers of social norms and political values and an eager embrace of alternative ideas and modes of organizing. These sentiments manifested in the intensive conflicts and outbreaks that define the era, from the violent clashes at the 1968 Democratic National Convention to urban rebellions across cities throughout the nation, to the anti-war movement.

Just as one can think of different American sentiments across varying political eras, we can think of the respective sentiments held by different social groupings within the body politic, such as those of white and African Americans. The perspective offered by Stacey Patton on the relative absence of black people from the Occupy Movement. The non-plussed reactions of Dave Chappelle and Chris Rock to the election-night results in the *SNL* sketch. These are reflections of and commentaries on the unique emotional sentiment generally held by black Americans toward the institutions and actors of US politics.

²⁰ Halperin and Gross (2011).

This sentiment, characterized by a racially distinct sense of resignation, has long reverberated in black discourses throughout history. In an address in Berkeley in 1966, activist, author and early proponent of Black Power Stokely Carmichael articulated this sense of resignation as a feeling of collective fatigue that sets in from black people's exhausting efforts to extract responsiveness from a recalcitrant system:

We have been tired of trying to prove things to white people. We are tired of trying to explain to white people that we're not going to hurt them. We are concerned with getting the things we want, the things that we have to have to be able to function. The question is, can white people allow for that in this country?

Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. also expounded on the distinct sense of resignation that cannot help but creep into the minds of African Americans with even the most ardent faith in the American promise, as they encounter time and again the resistance of American institutions to their demands for justice:

I must confess that that dream that I had that day has in many points turned into a nightmare. Now I'm not one to lose hope. I keep on hoping. I still have faith in the future. But I've had to analyze many things over the last few years and I would say over the last few months. I've gone through a lot of soul-searching and agonizing moments. And I've come to see that we have many more difficulties ahead and some of the old optimism was a little superficial and now it must be tempered with a solid realism. And I think the realistic fact is that we still have a long, long way to go...

Finally, Kweisi Mfume identified the longstanding perception that many African Americans have of the US sociopolitical system. This perception of the system as racially unjust fuels the sentiment of racial resignation, which in turn shapes black people's immediate emotional responses to politics. In his first address to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) since leaving his position as a Congressional Representative to become the NAACP president, Mfume remarked in 1997:

[This nation] was conceived in hypocrisy. Even before the republic was founded, it compromised the moral claim and the moral principles articulated in the Declaration of Independence and in the Preamble to the Constitution, and in all other documents that they issue to justify their revolution against tyranny, having subjected human beings, our ancestors, to a bondage of the flesh as well as a bondage of the spirit.²¹

²¹ Mfume (1997).

If this is the image of America that is conjured in the minds of many African Americans, then it should come as no surprise when emergent threats are met with more of a resigned shrug than clenched fists and flared nostrils.

A contrast can be drawn between the sentiment conveyed in the black political discourses highlighted above and the one emergent in the discourses of white mainstream political actors. As an example, just a few years before Mfume diagnosed the ills plaguing the country as inextricably tethered to the racist legacies of its founding, Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton offered a contrasting assessment of those ills, as well as the capacity of the American system of governance to solve them. During his speech accepting the Democratic Party's nomination for president in 1992, Clinton invoked black activist icon Fannie Lou Hamer when making the declaration:

If you are sick and tired of a government that doesn't work to create jobs, if you're sick and tired of a tax system that's stacked against you, if you're sick and tired of exploding debt and reduced investments in our future or if, like the great civil rights pioneer Fannie Lou Hamer, you're just plain old sick and tired of being sick and tired, then join us, work with us, win with us, and we can make our country the country it was meant to be.²²

What is the difference here? Clinton speaks of "our country" as fundamentally just and serviceable in its normal functioning. This is why the audience can be expected to be "sick and tired" over the litany of issues Clinton raises. Because they demand more from their government. They expect more. Clinton's call for Democrats to get mad as hell implicitly trades on the premise that the general sentiment of this audience toward the political system is characterized by a strong sense of entitlement to responsiveness and fair treatment.

Indeed, this sentiment has undergirded many an instance of Americans, albeit predominantly or exclusively white Americans, taking up political action as a result of their indignation over a system not operating as expected. The annals of American history contain an extensively chronicled – and often romanticized – tradition of Americans rising up in anger to challenge an unjust status quo. One need look no further than the mythologized image of the scrappy American colonialists, taking on their oppressive British overseers and fueling the revolutionary flame that would birth the United States. The story of America cannot be told without talking about anger.

²² Clinton (1992).

And contemporary politics cannot be fully understood without reckoning with the role of anger. There is a clear through line from the colonists to the Occupy Wall Street protesters, from the Tea Party movement activists to the so-called Bernie Bros to the throngs of people gathered at Trump rallies, shouting “make America great again.”²³ Anger is as American as apple pie.

As a large body of work in social and political psychology makes clear, this anger has long been a form of capital in politics, leveraged to energize political activity and propel major sea changes in the political environment. What are the consequences, then, if an emotional response of anger is muted among African Americans by a general sentiment of racial resignation? I answer that question by demonstrating that black Americans exhibit an *anger gap* in politics relative to their white counterparts, and I highlight the politically consequential effects of that racial anger gap.

Drawing upon data from the cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), a nationally representative survey of the political views and actions of Americans conducted every presidential election year, I present an initial glimpse of the raw anger gap exhibited by African Americans. Since the year 1980, the ANES has asked participants whether the presidential incumbent and the major party presidential candidates have made them feel each of the following emotions: angry, afraid, proud and hopeful. Figure 1.2 displays black and white Democrats’ mean reports of anger toward the incumbents and major party candidates in the respective presidential races, while Figure 1.3 displays the mean anger reports from black and white Republicans.

As ensuing chapters will reveal, partisanship exhibits a major influence on individuals’ emotional responses to politics. And as the trend lines indicate, people generally express more anger when the White House is occupied by the party they oppose. But across people sharing partisan affiliation, a clear racial difference is apparent. Among Democrats, the mean anger reported by white respondents is higher than that of black respondents in all but two election years, 1988 and 2016. Further, black anger just barely eclipses white anger in those years. Across the entire time period, the mean anger reported toward presidential figures by white Democrats is 53.25 on a scale of 100, compared to 46.53 for black

²³ If there was any doubt that Trump effectively tapped into the anger his supporters felt over a variety of issues, an NBC News poll revealed that whites and Republicans ranked as the angriest sets of individuals during the 2016 election (Rafferty 2016).




FIGURE 1.2 Mean reports of anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Democrats. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. No controls.

Democrats. Of note are both the difference in means and the fact that black anger is below the midpoint, distinguishing this group as more likely to *refrain from* expressing anger than to exhibit it.

Republicans follow a generally similar pattern. Although the mean anger reports of black Republicans exceed those of white Republicans in five of the ten election years, across the entire time period whites express more anger, by a count of 47.18 to 42.98. Unsurprisingly, the number of African Americans in the American National Election Study (ANES) identifying as Republican is greatly outweighed by the number of self-identified Democrats. The larger racial anger gap apparent among Democrats, then, is a more telling indication of the racial disparity in the leveraging of anger in politics.

Ensuing chapters will paint a refined picture of this racial anger gap, and demonstrate the implications of this gap for both electoral and unconventional modes of political activity. But I also aim to make clear that the anger gap has farther-reaching consequences than widening the racial participation disparity. This gap has consequences for African




FIGURE 1.3 Mean reports of anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Republicans. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. No controls.

Americans' capacity to form political coalitions with other groups. And this gap further reinforces the invisibilization and ostracism of African Americans from the American polity. From its founding, America's story is one of people seeing red over politics and rising up in anger to alter their fortunes. By not seeing red to nearly the same extent as their white counterparts, black people have too often been confined to the margins within this story.

Angry While Black: The Legal, Social and Political Costs of Expressing Black Grievance

The black anger gap looms large for party politics. Recent election cycles have made clear how critically dependent the Democratic Party is on black votes. The Democrats' inability in 2016 to maintain black turnout levels in key swing states like Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania resulted in razor-thin losses to Trump. In contrast, the surge in turnout among black voters – specifically black women – in a special Senate election in 2017 gave Democrats the unthinkable: a statewide victory in the state of

Alabama.²⁴ As the battle rages for the direction of the Democratic Party in the post-Obama era – will it become more progressive or reclaim the moderate ground? – its survival is dependent on its ability to mobilize black voters. The presence of a black anger gap is something the party needs to fully reckon with in order to ensure its message does not fall on deaf ears.

At the same time, the Democratic Party bears some responsibility for that anger gap in the first place. As I will lay out in greater detail in Chapter 2, messaging from Democrats (and, indeed, all major party candidates and officials) to black audiences has been restrained, to the detriment of Democrats' attempts to rally the group to action. While partisan elites express no hesitation to channel the grievances of white audiences over politics, sparking the anger that mobilizes individuals to take up action, these political elites water down their messaging to black people.

Ever fearful of channeling a black anger that has long been stereotyped as dangerous and uncontrollable, elites offer black audiences messages intended to placate rather than animate. Rather than have their grievances with the political status quo affirmed, legitimized and activated toward action, black people are constantly reassured that despite the injustices of the past, the political system is making steady upward progress toward racial equity.

Whereas the predominant black worldview identifies racial inequity as woven into the fabric of American politics, dominant messaging from political elites to black people imposes its own worldview – one in which African Americans need not feel angry, because the political system is naturally self-corrective. When you are dissatisfied with your situation, why be mad as hell (and accordingly, politically *active* as hell) when you can just be patient and prudent?

It is critical to take time to consider how this rhetorical reality is reinforced by a set of state and legal actors that work exhaustively to provide strong shows of force in response to expressions of black anger deemed to stray too far beyond the bounds of “acceptable” black behavior. History provides a litany of instances of black individuals feeling the full weight of the state apparatus after they dare to mobilize explicitly on the basis of expressed grievance with the sociopolitical status quo. Examples from two different eras illustrate this point.

²⁴ Brown (2017).

The Black Panther Party for Self Defense, a Black Nationalist organization originating in late-1960s Oakland, California, was exhaustively targeted by the FBI for surveillance and clandestine infiltration, with moles planted by the FBI gaining access to the organization. One of these moles was the right-hand man of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton. Hampton had begun to successfully build broad multi-racial coalitions between the Panthers and advocacy groups such as the Puerto Rican Young Lords and the Young Patriots – a group of poor whites based in the Appalachians. Though they appeared to make for strange bedfellows, these groups united on the basis of an intersectional race- and class-based critique of American economic and sociopolitical systems.

Looking at the Black Panther Party's coalition building through one lens, it could be hailed as affirming a distinctly American tradition. This group, radically opposed to the existing order, sought to ally with other groups that were “mad as hell” to challenge an entrenched system and forge a new, more equitable political order.

But viewing the Panthers through the archetypal lens of *perpetual black danger*, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies labeled the Panthers not as patriots, but as unassailable threats to the peace. Thus, with the aid of the embedded mole, the FBI operated alongside the Chicago Police Department to conduct a raid on Hampton's apartment, resulting in his death. In the raid's aftermath, there emerged conflicting accounts over exactly what happened. In response to a reporter's question inquiring whether the FBI may have intentionally targeted Hampton in the confrontation, a Chicago PD officer replied, “all indications to me, personally, was that this was, uh, obviously a political assassination.”²⁵

The second example is much more recent. During the summer of 2017, less than two weeks before a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville resulted in the death by vehicular homicide of a woman protesting the supremacists, the FBI issued a report highlighting the threat of a newly classified domestic terror group – “Black Identity Extremists” (BIE). This label is not the name of any particular organization or movement. Rather, it is largely an umbrella term that could be applied to any black individual or group that expresses anger over instances of police brutality. From the report:

The FBI assesses it is very likely that BIEs' perceptions of unjust treatment of African Americans and the perceived unchallenged illegitimate actions of law

²⁵ Quote taken from archival footage in the PBS documentary *Vanguard of the Revolution: The Black Panther Party*, directed by Stanley Nelson.

enforcement will inspire premeditated attacks against law enforcement over the next year. This may also lead to an increase in BIE group memberships, collaboration among BIE groups, or the appearance of additional violent lone offenders motivated by BIE rhetoric. The FBI further assesses it is very likely additional controversial police shootings of African Americans and the associated legal proceedings will continue to serve as drivers for violence against law enforcement.²⁶

Note the attempt here by the FBI to reframe black expressions of critique (to say nothing of anger) over controversial police shootings. Such expressions are not deemed to be reasonable, legitimate, or even acceptable. On the contrary, these expressions are viewed as indicative of the potential of African Americans to commit violence against law enforcement agents. This FBI report illuminates the degree to which the specter of black anger is feared within the sociopolitical system. Rather than devoting resources to problematizing the rash of incidents of police killings of black civilians, the highest law enforcement agency in the land emphasizes the systematic threat posed by black people who are justifiably disturbed by such incidents.

In December 2017, Christopher Daniels became the first individual believed to be arrested as a result of FBI monitoring under the BIE classification. Daniels' apartment was raided, and he was arrested for possessing firearms he was prohibited from owning as a result of a 2007 conviction. Legal advocates assert that Daniels was only on the FBI's radar due to his political activism and public expressions of contempt for law enforcement. Attorney Kamau Franklin warned, “[t]his is obviously the first of what will be several attempts to begin to criminalize black organizing, militant black organizing in particular, and work their way down to other types of organizing.”²⁷

Instances such as this send a clear message to black individuals across the nation who are considering joining efforts to advocate for black lives – even if simply in the form of a social media post. *You risk being labeled a threat, targeted, monitored, and brought down by agents of the system you challenge.* While the majority of black people will never personally lumber under the weight of such state-enforced pressure, the threat nonetheless looms large in the collective black psyche.

Beyond examples of intensive state-sanctioned pushback against expressions of black grievance, many prevailing images and narratives

²⁶ Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017).

²⁷ De Bourmont (2018).

throughout history illustrate the distinct space that black anger occupies in the public imagination. The specter of the archetypal *angry black man* and *woman* haunted Barack and Michelle Obama throughout their tenure in the national spotlight.²⁸ In a 2016 interview with Oprah Winfrey for CBS News, Michelle Obama expounded on how being labeled an “angry black woman” made her feel:

That was one of those things where you just sort of think, “Dang, you don’t even know me” [...] You just sort of feel like, “Wow, where’d that come from?” [...] You start thinking, “Oh wow, we’re so afraid of each other.”²⁹

A long-running satire of the collective scrutinizing of the Obamas through the lens of *perpetual black danger* arrived in the form of the popular “Obama translator” sketch on the show *Key and Peele*. Jordan Peele portrayed the president as unfailingly erudite, composed and stately. Meanwhile, Keagan Michael Key portrayed Obama’s “anger translator” Luther, who would rephrase Obama’s remarks with the unrestrained, palpable rage of which the POTUS would never deign to provide glimpses. For years this sketch mined comedy from the pointed observation that the most high-profile black man in the world had severe socially imposed limits on the emotions he could publicly convey.

The societal limits on black expression of grievance are further illuminated when we consider the lack of such limits on similarly positioned white Americans. Barack and Michelle Obama were continuously reminded of their need to remain poised and calm whenever in the public view. In contrast, South Carolina Congressional Representative Joe Wilson had no compunction when breaking with decorum to shout “you lie!” during Obama’s inaugural speech to a joint session of Congress in 2009. While Wilson issued an apology for this “lack of civility,” stating “I let my emotions get the best of me,” he never once had to worry about his outburst casting a pall over his entire racial group.³⁰

As illuminated by these contrasting examples, the societal fear of black anger creates an interesting – and politically impactful – irony. Being saddled with the prospects of legal retribution or social stigmatization from seeing red while black actually contributes to a depressing of the anger African Americans express over politics. White Americans, on the

²⁸ Cassidy (2016).

²⁹ Hensch (2016).

³⁰ Bailey (2009).

other hand, facing no such adverse effects of seeing red, express and act upon their anger in politics with greater frequency and intensity.

One can rightfully point to black political movements and actions that appear motivated by political anger, from the Black Power movement of the late 1960s to the contemporary movement for black lives. While such movements may loom large in the collective memory, one could easily question why we have not witnessed *more* of such movements. After all, there has never been a shortage of conditions or inciting factors to activate black political grievance. From the aforementioned lack of a major black presence in the Occupy movement, to a lack of broad-based black activism in the face of the Flint water crisis, to the absence of a coordinated counter-mobilization to the proposed welfare reform legislation in the mid-1990s, we can observe clear bounds on black activism. To what extent do these bounds reflect the fact that, contrary to popular belief, African Americans do not perceive the same incentives or utility to register anger over politics as whites?

In contrast, while there is no such narrative of *angry white men/women*, there is no shortage of political movements that appear to be animated by white political anger. From the Reagan revolution to the rise of Trumpism, from the Tea Party to the anti-Trump resistance movement, we witness numerous instances of white Americans mobilizing based on a collective sense of grievance, on both sides of the aisle and across the spectrum of electoral and insurgent actions. There may be no socially constructed racial narrative that ties together these actions. But, as I demonstrate in this book, these myriad instances point to an important truth about anger in American politics. Seeing red carries greater political capital for white Americans.

Because white anger is often legitimized and championed by the same discourses, practices and actors that demonize and stigmatize black anger, white people are uniquely able to engender anger over politics and translate it to effective political action. By providing an in-depth account of the divergent stakes and consequences of expressing anger among black and white Americans, I cast the racial participation gap in a brand-new light, while also dispelling a long-standing myth about black people being prone to anger.

The Distinct Political Force of Black Anger

A fuller picture of the anger gap emerges when accounting for its psychological and sociopolitical origins, both the sentiment of resignation

that stifles the emergence of anger in response to negative political developments, and the concern over stigmatization and pushback from being “angry while black.” To further flesh out understanding of the anger gap, I pinpoint the divergence in how the anger actually expressed by white and black Americans translates to political action. Not all anger is created equal. Thus, in addition to tracing the causes and consequences of the anger gap, this book will demonstrate that black anger generally mobilizes a different and more limited set of actions compared to the anger mobilizing white Americans.

Black political figures often bemoan the mischaracterizations of their expressions of grievance with the political system. In his earlier-cited 1997 address, NAACP President Mfume expressed exasperation with the labeling applied to black people who give pointed critiques of the racial status quo:

I get tired of having to stand up like you have to stand up in your communities around the country and defend your patriotism, defend your love of America simply because you question that which is wrong. I get tired of those who suggest how somehow that because our branches want to speak out and demonstrate and petition for the redress of their grievances that they are somehow less than full-fledged Americans.³¹

Mfume captures here the distinct and despairing societal response to black anger. Whereas expressions of grievance from white Americans are typically viewed as legitimate, if not patriotic, such expressions from black people are often viewed through lenses of suspicion and derision. Politicians ignore black anger, government actors aggressively suppress its expression, and widely disseminated sociocultural narratives demonize or ridicule black anger. Given these potential costs of being angry while black, it bears asking what distinguishes the black individuals who are willing to be angry while black in light of the consequences.

Because of the risks associated with being *angry while black*, the act of expressing black anger is best conceived as a politically defiant act in its own right. By letting their anger be known, black people flout the long-established conventions dictating that African Americans be pliant and patient. Two questions arise when considering the unique fore of political anger as expressed by African Americans. First, what factors should be expected to facilitate this willingness to defy racial convention? A strong sense of racial identity? A politicized racial consciousness? Being of a

³¹ Mfume (1997).

younger age, or identifying as a certain gender? Exploring the roles of these intersecting social identities and racial attitudes in shaping black individuals' orientations toward political anger, I identify which groups within the black body politic may carry more or less license to express anger. Are black women doubly precluded from exhibiting anger by the racial and gendered bounds placed upon them? Are younger African Americans more likely to take action in anger than older cohorts? Are racially conscious black people more or less likely to get mad as hell over politics?

Second, does black anger translate to the same set of political actions as white anger? Answering this question uncovers the extent of the racial anger gap in multiple domains of politics. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, while anger effectively moves white Americans to conventional playing fields of action, from the voting booth to the town halls, anger expressed by African Americans translates more strongly to confrontational and system-challenging domains of action, from the front lines of protest to the sites of marches and demonstrations. Thus, while the anger gap carries consequences for turnout, its effect is most keenly felt in the domain of black activism, which has long played an instrumental role in black politics.

The Anger Gap in Focus: Leveraging Emotion to Better Understand Black Politics

Better understanding the anger gap can provide insights that help us answer many of the pressing political questions of our time. The viability of the Democratic Party, the strength and capacity of interracial insurgent coalitions, and the present and future of black politics all hinge in part on the degree to which substantial numbers of black people feel sufficiently motivated to take up political action in a political climate increasingly polarized both racially and ideologically. What are the lessons that should be taken away from instances in which black participation surges, and instances in which it wanes? What are the cues and messages that animate black participation, despite what conventional wisdom says? What would black participation look like if African Americans were given full license to get angry over politics? Would anger then translate more effectively to electoral actions such as voting for black people? Or would we see even greater numbers of black people continuing the rich tradition of black insurgent activism in the US?

As I set about to answer these questions, I will tie together insights from psychology, black political identity, and political communication and behavior. From psychology I grapple with major issues in the field of emotions, such as the behavioral cues associated with varying emotions states, and how the emotions engendered within individuals vary based on whether they are members of advantaged or disadvantaged groups in society. From the field of black political identity, I explore how black-specific ideological narratives disseminated among African Americans, through messages from community elites, black media and everyday talk, shape dominant black worldviews. And in turn, I assess how these worldviews offer black individuals a framework for interpreting the world around them, thus influencing their broader collective emotional sentiments and their immediate emotional responses to the objects and actors therein. Finally, from the lens of political communications and behavior, I examine the emotional cues present and absent from messaging to black audiences from various sets of political elites. Additionally, I detail how the mobilizing effects of various emotions on participation are shaped by one's senses of racial identity and group agency. Bridging this diverse set of theoretical approaches, I explain the racial anger gap in politics as a product of varying emotional sentiments, divergent racialized messages about entitlement, grievance and legitimacy, and differences in the opportunities and limitations distributed to groups within the political sphere.

By uncovering this racial anger gap and highlighting its effect on the racial participation gap, I aim to illuminate how we think about political behavior. We derive a great deal of insight about African American electoral participation from seminal work that sheds light on how black decisions to take actions such as voting, donating and campaigning are distinctly shaped by their perceptions of the responsiveness of the political system to their demands, their sense of racial solidarity and the availability of black political elites behind which to rally.³²

³² Work by Dawson (1994; 2001) examines how distinct racial ideologies and perceptions of racial solidarity shape African Americans' political attitudes and behavior. Gay (2001) explores the effect of being represented in Congress by black elected officials on black individuals' participation. Tate (1994) assesses the relationship between African Americans' partisanship, policy preferences and their political decision making. Walton Jr. (1985) problematizes the behavioralist approach to studying political participation, analyzing black political action as a function of racial socialization and the functions and capacities of black indigenous institutions. Nunnally (2012) demonstrates that perceptions of racial stratification in the US characterize African Americans as generally

Similarly, scholars have assessed the unique opportunities and bounds faced by African Americans seeking to affect political change through insurgent political activity, i.e., protest, demonstrations, marches and uprisings.³³ Their scholarship sheds light on why black people may perceive a distinct utility to these actions that they may not perceive from electoral actions. Further, they reveal how these insurgent actions are framed by media and political actors in ways that can either advance or regress black interests.

This scholarship paints a vivid picture of how the participation of African Americans in various spheres of politics is influenced by the material and immaterial resources they possess (or lack), what they think about politics and their collective place within politics and their perceptions of intragroup racial solidarity. My focus here is to complement this work by considering another dimension – how black people *feel* about race, politics and their collective role within it.

Considering the role of emotions adds a unique element of dynamism to our understanding of black political behavior. Neither the resources at one's disposal nor one's underlying views about race or politics should be expected to vary much from one election cycle or issue campaign to another. But how one *feels* about those resources, race, the political environment, or one's role within it at any given time? Those feelings should be flexible, adaptive and mutable from one instance to another. And within the variance of those emotion states lies great promise in forging understanding of why someone's patterns of participation change from one instance to the next, despite consistency in their political views, resources and racial attitudes.

By accounting for the role of emotions in shaping black people's engagement of politics, I can both add greater nuance to our understanding of the racial participation divides – both in volume and type of action – and also sharpen the ability to predict how black and white participation will vary from one political context to another. For instance, I can reframe the surge in black turnout during the Obama era as a reflection of the uniquely mobilizing effects of positive emotions on black political behavior relative to whites. And I can contextualize the rise of Trumpism within the long history of white Americans leveraging political anger toward electoral behavior more effectively than racial minority groups.

less trusting socially and politically. This absence of trust carries consequences for black Americans' political engagement. Finally, Cohen (2010) examines the extent to which the emergent political generation of black youth in the Obama era view racial discrimination as a key determinant of their life trajectories.

³³ See, for example, work by Davenport (2009), Gillion (2013) and Gause (2016).

Additionally, I can trace the extensive history of black participation in insurgent movements – from the Black Power movement to Black Lives Matter – to the specific manner in which black anger is translated toward counter-systemic behaviors more so than system-oriented actions. Finally, looking ahead, I can assess how the racial anger gap may ultimately inhibit the policy gains of African Americans in a political era that should be marked for the foreseeable future by intensive racial and political polarization.

I am not alone in grappling with the reflexive relationship between race and emotion in shaping people's political decision making. Political psychologist Antoine Banks has established a clear connection between white Americans' anger and their racial attitudes – specifically their resentment toward African Americans for their perceived failure to live up to American ideals of work ethic and personal responsibility. This anger-attitude linkage has wide-reaching effects on white individuals' policy preferences and political decision making, thus creating a meaningful political impact to being angry while white.³⁴ Camille Burge has created a framework for understanding how the narratives and instances shaping the collective black experience produce distinctive group-based emotions of pride, anger and shame. She assesses how these group-based emotions influence black individuals' political opinions and behaviors.

Drawing on black feminist epistemology, Brittney Cooper explores how Black women navigate the confines of the “angry Black woman” stereotype to effectively leverage anger within sociopolitical spaces. Finally, Julia Jordan-Zachery conceives of black women’s anger as an intergenerational force that shapes individual and collective responses to racial and gendered trauma.³⁵ Building on the theoretical foundations laid by these scholars, I aim to integrate ideas from psychology and political behavior with insights from the black politics literature to provide a comprehensive account of how seeing red over politics while black differs consequentially from seeing red while white.

This opening chapter sets the stage for my approach to uncovering the anger gap and its consequences for black politics. I first aim to establish just how prevalent and impactful is the socially constructed narrative around the *angry black man/woman*. The stigma associated with being angry while black carries a host of legal and social consequences. And the fear of bearing the weight of these consequences in turn inhibits many African Americans from exhibiting anger in the political sphere.

³⁴ Banks (2014).

³⁵ Cooper (2018); Jordan-Zachery (2017).

Additionally, I trace the anger gap to the prevalent political narratives within both mainstream and black discursive spaces. These narratives reveal stark divides in the senses of expectation and entitlement that black and white Americans are socialized to draw from the political system, as well as the legitimacy that the polity ascribes to the grievances articulated by these respective groups. In subsequent chapters, I detail how these divides contribute to emotional sentiments that result in a paucity of anger expressed by African Americans over politics.

Plan of the Book

The remainder of this book fleshes out these concepts to paint a comprehensive picture of the factors shaping the racial anger gap and its consequences for race, political participation and politics.

Chapter 2 investigates a range of campaign messages and speeches from political elites over the years to highlight the whys and hows behind elites' attempts to activate various emotions within the intended public – specifically anger. I conduct emotion discourse analyses of these messages in order to identify the emotional sentiments that are cultivated and reinforced within primarily white and black audiences, respectively.

Drawing on different traditions in social psychology, this chapter breaks down the distinct attitudes underlying the emotion of anger, as well as the specific behaviors to which anger is expected to translate. It then demonstrates why and how mainstream political figures' appeals to anger are nearly exclusively reserved for white audiences, while black audiences receive more appeals to positive emotions.

Finally, the chapter showcases the effects of this racial difference by presenting and commenting on the divergent responses of black and white subjects to two different anger primes in an original survey experiment titled the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study. Within this experiment, subjects are invited to reflect on anything that makes them angry about either *politics* or about *race and racial controversies* in the US. Whether the object of anger is politics or race, black subjects show a pronounced hesitation to express anger relative to white subjects. And the open-ended reflections of black and white subjects reflect systematically varying sentiments about the fairness of politics.

Chapter 3 provides robust evidence of the black anger gap and its consequences for participation. With the aid of findings from survey data providing nearly 40 years' worth of information on black and white Americans' political attitudes, emotions and participation, I demonstrate

the effect of the anger gap on black turnout. Insights on how the anger gap shaped black decisions to participate in electoral politics span the Reagan era to the dawn of the Trump era.

The first object of respondents' anger measured in this chapter is the set of presidential incumbents and major party candidates across election years. The second measure employed is an indicator of how often survey respondents felt angry over the course of the 2016 election. Whereas this is a more open-ended measure, analyses demonstrate that individuals' reports of anger were closely tied to their perceptions of the figure who dominated the election season – Donald J. Trump.

Chapter 4 grapples directly with how seeing red over politics differs for the political participation of black and white people. From examinations of black discourses debating the proper role of anger in black political strategizing emerges a picture of black anger that directs individuals toward oppositional actions such as protesting and boycotting rather than electoral actions like campaigning. Data from both a national survey and the 2018 RAP Study show that anger over politics and racial issues more effectively steers African Americans to activist activities than vote-related activities. These data also show how the relationship between black people's anger and their participation in such activities is shaped by their views on race and their collective agency within politics.

Chapter 5 investigates the idea that while African Americans exhibit an anger gap in politics, they also demonstrate an *enthusiasm advantage*. With the aid of survey data, I demonstrate that across different political eras that carry positive prospects for African Americans – from Clinton to Obama – greater proportions of black individuals exhibit positive emotions relative to comparable whites. Further, these emotions exhibit a stronger mobilizing effect on black participation relative to whites. This chapter also highlights the findings from a second original experimental study, in which black subjects exhibit a uniquely motivating effect of hope on their participation in a local issue area. This chapter ultimately illustrates that the boost to black participation accrued from the enthusiasm advantage is generally not sufficient to balance out the disparity caused by the anger gap.

Similar to the objects of anger measured in the previous chapters, the measures of enthusiasm here include survey respondents' reports of hope and pride felt toward presidential incumbents and candidates across election years, as well as the frequency with which they report feeling hope and pride during the 2016 election season. The experiment offers a new measurement by asking subjects to indicate how hopeful they feel

(if at all) after receiving information about a promising political opportunity in their local community.

Chapter 6 extends the argument beyond the black–white binary by exploring the degree to which the racial anger gap and enthusiasm advantage are exhibited by Asian and Latina/o Americans. This chapter illuminates how features that distinguish these respective racial groups – specifically narratives that paint these groups as politically dormant or ostracized – shape their emotional responses to politics in a manner similar to African Americans. Using reports of the frequency of anger and enthusiasm felt during the 2016 election, I show that the anger gap and enthusiasm advantage are not limited to African Americans. Further, this chapter reveals the unique association between people of color’s expressions of anger and their perceptions of intergroup racial solidarity, uncovering a new potential consequence of the racial anger gap.

Chapter 7 offers concluding thoughts and reflections on the major implications of this work. I highlight the most important lessons to be taken away from the fact that smaller proportions of African Americans (and, indeed, racial minorities more broadly) feel agentic, entitled or secure enough to express and translate anger to political activity. How should this change the way we think about the roles of emotions in politics? Of the costs of the angry black man/woman stereotype? Of the state of black participation in a political era that seems sure to be defined by rife and rancor for a long time to come? This chapter also identifies indicators of a potential changing landscape in the role of black anger in politics. Is an emerging set of black political figures laying the groundwork for black people to leverage anger toward political action to greater effect?

A Final Note on the Operationalization of Emotions

Multiple measures of emotions are utilized throughout this book, from open-ended reflections, to frequency reports, to binary responses of whether or not one feels the specified emotion. This variation reflects the different means through which emotions have been operationalized in social and political psychology. By employing a diverse range of measurement options, I can examine the robustness of the anger gap across various specifications.

Additionally, the objects of people’s reported emotions vary, from specific actors and policy changes, to particular political climates, to ideas broadly defined by the individuals. Critical to my argument, I find that

the racial anger gap is generally robust across these various purported objects. In fact, whereas the anger gap is apparent despite the specific object of emotion, the potential racial enthusiasm advantage appears to be much more dependent on the specific object. That the anger gap emerges as a consistent force across different measurements and objects illustrates the wide-ranging power found in the racially distinct emotional sentiments of black and white Americans.

Anger (Mis)Management?

The thing that makes me angriest about what has gone wrong in the last 12 years is that our government has lost touch with our values, while our politicians continue to shout about them. I'm tired of it!¹

On a summer night in 1992, Madison Square Garden was packed with a rapturous but restless crowd. In front of thousands of Democrats eager to retake the White House after 12 years out of power, Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton accepted his party's nomination for president. During his speech, Clinton displayed his signature mix of charisma, optimism and homespun folksiness. He also let the world know he was angry. The above quote is not the only instance in which Clinton proclaimed his displeasure with the disconnect between the values of everyday Americans and the priorities of the government. He also declared he was "fed up with politicians in Washington lecturing the rest of us about family values." The Democratic nominee even issued a strongly worded warning to the business-as-usual crowd: "I have news for the forces of greed and the defenders of the status quo: Your time has come and gone. It's time for a change in America."

Such vivid displays of anger are not simply par for the course among political elites looking to rally their supporters to action. As this chapter will demonstrate, anger appeals of this type are considered a strategic necessity, due to the positive effect that getting people angry has on their political participation. Political figures on both sides of the aisle and across every era have sought to craft messages that tap into the raw

¹ Clinton (1992).

mobilizing power of their audience' anger. They recognize that doing so could be the decisive factor in whether their electoral pursuits end in victory or defeat.

For example, ten months after her stunning defeat in the 2016 presidential elections, former Senator and secretary of state Hillary Clinton expressed regret over not drawing more deeply on the anger felt by voters:

I understood that there were many Americans who, because of the financial crash, there was anger. And there was resentment. I knew that. But I believed that it was my responsibility to try to offer answers to it, not to fan it. I think that it was a mistake because a lot of people didn't wanna hear my plans. They wanted me to share their anger. And I should've done a better job of demonstrating "I get it."²

In these remarks, Clinton openly acknowledged the currency that many political actors expect to reap from encouraging the electorate to see red over politics.

But *why* does getting angry over politics stimulate greater political participation? Among the spectrum of negative and positive emotions, including fear, sadness, hope and pride, what distinguishes anger as an emotion state that readies one for action? Numerous traditions in social and political psychology provide different ways to understand the anger-action linkage. Surveying these traditions paints an emergent picture of anger being a product of a distinct set of forces related to an individuals' goals, expectations, resources, salient group ties and sense of agency.

Using a few visual models as guideposts, I employ real-world political campaigns and messages to illustrate how anger is distinct from other emotions in its antecedents and its effect on human behavior. Further, I draw distinctions in the messaging to black and white audiences from mainstream political actors and black activist actors, respectively.

I draw on the messages from these varying political elites to accomplish more than providing a real-world context for how race shapes one's emotional response to politics. I also engage in emotion discourse analyses of these messages, to determine how the words used, perceptions activated and values conveyed within them establish meaningful opportunities and bounds on the varying groups competing for resources and influence within politics.³ To what degree do prominent political discourses signal which emotions particular groups are free to leverage in their political engagement – and which emotions are off-limits for groups? And how

² CBS News (2017).

³ Koschut (2018).




FIGURE 2.1 Illustrating the role of threat in decision making.

does the emotional content of these discourses enhance or restrict the horizons of possibility for various groups? How are the respective emotional sentiments of black and white Americans shaped both by long-running expectations and the discourses signaling which emotions are off-limits?

By analyzing the emotional cues present or absent from messages transmitted to white and black audiences, I aim to pinpoint how these discourses reproduce and reinforce the age-old idea that black anger is a destabilizing threat to the polity. In turn, I demonstrate that black anger is constructed to be beyond the pale in mainstream politics, thus stripping many rank-and-file black people of the potential mobilizing power of seeing red.

From Emotion to Action: The Power of Threat

Figure 2.1 lays out the basic manner through which negative emotions shape an individual's decision making. This visual model draws primarily on the theory of affective intelligence originated by Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen, as well as Kahneman and Tversky's prospect theory.⁴⁵

The origin of one's anger (or fear, or sadness) can be broadly viewed as a threat that arises to impede one's progress toward a goal. Stopping you dead in your tracks, the emergence of this threat essentially triggers an alarm in your brain. The accelerating heart rate, the beads of sweat forming over the brow – these are the signals being communicated through the neurological system that something adverse is afoot. The

⁴ Tversky and Kahneman (1992).

⁵ Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000).

subconscious response to this danger is to ready the body for one of two responses – fight or flight.⁶⁷ Whether you engage the threat or flee from it, your underlying motivation is the same – your instinct for self-preservation drives you to use whatever means at your disposal to avert the threat and get back on the path to meeting your goal.⁸

Candidates for political office are constantly attempting to trigger this alert system within prospective voters, by communicating to them a serious threat to their political (or economic, or spiritual, or physical) well-being. Why is activating threat an effective communication strategy? Because, as laid out by affective intelligence theory, when in the state of alert triggered by threat, people become more attentive and receptive to the information they receive. This in large part is why scholars such as Ansolabehere and Iyengar find there is so much reliance on negative campaign advertisements during major electoral races. People have been shown to pay greater attention to negative messaging, and to retain the information from that messaging more effectively than information from positive advertisements.⁹ Politicians seek to do whatever it takes to shake potential voters, donors and volunteers out of their comfort zones and increase their motivation to act. Making them feel threatened is seen as an effective way to do so.

When that alert generates a response of fear, people become less confident in their prior knowledge, and more open to new information.¹⁰ Indeed, studies conducted by political scholar Nicholas Valentino and colleagues reveal that when feeling frightened or anxious over the threat of the candidate they dislike winning an election, people are more likely to seek new information than they are to take on costly political actions such as campaigning for or contributing to their preferred candidate. Further, in their study of how the increasing anxiety over the threat of terrorism has shaped Americans' political decision making, Bethany Albertson and Shana Gadarian find that messaging from political elites holds more sway over people's policy views when they feel afraid.¹¹

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Gray (1990).

⁸ This idea comports with Carver's (2004) behavioral approach and behavioral avoidance systems. Our pursuit of pleasurable feelings is motivated and regulated by our approach system, whereas our efforts to protect ourselves against feeling harmful experiences are motivated by the avoidance system.

⁹ Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1997).

¹⁰ Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007).

¹¹ Albertson and Gadarian (2015).

Making people anxious can work to the benefit of politicians who trail the frontrunners in a race. By getting people fearful about a potential threat, these elites can get people to question their existing loyalties and consider supporting a new platform or individual. When one takes retreat from her existing beliefs and seeks new answers, she is essentially engaging her *flight* mechanism in response to the threat.

When the alert system generates a response of anger, people become more confident in their prior knowledge, as well as their given abilities. In addition, feeling angry makes people less risk-averse and eager to take immediate action.¹² Valentino and colleagues find just that; people *angered* over the prospect of the candidate they dislike winning an election become more active in electoral activity.^{13¹⁴} Thus, getting people angry over an impending threat is an effective way for political elites to drive up actions in support of their campaigns and causes. When angered, people engage the *fight* response to the threat.

The first televised campaign advertisement rolled out by Florida Senator Marco Rubio during his run for the 2016 GOP presidential nomination is a clear attempt to try to activate a specific sense of threat among the target audience. This television spot features Rubio positioned off-center, his dark suit blending in almost perfectly with the black background. The left side of his face partly covered in shadow, Rubio speaks in a somber tone, invoking a recent terror attack in Paris as he implores listeners to view the threat against terrorism as a zero-sum prospect with intimately felt consequences:

This is a civilizational struggle between the values of freedom and liberty, and radical Islamic terror. What happened in Paris could happen here. There is no middle ground. These aren't disgruntled or dis-empowered people. These are radical terrorists who want to kill us, because we let women drive, because we let girls go to school... Either they win, or we do.

The feeling of dread being evoked here is conveyed as much by the visual and audio cues as by the message itself. The darkened color palette and Rubio's almost timid demeanor work in tandem with the substance of his remarks to invoke a sense of fear and uncertainty. As illustrated by Figure 2.2, the message is clearly seeking to establish a relevant threat (terrorism) that impedes the audience's ability to achieve its goals (in this case, general safety).

¹² Huddy, Feldman and Cassese (2007).

¹³ Valentino, Gregorowicz and Groenendyk (2009).

¹⁴ Valentino et al. (2011).




FIGURE 2.2 Illustrating the effect of exposure to the Rubio ad on decision making.

If the messaging of this ad works – meaning the threat of terrorism becomes a salient concern to prospective Republican primary voters – would we expect their reaction to be one of fight or flight? At first glance, the answer may seem obvious. Rubio has painted the specter of terrorism as omnipresent, the motivations and actions of the terrorists as unyielding and uncompromising, and the fight against terrorism as a strictly zero-sum game, with “no middle ground.” It is easy to imagine suburban soccer parents receiving this message and feeling an overwhelming sense of vulnerability and incapacity to act, which ultimately manifests as fear and an accompanying instinct to take flight. The hope of the Rubio camp is that these individuals take flight from their allegiance to the frontrunner candidate in the GOP race (at that point it was the eventual winner Donald Trump) and reconsider which Republican candidate should receive their support.¹⁵

But what about another set of potential message recipients? For instance, one can imagine a military veteran applying an altogether different set of calculations in response to this ad. Rather than be reminded of her vulnerability, a veteran might be emboldened by thinking about the United States’ unparalleled military might. Accordingly, rather than respond with fear, this individual might respond with more of a defiant disposition – *bring it on*. Finally, it is easy to imagine another very

¹⁵ Indeed, this would follow exactly the expectations laid out by Albertson and Gadarian (2015).

distinct response to his ad from a Muslim American. To this individual, the salient threat may originate not in the threat of terrorism, but more in the prospect of Islamophobic backlash that she fears this ad may help to inspire.

Connecting Identity to Emotion: Assessing Collective Expectations and Agency

These hypothetical reactions to the Rubio ad from different sets of people highlight an important fact about people's emotional reactions to the political messaging they encounter. Social psychologists from across the world, such as Martijn van Zomeren, Eran Halperin and Daniel Bar-Tal, have explored how emotions experienced collectively by varying groups shape relations between them. In the process, their work sheds light on the inextricable relationship between emotions and salient group identities.¹⁶ People's determinations of their goals and the relevant threats to those goals are not made in a vacuum. On the contrary, people operate within a social context in which their age, gender, religion, race, social class, sexuality, citizenship status and other identifying characteristics all matter to these determinations. Many of the threat-invoking messages so commonplace in the political discourse also activate one or more of these relevant identities.

These identities matter because they provide a signal of the resources an individual has at her disposal to counter the threat. According to cognitive appraisal theory, one's perceptions of her resources in the face of threat is a key determinant in whether her emotional response to that threat will be one of anger or fear.¹⁷¹⁸ On a basic level, one can feel as though she is not facing the threat alone. And this perception – that she is not in this fight alone – can be empowering rather than debilitating in the face of the threat. For instance, work by Eric Groenendyk and Antoine Banks finds that people with strong partisan attachments are more likely to respond to political threats with anger rather than fear when compared to people who do not strongly identify with a party.¹⁹ The reason for this difference? Strong partisans are bolstered by the sense that they are

¹⁶ Exemplary work from these scholars includes Bar-Tal, Halperin and De Rivera (2007), Halperin and Gross (2011) and Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer and Leach (2004).

¹⁷ Lerner and Keltner (2000).

¹⁸ Frijda, Kuipers and Ter Schure (1989).

¹⁹ Groenendyk and Banks (2014).

members of a team, as opposed to people with weaker attachments, who feel as though they are going it alone when navigating politics.

Conversely, if the group identity being primed is one that is on the margins of political power, then the individual might actually feel an overarching sense of vulnerability in the face of the threat. Past psychological scholarship from Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith and Huo revealed that members of groups occupying subjugated social positions may be precluded from exhibiting anger under threat if they do not perceive their group as having a strong chance of advancing from its marginalized position.²⁰ Further, work by Robert Folger goes on to surmise that members of these subjugated groups feel resentment in lieu of anger, and this resentment inhibits their action.²¹ This work, therefore, paints an image of members of socially subjugated groups carrying a broader sentiment that can preclude a mobilizing anger from arising in the face of threats.

This work has real implications for how we should think about the collective response of African Americans to political threats. It is not enough to consider whether the group feels threatened or aggrieved. We must also consider this group's perceptions of its political standing, and the resources at the group's disposal to advance its standing. If black people are generally skeptical about the responsiveness of the political system to black demands for redress, then such skepticism should color the emotional responses that African Americans register in the face of political threat.

This notion is reflected in a study by social psychologists Beth Mabry and Jill Kiecolt, which found that black people who are most mistrustful exhibit significantly *less* anger than the most mistrustful whites.²² The social positioning of African Americans provides them with less of a sense of collective agency relative to whites. This positioning, in turn, saps black individuals of some of their capacity to express anger when exhibiting markers of dissatisfaction within their environment.

Rubio's *civilizational struggle* ad sought to prime a broad identity of *Americans* as the set of people vulnerable to the threat being evoked. But other forms of political messaging have drawn more precisely defined boundary lines around the group identities they are looking to activate as those affected by the threat. By tailoring the messages to a smaller, socially relevant subset of the population, these messages can more effectively tap

²⁰ Tyler, Boeckmann and Smith (1997).

²¹ Folger (1987).

²² Mabry and Kiecolt (2005).

into the specific calculations of goals and threats made by the intended audience, thus making the communication of threat all the more compelling. While such a strategy can more effectively activate the sense of threat that triggers alertness and action, it can also intensify dividing lines between social groups in the US.

An illustrative example of this is found in the infamous “Hands” ad. Made in support of incumbent Republican Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina in 1990, this television spot aired during the final week of a closely contested race between Helms and Senate challenger Harvey Gant, the first black mayor of Charlotte.

It begins as ominously as an entry in the *Nightmare on Elm Street* series. A brooding synthwave tone is peppered with light snare drums before the voiceover begins. Spoken in an almost archetypal villainous tone, a man’s voice speaks directly to the audience:

You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?

As the voice narrates “your” plight, visible on screen is a pair of white male hands resting against a wooden desk. The hands unfurl a document presumed to be a rejection letter for a job, then angrily crumple it up right as the voiceover says “minority.”

In contrast to the Rubio ad, which is likely to instill a feeling of fear within many of the intended viewers, the “Hands” ad is designed specifically to invoke a feeling of anger within the target audience. How does this ad elicit anger over the specified threat opposed to fear? We can first zero in on the rhetorical question being asked: *is that really fair?* The answer is intended to be a resounding *no!* The fact that the threat being invoked here – mandated racial hiring quotas – is characterized as unjustly impeding on the audience’s goal of attaining gainful employment gives this threat a special weight.

People do not like being denied goods that they want. But they are particularly put off by being denied goods to which they feel entitled. Every day, people routinely encounter obstacles that frustrate their progress toward their goals. But while we may tend to shrug off the obstacles that we attribute to factors beyond our control (*oh it’s just a little bad luck*) or our own shortsightedness (*well, I should’ve seen that coming*), the obstacles that we deem to be *unfairly* standing in the way of our progress get quite a rise from us. The sensation of being slighted, of being cut off from a positive outcome that we believe we deserve, moves us from a simple feeling of frustration to one of indignation. It is not just the threat

but the unshakeable sense that this threat should not be affecting us in the first place that makes us see red.

It is that very sense of indignation – rooted in having a sense of entitlement to a good from which one is being denied – that gives anger its mobilizing power. When the frustration over the interruption of one’s personal progress is compounded by the sense that one is being unfairly targeted, one becomes laser-focused on overturning that interruption and achieving one’s goals, regardless of the costs. From this focus springs the aforementioned wellspring of confidence and willingness to take risks.

This is precisely the sensation being activated within the target audience for the “Hands” ad. Viewers are supposed to not only identify with the frustration of being denied potentially valuable job opportunities. They are expected to feel compelled to identify the racial quota policy that denied them the opportunity as meritless, and declare in response, *I’m not going to take this anymore!*

Clearly, this ad is not presented in a sociocultural vacuum. The senses of entitlement and unfairness it seeks to evoke are fundamentally tied to the racial group identity it is activating. The ad does not explicitly name white people as the target audience. Yet its explicit mention of a racial minority as the underserving recipient of the job due to a race-based policy does the implicit work of priming white Americans’ racial identity as they view it. Like any other racial group, white people’s experiences with politics vary greatly around the intersecting lines of gender, class, age, religion etc. Despite these variations, virtually every metric points to white people being collectively able to exercise greater political clout compared to other racial groups.

Whether we observe the proportions of whites represented in all levels of political office, compare elected officials’ rates of responsiveness to white constituents versus black constituents or examine turnout rates of whites and racial minority groups across election cycles, we see the same patterns.²³ White people are overrepresented in all echelons of politics and tend to receive more devoted attention from political elites relative to racial minority groups.

The privileged political position held collectively by white people translates to white Americans possessing a greater sense of entitlement from the political system. Without such entitlement, the rallying cry that racial quotas are unfair would not pack the same punch. But this call is

²³ Butler and Brockman (2011), Choi (2011) and Fraga (2018).

being made to a group that generally expects to receive fair and satisfactory outcomes from the political system.

Further, as suggested by the narratives raised by this Helms ad, there is often a distinct racial dimension to white Americans' anger. The aforementioned political psychologist Antoine Banks has produced numerous studies demonstrating that white individuals' expressions of anger – both over political *and* non-political objects – is fundamentally tethered to their racial attitudes.²⁴ Banks finds that priming white people's anger can activate those attitudes, making them express more conservative positions on race-relevant issues. These studies paint anger as an emotion that can both stimulate white Americans to action while increasing their perception of black Americans as competitors for scarce political resources – and undeserving competitors at that.

For these reasons, then, the call in the "Hands" ad is particularly effective for generating action-mobilizing indignation among white viewers. Fueled by the sense that these unfair racial quotas mark an unacceptable departure from the hiring norms whites routinely expect, they feel anger in response to the threat of those quotas. That anger is further fueled by the perception that black Americans are receiving an undeserved benefit.²⁵ In turn, that anger stimulates whites to take actions to counteract that threat – in this case by securing Jesse Helms another term in the Senate via voting, donating, volunteering etc.

In sum, the capacity of the "Hands" ad to effectively trigger an action-inducing anger among its intended audience is rooted in three factors. One, the communication of a threat impeding a relevant goal of the audience. Two, conveying that this threat is unjustly imposed. Three, activating a group identity that will feel empowered and entitled in the face of the threat. These factors are illustrated in Figure 2.3.

While many white people throughout North Carolina felt activated and propelled to action by this campaign spot, what did black Carolinians feel as the ad flashed across their TV screens? As African Americans viewed their white counterparts be rallied by their sense of grievance over the perceived unfairness of racial quotas, they saw another reminder of their own relatively marginalized status in the political sphere. Racial quotas may be far from a perfect policy intervention, but they represent a substantive effort to ameliorate economic disparities caused by centuries

²⁴ See, for example, Banks (2014), Banks and Bell (2013) and Banks and Valentino (2012).

²⁵ This concept is explored in the scholarship on racial resentment. See Kinder and Sears (1981), Kinder and Sanders (1996) and Sears (1988).




FIGURE 2.3 Illustrating the effect of exposure to the Helms ad on white viewers' decision making.

of systematic exploitation of black labor. Yet black viewers witnessed such attempts at levying racial parity pilloried as discriminatory against hardworking, deserving whites.

This framing of the issue puts black people in an untenable position, as it denies them the chance to be characterized as a group with full entitlement to the employment opportunities that legacies of institutionalized racism have made too few and far between. If the rallying cry made by whites for fair employment opportunity comes at the direct expense of black people, then what is the foundation from which black people mount their own rally?

It is not difficult to envision the implications black people draw from the "Hands" ad (and similar political messaging) regarding the kinds of political outcomes they can expect to receive from the political system. Rather than stoke their feelings of entitlement to fair outcomes, such communications reinforce the sentiment that African American engagement in politics will always be an uphill battle; this stark contrast in the collective senses of entitlement and expectation that shape white and black people's relationship with their environment creates a sharp divide in the emotions they draw upon most readily in response to the threats being communicated to them.

Black Ideologies and the Inhibition of Black Anger

This divide is clearly evident in the distinct collective responses of black and white Democrats to the fiery campaign of Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primary election. Perhaps lost in the conventional narrative about the Vermont Senator's struggles to attract black supporters is the

fact that Sanders fared quite well among the younger black cohort.²⁶ Not coincidentally, as will be shown in Chapter 3, younger black individuals exhibit a much smaller anger gap than their older counterparts.

But Sanders' inability to court larger numbers of rank-and-file black adults with his impassioned calls to fight back against an unresponsive ruling class raised questions similar to those posed during the height of the Occupy movement. Why aren't more black people heeding the call to challenge a system that harms them disproportionately? Why is the extensive tradition of black activism not being translated to this particular progressive politics revolution?

Interrogating the varied emotional responses of black and white audiences to Sanders' messaging provides insight that helps answer these questions. Precisely, we can consider which identities were being activated within white and black people respectively when they heard Sanders' talking points, and whether these identities would engender the senses of slight and confidence that animate a mobilizing anger.

These talking points are evident in "Enough is Enough," a video compilation of campaign remarks from the Vermont Senator that forcefully rails against systemic injustices inhibiting the fair operation of American economic and political spheres. These remarks are accompanied by a collage of images juxtaposing Sanders speaking before rapt audiences, and images of people living in destitution.

Notably, the images of destitution depict white people exclusively, while African Americans feature prominently in the crowd shots at Sanders rallies. This represents an intentional attempt to upend the conventional racial stereotyping that associates images of poverty with African Americans.²⁷ What should be taken away from this observation? The fact that Sanders, his campaign and supporters made clear efforts to make direct outreach to black prospective voters. The substance of the remarks from the video is below.

Here's the simple truth. That in America we have millions and millions of working people who are working hard, but are not making enough money to put bread on the table or to take care of their kids. And that has got to end ... The American people are angry. And what the American people are angry about is they understand that they did not cause this recession. This recession was caused by the greed, the recklessness, and the illegal behavior of the people on Wall Street. They could write a check out for 50 million or 100 million dollars, and it would not

²⁶ Sanders (2016).

²⁷ Gilens (2009).

matter at all. And I want people to take a deep breath and think about whether or not that is what we believe American democracy is supposed to be.

How do black recipients of this message process that “simple truth”? Does the sense that the working person in America is struggling to get by engender a sense of anger, as Sanders claims? Or is the collective response more akin to the resigned demeanor illustrated by Dave Chappelle in the *SNL* sketch? Or the defiant posture of *I told you so* exhibited by Prof. Stacey Patton in her essay explaining why black people weren’t embracing the Occupy movement?²⁸

The answer to that question hinges on the recurrent theme of expectations. For many African Americans, the image of people working long hours and barely scraping by while an elite class thrives off their effort represents not a departure from a satisfactory norm to which they feel entitled. On the contrary, this image represents the *norm* itself.

This image is in fact engrained in the black ethos, collectively informed by centuries of exploitation of black labor, from chattel slavery, to the system of debt peonage that took root in the South following Reconstruction, to the illegal forfeiture of land to which African Americans had legal claim after the Civil War. Rather than provoke anger, or even trigger their alert system, this statement merely reminds black people of the *simple truth* of their long history of economic oppression at the hands of the polity.

Bernie Sanders’ comments assigning responsibility for the Great Recession also surface a meaningful divide in the expectations of white and black message recipients. Sanders attributes rank-and-file people’s anger to the “greed, the recklessness, the illegal behavior of *the people* on Wall Street (emphasis mine).” These individuals may be callous and entrenched in power. But if these individuals constitute the threat that impedes working Americans’ goals of economic security and opportunities for advancement, they can be relatively easy to overcome. Simply replace these unjustly operating actors with fair actors and the system can be restored to its proper functioning.

But the responses of African Americans to this attribution are filtered through a distinct racial lens – one that tends to assign responsibility for dissatisfactory political or socioeconomic outcomes not just to *individuals* but to the *system* itself. This racial lens manifests in the wide gulf in black–white opinion, which is apparent even among black and white liberals, as well as among those from the millennial age cohort.²⁹

²⁸ Both examples are illuminated in Chapter 1.

²⁹ Hutchings (2009).

TABLE 2.1 *Comparing black and white opinion on racial and social issues.*
Data from multiple polls conducted by the Pew Research Center and Gallup

Opinion Prompt	Black	White
Black males are more likely to go to prison than white males. Do you think this is mostly due to discrimination against blacks, or something else? (Gallup 2013)	Discrimination 50%	Discrimination 19%
Confidence in police (Gallup 2011–2014)	Little/none 25%	Little/none 12%
How satisfied are you with how blacks are treated in society? (Gallup 2013)	Dissatisfied 52%	Dissatisfied 33%
Are new civil rights laws needed to reduce discrimination? (Gallup 2013)	Yes 83%	Yes 17%
Are blacks treated less fairly than whites on the job? (Pew 2014)	Yes 54%	Yes 16%
Are blacks treated less fairly than whites in local public schools? (Pew 2014)	Yes 51%	Yes 15%
Are blacks treated less fairly than whites when voting in elections? (Pew 2014)	Yes 48%	Yes 13%

Table 2.1 highlights just some of the issue areas on which black and white Americans apply distinct racial perspectives. These opinion indicators from Gallup and Pew Research Center surveys illustrate that black people view spheres such as criminal justice, education and employment through the lens of systemic racial discrimination.

This interpretive lens can inhibit anger from being activated among black people by signaling to them the political threats they encounter are *not* discrete, tangible forces that can be overcome with a requisite amount of sweat equity. On the contrary, when such threats are perceived as symptomatic of a sociopolitical system that consistently marginalizes black interests, then the consequent emotional response of black people will be more akin to disillusionment than anger.

Preeminent black politics scholar Michael C. Dawson (2011) exemplifies the divide between individual and systemic-level attributions in his examination of the dissimilar reactions of black and white Americans to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.

Was it a tragic event in which a large number of citizens proved unexpectedly vulnerable to a freak accident? Or was this business as usual? That is to say, proof, once again that some Americans count for more than others, and that skin color provides a brutally direct indication of who does count and who does not.³⁰

For African Americans, a majority of whom are likely to view the government's response to Katrina as "business as usual," and further proof that their racial group is systematically marginalized at the hands of the political system,³¹ the idea that the economic injustice they experience can simply be attributed to a few rotten apples on Wall Street rings hollow. Black people will tend to view these greedy, reckless and illegally operating individuals as symptomatic of a larger disease, rather than the disease itself.

The contrast is clear. Large numbers of white Americans, whose underlying confidence in the justness of the sociopolitical and economic systems facilitates their belief that their present threats can be overcome with a sufficient cleaning of house, are drawn to Sanders' messaging. At the same time, significant numbers of African Americans believe Sanders' calls to action fall far short of addressing what is truly necessary to remove the threats to their economic self-realization.

From the racialized divides in what black and white people fundamentally expect from their politics come varying emotional and behavioral responses to the so-called Sanders revolution. Sanders' calls to action resonated primarily with white progressives because he effectively activated their sense of anger over an unresponsive ruling class treating hardworking people worse than they expected to be treated. But those same calls to action failed to resonate with large numbers of African Americans on the political left, for whom the threats invoked by Sanders constitute a reality from which they feel little collective agency to deter.

It is important to note that white and black recipients of this message can fundamentally agree on the existence of the threat of economic injustice, its scope and impact, as well as the urgency with which it must be addressed. But where they disagree is in their assessments of the pervasiveness of the threat, as well as the extent of their collective capacity to overcome it. Adherence to the belief that black people are collectively marginalized in politics creates a different calculation for black

³⁰ Dawson (2011, p. xv).

³¹ White, Philpot, Wylie and McGowen (2007).

individuals of their political agency – i.e., their confidence that they can affect political change.

This calculation is evident when comparing the rhetoric of Sanders' political revolution with the rhetoric of a historic black revolutionary figure. Note how Black Panther Party Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton frames the response of a base of black people seething under the rule of unresponsive political regimes and over-aggressive police forces:

We ain't gonna fight no reactionary pigs who run up and down the street being reactionary; we're gonna organize and dedicate ourselves to revolutionary political power and teach ourselves the specific needs of resisting the power structure, arm ourselves, and we're gonna fight reactionary pigs with international proletarian revolution.³²

Hampton explicitly rejects the idea that black revolutionary action will be reactionary and immediate. Instead, he paints a picture of black radical action as being intentionally deliberate and governed by training and organizing principles. What a far cry from the image of anger that emerges from the conventional wisdom!

Instead of being characterized by risk aversion and an insistent impulse on eradicating the threat, this idea of action fueled by black anger is informed by careful consideration of the stakes and strategies facing black revolutionaries. Further, Hampton is asking black people not to leverage their anger toward actions within the system, in support of any particular campaign or platform. On the contrary, he seeks to translate that anger toward actions that directly oppose and aim to overcome that system. This different image of the black anger-action linkage demands a consideration how the social dimensions of emotions such as anger shape their influence on behavior.

Why would anger not carry the same action-inducing immediacy for African Americans as it does for whites? In no small part because of the collective fear of black anger in the public consciousness. As noted in Chapter 1, black people face a myriad of social and legal repercussions for their public expressions of anger. The potential risks of being *angry while black* contribute to the disinclination to see red among black people. These risks also alter the calculations made by black people once they do engender anger over politics. It is worth exploring further how the fundamental differences in African Americans' political worldviews shape the emergence and effects of their political anger.

³² Hampton (1969).

TABLE 2.2 *Descriptive statistics on participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study*

	Black	White
Total observations	472	473
Average age	35	51
% women	54.0	54.0
% college graduates	62.0	61.0
% moderate/strong Republicans	14.3	35.6
% moderate/strong Democrats	27.1	26.8

Individual versus Collective Agency: Double Consciousness and the Anger Gap

Recall that a sense of confidence is critical in distinguishing a rather subdued emotional response of frustration from a more impulsive, action-oriented anger. If, therefore, black people collectively possess less of that political agency, then they have less fuel to fan the flames of anger in response to the political threats they routinely encounter.

The stark racial divides in black and white individuals' conceptions of their political agency are illustrated in the differences between their expressed confidence as *individuals* versus their confidence as *racial groups*. I measured these differences in an original study I conducted on national samples of black and white participants called the Race, Anger and Participation Study (hereafter RAP). During a two-week period in January 2018, I distributed a questionnaire to a sample of 462 white and 461 black participants using the Qualtrics online survey platform. The Qualtrics platform ensured the 945 participants contained parity across factors such as age, education level, region and partisanship.³³ White participants skewed older and more politically conservative than black participants. Details on the sample are displayed in Table 2.2.

The questionnaire for the RAP Study gauged participants' racial attitudes and senses of racial group identity, before priming them with various anger prompts and gauging their subsequent willingness to engage in a variety of political actions. Here and in Chapter 4, I provide insights yielded by this study regarding the racial anger gap, beginning

³³ I am most grateful to my research assistant Nathan Chan for his invaluable contributions to the creation of the RAP Study.




FIGURE 2.4 Comparing individual-level indicators of political agency across black and white participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

here with comparisons of black and white participants' expressions of political agency as individuals and as racial groups.

Figure 2.4 compares the mean levels of confidence expressed by white and black RAP Study participants in their individual capacity to affect political change. The solid line represents respondents' confidence that people like them have a say in how government handles important issues. The dashed line represents their confidence that government officials care what people like them think.

Both of these are conventional measures of *external efficacy* – in other words, indicators of people's perceptions that elites actually respond to their political participation. The designation of “people like me” could refer to any identity that is on a person's mind when they answer the question. *People like me* could be people in my age cohort, neighborhood, income bracket etc. It is quite a broad, nebulous conceptualization.

Note from the slope of the lines that African Americans answering these questions are on average expressing much more efficacy than their white counterparts. Comparing the responses to these questions suggests that black people possess greater political agency than whites. But what




FIGURE 2.5 Comparing group-level indicators of political agency across black and white participants in the 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

happens if the frame of reference is shifted from the imprecise *people like me* to members of one's racial group, specifically? Then we see the opposite pattern, as shown in Figure 2.5.

In this figure, the solid line represents individuals' reports of how often *their racial group* has a say in how government handles important issues. And the dashed line represents individuals' reports of how often public officials work hard to help their racial group. Once the focus is placed squarely on the individuals' perceptions of their racial group's political agency, a shift occurs. The same African Americans who were more confident as individuals express considerably less collective agency than their white counterparts.

This duality in black people's calculations of their political agency is critical to understanding the racial anger gap they exhibit in politics. As individuals, they can express a self-assured poise that animates their political activity. But when primed to view politics through the lens of race, such self-assuredness transforms into a collective sentiment of resignation. Black people constantly wrestle with the competing forces of

American individualism and racial stratification, navigating the dissonant tension between the ideal of self-determination and the reality of being constrained by their group affiliation.

This tension has long been acknowledged as an inescapable fact of black American life. W. E. B. DuBois captures this tension eloquently in his discussion of the concept of *double consciousness*.

It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.³⁴

This sensation, this pervasive feeling of being somehow both American and something other than – *less than*, actually – colors the way African Americans navigate the political world. This perspective produces a modal state of caution rather than confidence. It engenders temperance in the face of threats, not indignation.

This idea that black people's political decision making is influenced by the duality of their identities as both *black* and *American* has informed many an insight into black political behavior. Double consciousness is very much present in Michael C. Dawson's concept of linked fate. African Americans by and large believe their destinies as individuals to be tied to the collective destiny of the racial group, and vice versa.³⁵ This belief looms large in the political preferences of black individuals, as they prioritize their consideration of what is best for the group as a whole over what they perceive to be best for them as individuals. For this reason, many middle- and upper-class African Americans, who would be expected by rational choice theories to vote Republican, still maintain steadfast support of the Democratic Party.³⁶ The sense of linked fate with working-class black people alters their political calculation.

Double consciousness also informs the tradition of work examining the relationship between group consciousness and political participation. Many black Americans' relationship with their racial identity extends beyond simply perceiving a sense of social belonging or having a psychological attachment to the group. These African Americans feel an acute responsibility to advance the standing of the group. Not only, then, does

³⁴ DuBois and Marable (2015).

³⁵ Dawson (1994).

³⁶ *Ibid.*

the lens of blackness shape their views on politics; these racially conscious individuals are also propelled by their sense of duty to the group to be politically active.³⁷

Early scholars of political participation were puzzled by the high rates of black participation they observed, given the group's relative paucity of resources traditionally linked to participation, such as job security, high educational attainment and financial flexibility.³⁸ Group consciousness on the part of African Americans helped to solve this puzzle. An unyielding sense of devotion to improving the collective standing of the group motivated many black individuals to be active in the political arena, despite facing higher barriers to participation.³⁹⁴⁰

What is the relevant take-away from these observations? Black individuals' decisions regarding whether and how to take action politically are fundamentally tied to their experiences and perspectives as members of the racial group. African Americans filter their perceptions of the political environment through the lens of blackness, and that same lens can effectively mobilize political action. So we cannot understand black political behavior without a full reckoning of the reality of their dual experiences as *individuals* pursuing their American dreams within a system that defines them primarily by their *group* affiliation.

The reflexive influences of black Americans' dual individual and group-centric perspectives shape the anger gap they exhibit in politics relative to whites, a group whose members perceive significantly less dissonance between their individual and American identities. Bear in mind from the earlier figures, whites' expressions of their political agency increased sharply when they considered the efficacy of their racial group. The priming of this racial identity – whether directly, as in the “Hands” ad, or indirectly, as in much of the rhetoric prevalent in politics – only augments the collective senses of entitlement and empowerment typically held in greater measure by whites.

In contrast, the prevailing sentiment among black Americans that they are perpetually caught between two worlds has a profound influence on their sense of collective agency. Addressing the claim from the 1968 report of the Kerner Commission that “our nation was moving toward two societies – one black, one white, separate and unequal,”

³⁷ Miller, Gurin, Gurin and Malanchuk (1981).

³⁸ Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995).

³⁹ Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (1993).

⁴⁰ Miller et al. (1981). Also, see Chong and Rogers (2005) for a review of work discussing the link between group consciousness and black political participation.

then-NAACP President Kweisi Mfume declared, “America has always been two societies. The master-slave ontology and the doctrine of white supremacy which pre-existed before the republic was founded have made and kept this nation of two societies.”⁴¹ The belief that black people’s political world is *separate and unequal* compared to the world navigated by white Americans inhibits the sentiment of expectation and entitlement that fuel anger in response to political threats. This inhibition in turn both makes black people less likely to see red over politics, and creates a different set of motivators for instances in which black people do express anger.

The Message Matters: Political Signaling of the Illegitimacy of Black Grievance

Signals that black Americans should not carry the same senses of expectation and entitlement as whites abound in political discourse. Ripe for picking are talking points from Republican elites that characterize African Americans as feeling entitled to government benefits that they do not deserve. For instance, former GOP Senator Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania declared during his 2012 presidential run, “I don’t want to make black people’s lives better by giving them somebody else’s money. I want to give them the opportunity to go out and earn the money.”⁴² While on the same campaign trail, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich offered to take such a message directly to black people: “if the NAACP invites me, I’ll go to their convention and talk about why the African American community should demand paychecks and not be satisfied with food stamps.”⁴³

Much like the “Hands” ad, these quotes paint an image of black people as receiving unearned favors from government. Perhaps worse, they depict the group as violating a core tenet of the American Creed; rather than working diligently to make good on the opportunities afforded them, black people are portrayed to be languidly relying on government handouts. This type of rhetoric can animate white Americans’ sense of grievance over perceived special favors received by African Americans, while also delegitimizing the claims actually made by black people on government.

⁴¹ Mfume (1997).

⁴² Madison (2012).

⁴³ Byers (2012).

Such rhetoric is perhaps expected from Republicans. The party routinely fails to attract any more than 10 percent of the black vote.⁴⁴ Since the 1970s, the Republican Party has reaped major gain by pursuing a rhetorical strategy that targets African Americans for stigmatization in order to mobilize the white voters making up its constituency base, a tactic labeled the Southern strategy.⁴⁵ But such rhetoric has also been on full display from the vanguards of the Democratic Party over the years, and such messaging from the elites most ardently supported by African Americans likely proves even more impactful for engendering the anger gap than such messaging from Republicans.

Passages from the aforementioned Bernie Sanders illustrate how even champions of unapologetically progressive politics can perpetuate the notion that black demands on the political system are not as legitimate as demands made by whites. Again, these discourses only reinforce the sense held by and large by black people that their expressions of grievance within the political system will be met with derision or pushback.

When Senator Sanders was queried about whether he would support reparations for descendants of black slaves, he responded:

No, I don't think so. First of all, its likelihood of getting through Congress is nil. Second of all, I think it would be very divisive. The real issue is when we look at the poverty rate among the African American community, when we look at the high unemployment rate within the African American community, we have a lot of work to do. So I think what we should be talking about is making massive investments in rebuilding our cities, in creating millions of decent paying jobs, in making public colleges and universities tuition-free, basically targeting our federal resources to the areas where it is needed the most and where it is needed the most is in impoverished communities, often African American and Latino.⁴⁶

Sanders certainly is not wrong in his assertion that the reparations issue would be divisive and face long odds of passing through Congress. But as the public intellectual Ta-nehisi Coates asks, is the issue of reparations truly any more divisive or any more of a longshot than any of Sanders' core proposals, such as tuition-free colleges, or single-payer healthcare?⁴⁷ The pragmatic reticence Sanders displays on reparations marks a far cry from his defiant, robust defenses of radical policy proposals that do not benefit African Americans singly. For example, a year before he hit the campaign trail, Sanders did not concede an inch in responding to critics

⁴⁴ Bates (2014).

⁴⁵ Astrup (2015).

⁴⁶ Coates (2016).

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

of his plan to raise the marginal tax rate on the richest Americans to as much as 90 percent.

[W]e have kids who are hungry in this country. We have people who are working two, three, four jobs, who can't send their kids to college. You know what? Sorry, you're all going to have to pay your fair share of taxes. If my memory is correct, when radical socialist Dwight D. Eisenhower was president, the highest marginal tax rate was something like 90 percent.⁴⁸

The fiery bluster on display in these remarks is precisely what attracted so many progressives to Sanders' 2016 presidential campaign. But that fire seemed to be doused when Sanders spoke directly to the specific positions, vulnerabilities and demands of black people. He is far from the only politician to seek to pivot the focus away from black-specific policy solutions and toward interventions with a broader reach. But as the remarks below attest, the issue runs deeper than the question of whether a policy has a singular or more extensive reach. To what extent do political elites – yes, even those on the left seeking to directly represent the interests of black people – draw boundaries that demarcate the grievances of African Americans as beyond the pale of the political imagination?

During an appearance on *The Late Show with Seth Meyers* in October 2017, the Vermont Senator addressed how the left should move forward in the Trump era.

I mean, I think we've got to work in two ways. Number one, we have got to take on Trump's attacks against the environment, against women, against Latinos and blacks and people in the gay community, we've got to fight back every day on those issues. *But equally important, or more important: we have got to focus on bread-and-butter issues that mean so much to ordinary Americans* (emphasis mine).⁴⁹

As *Fusion* commentator Anne Branigin astutely noted, Sanders draws an unnecessary dividing line between the bread-and-butter issues facing "ordinary Americans" and the issues of racism, sexism and homophobia afflicting people from these respective social identity groups.⁵⁰ Are the specific challenges faced by black people (and Latina/o people, and women and LGBT identifiers of all races) not "ordinary"? Must addressing racism, sexism and homophobia come at the cost of addressing issues of economic inequality? Does Sanders not realize that the bread-and-butter

⁴⁸ NBC News (2016).

⁴⁹ NBC (2017, October 30).

⁵⁰ Branigin (2017).

class-focused issues that he wants to prioritize are inextricably linked to issues such as racism and sexism?

Such a restrictive conception of where black people's priorities fall in the political totem pole is by no means limited to Bernie Sanders. Barack Obama, perhaps the most important black mainstream political figure in the modern era, regularly took his messaging straight to black audiences before and during his presidency. But even in these direct addresses, Obama would often frame black Americans' political grievances not as sources of a mobilizing anger, but rather as distractions to get over. As alluded to in Chapter 1, Barack Obama himself faced constraints on the emotions he was allowed to publicly express without facing serious blowback from a polity that stigmatizes black anger. But his unwillingness or inability to affirm the anger of his black constituents precluded this group from fully leveraging anger to animate political action.⁵¹

One of the most dissected examples of this came in his remarks to the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) in September 2011. Obama's stern call to action to the CBC – and his black voter base more broadly – raised plenty of eyebrows.

I expect all of you to march with me and press on. Take off your bedroom slippers, put on your marching shoes. *Shake it off. Stop complaining, stop grumbling, stop crying.* We are going to press on. We've got work to do, CBC (emphasis mine).⁵²

After the speech, Congressional Representative Maxine Waters of California contested Obama's remarks on two counts. One, she noted that Obama had never chided any other racial groups comprising his support base, such as Jewish or Latina/o Americans, to stop complaining when they brought their specific demands to the White House. Two, Representative Waters asserted that black people "certainly aren't complaining."⁵³ Indeed, weeks before the speech, CBC Chair Emmanuel Cleaver of Missouri indicated that for their part, black members of Congress had been withholding their harsher critiques of the Obama administration, despite major rises in black unemployment during Obama's first two years in office.

If Bill Clinton had been in the White House and had failed to address this problem, we probably would be marching on the White House. There is a less-volatile

⁵¹ See, for example, Banks, White and McKenzie (2018).

⁵² Obama (2011).

⁵³ Williams (2011).

reaction in the CBC because nobody wants to do anything that would empower the people who hate the president.⁵⁴

Despite concerted efforts by black elites to temper their criticisms of the president, and despite support from rank-and-file black people that remained more robust than support among white Democrats, Obama offered a sharp rebuttal to black expressions of dissatisfaction with their current state of affairs. As the previous examples of political messaging demonstrate, this marks a notable departure from the communications afforded to “everyday” Americans – who are typically conceptualized as white. This group often has its complaints affirmed by political actors, who seek to stimulate their anger and mobilize them toward action (as exemplified by the Bill Clinton remarks that opened this chapter). In contrast, black anger appears to be beyond the bounds of acceptable politics, thus depriving black people of a potential source of political participation.

From Seeing Red to Seeing the Bright Side: Appeals to Black Positivity

Elsewhere in the same speech, Obama lays out what he envisions to be the proper emotional disposition of black people navigating a socio-political system in which they are constantly on the margins. Rather than be propelled to act by a sense of indignation, Obama asserts African Americans find motivation to act in the moral urgency of their cause. Drawing on stirring imagery from the Civil Rights era of black activism, Obama declared:

Even when folks are hitting you over the head, you can't stop marching. Even when they're turning the hoses on you, you can't stop ... Because we know the rightness of our cause – widening the circle of opportunity, standing up for everybody's opportunities, increasing each other's prosperity. We know our cause is just. It's a righteous cause.

One key element of this passage is the manner in which Obama pivots from a focus on black people’s specific plight to a broader conception of “everybody’s” opportunities and prosperity. This is similar to Bernie Sanders’ shifting of attention away from the issue of reparations and toward issues broadly affecting all groups, such as job availability and cost of education. This rhetorical pattern deftly communicates the lack of urgency given to issues deemed to be specific to black people. Only when

⁵⁴ Cohn (2011).

the issue's scope can be broadened to include groups beyond African Americans are politicians showing a willingness to lead action on it.

Also notable in this passage is the manner in which Obama centers black activism on a sense of moral duty opposed to a sense of immediate needs-fulfillment. According to the vision being laid out here, black people do not incur the risks of collective action simply to attain greater legal protections, advance their economic standing or increase their political influence. No, black people take on these risks in order to advance the bigger-picture goals of justice and opportunity.

This vision should resonate with black people for two reasons. One, it conjures up an image of the Christian pilgrimage that rings familiar to the many African Americans connected to churches – particularly black churches. Indeed, the black arc toward racial progress is often framed as an upward march toward a destined Eden of racial salvation. One need only think of the words in Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.'s final speech in Memphis before his assassination in 1968: "I've looked over. And I've seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the Promised Land!"⁵⁵

Two, the idea of a righteous cause propelling black collective action comports with the sense of responsibility that racially conscious black Americans feel to advance the standing of their race. This sense of responsibility is reflected in the notion that black people endure the unsteady march toward racial progress out of a sense of moral duty.

It is noteworthy just how fundamentally distinct this type of call to action for African Americans is from the typical calls to action made to white Americans. Political figures on both sides of the aisle routinely seek to make white Americans *mad as hell* to inspire political action. But these same figures will seek to inspire action among black Americans by appealing to their moral authority rather than their anger.

Such calls to action are often intended to shift the gaze of the black audience in one of two directions. On the one hand, fixing their eyes on the past, by recalling successful historic efforts by black people to achieve their collective goals. On the other hand, fixing their eyes on the future, by speaking declaratively of the racial Promised Land that lies just over the horizon. The gaze upon the past can stir up group pride, while the gaze upon the future can engender optimism for the group's prospects. But neither of these fixations focus black people on the political threats

⁵⁵ King Jr. (1968).

they are currently facing, revealing the lack of urgency with which these threats are attended to by political elites.

How should the rhetorical appeals to black feelings of pride in collective accomplishments or hope for future progress be expected to shape African Americans' political behavior? Affective intelligence theory links these two positive emotions under the umbrella concept of enthusiasm. In contrast to signals of threat, which activate an immediate alert system triggering a fight-or-flight response, signals engendering satisfaction or optimism promote a reassurance that everything is operating according to plan. Psychologists assert this sense of assurance motivates individuals to continue along their existing course of action. This ultimately results in no meaningful departure from one's modal forms and volume of behavior, as one seeks to maintain a satisfactory status quo.⁵⁶

Studies conducted by political psychologist Ted Brader reveal that political messages that prime a feeling of enthusiasm increase people's likelihood of voting, while also making them more reliant on their existing predispositions.⁵⁷ Studies of the specific impact of hope indicate that when feeling hopeful, people become motivated to seek out information that confirms the object of their hope will come to fruition.⁵⁸ Surveying the scholarship on positive emotions, a picture emerges of enthusiasm increasing people's motivation to act to make good on opportunity, but not to consider new strategies, ideas or actions. If, therefore, feelings of enthusiasm are more commonly engendered among black Americans by the messages most prevalent within the political discursive space, we may expect to see tempered black political action as a result.

The thrust of positive-focused political messaging aimed at black audiences was on full display in the 2016 race. While on the presidential campaign trail, Hillary Clinton often employed language that would shift the gaze of her black audiences away from the precarious prospective state of black politics under the specter of a racially hostile Trump administration. Instead, she would focus attention on the collective gains made by the group. While speaking at the National Baptist Convention in Kansas City, Missouri in September 2016, Clinton took the rare step of declaring the public goods to which black people should feel entitled:

⁵⁶ Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000).

⁵⁷ Brader (2005).

⁵⁸ Just, Crigler and Belt (2007).

You deserve a sustained commitment to expanding opportunity, equity, and justice, not just for two or four years, not just when the cameras are on and people are watching, but every single day.⁵⁹

But rather than follow this up with an observation over how black people have too often been unjustly denied these goods, or pledge that her administration would advance these causes, Clinton immediately shifted the focus away from government (and its accompanying responsibility to protect black people's access to these ideals) and toward the black community.

And you know better than anyone that people who look at the African American community and see only poverty, crime, and despair are missing so much. They're missing the vibrancy of black-owned businesses, the excellence of historically black colleges and universities. They're missing the success of black leaders in every field, and the passion of a new generation of young black activists.

While this acknowledgment of black successes can cultivate feelings of racial pride and solidarity within the audience, it precludes the audience the opportunity to feel aggrieved over their constant denial of the public goods Clinton just mentioned. Inherent in these and similar remarks is the idea that the emotions that can be engendered within black audiences are a zero-sum game. Appeals to anger are off-limits, and in their stead is an abundance of appeals to black pride or hope.

This dynamic was also apparent later in Clinton's remarks, when she addressed the Flint water crisis. If ever there was an occasion for political elites to grant African Americans legitimate ground to express their anger over a political injustice, it would be Flint. Illustrating the devastating intersection of race and class vulnerabilities, Flint was once home to a major General Motors plant and a thriving economy. But decades after the auto bust, this majority-black city became home to the nation's highest poverty rate in 2017.⁶⁰ And the residents of this city have gone years without having access to safe, drinkable water.

Almost immediately after local officials switched the water supply from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) to the Flint River, city residents mounted vociferous complaints that the water was undrinkable. Their calls were met with either resistance or hollow assurances from public officials and bureaucrats that the water was indeed safe – despite its brown color and odorous stench.

⁵⁹ Clinton (2016).

⁶⁰ Mack (2017).

So the residents responded by following every conceivable rule in the collective action playbook. They formed advocacy organizations. These organizations in turn mobilized people through churches, neighborhood groups and informal networks. Large swaths of residents took coordinated actions designed to attract and retain the attention of public officials and news media, from protests, to marches, to sit-ins. These groups persisted, as weeks passed with no sufficient response from the powers that be. Then months passed. Then years – despite the ensuing revelations that the water contained elevated lead levels.⁶¹ The residents of Flint that rose up to demand access to the essential basic good of safe water are exemplary of the mythic image of Americans rising up in anger to challenge injustices within the system. And yet, they went more than three years without safe water.

This account rings a painfully familiar tune for black people across many eras. The aforementioned Fred Hampton recalled a similar account of black residents encountering resistance from local officials to their repeated calls for a specific intervention to increase their safety. In this instance, residents demanded redress for an unmarked street intersection that was the cause of numerous accidents. Hampton gave a vivid description of the escalating sense of dejection that sets in as African Americans are routinely stonewalled by the people ostensibly obligated to provide redress to their demands.

And they get you wound up in an *excursion of futility*, and you be in a *cycle of insaneness* [sic], and you be goin' back and goin' back, and goin' back, and goin' back so many times that you're already crazy (emphasis added).⁶²

Too often, African Americans such as the residents of Flint are made to feel as though their political actions are little more than an excursion of futility. So why should any emergent threat in their political environment inspire a mobilizing anger opposed to a resigned acceptance? At what point do African Americans decide to refrain from action, out of a desire to keep themselves out of what Hampton aptly (if not grammatically correctly) labels the *cycle of insaneness*?

Clinton's remarks on Flint were unlikely to inspire many in the audience to risk re-entering the cycle. Clinton refrained from castigating the actions of numerous agency heads and elected officials that were deemed criminal. She chose not to emphasize the removal of Flint residents' basic

⁶¹ Krings, Kornberg and Lane (2018).

⁶² Hampton (1969).

right to representative government, as the City Council and Mayor they elected to office were stripped of their governing powers in favor of a Governor-appointed City Manager with decision making authority.⁶³ Instead, Clinton focused on the acts of charity black communities provided for Flint residents.

I've seen the love at Mount Zion Missionary Baptist Church in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Pastor Damian Epps and his congregation collected tens of thousands of water bottles to send to families in Flint, Michigan suffering from water poisoned with lead. Because they remembered that eight years before, when the Mississippi River rose up and flooded Eastern Iowa, others came to their aid. As Pastor Epps said, they are fellow Americans. They are human beings. We should want to reach out and help. And he's right. That ethic is at the core of our Christian faith. And we all have work together to make sure every child in America has clean water to drink, clean air to breathe, and good schools, no matter what zip code they live in.⁶⁴

Bear in mind that Clinton is speaking at an explicitly religious event. It only makes sense for her to highlight the actions of black communities as reflective of their Christian faith. But can the black church leaders in attendance not *also* be made to feel a righteous fury about this injustice? Is it appropriate for a crisis resulting directly from the decisions of institutional actors – one that provoked concerns about human rights violations from United Nations experts – be framed as analogous with a natural disaster?⁶⁵ Why should the lesson be that “we all have to work together,” given the people of Flint *did* work together – painstakingly – for years, without restitution? Would not a better lesson to take away from this crisis be that government needs to no longer systematically deny the calls for accountability made by its black constituents?

Perhaps this would be the lesson conveyed if there was sufficient room for black expressions of grievance in the public imagination. But a clear signal is sent to African Americans when the most important figure of the political party almost uniformly supported by black people uses the Flint water crisis as an occasion to tout the goodwill of black people, but not to affirm the pain, anguish and, yes, the *anger* felt by black people across the nation over this crisis.

None of the passages highlighted here are exceptional. Far from it, these are in fact archetypal of the racialized patterns of distinction in

⁶³ Egan and Anderson (2016).

⁶⁴ Clinton (2016).

⁶⁵ United Nations Office of the High Commissioner (2016).

the political messaging made to black and white audiences. Mainstream political discourses regularly bracket off issues faced specifically or disproportionately by black people as lower-order issues compared to those perceived to affect more “everyday Americans.” This bracketing has the effect of excluding black people from the public imagination when considering whose issues matter and why. At the same time, the needs and demands of white people are privileged, because in the public consciousness, no group better fits the image of everyday Americans than whites.

The consequence of this pattern of discourse is to signal loud and clear to African Americans that their demands of government will not be given the same prioritization afforded to whites, with whom they are consistently positioned as being in zero-sum competition. Their grievances will not be given the same level of attentiveness and concern as the grievances expressed by their white counterparts. Finally, their calls for distinct interventions to meet their specific needs will be met with resistance. This resistance will be justified on the grounds that no one group can be prioritized in politics – ironic, given that the very needs upon which black people make their demands result from centuries of policies that systematically prioritized groups over African Americans.⁶⁶

For these reasons, the response of many rank-and-file black people to calls from mainstream actors to get angry over political threats – be it during the Occupy movement, the Sanders revolution or the incoming Trump administration – are met with shrugs, smirks and eye rolls rather than clenched fists and flared nostrils. For many black people such calls ring hollow. Adhering to a collective sentiment of resignation shaped by discourses that emphasize the illegitimacy of black demands and the danger of black expressions of grievance, members of the group become numb to the sudden calls to rise up in anger over threats that have constituted their reality. As a result, a racial anger gap manifests in the immediate emotional reactions of white and black Americans to threats within the political environment.

Does the outsized role of positive appeals in messaging to black audiences augment the effect of enthusiasm on African Americans’ political behavior? Given the prevalence of such messaging and its resonance with tenets of black racial consciousness and spiritual life, it is possible

⁶⁶ Katzenbach (2005).




FIGURE 2.6 Mean reports of enthusiasm toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Democrats. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. No controls.

that black people are uniquely receptive to them. Chapter 5 examines in depth whether enthusiasm is distinctly mobilizing for African Americans. But an initial observation of trends from national survey data suggests that the racial anger gap is not compensated for by a commiserate racial enthusiasm advantage. Similar to the graph displayed in Chapter 1, I present trends from the American National Election Study (ANES). Figures 2.6 and 2.7 display the mean combined reports of hope and pride expressed toward the incumbents and major-party candidates in the respective presidential races from self-identified Democrats and Republicans, respectively.

Racial ebbs and flows in expressions of positive emotions are clearly apparent among both self-identified Democrats and Republicans. Overall, the racial differences are minuscule. Across the nearly 40-year period, mean enthusiasm expressed by black Democrats registers at 44.8, compared to 45.8 for white Democrats.

Similarly, for black Republicans the mean enthusiasm rate is 49.9, compared to 51.4 for their white partisan counterparts. These initial trends suggest that the appeals to positivity so prevalent in mainstream




FIGURE 2.7 Mean reports of enthusiasm toward presidential incumbents and candidates from self-identified Republicans. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. No controls.

political appeals to African Americans are more effective at inhibiting expression of black anger than priming black enthusiasm.⁶⁷

The Anger Gap at Work: Preliminary Evidence from the RAP Study

I have inferred the ways in which African Americans by and large respond to the signaling they receive about the urgency of their demands and the legitimacy of their grievances. But do these inferences actually capture how every day black people make sense of and generate emotional responses to the political phenomena constantly bombarding them? Insights into this are provided from the RAP Study.

The RAP Study contained an experimental component in the form of an emotion induction exercise. This exercise was adapted from past psychological studies, including those conducted by the aforementioned

⁶⁷ The interaction of race and enthusiasm in shaping political behavior is explored in depth in Chapter 5.

Banks and Valentino.⁶⁸ In this induction, RAP participants are asked to reflect on a past experience or instance that made them feel angry, and are prompted to write in detail about that experience. In addition to the written prompt, participants view a corresponding image of people vividly expressing anger. The combination of viewing the image and engaging in the reflective writing is sufficient to actually make participants experience the emotion on which they are reflecting.

I created two distinct induction prompts, in order to determine whether black and white participants differed in their experiences with varying dimensions of anger. RAP Study participants were randomly assigned to either a *political anger* condition, a *racial anger* condition or a *control* condition.

Subjects in the political anger condition viewed an image of a mostly white crowd of angry constituents at a town hall meeting, along with the following prompt:

Above is a picture of angry constituents confronting public officials at a local town hall. Many people on both sides of the aisle have expressed anger over a political system that they believe is corrupt and ignores their needs. We would like you to take two minutes to describe in general things that make you feel angry about politics. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what it is that makes you angry and what it feels like to be angry about politics. Please describe the events that make you feel the angriest about politics.

Participants assigned to the racial anger condition viewed an image of African American protestors confronting police, along with the prompt:

Above is a picture of angry activists confronting police officers at a local protest. Many people on both sides of the issue have expressed anger over recent controversies involving police and treatment of racial minorities. We would like you to take two minutes to describe things in general that make you feel angry about racial controversies like policing. It is okay if you don't remember all the details, just be specific about what exactly it is that makes you angry and what it feels like to be angry about racial issues. Please describe the events that make you feel the angriest about racial issues.

Finally, participants in the control condition viewed an image of an empty suitcase, and were prompted to write about what they would pack on a vacation. These participants were not primed to feel any type of emotion, and thus served as the point of reference against which the political behaviors of participants in the emotion conditions were compared.

⁶⁸ Banks (2014); Banks and Valentino (2012); Lerner and Keltner (2000).

The responses of black and white participants in both the political and racial anger prompts revealed that the induction constituted in effect a racial Rorschach test. Collectively, black and white study participants processed each induction through vastly different lenses, and the racial patterns of reflective writing across conditions give strong indication that anger over political and racial issues indeed means something qualitatively different to black and white Americans.

Of the 150 black participants in the political anger condition, 23 (or 15 percent) explicitly rejected the call to reflect on what makes them angry. Many of their responses were similar to that of a 42-year-old woman who wrote: “Nothing really makes me angry to be honest. I have Jesus in my life. [T]hat is all I need. Man can’t do anything for me.”

This proportion may not seem like much. But of the 146 white participants in the political anger condition, only 11 (about 7 percent) explicitly declared that they simply do not get angry. Interestingly, none of the white participants who claimed to be made angry by politics made any mention of their religious faith, despite this being a recurrent theme among their black counterparts. Instead, they often expressed the belief that it was not their place to express anger over a domain in which they were not immersed. This sentiment is captured succinctly in the assertion by a 61-year-old man that “politics are for politicians.” Ironically, this was written in all caps; this white participant conveyed his lack of anger in type style signifying anger.

Thus, there is a subset of black participants that reject the call to express anger even after being explicitly asked to do so in a stakes-free setting. That subset is notably bigger than the subset of whites making a similar rejection. And among the black subset, many are explicitly linking their lack of anger to their Christian faith.

My purpose here is not to dive into empirical analysis of the observations from the experiment; this is reserved for Chapter 4. Here I aim to highlight the emotional discursive patterns in the written reflections of the subjects. These patterns indicate a unique reticence on the part of African Americans to express anger over politics. And further, the role of Christian faith in shaping many black people’s lives may indeed be fixing their gaze upon a racial Promised Land of salvation, thus further precluding them from perceiving anger to be a resource worth leveraging in their navigation of politics.

Another recurrent theme for black and white participants in the political anger condition is the differences in the respective groups’ reported objects of anger. White participants overwhelmingly identified specific

policy areas or actions by political actors at the national or local level that drew their ire. For instance, a 33-year-old man expressed anger over “[g]reedy politicians, get[ting] paid during government shutdowns, they don’t pay into social security but can take from it.” Or a 51-year-old woman who decried, “They don’t care about healthcare, Medicare, Medicaid, CHIP, social security, etc. because they will never have to rely on those [programs] like the majority of others in the US.”

A non-trivial proportion of black people also identified specific actions or policies that made them angry, as in the case of the 34-year-old man who wrote, “[w]hen the Illinois legislature failed to pass a budget because of personal agendas, I was pissed off.” But overall, African Americans’ expressions of anger were rooted more in broad-based assessments of the political system. More than a third of black participants explicitly cited issues related to race as the objects of their anger, compared to only 6 percent of whites.⁶⁹ Some of these black participants did not even make any direct connection to politics. For example, a 24-year-old man expressed anger over the stigmatization and appropriation of black culture.

The stuff that makes me angry is for blacks to still be treated less respectfully and not be liked upon because of our skin color. Someone outside of my race does a hairstyle, it’s trendy. But if my race does it, it’s a disgrace.

Similarly, a 22-year-old woman expressed anger not over any specific political phenomenon, but rather her perception that both black and Latina/o Americans have a generally harder time than whites.

The way blacks and Hispanics are treated unfairly with no right to anything basic that the white American will get without stress. Having to work twice as hard to earn half the reward and constantly living in fear.⁷⁰

These expressions of frustration over the systemic treatment of African Americans illustrate why the black participants perceive their racial group to have such little agency within politics, relative to their white counterparts. And reading in their own words how these individuals feel their group is consistently marginalized – whether in politics, the economy or popular culture – provides helpful context for understanding

⁶⁹ Of the 150 black participants in the *politics* condition, 50 made explicit mention of racial issues, compared to 9 out of 146 white participants.

⁷⁰ This sense of frustration with broad, systemic patterns of discrimination was not expressed only by younger black participants, as evidenced by the 69-year-old woman who simply wrote “racism.”

TABLE 2.3 *Black RAP Study participants' views on racial discrimination. Total number of respondents in each category, with column percentages in parentheses*

	Agree	Don't Agree
Dealing with racial discrimination is a constant source of stress for me	259 (54%)	213 (45.1%)
No matter how much racial progress is made, discrimination will always affect the lives of black people	382 (81.1%)	89 (18.9%)
I feel a responsibility to my racial group to stay calm in the face of discrimination	345 (73.9%)	127 (26.9%)

why many black people may feel demobilized rather than riled up in anger over the political threats they encounter.

Table 2.3 displays black subjects' responses to a number of pre-treatment questions about how they navigate race.

A large majority of black RAP Study participants feel regularly stressed by racial discrimination. They generally feel as though discrimination will always affect black people. And a large majority feels an obligation to remain *calm* in the face of discrimination. All of these indicators paint a picture of black people as generally conveying a sentiment of resignation rather than anger in the face of threat. It should come as no surprise, then, that black subjects' reflections as part of the anger induction treatment coming after these questions would reflect that resignation, in contrast to the indignation displayed by so many white subjects.

The reflections of white and black people receiving the *racial* anger prompt further sharpen this image in contrast. A prevailing pattern among white subjects is anger expressed over their beliefs that black people expected special treatment from the government, as in the case of the 34-year-old man who said:

I feel like Blacks think because of what happened over 200 yrs ago that now they are owed a free ride to do anything they want without any problems coming back at them!!! WRONG!! I think you have to work hard to have what you want not say gimme. [G]et real.

Many others countered claims of unjust treatment of racial minorities with cries of "all lives matter" or "blue lives matter." These expressions demonstrate just how much the belief that black claims to racial redress are illegitimate is engrained within the public consciousness. With so

many whites espousing this belief, even across party lines, it should come as no surprise that appeals to anger based on white grievance have been so prevalent in politics. As a result, it can be better understood how anger in politics is so often the domain of white Americans.

Meanwhile, African Americans receiving the *racial anger* prime generally placed focus on the immutability of their condition as a racially subjugated group. In stark contrast to white participants such as the man quoted above, who asserted that racial oppression ended centuries ago, black reflections were generally aligned with those of a 24-year-old man who articulated the far-reaching reverberating effects of slavery into the present day.

The police brutality is militarized slavery. Simply put. There is no need to be fully suited in kill gear for simple policing. Further, what ticks me off is the treatment of the offending officers by law. We have seen proof of officers being in the wrong and still go Scott free. This country will never be an ally of the black man or woman. The systematic vehicles of oppression plus the post traumatic slavery syndrome and mental colonization perpetuate these events into continuity. *We just need to work together more and police ourselves* (emphasis mine).

The last sentence here is especially telling. After diagnosing the country's racial ills, this individual does not *lash out*, but rather, *turns inward*, placing the onus on his racial group to step up its collective efforts to endure the systemic injustices he just identified. Rather than maintain his gaze on the racial inequities and generate a righteous fury over it, he turns his gaze toward the black community, and asks that community to solemnly soldier through the wilderness of racial strife. Is he essentially following the script offered by mainstream political messaging to black audiences? Or is he following the lead of black leaders who assert African Americans must practice self-sufficiency and resilience if they are to survive a racially stratified system?

We see in the words of this set of everyday black and white Americans the consequences of the racialized patterns of political discourse highlighted throughout this chapter. From white Americans emerges the sentiment that specific policies, platforms or actors they do not like are worth getting angry about. Further, whites by and large convey the sentiment that the system is fair *for everyone*, meaning the demands for racial redress made by African Americans are generally unjustified. Gleaned from black Americans is the sense that American society has always been and will always continue to be racially oppressive. This perception

generally animates a sentiment of resignation that inhibits anger in the face of the threats identified by black people.

As illuminating as these observations are, they remain simply anecdotal. In the next chapter, the racial anger gap is shown to exist not just in the open-ended responses of a few hundred individuals, but in the general expressions and actions of nationally representative sets of black and white people across multiple eras, spanning nearly the past 40 years. How has this anger gap shaped black and white patterns of electoral participation over the years? And how has this gap shaped the national fortunes of the two major parties vying for power?

3

The Anger Gap and Turnout in American Politics

The year was 1984 and, in a now-famous television advertisement, the campaign to re-elect presidential incumbent Ronald Reagan declared it was “morning in America.” Over a montage of heartening images of people rising to prepare for their workday, getting married and raising an American flag, a narrator’s voice asserted that people “can look forward with confidence to the future.”

But not everyone viewed Reagan’s rise to the White House as the dawn of a prosperous new era. The Reagan administration (and that of his immediate successor, George H. W. Bush) presided over massive federal spending cuts that left urban city cores bereft of needed resources. Reagan appointed opponents of affirmative action to lead the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Civil Rights Commission. Such actions caused the National Urban League to report in 1982 that the economic rights of black Americans were subject to the strongest attack since the organization began making annual reports on the state of black America.¹ It may have been morning in white America; but it felt like dusk in black America.

While launching his bid for the Democratic presidential nomination on January 16, 1984, black civil rights icon Reverend Jesse Jackson offered a pointed diagnosis of Reagan’s landslide 1980 victory.

Reagan won the last time not by genius. Reagan won when we were asleep. He won by the margin of despair. He won by the margin, the fracture of our coalition, he won by the margin of racial division, he won by default.²

¹ Denton (1982).

² Jackson (1984).




FIGURE 3.1 Rates of black and white turnout in presidential elections, 1976–2016. Data from US Census Current Population Study.

Is there something to Jackson's assertion that Reagan first ascended to the presidency by *the margin of despair*? Looking back on Reagan's deployment of implicit racial appeals during the 1980 campaign, one can reasonably conclude his campaign team sought to animate white grievance to mobilize votes. Yet, I argue, it was not despair that Reagan effectively activated with these racial appeals, but white anger. As this chapter will make clear, that white anger has proven particularly effective at swinging election outcomes, particularly because an accompanying anger has not been leveraged to electoral action by comparable proportions of black voters during this and other eras.

Anger in Electoral Politics, in Black and White

Before proceeding to show that the racial anger gap is an actual, observable phenomenon that spans the nation, as well as multiple recent eras of politics, I want to revisit a figure first shown in Chapter 1 – the rates of presidential election turnout for black and white Americans over the past 40 years.

With two exceptions, in every year during which there is a Republican presidential incumbent, the white–black turnout gap actually widens. The first exception is 1984, during which Jesse Jackson’s first presidential run energized the black voter base, causing surges in registration and turnout during the primaries that had carry-over effects for the national election.³ The second exception is 2008, which is the year of Obama’s breakthrough election.

As a group staunchly supportive of the Democratic Party, during many of the years in which black people should be most motivated to replace the incumbent administration, black turnout actually lags behind the turnout of whites. The two exceptions point to years in which black people would be distinctly motivated by senses of optimism and pride rather than aversion to threat.

Could these turnout trends reflect the fact that black and white Americans – specifically self-identified Democrats – differ in their emotional responses to the partisan regimes they oppose? To what extent is this turnout gap resonant with an anger gap, wherein being mad as hell mobilizes white partisans to vote, while black partisans remain relatively unfazed?

To answer these questions I turn to the American National Election Study (ANES), a nationally representative survey of the political views and actions of Americans conducted every presidential election year. Findings from the ANES yield two meaningful observations. Across these political eras, African Americans are generally expressing less anger toward presidential figures than whites. The same disparity is apparent when focusing solely on Democrats, the partisan affiliation with which the lion’s share of black respondents identify. Most notably, among those partisans, anger expressed has a strong and positive effect on the likelihood of white partisans to vote. Yet expressed anger has no effect on black Democrats’ likelihood of voting. Thus, a racial anger gap emerges not only in the activation of anger among black and white Americans, but also in the translation of that anger to electoral action. What are the consequences of this multidimensional anger gap for black electoral politics?

As noted in Chapter 1, since the year 1980, the ANES has asked participants whether the presidential incumbent and the major-party presidential candidates have made them feel each of the following

³ Tate (1991).

emotions: angry, afraid, proud and hopeful.⁴ I conducted logistic regression analyses to examine the racial anger gap in respondents' expressions of anger toward all presidential incumbents and candidates, from the Reagan through Obama eras.⁵ My dependent variable is a simple dichotomous measure of whether or not the respondent expressed anger toward presidential figures in a given year. My independent variable is a dichotomous measure of whether the respondent is black or white.

To ensure the racial differences in reported anger are attributable to the systematic racial differences in the groups' respective senses of expectation, emotional sentiment and perceived currency of expressing anger, I include a host of control variables in the model. I account for the demographic factors of age, gender and whether or not the respondent lives in the South. Additionally, I include education attained and household income as indicators of the material resources respondents have at their disposal to participate in politics. I include as indicators of respondents' psychological and social engagement with politics and their communities the measures of party identification, strength of party identification, distrust in politics, external efficacy and frequency of religious service attendance. Finally, I control for respondents' approval of the presidential incumbent, and other emotions expressed toward partisans – fear, hope and pride.⁶

The range of demographic, resource and engagement variables accounted for have long been employed in models investigating individual political behavior.⁷ I include these measures in my models because as indicators of one's capacity and inclination to participate in politics, they are also likely indicators of one's level of emotional investment in politics. It is critical to demonstrate that the racial anger gap is not simply a smokescreen for racial differences in respondents' possession of material resources or their interest in politics. By including measures of these factors in the models, I can pinpoint the role of race in shaping emotional responses to the figures and administrations of varying political eras, among individuals otherwise equivalent in political resources, motivations and affiliations.

⁴ The Appendix to this chapter contains full question wording for these emotion measures, as well as the turnout measure used in all ANES analyses.

⁵ I examine the Trump era in full later in this chapter, while employing a different data set.

⁶ All dependent, independent and control variables have been rescaled to range in value from 0 to 1.

⁷ Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995).

TABLE 3.1 *Effect of race on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown*

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Black	-0.09 (0.24)	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.08 (0.21)	-0.11 (0.18)	-0.50* (0.22)	-0.71** (0.25)	-0.47 (0.30)	-0.29 (0.25)	-0.05 (0.14)
Obs.	1138	1577	1513	1960	1370	1243	900	895	2785

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 3.1 presents the main effects of respondent race on respondents' likelihood of expressing anger across each election year.⁸ As indicated by the negative coefficients for respondent race, across each year black respondents are less likely than their white counterparts to express anger. Only in the years of 1996 and 2000 does this racial difference reach the conventional level of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$), thus indicating that African Americans were least inclined toward anger during the Clinton incumbency years. A visual representation of this racial anger gap across the years in this time period is displayed in Figure 3.2. The lines depict black and white respondents' respective likelihoods of expressing anger toward the incumbents and candidates, with all control variables set at their means. For the entire era, African Americans are five percentage points less likely than whites to express anger; although consistent with the table results, the anger gap is indeed widest under the Clinton years.

Under the Clinton administration, black median household income rose by more than twice the rate of other households, and the black unemployment rate was reduced by nearly half.⁹ The pronounced racial anger gap arising during this era, therefore, appears to be an apt reflection of the relative satisfaction African Americans generally felt with the political environment. But by this same logic, the strong indicators of black discontent with Republican administrations should manifest in greater expressions of anger relative to whites. Yet shifting the gaze to black and white Democrats reveals no such connection between black expressions of discontent and their expressions of anger.

⁸ For greater ease of comprehension, in the main text I only display the regression results for my main variables of interest. Full model results for the duration of the time period, including main effects and standard errors for control variables, available in the Appendix to this chapter.

⁹ Kurtzleben (2016).




FIGURE 3.2 Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

It is important to account for individuals' partisanship when exploring the racial anger gap in electoral politics. Partisanship exerts an unquestionable influence on how individuals navigate politics, from directing their vote choice and policy preferences to shaping their impressions of political actors across the political spectrum. People sharing a partisan attachment can be expected to hold generally similar views toward political regimes, symbols, actors and policies. Thus, when comparing the emotional responses of white and black Democrats to the presidential figures of past eras, the differences that emerge can be attributed to distinct emotional sentiments, rather than dramatically divergent views or impressions of those figures.

Additionally, because an overwhelming proportion of African Americans sampled in this survey identify as Democrats, the set of white Americans most apt as a point of comparison is those sharing the same political affiliation.¹⁰

¹⁰ Presidential approval is a four-category measure scaled from 0 to 1: 0 = strongly disapprove; 0.33 = slightly disapprove; 0.66 = slightly approve; 1 = strongly approve.

TABLE 3.2 *Effect of race on likelihood of self-identified Democrats to express anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown*

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Black	-0.09 (0.26)	-0.07 (0.22)	-0.18 (0.25)	-0.08 (0.21)	-0.63** (0.24)	-0.65* (0.27)	-0.47 (0.30)	-0.48 (0.30)	-0.19 (0.15)
Obs.	572	747	716	987	726	632	444	563	1471

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 3.2 presents the main effects of respondent race on self-identified Democrats' likelihood of expressing anger across each election year.¹¹ The results for Democrats mirror those for the entire sample. Across each year, black Democrats are less likely to express anger, but the racial difference is only statistically distinguishable from zero in the years 1996 ($p < 0.01$) and 2000 ($p < 0.05$).

The racial differences in Democrats' expressions of anger are illustrated in Figure 3.3. Across the entire time period black Democrats are about five percentage points less likely to express anger. Again, there is virtually no difference between the Democratic subset and the entire sample.

Why should a difference of just five points be considered meaningful? To grapple fully with the magnitude of this difference requires interpreting it in light of the indicators of black and white Democrats' satisfaction – or lack thereof – with the presidential regimes of this era. One of those indicators is Democrats' reported approval of the various incumbents. Figure 3.4 compares black and white Democrats' mean levels of approval for presidential incumbents across every election year between 1980 and 2012.

Clear patterns are evident from these approval scores. With the exceptions of 1996, 2004 and 2008, the racial differences are significant at the 0.05 alpha level. Black Democrats tend to view the presidents of their "home team" much more favorably than their white counterparts. Conversely, they are much more disapproving of Republican incumbents than whites. When viewing black Democrats' high rates of disapproval for Republicans in the context of the ominous report of the National Urban League or the comments by Reverend Jackson about the margin

¹¹ Sample includes those who identify as Independents but lean Democratic. Full regression results available in the Appendix to this chapter.




FIGURE 3.3 Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates among self-identified Democrats, across respondent race. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 3.4 Self-identified Democrats' mean approval of presidential incumbents from 1980 through 2012, across respondent race. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. No controls.

of despair, one can intuit that this set of black partisans senses a particular vulnerability to these out-partisan regimes. That vulnerability in turn should make the specter of Republican presidencies more of a threat to black Democrats than their white Democratic counterparts.

Further, the strong affinity that African Americans express toward Democratic incumbents means this group feels a particularly precipitous decline in satisfaction when moving from a Democratic to a Republican regime. These approval scores emphasize the notion that a Democratic or Republican presidential administration appears to carry starker consequences for black Democrats. In light of these observations, we can reconsider the magnitude of that five-point anger gap. Black Democrats are expressing anger under these incumbents at rates either equivalent to or slight lower than their white partisan counterparts, despite exhibiting significantly greater discontent under those incumbents. Somehow that discontent is failing to translate to a commiserate display of anger.

Could the greater discontent registered by black Democrats be translating to a negative emotion other than anger? I have argued that the sentiment of resignation characterizing the general disposition of African Americans toward politics is driven in large part by the group's collective perception that it lacks agency within politics. Appraisal theories of emotion indicate that within a context of threat, such lack of agency is more likely to generate an emotional response of fear than anger.

It is not the case, however, that African Americans in the ANES exhibit an abundance of fear in lieu of their relative lack of anger. Figure 3.5 displays black and white Democrats' respective likelihoods of expressing fear toward the incumbents and candidates, with all control variables set at their means.

Across the entire time period, there is no discernible racial difference in reported fear. Both black and white Democrats exhibit a 52.8-percent likelihood of reporting fear. The racial anger gap, therefore, appears to be more reflective of African Americans showing emotional restraint in the face of their discontent, rather than expressing fear.

The relative paucity of anger expressed by African Americans across the Reagan and Bush eras is made all the more striking when taking into consideration the fraught racial politics that defined these respective regimes. By taking some time to assess how race colored the rhetoric and policy agendas of Republican regimes during this time period, I highlight how the racial anger gap uncovered here is a direct reflection of a political discursive space that champions expressions of anger from white




FIGURE 3.5 Predicted probabilities of reporting fear toward presidential incumbents and candidates among self-identified Democrats, across respondent race. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

Americans while simultaneously delegitimizing black claims for governmental redress.

White Grievance, Black Pain: The Racial Politics of Republicanism, 1980–2008

During a 1980 campaign speech delivered in Philadelphia, Mississippi – just seven miles from the site of the high-profile slayings of three Civil Rights workers – presidential candidate Ronald Reagan declared “I believe in states’ rights.”¹² The location choice and the direct appropriation of language long used by racial segregationists sent a clear message to black Americans: this regime would be at best indifferent and at worst openly hostile to the needs and demands of African Americans.

And Reagan had honed and refined this just-so-subtle messaging over a decades-long political career. This was apparent in his campaign promise as California gubernatorial candidate in 1966 to invalidate the

¹² Jackson Jr. (2004).

Fair Housing Act, asserting that “if an individual wants to discriminate against Negroes or others in selling or renting his house, he has a right to do so.”¹³ It was also evident in his repeated references during the 1976 presidential campaign to the notorious “welfare queen,” wherein Reagan employed racially evocative (and factually exaggerated) language to describe a woman from “Chicago’s South Side” abusing the system to rake in six-figures’-worth of unearned money.¹⁴ By 1980, black Americans were keenly aware of the threats to their well-being signaled by Reagan’s campaign appeals.¹⁵

As Chapter 2 made clear, the racial narratives invoked in political messages influence white and black Americans’ collective senses of entitlement, agency and belonging within the political system, which in turn shapes their emotional and behavioral responses to the system. But the messaging from political elites also matters because it signals their policy agendas – what – or more appropriately *who* – they will champion, and what or who they will dismiss. Sure enough, the racial policy agenda of the Reagan and Bush administrations matched the racial rhetoric of the Reagan campaign.

I mentioned earlier some of the actions of the Reagan/Bush administrations that had deleterious effects on African Americans’ collective economic standing. But black vulnerability extended far beyond the economic realm during this time period. The acceleration of Richard Nixon’s War on Drugs policies contributed to mass incarceration of black men and women.¹⁶ The 1990 National Defense Authorization Act signed into law by George H. W. Bush spurred the equipping of local police forces with military-grade weaponry and armor, a factor that reverberates in present tensions between police and minority communities.¹⁷ The persistent silence emanating from the Reagan White House as the HIV/AIDS crisis ravaged people with the stigma of being either gay or intravenous drug users had a disproportionately harmful impact on African Americans.¹⁸

¹³ Yglesias (2007).

¹⁴ Black and Sprague (2016).

¹⁵ This is to say nothing of the infamous Willie Horton ads employed to great effect by Bush affiliates in 1988. See Mendelberg (2001) for an exhaustive review of this campaign ad and its effects on white voters’ decision making.

¹⁶ John (2014).

¹⁷ Roller (2014).

¹⁸ Gavett (2012).

This is but a small sample of the policies from the Reagan/Bush era that were uniquely felt by black America. Especially notable are the dual purposes of the racial appeals employed by Reagan and Bush that set the tone for this policy environment. Such messages reinforced to black people the illegitimacy of their needs and demands, while simultaneously validating and activating white grievance. Whether the appeals implored whites to direct their ire toward black people abusing the welfare system, violent black criminals taking advantage of a weak penal system to terrorize white families or federal legislation protecting minority interests at the perceived expense of whites – as in the case of Reagan decrying the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as “humiliating to the South” – they are clearly intended to provoke whites’ anger over perceived racial injustices within the political system.¹⁹

During the Reagan/H. W. Bush era, Republicans yielded beneficial electoral returns from their rhetorical strategy of activating white anger. White turnout increased by about seven percentage points between 1984 and 1992, compared to an increase of just 1 percent among black voters. The racial anger gap is manifest in this widening voting disparity. While the Republican Party effectively made white voters see red and come to the polls in droves, the Democratic Party failed to counter with a mobilization strategy that could make its black voter base translate its perceptions of threat from Republican incumbents to a similarly mobilizing anger.²⁰

The George W. Bush era, the other Republican regime captured within this time period, was characterized by a rhetorical shift away from dog-whistle racial appeals. In its place was a kinder, gentler branding of the conservative policy agenda. This “compassionate conservatism” may not have directly targeted African Americans for demonization,²¹ but black people still felt the ire of the Bush administration’s policies and actions. In his treatise on the state of black politics since the turn of the century, Michael C. Dawson offers succinct summary of the many ways the Bush era produced outputs inimical to black interests:

¹⁹ Iglesias (2007).

²⁰ On the contrary, during this time Democratic strategists were conceiving of ways to pivot the party away from its strong associations with African Americans, the LGBT community and labor – all groups viewed unfavorably in the public consciousness. See Smith (1996).

²¹ Douthat and Salam (2009).

In the first several years of the 21st century, African Americans became increasingly despondent about the potential for achieving racial justice in the nation as they saw their views on the country's central issues – such as the 2000 presidential election, the Iraq War, the legitimacy of anti-war protest, and their evaluation of the Katrina disaster – overwhelmingly rejected, ridiculed and demonized by white Americans.²²

Registering anger in a survey constitutes a small but legible expression of African Americans' visceral displeasure toward an administration steadfast in its dismissal of their demands and its discounting of their needs. The outcome of the 2000 election, perceived by many black people as unjust.²³ The unimpeded march to a war strongly opposed by black people.²⁴ The scale of tragedy in Katrina-ravaged New Orleans being heightened by insufficient governmental intervention. Any of these would be expected to elicit an incensed response from African Americans. But no such response is uncovered here; on the contrary, the anger gap reflects an emotionally muted response of black people to this and other racially hostile regimes.

The contrasting effects of these regimes on the emotional dispositions of black and white partisans comes into clearer focus when exploring the anger reported by white Republicans during this time period. Figure 3.6 displays the respective likelihoods of reporting anger toward presidential figures from black Democrats, white Democrats and white Republicans between 1980 and 2012, with all control variables set at their means.

As illustrated by the slopes of the respective lines, both sets of partisans exhibit more anger when the presidential incumbent is a member of the party they oppose. But expressed anger from white Republicans under Democratic incumbents exceeds anger reported by white and black Democrats under Republican regimes by about seven and ten points, respectively. The rhetoric and politics of white grievance indeed appear to have been effective at activating anger among white Republicans, a group for whom such signaling should prove particularly resonant. And yet, African Americans, the group targeted in the crossfire of that signaling throughout this era, have not responded in kind with an uptick in anger.

²² Dawson (2011).

²³ Avery (2007).

²⁴ Jones (2003).




FIGURE 3.6 Predicted probabilities of reporting anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates across respondent race and party affiliation. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

The Anger Gap at the Intersections of Identity

The question remains of whether some sets of African Americans exhibit a greater anger gap across these years than others. How might the intersection of racial archetypes with prevailing gender norms affect the anger gap for women compared to men? Should the racial anger gap be less palpable among younger people, who tend to be less conformant to social norms and more impulsive? Finally, how does the racial anger gap intersect with socioeconomic status? Specifically, would African Americans with higher educational attainment perceive a greater risk to being stigmatized as an *angry black person*? Or would this group perceive an acute sense of racial unjustness that makes them more willing to express anger?

The data from this study provides some insight. I ran separate regressions for white and black respondents in the sample, examining the effects of three dichotomous variables on their likelihood of reporting feeling anger toward incumbents and candidates: gender ($1 = \text{woman}$), age ($1 = \text{younger than } 30$) and possession of a four-year college degree

TABLE 3.3 *Effects of gender, age and education on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown*

	Black	White
Women	0.10 (0.10)	0.07 [^] (0.04)
Under 30	-0.00 (0.10)	0.02 (0.04)
College degree	0.29 [^] (0.15)	0.34*** (0.05)
Obs.	2326	13,562

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

(1 = college degree). Table 3.3 presents the main effects of these factors for black and white respondents, respectively. Regression results are displayed for the entire time period, and include the same set of control variables.

I focus first on how gendered norms might augment the racial anger gap for black women. When the public imagination conceptualizes the demonization or persecution of African Americans, it tends to focus disproportionately on the toll on black men. Black men are often centered in discussions and debates about widespread unemployment or mass incarceration of black people, or instances of unarmed black civilians killed in encounters with police. This centering often erases from the public view the experiences of black women, are also disproportionately denied access to work opportunities, ensnared in the carceral state and whose deaths at the hands of officers do not as often inspire trending hashtags demanding justice.

Perhaps a larger anger gap exhibited by black women – however slight – is reflective of the marginalizing of black women's grievances in the few spaces within which black grievance is actually reckoned? Perhaps relative to their male counterparts black women perceive even less of the sense of entitlement to getting their demands heard that animates anger in times of threat.

As shown in the first row of Table 3.3, among black respondents, gender has a null effect on reporting anger, indicating that black men and women are actually no different in their likelihoods of reporting anger during this time period. But among white respondents, women are more

likely than men to report anger – a difference that falls just short of one-tailed significance ($p = 0.052$). White women here appear to flout the gendered norms that signal they should exhibit demureness rather than indignation. Yet this willingness to see red over politics, in spite of those gendered conventions, is not shared by their black women counterparts.

Turning to age, do young black respondents display any of the anecdotal brashness and lack of susceptibility to social norms that constantly provoke hand wringing from older generations? Far from viewing such brashness as problematic, I would view it as promising. Younger black people may feel less burdened by the stigma of being labeled *angry while black*. Further, black youth may not yet have reached a state of disillusion over the failing of the political system to adequately reckon with black people's distinct needs and demands. Thus, whereas older black people – who are perhaps more seasoned in the way of disappointment – may react to viable political threats with an experience-hardened sense of resignation, younger black could people react with more of the entitlement-fueled indignation that fans the flames of anger among whites across age cohorts.

If there is indeed any mitigation of the racial anger gap among younger cohorts, it is not to be found here. Black and white respondents are alike in that neither exhibits a statistically distinguishable relationship between age and expressing anger. Whereas this analysis gives no indication that younger African Americans are more likely to express anger over politics, when the focus shifts to the 2016 election, a different story is told.

Finally, what role does education play in moderating the racial anger gap? It is important to note that among both black and white respondents, those with college degrees are *more* likely to express anger than those without. This observation strikes against an all-too-common refrain from pundits who bemoan the fact that people feel their way through politics rather than utilizing their rational sensibilities. Yes, anger is tied to impulsivity and greater willingness to take risks. But anger and other emotions are not simply the reserve of the unthinking or unrefined. People can see red while still seeing clearly and thoughtfully.

Having said that, the education-anger linkage appears to be notably stronger for white than black respondents. The positive association between possession of a college degree and likelihood of reporting anger is marginally significant ($p = 0.051$) for black respondents, yet strongly significant ($p < 0.001$) for whites. What could this weaker relationship imply about African Americans and anger? One, more educated black people may be more acutely aware of the lack of the responsiveness of

the political system to the needs of black people, ultimately inhibiting their anger in response to political adversity. Two, this set of African Americans may be most hesitant to endure the stigma of being labeled *angry while black*.

Considering the intersections of the racial anger gap with these social identities illustrates that the gap cannot be dismissed as a phenomenon limited to some small, anti-intellectual faction of the electorate. Political anger is being expressed by people across all ages and education levels. People on both sides of the aisle and across multiple eras. Women and men alike. And, as shown by Figure 3.7, across all of these categorizations black people are less inclined to express anger than whites. Figure 3.7 displays black and white respondents' respective likelihoods of expressing anger toward presidential figures, across gender, age and education. Across each measure of these identities, black respondents report less anger than their white counterparts; although it is worth noting these differences are within the margin of error.

The Other Side of the Anger Gap: Translating Emotion to Action

The disparity in the anger reported from black and white respondents in this study constitutes only one element of the anger gap. The other element comes into view when examining the influence of anger on respondents' likelihood of voting. To assess how anger translates to turnout for black and white respondents, I ran logistic regression models predicting the effect of respondents' reports of anger toward the out-partisan incumbents and candidates. I ran these models for black Democrats, white Democrats and white Republicans. The models include the same set of control variables, which demonstrates the power of emotions to compel electoral behavior above and beyond the demographic, resource and engagement factors typically associated with participation. Table 3.4 displays the main effects and standard errors for out-partisan anger for the three groups, across each year. The final column shows the overall effect of anger on turnout for the entire time period.

As the first two rows make clear, expressed anger toward Republicans carries very different effects on the turnout of black and white Democrats. For the African American set of partisans, anger is only significantly associated with voting in the 1992 election ($p < 0.05$). In six of the nine years, the coefficient effect on anger is exceeded by its standard error. Additionally, in six of those years, the coefficient on anger is negative. For




FIGURE 3.7 Marginal effects of gender, age and education attained on respondents' likelihoods of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 3.7 (cont.)

TABLE 3.4 *Effect of out-partisan anger on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown*

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	Total
Black	-0.85 (0.66)	-0.91 (0.66)	-0.20 (0.52)	1.33* (0.56)	-0.35 (0.58)	0.42 (0.70)	0.12 (0.80)	-0.25 (0.52)	-0.27 (0.38)	0.03 (0.15)
Democrats				95	126	150	184	111	102	105
Obs.								202	408	1483
White	0.56* (0.28)	0.02 (0.27)	0.26 (0.29)	0.34 (0.26)	0.19 (0.34)	0.43 (0.34)	1.19* (0.29)	-0.16 (0.51)	0.36 (0.48)	0.40*** (0.09)
Democrats				445	554	464	695	524	448	275
Obs.								214	628	4247
White	-0.20 (0.42)	0.09 (0.25)	0.29 (0.27)	0.11 (0.25)	-0.49 (0.39)	0.31 (0.39)	0.34 (0.31)	0.10 (0.41)	-0.10 (0.55)	0.16 (0.39)
Republicans				392	614	592	667	483	424	332
Obs.								191	725	4420

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

the duration of the period, black Democrats' anger toward Republicans registers no observable impact on their likelihood of turning out ($p = 0.86$).

Among white Democrats, on the other hand, anger exhibits a positive and strongly or marginally significant relationship with turnout in two years, 1980 and 2004 ($p < 0.05$). There is a negative coefficient on anger in only one of the nine years, and the anger coefficient effect is exceeded by its standard error in only three of those years. For the duration of the time period, the effect of anger on white Democrats' likelihood of turning out is incredibly strong ($p < 0.001$).

These divergent trends should be assessed in the light of two previously established contexts. One, the indicators of greater black discontent with Republicans, as illustrated by the racial differences in approval scores. Two, the racial politics in which the Republican regimes of this era engaged, which both activated and leveraged white grievance and alienated and targeted the black body politic. Despite the increased vulnerability and greater expressed displeasure of African Americans to these regimes, they registered slightly less anger than their white partisan counterparts. Furthermore, the anger that was engendered from black Democrats toward the opposed party exerted no effect on their willingness to turnout. This is a stark contrast to the anger expressed by white Democrats, which exhibited an undeniably strong mobilizing effect on voting. From assessing the racial differences in both the activation of anger and in the translation of anger to voting, we can understand the real-world electoral consequences of the anger gap.

Interestingly, the effect of anger on turnout among white Republicans appears to fall somewhere between black and white Democrats. There is no year for which the effect of anger reaches one-tailed or two-tailed statistical significance. Anger has a negative coefficient in three of the nine years, and the coefficient size is exceeded by the standard error in six years. Yet, throughout the entire time period, anger carries a positive effect that is substantially more palpable for this group relative to black Democrats ($p = 0.104$).

Figure 3.8 illustrates the effects of anger on turnout across the three racial and partisan groups. Each line represents the change in turnout likelihood between those who do not express anger toward out-partisans and those who do, with all control variables set at their means.

Why is anger exerting a less-than-expected mobilizing force for Republicans? In large part because this group's turnout is so high to begin with. But among Democrats, anger distinguishes the patterns of participation between black and white Americans. White Democrats'




FIGURE 3.8 Marginal effect of anger expressed toward out-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation. Data from ANES, 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

anger both propels them to greater turnout and causes them to outpace the vote rate of their black co-partisans.

Again, this trend highlights the electoral consequences of the racial anger gap. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, rhetoric from the Democratic Party to and about black people illustrates an unwillingness to legitimize black political grievance, and a hesitation to activate black anger toward political action. The vanguards of the party with which most African Americans are affiliated prove time and time again to be content to make appeals to the group rooted in pride in past and current accomplishments or hope for a better tomorrow.

As a consequence, the uniquely powerful force of anger toward Republicans is limited to white Democrats. African Americans, who are increasingly important to the party's odds of winning elections, are not leveraging the political capital of anger to nearly the same degree. This in turn amounts to a clear limit on the party's potential. But if party leaders were willing to fully engage black discontent with politics, and to invite black Americans to see red, as white partisans are routinely invited to do,

perhaps anger would play a stronger mobilizing role in black electoral behavior. If black Democrats evidenced a turnout-stimulating effect of anger on a par with white Democrats, more electoral outcomes during the era under study could be swayed in Democrats' favor.

Seeing Red in the Twilight of Obama and the Dawn of “The Donald”

The Reagan era can be viewed as the apex of coded racial appeals being strategically employed to mobilize whites in anger in the post-Civil Rights era. Conversely, the George W. Bush era represents the gentler approach of compassionate conservatism, packaging a policy agenda generally detrimental to black interests in less directly hostile wrapping. So what is to be made of the immediate post-Obama era? The racial messaging from Republicans during the 2016 presidential campaign was an unwelcome throwback to past eras, in which black people were treated as bogeymen whose images were to be conjured up for the express purpose of activating a mobilizing resentment among whites. The signaling of Donald Trump embodied this regression.

The racial stereotypes that Ronald Reagan and his acolytes would allude to with knowing winks and nudges would be unabashedly proclaimed by Donald Trump. He routinely castigated black neighborhoods as war zones, asserting “[t]here are places in America that are among the most dangerous in the world. You go to places like Oakland. Or Ferguson. The crime numbers are worse [than in Iraq]. Seriously.”²⁵ In front of virtually all-white rally audiences, Trump severely overstated the extents of black poverty and joblessness, painting a picture of a group so destitute and hopeless it has literally nothing to lose in voting for him.²⁶

In remarks in Pennsylvania, Trump used coded language to imply that racially diverse parts of the state would produce “rigged” outcomes, declaring “we’re going to watch Pennsylvania – go down to certain areas and watch and study – make sure other people don’t come in and vote five times.”²⁷ Made without a shred of factual basis, these remarks belied a very real history of suppression of black enfranchisement. They also signaled implicit endorsement of voter intimidation efforts in minority polling locations.

²⁵ Bump (2016).

²⁶ Johnson (2016).

²⁷ Trickey (2016).

On the whole, these statements may not have generated as much intense media scrutiny as some of Trump's even more incendiary remarks about Latina/o and Muslim Americans. But nevertheless, they constituted a clear signal to African Americans that the Trump administration would show no hesitation to align firmly against black interests in order to maintain the support of a conservative white base becoming increasingly agitated by perceived minority gains made at the expense of whites. Indeed, white Americans have become more concerned about the scourge of racial discrimination – against *whites* – with an Obama-era study finding that the average white person views anti-white bias as a bigger problem than anti-black bias.²⁸

This sentiment fueled a post-Obama landscape in which white racial grievance seemed poised to be even more impactful in shaping racial patterns of participation than in the previous eras examined here. But what would be the prevailing emotional responses of African Americans to this fraught racial climate? As African Americans looked upon the political landscape, they saw growing numbers of whites expressing their resentment over being marginalized and ignored by identity politics. Many black people were exposed to mainstream discourses treating as up for debate the fundamental rights of black civilians when interacting with police. And they heard the Republican presidential candidate repeatedly make racial appeals so explicit they would have given the Gipper pause.

Would these developments constitute a breaking point? Would black people be moved to anger in larger droves than what was witnessed in previous political eras? Perhaps the successful election of a black individual as president would engender black people with a greater sense of collective political agency, which could carry over into the subsequent era. Anchored in this agency, perhaps black people could display a level of indignation rarely seen in modern politics. On the other hand, perhaps the fraught racial climate would once again be met with a collective sense of resignation.

To answer these questions, I turn to data from a different study conducted on national samples of white and black Americans soon after the 2016 presidential election, the Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). The CMPS is a web-administered survey of 10,145 respondents, including vote-registered, non-registered and non-citizen

²⁸ Norton and Sommers (2011).

individuals. The CMPS included a total of 3102 black respondents and 1034 white respondents.²⁹

This study asked participants to report how often they felt the following emotions over the course of the election season: anger, fear, sadness, pride and hopefulness. For each of these emotions, respondents choose between four options: “never,” “sometimes,” “often” and “all the time.”³⁰

This question offers a shift in the object of survey respondents’ reported emotions. No longer tied explicitly to the presidential incumbents and candidates of the era, this measure gives insight into the broader emotional sentiments conveyed by Americans in the dawn of the Trump era. This measure has the capacity to capture people’s reactions to the twists and turns of the campaign, the media portrayals of the race and its major players, or how their preferred candidates and parties fared. Yet, like seemingly so many facets of American life in 2016, people’s responses to these emotions questions served mainly as a referendum of their views on Donald Trump.

Figure 3.9 displays the differences in mean reported anger among CMPS respondents who viewed Trump and Clinton favorably and unfavorably, respectively.

People who did not like Trump reported feeling angry during the election quite frequently. Meanwhile, people who did not like Clinton exhibited the opposite pattern. Not surprisingly, the African Americans in the study view Trump more unfavorably than whites; this effect is present across party lines as well as when focusing solely on Democratic identifiers. Given the antipathy black people expressed toward Trump, would the anger gap present in previous eras still be existent in the emergent Trump era? The answer is a resounding yes.

Figure 3.10 is an odds ratio display revealing the extent of the racial anger gap between the same categorizations of black and white survey respondents examined earlier – first comparing all black and white respondents, followed by the key intersecting identities: women and men, then those under 30 versus those 30 and older, and finally those without four-year college degrees versus those with college degrees.

²⁹ Survey data are weighted within each racial group to match the population of the 2015 Census ACS one-year data file for age, gender, education, nativity, ancestry and voter registration status. Sample characteristics are displayed in Table A3.1 in the Appendix to this chapter, along with full question wording for the emotion and participation variables examined.

³⁰ Responses to this and all variables examined from the data are coded on a 0-to-1 scale.




FIGURE 3.9 Mean reported anger felt during 2016 election, across reported favorability toward Trump and Clinton. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). No controls.

The levels of anger reported by the white respondents are established as the baseline of one. The respective icons representing each set of black respondents reflect the groups' odds of reporting anger at the same frequency as their white counterparts. Icons to the left of the white baseline mean black respondents have *lower* odds of reporting anger levels equivalent to whites. The respective lines running through the icons represent the 95-percent confidence intervals.³¹

Every set of black respondents falls to the left of the white baseline, meaning that across every category, black people exhibit an anger gap. Again, this anger gap is observable even after accounting for a host of demographic, socioeconomic and political variables, such as household

³¹ These odds ratios are calculated via ordered logistic regression models that include as control variables the same set of demographic, resource and engagement variables employed in the analyses of the ANES data. In addition, these models include additional measures of respondents' political engagement and racial views, including: whether respondent was contacted by political elites, whether respondent was born in the US, interest in politics, internal efficacy, belief about whether economy has improved or worsened in past year, linked fate with other members of respondents' racial group and whether or not respondent has personally experienced discrimination. Full results displaying the effects of these coefficients are displayed in the Appendix to this chapter.




FIGURE 3.10 Odds ratios comparing black and white expressions of anger throughout 2016 election. Comparisons made across total sample, as well as between men and women, those under 30 and those 30 and older, and those with and without college degrees. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

income, partisanship, perceptions of racial discrimination and unfavorable views of both presidential candidates. Overall, black people are reporting anger at a rate about half as frequent as what whites are reporting. Given the broader scope of this emotion question, we can infer that even after the euphoria of the Obama era, and even in the face of the racial animus explicitly communicated by the Trump campaign, the black emotional sentiment is characterized more by resignation than indignation.³²

In a departure from the previous eras, the anger gap is slightly larger for black men than black women. The marginal increase in reports of anger from black women relative to men in 2016 should come as no surprise. In addition to perceiving threat as racial minorities, this group felt threatened as women. From the relentless gendered slanders of Hillary Clinton masquerading as legitimate criticisms to the causal dismissal of language describing sexual assault as “locker-room talk,” the

³² Further underscoring this point, black respondents once again are not reporting more fear relative to whites. In fact, black respondents report significantly less fear than whites. See Table A3.4 in the Appendix to this chapter for results of ordered logistic regression models for fear reports.

2016 campaign regularly surfaced both racial and gender fault lines in politics.³³ Caught in a crossfire of intersecting racial and gender-based threats, black women were a bit more willing than black men to tap into their reserve of political anger. This reduced anger gap maps on well with the election results, which identified black women as the most ardent and unified supporters of Clinton at the polls.³⁴

In this election season, younger black people exhibit a smaller anger gap relative to their older counterparts. In fact, younger black people are the only category for whom the line representing the 95-percent confidence interval crosses the white baseline threshold – meaning the difference in reported anger between black and white youth is negligible. In the immediate post-Obama era, the young black people in this study are unique in exhibiting senses of agency and expectation on par with their white counterparts. What does this foretell about the racial anger gap going forward?

The answer to that question hinges in large part on whether this pattern represents a *cohort* effect, meaning that as this set of black people ages, their sense of entitlement will continually fade and they will mirror the older black people before them, or if this is a *generational* effect, meaning there is something distinct about this emergent political generation of African Americans that will define their emotional responses to politics even as they age. This generation has come of age in an era in which a black president was a reality rather than a dream. Groundbreaking technological innovations and new media landscapes have shrunk their world and given them new avenues to build virtual communities and the social capital that come with them. Given these realities, it is possible this generation of African Americans will navigate their political environment with greater senses of expectation and collective agency than their predecessors.

Finally, the trends for education run counter to those found in previous eras. In 2016, college-educated African Americans exhibit a larger anger gap relative to black people without four-year degrees. While questions constantly swirled throughout the campaign over whether Clinton was out of touch with everyday people, Trump constantly attempted to position himself as a man of the people. The issues of class surfaced by

³³ A 2016 *Perspectives on Politics* piece by Jennifer J. Jones (2016) contains a cogent analysis of the gender roles imposed on Hillary Clinton throughout her national political career.

³⁴ Williams (2016).

these framings of the candidates were made particularly salient by the prevailing belief that the recovery from the Great Recession had been slow and uneven.³⁵ Thus, people acutely feeling the vulnerabilities of their socioeconomic status may have been more prone than in previous eras to exhibit anger. The greater willingness of people – specifically black people – of lower socioeconomic standing to express anger is a direct reflection of the times.

This underscores an important fact about the roles of emotions in shaping our political behavior. Our emotions are responsive and adaptable to the specific political, economic and social contexts we encounter. Likewise, the racial anger gap exhibited by African Americans is influenced by the specific sets of expectations, vulnerabilities, resources and threats black people perceive in their political environment at any given time.

In the twilight of the Obama era, and facing the prospect (however much it was considered a longshot prior to the actual election) of a racially hostile Trump administration, black perceptions of these factors were shaped by crosscutting identities such as gender, age and class. Yet overall, African Americans responded to the political environment with substantially less anger than their white American counterparts.

This racial anger gap is even present among the black CMPS respondents who exhibit the most negative views toward Trump. Figure 3.11 displays the predicted anger reported by black and white respondents across each level of favorability toward Trump. As one might expect, white Americans who express the most favorability toward Trump are substantially angrier than the small set of African Americans who are most favorable. But even among those who are most unfavorable toward Trump, white respondents report anger at greater rates than their black counterparts. And this gap remains significant at the 95-percent confidence level.

Translating Anger to Electoral Action under the Specter of Trump

How did the racial anger gap affect racial patterns of electoral participation in 2016? To answer this question, I once again ran logistic regression models predicting the effect of respondents' expressed anger on their likelihood of turning out in the 2016 election. Table 3.5 displays the main effect and standard errors of reported anger for black and white

³⁵ Schnurer (2016).




FIGURE 3.11 Marginal effect of favorability toward Trump on frequency of anger reported during 2016 election, across respondent race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

TABLE 3.5 Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of voting in presidential election. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown

	Black Total	White Total	Black Dem.	White Dem.	White Rep.
Anger	0.14 (0.43)	0.35 (1.05)	-0.07 (0.48)	1.43 (1.82)	3.71 (4.41)
Obs.	1432	561	1278	265	170

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

respondents.³⁶ Additional columns of the table display the effects of anger for the previously examined partisan subgroups: black and white Democrats and white Republicans.

Without parsing out the black and white samples by partisan affiliation, we see anger exhibiting a positive effect on white turnout that is

³⁶ Once again, regression models include the previous sets of demographic, resource and engagement variables.




FIGURE 3.12 Marginal effect of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

about two-and-a-half times larger than its effect on black turnout. For neither group, however, does the coefficient effect reach one- or two-tailed significance. When the sample is broken down into partisan groupings, the racial anger gap appears to widen. The coefficient on anger for black Democrats is virtually nil, a far cry from the substantially larger effects of anger for both white Democrats and Republicans.

But these substantive differences must be taken with a large grain of salt, since all of these coefficients are exceeded by their respective standard error terms. While the effect of anger on black turnout pales in comparison to its effect on white turnout, for neither group does anger exert a statistically discernible mobilizing effect.

The racial and partisan differences in anger's effect on turnout are displayed visually in Figure 3.12. This figure displays each group's respective likelihood of voting at each level of reported anger, with all control variables set at their means.³⁷ White Republicans are most likely to turn out regardless of how much anger they reported feeling

³⁷ See Table A3.5 in the Appendix to this chapter.

throughout the election. White Democrats become more likely to turn out as their anger increases, whereas vote likelihood for black Democrats remains unfazed by the anger they report. Although these patterns all fall within the margins of error, they are remarkably consistent with those revealed by the ANES data covering the years 1980 through 2012.

Spanning the political landscape from the Reagan revolution to the dawn of Trumpism, the racial anger gap manifests in two critical ways – African Americans registering less anger than similarly situated white Americans, and anger mobilizing the vote much less effectively for black people relative to their white counterparts. However, as Chapter 4 shows, when the focus is shifted to political actions beyond the voting booth, anger makes its presence felt in distinct ways for white and black respondents.

Fear of the Angry Black Archetype?

The racial anger gap uncovered here is consistent across multiple time periods, political eras and studies, and this gap carries direct consequences for turnout, providing us with an additional means of understanding the turnout trends that have proven favorable to Republicans at various intervals over the past 40 years.

What these broad trends cannot determine is the sets of ideas in which the racial anger gap is rooted. To what extent is the anger gap rooted in black Americans' distinctly diminished expectations and senses of collective agency when navigating their political environment? And how much of the anger gap is attributable to blacks people's reticence to express their political anger, for fear of being derided or targeted as the stereotypical *angry black* person? From analysis of the RAP Study in the next chapter, I can identify some of the racial beliefs espoused by black people that moderate the impact of their expressed anger on their decisions to take up political action. This provides insight into the impact of African Americans' general collective sentiment of resignation on their decision making when they see red over politics.

But first, I return briefly to the black and white self-identified Democratic respondents in the 1980–2012 ANES results, making use of an interesting wrinkle to assess how concerns over being stereotyped inform black Democrats' reluctance to express anger toward out-partisan presidential figures. Table 3.6 displays black and white Democrats' respective mean likelihoods of expressing anger toward Republicans, separated by the race of interviewers conducting the study with the participants.

TABLE 3.6 *Black and white Democrats' mean reported anger toward out-partisans, across race of interviewer. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. No controls*

	White Democrats	Black Democrats
Black interviewer	0.50 (52)	0.66 (50)
White interviewer	0.54 (1922)	0.47 (471)

^ $p < 0.10$ * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In parentheses under the mean values are the number of respondents interviewed by each set of interviewers.

The race of the survey interviewers had negligible impact on white Democrats' expressions of anger toward Republicans. Black Democrats, on the other hand, were substantially *more* likely to express anger toward Republicans when interacting with a black interviewer ($p = 0.01$). The small numbers of participants interviewed by African Americans means this finding should be taken with quite a few grains of salt. But they certainly corroborate the idea that black people would tend to exhibit hesitation to risk being labeled another unjustifiably angry black person by a white individual; absent that fear, black people feel greater comfort outwardly expressing anger.

What does this mean for the anger gap, revealed from these surveys to spread across multiple political eras? Are we to think of this gap as a true reflection of differences in the collective emotional sentiments of black and white Americans in politics? Or is it simply an artifice resulting from black people withholding their true feelings from the public record?

Even if some moderate or even large portion of the anger gap is a product of black people's hesitation to express their anger in non-black spaces, we should recognize the important consequences of this hesitation. Recall from Chapter 2 the distinguishing features of anger – at least, anger as typically exhibited by white Americans. Greater willingness to take risks. Increased confidence in one's actions. A disposition to take action in the immediate moment, and ask questions later. *I'm mad as hell, and I'm not going to take this anymore!*

Is this image of anger at all consistent with the risk aversion and pensive calculation that factor into an African American's decision to withhold expressing her true feelings of anger? By the time the conscious decision

has been made to withhold that expression, the force of that anger's impulsivity and confidence – the fuel of its action mobilizing fire – has been neutralized. At the point of (non)expression, that anger has been reduced to *sure, I am mad. But I've got too much to lose if I let you see that.*

Thus, feeling anger but choosing to suppress it ultimately carries the same demobilizing effect as never feeling the anger in the first place. The anger gap, therefore, remains critical in shaping racial participation disparities in politics, even if much of it is anchored in black Americans withholding their true feelings about politics.

Unpacking the Absence and Presence of Black Anger

Was Jesse Jackson correct during his 1984 campaign kickoff speech? Have the dawns of recent Republican presidential eras, from Reagan to George W. Bush to Trump, arisen in part because the African American voting bloc was asleep? Well, the evidence presented here suggests that African Americans responded to these eras with an emotional dormancy, which in turn inhibited electoral activity among this group. Many African Americans face potential obstacles in their path to the voting booth, from longer polling lines to restrictive voter ID requirements. We should consider the additional obstacle posed by the racial anger gap, as the lack of a mobilizing anger expressed toward electoral politics translates to a lack of motivation to overcome the barriers to vote participation.

To this point, I've examined why black people respond to politics with less anger, and what that lack of anger means for black electoral politics. The next chapter switches gears to explore how expressing anger affects African Americans' relationship to insurgent politics. Among the black people who are willing to let it be known that they are *mad as hell* over political conditions, should there be a stronger inclination to head to the polls, or to head to protest-lined streets? Does the phenomenon of anger while black help explain the extensive and robust tradition of black activism in the US?

Chapter 4 sheds light on these questions, while highlighting how black political discourses centered on the proper role of anger in black strategizing give anger a distinct motivational pull for African Americans compared to whites. By unpacking the unique behavioral consequences of being angry while black, the next chapter illuminates the role of anger in shaping black political action in a manner that cannot be captured by turnout indicators. For many black people, to see red is to also see the need for a counter-institutional system that challenges the political system from outside rather than within. This anger-fueled motivation to

rise up and act out is captured in the call to action made by Civil Rights pioneer Ella Baker in a 1960 student newsletter:

We want the world to know that we no longer accept the inferior position of second-class citizenship. We are willing to go to jail, be ridiculed, spat upon and even suffer physical violence to obtain First Class Citizenship.³⁸

A proper understanding of what anger means to black politics requires a reckoning with strategies, with belief systems and with the concept and history of American violence itself.

Appendix to Chapter 3

American National Election Study (ANES): Question Wordings for Emotions and Turnout

Emotions toward Presidential Incumbents and Candidates

Now we would like to know something about the feelings you have toward [name of presidential incumbent/Democratic Party nominee/Republican Party nominee]. Has [name of presidential incumbent/Democratic Party nominee/Republican Party nominee] – because of the kind of person he is, or because of something he has done – made you feel [angry/afraid/proud/hopeful]?

Response Options

- Yes, have felt
- No, haven't felt
- Don't know

Voting in Presidential Election

In talking to people about the election we often find that a lot of people weren't able to vote because they weren't registered, or they were sick, or they just didn't have time. How about you – did you vote in the elections this November?

Response Options

- No, did not vote
- Yes, voted
- Don't know

³⁸ Baker (1960).

**Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey
(CMPS): Question Wordings for Emotions and
Political Participation**

Emotions during 2016 Election

During the 2016 election season, how often did you feel the following?
[Angry/Afraid/Sad/Proud/Hopeful]

Response Options

- All the time
- Often
- Sometimes
- Never

Voting

This year a lot of people said they did NOT vote in the election, because they were just too busy, not that interested in politics, or frankly didn't like their choices. How about you? Would the official vote records for [insert state] indicate that you voted in the 2016 election, or, like many people, did you skip this one?

Response Options

- Yes, I voted
- No, I did not vote

Political Participation

In the last 12 months, have you...

- contributed money to a candidate, political party, ballot issue, or some other campaign organization? [Donate]
- worked for a candidate, political party or some other campaign organization? [Volunteer]
- attended a meeting to discuss issues facing the community? [Attend meeting]
- worked or cooperated with others to try to solve a problem affecting your city or neighborhood? [Work with others]
- contacted an elected representative or a government official in the US in any way – such as through writing a letter, emailing, calling or in person – about a policy or issue you care about? [Contact official]
- attended a protest, march, demonstration, or rally? [Protest]
- boycotted a company or product for political reasons? [Boycott]

Response Options

Yes

No

TABLE A3.1 *Sample characteristics of 2016 CMPS*

	White	Black	Latina/o	Asian	Total
Registered	703	2002	1816	1503	6024
Not registered	331	1100	1187	1503	4121
Total	1034	3102	3003	3006	10,145

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A3.2 *Effect of race on likelihood of expressing anger toward presidential incumbents and candidates. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Left column includes all respondents. Right column includes self-identified Democrats*

	All	Democrats
Black	-0.09 (0.06)	-0.09 (0.06)
Fear	1.87*** (0.06)	1.85*** (0.08)
Hope	0.12* (0.05)	0.07 (0.07)
Pride	0.20*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.07)
Religious attendance	-0.11* (0.06)	-0.14 (0.08)
Woman	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)
South	-0.18*** (0.04)	-0.25*** (0.05)
Age	-0.25* (0.10)	-0.28 (0.15)
Household income	0.06 (0.07)	0.00 (0.09)

(continued)

TABLE A3.2 (cont.)

	All	Democrats
Education	0.81*** (0.06)	0.97*** (0.09)
Party ID	0.14** (0.05)	-
Party ID strength	0.49*** (0.05)	0.64*** (0.10)
Government distrust	0.93*** (0.08)	0.83*** (0.11)
Incumbent approval	-0.98*** (0.04)	-0.95*** (0.06)
External efficacy	-0.08 (0.05)	-0.04 (0.06)
Constant	-0.64*** (0.10)	-0.67*** (0.14)
Pseudo R ²	0.15	0.14

^a p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A3.3 *Effect of out-partisan anger on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012.*

	Black Democrats	White Democrats	White Republicans
Anger toward Republicans	0.03	0.40*** (0.09)	0.16 (0.10)
Out-partisan	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Fear	0.49* (0.23)	0.31* (0.14)	0.45** (0.16)
Hope	0.34 (0.28)	0.28* (0.14)	0.33* (0.16)
Pride	0.58* (0.27)	0.39** (0.13)	0.35* (0.15)
Religious attendance	1.50*** (0.26)	0.87*** (0.14)	1.22*** (0.15)

TABLE A3.3 (cont.)

	Black Democrats	White Democrats	White Republicans
Woman	0.11 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
South	-0.45** (0.16)	-0.41*** (0.09)	-0.49*** (0.09)
Age	1.52** (0.47)	2.91*** (0.26)	3.19*** (0.27)
Household income	1.21*** (0.30)	1.53*** (0.16)	1.47*** (0.18)
Education	1.81*** (0.32)	2.32*** (0.17)	1.69*** (0.18)
Party ID strength	1.53*** (0.28)	1.32*** (0.17)	1.39*** (0.18)
Government distrust	0.76* (0.33)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.30 (0.23)
Incumbent approval	0.07 (0.17)	-0.30** (0.09)	-0.08 (0.11)
External efficacy	-0.45* (0.19)	-0.61*** (0.11)	-0.70*** (0.12)
Constant	-2.95*** (0.43)	-2.58*** (0.26)	-2.71*** (0.28)
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.19	0.19

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A3.4 *Effect of respondent race on frequency of anger and fear reported during 2016 election. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	Anger	Fear
Black	-0.22* (0.10)	-0.36*** (0.10)
Fear	3.49*** (0.13)	-
Anger	-	3.69*** (0.14)

(continued)

TABLE A3.4 (cont.)

	Anger	Fear
Pride	-0.35*	-0.60*** (0.16)
Hope	-0.02 (0.15)	0.22 (0.16)
Belief economy worsened	0.09 (0.12)	-0.06 (0.12)
US-born	0.21 (0.15)	-0.14 (0.16)
Contacted by elites	0.14 (0.08)	-0.06 (0.08)
Linked fate	0.44*** (0.10)	0.64*** (0.10)
Experienced discrimination	0.17* (0.08)	0.16 (0.08)
Education	0.47** (0.16)	0.04 (0.16)
Household income	0.31* (0.13)	-0.33* (0.13)
Woman	0.07 (0.08)	0.47*** (0.08)
Age	0.32 (0.25)	-2.32*** (0.26)
Party ID	0.57*** (0.13)	0.31* (0.13)
Church attendance	-0.26** (0.10)	-0.11 (0.10)
Interest in politics	0.52*** (0.15)	0.56*** (0.15)
Internal efficacy	0.08 (0.13)	-0.71*** (0.13)
Distrust in government	0.87*** (0.16)	-0.27 (0.17)
Constant	1.26*** (0.27)	0.14 (0.28)
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.17

^ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A3.5 *Effect of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of voting, across race and party affiliation. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	Black Democrats	White Democrats	White Republicans
Anger	-0.07 (0.48)	1.43 (1.82)	3.71 (4.41)
Fear	0.78 (0.44)	-1.28 (1.60)	0.42 (3.20)
Pride	0.33 (0.60)	1.01 (1.89)	0.86 (3.60)
Hope	0.89 (0.58)	-0.01 (1.57)	1.88 (3.59)
Belief economy worsened	-0.54 (0.43)	-1.70 (1.48)	2.64 (2.33)
US-born	1.49** (0.53)	2.86 (1.78)	0.00 (0.00)
Contacted by elites	0.07 (0.28)	-1.40 (0.81)	0.00 (0.00)
Linked fate	-0.20 (0.36)	1.36 (1.17)	3.98 (2.34)
Experienced discrimination	-0.96** (0.30)	-0.93 (1.06)	-1.62 (1.56)
Education	1.81** (0.59)	3.83 (1.98)	1.70 (4.38)
Household income	2.04*** (0.59)	-0.36 (1.48)	6.88* (3.42)
Age	4.88*** (1.05)	-0.26 (2.56)	11.88 (7.04)
Woman	0.06 (0.31)	1.24 (0.89)	-2.01 (1.77)
Church attendance	0.72 (0.37)	2.10 (1.46)	-2.00 (1.79)
Interest in politics	1.78*** (0.48)	0.36 (1.79)	4.44 (4.97)
Internal efficacy	0.62 (0.48)	0.46 (1.46)	6.63 (4.49)
Distrust in government	0.76 (0.56)	1.92 (2.19)	-6.86 (4.48)
Constant	-4.06*** (0.98)	-3.53 (3.33)	-8.73 (6.55)
Pseudo R ²			

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

From Black Anger to Black Activism

Politics is war without bloodshed, and war is politics with bloodshed.¹

A History of Violence

The above definition of politics, articulated by Black Panther Party Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton, is partially right. The arena of politics is inherently contentious. It is characterized by conflict – intensive conflict – over the distribution of both finite and immeasurable resources that are believed to be of limited supply. In the political arena, people do not only contend for greater allocation of material resources such as money or votes. They also contend for the power to determine those allocations.

So why is Fred Hampton only partially right? Because in numerous instances throughout history, American politics has also produced bloodshed. And black America's politics in particular have been characterized by bloodshed. Blood was spilled throughout the duration of slavery in America, before blood was shed in the war that ended the institution. Black politics was a politics of bloodshed throughout the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as more than 4000 African Americans were slain in lynchings occurring in 20 states between the 1870s and 1950s.² These acts of terror must be understood of acts of *political* violence, as they were often motivated as much by desires to suppress collective black economic advancement and black exercise of Civil Rights as they were

¹ Hampton (1969).

² Equal Justice Initiative (2017).

about punishing black individuals accused of stepping beyond the rigidly imposed bounds on black sexuality.

Black politics was a politics of bloodshed on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Alabama in March of 1965. Civil Rights marchers, led by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee Chairman (and future Congressmen) John Lewis, sought to cross the bridge en route from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery, to protest acts of racial violence against black people that went unanswered by law. State troopers, along with a posse of white men deputized earlier that morning, descended on the marchers with billy clubs and tear gas, leaving many marchers bloody and broken. Images of those black bodies on the bridge were broadcast across the country, marking this day as “Bloody Sunday” in the American historical ledger.³

Black politics was a politics of bloodshed in May 1985, when the Philadelphia Police Department razed a row house on Osage Avenue that served as the compound of the black radical organization MOVE. The department dropped an explosive device on the row house, in the only instance in history in which US state actors employed a bomb on civilians within US bounds. The police department infamously instructed firefighters to “let the fire burn,” a decision resulting in the destruction of more than 60 houses on this black middle-class block. More than 30 years after the MOVE bombing, many homes on Osage Avenue remained boarded up.⁴

Finally, throughout the mid-1960s and early 1970s, black politics was a politics of bloodshed in urban enclaves spanning the nation, from Watts, California to Washington, DC. Decades of flight out of urban city cores – both by white residents and providers of jobs, infrastructural support and social services, had left majority-black cities bereft of adequate housing, educational and employment opportunities, and vulnerable to racially biased over-policing. In city after city, tensions boiled over, culminating in eruptions of violence and property destruction that have been variously labeled riots or rebellions.^{5,6}

The word used to define these urban uprisings likely depends on the historical lens applied to view them. Viewed through the lens of good ol’-fashioned American anger, these uprisings can be contextualized as

³ Fager (1974).

⁴ Demby (2015).

⁵ Harris (1998).

⁶ Masotti and Bowen (1968).

fitting within a long history of everyday people feeling *mad as hell* over their substandard subsistence and using the means at their disposal – including violence and property destruction – to mount a challenge to an unresponsive ruling elite. The Boston Tea Party in 1773, in which a resistance movement known as the “Sons of Liberty” stole aboard three British ships in the Boston Harbor and dumped more than 300 boxes of tea overboard.⁷ The New York City Draft Day riots of 1863, during which hundreds of men marched down the streets of the city to protest the state’s conscription law, before storming the draft office, attacking the police superintendent and ransacking the homes of wealthy New Yorkers who had bought their way out of the draft.⁸ The Battle of Blair Mountain in 1921, in which tensions between West Virginia coal miners seeking to unionize and their resistant employers escalated into several days of violent clashes, in what would go down as the bloodiest labor dispute in history.⁹

Viewed in the context of the past record of Americans lashing out at the institutions and actors by which they feel aggrieved, the period of urban uprisings in the late 1960s and early 1970s is not particularly remarkable. On the contrary, it simply comprises another chapter in a long and intermittently violent story of American anger. Although collective reflections on American history often turn the page on these chapters rather quickly, they are undeniably important to the shaping of the country.

Alternately, viewed through the historical lens that defines black people as an existential and perpetual danger, these uprisings become not another chapter in the story of American anger, but rather, further proof that black people need to be surveilled, and their expressions of grievance tightly regulated. Richard Nixon applied this lens to the uprisings during his speech accepting the Republican Party’s nomination for the presidency in 1968. Declaring that “as we look at America, we see cities enveloped in smoke and flame; we hear sirens in the night,” Nixon asserted the answer to the uprisings was not to be found in more full-throated government interventions to alleviate the ills of entrenched poverty and institutional racism that fueled the flames of rebellion.¹⁰ As evidenced by the many declarations throughout his address, Nixon asserted that more power

⁷ Labaree (1964).

⁸ Bernstein (1991).

⁹ Corbin (2015).

¹⁰ Nixon (1968).

needed to be afforded to police and prosecutorial agents to stamp out the chaos and dissent threatening the nation:

When the nation with the greatest tradition of the rule of law is plagued by unprecedented lawlessness ... then it's time for new leadership.

[L]et us also recognize that some of our courts in their decisions have gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in this country and we must act to restore that balance.

[L]et [our judges] also recognize that the first civil right of every American is to be free from domestic violence, and that right must be guaranteed in this country.¹¹

Nearly 50 years later, Donald J. Trump would draw heavily from Nixon's rhetorical playbook when accepting the Republican nomination for president in 2016. Trump too asserted a call for renewed attention to law and order to restore calm to a nation under duress:

Our Convention occurs at a moment of crisis for our nation. The attacks on our police, and the terrorism in our cities, threaten our very way of life. Any politician who does not grasp this danger is not fit to lead our country.

Americans watching this address tonight have seen the recent images of violence in our streets and the chaos in our communities.

I have a message for all of you: the crime and violence that today afflicts our nation will soon – and I mean very soon – come to an end.¹²

When Nixon made his address in 1968, the nation was roiled by the outbreaks of violence in large cities, and vociferous anti-war protests. The nation was also reeling from assassinations of key political actors such as Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy. Trump gave his remarks during a much more sanguine time in American history. Despite measures showing a slight uptick in violent crime between 2014 and 2016, the overall violent crime rate in 2016 was nearly 50-percent lower than its peak rate in the early 1990s.¹³

So what was Trump drawing upon – if not the statistical reality – when citing the *violence in our streets* and *chaos in our communities*? The common thread between 1968 and 2016 seems to be the recurring imagery of vivid black insurgent activity fueled by black anger. In 2016, images of black urban uprising were replaced by images of black

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Trump (2016).

¹³ Gramlich (2018).

protests, demonstrations and clashes with police in response to high-profile killings of black civilians by law enforcement authorities, such as Michael Brown in Ferguson, Eric Garner in New York City and Freddie Gray in Baltimore.

To this point I have argued that mainstream political actors' framing of black expressions of anger as both illegitimate and destabilizing constitute a clear signal to black individuals that there are high costs to be paid for letting it be known that they see red. In turn, consideration of the costs of being angry while black contributes to the racial anger gap.

But in this chapter, I want to shift the focus from the emotional discourse of mainstream political actors to that of black activist leaders. As these grassroots leaders push back against the idea that black anger is always unjustified or threatening, they attempt to do more than to reframe black anger as a worthwhile foundation for black political action. The discourses from this set of political actors project a vision of political anger that looks quite different from the vision offered by the set of political actors seeking to encourage white Americans to get angry and active.

The vision posited to white Americans is generally one of anger propelling them to overturn regimes or policies antithetical to their interests. But black activist leaders offer a vision of anger propelling African Americans to oppose and upend the broader sets of institutions and structures within which those regimes and policies are nestled. The difference in the foci of black and white anger should manifest in anger mobilizing varying sets of actions between these groups. Whereas anger expressed by white people should translate to actions focused on overturning actions and regimes, such as voting, canvassing and attending town halls, anger expressed by African Americans should translate more toward system-challenging actions such as participating in protests and boycotts.

This reframing is apparent in comments that trailblazing black power activist and scholar Angela Davis offered from a California prison cell in 1972. In response to a question from an interviewer asking whether black people could expect to achieve their political goals through confrontation or violence, Davis offers a new lens through which to view the latest instance of black politics that became a politics of bloodshed. She centered black political expressions that result in violence as a reflection of the political system itself, which constantly enacts violence against the black body politic.

Because of the way this society is organized, because of the violence that exists everywhere, you have to expect that there will be such explosions, you have to expect things like that as reaction. If you are a black person who lives in the

black community all your life and walk out on the street everyday seeing white policemen surrounding you ... when you live under a situation like that constantly, and then you ask me whether I approve of violence, I mean, that just doesn't make any sense at all.¹⁴

As this chapter digs deeper into black activists' definitions of black anger, black politics and violence, a clear distinction emerges in the behavioral consequences of seeing red in black and white. From Jesse Helms' "Hands" television ad, to Ronald Reagan's racially coded messages about welfare queens and states' rights, to Bernie Sanders' calling out of the unrestrained greed on Wall Street, the common thread of messages activating white American anger is their mobilization of people toward actions aimed at supporting or opposing electoral targets – specifically candidates for office. What undergirds this anger-fueled electoral activity is an underlying sentiment of confidence that the political system works to the benefit of those participating in it.

It should be apparent by now that African Americans collectively do not possess this same sentiment. It makes sense, then, that the messaging from the distinct set of black leaders who seek to activate black anger (rather than shy away from it) is heavily tilted toward actions that oppose the system, rather than actions prescribed by that system. So while white people may generally be steered toward the voting booth and campaign offices when they express anger, black people may generally be steered toward the front lines of demonstrations, protests and other spaces that challenge the system rather than work within it.

This chapter builds the case for why the expression of political anger produces a distinct decision making calculus for black Americans. From emotional discourse analysis of calls to action made to black people from black activist leaders across different eras, I draw a through line connecting the rich history of black participation in insurgent politics in the US to the unique effect of black anger on political behavior. Because appeals from these activist leaders are undergirded by an emotional sentiment of skepticism about the fairness and responsiveness of the US political system to black demands, their subsequent calls to action are markedly different from calls made by both white and black mainstream political actors. I uncover how the differences of both race and racial ideology apparent in this messaging contribute to a variation in the translation of anger to action between black and white Americans.

¹⁴ Quoted in the documentary *The Black Power Mixtape*, directed by Goran Hugo Olsson (2011).

I return to trends from the 2016 CMPS and my own 2018 RAP Study to show the racially distinct ways that anger has shaped the political action of African Americans in the post-Obama era. The findings reveal that across a range of political actions, anger expressed by African Americans exerts the strongest mobilizing effect on system-challenging behaviors. This anger-activism linkage is moderated by intersecting identities such as age and gender, as well as African Americans' fundamental beliefs about race, such as their perceptions of linked fate. Notably, the racial anger gap still manifests in the translation of anger to activism among black Americans. This gap not only advances our understanding of trends in electoral participation across multiple political regimes. It also surfaces the potential boundaries of black participation in counter-institutional behavior.

Hot and Uncompromising: The Black Radical Guide to Anger

How do the leaders of black radical movements envision black anger? Malcolm X touted his vision in a 1963 *Message to the Grassroots* speech in Detroit, Michigan. X offered a pointed critique of the historic March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, which had taken place four months prior. This march became etched in history, as it was here that Martin Luther King Jr. delivered his revered "I have a dream" speech. But from the perspective of the influential public face of the Nation of Islam, the march failed to harness the true potential power of black people eager to press for economic and sociopolitical change. Bemoaning the presence of white allies in the movement, X asserted:

[White people] didn't integrate it; they infiltrated it. They joined it, became a part of it, took it over. And as they took it over, it lost its militancy. *They ceased to be angry. They ceased to be hot. They ceased to be uncompromising.* Why, it even ceased to be a march. It became a picnic, a circus (emphasis added).¹⁵

Malcolm X's criticism of the March on Washington reveals what he believes to be the most effective course of action black people should take to assert their demands. African Americans should exercise a commitment to defiance rather than a willingness to compromise. They should work in opposition to white people, not in concert with them. And their defiant, oppositional actions should be fueled *hot anger*, not a buoyant optimism.

¹⁵ X (1963).

X's prescription can be juxtaposed against the calls to action typically posed to black people from mainstream political actors (both non-black and black), as well as many leaders from the black Christian church. Such messaging, as highlighted in previous chapters, tilts the black gaze toward the future promise of racial salvation. X not only rejects the premise that black action should be motivated by the hope of racial salvation; he urges black people to raise a bit of hell in the present.

For instance, earlier in his remarks in Detroit, X challenged black people to interrogate their roles in the politics of bloodshed, both abroad and at home. He decried the willingness of African Americans to participate in US military campaigns abroad while remaining unwilling to react with violence to the US legal and political systems that enact violence against them.

[As] long as the white man sent you to Korea, you bled. He sent you to Germany, you bled ... You bleed for white people. But when it comes time to seeing your own churches being bombed and little black girls be murdered, you haven't got no blood ... How are you going to be nonviolent in Mississippi, as violent as you were in Korea? How can you justify being nonviolent in Mississippi and Alabama, when your churches are being bombed, and your little girls are being murdered, and at the same time you're going to [get] violent with Hitler, and Tojo, and somebody else that you don't even know?

Much like Angela Davis, Malcolm X espouses the view that black engagement in the politics of bloodshed is a natural and justified reaction to the literal and figurative violence imposed upon black people by systems of power in the US. Indeed, it tends to be the black political figures who characterize the US sociopolitical system as fundamentally and irrevocably racist who also depict anger as a legitimate and valuable tool to mobilize black people toward actions that challenge that system.

Debating the Utility of Anger in Black Political Strategizing

There is a meaningful contrast to draw here between various sets of black leaders. On one end stands the set of leaders who view anger as a tool that can motivate effective black action. These leaders' views on the utility of anger are tied to their beliefs that the US sociopolitical system is fundamentally racist and incapable of reform. They prescribe, therefore, actions aimed at challenging, disrupting and ultimately overthrowing that system. What better way to animate such types of actions than to prime African Americans to be *mad as hell*? Getting black rank-and-file

soldiers angry over the racial injustices embedded within US political institutions helps to keep them motivated in the ongoing battle waged against an oppressive system.

On another end of the spectrum stand the sets of black leaders whose perspectives have been highlighted in previous chapters. Either implicitly or explicitly rejecting anger as an effective resource for black mobilization, these leaders seek to engender black political action through priming positive emotions within black people, such as pride and hope. Their reliance on these enthusiastic emotions reveals their fundamental belief that the US sociopolitical system is capable of producing a just racial order. Accordingly, these leaders aim to keep black rank-and-file pilgrims encouraged along their uphill journey toward racial salvation.

By juxtaposing these two different spheres of black political thought, we gain better purchase into how political anger a distinct political and behavioral significance for African Americans compared to their white counterparts. The differences in how black anger and black enthusiasm are constructed in the rhetoric of these respective black political figures reveals key differences in these figures' values, beliefs and visions of black America's future.

Sometimes those differences are expressed as subtly – yet important – variations on the same ideas. For example, I turn to the vision of society laid out by Bayard Rustin. One of the most critical figures of the black Civil Rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, Rustin was the chief organizer of the 1963 March on Washington, a key organizer of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and an influential adviser to Reverend King, teaching him principles of nonviolent resistance, which Rustin himself had learned directly from Gandhian movement leaders in India.¹⁶ In a public letter written for an exhibit in Cleveland in 1969, Rustin cautioned that the political methods engaged upon by black people must not lose sight of the ultimate vision of an ideal society.

[W]e must remember that we cannot hope to achieve democracy and equality in such a way that would destroy the very kind of society which we hope to build. If we desire a society of peace, then we cannot achieve such a society through violence. If we desire a society without discrimination, then we must not discriminate against anyone in the process of building this society.¹⁷

¹⁶ D'emilio (2003).

¹⁷ Long (2016).

Rustin espouses here a course of action that is fundamentally tethered to his unwavering belief that American society is capable of producing just and fair outputs – as long as those are the inputs exercised by its citizenry. From such confidence flowed Rustin’s approach to black political action. He envisions black action fueled not by a heated sense of indignation over the immediate ills that plague the black condition, but by the steadfast hope that if black people endure, they will be rewarded with racial justice.

This approach is captured in a letter of encouragement Rustin wrote to a professor in 1969. In it, Rustin recounts numerous instances that could reasonably engender disillusionment and bitterness within black people, including himself. Yet, in so many words, Rustin rejects those reactions. He believes that dwelling on the pain will produce not a mobilizing anger but a debilitating anguish. And he articulates his duty – and the duty of black people collectively – to keep striving toward the racial Promised Land.

I am black and I have lived with and fought racism my entire life ... I have seen periods of progress followed by reaction. I have seen the hopes and aspirations of Negroes rise during World War II, only to be smashed during the Eisenhower years. I am seeing the victories of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations destroyed by Richard Nixon. I have seen black young people become more and more bitter. I have seen dope addiction rise in the Negro communities across the country ... Yet, to remain human and to fulfill my commitment to a just society, I must continue to fight for the liberation of all men. There will be times when each of us will have doubts. But I trust that neither of us will desert our great cause.¹⁸

Stokely Carmichael, himself one of many significant black figures advised by Bayard Rustin, offered a contrasting vision of American society. Like Rustin, Carmichael desired to achieve a society built upon racial and economic fairness and equality. But whereas Rustin believed the current society could be *transformed*, Carmichael believed the current society needed to be *destroyed*.

In order for America to really live on a basic principle of human relationships, a new society must be born. Racism must die, and the economic exploitation of this country of non-white peoples around the world must also die.¹⁹

Again, Carmichael and Rustin may share the same *ends*, but in the contrast in their prescribed *means*, we see the unique meaning of being angry while black. Carmichael and his contemporaries in the Black

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Carmichael (1966).

Power movement see little to no recourse from working within the system to produce the changes they desire. This is because they have no faith in the system itself. Fred Hampton employs a vivid analogy to describe why this set of black figures see working within the system as so futile – and why only actions that would seek to upend that system should be seriously considered by those looking to advance black interests:

A lot of people get the word revolution mixed up and they think revolution's a bad word. Revolution is nothing but like having a sore on your body and then you put something on that sore to cure that infection. And I'm telling you that were living in an infectious society right now. I'm telling you that were living in a sick society. And anybody that endorses integrating into this sick society before it's cleaned up is a man who's committing a crime against the people.²⁰

Hampton makes the bold claim here that not only are efforts by black people to work within the system counterproductive, they are downright harmful to the black body politic. When we take a broad view of political discourse, we see countless instances of political figures proclaiming that the system is broken. Prior chapters contained numerous examples, whether it be Governor Bill Clinton asserting in 1992 that government has lost touch with its values, Senator Sanders declaring in 2016 that the greed and graft in our financial system has run amok or Donald Trump's numerous calls during his successful presidential campaign to "drain the swamp." So the idea that the American political system is broken is par for the course. But when these mainstream political actors diagnose the system as broken, they prescribe actions *within* the system to fix it. Seeing red over a system that doesn't work for you? The solutions are simple. Volunteer. Donate. Vote. By working within the system, you can change it to better suit your needs.

While figures such as Carmichael, X, Hampton or Davis may share the observation that the system is broken, they lack the same confidence that it can be corrected from within. The system is not just in need of repair. It is incurably infected. This view informs the calls to action made to black people who may not adhere to the belief that America's socio-political institutions are capable of self-correcting toward racial salvation. *Seeing red over a system that doesn't work for you? It never will. Fight it. Overturn it. Rebuild it.*

There is a great deal of work that sheds light on the distinct sets of values and beliefs that undergird the varying political strategies

²⁰ Hampton (1969).

prescribed by leaders of different black political movements.²¹ Building on this work, I contend that these diverse visions of how black people should engage a racially stratified political sphere are rooted not just in differences of philosophy and strategy, but differences of *emotion* as well. How African Americans are invited to feel their way through politics can produce a gap in anger expressed by black people relative to white Americans. Additionally, this feeling their way through politics creates a different participatory outlet for black anger in the instances that black people do choose to express and act on it.

These discourses on anger are by no means limited to the 1960s and 1970s. They remain present and viable in the contemporary context. For example, remarks made in 2016 by Alicia Garza, one of the co-creators of the Black Lives Matter movement, carry a strikingly similar sentiment to what was said by the likes of Davis, Carmichael and Hampton. Garza highlights the recent period of black insurgent activity – which she makes a point to label as “uprisings” – and asserts that it is this insurgency rather than electoral gains made by black people in the Obama era that has reshaped African Americans’ political possibilities:

[A] cauldron has been bubbling under the surface for a very, very long time, occasionally expressing itself in instances of uprising. But none as sustained as what we are experiencing today. Indeed, the last decade of post-racialism, and the neoliberal assault on black communities, has prompted a beautiful upsurge in black resistance. And it is a resistance that has resulted in a new political order.²²

Indeed, the 60 or so organizations united under the umbrella coalition called the National Movement for Black Lives illustrate the continued insistence of many black political leaders and movements to reject working within a broken system to enact change. While the organization released an extensive set of platform demands in the thick of the 2016 presidential election, it made a point to not endorse any specific candidate for office. One of the leaders of the group’s policy team, Marbre Stahly-Butts, articulated why the group refrained from engaging too deeply in electoral politics during the election year.

On both sides of the aisle, the candidates have really failed to address the demands and the concerns of our people. So this was less about this specific political moment and this election, and more about how do we actually start to

²¹ See, for example, Dawson (2001), Smith (1996) and Ture and Hamilton (1992).

²² Garza (2016).

plant and cultivate the seeds of transformation of this country that go beyond individual candidates.²³

Again, we see a recurrent theme, the belief that being confined to the bounds of any particular election cycle or a particular party will not achieve the goals of the group. Rather, true transformation requires working outside of the system instead of within it. Outspoken former NFL quarterback Colin Kaepernick, whose playing career was summarily cut short soon after he began kneeling in protest of police brutality and racial injustice before the start of games, received intense scrutiny for remarks expressing this very sentiment. Explaining why he refrained from voting in the 2016 election, Kaepernick declared:

I think it would be hypocritical of me to vote. I said from the beginning I was against oppression, and I was against the system of oppression. I'm not going to show support for that system. And to me, the oppressor isn't going to allow you to vote your way out of your oppression.²⁴

With this idea continuing to reverberate in black discursive and political spaces, it is worthwhile to explore whether the political anger that is expressed by black people (even if that anger is in smaller reserve compared to whites) tends to steer them more toward actions aimed at opposing or challenging the political system, rather than system-directed actions such as voting and canvassing.

From Anger to Activism among Black and White Americans

The previous chapter uncovered the racial anger gap and explored its consequences for turnout. Now I return to the data from the 2016 CMPS to determine how expressions of political anger affected the political participation of black and white Americans beyond the voting booth in the dawn of the Trump era. As discussed in the previous chapter, African Americans had plenty of reason to feel threatened and aggrieved by the rhetoric from the GOP candidate throughout the 2016 campaign season. Yet the racial anger gap persisted. But would African Americans feeling agentic or comfortable enough to more readily express anger actually be more likely to engage in electoral behavior, such as donating to or volunteering for candidates? Or would anger fuel black participation in oppositional activities, such as protesting and boycotts?

²³ Quoted in Alcindor (2016).

²⁴ Koseff (2016).

TABLE 4.1 *Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis.*
Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown

	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Black (2009 Obs.)	0.55* (0.24)	0.48 (0.32)	0.25 (0.20)	0.05 (0.21)	0.57* (0.23)	1.16*** (0.27)	1.31*** (0.25)
White (785 Obs.)	1.96*** (0.47)	0.90 (0.66)	1.19** (0.42)	1.49*** (0.42)	1.75*** (0.40)	2.05** (0.65)	2.61*** (0.44)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Insight on this question comes from Table 4.1, which displays main coefficients and standard errors showing anger's effects on black and white respondents' respective likelihoods of participation in a variety of actions. Displayed here are the effects of anger when already accounting for the influences of demographic, resource and engagement variables known to shape political behavior.²⁵

Anger reported during the 2016 election exerts a positive and statistically significant relationship with four of the seven activities for black respondents, compared to six of the seven activities for whites. What do the sizes of the coefficients indicate? That across all of the domains of action, anger packs a much stronger mobilizing punch for white than black Americans. The anger gap that emerged in Chapter 3 when examining turnout extends to multiple types of political behavior. Anger simply does not move African Americans toward political action to the same extent as whites.

Figure 4.1 provides a visual illustration of the translation of anger to political action for black and white respondents, displaying the change in likelihood of taking part in each activity as respondents move from *never* feeling angry to feeling angry *all the time* throughout the 2016 election.²⁶

These are the four domains in which anger stimulates both black and white respondents toward greater participation – donating to a campaign,

²⁵ Those variables include gender, age, household income, education attained, party identification, church attendance, distrust in government, internal efficacy, perceptions of discrimination against respondent's racial group, past experience with discrimination, linked fate, beliefs about economic performance. Full regression results are displayed in Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the Appendix to this chapter.

²⁶ These likelihoods are calculated with all control variables set at their mean values.




FIGURE 4.1 Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihoods of donating, contacting a public official, protesting and boycotting in the past year, across respondent race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 4.1 (cont.)

contacting an elected official, protesting and participating in a boycott. And across every action except protest, white respondents begin outpacing their black counterparts as both groups report feeling more anger over the course of the election. Protesting is the only action for which African Americans are more likely to participate than whites at every level of anger. But as indicated by the overlapping confidence intervals, the angriest white respondents essentially close the gap with the angriest black respondents.

Among African Americans, there is an unmistakable linkage between reported anger and participation in system-challenging activity, as the two of the four actions for which anger has the strongest effect on black participation are protesting and boycotting. Indeed, black Americans willing to flout the stigmatization of being angry and register their anger appear motivated to translate that emotion toward actions that challenge political institutions from the outside, as opposed to working to change them from within. This is a pattern that resonates strongly with the results of experimental work conducted by Banks, White and McKenzie, who find that when primed with anger African Americans pursue strategies in support of black indigenous organizations and in the domain of protest, as opposed to universalistic or electoral strategies.²⁷

This particular linkage between anger and black insurgent activity fits nicely with the extensive history of African American activism in the US. The black people mobilizing throughout the 2016 year to contest institutions and actors by which they felt wronged could conceive of themselves as continuing a tradition upheld by every previous black generation, from the slave rebellions and black-led abolitionist movements, to the anti-lynching campaigns of the early twentieth century, from the Black Power movement to the Black Lives Matter movement.

Yet there is a key consequence of this anger-activism linkage for African Americans. Anger carries a much more limited capital for African Americans compared to whites. White Americans can essentially cash in their anger for a variety of actions. Opening their checkbooks for candidates. Attending town halls. Giving elected officials a piece of their mind. Even taking part in a protest or boycott. In contrast, the anger expressed by black Americans is leveraged toward a smaller range of actions. While anger may move the group to activism, this emotion does not stimulate greater participation in community-based actions such as attending meetings or working with others to tackle a local problem.

²⁷ Banks, White and McKenzie (2018).

This means that the racial anger gap carries reverberations that extend beyond election outcomes. The inhibition of black anger in politics can be felt in the absence of African Americans from a variety of sites of political activity. Not just the voting booth, but the community center, the political rally, and even the protest gathering. In all, we see two manifestations of the racial anger gap. One, anger propels white Americans to a wider range of political actions than African Americans. Two, in the domains in which black people are moved to action by anger, this emotion still carries a stronger boost on the participation of whites.

The space occupied by black activism in the black public imagination has a meaningful effect on the translation of black anger to insurgent action. This relationship between beliefs about the efficacy of activism and the mobilizing effect of anger on black action comes into greater focus when we examine the interplay between black respondents' reported anger, their participation in protests and their views about the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Figure 4.2 displays a series of graphs that compare the influence of anger on likelihood of protesting across African Americans with varying views on BLM. In all three graphs, black people who express the most positive assessments of the movement exhibit the strongest positive correlation between their anger and their odds of protesting. These differences all fall within the margin of error, but they remain potentially instructive of the manner in which black anger is animated by African Americans' perceptions of the value of activism in politics.²⁸

The first graph compares black respondents falling on either side of the statement:

[The Black Lives Matter movement has] forced politicians and the media to discuss openly issues about race that [hurt/help] race relations and the future of black people's influence on politics.

Among the 28 percent of black respondents who feel BLM has *hurt* race relations and black people's political future, the impact of expressing anger on their likelihood of protesting is around 7 percent. The effect of anger on protest is nearly doubled – around 12.5 percent – for the vast majority of black respondents who believe BLM has helped black people.

The second graph displays the effects of anger on protest as black respondents move from least to most supportive of the movement.

²⁸ Once again, these probabilities are calculated while controlling for a full host of variables. Full regression results displaying the results of interaction terms between anger and views on BLM are displayed in Table A4.3.




FIGURE 4.2 The influence of attitudes toward the Black Lives Matter movement on the relationship between reported anger and black respondents' likelihood of protesting. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 4.2 (cont.)

A full 70 percent of respondents report supporting BLM *somewhat* or *strongly*. Again, as people express more support for the movement, the relationship between their expressed anger and their odds of protesting is strengthened, albeit slightly, from just under 8 percent to just under 12 percent.

The final graph displays the influence of anger across African Americans' perceptions of the goals of BLM. Among the 6 percent of black respondents who report not understanding the movement's goals very well, the effect of their anger on their odds of protesting is around 7.5 percent. But among African Americans who report understanding the movement's goals very well – about one-third of the sample – the influence of anger increases to about 13 percent.

We can take away from these trends a better appreciation of how anger is distinctly leveraged toward political action by the sets of black people who cultivate a particular understanding and appreciation of past and present black activist movements. If a cognitive connection is not made to these movements and their potential power to advance black interests, then anger loses some of its mobilizing power.

This sense of an interconnected racial indignation *and* racial group obligation is evident in the reflections by Claudette Colvin on what

propelled her to defy a racist system and carve out her own piece of unheralded history. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks would become an icon of the Civil Rights movement by refusing to give up her bus seat to a white passenger in Montgomery, Alabama, as part of a coordinated act of civil disobedience. But nine months earlier, 15-year-old Claudette Colvin engaged in this very act of defiance in the same bus system. On that fateful day in 1955, Claudette was not part of any coordinated Civil Rights effort. Her mind was simply buzzing with the stories of black pioneers for justice, whom she had been learning about in her school during Black History Month. As Ms. Colvin recounted in an interview:

My head was just too full of black history, you know, the oppression that we went through. It felt like Sojourner Truth was on one side pushing me down, and Harriet Tubman was on the other side of me pushing me down. I couldn't get up.²⁹

In the small but impactful act of refusing to give up her seat, Claudette Colvin was not simply striking back against an impressive institution. She was also carrying forward the baton held by previous black trailblazers who deigned to oppose the systems that impede their progress. This is often the true meaning and significance of being angry while black. It means not only generating anger to challenge institutions, but drawing on the collective power of black history, the perceived support of the black community, and the sense of responsibility to the racial group to engender the impetus to act. If, then, the general emotional sentiment of resignation inhibits the emergence of this anger or mutes its translation to action, the rich black tradition of activism is in effect robbed of some of its vitality.

Translating Anger to Activism across Identities of Gender, Age and Socioeconomic Status

The previous chapter explored how the racial anger gap intersects with gender, age and socioeconomic status. I determined whether different subsets of black individuals were more or less likely to see red over political actors and regimes of which they did not approve. I now return to these three factors, to assess whether the relationship between anger and insurgent action is stronger or weaker among a particular gender, age cohort or education level. From the CMPS data, I compared the relationship between reported anger and likelihood of protest across gender,

²⁹ Adler (2009).

TABLE 4.2 *Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of participating in a protest in the past year, across respondent race, gender, age and education level. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Men	Women	Under 30	30 and Older	No College Degree	College Degree
Black	1.01*	1.25*	1.12**	1.28**	1.15**	1.22*
	(0.45)	(0.35)	(0.43)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Obs.	612	1348	722	1238	1275	685
White	1.62^	2.44*	1.03	2.17*	2.49*	1.55^
	(0.95)	(1.00)	(1.11)	(0.89)	(1.21)	(0.81)
Obs.	285	464	221	529	410	339

^{*} p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

age and education among black respondents. As a point of reference, I made the same comparisons for white respondents. Table 4.2 displays the coefficients and standard errors indicating the effect of anger on each respective group's likelihoods of participating in a protest.

All three identities appear to intersect meaningfully with respondents' race in shaping the role played by anger in decisions to protest. Anger matters more for the decision of white women to protest compared to white men. This relationship is not mirrored among African Americans. Similarly, anger is more impactful on decisions to protest among white respondents over 30. But age has little bearing on the relationship between anger and protesting among black people. Finally, anger motivates protest to a greater degree among whites who have not attained a four-year college degree. In contrast, whether or not African Americans have such a degree has little bearing on how anger shapes their likelihood of protesting.

Further contrasts can be drawn from examining the likelihoods of protesting at each level of anger for these respective subgroups.

Figure 4.3 displays the likelihood of protesting across reported anger, for black and white men and women, respectively. For both black and white respondents alike, men exhibit a higher likelihood of protesting than women across all levels of anger. But among only whites, women exhibit a slightly stronger positive relationship between anger and protest than men. As white women move from least to most angry, their inclination to protest gains a bit of ground on their white men counterparts. This pattern comports with the idea that it was largely white women being fueled by their antipathy toward Trump to participate in women's




FIGURE 4.3 Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and gender. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

marches throughout the country. Despite efforts by march organizers to promote diversity and inclusiveness, the movement has faced numerous questions and criticisms about the degree to which it represents the needs and demands of *white* women rather than *all* women.³⁰³¹

Given that black women found themselves doubly vulnerable to the racial and gendered fault lines surfaced in the 2016 election, why would their anger not translate to protest as effectively as for white women? Since men are often centered in the most prominent narratives and images of black activism, black men may feel a greater sense of belongingness in the realm of protest. Consider which figures loom the largest in our collective memories of black activist movements and rebellion movements. Nat Turner. Malcolm X. Huey Newton. Far too infrequently the women at the forefront of these movements are given their rightful due in the

³⁰ Ramanathan (2017).

³¹ Quarshie (2018).

recollection and reproduction of these stories of struggle. Women such as Kathleen Cleaver, Elaine Brown and Claudia Jones. The frequent exclusion of black women from the historical record of black insurgency contributes to a gendered image of black activism. As the historian Clayborne Carson notes in a documentary on the Black Panther Party:

One of the ironies of the Black Panther Party is that the [predominant] image is the black male with the jacket and the gun. But the reality is that the majority of the rank and file by the end of the '60s are women.³²

When weighing the costs of expressing and acting on their anger, African Americans draw motivation from the black people who have blazed trails of anger-fueled action before them. If the trailblazers who are most accessible in the black public's imagination are disproportionately men, do black women have less collective history to draw upon to summon the motivation to translate anger to activism? Perhaps a more full-throated articulation of the stories of black political pioneers such as Ella Baker, Angela Davis and Assata Shakur will reverberate in greater numbers of women asserting their rightful place in the sphere of political contestation when seeing red.

Further, black women too often may find themselves being excluded from narratives and discourses both about *black* activism and *women's* activism. Thus, while black women are clearly observable in the realm of protest, there must be acknowledgment of the fact that this group's intersectional marginalities may slightly augment the effect of the anger gap on black women's participation.

Turning to age, Figure 4.4 compares the respective effects of anger on protesting among people under 30 and those 30 and older.

Among African Americans, both younger and older age cohorts are about equally likely to participate in protests as they move from *never* angry to angry *all the time* during the election. Yet across every level of anger, younger black individuals express a greater likelihood of protesting. A different pattern emerges among white respondents, for whom the older cohort exhibits a stronger relationship between anger and protesting. In fact, when they express feeling angry most frequently, white respondents over 30 become more likely than those under 30 to take part in a protest.

Anger appears to have a stronger mobilizing effect on young African Americans relative to young whites. Again, this pattern maps on quite

³² Nelson (2016).




FIGURE 4.4 Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and age cohort. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

well with real-world observations during the election, as young black people became increasingly more entrenched in political activism – while *not* increasing their electoral participation. This pattern was highlighted in a *Washington Post* piece from May 2016, which noted that despite spirited activism by young black people in both online spaces and in tangible communities, they were voting at no greater rates than in past years.³³

Recall from Chapter 3 that younger black respondents reported feeling anger throughout the election season at a rate statistically indistinguishable from younger whites. Taken together, the patterns indicate that the cohort of African Americans that came of age during the Obama era may indeed be engendering anger and leveraging it toward political action more strongly than older cohorts. Time will tell whether this cohort is ultimately able to bridge the racial anger gap.

³³ Williams and Clement (2016).




FIGURE 4.5 Marginal effects of anger reported during 2016 election on likelihood of protesting in the past year, across respondent race and education level. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 CMPS. All control variables held at means.

Finally, Figure 4.5 displays the relationships between anger and protesting across black and white respondents with and without college degrees.

Among black and white respondents, those with a college degree are more likely to protest across all levels of reported anger. Notably, African Americans without college degrees exhibit a likelihood of protesting across all levels of anger that is virtually equivalent to white individuals with a college degree. So while educational attainment does increase the propensity of African Americans to protest when they see red, the disproportionate lack of access to education among the group does not necessarily create a racial disparity on the front lines of oppositional politics.

In sum, among the African Americans seeing red most frequently throughout the 2016 campaign, there is a slightly stronger inclination to take to the front lines of protest among men, those under 30 and those with college degrees. The gender trend is especially notable, as among whites the anger-action link is slightly greater for women than men.

Additionally, younger African Americans are more mobilized toward protest by anger than their white age counterparts. Across these social identities, black people tend to generally outpace their white counterparts in protesting across all levels of anger. Yet as Table 4.2 reveals, anger still moves the needle for white individuals across nearly all of these subgroups relative to black people.

What does the anger-to-activism linkage look like when shifting from comparisons across social identities to comparisons across racial attitudes? In Chapter 2, I argued that the beliefs generally adhered to by African Americans – beliefs regarding their collective political agency, the lack of responsiveness from the sociopolitical system to black demands, and the existence of a racial Promised Land on the horizon – contribute to the anger gap displayed by the group in politics. In light of the observation that black people's expressed anger tends to translate most effectively to the domain of insurgent action, it is worth considering how this effect of political anger is moderated by the racial beliefs adhered to by black people.

Retuning to trends from my original 2018 RAP Study, I explore how black people's fundamental beliefs about racial discrimination, their senses of racial solidarity, their senses of group efficacy and their religiosity can maximize or mitigate the effect of their expressed anger on their willingness to enter the front lines of political action on an issue that is always of particular salience to African Americans – race and policing.

Racial Ideology and the Translation of Black Anger to Activism

Late in the summer of 2014, much of the nation was fixated upon the small suburb of Ferguson outside St. Louis, Missouri. Sprayed across the front pages of newspapers, television screens and social media feeds were the images capturing the smoldering black anger over the killing of teenager Michael Brown by Ferguson police officer Darren Wilson. The weeks, months and years that followed (and indeed, even preceded) would provide black people with an exhaustingly ample set of opportunities to signal their displeasure with the constellation of policies, police practices and laws that provide insufficient recourse when black civilians are killed by police with seeming impunity.

The threats to black well-being represented by economic downturns, non-favored partisan administrations or employment of disparaging

racial codes in campaign ads may be met with the resigned acceptance that these represent the costs of being black in a racially stratified society. But the threat of a fatal encounter with police – and of legal and political systems ill-suited to alleviating this threat – strikes an altogether different chord.³⁴

The general responses of African Americans to this visceral type of threat should animate an anger that is not commonly exhibited in response to threats more political or partisan in nature. I endeavored to find if black participants in the RAP Study would demonstrate a greater willingness to address issues of race and policing immediately after being primed to consider what makes them angry about issues of race in America.

I focus exclusively on the racial anger prime here because it offers an occasion to examine an emotional expression that departs from the domain of electoral politics. As chronicled earlier in this chapter, black political discourses tend to link black anger to strategies aimed at challenging broader systems of racial oppression, as opposed to challenging specific actors or regimes within those systems. It is only fitting, therefore, to assess how anger expressed over the broader phenomenon of racial stratification informs black decisions to take on political action.

After receiving either of the primes described in Chapter 2, black and white study participants indicated whether or not they wanted to receive information on how to attend an upcoming forum in their local area that would address local policing of racial minorities. They were told this forum was expected to draw activists on both sides of the issue. Thus, the participants were asked if they were willing to jump directly into the fray over one of the most contentious issues in the contemporary racial landscape.³⁵

As shown in Figure 4.6, African Americans were indeed more inclined to enter this contentious space when primed to engender their anger over race in America. Black subjects who received the racial anger prime were about eight percentage points more likely to request information on the forum than black people who received no anger prime. In contrast, white participants receiving the anger prime were virtually no more likely than whites receiving no prime to request information about the forum. So,

³⁴ Albertson and Gadarian (2015).

³⁵ Exact question wording for this and all measures examined here are available in the Appendix to this chapter.




FIGURE 4.6 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across participant race. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

black people are more willing and able to take on direct political action when reflecting on their anger over racial issues. But how is this willingness to take action influenced by their fundamental views on race?

Racial Solidarity, Racial Strife, and the Effect of Anger on Action

Recall from Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 that a majority of African Americans in the RAP study (54 percent) agreed that racial discrimination was a constant source of stress for them. These feelings of racial stress actually hinder the mobilizing effect of the racial anger prime on black people's willingness to participate in the policing forum. As shown in Figure 4.7, among African Americans who *do not* feel this stress, the positive effect of the racial anger prime is double the size of its effect among black participants who do constantly feel racial stress (12 percent to 6 percent).

Table 2.2 also revealed that nearly 75 percent of the black study participants reported feeling a responsibility to stay calm in the face of racial discrimination. This sense of duty would seem to inhibit any potential mobilizing effect of black anger on political action. Sure




FIGURE 4.7 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief that racial discrimination is a constant source of stress. Black participants only. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

enough, among African Americans who express this responsibility, the positive effect of the racial anger prime on their interest in the policing forum is only about three-quarters the size for African Americans who do *not* feel compelled to stay calm in the face of discrimination (see Figure 4.8).

Finally, Chapter 2 highlighted the role of linked fate in shaping black political decision making. A robust 77 percent of black RAP Study participants agreed that what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in their lives. How does the sense that one's destiny is tied to the collective destiny of their racial group affect one's likelihood of taking action when seeing red over race in America?

As displayed in Figure 4.9, linked fate actually *inhibits* the effect of racial anger on black action. Black participants expressing linked fate are only slightly more likely to request information on the policing forum than those receiving no anger prime. But among the minority of black




FIGURE 4.8 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief in the need to stay calm in the face of racial discrimination. Black participants only. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

people who do not express linked fate, the anger prime boosts likelihood of requesting information by a substantial 28 percentage points.

What should be made of the effects of these racial perceptions on the relationship between African Americans' racial anger and their motivation to take action in the contentious domain of policing? The beliefs adhered to by majorities of African Americans – that their fates are interlocked, that racial stressors are a constant force in their lives, and that they feel the responsibility to maintain their cool in the face of such racial stressors – help them filter and make sense of their experiences as black people.

Acting as guideposts helping black people navigate the racial roadblocks in their paths, these beliefs also engender the sentiment of resignation regarding the utility of leveraging anger in order to advance black people's collective goals. That skepticism may not outright erase the mobilizing effect of the anger expressed by these individuals. But it does dull the impact of anger, in comparison to black people who do not adhere to these common racial perceptions.




FIGURE 4.9 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief in racial group linked fate. Black participants only. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

Once again, we see the anger gap emerge, this time in a slightly different form. Political anger simply does not carry the same senses of agency and entitlement for black Americans that it typically does for white Americans. So even in this instance, in which we find black people sufficiently expressing anger *and* effectively acting on that anger, we find the anger-action linkage to be constrained by the racial ideological beliefs adhered to by most black Americans.

That is not to say these racial perceptions are altogether incapable of stimulating black people to action. Linked fate in particular has long been viewed as a factor uniquely promoting political activity among African Americans.³⁶ Rather, it is the case that the specific emotion state of anger is not the most likely pathway through which these beliefs stimulate black action. These perceptions of racial solidarity and strife can effectively translate to feelings of racial pride or optimism. And those feelings

³⁶ Chong and Rogers (2005).

can in turn be conduits to political action. But it appears that these same perceptions do not particularly animate anger in a way that makes black people more likely to enter the fray of oppositional politics.

Racial Group Agency and the Effect of Anger on Action

It was earlier shown that in general black RAP Study participants convey significantly lower senses of racial group agency relative to white participants. Given the role of agency in activating anger, how would such perceptions moderate the mobilizing effects of racial anger on willingness to take action, across participant race?

Figure 4.10 displays the mobilizing effects of the anger prime among black and white participants respectively, based on their perceptions of how often their racial groups have a say in how government handles important issues.

The effect of anger on the likelihood of requesting information about the police forum is doubled among black people who believe their group *often* has a say in government, compared to those who do not feel their group often has a say. In contrast, this indicator of racial group agency has virtually no effect whatsoever on the relationship between anger and action for white participants.

Why would these group-based perceptions of political agency have an effect only for African Americans? Consider the role of double consciousness in shaping black people's perceptions of themselves and their socio-political environment. In contrast to white Americans, who by and large feel no dissonance between their individual identities and their collective national identities as American, black people constantly feel the pull of the two not-always-compatible worlds to which they belong – those of America and of *black* America. Whereas white people's perceptions of their collective capacity as *whites* may not inform their views in a manner much different than their perceptions of their agency as individuals, for black people, these two perceptions carry different and often contradicting ideas.

Put simply, the group-centric calculation should factor more heavily in the decision making of the people who feel more defined – and bound – by their group status. We therefore witness racial group agency playing no discernible effect on whites' leveraging of emotion toward action likelihood, while constituting a major difference maker for African Americans.




FIGURE 4.10 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across belief respondent's racial group has say in government. Results shown for black participants and white participants separately. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

Racial Salvation and the Effect of Anger on Action

As discussed in Chapter 2, a common thread in political communications to black Americans is the framing of America's racial arc as one of steady upward progress, which will ultimately lead to (if it has not already been achieved) full-scale racial justice and equity. Part of the resonance of this messaging lies in its synchronicity with Christian narratives of salvation, with which a great many African Americans are intimately familiar. I termed this rhetorical pattern the narrative of racial salvation.

This salvation narrative may be able to mobilize black action, but likely *not* through making black people get angry. To test this, I examined whether the fixing of black people's gaze upward toward the racial Promised Land inhibited the mobilizing effect of their expressed anger on their willingness to participate in the policing forum.

First up, as displayed in Figure 4.11, are the mobilizing effects of anger across black people's beliefs about how long discrimination will affect the lives of black people.

Recall from Chapter 2 that just under 20 percent of black RAP Study participants *disagreed* with the notion that discrimination will always affect black people. This small subset of African Americans has its gaze firmly fixed on the racial Promised Land. For this group, expressed anger over racial issues *decreases* their likelihood of requesting information on the forum, by a substantial 16 percentage points. In contrast, the majority of black people who feel discrimination will always affect African Americans are mobilized by anger, to the tune of about 15 percentage points. This is not just a degree of difference, but of direction. The racial optimism expressed by this set of African Americans completely reverses the effect of anger on their likelihood of taking action. Meanwhile, for the majority of black people with a more jaded view of race relations, anger is indeed an effective tool for taking non-electoral action.

Making clearer the connections between racial salvation narratives and religious narratives, Figure 4.12 shows the effects of the racial anger prime on participation across people who attend a religious service at least once a week, and those who attend less frequently or not at all. There are contrasting effects of this religious devotion for black and white people.

Among whites, anger has absolutely no effect among the less devout, and a slight positive effect among the devout. Among black subjects, in contrast, the devout attenders are virtually not impacted by their expressed anger. But among infrequent and non-attenders, anger increases the




FIGURE 4.11 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across beliefs about how long discrimination will affect the lives of black people. Black participants only. Data from 2018 Race and Participation (RAP) Study.

likelihood of requesting information about the forum by 15 percentage points. Once again, black people whose eyes are fixed on salvation – literally, in this instance – are not mobilized by anger.

The black church has had a clear hand in mobilizing black people toward political action for centuries. Whether providing empowering political socialization, developing the civic skills that translate well to political behavior or helping to offset the material and immaterial costs of action, the church has and continues to be an invaluable motivator of black action.³⁷³⁸ But as these trends indicate, *anger* is likely not the primary pathway through which the church engenders action. It appears that seeing red is largely incompatible with seeing the Promised Land over the horizon.

³⁷ Peterson (1992).

³⁸ Harris (1994).




FIGURE 4.12 Mean likelihood of requesting information on community policing forum in control and racial anger conditions, across frequency of church attendance. Results shown for black participants and white participants separately. Data from 2018 Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study.

The Limits of Black Anger, the Potential of Black Enthusiasm

These observations from the RAP Study raise important questions about the sets of emotions that most effectively mobilize black political participation. What have the explorations established so far? Given the linkage in many strands of black political discourse between anger and activist strategizing, the racial anger gap has meaningful consequences that extend beyond electoral outcomes, shaping black participation in activist campaigns for racial justice.

Given that some of the primary ideological beliefs that shape the way black people navigate their political environment – i.e., perceptions of structural discrimination, linked fate, religion and beliefs about racial salvation – inhibit rather than enhance the mobilizing effects of anger on their participation, what emotions are the effective conduits translating these beliefs to action? Perhaps the answer to that question has been hiding in plain view. *Yes we can. Keep hope alive. I'm black and I'm proud.*

In the next chapter, I lay out how the same black ideological beliefs that facilitate the racial anger gap also give positive emotions – specifically hope and pride – a specific potency in stimulating black action. Do black Americans generally exhibit an *enthusiasm advantage* in politics? And does the mobilizing effect of this enthusiasm advantage close the disparity brought about by the anger gap?

Appendix to Chapter 4

2018 Race, Anger and Participation Study: Question Wording for Racial Attitudes and Participation

Dealing with racial discrimination is a constant source of stress for me.
I feel a responsibility to my racial group to stay calm in the face of discrimination.
No matter how much racial progress is made, discrimination will always affect the lives of black people.

Response Options

Strongly agree

Agree somewhat

Neither agree nor disagree

Disagree somewhat

Disagree strongly

Do you think what happens generally to black people in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?

Response Options

Yes

No

How often would you say [black/white people] have a say in how government handles important issues?

How often would you say public officials work hard to help [black/white people]?

Response Options

All the time

Most of the time

About half of the time

Rarely

Never

There is an upcoming community forum on policing of minorities in your local area that is expected to draw activists on both sides. At the conclusion of this survey, would you like to receive information on how to attend this event?

Response Options

Yes

No

TABLE A4.1 *Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Black respondents only. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Anger	0.53* (0.24)	0.48 (0.32)	0.25 (0.20)	0.06 (0.21)	0.58* (0.23)	1.17*** (0.27)	1.33*** (0.25)
Fear	0.83*** (0.23)	0.49 (0.29)	0.23 (0.19)	0.25 (0.20)	0.26 (0.21)	0.43 (0.24)	0.38 (0.22)
Pride	0.85*** (0.25)	0.94** (0.32)	0.33 (0.21)	0.50* (0.22)	0.73** (0.24)	1.14*** (0.28)	0.83** (0.26)
Hope	-0.18 (0.26)	-0.15 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.21)	-0.30 (0.23)	-0.20 (0.25)	-0.55 (0.29)	-0.83** (0.27)
Belief economy worsened	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.28)	-0.43* (0.18)	-0.47* (0.19)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.32 (0.23)	0.04 (0.21)
US-born	0.94** (0.34)	0.41 (0.38)	0.12 (0.22)	0.29 (0.24)	0.16 (0.26)	0.24 (0.30)	1.01** (0.35)
Contacted by elites	0.34* (0.13)	0.96*** (0.17)	0.53*** (0.11)	0.56*** (0.11)	0.50*** (0.12)	0.66*** (0.14)	0.71*** (0.13)
Linked fate	0.21 (0.19)	0.25 (0.24)	0.32* (0.15)	0.31* (0.16)	0.56** (0.18)	0.30 (0.21)	0.74*** (0.19)
Experienced discrimination	0.09 (0.15)	0.05 (0.19)	0.12 (0.12)	0.37** (0.13)	0.03 (0.14)	0.28 (0.16)	0.30* (0.15)
Education	0.25 (0.28)	0.41 (0.36)	0.29 (0.23)	0.39 (0.24)	1.11*** (0.27)	0.10 (0.30)	0.95*** (0.28)
Household income	0.71** (0.23)	0.68* (0.29)	0.23 (0.19)	0.23 (0.20)	0.38 (0.21)	0.41 (0.25)	1.22*** (0.23)
Age	1.08* (0.45)	0.23 (0.59)	-0.71 (0.38)	-1.38*** (0.41)	1.56*** (0.43)	-3.29*** (0.54)	-1.83*** (0.48)
Woman	-0.22 (0.14)	-0.14 (0.18)	-0.26* (0.12)	-0.28* (0.12)	-0.26* (0.13)	-0.12 (0.16)	0.08 (0.14)
Party ID	0.02 (0.27)	-0.96** (0.31)	-0.21 (0.22)	-0.32 (0.23)	-0.77** (0.24)	0.20 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.27)
Church attendance	0.70*** (0.17)	0.52* (0.22)	1.10*** (0.14)	0.80*** (0.15)	0.20 (0.16)	0.35 (0.19)	-0.05 (0.17)
Interest in politics	2.35*** (0.30)	1.14** (0.37)	1.30*** (0.22)	1.23*** (0.24)	1.69*** (0.27)	1.36*** (0.30)	1.43*** (0.28)

(continued)

TABLE A4.1 (cont.)

	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Internal efficacy	0.16 (0.22)	-0.43 (0.28)	-0.05 (0.18)	0.05 (0.19)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.41 (0.24)	0.14 (0.22)
Distrust in government	-0.79** (0.27)	-1.14*** (0.34)	-0.07 (0.23)	-0.08 (0.24)	-0.60* (0.26)	-0.58* (0.29)	-0.40 (0.28)
Constant	-5.99*** (0.56)	-3.81*** (0.63)	-2.52*** (0.39)	-2.48*** (0.41)	-4.10*** (0.46)	-3.03*** (0.53)	-5.05*** (0.56)
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.17	0.14	0.10	0.09	0.14	0.13

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A4.2 *Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. White respondents only. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from CMPS*

	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Anger	1.90*** (0.47)	0.94 (0.67)	1.10* (0.43)	1.36** (0.43)	1.70*** (0.41)	2.05** (0.66)	2.68*** (0.45)
Fear	-0.09 (0.41)	0.39 (0.57)	0.08 (0.38)	-0.05 (0.37)	-0.01 (0.35)	0.33 (0.55)	-0.56 (0.37)
Pride	-0.28 (0.47)	0.67 (0.66)	0.70 (0.43)	0.12 (0.43)	0.41 (0.41)	1.03 (0.67)	-0.21 (0.43)
Hope	1.43** (0.47)	0.70 (0.65)	0.17 (0.44)	0.28 (0.43)	0.40 (0.41)	-0.05 (0.64)	0.88* (0.43)
Belief economy worsened	-0.23 (0.35)	-0.45 (0.49)	-0.62 (0.33)	-0.70* (0.32)	-0.19 (0.30)	-0.95* (0.49)	-0.09 (0.32)
US-born	-0.70 (0.46)	-0.73 (0.62)	-0.06 (0.47)	0.08 (0.51)	0.27 (0.47)	-1.66** (0.57)	0.24 (0.52)
Contacted by elites	0.71** (0.22)	0.40 (0.30)	0.75*** (0.20)	0.83*** (0.20)	0.65*** (0.19)	0.90** (0.29)	0.50* (0.20)
Linked fate	0.16 (0.30)	0.45 (0.44)	0.35 (0.28)	0.63* (0.29)	0.35 (0.26)	0.89* (0.45)	0.60* (0.28)
Experience discrimination	-0.39 (0.28)	0.25 (0.36)	0.54* (0.24)	0.61** (0.23)	0.01 (0.23)	0.50 (0.34)	0.17 (0.24)
Education	0.89* (0.45)	1.27 (0.66)	1.28** (0.42)	0.87* (0.41)	0.99* (0.39)	1.36* (0.63)	1.38*** (0.41)

TABLE A4.2 (cont.)

	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Household income	1.03** (0.36)	-0.12 (0.51)	0.95** (0.34)	0.54 (0.33)	0.98** (0.31)	0.88 (0.51)	0.06 (0.33)
Age	0.28 (0.67)	-1.43 (0.94)	0.46 (0.63)	0.49 (0.62)	1.30* (0.58)	-4.83*** (1.03)	-0.20 (0.62)
Woman	0.05 (0.22)	-0.26 (0.31)	-0.33 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.52 (0.30)	0.25 (0.21)
Party ID	0.32 (0.30)	0.81 (0.42)	0.47 (0.29)	0.49 (0.29)	-0.07 (0.27)	0.83* (0.42)	0.28 (0.28)
Church attendance	-0.09 (0.28)	0.17 (0.39)	0.96*** (0.26)	0.68** (0.26)	0.08 (0.25)	0.18 (0.39)	0.13 (0.26)
Interest in politics	3.00*** (0.53)	2.35** (0.77)	1.10* (0.46)	1.10* (0.45)	1.77*** (0.42)	1.91** (0.71)	1.85*** (0.45)
Internal efficacy	0.37 (0.37)	0.25 (0.51)	0.81* (0.35)	0.20 (0.35)	0.42 (0.33)	0.07 (0.50)	0.53 (0.34)
Distrust in government	-1.23* (0.53)	-1.78* (0.70)	-0.52 (0.49)	-0.09 (0.49)	-0.10 (0.46)	0.14 (0.71)	0.26 (0.49)
Constant	-5.44*** (0.87)	-4.58*** (1.17)	-5.11*** (0.82)	-4.97*** (0.83)	-5.74*** (0.80)	-3.96*** (1.11)	-6.30*** (0.87)
Pseudo R ²	0.24	0.19	0.21	0.17	0.20	0.27	0.20

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A4.3 Logistic models regressing interactions between anger and views about BLM on likelihood of protesting. Black respondents only.
Data from CMPS

	BLM helps blacks	Support BLM	Informed about BLM
Anger	1.13* (0.57)	1.73* (0.85)	1.41 (0.78)
BLM helps blacks	0.50 (0.41)	-	-
Anger* BLM helps	0.12 (0.62)	-	-

(continued)

TABLE A4.3 (*cont.*)

	BLM helps blacks	Support BLM	Informed about BLM
Support BLM	—	1.37*	
	—	(0.65)	
Anger*support BLM	—	-0.64	
		(0.98)	
Informed about BLM	—	—	0.27
			(0.60)
Anger*informed about BLM	—	—	-0.18
			(0.90)
Belief economy worsened	-0.40	-0.38	-0.41
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Linked fate	0.39	0.31	0.42*
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Experienced discrimination	0.29	0.34*	0.35*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Perceived discrimination against blacks	-0.20	-0.38	-0.26
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
Education	-0.04	0.09	0.06
	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Household income	0.38	0.32	0.32
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Age	-2.93***	-2.95***	-2.96***
	(0.50)	(0.50)	(0.50)
Woman	-0.18	-0.17	-0.16
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Party ID	-0.07	-0.11	0.08
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Church attendance	0.49**	0.50**	0.48**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Interest in politics	1.65***	1.76***	1.76***
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Internal efficacy	-0.39	-0.40	-0.39
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Distrust in government	-0.69*	-0.77**	-0.79**
	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.28)
Constant	-2.54***	-3.10***	-2.55***
	(0.56)	(0.67)	(0.64)
Observations	2031	2065	2065

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

The Racial Enthusiasm Advantage in Politics

“Little David ... took off his unnecessary garments, Little David. Didn’t want to get weighted down with a lot of foolishness, little David. Took what God gave him, a sling shot and a God biscuit, a rock.”¹

During the heated race to choose its next presidential nominee, the Democratic Party stared down a vexing dilemma. Who would be best suited to lead the party ticket in the upcoming electoral battle against an opponent universally despised by its party base? On one hand was a candidate with an extensive track record of public service, yet who was frequently criticized for a supposed lack of charisma or dynamism. On the other, a candidate characterized by an electric energy, whose unapologetic liberal fervor was simultaneously endearing to younger progressives and unnerving to older and more moderate members of the party.

Indeed, political history always seems to repeat itself – for I am not referring to the choice between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders in 2016. Rather, the choice between Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis and Civil Rights leader Reverend Jesse Jackson in 1988. In both 1988 and 2016, the Democratic contender with the more conventional political track record ultimately received the Democratic nomination, before going on to lose the general election.

Although he never secured the party nomination, Jesse Jackson left an indelible impact on both the Democratic Party and the black electorate. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Jackson’s presence on the Democratic primary ticket in 1984 energized black voters, boosting black registration

¹ Jackson (1984).

and turnout in both the primary and the general race. But in 1988, Jackson's inability to capture the party nomination a second time left a sour taste in the mouths of many African American Democrats. As political scholar Katherine Tate demonstrated, black people who supported Jackson's 1988 campaign were *less* likely to vote in that year's general election – the converse of the pattern in 1984.²

We can view the muted turnout of Jackson adherents in 1988 as an expression of disillusionment with a party that seems to consistently choose the conventional, middle-of-the-road candidates over the progressive champions. But black people's excitement about the prospect of a Jesse Jackson candidacy was rooted in more than his unapologetically liberal policy platform. And that excitement went beyond even Jesse Jackson's race and his record of racial advocacy. Black excitement was also generated by the unabashed optimistic tone of Jackson's messaging to black people.

When the Reverend opened his first presidential campaign in 1984, he analogized his quest for political pay dirt – and by extension the quest of black people generally – with the biblical story of David, the young shepherd's son and eventual king of Israel. Then just a scrawny teenager, David brazenly took down the giant Pharisee soldier Goliath, with nothing more than a sling and a stone. The story of David and Goliath is the story of someone who is overmatched, yet not overwhelmed. Facing long odds of survival with the sparsest of resources, the hero ultimately endures and overcomes. This story resonates with many black people, as it is an effective characterization of the black collective struggle for self-actualization in a racially stratified sociopolitical world.

By inspiring African Americans to see themselves as an army of Davids, slinging their stones at the various Goliaths of unfair hiring practices, substandard educational systems, racially alienating housing practices and police profiling, Jackson effectively tapped into those long-running narratives of black salvation. By proclaiming that the answer to the question of whether black people can reshape their political reality was a resounding *yes we can*, Jackson affirmed the efficacy of black people's uphill march toward the racial Promised Land. By urging his supporters to *keep hope alive*, Jackson articulated a new blueprint for mobilizing electoral action – not by seeing red, but by seeing glory on the horizon.

² Tate (1991).




FIGURE 5.1 Predicted probabilities of reporting hope toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

It is no coincidence that two of the most memorable messages from Barack Obama's historic presidential run in 2008 were lifted directly from the Jackson campaign. *Hope*, and *yes we can*. I imagine Obama shared Jackson's understanding of the visceral resonance of such messages with the black electorate. Not surprisingly, this messaging indeed had a distinct impact on the emotional dispositions of African Americans. But as revealed by trends from the ANES, that impact may not have been felt on the expected emotions.

Figure 5.1 displays black and white ANES respondents' respective likelihoods of expressing hope toward presidential candidates and incumbents, from the Reagan through Obama years. These likelihoods are calculated holding demographic, resource and engagement variables at their means, allowing us to pinpoint the role of race in shaping individuals' emotional reactions to the political figures.

Hope expressions from black and white respondents remain remarkably consistent across the time period, so much so that the mean likelihood of expressing hope for African Americans is 89.5, compared to 89.9 for whites. Perhaps surprisingly, there is no surge of hope from black




FIGURE 5.2 Predicted probabilities of reporting pride toward presidential incumbents and candidates, across respondent race. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

respondents during the Obama era. In the years 2008 and 2012, the mean likelihood of hope for this group stands at 94.3, essentially equivalent to the mean likelihood of 93.1 among whites.

Where Obama's campaign truly struck a chord among African Americans was not in their reports of hope, but their expressions of pride. This pride surplus is evident in Figure 5.2, which displays black and white respondents' likelihoods of feeling pride toward presidential incumbents and candidates.

Once again, expressions of pride are quite similar between black and white respondents across the entire time period, with mean likelihoods of 80.4 and 78.3 for black and white people, respectively. But during the Obama era, black people were substantively more likely than their white counterparts to express pride, to the tune of a 94-percent likelihood compared to an 82.15-percent likelihood for white respondents. This difference is significant at the 0.001 alpha level.³

³ The Appendix to this chapter contains full logistic regression analysis results predicting race of respondent on reports of hope and pride, controlling for the full battery of demographic, resource and engagement variables.

Prevalent theoretical perspectives on the roles of emotion in politics, from affective intelligence theory to appraisal theory, tend to aggregate the emotions of hope and pride into the broader umbrella feeling of enthusiasm. But as indicated by these patterns from the ANES, I find it worthwhile to disentangle these emotions and consider the independent respective effects they wield on black political behavior. Doing so uncovers nuances in the translation of these emotions to behavior that are overlooked when viewing them together.

Black expressions of hope are rooted in adherence to narratives of racial salvation and the belief in the upward march of the black body politic toward the racial Promised Land. In what context, then, will this emotion be more or less effectively activated and leveraged toward political action by African Americans? Black pride is tethered to racial identity and an unwavering belief in the capacity for the group to overcome the many obstacles standing in the way of advancement. Can this emotion propel African Americans to action across a broader range of contexts than those in which hope is engendered? Additionally, do hope and pride mobilize varying sets of actions from black people? Finally, do hope and pride exert stronger mobilizing effects on African Americans than they do for whites, thus suggesting a racial enthusiasm advantage to complement the anger gap in politics?

This chapter answers these questions by exploring how black people draw on positive emotions in their political decision making. I first return to emotional discourse analysis to illuminate the distinct roles of hope and pride in black people's navigation of the political environment. Then, I present a set of patterns from the ANES, CMPS and an original experiment conducted in the Detroit metro area to highlight the distinct ways in which pride and hope shape black participation. Assessing the translation of these emotions to political activity gives rise to both optimism and skepticism regarding the power of positive emotions to close the gap in action between black and white Americans.

Hope, Agency and Imagination in Black Political Discourse

There are two elements that distinguish the emotion state of hope. One, a feeling of anticipation for a goal toward which one aspires. Two, a sense of optimism that the goal will be achieved.⁴ It may seem intuitive to view hope as the emotional counterpart to fear. Both emotion states, after

⁴ Bar-Tal (2007).

all, are rooted in senses of uncertainty regarding future outcomes. The difference, of course, is that fear is a feeling of dread over a threatening prospective outcome, while hope is tied to a promising prospect. Much as fear motivates people to seek new information to resolve their uncertainty, hope has been shown to move people to engage in biased information seeking, as they search for confirmatory signs that the object of their hope will come to pass.⁵

Yet for all these similarities between hope and anger, scholars of emotions regularly posit that hope is the emotional inverse of *anger*. Like anger, research finds hope is attached to a concrete object,⁶ and like anger, feelings of hope make one more likely to take risks.⁷ Additionally, both anger and hope are anchored to people's sense of agency. As detailed in Chapter 2, anger imbues a sense of confidence – perhaps even an irrational confidence – in people as they work to right a wrong. Meanwhile, seeing reason for hope on the horizon engenders confidence that one will ultimately realize the change they desire.

The points at which anger and hope depart from one another yield insight into how hope can play a unique role in shaping black political behavior. First, we can consider the varying types of confidence animated by anger and hope. Anger is rooted in a person's sense of agency in her environment. Thus, black people's lack of collective agency within their political environment is a key factor in the racial anger gap in politics.

In contrast, a feeling of hope fundamentally alters how someone perceives her environment. When hopeful, people's sense of agency matters *less*. Unlike anger, which reflects a person's sense of her capacity for change, hope inspires optimism for change regardless of the individual's capacity to realize it.^{8,9} So the lack of collective political agency that inhibits African Americans' expressions of political anger should not translate to a similar hope gap.

On the contrary, because hope diminishes the centrality of one's agency in her perceptions of what is achievable within a given environment, this emotion can prove uniquely mobilizing for a group with generally low agency. This is why Jesse Jackson can appeal to hope to a black electorate feeling particularly defeated by the racial politics of the Reagan era, and why

⁵ Just, Crigler and Belt (2007).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Snyder (1994).

⁸ Frijda, Kuipers and Ter Schure (1989).

⁹ Uslaner (1998).

Barack Obama can draw upon the hope of a black body politic fatigued by the actions of the George W. Bush administration. Even black figures from radical political traditions appeal to hope, even as they recount the myriad ways in which black political influence is limited within conventional channels. For instance, the aforementioned Black Panther Party Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton knowingly appropriated Martin Luther King Jr.'s messaging about the racial Promised Land in a message to adherents:

[E]ven though it's nice to be on the mountaintop, we're going back to the valley. Because we understand that there's work to be done in the valley, and when we get through with this work in the valley, then we got to go to the mountaintop.¹⁰

Whether African Americans are being steered toward electoral or insurgent political actions, appeals to hope can prove resonant because of hope's capacity to shift black people's focus away from their lack of political influence and toward a concrete opportunity on the horizon. A focus on the opportunity waiting in the wings inspires not only optimism, but also creative thinking. While anger makes people laser-focused in combating the obstacle that impedes their progress toward their goal, research indicates that hope opens people's minds to consider new possibilities and novel means of problem solving.¹¹ Hope, then, carries the potential to motivate more than just information seeking or action. Hope sparks imagination; it engenders the envisioning of a new reality.

It is no surprise, then, that hope has long been an essential thread in African American discourse. For as long as black people have existed and persisted in America, they have shared in the construction of collective visions of change. Of the Promised Land of racial equality. Of the mountaintop of black liberation.

It is this vision of change that caused black enslaved people to embrace the Old Testament story of Moses as both analogy and blueprint for their own hard-fought path toward freedom from bondage.¹² The Negro spiritual "Go Down Moses" embodies the restless imagination of the black enslaved person, who had the audacity to imagine deliverance from the modern-day Pharaohs of the plantation.

*Go down, Moses
Way down in Egypt's land*

¹⁰ Hampton (1969).

¹¹ Isen, Daubman and Nowicki (1987).

¹² Feiler (2009).

*Tell old Pharaoh
Let my people go*

It is this vision of change that courses through W. E. B. DuBois' "Of the Wings of Atalanta." In this chapter from his seminal 1903 treatise *The Souls of Black Folks*, DuBois attributes the rise of Atlanta as a thriving Southern city in no small part to the tilting of the black gaze away from the abject horror of slavery and toward the promise of progress offered by the future.

All this is bitter hard; and many a man and city and people have found in it excuse for sulking, and brooding, and listless waiting. Such are not men of the sturdier make; they of Atlanta turned resolutely toward the future; and that future held aloft vistas of purple and gold ... So the city crowned her hundred hills with factories, and stored her shops with cunning handiwork, and stretched long iron ways to greet the busy Mercury in his coming. And the Nation talked of her striving.¹³

Striving is a concept to which DuBois refers frequently in his writings. In an essay written in 1897 for *The Atlantic*, DuBois described striving as the diligent labor put in by African Americans to make real the distant possibility of self-realization.

[The Negro] simply wishes to make it possible for a man to be both a Negro and an American without being cursed and spit upon by his fellows, without losing the opportunity of self-development. This is the end of his striving: to be a co-worker in the kingdom of culture, to escape both death and isolation, and to husband and use his best powers.¹⁴

This notion of laboring toward the promise of the future, with little regard for the societal and institutional constraints imposed on black people, comports well with the scholarship on the effects of hope on decision making. Hope causes people to focus not on what they possess or lack, but rather, what they stand to gain should the Promised Land come to pass. This calculation should prove particularly enticing for African Americans, a group often viewing its political prospects as limited.

The unique effect of hope on the political participation of African Americans was on full display in a study I conducted in Southeast Michigan between 2013 and 2014. This study showcased the power of hope to compel action in a fiercely contested issue domain that in ensuing

¹³ DuBois and Marable (2015).

¹⁴ DuBois (1897).

months would leave a bitter taste in many Michiganders' mouths, literally and figuratively.

Black Hope Floats: Mobilizing Action over Water in Detroit

Well before residents of Flint, Michigan demanded answers from city officials about the brown, odorous water coming from their faucets (see Chapter 2), debates were mounted in the Detroit metro area about issues of ownership, efficiency and costs relating to residents' own water supply. Residents had complained for years about their water service, with a local area news report in 2014 claiming that the average water bill in Detroit was about twice as high as the national average. And the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (DWSD) was often the direct target of residents' ire. The laundry list of complaints against the DWSD included improperly shutting off customers' water, taking too long to respond to requests for service, and leaving maintenance projects incomplete for months at a time.

Around 2013, a proposed restructuring of the DWSD was being touted by proponents as a solution to these long-gestating problems. Under this plan, control over the DWSD would shift from the city to either a private international water firm, or a newly created regional authority.¹⁵ Many government officials and rank-and-file residents touted this restructuring as a necessary move that would streamline the DWSD's operations and allow it to receive a much-needed injection of money. In turn, this better-resourced and trimmed-down operation could offer more timely and cost-efficient service to residents.

But to many residents, this plan was just another effort to strip the citizenry of power over decisions regarding public goods such as water. This restructuring effort was led not by Detroit's city council, but instead by the emergency manager appointed by Governor Rick Snyder in 2013. This emergency manager was given the authority usually reserved for the councilmembers elected to office. So the council and mayor were in effect stripped of their governing power, and the decisions for the city were being made by a non-democratically elected individual.

The lack of democratic accountability of the manager rubbed many Detroit residents the wrong way. It was seen as the latest unwelcome

¹⁵ Guillen (2014).

change for a city that in the time since 2000 had fallen from 10th to 18th in population size, endured a major scandal that landed its mayor and his chief of staff in prison and became constantly besieged by substandard city services. In light of these slights, the idea of the city no longer controlling its water service, as it had been doing for 80 years, was viewed by many as another sign that residents were losing control over their city's destiny. The ensuing debate over the DWSD restructuring in the city, therefore, was centered both on immediate issues of the water service and on bigger-picture issues of responsible governance and self-reliance.

From the summer of 2013 through the summer of 2014 I dove headfirst into this debate. Through sending mailers to lists of registered voters, posting advertisements in local newspapers and entering local area churches, universities and workplaces, I recruited participants to complete a survey about their political attitudes and local policy issues. My efforts yielded a total sample of 139 white and 148 black residents of the Detroit metro area.

Attaining this convenience sample was an exhaustive endeavor. The Detroit metro area is marked by extreme racial segregation, and many neighborhoods within the DWSD's jurisdiction had suffered from severe economic hardship. A palpable sense of political fatigue emanated from many of the denizens approached for the survey; only a fraction of the people contacted leapt at the chance to expound on their social and political views for a perceived interloper descending upon the town from the ivory tower.

This challenge ultimately resulted in producing a sample of African American subjects that was significantly older, more religious and more educated than the white sample, many of whom were recruited at and around the local universities. Additionally, women participants are overrepresented within both racial groups. Characteristics of the samples are displayed in Table 5.1.

Tests of the data reveal that the patterns exhibited by black and white participants hold even when accounting for these variations. The Appendix to this chapter presents the treatment and emotion effects with the inclusion of control variables. While these control variables subsume some of the effects of the emotions on participation, the differences in how black and white participants respond to the conditions remain intact.

As part of the survey, participants were shown one of several flyers purported to be from a local area advocacy organization. All of the flyers addressed the proposed DWSD restructuring plan. The *control* flyer provides both arguments for and against the restructuring, and

TABLE 5.1 *Descriptive statistics on participants in the 2013–2014 Detroit area water study*

	Black	White
Total observations	148	139
Average age	40	23
% Women	69	57
% College graduates	48	23
% Attending church at least once per week	43	9
% Living in majority-white zip codes	14	74
% Living in majority-black zip codes	71	9

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

encourages people to gather more information on the issue. The *threat* flyer highlights three negative consequences of the restructuring: loss of local jobs, increased risk to subjects' water and higher water bills. This flyer also contains images of people looking stern or dejected. Finally, the *opportunity* flyer highlights three positive potential consequences of the change: elimination of wasteful government spending, improved water quality standards and the smallest increases to water bills in decades. This content is accompanied by imagery of people with cheery demeanors. Both the threat and opportunity flyers encourage people to reach out to their local state representative to either oppose or support the restructuring. Why direct the letter to the state rather than the Detroit city council? Because the installation of a state-appointed emergency manager for the city effectively sapped the council of its governing authority. Examples of the control and opportunity flyers are displayed in the Appendix to this chapter.¹⁶

The arguments used in all three flyer types mirrored those that were swirling about this issue in real time, and my study participants varied in the amount of prior knowledge and attitudes they possessed on the proposed restructuring when they viewed one of my flyers. In other

¹⁶ Originally, there were three different types of threat opportunity flyers, respectively. The treatment for the “threat (or opportunity) + racial prime” condition contained alterations of the wording and imagery intended to prime subjects’ racial group identification (e.g., inclusion of a picture of either a black or white family). The treatment for the “threat (or opportunity) + narrative” condition contained altered text intended to prime racial resignation (e.g., inclusion of the text “here we go again...”) or racial salvation (e.g., “we’ve finally got somebody on our side”). Due to the small overall number of study participants I was able to attain in each of these conditions, I was unable to adequately capture differences in subject responses across conditions. I therefore collapsed these conditions into the broader “threat” and “opportunity” conditions.

settings, that kind of variation may be a drawback to an experimental study. But in this case, it lent the study with ecological validity – that is, closely approximating how people encountered these same messages in the real world. Just as in real life, people had varying frames of reference and opinions on the issue when encountering the flyers. Whether they were being exposed to this debate for the first time through the flyer or had long been thinking and acting on the issue, I suspected participants would register a meaningful reaction to the content, as this real-world issue directly affected them.

After subjects viewed the flyer to which they were randomly assigned, they were asked about their opinions on the proposed restructuring, their emotional reactions to the content of the flyer and whether they would like to sign their name to letters being sent to the state legislature either opposing or supporting the restructuring. In addition to this direct-action invitation, participants were asked how likely they would be in the future to attend a local meeting about the issue, discuss the DWSD issue with others and contact an elected official regarding DWSD.¹⁷

My goal with this study was twofold. To determine the emotional responses black and white participants registered most strongly in response to the different framings of the DWSD restructuring, and to determine which emotions were the most effective pathways to political action for these groups. I focus here exclusively on black and white subjects receiving the policy opportunity frame.¹⁸ Black subjects in this condition exhibit an action-stimulating effect of hope not shared by whites.

Figure 5.3 showcases the mean levels of hope reported by black and white subjects when receiving the policy opportunity flyers.

Black participants registered only slightly more hope than whites. But whereas the opportunity treatment had no effect on the hope expressed by white participants, black participants did exhibit an increase in hope when moving from the control to opportunity condition. Figure 5.4 gives an indication of how participants' hope translated to action readiness, displaying black and white participants' mean likelihoods of signing their names to letters sent to the state legislature, across the control and opportunity conditions.

¹⁷ The Appendix to this chapter contains the exact wording for these measures.

¹⁸ Summarizing the results for subjects receiving the threat frame, both black and white subjects indicated a greater willingness to take action when expressing anger over the policy threat. But, consistent with the findings of my prior analyses, receipt of the threat mobilized white subjects by a notably larger margin than their black counterparts.




FIGURE 5.3 Mean reported hope in the opportunity condition, across participant race. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study.




FIGURE 5.4 Mean likelihood of signing name to letter in control and opportunity conditions, across participant race. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study.




FIGURE 5.5 Marginal effect of reported hope on likelihood of signing name to letter, across participant race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study.

Black subjects in the opportunity condition are about twice as likely to sign the letter than in the control condition. In contrast, white subjects are about a third more likely to sign the letter in the opportunity condition than those in the control. Figure 5.5 provides some insight into this difference. This figure displays black and white subjects' respective likelihoods of signing their name to the letter as they move from least to most hopeful over DWSD restructuring.

Following the dashed lines for whites we see a moderate increase from about 30 percent among those feeling no hope at all to about 47 percent among those feeling extremely hopeful. The increase is more pronounced among African Americans. Those who are not at all hopeful are about 40 percent more likely to sign the letter, while those who are extremely hopeful are about 74 percent more likely. Not only is the mobilizing effect of hope larger among black subjects, feeling most hopeful makes black people more likely than not to sign the letter. This is a far cry from white participants, who even when feeling the most hopeful are more likely than not to refrain from this action. The impact of hope on black participation is statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level, while its effect for white subjects is null.

The racially distinct effects of hope are even more pronounced when viewing participants' intent to take future actions on the DWSD




FIGURE 5.6 Marginal effect of reported hope on likelihoods of attending a meeting on DWSD restructuring, discussing the issue with others and contacting elected officials over the issue, across participant race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study.




FIGURE 5.6 (cont.)

restructuring. Figure 5.6 shows participants' respective likelihoods of attending a meeting on the restructuring, discussing the issue with others and contacting elected officials on the issue, all as they move from least to most hopeful.

Across all three prospective actions, black subjects become more likely to engage as they become more hopeful about the DWSD restructuring. And these likelihood increases are substantial, ranging from about a 34-percent increase in the likelihood of discussing the issue with others, to about a 41-percent increase in the likelihood of contacting elected officials.

While expressed hope is motivating African Americans to action on this water issue, it is having nil or negative effects among whites. Whether whites are least or most hopeful has no effect on their likelihood of attending a meeting on DWSD. And when it comes to discussing the issue with others or contacting officials, whites who feel extremely hopeful express *less* intent to act relative to the least hopeful.¹⁹

¹⁹ Tables A5.2–A5.4 in the Appendix to this chapter display the full results of the logistic regression models showing the effects of the opportunity treatment and reported hope on black and white subjects' likelihoods of participation, including controls.




FIGURE 5.7 Marginal effect of church attendance on likelihood of expressing hope over DWSD, across participant race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study.

As one final indicator of the unique pull of racial salvation for black subjects, Figure 5.7 displays the relationships between hope expressed over the DWSD restructuring and church attendance.

Church attendance has a profound impact on black subjects' proclivity to feel hopeful about the DWSD restructuring. African Americans who report attending church at least once per week are about 30 percent more likely to express hope than those never attending church. Among white participants, however, there is absolutely no difference in likelihood of expressing hope between non-attenders and frequent attenders. These contrasting patterns suggest that the strong current of religiosity among African Americans indeed makes the group uniquely primed to express and be mobilized to political action by this positive emotion.

The patterns of behavior shown by white participants in this study conform to conventional wisdom. Those expressing hope when perceiving the DWSD issue as an opportunity appear to be less action-ready. They conform to the classic trope: *if it ain't broke, don't fix it. Why rock the boat?* But the manner in which black participants engage the DWSD issue when feeling hopeful illustrates a collective response to opportunity that departs quite a bit from *if it ain't broke, don't fix it*. As has been

demonstrated to this point, many black people generally perceive the sociopolitical system to generally be broken, at least in how it responds to black people's input. So when political opportunities arise, though few and far between as they may be, they demand increased action – stepping up to realize that opportunity, as opposed to stepping back to avoid messing with a good thing.

The narratives of racial salvation that have long permeated black political discourse prime African Americans to perceive such political opportunities as unique occasions to act. And as the prior examples of rhetoric from figures such as Fred Hampton and W. E. B. DuBois indicate, opportunities hoped for cannot simply be waited upon; they must be worked toward. *There's work to be done in the valley. This is the end of his striving.* From these narratives spring the mobilizing effects of hopefulness on black people's political action. They become less inhibited by their lack of collective agency, and motivated to do their part to move the group that much closer to the racial Promised Land.

The Limits of Hope, the Potential of Pride

The Detroit study illustrates the potential transformative effect of hope on black political behavior. Among a population mired in a seemingly uninterrupted chain of deflating economic and political losses, the prospect of a win in the contested policy area of water stimulated an action-readiness that far outpaced that of white residents. But when assessing the effects of hope on black people's participation in specific electoral contexts, there are clear limits.

These limits are on display in both the ANES and CMPS. Recall that the ANES examines the years 1980 through 2012. For this time period I conducted regression analyses to examine the effect of hope on likelihood of turnout in a presidential election, when accounting for the effects of the full slate of demographic, resource, and engagement variables. I examined the vote-stimulating effect of hope expressed toward the preferred party's incumbents and candidates among three groups – black Democrats, white Democrats and white Republicans. Table 5.2 displays the coefficients and standard errors on hope for these groups across each year. The rightmost column displays the effect of hope for the duration of the time period.

Expressions of hope toward preferred-party figures carries no greater effect for the black partisans in this data set. On the contrary, throughout the entire time period, this set of African Americans is the only group for

TABLE 5.2 *Effect of hope toward favored partisan on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown*

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	Total
Black	-1.46	-0.20	1.23*	0.42	0.72	-0.57	0.57	-1.31	-0.54	0.20
Democrats	(1.26)	(0.68)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.98)	(0.63)	(0.18)
Obs.	96	127	149	184	111	102	105	202	408	1484
White	0.30	-0.25	0.09	-0.31	0.23	0.34	0.82^	0.47	0.71	0.24*
Democrats	(0.31)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.50)	(0.36)	(0.10)
Obs.	445	553	465	694	524	446	275	214	628	4244
White	-0.02	0.72*	0.73**	0.30	-0.38	0.08	-0.14	-0.10	0.84**	0.51***
Republicans	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.31)	(0.10)
Obs.	393	618	594	668	483	425	332	191	725	4429

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

which in-party hope does not exert a statistically significant association with turning out to vote. For both white Democrats and Republicans, in contrast, hope toward the favored partisans is strongly and positively correlated with turning out. Notably, there is no surge in hope's mobilizing effect on African Americans during the Obama era. During the years 2008 and 2012, hope retains its null effect on black Democrats' likelihood of voting.

Figure 5.8 illustrates the translation of hope toward voting among the three sets of partisans. It displays the changes in the groups' respective likelihoods of voting resulting from whether or not they expressed hope toward the relevant political figures. These likelihoods are calculated with all control variables set at their means.

Propensities to vote are nearly equivalent between black and white Democrats at both intervals. Of note, hopeful white Republicans are significantly more likely to vote than hopeful Democrats of either race.

Why might hope not translate so clearly to an electoral participation advantage for African Americans, especially in the Obama era? To appropriate a quote from Malcolm X, perhaps this can be considered a case of chickens coming home to roost. Chapter 2 detailed the manner in which Democrats engage in a rhetorical tack that shifts the black gaze toward the promise of a better tomorrow, while simultaneously denying black people legitimate grounds for expressing their political grievance. This rhetoric can work to both inhibit expressions of black political anger and deflate the action-lifting power of black hopefulness. After all, how




FIGURE 5.8 Marginal effect of hope expressed toward favored-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

fired up can one be by narratives of racial salvation, if one can't shake the feeling that the message rings hollow?

Chapter 2 highlighted such rhetoric from Barack Obama. But the previous Democratic president, Bill Clinton, displayed a masterclass in shrewdly cultivating support among African Americans, while still signaling that the group's demands for redress were unlikely to be heard. Indeed, Clinton was viewed as the great hope of the moderate faction of "New Democrats" that emerged after the third consecutive GOP presidential win in 1988. Clinton represented the successful culmination of this faction's efforts to move the party closer to the ideological center, by maintaining support of the Democratic Party's more progressive constituencies – including African Americans – while simultaneously appealing to racially conservative whites via both racial appeals and the pursuit of a center-right policy agenda.²⁰ Clinton's 1992 campaign alone provided no shortage of examples of such messaging, from his vociferous

²⁰ Hale (1995).

condemnation of rapper and activist Sister Soujah – while speaking to Reverend Jesse Jackson’s rainbow coalition, no less – to his repeated vows on the campaign trail to “end welfare as we know it.”²¹²²

Often forgotten amidst the enduring images of black audiences fawning over Bill Clinton, or his designation as “the first black president,” is a critical observation by political scholar Linda Faye Williams.²³ Clinton actually received a *smaller* share of the black vote compared to previous Democratic presidential contenders Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis.²⁴ I view this turnout decline and the ANES trends above as illustrative of the limits of hope in the electoral context. While the narrative of racial salvation resonates, it cannot be just talk. Without genuine indicators that actual change lies on the horizon, the message simply will not motivate increased political action among African Americans.

I attribute the perhaps perplexing lack of a hope effect in the Obama era to something other than a perceived hollowness of his message of hope. On the contrary, black people attached a great deal of weight to the importance of Obama’s breakthrough victory in 2008. Yet at the same time, scholarship revealed that black people remained skeptical about the prospect of Obama achieving substantial policy advances on the part of the racial group. African Americans, in fact, expressed *less* optimism over this prospect than both white and Latina/o Americans.²⁵

It is perhaps this guarded set of expectations that undergirded black people’s unwavering enthusiasm for Obama, even long after the honeymoon ended among white supporters.²⁶ As progressive whites expressed disillusionment with an Obama presidency that dashed their hopes for a new Camelot-like era of liberal politics, black people by and large maintained both strong support and tempered expectations.

These tempered expectations can shield black people from the bitter sting of disappointment. They can incline black people more toward responses of resignation than either anger, fear or despair in the face of political threats. But they can also dampen the potential mobilizing feelings of hope in response to promising political circumstances. Maintenance of a general posture of resignation toward a political system deemed broken can both make one less likely to register anger when things go wrong

²¹ Ansell (1997).

²² Zylan and Soule (2000).

²³ Morano (2008).

²⁴ Williams (2010).

²⁵ Hunt and Wilson (2009).

²⁶ Newport (2014).

(because the default expectation is that things will go wrong), and less likely to maintain optimism that something can go right.

The Detroit study provided black participants with a concrete, tangible policy opportunity. In accord, they could effectively generate the belief that change was gonna come. On the other end of the spectrum, Obama's election provided no such concrete opportunities. Obama certainly had a definitive policy agenda to pursue. He also had multi-faceted constituency to maintain, stiff opposition from the opposing party, separation of powers with which to contend, a historic economic downturn from which to steer the nation, countless global crises that demanded immediate attention and, on top of all that, the exceptional burden that came from bringing the nation's first black president. Considering these myriad factors, could African Americans be faulted for not generating strong levels of optimism about receiving substantial policy concessions under this administration?

This goes to show that hope indeed has its limits. The more immediate and graspable the opportunity on the horizon, the more effectively hope can be activated and translated toward political action among African Americans. But the more obtuse, long-run or symbolic that opportunity, the less impactful hope will be on black participation.

That is not to say black people exhibit no type of enthusiasm advantage in the realm of electoral politics. The focus must simply be shifted, from hope to pride. Table 5.3 displays the coefficient effects and standard errors showing the effects of pride expressed toward preferred incumbents and candidates on black and white partisans' likelihood of turning out.

Although there is no surge in the vote-stimulating effects of pride during the Obama era, for the duration of the period, African Americans exhibit a positive and statistically meaningful association between pride and turnout. The mobilizing effect of pride on black turnout is substantively larger than its effect on white Democrats, and just a tick lower than the effect exhibited by white Republicans. As illustrated by the changes in vote likelihood displayed in Figure 5.9, expressed pride helps African Americans close the voting gap with their white partisan counterparts. But once again, turnout among white Republicans becomes most distinguished by feeling this positive emotion.

Why would the enthusiasm advantage in turnout appear to be strongest for white Republicans? I posit that the relative homogeneity of Republicans, along both the key social identities of race and religion, makes it easier for partisan elites to engage in a unified messaging front, which can effectively rile up both negative and positive emotions. Whereas white Republicans can find resonance with messaging of white grievance, they can also prove responsive to messages provoking a sense of pride.

TABLE 5.3 *Effect of pride toward favored partisan on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses.*
Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. Control variables not shown

	1980	1984	1988	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	Total
Black	-0.98	0.15	-0.04	0.48	-0.89	0.80	0.57	-0.04	0.87	0.43**
Democrats	(0.90)	(0.62)	(0.53)	(0.46)	(0.82)	(0.68)	(0.65)	(0.73)	(0.71)	(0.16)
Obs.	96	127	149	184	111	102	105	202	408	1484
White	-0.03	0.11	0.52^	0.24	0.13	-0.42	0.82^	0.92*	0.26	0.28**
Democrats	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.33)	(0.09)
Obs.	445	550	464	695	524	442	275	214	628	4237
White	0.15	0.10	0.42	0.81**	0.51	0.63*	-0.14	1.42*	0.60*	0.48***
Republicans	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.60)	(0.64)	(0.27)	(0.10)
Obs.	391	618	593	668	483	424	332	191	725	4425

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001




FIGURE 5.9 Marginal effect of pride expressed toward favored-partisan presidential incumbents and candidates on likelihood of voting in presidential election, across respondent race and party affiliation. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012. All control variables held at means.

And what type of messaging can stimulate that emotion among Republicans? Appeals to American patriotism. Consider the common thread apparent in GOP slogans such as “make America great again,” “America first” or “we built it.” The conflation of white and “American” identities means the Republican Party can effectively activate a sense of pride via rhetoric championing traditional notions of American patriotism – the same rhetoric that can effectively engender anger.

As political scientist Lilliana Mason demonstrates, Republicans possess a stronger alignment between their partisan and social identities relative to Democrats. This is due in no small part to Republican adherents comprising a much more racially homogenous group.²⁷ Because Republicans’ partisanship is more centrally tethered to their core identity, this group is uniquely positioned to be fired up and mobilized by emotionally evocative rhetoric.

Turning to the 2016 CMPS, which assesses a variety of electoral, communal and oppositional actions, the black enthusiasm advantage continues to be rooted in expressed pride rather than hope. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 display coefficients and standard errors showing the respective effects of hope and pride reported during the 2016 election on respondents’ likelihoods of taking part in a variety of political activities. Once again, these values are derived from regression analyses controlling for the same variables included in previous CMPS analyses.²⁸

As shown in Table 5.4, black respondents’ expressions of hopefulness during the election carry no meaningful positive effects on their likelihood of taking part in any of these actions. In fact, black respondents become notably *less* likely to participate in a boycott as they report feeling more hopeful. Expressed hope during the election actually carries a stronger participatory effect for white respondents. Feeling more hopeful significantly increases whites’ likelihoods of both donating to a campaign and participating in a boycott.

²⁷ Mason (2018); Mason and Wronski (2018).

²⁸ Full list of controls included in the CMPS analyses: age, gender, whether or not the respondent lives in the South, education attained, household income, party identification, strength of party identification, distrust in politics, internal efficacy, external efficacy, frequency of religious service attendance, contact from political elites, whether respondent was born in the US, interest in politics, belief about whether economy has improved or worsened in past year, linked fate with other members of respondents’ racial group, whether or not respondent has personally experienced discrimination, and other reported emotions during election. Full logistic regression results assessing effects of hope and pride on respondent participation across race are available in Table A3.4 in the Appendix to Chapter 3, and Tables A4.1 and A4.2 in the Appendix to Chapter 4. Interracial comparisons of respondents’ frequency of hope and pride are discussed in Chapter 6.

TABLE 5.4 *Effect of hope expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Black (2009 Obs.)	0.97 (0.52)	-0.18 (0.26)	-0.16 (0.33)	-0.21 (0.22)	-0.30 (0.23)	-0.19 (0.24)	-0.55 (0.29)	-0.82* (0.27)
White (785 Obs.)	-0.61 (1.04)	1.49** (0.47)	0.61 (0.64)	0.22 (0.43)	0.33 (0.43)	0.42 (0.41)	-0.02 (0.64)	0.94* (0.42)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE 5.5 *Effect of pride expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Black (2009 Obs.)	0.42 (0.55)	0.86*** (0.25)	0.94** (0.32)	0.32 (0.21)	0.49* (0.22)	0.71** (0.24)	1.13*** (0.28)	0.80** (0.26)
White (785 Obs.)	1.51 (1.18)	-0.31 (0.46)	0.72 (0.65)	0.63 (0.43)	0.10 (0.43)	0.39 (0.40)	1.05 (0.66)	-0.23 (0.43)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Whereas hope felt over the 2016 election failed to propel African Americans to political participation, expressions of pride mobilize the group toward a wide variety of actions. As shown in Table 5.5, black respondents' reported pride exerted a positive and statistically significant relationship with six of the eight reported actions. Pride stimulates African Americans toward participation in the full gamut of actions – electoral activities such as donating to and volunteering for a campaign, communal activities such as attending meetings and working with others to address a local problem, and system-challenging activities such as protesting and boycotting. In quite the contrast, no such mobilizing effect is found among white respondents. This group's reported pride fails to exhibit a statistically significant association with a single activity.

To illustrate the contrasting effects of hope and pride on the participation of black and white Americans, Figures 5.10 and 5.11 display the differences in these respective groups' likelihoods of participating in a protest and boycott as they move from *never* feeling the respective emotion to feeling it *all the time* during the election. These figures also display the action likelihoods as respondents move from never to always angry. This inclusion allows me to compare how positive emotions shape black and white participation relative to anger, the emotion state that conventional wisdom declares is the most effective action mobilizer.

Why focus on the specific actions of protests and boycotting? Because, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, black expressions of anger translate most clearly to counter-institutional actions such as these. Is the anger-activism linkage more pronounced than the linkage between pride and activism for African Americans? The answer is a resounding no. As indicated by the respective graphs in Figure 5.10, black pride exerts a mobilizing effect on these behaviors that is quite similar to the effect of anger. The slopes on anger and pride are essentially equivalent in the domain of protesting, while the effect of pride is only slightly outpaced by anger's effect on boycotting. In contrast, black expressions of hope pack nowhere near the same mobilizing punch. In fact, the most hopeful black respondents are significantly less likely to participate in either a protest or a boycott than both those who are the angriest and those who are the proudest.

The emotion state of pride proves to be as effective in essence as anger in stimulating black respondents to engage in system-challenging actions. As shown in Figure 5.11, this pattern distinguished black respondents from their white counterparts, for whom the effect of pride on these actions pales in comparison to that of anger. The effect of pride on white respondents' likelihood of protesting is slightly lower than that of anger. And pride elicits no positive effect on whites' likelihood of boycotting.

Context matters in shaping the relationship between hope and political behavior for both black and white Americans. The context of the 2016 election was generally quite subduing for African Americans, as they watched unfold a rather jarring shift from the promise – however symbolic – of the Obama era to the racially retrograde politics of Trumpism. Appropriately, hope rang hollow during this time, thus depriving it of the potential action-inducing effect on full display in the Detroit experiment. But pride still moved the needle for black participation. This emotion effectively mobilized African Americans to a wider range of action types than anger, while exerting effects on black behavior unparalleled among whites.




FIGURE 5.10 Marginal effects of hope, pride and anger during 2016 election on likelihoods of protesting and boycotting in the past year. Black respondents only. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 5.11 Marginal effects of hope, pride and anger during 2016 election on likelihoods of protesting and boycotting in the past year. White respondents only. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.

Black Pride and Black Political Empowerment

Why is pride such an effective mobilizer of African American action?²⁹ Pride distinguishes itself from emotions such as hope and anger in that it is not a feeling tethered to a specific object within one's environment, such as a prospective threat or opportunity. On the contrary, pride is a reflective, or "self-conscious evaluative," emotion.³⁰ It exists on the same continuum of feelings as embarrassment, guilt and shame. What these feelings share in common is that they arise in response to an individual's own actions, signaling how the individual should evaluate that action and providing a sense of whether or not the individual will receive utility from continuing or abandoning that course of action in the future.

Pride emerges when an individual evaluates her actions to be successful. The feeling of pride refers specifically to "joy over an action, thought or feeling well done."³¹ A meaningful distinction between pride and hope can be identified here. Whereas feelings of hope reduce an individuals' calculation of her agency within a given environment, feelings of pride augment her perception of agency, by signaling that she is charting an effective path toward success. In other words, the sense of *yes we can* inspired by hope is rooted in the belief that a shift in the environment has created a unique opportunity. But the sense of *yes we can* inspired by pride is rooted in a fervent belief in one's own capacity to get the job done.

It follows that African Americans' feelings of pride would be less context-dependent than their feelings of hope. Action-inducing hope should only materialize in the instances in which black people sense the chance to score a rare political win. But pride can be engendered in both good times and bad, in electoral and non-electoral contexts.

Sure enough, historical and contemporary black discourses contain an abundance of narratives centered on African Americans' distinct capacities to endure and thrive, even in the face of racial adversity. It is not hard to imagine such narratives both engendering a sense of staid resilience in the face of threats (in turn inhibiting an emotional response of anger) while also engendering a sense of pride, which can be drawn upon to mobilize action.

In "The Sorrow Songs," the aforementioned W. E. B. DuBois once again employs the concept of striving, this time in the context of extolling the many black contributions to America.

²⁹ Psychologists have debated whether pride should even be considered an emotion state in its own right. See, for example, Tracy and Robins (2007).

³⁰ Lewis (2011).

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Actively we have woven ourselves with the very warp and woof of this nation – we fought their battles, shared their sorrow, mingled our blood with theirs, and generation after generation have pleaded with a headstrong, careless people to despise not Justice, Mercy, and Truth, lest the nation be smitten with a curse. Our song, our toil, our cheer, and warning have been given to this nation in blood-brotherhood. Are not these gifts worth the giving? Is not this work and striving? Would America have been America without her Negro people?³²

DuBois forcefully and somberly affirms in this passage the value of the blood, sweat and tears poured into the nation by black people. This is not simply a call for white America to recognize the humanity and worth of black people. It is also a rallying cry for black people to continue to strive, by reminding them what their past striving has managed to accomplish.

Social psychologists Jennifer Crocker and Katherine Knight assert that “people want to believe that they are worthy and valuable human beings, and this desire drives their behavior.”³³ When black political figures explicitly affirm the value of black people’s contributions to society, they are implicitly affirming black people’s inherent worth as people, thus providing a counter-narrative to the many discourses, practices and cues within mainstream society that dehumanize or devalue black people. By bolstering black feelings of self-worth and efficacy, these counter-narratives can increase black people’s willingness to take up political action.

It is for this reason that amidst calls that *black lives matter* – itself a declaration intended to repudiate a criminal justice system believed by many black people to devalue black lives – BLM co-founder Alicia Garza explicitly affirmed the past and present contributions of African Americans to the liberation movement.

It is important to us that we understand that movements are not begun by any one person. That this movement actually was begun in 1619 when black people were brought here in chains and at the bottoms of boats. And certainly we should be reminded that it is the combined effort of so many incredibly courageous and bold and fearless and wise people that some, you will never know their names. But you should know that they too are co-creators of what it is that we are experiencing and participating in today.

Garza’s remarks here reflect an acute understanding that black insurgent action is not sustained simply on the basis of providing black people with grounds to see red over their sociopolitical status. Black people must also

³² DuBois and Marable (2015).

³³ Crocker and Knight (2005).

see their actions as powerful, when they far too often feel the weight of their powerlessness.

Black actors seeking to mobilize electoral action have also drawn on the action-inducing power of such affirming appeals. During his 1983 campaign to become the first black mayor of Chicago, the charismatic Harold Washington directly invoked black pride to rally the African American voting bloc to action.

So I approached this awesome job with pride – pride in my community – pride in the ability of my community to rise up as though they had been a sleeping giant and to recognize that there is a responsibility that they have that they cannot shirk. Nobody else is going to shoulder that burden.³⁴

Indeed, affirmations of black achievement and intonation of black pride are essentially staples of black discourse. Such messaging emanates from the frontlines of insurgent activity, the bully pulpits of elective office seekers and even the radio waves. In 1968, R&B legend James Brown declared in song “say it loud... I’m black and I’m proud!” The call to black America to declare *I’m black and I’m proud* is quite distinct from the call to mainstream America to declare *I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore!* But the mobilizing effect on black participation is nonetheless clearly apparent.

Pride effectively engenders black political action through affirming black agency; this point is underscored in Figure 5.12. This figure displays black CMPS respondents’ respective reports of pride, hope and anger throughout the election, across their levels of collective agency. The graph on the left shows emotion levels across African Americans’ perceptions of how often their racial group has a say in government. The graph on the right displays levels of these emotions across black perceptions of how often public officials work to advance black people’s interests.

The patterns are consistent across both measures of collective agency. Believing in the political influence of the group makes black people only marginally more hopeful. And this belief in the group’s efficacy actually makes black people *less* angry. Meanwhile, believing in the racial group’s efficacy steadily increases black people’s reports of pride.

It appears that black respondents’ pride expressions are indeed rooted in their sense of collective self-concept, consistent with the characterization of pride as a self-conscious evaluative emotion. Because pride is

³⁴ Transcript of remarks taken from the documentary film *Chicago Politics: A Theatre Of Power*, directed by Bill Stamets.




FIGURE 5.12 Marginal effects of black respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.

based on inward reflection, as opposed to being reflective of external phenomena, as are anger and hope, pride strongly animates black participation across different types of actions and different political eras.

Juxtaposing the Black Enthusiasm Advantage and Anger Gap

While both hope and pride can contribute to a black enthusiasm advantage in political participation, the hope effect is limited to particular contexts. Pride, on the other hand, can be activated and translated to action in times of black joy and pain. Both of these positive emotions are commonly apparent in messaging to African Americans, from political actors both black and white, both mainstream and insurgent. Because these emotions are readily drawn upon in relevant discourse, and because of their uniquely mobilizing effects on black participation, can the enthusiasm advantage be viewed as the remedy to the racial anger gap?

There were clearly identifiable limits on when hope could effectively raise action among black Americans relative to whites, indicating that hope cannot bridge the participation divide resulting from the anger gap. Pride carries an intriguing promise, as it demonstrated wide ranging effects on black political behavior, across a range of activities. In the domain of turnout, however, the mobilizing effect of pride appears to pale in comparison to its effect on white Republicans.

Ultimately, effectively rallying African Americans to political action requires more than continued reliance on the racial salvation narratives that have long been a prominent feature of black discourse. As effective as these narratives may be at inspiring action, the fact remains that African Americans pay a cost for not having full capacity or inclination to leverage the power of anger in politics. The translation of black pride to black participation is a notable element of black political behavior. But how much more prominent would black participation be if we bore witness to the uninhibited translation of black anger to those same actions?

If black people are to truly be fully representative players in the sphere of political competition, space needs to be created to allow them to express anger without fear of stigma, demonization or surveillance. Our political environment is only further diversifying, and further fragmenting along the overlapping lines of racial and partisan identity. As long as the near-exclusive reliance on the salvation narrative from mainstream political actors – motivated by the collective fear of black anger – continues to be

the norm, black people face the prospect of continuously being on the wrong end of racial participation patterns.

What of other communities of color in the increasingly diversifying political landscape? Do Asian Americans and Latina/o Americans exhibit racial anger gaps similar to African Americans? Do they exhibit similar enthusiasm advantages? The next chapter assesses how these two groups respectively leverage emotions toward action, as they navigate a political environment in which they are alternately viewed as potential election game-changers, as threats to the polity, or rendered virtually invisible.

Appendix to Chapter 5

Figures A5.1 and A5.2 show control and opportunity treatment flyers.

Detroit Water Study Question Wording on Prospective Actions and Emotions Felt in Response to DWSD Flyers

Different groups are writing letters signed by state residents that will be sent to the Michigan legislature asking members to either support or oppose the DWSD restructuring. Please indicate whether you would be willing to add your name to either of these letters.

Response Options

YES, I would add my name to the letter opposing the DWSD restructuring

YES, I would add my name to the letter supporting the DWSD restructuring

NO, do not add my name to either letter

Please check the boxes to indicate your likelihood of taking the following actions:

Attending a meeting or forum on DWSD

Discussing the DWSD plan with others

Contacting a public official about DWSD

Response Options

Not at all likely

A little likely

Moderately likely

Very likely

Extremely likely

Changes coming to YOUR water service.

What Can YOU Do?

Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. And it is beginning a restructuring process that can mean big changes to your water service. But will these changes be what you want?

Supporters say it will:

- ⇒ ***Lower your rates***
- ⇒ ***Improve your water quality***

Opponents say it will:

- ⇒ ***Increase your rates***
- ⇒ ***Kill jobs for Michigan workers***

What do independent researchers say?

Which side should you take?

Follow the **Midwestern Commission on Water** to learn the facts about how changes to DWSD will affect your water. Tell your state rep to take a stand on this issue. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.



FIGURE A5.1 Control condition flyer.

How did you feel when reading the flyer about this issue? Please mark with an "X" how much you felt each of the following emotions while viewing the flyer:

Angry

Anxious

Want SAFER Water & ***LOWER*** Rates?

What YOU Can Do.

Michigan's largest water supplier (DWSD) covers 40% of the state's residents across the southeast. In response to *your* rising demand for quality water provision, the department has begun a bold transformation, with the support of some politicians. This transformation is delivering on the promises of:

- ⇒ *Cutting wasteful spending*
- ⇒ *Improving standards for your water quality, and*
- ⇒ *Creating the smallest increases to your service rates in a decade.*

Join the efforts of ***Michigan Water Watch*** in voicing support for the continuation of this transformation. Tell your state rep to defend this service-improving, rate-lowering plan. And join our mailing list to stay up to date on this and other issues affecting your service and your pocketbook.



MICHIGAN WATER WATCH
Protecting our greatest natural resource
www.michwaterwatch.org

FIGURE A5.2 Opportunity condition flyer.

Concerned
Delighted
Distressed
Enthusiastic
Frustrated

Hopeful
Motivated
Optimistic
Outraged
Relieved
Worried

Response Options

Not at all
A little
Moderately
Very much
Extremely

How often would you say you attend a church or religious service?

Response Options

Never
A few times a year
Once or twice a month
Nearly every week
Once or more per week

TABLE A5.1 *Effect of race on likelihood of expressing hope and pride toward presidential incumbents and candidates. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012*

	Hope	Pride
Black	0.03 (0.06)	0.29*** (0.06)
Fear	0.33*** (0.06)	0.47*** (0.05)
Anger	0.18*** (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Pride	2.52*** (0.06)	–
Hope	–	2.01*** (0.05)

(continued)

TABLE A5.1 (cont.)

	Hope	Pride
Religious attendance	0.16** (0.06)	0.27*** (0.06)
Woman	0.05 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
South	-0.08 (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Age	0.60*** (0.12)	0.68*** (0.11)
Household income	0.11 (0.08)	0.03 (0.07)
Education	0.55*** (0.07)	0.14* (0.07)
Party ID	0.38*** (0.06)	-0.28*** (0.06)
Party ID strength	0.51*** (0.06)	0.79*** (0.06)
Distrust in government	0.19 (0.10)	-0.45*** (0.09)
Incumbent approval	0.23*** (0.05)	0.80*** (0.04)
External efficacy	-0.34*** (0.05)	-0.41*** (0.05)
Constant	-1.05*** (0.12)	-1.17*** (0.11)
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.16

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A5.2 *Predicting the effects of assignment to the opportunity condition on participants' reports of hope over DWSD restructuring. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study*

	Black	White
Opportunity condition	0.67 (0.55)	0.15 (0.59)
Woman	-0.17 (0.42)	-0.15 (0.36)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)
Education	-1.31 (0.85)	-2.54* (1.16)
Church attendance	1.41* (0.64)	-0.06 (0.52)
Observations	109	126

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A5.3 *Predicting the effect of race on participants' likelihood of signing a letter over DWSD restructuring, across treatment conditions. Results of logistic regression analysis. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study*

	Opportunity condition
Black	0.79* (0.31)
Woman	0.36 (0.28)
Age	0.02 (0.01)
Education	-1.69* (0.69)
Church attendance	0.13 (0.41)
Constant	-0.61 (0.40)
Observations	266

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A5.4 Predicting the effects of reported hope on participants' likelihood of participation regarding DWSD restructuring, across race. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Data from 2013–2014 Detroit water study

	Sign Letter	Attend Meeting over DWSD		Discuss DWSD w/ Others		Contact Officials over DWSD	
		Black		White		Black	
		Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
Hope	1.08 (0.85)	0.36 (0.72)	1.60 (0.91)	-0.75 (0.81)	3.30** (1.25)	0.14 (0.71)	2.04* (0.94)
Woman	0.57 (0.49)	0.88* (0.45)	0.13 (0.50)	0.52 (0.45)	-0.52 (0.62)	-0.28 (0.41)	0.35 (0.32)
Age	0.00 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Education	-1.43 (0.98)	-2.52 (1.47)	1.92 (1.05)	-0.15 (1.32)	4.43** (1.36)	0.92 (1.30)	1.43 (1.05)
Church attendance	0.19 (0.72)	-0.80 (0.65)	-0.15 (0.77)	-0.21 (0.64)	0.24 (0.86)	1.04 (0.63)	0.34 (0.78)
Constant	-0.50 (0.77)	-1.12 (0.82)	-2.77** (0.88)	-2.58** (0.85)	-3.05** (1.00)	-1.62 (0.85)	-3.22** (0.93)
Observations	117	126	115	126	115	126	116

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A5.5 *Effect of hope expressed toward favored partisans on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012*

	Black Democrats	White Democrats	White Republicans
Hope toward favored partisan	0.20 (0.18)	0.24* (0.10)	0.51*** (0.10)
Anger	0.06 (0.22)	0.24 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.14)
Fear	0.46 (0.24)	0.37** (0.13)	0.42** (0.14)
Pride	0.62* (0.26)	0.42*** (0.12)	0.34* (0.14)
Religious attendance	1.53*** (0.26)	0.84*** (0.14)	1.17*** (0.15)
Woman	0.10 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.09)
South	-0.44** (0.16)	-0.42*** (0.09)	-0.50*** (0.09)
Age	1.54*** (0.47)	2.84*** (0.26)	3.09*** (0.27)
Household income	1.23*** (0.30)	1.53*** (0.16)	1.46*** (0.18)
Education	1.77*** (0.32)	2.35*** (0.17)	1.73*** (0.18)
Party ID strength	1.52*** (0.28)	1.34*** (0.17)	1.34*** (0.18)
Government distrust	0.76* (0.33)	0.01 (0.21)	0.35 (0.23)
Incumbent approval	0.12 (0.17)	-0.26** (0.09)	-0.07 (0.11)
External Efficacy	-0.45* (0.19)	-0.62*** (0.11)	-0.67*** (0.12)
Constant	-2.98*** (0.43)	-2.58*** (0.26)	-2.78*** (0.28)
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.19	0.20

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A5.6 *Effect of pride expressed toward favored partisans on likelihood of self-identified partisans to vote in presidential elections, across race and party affiliation. Results of logistic regression analysis.*
Standard errors in parentheses. Data from cumulative American National Election Study (ANES), 1980–2012

	Black Democrats	White Democrats	White Republicans
Pride toward favored partisan	0.43** (0.16)	0.28** (0.09)	0.48*** (0.10)
Anger	0.03 (0.22)	0.23 (0.12)	-0.01 (0.14)
Fear	0.51* (0.24)	0.38** (0.13)	0.42** (0.14)
Hope	0.33 (0.26)	0.33* (0.14)	0.33* (0.15)
Religious attendance	1.51*** (0.26)	0.85*** (0.14)	1.19*** (0.15)
Woman	0.10 (0.15)	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.05 (0.09)
South	-0.45** (0.16)	-0.43*** (0.09)	-0.50*** (0.09)
Age	1.50** (0.47)	2.83*** (0.26)	3.11*** (0.27)
Household incumbent	1.25*** (0.30)	1.52*** (0.16)	1.47*** (0.18)
Education	1.79*** (0.32)	2.37*** (0.17)	1.74*** (0.18)
Party ID strength	1.44*** (0.28)	1.33*** (0.17)	1.32*** (0.18)
Distrust in government	0.69* (0.32)	-0.01 (0.21)	0.33 (0.23)
Incumbent approval	0.17 (0.17)	-0.27** (0.09)	-0.10 (0.11)
External efficacy	-0.47* (0.19)	-0.63*** (0.11)	-0.67*** (0.12)
Constant	-2.91*** (0.43)	-2.50*** (0.26)	-2.72*** (0.28)
Pseudo R ²	0.17	0.19	0.20

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The Anger Gap, beyond Black and White

“We got to face some facts. That the masses are poor, that the masses belong to what you call the lower class, and when I talk about the masses, I’m talking about the white masses, I’m talking about the black masses, and the brown masses, and the yellow masses, too. We’ve got to face the fact that some people say you fight fire best with fire, but we say you put fire out best with water. We say you don’t fight racism with racism. We’re gonna fight racism with solidarity.”¹

Working in solidarity with other racial groups is essential to the effort to advance black interests. This is a central thread that has long been running through the discourses of many black political figures. As noted in Chapter 1, Fred Hampton, the individual behind the quote above, displayed a unique ability to build alliances between the Black Panther Party and respective Latina/o and white-led political groups, culminating in the creation of the “Rainbow Coalition” in the late 1960s.² Counted among the official endorsement partners of The National Movement for Black Lives (the collective of organizations formally affiliated with the Black Lives Matter movement) are non-black groups such as Mijente, the Southeast Asian Freedom Network and Jewish Voice for Peace. The National Movement’s platform is available to read on its website in Arabic, Spanish, French and Chinese.³ In 1909, the aforementioned W. E. B. DuBois founded the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) alongside two white Americans – one of

¹ Hampton (1969).

² Williams (2013).

³ Information taken from the Movement for Black Lives website.

whom, Moorfield Storey, would serve as the organization's founding president.⁴

Interracial coalitions have also served as a pillar of black electoral movements. Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition – named after the earlier Hampton-led movement – sprung forth from his first presidential bid in 1984. During his famous "Rainbow Coalition" speech at that year's Democratic National Convention, Jackson implored the political left to make room for a multiplicity of racial and ethnic groups: black, Jewish, Arab, Native, Latina/o and Asian. Jackson called on the Democrats to be the party uniting this patchwork group and advancing its interests in the partisan playing field.⁵

This is but a small set of the many examples of black political leaders seeking to leverage the potential power of interracial solidarity. From the San Francisco State strikes led by the Third World Liberation Front in 1968 to the coalition of color surging to record turnout levels to elect Barack Obama in 2008, cooperative efforts across racial groups have paid political dividends across time. And for the foreseeable future, the fate of the Democratic Party appears to be tethered to the collective political decisions of key groups comprising the so-called Rainbow Coalition.

African Americans comprise a major – and generally increasing – portion of the Democratic Party's base of support. During the 2012 election, nearly one-fourth of the ballots cast in support of Obama came from black voters. For comparison's sake, only 13 percent of votes in support of Bill Clinton came from black voters in 1992. Further, in swing states such as Virginia and North Carolina, black votes make up between 15 and 20 percent of Democrats' overall vote share; this amount is more than enough to determine the state's electoral winner.⁶

As the electorate has undergone rapid shifts over the past years, Asian American and Latina/o American voters are also becoming crucial voting blocs for the Democratic Party. Democratic support among Asian Americans has skyrocketed. In 1992, just over 30 percent of AAPI voters cast ballots in support of Clinton.⁷ That number has steadily risen, with about 73 percent of Asian Americans casting ballots for Obama in 2012.⁸

⁴ Ovington (1996).

⁵ Jackson (1984, July 18).

⁶ Bump (2015).

⁷ Throughout this chapter I refer interchangeably to Asian Americans or "AAPI" – Asian American/Pacific Islander.

⁸ While at the time of this writing I do not have verified vote figures for Asian Americans in the 2016 election, exit polling of nearly 14,000 Asian American voters conducted by the

Meanwhile, the share of the American electorate made up of Latina/o voters is steadily rising. According to the Pew Research Center, Latina/o voters constituted just under 4 percent of the electorate in 1988, but comprised 11 percent of the electorate in 2012. And although Latina/o voters are largely concentrated in non-battleground states such as California and Texas, the share of Latina/o voters in competitive states such as Florida and Nevada hovers around 17 percent.⁹ While both major parties generally believe there is competition for Latina/o votes, the Democratic Party has maintained a substantial edge among this voting bloc, receiving support from more than two-thirds of Latina/o voters in the 2012 election, and receiving about 60 percent of the Latina/o vote in the midterm elections in 2014 and 2010.¹⁰

While turnout among Asian and Latina/o American voters stayed relatively consistent between 2012 and 2016, turnout among black voters dropped by about 7 percent. Further, Hillary Clinton received about 66 percent of the Latina/o vote in 2016, a 5-percent decline from the support Obama received four years earlier. In a race determined by a razor-thin margin in key battleground states, these diminishing returns among minority blocs may have sealed Clinton's electoral fate. In addition to the usual suspects that determine racial participation gaps, such as general lack of socioeconomic resources, lower perceptions of political agency or disproportionate vulnerability to restrictive voting laws, what roles could the anger gap and enthusiasm advantage have played in shaping participation across Latino/a and Asian Americans?

This question has significance that extends far beyond a rehashing of the 2016 outcome. If black Americans are not the only minority group to buck the conventional wisdom regarding anger and political behavior, then the Democratic Party is best suited to embark on an entirely different campaign strategy than the Republican Party, which can more effectively get its largely racially homogenous base to see red over politics.

Returning to data from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS), I show that in distinct ways both AAPI and Latina/o American respondents in the survey exhibit an anger gap and enthusiasm advantage. Similar to African Americans, both Asian and Latina/o Americans responded to the 2016 race with demonstrably

Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF) indicated that Clinton received 79 percent of Asian Americans' votes.

⁹ Krogstad (2016).

¹⁰ Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera and Krogstad (2014).

less anger than whites. Further, anger expressed by these respective groups has a much more limited effect on their political participation relative to whites. In contrast, both groups exhibit considerably more pride and hope relative to white respondents. But these positive emotions pay mixed dividends for their political action.

Given how frequently both groups found themselves to be the targets of incendiary racial rhetoric throughout the 2016 campaign, the anger gaps they exhibit are striking. To this point I have argued the anger gap for African Americans reflects in part political discourses that function to establish bounds on what is and is not acceptable for black people to feel and express as they navigate politics. Similarly, this chapter attempts to contextualize the anger gaps exhibited by Asian and Latina/o Americans, respectively, within the broader discourses that characterize them. These discourses characterize these groups respectively as outsiders not entitled to political goods, or invaders threatening access to political goods among “true,” “deserving” Americans.

Beyond assessing how varied and crosscutting patterns of political rhetoric shape the emotional responses of non-black people of color to politics, this chapter also explores how emotions can shape prospects of intergroup cooperation or conflict. What are the relationships between emotions – especially anger – and expressions of solidarity or antipathy toward other groups? Can Latina/o pride facilitate black–brown alliances? Does political anger expressed by whites make them more likely to support the policy of racial profiling?

In seeking answers to such questions, I offer a novel way of thinking about interracial relations in the political sphere. I move beyond the black–white binary not just in examining how emotion shapes political behavior, but also in considering how emotions over politics shape the broader sets of perceptions and affinities groups have toward one another. In essence, I seek to put a part of Fred Hampton’s assertion to the test; which emotions more or less steer varying groups toward actions that fight racism with solidarity, and which emotions steer them toward fighting one another?

This chapter first interrogates the contemporary and historical political discourses around the Asian and Latina/o American populations, to assess the bounds imposed on these groups’ engagement of politics. Once again using data from the CMPS, I then examine the racially distinct ways that anger, hope and pride were activated and translated to political activity by these groups during the 2016 election year. Highlighted in particular are the ways that the anger gap and enthusiasm advantage

manifest for these two groups in ways both consistent with and departing from African Americans. I then explore how the emotions expressed by groups – especially anger – relate to intergroup perceptions. These trends illuminate which emotion states facilitate postures of cooperation or conflict across race.

Latina/o Americans in the Dawn of Trump: Threat or Sleeping Giant?

Anyone paying a modicum of attention to the 2016 election would reasonably expect anger to play a major role in the political behavior of Latina/o Americans. From the very moment he announced his presidential candidacy, Donald Trump placed this group in his rhetorical crosshairs. During his campaign-opening speech in June 2015, Trump infamously asserted:

When Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best ... They're sending people that have lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.¹¹

He doubled down on these claims just a month later, declaring:

What can be simpler or more accurately stated? The Mexican Government is forcing their most unwanted people into the United States. They are, in many cases, criminals, drug dealers, rapists, etc.¹²

Remarks from Trump to CNN's Jake Tapper in June 2016 further indicated that his ire against undocumented immigrants may have been rooted more in this group's perceived racial status rather than its citizen status. Trump made waves in this interview by explicitly calling out US District Judge Gonzalo Curiel's "Mexican heritage" as the reason the judge could not fairly preside over a fraud case involving Trump University.¹³ For the record, Curiel was born in Indiana. But accuracy consistently seemed to take a backseat to racial invective in many of Trump's comments targeting Latina/os.

Such was the case in Trump's many claims throughout the campaign that undocumented immigrants were responsible for increases in violent crime. In fact, data reveal immigrants – both documented and

¹¹ Trump (2015).

¹² Lee (2015).

¹³ Neidig (2016).

undocumented – to be substantially *less* likely than native-born individuals to commit violent crimes.¹⁴ Similarly, when Trump claimed during his Republican National Convention address that “decades of record immigration have produced lower wages and higher unemployment for our citizens,” he flagrantly disregarded many facts to the contrary. Among them, authorized immigration had held steady annually since 2001, while unauthorized immigration into the country had been *a net zero* from 2007 to 2014. And while competition with immigrants for low-wage jobs is indeed one of a myriad of factors that can depress employment or wages for low-skill laborers, immigration nets an overall positive effect on the economy and workers.¹⁵

It is important to recognize that while Trump’s messaging on the scourge of Latina/o immigration may have lacked the nuance or polish of more conventional veiled racial appeals, they certainly did not lack historical precedent. As illustrated by historian Natalia Molina, throughout the twentieth century arguments have been made to restrict the population of Latina/os as a means of preserving the economic capacity or moral character of the nation. For instance, in the late 1920s, eugenicist C. M. Goethe shared correspondence with his California Congressional Representative John Garner in which he questioned whether the saturation of Mexican Americans might doom America.

Does our failure to restrict Mexican immigration spell the downfall of our Republic ...? Athens could not maintain the brilliancy of the Golden Age of Pericles when hybridization of her citizenry began. Rome fell when the old patriarchal families lost their race consciousness and interbred with servile stocks.¹⁶

Latina/o Americans have contended with this rhetoric on their collective senses of identity and opportunity for decades. And a wide body of research has shown that for many group members, wrestling with these narratives has fostered a sense of pan-ethnic racial solidarity that fuels political engagement.¹⁷ The messaging from Trump, however comparatively inelegant, carried the same sentiment. As such, it was expected by pundits to animate a vigorous electoral response from the Latina/o electorate. Indicators of Latina/o American opinion suggested a counter-mobilization to Trump was inevitable. For instance, a survey conducted by the polling firm Latino Decisions found only 21 percent of Latina/o

¹⁴ Light and Miller (2018).

¹⁵ National Academies of Sciences (2017).

¹⁶ Quoted in Molina (2010).

¹⁷ Masuoka (2006); Pantoja, Ramirez and Segura (2001).

os reported that the GOP truly cares about their group. In addition, a whopping 70 percent said Trump had made the Republican Party more hostile to Latina/os.¹⁸

Many political and popular figures from the group actively encouraged Latina/o Americans to translate their antipathy over Trump to increased electoral behavior. Jorge Ramos, the journalist and Univision news anchor identified in 2012 as Latina/os' most trusted source of information, used his anchor desk as a bully pulpit to both keep his audience informed of the threats posed by Trump's campaign rhetoric and implore them to register to vote to counteract it.¹⁹ When Maná, the highest selling Mexican rock band of all time, set out on its North American tour in February 2016, it teamed with advocacy group Voto Latino to provide voter registration booths at every venue. When describing the band's efforts to mobilize Latina/o voters, Maná frontman José Fernando Olvera extoled the political power the group could exercise through the ballot box.

We have baptized our new tour “Latino Power,” because with the strength of their collective vote this year, US Latinos can further empower our community – demanding more respect and effecting real change in the living conditions and opportunities for our people.²⁰

Olvera also tied this “Latino Power” to the group’s collective responsibility to be electorally active to stave off the prospect of a Trump presidency.

Latinos know how much their vote counts. We need to create our destiny and not let anyone else do it for us. *You can't just complain about Trump being a racist, you actually have to get registered and vote* (emphasis added).

Similar sentiments were expressed by prominent Latina/o American political figures. Arturo Vargas, executive director of the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials, asserted that Latina/os would be motivated to act by their desire to punish Trump for his rhetoric: “[n]ow the moment has arrived, a standard has been set. You can't do that and get away with it.”²¹ Julian Castro, a rising star in the Democratic Party who served as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under Barack Obama, echoed the idea that Latina/o electoral behavior would be energized by Trump’s hostile rhetoric.

¹⁸ Manzano (2016).

¹⁹ Garcia-Rios (2015).

²⁰ Varga (2016).

²¹ Jordan (2016).

[Trump] really has, truly has motivated the Latino community more than any other presidential candidate, I think, in generations, and motivated them in a negative way. And so if the turnout rate in 2012 among Hispanics was 48 percent, I expect it to go at least into the 50s for this election.²²

These sentiments fed into an overarching narrative that was generally applied to Latina/o Americans by those shaping mainstream political discourse in the run-up to the election. This was the narrative painting Latina/os as the “sleeping giant” – a politically dormant group whose political participation would be awakened by the threat of Trump, causing the group to finally exercise a level of political influence commiserate with its rapidly growing numbers. This narrative was by no means new to 2016. It has in fact long been applied to the group.²³ And it suggests that Latina/os have collectively been less engaged in US politics – and by extension, less emotionally invested in politics – which has caused the group to be less politically active than it should be.

This predominant characterization of Latina/os does not square with the actual history of the group’s participation in the US. Far from dormant in the face of past political threats, Latina/os have an established track record of increased political participation in a variety of actions.

For instance, in December 2005, the House of Representatives passed the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act. Among the many provisions of this bill, also known as HR 4437, were a requirement that employers verify their employees’ legal status, a mandate that all people caught crossing the border be held in federal custody (ending the “catch-and-release” policy), and stiffer enforcement of legal penalties against people knowingly aiding and abetting undocumented persons.

Although the bill ultimately died in the Senate, it struck a nerve within many on the Latina/o community, who felt a keen sense of threat from the potential legislation. Research identified that sense of threat as a primary reason that many Latina/o Americans joined the massive May Day protests across the country in 2006.²⁴ These protests issued calls for comprehensive immigration reform, and are credited among many Latina/o politics scholars with sparking a newly energized wave of Latina/o political engagement.²⁵

²² Woodruff (2016).

²³ Beltrán (2010).

²⁴ Ramírez (2013); Zepeda-Millán (2017).

²⁵ Zepeda-Millán (2014).

Stretching back further, scholars have pointed to the passage of Proposition 187 in California as a critical turning point both for the political activism of Latina/os in the state, and for the long-run fates of the Republican and Democratic Parties. This legislation, passed via ballot initiative, prohibited undocumented people from receiving any public service, cutting them off from healthcare, social services, and enrollment in public schools. Proposition 187 activated major shifts in the volume and direction of Latina/o Americans' electoral behavior. Scores of Latina/os both naturalized and registered to vote after its passage. These Latina/os turned out to vote at higher rates than those naturalized before Proposition 187.²⁶ And overall, Latina/os were found to identify more strongly with the Democratic Party in light of strong support from Republicans for Proposition 187.²⁷ The threat, then, of Proposition 187 activated a strong electoral response from Latina/o Americans within the state, one that contributed in no small part to the rise of the Democratic Party to dominance within the state.

Stretching back even further, we witness examples of Latina/o Americans mobilizing for insurgent activity during the tumultuous periods of the 1960s and 1970s. From the Los Angeles school district walkouts in 1968, which sparked the Chicano movement in California, to the transformation of the Young Lords in Chicago from a Puerto Rican territorial gang to a politically active leftist movement spanning a national network, a picture gradually emerges not of a sleeping giant, but of a group ready to step up its action when seeing red.

If history indicates that Latina/os are indeed activated and energized by political threats, then why was there no apparent vote surge among the group to combat the threat of Trump in 2016? The answer to this question may be found in the collective emotional sentiment engendered within this group, as members become acutely aware of their marginalized societal status. Similar to African Americans, Latina/o Americans are disproportionately overrepresented in incarceration, unemployment and high-school dropout rates.

As demonstrated by race and politics scholar Natalie Masuoka, the perception among Latina/os that the group is generally discriminated against in such spheres is highly correlated with possession of a pan-ethnic racial group consciousness. This political salience of group members' racial

²⁶ Pantoja et al. (2001).

²⁷ Bowler, Nicholson and Segura (2006); however, for an opposing view on Latino partisan realignment in California, see Hui and Sears (2018).

identity may cultivate a sentiment of resignation akin to that of African Americans. Such a sentiment would inhibit the mobilizing force of anger in shaping Latina/o Americans' behavior in the face of threat. If anger is not the most effective pathway to political action among Latina/os, could a positive emotion such as pride actually be the key to unlocking this group's political activity in contexts of threat?

Assessing patterns among Latina/o Americans in the CMPS provides some insight. But before delving into those trends, I examine how the political messaging centered on Asian Americans during the 2016 race signaled a retreat to long-running narratives depicting the group as perpetual outsiders in the political sphere.

Asian Americans in the Dawn of Trump: On the Perpetual Margins of the Polity?

Trump by no means reserved all of his ire for Latina/o Americans. Asian Americans also frequently found themselves targets of sleights and threats throughout the campaign. During an August 2015 rally, Trump employed a broken accent and a mocking affectation while describing Japanese and Chinese businesspeople. These remarks were forcefully condemned by California Representative Mike Honda, who remarked the incident "builds upon a disturbing narrative that is fueled by xenophobic speech and thinking."²⁸ The following April, Trump returned to the well of mocking accents. Once again while holding serve at a campaign rally, Trump employed a stereotyped Indian accent while bemoaning the loss of call center jobs overseas.²⁹

More substantive threats to Asian Americans came in the form of Trump's proposal during the campaign to restrict H-1B visas in the name of increasing employment of US-born workers. Between 2001 and 2015, 70 percent of all H-1B visas were attained by Asian Americans.^{30³¹} Thus, restrictions would profoundly cut off the immigration flow of AAPIs into the country.

Trump also singled out particular Asian nations for stigmatization within his anti-immigrant rhetoric. In an August 2016 speech, Trump listed the Philippines among the "terrorist nations" from which

²⁸ Wang (2015).

²⁹ Gurciullo (2016).

³⁰ Kwong (2018).

³¹ Ruiz (2017).

immigrants should not be allowed into the US. He punctuated his demonization of these groups by stating bluntly “we’re dealing with animals.”³² And it should be noted that while Latina/os were largely perceived to be the targets of Trump’s general anti-immigrant rhetoric, a majority of AAPI respondents in the 2016 CMPS (53 percent of the 3000+ sample) viewed that messaging as targeting Asian Americans as well.

As with the rhetoric around Latina/os, Trump’s anti-Asian sentiments surfaced long-running political narratives stigmatizing Asian Americans. These narratives paint Asian individuals in the US as perpetual foreigners, incapable of truly assimilating within the social and political fabric of American life. Race and political scholar Claire Kim offers an account of how throughout US history, Asian Americans have been simultaneously positioned as a superior racial minority group along lines of intellect and work capacity, and inferior along lines of trustworthiness and capacity for sociopolitical incorporation. Her concept of “racial triangulation” is on full display in a characterization of people of Chinese descent by Charles Wolcott Brooks, US Counsel to Japan in the late nineteenth century.

I think the Chinese are a far superior race to the negro race physiologically and mentally ... The Negro[’s] mind ... is undisciplined and not as systematic as the Chinese mind. For that reason the Negro is very easily taught; he assimilates more readily... The Chinese are non-assimilative because their form of civilization as crystalized.³³

The sentiment that people of Asian descent are intrinsically unable to shed their “otherness” to become true Americans has been reflected in a long line of historical policy decisions that precluded AAPIs from exercising in full the rights of legal and social citizenship, from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 to the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. An editorial published in the *Los Angeles Times* in 1942 made vividly clear the tenuous ties to American identity possessed by Japanese Americans.

A viper is nonetheless a viper wherever the egg is hatched. So a Japanese-American, born of Japanese parents, nurtured upon Japanese traditions, living in a transplanted Japanese atmosphere, and thoroughly inoculated with Japanese thoughts, Japanese ideas and Japanese ideals, notwithstanding his nominal brand of accidental citizenship, almost inevitably and with the rarest of exceptions, grows up to be a Japanese, not an American, in his thoughts, in his ideas, and in his ideals...³⁴

³² Alibutud (2016).

³³ Quoted in Kim (1999).

³⁴ Anderson (1942).

When Donald Trump used stereotypical affectations to mock various Asian accents, and when he proposed limits on high-skilled immigration under the “Buy American, Hire American” initiative, he harkened back to these age-old tropes equating Asian Americans with something distinctly *less than* American. And in the contemporary era these tropes continue to shape the political engagement of Asian Americans. How else can we explain the observation that despite being the fastest-growing demographic group in the United States electorate, Asian Americans are the group least contacted by political parties?³⁵³⁶

Whereas the political behavior of Latina/o Americans has frequently been mischaracterized via the image of the “sleeping giant,” Asian Americans have in the past been misrepresented as a politically quiescent “silent minority.”³⁷ Overall rates of participation among AAPIs are indeed somewhat lower relative to other racial minority groups.³⁸ Political scholars such as Janelle Wong, Pei-te Lien and M. Margaret Conway attribute this participation gap to factors such as the proportion of group members who are foreign-born and less acculturated to US politics, the aforementioned weak mobilization efforts by political parties, and formal barriers such as English-only ballots.³⁹

But viewing trends in AAPI participation through a lens espousing the perpetual foreignness of the group would raise the possibility that Asian Americans are simply not as emotionally invested in politics. Again, this view does not comport with the reality. Dating back to the nineteenth century, Asian Americans have been effectively mobilized, particularly through labor and religious groups, to combat discrimination and advance group interests in domains such as education and property rights.⁴⁰

The second half of the 1800s witnessed a spate of litigation brought to the courts by Chinese individuals to advance their civil rights. Through such cases, Chinese Americans earned protections for their rights to operate businesses, fish in state waters and seek housing in areas beyond

³⁵ APIAVote/AAJC/AAPIData (2016).

³⁶ Hajnal and Lee (2011).

³⁷ For details on this characterization, see Jo (1984).

³⁸ Bowler and Segura (2011); Jamieson, Shin and Day (2002).

³⁹ Cain, Kiewiet and Uhlaner (1991); Wong, Lien and Conway (2005); Lien, Collet, Wong and Ramakrishnan (2001); Lien (2010).

⁴⁰ McClain (1994).

state-designated ghettos.⁴¹ In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UCLA-based radical paper *Gidra* chronicled the intensive – albeit oft overlooked – efforts by AAPIs to mobilize around opposition to Vietnam, as well as to coalesce around a politically meaningful pan-ethnic identity taking shape – that of *Asian American*.⁴² In recent years, the number of Asian Americans seeking positions of elective office around the country has exploded, giving the group an increasing foothold in electoral politics.⁴³

A far cry from a “silent minority,” these trends indicate that Asian Americans have been invested enough in politics to push through institutional barriers and stereotypical boundaries to make their presence felt. Will the trends in Asian American emotion and participation in the CMPS reveal a group that takes up increased action when angry? Or will Asian Americans be moved to action by a different set of emotions?

Asian Americans provide a particularly interesting test case for exploring the role of anger in shaping the political behavior of various groups. As a racial group largely constructed by various sets of political elites – from the party system to the news media – to exist largely on the periphery of American politics, AAPIs may be expected to be vigilantly responsive to any potential threats to their already precarious position. At the same time, the sense that one’s group is perpetually on the socio-political margins should preclude the sentiment of entitlement and high expectation that breeds anger. The possibility remains, thusly, for anger to prove an ineffective pathway to action for this group. But could another negative emotion prove uniquely mobilizing for Asian Americans?

The Anger Gap and Enthusiasm Advantage among Latina/o and Asian Americans

From this brief overview emerge some common threads across Asian and Latina/o Americans in the political landscape during the 2016 election. Both groups perceived salient political threats from the rhetoric of the GOP candidate. Both groups are steadily increasing both their share of the overall electorate and their influence within the Democratic Party. Despite this increasing electoral relevance, both groups still contend with narratives painting them as politically dormant or peripheral. How did these crosscutting factors, which communicate the urgent stakes of

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Chang (2017).

⁴³ Khrais (2012).

participation, but also the respective bounds on the groups' senses of political agency, shape the emotional responses of Latina/o and Asian Americans to the political environment during the 2016 race? And which emotions were most mobilizing for these groups?

Here I answer these questions, using data from the 2016 CMPS. I use only CMPS data here because the ANES does not contain sufficient numbers of people across all four racial and ethnic groups.⁴⁴ These data yield trends revealing that both the racial anger gap and enthusiasm advantage extend beyond black Americans to other racial minority groups in the political playing field.

First up are odds ratios comparing reports of four emotions – anger, fear, pride and hope – across Asian, black, Latina/o and white respondents.⁴⁵ Whites are represented by the dotted line at the value of 1. Every racial minority group's placement represents their odds of feeling the respective emotion at the same frequency of white respondents over the course of the election; icons to the left of the dotted line mean that the minority group reported feeling the emotion at a lower rate than whites, whereas icons to the right of the dotted line mean the minority group reported feeling the emotion at a frequency greater than whites. The solid lines running through the icons, or "tails," represent the 95-percent confidence intervals for the odds ratios.

Alongside all previous CMPS analyses, these odds ratios account for indicators of demographics (such as age and gender), possession of socio-economic resources (i.e., educational attainment and household income), partisan and psychological attachments (including party ID, trust in politics and political efficacy) and senses of racial identity (e.g., linked fate and perceptions of racial discrimination). Importantly, these analyses also take into account an indicator of acculturation – whether or not respondents are US-born. Results for African Americans are displayed once again here, in order to provide an easy visual comparison with AAPI and Latina/o American respondents, respectively.⁴⁶

As indicated by the dot and triangle icons representing odds ratios of reporting anger and fear, respectively, all three racial minority groups exhibit a paucity of negative emotions relative to white respondents. The anger gap among Latina/os – the group perhaps most consistently and

⁴⁴ The CMPS contains a sample of 3003 self-identified Latina/o respondents and 3006 self-identified Asian respondents.

⁴⁵ I examine fear here because, as will be clear later in this chapter, this emotion state yields a unique relationship with participation for one of the groups.

⁴⁶ Full ordered logistic regression results for Latina/o and AAPI respondents, respectively, are displayed in Table A6.1 in the Appendix to this chapter.




FIGURE 6.1 Odds ratios comparing expressions of anger, fear, hope and pride throughout 2016 election, across respondent race. White respondents are baseline of 1. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.

viscerally threatened by rhetoric throughout the campaign – is only slightly smaller than the gap for African Americans. Meanwhile, the anger gap among AAPI respondents is slightly greater. While Asian Americans are unique in reporting fear with greater frequency than anger, no minority group comes close to matching whites' frequency of fear expressions. Despite clear anecdotal evidence that Latina/o and Asian Americans were distinctly threatened by the xenophobic rhetoric of Donald Trump during the election, these groups joined black Americans in registering significantly *less* anger during this critical election season.

These racial anger gaps remain even among those respondents who express the greatest antipathy for Trump. Figure 6.2 displays AAPI and Latina/o Americans' respective levels of reported anger as they move from most to least favorable toward Trump.

Across every level of favorability toward Trump, white respondents exhibit the most anger of any group.⁴⁷ One would reasonably expect

⁴⁷ While the differences between Latina/o Americans and whites are not statistically significant, the anger gap exhibited by Asian Americans at all levels of Trump favorability are significant at the 0.05 alpha level.




FIGURE 6.2 Marginal effect of favorability toward Trump on frequency of anger reported during 2016 election, across respondent race. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.

whites who are most favorable toward Trump to express the most anger of all racial groups. After all, Trump was noted for crafting a populist message that activated the grievances of disaffected whites. But this messaging often acutely targeted black, Asian and – perhaps foremost – Latina/o Americans. Members of these groups that express the greatest unfavorability toward Trump likely perceived real threat from that rhetoric. And yet, that perception of threat from people of color fails to translate to reports of anger that exceed those among anti-Trump whites.

That this political environment, which was particularly rife with racial rancor, would elicit no more anger from racial minority groups relative to whites goes to show the extent to which anger in politics is largely the domain of white Americans – this despite the prevalent narratives touting the existence of the angry black man/woman, the awakened giant and the like.

Could this lack of anger (or *any* strong negative emotion) have played a small but meaningful role in the absence of the anticipated Latina/o electoral surge? Could this anger gap have inhibited the modest

turnout increases that Asian Americans displayed in the 2016 election? The answers to these questions hinge not just in how much anger was exhibited by these groups during the election, but also in how effectively anger mobilized action for these groups.

Whereas black CMPS respondents expressed the positive emotions of hope and pride at rates not meaningfully distinguishable from whites (as evidenced by the overlap of the “tails” with the dotted line at 1), both AAPI and Latina/o respondents exhibit more apparent enthusiasm advantages. Latina/o Americans reported feeling both pride and hope at rates significantly greater than whites, while Asian Americans reported feeling proud more frequently. And it is worth noting that the tail for Asian American expressions of hope barely overlaps with white respondents, meaning Asian Americans come quite close to expressing hope significantly more frequently than whites as well.

It appears, then, that Latina/o and Asian Americans did register a strong emotional response in the face of the threats being communicated within the political environment of 2016. But far from seeing red, these groups responded with sanguinity and pride. What prompted the activation of these positive emotions? Did the efforts by racial advocacy organizations such as APIAVote and Voto Latino to rally the respective groups to action engender a sense of collective optimism? Did the rebuttals to Trump from popular figures such as members of Maná or restaurateur, author and food personality Eddie Huang inspire a commanding sense of racial pride? These trends do not say. But they indicate that racial minority groups beyond African Americans are especially responsive to group-specific narratives of racial salvation, while simultaneously resistant to – or, perhaps more accurately, perceive themselves to be *excluded from* – calls to get mad as hell in politics.

Figures 6.3a and 6.3b display the respective associations between AAPI and Latina/o American respondents’ perceptions of their racial groups’ agency and their reported anger, pride and hope. As indicated in the slopes in the first graph displayed in Figure 6.3a, greater confidence that Asian Americans have a say in government has very little bearing on how angry or hopeful this group felt during the election. But the belief in this particular type of racial group efficacy steadily increases the groups’ reports of pride felt during the election. This pattern is quite similar to that shown for African Americans in the previous chapter. The second graph in Figure 6.3b reveals that perceiving public officials to be working on behalf of AAPIs increases both the frequencies of reported pride and hope among the group. The apparent association between this indicator




FIGURE 6.3A Marginal effects of AAPI respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.




FIGURE 6.3B Marginal effects of Latina/o respondents' perceptions of racial group efficacy on likelihoods of expressing hope, pride and anger during 2016 election. Includes 95-percent confidence intervals. Data from 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). All control variables held at means.

of Asian Americans' racial group efficacy and their hope – however slight – is not shared by black respondents.

The graphs in Figure 6.3b reveal a constant pattern for Latina/o American respondents across both indicators of racial group efficacy. Both the belief that Latina/os have a say in government and that public officials work for Latina/o Americans have the strongest positive associations with their reported pride. Just like African Americans, among Latina/os these perceptions of collective agency carry slightly negative relationships with reported anger during the election. And the associations between agency and hope are less robust. Among all three groups of color, the self-reflective emotion of pride emerges as a common pathway to animating a sense of collective agency, which is often lacking among racial minorities in the US.

Emotions and Participation beyond Black and White

Which of these emotions translate most effectively to political participation among AAPI and Latina/o American respondents? Tables 6.1 through 6.4 display coefficient effects and standard errors revealing the effects of each emotion – anger, fear, hope and pride – on each racial group's likelihood of participating in the full range of electoral, communal and system-challenging actions. Once again, these effects are derived from logistic regression analyses that control for demographic, resource, engagement and racial attitude variables.⁴⁸ Displayed first are the results for anger across respondent race.

White respondents remain the group most consistently and strongly mobilized to political action by anger. For Latina/o respondents, anger elicits a positive relationship that is statistically meaningful for only three of the eight actions. Notably, two of those actions are the counter-institutional activities of protesting ($p < 0.01$) and boycotting ($p < 0.001$). Anger operates for Latina/o Americans in a manner quite comparable to African Americans – stimulating participation in a much narrower range of activities relative to whites, and being felt most acutely in the domain of activist actions. Anger exerts an even smaller mobilizing effect for the Asian American respondents, mobilizing greater activity in just two actions – donating to a campaign ($p < 0.01$) and participating in a

⁴⁸ Full logistic regression results are displayed in Tables A6.2–A6.3 in the Appendix to this chapter.

TABLE 6.1 *Effect of anger expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
White	0.35	1.96***	0.90	1.19**	1.49***	1.75***	2.05**	2.61***
785 Obs.	(1.05)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.65)	(0.44)
Latina/o	-0.09	0.59*	-0.47	0.30	0.22	0.78**	0.92**	1.47***
1945 Obs.	(0.46)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.27)
AAPI	0.17	0.98**	0.28	0.31	0.40	0.49	0.17	1.38***
1838 Obs.	(0.62)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.26)
Black	0.14	0.55*	0.48	0.25	0.05	0.57*	1.16***	1.31***
2009 Obs.	(0.43)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.25)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

boycott ($p < 0.001$). For the AAPI group, anger appears to only stimulate actions related to the pocketbook.

Throughout this book, less attention has been paid to the relationship between fear and political action, and with good reason. The consensus view is that fear simply does not motivate people to take up costly political actions. On the contrary, fear moves people to seek new information, as they evaluate their existing predispositions.⁴⁹ As shown in Table 6.2, this expectation is largely borne out. But there is one major exception.

Fear reported during the election carries a significant relationship with none of the activities for white respondents, one activity for Latina/os (volunteering for a campaign, $p < 0.001$) and one activity for African Americans (donating to a campaign, $p < 0.001$). For these groups, fear operates as expected by the existing scholarship – that is to say, by not strongly mobilizing much action.

But the story is quite different for Asian Americans. For this group, fear exhibits a positive and statistically significant effect on five of the eight actions. The activities for which fear mobilizes greater participation run the gamut from volunteering for a campaign ($p < 0.01$) to contacting public officials ($p < 0.01$) to both sets of system-challenging behaviors ($p < 0.01$ for protesting and $p < 0.05$ for boycotting).

AAPI respondents depart notably from the conventional wisdom here by effectively leveraging their fear toward a variety of costly actions. If

⁴⁹ See Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen (2000) and Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz and Hutchings (2011).

TABLE 6.2 *Effect of fear expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
White	0.19	-0.10	0.53	0.03	-0.11	-0.02	0.38	-0.53
785 Obs.	(0.90)	(0.40)	(0.56)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.54)	(0.37)
Latina/o	-0.40	0.56*	1.46***	0.03	0.21	0.25	0.26	0.23
1945 Obs.	(0.44)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.23)
AAPI	0.49	0.36	1.08**	0.29	0.79**	0.88**	0.97***	0.62*
1838 Obs.	(0.65)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.35)	(0.25)
Black	0.45	0.84***	0.49	0.23	0.25	0.26	0.42	0.37
2009 Obs.	(0.39)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.22)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

political anger is largely the reserve of white Americans, then it appears fear is the reserve of Asian Americans. But why would this group buck the prevailing pattern regarding this emotion?

A confluence of factors is likely at play. One, the positioning of Asian Americans within the sociopolitical system as a perpetual *other* may work to heighten the group's perception of its vulnerability within politics, making threatening political development loom that much larger in the group's collective consciousness. At the same time, the demarcating of Asian Americans as not fully integrated within the political fabric – as evidenced by the weaker mobilization efforts directed toward the group from mainstream political elites – can inhibit the sentiment of entitlement from which originates the activation of anger and its leveraging toward political action.

Finally, given the substantial proportion of Asian Americans who are born outside of the US – 59 percent, according to 2017 Pew research data – it is worth considering how Asian Americans' emotional sentiments are shaped by the political cultures of their origin states. How might lessons learned about political authority and individual agency within these distinct contexts make fear a more salient emotion within politics? The tenuousness of AAPIs' collective incorporation within American politics, combined with the cues about politics received from socialization within non-US political systems, may contribute to making anxiety over politics a pivotal force in shaping this group's political decision making.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ See Phoenix and Arora (2018) for a deeper exploration of this phenomenon.

TABLE 6.3 *Effect of hope expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
White	-0.61	1.49**	0.61	0.22	0.33	0.42	-0.02	0.94*
785 Obs.	(1.04)	(0.47)	(0.64)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.64)	(0.42)
Latina/o	0.78	0.03	0.09	0.17	0.62*	-0.04	-0.21	0.07
1945 Obs.	(0.50)	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.28)
AAPI	1.17	-0.16	-0.17	0.08	0.41	-0.20	-0.23	-0.18
1838 Obs.	(0.78)	(0.36)	(0.45)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.31)
Black	0.97	-0.18	-0.16	-0.21	-0.30	-0.19	-0.55	-0.82**
2009 Obs.	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.27)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Racial distinctions remain pronounced when examining the mobilizing effects of one of the positive emotions. I turn first to the effects of hope on participation across race, displayed in Table 6.3.

Hope elicits mostly null effects on participation across all four racial groups. Among Latina/o respondents, hope is strongly associated with a single action, working with others to address a local issue ($p < 0.05$). Hope carries no significant mobilizing effects for Asian Americans. The lack of a robust action-inducing effect of expressed hope across these two groups places them on a par with both black and white respondents.

Last, Table 6.4 displays the effects of reported pride on participation across race. Taking a macro level view, the results for pride are the converse of those for anger.

Whereas white respondents were unique among the racial groups in being stimulated toward a variety of political actions by anger, they are also unique in being the only racial group whose political behavior is wholly unfazed by reported pride. Latina/o Americans exhibit a positive and statistically significant association between pride and four of the eight actions. Among Asian Americans, the strong association between pride and action is present for a whopping seven of eight actions. Both the racial anger gap and the pride advantage remain fully apparent when broadening the scope beyond white and black Americans.

These patterns from the CMPS uncover pathways from emotion to action in 2016 that varied considerably across all four racial and ethnic groups, and they suggest that distinct mobilizing strategies would need

TABLE 6.4 *Effect of pride expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
White	1.51	-0.31	0.72	0.63	0.10	0.39	1.05	-0.23
785 Obs.	(1.18)	(0.46)	(0.65)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.40)	(0.66)	(0.43)
Latina/o	0.18	1.08***	1.52***	0.25	0.24	0.49	0.78*	0.51*
1945 Obs.	(0.48)	(0.29)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.26)
AAPI	1.11	1.13***	1.83***	0.60*	0.74**	0.84**	1.08**	0.60*
1838 Obs.	(0.82)	(0.33)	(0.42)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.30)
Black	0.42	0.86***	0.94**	0.32	0.49*	0.71**	1.13***	0.80**
2009 Obs.	(0.55)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.26)

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

to be employed to rally each group toward action. A one-size-fits-all approach simply would not suffice if one is attempting to mobilize multiple racial groups to action.

Calls to action that engender a sense of pride are most likely to rally multiple groups of color to electoral and system-challenging actions. Yet such calls should fail to strike a responsive chord among whites. Activating anger among both black and Latina/o Americans will have only marginal effects on their participation in electoral and communal actions. But both groups will be more likely to take on insurgent activities when angered. While Asian Americans will be slightly responsive to anger appeals in the domain of these insurgent actions, they will be strongly motivated to take on action across multiple domains when primed with fear. And white Americans remain the only group for whom seeing red can be expected to produce surges in participation across all types of actions. These findings only further corroborate my claim that the political power leveraged from being *mad as hell* is largely reserved only for white Americans.

The sets of emotions to which different racial groups prove most responsive illuminates the different challenges facing the Democratic and Republican Parties in their efforts to mobilize their respective bases. The relative racial homogeneity of the GOP base makes it that much easier for the party to craft messaging that is both emotionally resonant and unifying. Getting the troops *mad as hell* is an effective means of rallying action in service of the party's objectives.

For Democrats, on the other hand, crafting messaging that can both unify the diverse racial factions comprising the group while also

activating action-stimulating emotions within them proves a tall order. How can the party credibly convey a message that generates pride among black, Latina/o and Asian American supporters and anger among white supporters? Is it possible to tailor distinct missives to generate the respective mobilizing emotions within the respective groups without impeding a unifying vision for the base?

These questions highlight a critical – if heretofore understudied – consequence of the increasing overlap between race and partisanship in US politics. The racial anger gap magnifies the challenge faced by a Democratic Party that must rally a racially heterogeneous set of people to action. Accordingly, a reckoning with this gap provides a new lens to consider not only how race shapes the manner through which people feel their way through politics, but also how race shapes the effectiveness of various strategies of political communication.

Reflecting on Emotion to Reframe the 2016 Election

These findings occasion an opportunity to scrutinize the intent and effects of the political messaging from the contenders for the presidency in 2016. On the one hand stood Donald Trump, whose rhetoric provided unending fuel to the flames of white conservatives' grievances with the state of sociopolitical affairs. His remarks on different groups of color painted them variously as interlopers, ransackers, destitute or simply un-American. Trump also turned his ire toward journalists, referring on multiple occasions to reporters as "sleazy," "extremely dishonest" and "not good people."⁵¹ And Trump frequently lashed out at his opponents, often with belittling nicknames like "Little Marco," "Low-energy Jeb" and "Crooked Hillary."

For all of the people and pundits turned off by this brash, brazen and conflictual approach, Trump managed to strike a nerve among a large enough segment of the white electorate to win the election in stunning fashion. As has been shown anecdotally and empirically throughout this book, Trump's expectation-shattering success is rooted in no small part in his ability to leverage the power of white anger. This power has been on display many times before, from the American Revolution to the Reagan Revolution.

But strategists, election forecasters and Trump's Democratic opponents veered wrongly in their expectation that the threat posed by Trump to the

⁵¹ Shafer (2016).

people of color who are so vital to the Democratic base would be sufficient to inspire a major counter-mobilization. They wrongly asserted that his racial invective would sufficiently inspire people of color to see red and step up their action accordingly. The Clinton campaign bet big on the strategy of highlighting the racist and xenophobic undertones of the Trump campaign. But its “basket of deplorables” messaging appeared to engender more of a rise from the Trump supporters falling under this label than the people of color feeling targeted.

Meanwhile, Bernie Sanders’ constant denunciations of a broken political system generated an indignant and mobilizing anger within his cadre of loyal white supporters. Yet beyond younger cohorts, this message failed to resonate as strongly with people of color, for whom a broken system is less a call to electoral action, and more a confirmation of their extant worldview.

Put simply, everyone who banked on the fact that Trump would pay a severe price on Election Day for alienating and threatening virtually every key non-white contingent within the electorate made a severe miscalculation of the way people of color respond to political threats. Black, Asian and Latina/o Americans share a common disposition to *not* generate anger in the same vein as white Americans when facing political threats. And anger does not move these groups toward election-influencing action to anywhere near the same degree as whites.

If anger carried the same political force for people of color as it does for whites, perhaps the 2016 election would have produced the widely expected outcome. Alternately, if Democrats crafted a campaign to effectively engender pride among people of color, perhaps the election would have turned differently. But these are hypotheticals. The reality is that the Democratic Party banked on the prospect of Trump animating anger and increased political action among people of color. This expectation was shared by pundits who recycled the narrative of a sleeping giant being awakened by Trump’s racial threats. But these expectations were unmet, in large part because anger is not the most effective pathway to action for any group of color.

Emotions and Perceptions of Racial Intergroup Solidarity

Having offered a sense of how emotions shape different racial groups’ participation in varying ways, I now turn to exploring how emotions shape racial groups’ perceptions of one another. The CMPS included a

variety of questions that gauge respondents' support for policies with outsized impacts on particular racial groups, such as immigration, affirmative action, and policing practices. Additionally, the survey asked select respondents to provide their direct assessments of other groups, as well as their capacity to work alongside those groups. From these questions I derive a sense of whether respondents view other racial groups as either assets or burdens – potential partners with whom to work in solidarity, or potential threats against whom to mobilize.

I identified six of these questions and used ordered logistic regression models to assess the relationship between respondents' reported emotions of anger, fear, pride and hope and their attitudes about other racial groups and racialized policies. In the tables below, I present the regression effects for each of the emotions, across respondent race.⁵² One clear and consistent pattern emerges. Across every question and for every racial minority group, reported anger is strongly and positively associated with the position that implies racial solidarity and cooperation. Yet for white respondents, reported anger *never* exhibits a statistically discernible positive relationship with the position implying racial solidarity with minority groups. There is a second recurrent pattern that is also quite notable. Expressions of pride by people of color are often associated with weaker expressions of interracial – and even in-group – solidarity.

First up is a question viewed in Chapter 4. All respondents – not just African Americans – were asked whether they oppose or support the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Table 6.5 presents the effects of respondents' reported emotions on their support for BLM, across race. Given the coding of the question, positive values on the coefficients mean that as respondents report feeling more of the respective emotions, they become more strongly supportive of the movement. Conversely, a negative coefficient indicates that feeling the emotion more frequently is associated with greater opposition to Black Lives Matter.

For all four racial groups, greater expressions of fear are strongly associated with greater support for the Black Lives Matter movement ($p < 0.01$ for AAPI respondents; $p < 0.001$ for all other groups). But white respondents are the only group for whom anger is not also strongly associated with supporting the movement ($p = 0.56$). The null result for whites runs in stark contrast to the substantially large and strongly significant anger effect for each group of color ($p < 0.001$ for all).

⁵² I display only the main effects of the emotions here. Full regression results are available in Tables A6.4–A6.9 in the Appendix to this chapter.

TABLE 6.5 *The influence of emotions on support for the BLM movement, across respondent race. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	White	Black	AAPI	Latina/o
Anger	-0.16 (0.28)	0.88*** (0.15)	0.66*** (0.17)	0.81*** (0.16)
Fear	0.80** (0.26)	0.38** (0.14)	0.58** (0.17)	0.40** (0.15)
Pride	-0.23 (0.29)	0.21 (0.17)	-0.37* (0.18)	-0.26 (0.16)
Hope	-0.25 (0.29)	0.19 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.17)
Obs.	839	2126	2033	2126

Question: From what you have heard about the Black Lives Matter movement, do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose or strongly oppose the Black Lives Matter movement activism?

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Interestingly, Asian Americans exhibit a positive relationship between reported pride and opposition to the movement ($p < 0.05$). Across all racial groups, this is the only effect of a positive emotion that appears distinguishable from zero. Thus, negative emotions more clearly animate respondents' support of BLM than positive emotions. But among white Americans – by far the angriest of the four racial groups – anger does not increase solidarity with this movement advocating for racial reform of the legal and criminal justice systems.

The next question asks respondents whether they believe undocumented Mexican immigrants should be eligible for a pathway to citizenship, or be deported. It is critical to note that this question explicitly identifies undocumented immigrants of *Mexican* descent. An experimental study by Brader, Valentino and Suhay reveals that white Americans' feelings of anxiety about competition with immigrants are activated when they are posited as being of Latin compared to European descent.⁵³ So we can expect the specific wording of this question to conjure up the image of undocumented immigrants that is especially threatening to many white people.

Table 6.6 displays the relationships between emotions and attitudes on this question. Positive coefficients indicate stronger support for a pathway

⁵³ Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008).

TABLE 6.6 *The influence of emotions on policy preferences toward undocumented Mexican immigrants, across respondent race. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	White	Black	AAPI	Latina/o
Anger	0.39 (0.28)	0.35* (0.15)	0.84*** (0.17)	0.72*** (0.17)
Fear	0.46^ (0.27)	0.24 (0.15)	0.08 (0.17)	0.46** (0.16)
Pride	-0.17 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.34^ (0.19)	-0.45** (0.18)
Hope	0.21 (0.29)	0.08 (0.17)	0.22 (0.19)	0.43* (0.19)
Obs.	839	2126	2033	2126

Question: Do you think the millions of undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States should be eligible for a pathway to citizenship, or do you think we should deport undocumented Mexican immigrants?

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

to citizenship, while negative coefficients indicate stronger support for deportation.

Across all groups there is only one instance of a significant and positive relationship between a reported emotion and increased support for deporting undocumented Mexican immigrants. Notably, that effect is present for Latina/o American respondents who feel proud ($p < 0.01$). It appears Latina/o Americans' pride inhibits a particular type of in-group solidarity. This association between pride and support for deportations suggests Latina/o respondents who feel the most pride also feel the most distance from undocumented immigrants, who may be perceived as dragging down the general representation of the racial group in the political discourse.

Every other emotion reported by Latina/o Americans has a statistically strong and positive relationship with support for a pathway to citizenship. Not surprisingly, this is the racial group displaying the most emotional investment in the issue. Among black respondents, anger is the only emotion with a statistically discernible relationship with views on undocumented Mexican immigrants; this emotion is associated with stronger support for a pathway to citizenship ($p < 0.05$). The positive linkage between reported anger and support for a pathway to citizenship

TABLE 6.7 *The influence of emotions on views about racial profiling, across respondent race. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Black	AAPI	Latina/o
Anger	-0.86*** (0.16)	-0.41* (0.17)	-0.78*** (0.16)
Fear	0.30* (0.15)	-0.23 (0.17)	0.20 (0.15)
Pride	0.71*** (0.17)	0.25 (0.19)	0.78*** (0.16)
Hope	-0.13 (0.17)	0.18 (0.19)	-0.25 (0.17)
Obs.	2126	2016	2126

Question: Racial profiling is sometimes necessary as a law enforcement tool [agree or disagree]. ("Racial profiling" refers to targeting individuals from certain groups in the belief that they are more likely to commit crimes.)

^ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

is even stronger for AAPI respondents ($p < 0.001$). In addition, pride shapes Asian Americans' views on this question in a manner similar to Latina/o respondents, making AAPIs marginally less supportive of a pathway to citizenship ($p = 0.07$).

Among white Americans, anger, pride and hope yield null relationships with their opinion on the matter. However, fear carries a marginally positive effect on whites respondents' support for a pathway to citizenship ($p = 0.09$). Two patterns continue to emerge. One, the strong association between expressed anger and racial solidarity among people of color – an association not shared by white respondents. And two, a weaker but observable association between people of color's expressions of pride and their staking-out of positions in potential opposition to racial solidarity.

The remaining questions are asked of subsets of the sample rather than all racial groups. Black, Asian and Latina/o groups were asked whether they agree with the notion that racial profiling is sometimes a necessary tool of law enforcement. Table 6.7 displays the emotion coefficients for each of these groups. Here, positive coefficient indicates agreement with the notion, while a negative coefficient indicates disagreement.

The same patterns emerge here. For all three groups, anger is strongly associated with opposing the idea that racial profiling is sometimes a necessity. Anger is more strongly associated with opposing this notion

for black and Latina/o respondents ($p < 0.001$) than Asian Americans ($p < 0.05$). Nonetheless, for all groups expressed anger is meaningfully associated with rejecting the perspective that profiling can be a useful tool in law enforcement. Once again, people of color's anger appears to be tethered to the racially liberal position on a contentious issue.

Again, we also see expression of pride as indicative of less solidarity – perhaps both interracial and within-group. For both black and Latina/o respondents, pride is strongly associated with agreeing with the statement that racial profiling is sometimes necessary ($p < 0.001$). The magnitudes of these effects are roughly equivalent to the opposing effects of anger; in fact, in the case of Latina/o Americans, the substantive effect of pride is slightly larger than the opposing effect of anger.

It appears people of color's expressions of pride may create the effect of distancing them from members of the group perceived to be delinquent in some aspect, perhaps due to their citizenship status or run-ins with law enforcement. The trends on display here are illustrative of the central thesis in Cathy Cohen's seminal work *The Boundaries of Blackness*, in which she examines how the sense of in-group solidarity exhibited by many black leaders and rank-and-file individuals does not extend to black group members who are stigmatized as morally irresponsible or deficient.⁵⁴ In these instances, the perceived stigmas of being undocumented or a potential criminal suspect seem to be grounds for being excluded from the advocacy or sympathy of the group.

The next question was asked only of black and white respondents. Both were asked whether they agree or disagree with the notion that the distinct nature of Latina/o culture and traditions enriches American culture for the better. In essence, respondents were asked whether they view Latina/o Americans as an asset to be embraced, or a potential threat to the American way of life if not assimilated or excluded. This question speaks directly to political debates raging over the role and contributions of Latina/o immigrants in the US during the 2016 election season. Marco Gutierrez, founder of the group "Latinos for Trump," exemplified the inflammatory rhetoric on this very issue when he declared on a cable news show "my culture is a very dominant culture, and it's imposing and it's causing problems. If you don't do something about it, you're going to have taco trucks on every corner."⁵⁵

The emotion coefficients for black and white respondents are displayed in Table 6.8. Positive coefficients signify agreement that Latina/o

⁵⁴ Cohen (1999).

⁵⁵ Chokshi (2016).

TABLE 6.8 *The influence of emotions on views about Latina/o culture, across respondent race. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	White	Black
Anger	0.34 (0.30)	0.31* (0.15)
Fear	0.49^ (0.29)	0.47** (0.15)
Pride	-0.57^ (0.32)	0.42* (0.17)
Hope	0.33 (0.32)	-0.05 (0.17)
Obs.	754	2092

Question: The distinct nature of Latino culture and traditions enriches American culture for the better [agree or disagree].

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

culture and traditions are enriching, while negative coefficients indicate disagreement.

Both reported anger and fear make African Americans more likely to agree that Latina/os enrich American culture ($p < 0.05$ for anger and $p < 0.001$ for fear). In a departure from the previous patterns, black people's pride is also positively associated with valuing Latina/o culture ($p < 0.05$). Once again, anger exhibits a null effect among white Americans. White respondents' fear has a marginally positive relationship with viewing Latina/o culture as enriching ($p = 0.09$). But feelings of pride, on the other hand, are marginally related to disagreeing with the notion that this culture is enriching ($p = 0.07$). This marks the only instance in which expressed pride among whites exhibits a statistically discernible relationship with the position indicating interracial antipathy.

The final two questions were asked of only one respective racial group. Latina/o Americans were asked to what extent Trump's rise has made them consider working more closely with African Americans to resolve local community issues. Answers ranged from *none at all* to *a lot*. This question offers a direct gauge of Latina/o respondents' belief in the utility of working in solidarity with African Americans. Coefficients on the emotions are displayed in Table 6.9.

Every single emotion is positively associated with a greater willingness to work in coalition with black Americans in the face of Trump's rise. Whereas pride and hope yield positive effects that are marginally

TABLE 6.9 *The influence of emotions on Latina/o Americans' perceived importance of working with African Americans. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

	Latino
Anger	0.51** (0.16)
Fear	0.92*** (0.15)
Pride	0.29^ (0.16)
Hope	0.29^ (0.17)
Obs.	2126

Question: To what extent does Donald Trump's rise in popularity among many potential voters in the US cause you to consider working more closely with African Americans on resolving issues in your community?

[^] $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

significant ($p = 0.07$ for pride and $p = 0.09$ for hope), the effects for both negative emotions are strongly significant ($p < 0.001$ for both). Latina/o respondents' expressed fear has the largest substantive effect on their willingness to work alongside black Americans. Yet it is worth stressing that anger once again emerges an emotion associated with racial solidarity.

The final question asked AAPI respondents whether affirmative action programs designed to increase the number of underrepresented minorities on college campuses is a good or bad thing. Importantly, this question wording touted the benefits of affirmative action to groups "such as African Americans and some Asian groups like Cambodian Americans." This question touches on the racial fault lines that have long surfaced in the political debate over affirmative action.

Claire Kim's aforementioned treatise on the racial triangulation of Asian Americans recounts the efforts of political conservatives throughout the 1980s to reframe the issue of affirmative action to situate Asian and African Americans on opposing ends of the debate.⁵⁶ During this time, Asian American advocacy groups scrutinized the fact that AAPI admission rates at elite universities were remaining stagnant, despite major surges in

⁵⁶ Kim (1999).

the group's application rates. These groups originally framed this pattern as reflective of attempts by universities to preserve the whiteness of their student populations. But political conservatives opposed to affirmative action worked to paint this issue as illustrative of hardworking Asian Americans being denied spots because of racial quotas, which privileged less-deserving black (and Latina/o) Americans.

This characterization of affirmative action, which casts Asian Americans as unfairly disadvantaged by a policy motivated by racial identity politics, continues to reverberate. In 2014 the advocacy organization "Students for Fair Admissions" filed a lawsuit against Harvard University claiming the school's consideration of race in its admission policy illegally discriminated against Asian Americans. In 2018, Trump's Department of Justice filed a motion encouraging the federal judge presiding over the case to publicly disclose Harvard's admission practices. This step was ostensibly taken on the behalf of the Asian Americans alleging discrimination.

But in August 2017, this same Justice Department devoted resources from its Civil Rights division to "investigating and suing universities over affirmative action admissions policies deemed to discriminate against white applicants."⁵⁷ Consistent with Kim's claims, it appears the framing of affirmative action policies as pitting Asian Americans against African Americans can obfuscate the true reasons for challenging affirmative action – to maintain the privilege held by white applicants.

Table 6.10 displays the effects of expressed emotions on AAPI respondents' views of affirmative action. Positive coefficients are indicative of believing affirmative action to be a good thing, whereas negative coefficients indicate viewing the practice as bad.

Asian Americans' anger is the only emotion exhibiting a statistically discernible relationship with their opinion of affirmative action, with an effect falling just short of the 95-percent threshold of significance ($p = 0.052$). As in every other case, anger is associated with the position suggesting racial solidarity. Anger is positively associated with believing affirmative action policies that benefit groups such as African Americans are a good thing.

Assessing the Roles of Emotions in Fostering Interracial Cooperation and Conflict

Across multiple issue domains, people of color in the CMPS reflect a remarkable consistency. Their expressions of anger throughout the 2016

⁵⁷ Savage (2017).

TABLE 6.10 *The influence of emotions on Asian American attitudes toward affirmative action in colleges. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS). Control variables not shown*

AAPI	
Anger	0.48 [^] (0.25)
Fear	0.20 (0.25)
Pride	-0.29 (0.27)
Hope	0.33 (0.27)
Obs.	1027

Question: Do you think affirmative action programs designed to increase the number of underrepresented minorities, such as African Americans and some Asian groups like Cambodian Americans, on college campuses are a good thing or a bad thing?

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

election are virtually always strongly associated with the stance that either advocates for other racial groups or posits other racial group as assets and allies. What makes this pattern especially notable is that white Americans in the CMPS demonstrate absolutely no such relationship between the anger they express and their proclivity toward advocating for or allying with other racial groups.

These patterns reveal another critical manner in which anger in politics differs across racial groups. Regardless of the specific object of the anger felt by people of color, that anger can fuel perceptions of commonality and motivation to form coalition across racial groups. Thus, political leaders seeking to build cross-racial alliances – which as alluded to at the start of this chapter have been prevalent throughout American history – have a clear blueprint for facilitating interracial allegiances. Those aiming to build coalitions across race should work to get people of color seeing red.

It is worth noting that given the breadth of the emotion measures in the CMPS, different groups can be registering their anger over different targets. Perhaps Latina/o Americans' expressed ire was directed more

toward the Trump campaign, whereas Asian Americans were recounting their anger toward a Democratic campaign that they felt was unresponsive to their communities' demands. It matters less to me what particular actors or incidents made these respondents angry; I care more about how their anger informs their perceptions of potential allies and opponents in the political arena. So the fact that these measures of anger and pride exert such remarkably similar effects on minority respondents' behaviors and perceptions despite the possibility that these emotions are anchored in varying objects makes these findings even more revelatory.

The patterns revealed here show that the consequences of the anger gap exhibited by people of color extend far beyond disparities in participation. The limits on anger expressed by these racial minority groups can also limit their propensity to work in solidarity. One could imagine this particular effect of the anger gap having potentially adverse effects for the Democratic Party. Being unable to fully leverage the effects of racial minority groups urging one another toward political action in solidarity, the party cannot maximize the electoral influence of the people of color making up an increasingly crucial bloc of its support base. Democrats, therefore, may face even more urgent stakes to disrupt the socially imposed boundaries placed on each minority group in order to fully engender and legitimize their anger over politics.

But given the rather limited effects of anger on people of color's participation in election-influencing activities, the real impact of this anger gap is likely felt not within the Democratic electoral coalition, but in the domain of insurgent politics. Anger makes black and Latina/o Americans more prone to take on non-systemic actions. While this effect is not as strong among Asian Americans, this group is strongly mobilized to such actions by fear. All three groups, therefore, can leverage a negative emotion in the face of political threat toward increased political activism. Further, given that anger enhances interracial solidarity across all three groups, seeing red appears to be an especially potent fuel for sparking multi-racial alliances on the front lines of activism.

This chapter opened with allusions to historical instances of multi-racial insurgent coalitions, from the Rainbow Coalition to the Third World Liberation Front. Could these movements be only scratching the surface of the potential for interracial organizing? One can envision the electoral outcome in 2016 if bounds did not exist on the activation and expression of political anger by people of color. How might we envision the state of current activist movements? What if the movement for black lives had the full-throated participation of other people of color,

who engendered anger over racial bias in the criminal justice system? What if the marches and demonstrations by groups protesting deplorable conditions in migrant detention centers were joined en masse by people of color who, despite having secure citizenship status, were mad as hell over what they perceived to be poor treatment of fellow people of color in the US?

One can only imagine how much more effective such grassroots movements would be at forcing their respective demands onto the national agenda, attracting media attention, and eliciting responsiveness from political elites. But I fear this potential power may only be left to the imagination. For as long as African Americans remain stymied by the collective fear of black anger and the engrained sentiment of racial resignation, as long as Latina/o Americans are mischaracterized as politically dormant sleeping giants, and as long as Asian Americans are painted as perpetually on the political periphery, these groups will not fully realize the collective political force of anger.

Another potential inhibition on interracial political solidarity may come from the pride felt by people of color. All in all, pride was the emotion that mobilized every minority group more consistently than it mobilized whites. But this same pride was often associated with people of color taking positions that pitted them against one or more of the other groups. In a few instances, pride also exacerbated within-group cleavages.

These trends uncover a vexing dilemma. While feelings of pride can effectively move people of color from the sidelines to the political playing field, they may simultaneously steer racial minorities toward actions that place them at cross-purposes with one another. What is the value of the participation boost yielded by a person of color's pride when that action may facilitate policy losses for other people of color, or for stigmatized members of the in-group? While the results for anger and expressions of solidarity heighten the adverse consequences of the anger gap, the results for pride cloud the previously rosy view of the enthusiasm advantage.

This chapter sought to go beyond black and white in assessing the political significance of the anger gap. Over the course of uncovering both striking similarities and distinctions across racial groups, some clear patterns emerge. These patterns reveal people of color to be quite distinct from white Americans in the activation of anger, as well as the translation of anger toward political behavior and perceptions of other racial groups. African Americans are not the only group exhibiting an

anger gap and enthusiasm (specifically pride) advantage. And both of these racial differences carry far-reaching implications for how various racial and ethnic groups choose to engage politics, and one another. The anger gap is a phenomenon transcending the black–white binary, with real consequences for the current and future state of racial and partisan politics.

Appendix to Chapter 6

TABLE A6.1 *Effect of respondent race on reports of anger, fear, pride and hope throughout 2016 election. Whites are omitted category. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	Anger	Fear	Pride	Hope
AAPI	-0.72*** (0.09)	-0.53*** (0.09)	0.24** (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)
Latina/o	-0.36*** (0.08)	-0.51*** (0.09)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.26** (0.09)
Black	-0.70*** (0.09)	-0.81*** (0.09)	-0.01 (0.09)	0.06 (0.09)
US-born	0.23*** (0.06)	0.11 (0.06)	0.08 (0.06)	-0.31*** (0.06)
Linked fate	0.67*** (0.07)	0.80*** (0.07)	-0.03 (0.07)	0.16* (0.07)
Experienced discrimination	0.45*** (0.05)	0.44*** (0.05)	-0.22*** (0.05)	-0.18*** (0.05)
Contacted by elites	0.16** (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)	0.10 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)
Education	0.03 (0.10)	0.08 (0.10)	-0.21* (0.10)	-0.33** (0.10)
Household income	0.24** (0.08)	-0.13 (0.08)	-0.19* (0.09)	-0.24** (0.08)
Age	-0.99*** (0.16)	-2.76*** (0.17)	2.38*** (0.17)	0.96*** (0.16)
Woman	0.37*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
Party ID	0.18 (0.10)	0.10 (0.10)	-0.13 (0.10)	0.05 (0.10)

TABLE A6.1 (*cont.*)

	Anger	Fear	Pride	Hope
Church attendance	-0.21** (0.06)	-0.04 (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)	0.31*** (0.06)
Interest in politics	1.17*** (0.10)	0.78*** (0.10)	1.20*** (0.10)	1.07*** (0.10)
Internal efficacy	-0.38*** (0.09)	-0.69*** (0.09)	-0.15 (0.09)	-0.28** (0.09)
Distrust in government	0.89*** (0.11)	0.09 (0.11)	-1.20*** (0.11)	-1.11*** (0.11)
Belief economy worsened	0.29*** (0.08)	0.15 (0.08)	-0.38*** (0.08)	-0.32*** (0.08)
Constant	0.96*** (0.18)	-0.39* (0.19)	-1.52*** (0.19)	-3.36*** (0.19)
Observations	6282	6282	6282	6282
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.2 Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year. Latino respondents only. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses.
Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Anger	-0.09 (0.46)	0.59* (0.30)	-0.47 (0.39)	0.30 (0.23)	0.22 (0.25)	0.78** (0.26)	0.92** (0.32)	1.47*** (0.27)
Fear	-0.40 (0.44)	0.56* (0.26)	1.46*** (0.35)	0.03 (0.21)	0.21 (0.22)	0.25 (0.23)	0.26 (0.27)	0.23 (0.23)
Pride	0.18 (0.48)	1.08*** (0.29)	1.52*** (0.38)	0.25 (0.23)	0.24 (0.24)	0.49 (0.25)	0.78* (0.30)	0.51* (0.26)
Hope	0.78 (0.50)	0.03 (0.32)	0.09 (0.41)	0.17 (0.25)	0.62* (0.26)	-0.04 (0.27)	-0.21 (0.33)	0.07 (0.28)
Belief economy worsened	-0.11 (0.39)	-0.14 (0.24)	-0.11 (0.31)	0.08 (0.19)	0.11 (0.20)	-0.15 (0.21)	0.18 (0.25)	0.04 (0.21)
US-born	0.27 (0.32)	0.96*** (0.21)	0.97*** (0.28)	0.09 (0.14)	-0.09 (0.15)	0.61*** (0.16)	0.30 (0.20)	0.59*** (0.17)
Contacted by elites	0.06 (0.27)	0.68*** (0.15)	0.61** (0.19)	0.72*** (0.12)	0.62*** (0.13)	0.73*** (0.13)	0.71*** (0.15)	0.46*** (0.13)
Linked fate	-0.24 (0.33)	0.62** (0.21)	0.37 (0.27)	0.56*** (0.17)	0.56** (0.18)	0.38* (0.18)	0.50* (0.22)	0.50** (0.18)
Experienced discrimination	0.10 (0.25)	0.29 (0.15)	0.27 (0.20)	0.44*** (0.12)	0.55*** (0.13)	0.37* (0.13)	0.65*** (0.16)	0.48*** (0.13)

Education	1.89*** (0.52)	0.70* (0.31)	0.87* (0.41)	0.00 (0.24)	0.08 (0.26)	0.98*** (0.27)	0.29 (0.33)	0.93*** (0.27)
Household income	1.36** (0.43)	1.32*** (0.25)	0.33 (0.33)	0.47* (0.20)	0.51* (0.22)	0.76*** (0.21)	0.66* (0.27)	0.74*** (0.22)
Age	1.81* (0.92)	-0.39 (0.55)	0.39 (0.72)	-0.02 (0.44)	-0.25 (0.48)	1.00* (0.47)	-2.93*** (0.64)	-0.50* (0.19)
Woman	-0.23 (0.26)	-0.33* (0.15)	-0.47* (0.20)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.14)	-0.08 (0.17)	0.01 (0.14)
Party ID	1.47*** (0.33)	0.31 (0.22)	0.31 (0.28)	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.19)	0.81** (0.25)	0.08 (0.20)
Church attendance	0.64* (0.32)	0.47* (0.19)	0.79** (0.25)	0.50** (0.15)	0.50** (0.16)	0.54** (0.17)	0.32 (0.21)	-0.01 (0.17)
Interest in politics	1.78*** (0.43)	2.63*** (0.36)	1.63*** (0.46)	1.41*** (0.26)	1.02*** (0.27)	1.89*** (0.29)	2.18*** (0.36)	2.03*** (0.29)
Internal efficacy	0.39 (0.45)	0.85*** (0.26)	0.44 (0.34)	0.23 (0.21)	0.18 (0.22)	0.72** (0.22)	0.32 (0.28)	1.20*** (0.23)
Distrust in government	0.22 (0.51)	-0.30 (0.32)	-1.27** (0.41)	-0.21 (0.26)	-0.05 (0.27)	0.06 (0.28)	-0.11 (0.34)	0.46 (0.29)
Constant	-2.41** (0.78)	-7.38*** (0.56)	-6.66*** (0.69)	-3.65*** (0.39)	-3.68*** (0.41)	-6.19*** (0.46)	-5.64*** (0.55)	-6.68*** (0.48)
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.23	0.19	0.10	0.09	0.18	0.19	0.20

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.3 Effects of emotions expressed during 2016 election on likelihood of political participation in the past year.
 AAPI respondents only. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses.
 Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)

	Vote	Donate	Volunteer	Attend Meeting	Work w/ Others	Contact Officials	Protest	Boycott
Anger	0.17 (0.62)	0.98** (0.31)	0.28 (0.41)	0.31 (0.26)	0.40 (0.26)	0.49 (0.28)	0.17 (0.37)	1.38*** (0.26)
Fear	0.49 (0.65)	0.36 (0.31)	1.08** (0.39)	0.29 (0.26)	0.79** (0.26)	0.88** (0.28)	0.97** (0.35)	0.62* (0.25)
Pride	1.11 (0.82)	1.13*** (0.33)	1.83*** (0.42)	0.60* (0.28)	0.74** (0.28)	0.84** (0.31)	1.08** (0.39)	0.60* (0.30)
Hope	1.17 (0.78)	-0.16 (0.36)	-0.17 (0.45)	0.08 (0.29)	0.41 (0.29)	-0.20 (0.32)	-0.23 (0.41)	-0.18 (0.31)
Belief economy worsened	-0.80 (0.56)	0.33 (0.26)	-0.09 (0.35)	-0.00 (0.23)	0.04 (0.22)	-0.27 (0.24)	0.56 (0.30)	0.03 (0.22)
US-born	0.86** (0.31)	0.18 (0.16)	0.38 (0.21)	-0.00 (0.13)	0.05 (0.13)	0.49*** (0.15)	0.30 (0.19)	0.54*** (0.14)
Contacted by elites	0.09 (0.36)	0.82*** (0.16)	0.90*** (0.21)	0.74*** (0.14)	0.64*** (0.14)	0.69*** (0.15)	0.79*** (0.19)	0.59*** (0.14)
Linked fate	0.24 (0.45)	0.33 (0.23)	0.43 (0.30)	0.50** (0.19)	0.45* (0.19)	0.37 (0.21)	0.73** (0.27)	0.54** (0.19)
Experienced discrimination	-0.21 (0.33)	-0.11 (0.17)	-0.01 (0.22)	0.18 (0.14)	0.34* (0.14)	0.25 (0.15)	0.36 (0.20)	0.63*** (0.14)

Education	0.83 (0.73)	-0.16 (0.34)	-0.52 (0.43)	0.40 (0.29)	0.12 (0.28)	0.34 (0.31)	-0.19 (0.39)	0.42 (0.29)
Household income	0.48 (0.52)	0.48 (0.27)	0.11 (0.34)	0.27 (0.22)	0.35 (0.24)	-0.32 (0.30)	-0.01 (0.30)	0.45* (0.22)
Age	4.31*** (1.23)	2.75*** (0.51)	0.15 (0.67)	0.06 (0.45)	-0.40 (0.46)	1.79*** (0.47)	-0.60 (0.63)	0.13 (0.46)
Woman	-0.11 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.16)	-0.09 (0.21)	-0.27* (0.13)	-0.29* (0.13)	-0.34* (0.14)	0.12 (0.19)	0.11 (0.14)
Party ID	0.34 (0.31)	0.48* (0.24)	0.56 (0.31)	-0.06 (0.20)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.22)	1.13*** (0.31)	0.14 (0.21)
Church attendance	-0.67 (0.41)	0.26 (0.21)	0.70** (0.27)	-0.03 (0.18)	0.24 (0.17)	0.24 (0.19)	0.14 (0.25)	0.32 (0.18)
Interest in politics	1.34* (0.61)	2.58*** (0.36)	2.16*** (0.48)	2.18*** (0.30)	1.62*** (0.29)	2.06*** (0.32)	2.53*** (0.44)	1.40*** (0.29)
Internal efficacy	-0.95 (0.57)	0.54 (0.28)	0.57 (0.37)	-0.12 (0.25)	0.26 (0.25)	0.74** (0.26)	0.68* (0.33)	0.89*** (0.25)
Distrust in government	0.25 (0.80)	-0.33 (0.37)	-0.21 (0.46)	-0.64* (0.31)	-0.57 (0.31)	0.12 (0.34)	-0.74 (0.42)	0.26 (0.32)
Constant	-1.36 (1.09)	-6.90*** (0.55)	-6.40*** (0.67)	-3.78*** (0.43)	-3.72*** (0.42)	-5.42*** (0.48)	-6.45*** (0.62)	-5.84*** (0.46)
Pseudo R ²	0.16	0.23	0.19	0.10	0.09	0.18	0.19	0.20

^ p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.4 *The influence of emotions on support for BLM movement, across respondent race. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	White	Black	Asian	Latina/o
Anger	-0.16 (0.28)	0.88*** (0.15)	0.66*** (0.17)	0.81*** (0.16)
Fear	0.80** (0.26)	0.38** (0.14)	0.58*** (0.17)	0.40** (0.15)
Pride	-0.23 (0.29)	0.21 (0.17)	-0.37* (0.18)	-0.26 (0.16)
Hope	-0.25 (0.29)	0.19 (0.16)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.06 (0.17)
Internal efficacy	0.17 (0.24)	0.24 (0.14)	-0.47** (0.16)	-0.15 (0.15)
Distrust in government	-1.31*** (0.32)	0.18 (0.17)	-1.22*** (0.20)	-0.92*** (0.18)
US-born	-0.26 (0.32)	0.24 (0.16)	0.05 (0.08)	0.10 (0.09)
Household income	-0.11 (0.22)	0.08 (0.15)	-0.18 (0.14)	-0.45** (0.14)
Education	0.41 (0.27)	-0.17 (0.18)	0.15 (0.18)	0.35* (0.16)
Party ID	2.66*** (0.21)	1.62*** (0.18)	2.16*** (0.14)	2.13*** (0.13)
Church attendance	-0.10 (0.18)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.11)
Interest in politics	0.50 (0.27)	0.48** (0.16)	0.68*** (0.17)	0.29 (0.16)
Age	-1.00* (0.41)	-0.86** (0.29)	-1.21*** (0.29)	-1.01*** (0.30)
Woman	0.32* (0.14)	0.22* (0.09)	0.15 (0.09)	0.03 (0.09)
Constant	-0.72 (0.50)	-0.92** (0.29)	-1.62*** (0.26)	-1.14*** (0.25)
Pseudo R ²	0.12	0.06	0.11	0.10

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.5 *The influence of emotions on support for pathway to citizenship for undocumented Mexican immigrants, across respondent race. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	White	Black	Asian	Latina/o
Anger	0.39 (0.28)	0.35* (0.15)	0.84*** (0.17)	0.72*** (0.17)
Fear	0.46^ (0.26)	0.24 (0.15)	0.08 (0.17)	0.46** (0.16)
Pride	-0.17 (0.29)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.34^ (0.19)	-0.45** (0.18)
Hope	0.21 (0.29)	0.08 (0.17)	0.22 (0.19)	0.43* (0.19)
Internal efficacy	-0.02 (0.25)	-0.06 (0.15)	0.18 (0.17)	-0.20 (0.16)
Distrust in government	-1.12*** (0.32)	-0.56** (0.18)	-0.33 (0.20)	-0.13 (0.20)
US-born	0.47 (0.33)	-0.44* (0.17)	0.40*** (0.09)	-0.18 (0.11)
Household income	0.49* (0.23)	0.31* (0.15)	-0.25 (0.15)	-0.51** (0.16)
Education	0.60* (0.28)	0.36 (0.18)	-0.07 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.18)
Party ID	2.10*** (0.21)	0.84*** (0.17)	1.52*** (0.14)	1.62*** (0.13)
Church attendance	-0.33 (0.18)	0.09 (0.11)	-0.03 (0.12)	0.07 (0.12)
Interest in politics	0.80** (0.28)	0.49** (0.16)	0.73*** (0.17)	0.74*** (0.18)
Age	-0.50 (0.42)	-0.57 (0.30)	-0.18 (0.30)	-0.57 (0.33)
Woman	0.29* (0.14)	0.02 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.10)
Constant	0.01 (0.52)	-2.07*** (0.29)	-0.69** (0.26)	-1.75*** (0.27)
Pseudo R ²	0.11	0.03	0.07	0.10

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.6 *The influence of emotions on views about racial profiling, across respondent race. Results of logistic regression analysis.*
Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)

	Black	Asian	Latina/o
Anger	-0.86*** (0.16)	-0.41* (0.17)	-0.78*** (0.16)
Fear	0.30* (0.15)	-0.23 (0.17)	0.20 (0.15)
Pride	0.71*** (0.17)	0.25 (0.19)	0.78*** (0.16)
Hope	-0.13 (0.17)	0.18 (0.19)	-0.25 (0.17)
Internal efficacy	-0.76*** (0.15)	-0.39* (0.17)	-0.59*** (0.16)
Distrust in government	-1.10*** (0.18)	-0.41* (0.20)	-0.58** (0.18)
US-born	0.24 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.08)	0.31** (0.10)
Household income	-0.17 (0.15)	-0.00 (0.14)	0.54*** (0.14)
Education	-0.34 (0.18)	-0.09 (0.18)	-0.52** (0.17)
Party ID	-0.67*** (0.17)	-1.20*** (0.13)	-1.41*** (0.13)
Church attendance	0.13 (0.11)	0.27* (0.11)	0.25* (0.11)
Interest in politics	0.04 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.17)	0.25 (0.16)
Age	-0.77* (0.30)	1.01*** (0.29)	0.17 (0.31)
Woman	-0.09 (0.09)	-0.22* (0.09)	-0.02 (0.09)
Constant	-1.98*** (0.28)	-2.30*** (0.26)	-1.72*** (0.25)
Pseudo R ²	0.05	0.05	0.06

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.7 *The influence of emotions on views about Latina/o culture, across respondent race. Results of logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	White	Black
Anger	0.34 (0.30)	0.31* (0.15)
Fear	0.49^ (0.29)	0.47** (0.15)
Pride	-0.57^ (0.32)	0.42* (0.17)
Hope	0.33 (0.32)	-0.05 (0.17)
Internal efficacy	0.41 (0.26)	0.12 (0.15)
Distrust in government	-1.21*** (0.35)	-0.18 (0.18)
US-born	0.54 (0.36)	-0.08 (0.16)
Household income	0.38 (0.24)	0.24 (0.15)
Education	1.28*** (0.30)	0.79*** (0.18)
Party ID	1.43*** (0.22)	0.29 (0.17)
Church attendance	-0.06 (0.19)	-0.13 (0.11)
Interest in politics	0.57 (0.30)	0.75*** (0.16)
Age	-0.50 (0.45)	-0.38 (0.30)
Woman	0.03 (0.15)	-0.21* (0.09)
Constant	-1.34* (0.56)	-2.02*** (0.30)
Pseudo R ²	0.09	0.03

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.8 *The influence of emotions on Latina/o Americans' perceived importance of working with African Americans. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	Latina/o
Anger	0.51^{**} (0.16)
Fear	0.92^{***} (0.15)
Pride	0.29^{\wedge} (0.16)
Hope	0.29^{\wedge} (0.17)
Internal efficacy	-0.05 (0.15)
Distrust in government	-0.82^{***} (0.18)
US-born	-0.10 (0.10)
Household income	0.04 (0.14)
Education	0.11 (0.17)
Party ID	0.67^{***} (0.12)
Church attendance	-0.21 (0.11)
Interest in politics	1.11^{***} (0.16)
Age	-1.64^{***} (0.31)
Woman	0.01 (0.09)
Constant	-0.09 (0.24)
Pseudo R ²	0.07

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

TABLE A6.9 *The influence of emotions on Asian American attitudes toward affirmative action in colleges. Results of ordered logistic regression analysis. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS)*

	AAPI
Anger	0.48 [^] (0.25)
Fear	0.20 (0.25)
Pride	-0.29 (0.27)
Hope	0.33 (0.27)
Internal efficacy	-0.37 (0.24)
Distrust in government	-0.84 ^{**} (0.30)
US-born	0.07 (0.12)
Household income	-0.20 (0.21)
Education	-0.35 (0.26)
Party ID	1.51 ^{***} (0.20)
Church attendance	-0.06 (0.16)
Interest in politics	0.69 ^{**} (0.25)
Age	0.09 (0.43)
Woman	0.20 (0.13)
Constant	-0.70 (0.37)
Pseudo R ²	0.06

[^] p < 0.10 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

On Dreams Deferred and Anger Inhibited

“To be a Negro in this country and to be relatively conscious, is to be in a rage almost all the time.”¹

I have come across this quote, articulated by James Baldwin in a 1965 roundtable on race, many a time. But less often do I come across the second part of his statement:

So that the first problem is how to control that rage so that it won’t destroy you.

My concept of the anger gap comports well with the idea of black people endeavoring to control their political rage, so as not to be destroyed by it. Such destruction can come in the form of agents of the state, who throughout history have sought to forcefully suppress black descent, escalating black politics to the politics of bloodshed. Or destruction can take the form of the ruination of one’s reputation – the stain and stigma of being labeled as an unjustifiably or unreasonably angry black person, which in turn robs one of the legitimacy of her demands for redress.

Or those forces of destruction can come from within. Without an outlet for that rage, it is left to gnaw away at the black psyche, enacting a corrosive effect that can exact a psychological and physical toll on the black mind and body.^{2,3} In this light, I view the rage of which Baldwin speaks as similar to a concept posited by one of Baldwin’s peers in the 1965 roundtable, Langston Hughes. Hughes’ classic poem *Harlem* is a

¹ Baldwin, Capouya, Hansberry, Hentoff, Hughes and Kazin (1961).

² Jamieson, Koslov, Nock and Mendes (2013).

³ Williams, Yu, Jackson and Anderson (1997).

ruminations on the lingering tolls of dreams deferred on black people's well-being:

Does it dry up
like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore –
And then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?

I believe the story of African American engagement with US politics has been a story of dreams deferred. Accordingly, it is not only those dreams that dry up, thus leading to black people generally carrying tempered expectations regarding what benefits they can extract from politics. The black rage also dries up, pruning into a sentiment of racial resignation.

This in essence is the anger gap. The action-inducing indignation that manifests within many white Americans when they face an unsatisfying or threatening set of prospects from politics simply is not cultivated within comparable numbers of black Americans. As a result, scores more white than black Americans leverage anger toward political action. So this anger gap widens the racial participation gap, which contributes to further widening the distance between black people's political interests and their prospects for responsiveness.

The Origins and Manifestations of the Racial Anger Gap

Throughout this book I have mined various sources of data – from surveys to speech transcripts, from original experiments to comedy sketches – to uncover the origins of this anger gap, the ways that it manifests in politics, and its consequences for the politics of race and partisanship.

The messaging of mainstream political elites from both sides of the aisle, both black and non-black, signals that white Americans' grievances with the state of political affairs take precedence over the grievances of black Americans. For instance, comments from Senator Bernie Sanders created an artificial dividing line between the challenges faced disproportionately by black people and the “bread-and-butter” issues facing “ordinary Americans,” which Sanders posited are more important. As president, Barack Obama admonished black political leaders to “stop complaining, stop grumbling, and stop crying,” implicitly asserting that black expressions of dismay over exceedingly high unemployment and wealth loss in the wake of the Great Recession were beyond the pale of

acceptable political grievances. Meanwhile, Republican politicians such as Ronald Reagan, Jesse Helms and Donald Trump have actively courted white votes by appealing to their resentment over the perceived economic or political gains made by African Americans at the expense of whites.

Such political messaging crystalizes the notion that African Americans cannot lay the same claims to politics as their white counterparts. This idea is further reinforced in popular discursive spaces. Throughout history, black sports figures such as Muhammad Ali and Colin Kaepernick have been labeled as “angry black athletes” after expressing dissenting political opinions. This label has managed to derail the careers of multiple athletes in their prime. Comedians such as Jordan Peele and Keagan Michael Key have long satirized the societal demand that African Americans in the public eye remain tranquil and composed at all times, or risk dire consequences. The pressure on black people to publicly perform to standards of respectability further denies African Americans the capacity to see red over politics. For to express anger is to take on the risk of being stigmatized, ridiculed or to open oneself up to receiving severe pushback.

There is a long history of black expressions of dissent – even those that are purely rhetorical or being conducted by strict non-violent principles – provoking intense surveillance and aggressive responses from state actors. Examples range from Bloody Sunday – the assault on Civil Rights marchers on the Edmund Pettis Bridge by local police officers and civilians – to the FBI classification of African Americans disturbed by police slayings of black civilians as potential “Black Identity Extremists.” Such institutional responses to black expressions of grievance further strengthen the barrier to black people expressing anger in any given political environment.

I see in these mainstream political and popular discourses, as well as the threat of crackdowns from legal and political institutions, the origins of the anger gap. The rhetoric that delegitimizes black grievance, and the risks that black expressions of grievance entail – these factors weigh heavily on the collective psyche of African Americans. They temper expectations. They inhibit perceptions of the group’s political agency, while increasing perceptions of vulnerability. In turn, they diminish the sentiment that imbues a sense of anger.

Absent an underlying sense of entitlement to satisfactory outcomes, and absent a resolute confidence that one’s actions can produce the expected positive outcome, anger will not be the emotion state that arises in the face of political threat. And as the empirical analyses made clear, an

abundance of fear is not being felt in anger's stead. Rather, as their white counterparts are rising up in anger, a disproportionately large number of African Americans are responding to political threats with a distinct sense of resignation.

That resignation is apparent in the assertion by Stacey Patton that the absence of African Americans from the Occupy movement is a message declaring "we told you so! Nothing will change." And that resignation was apparent in the trends from decades of data from the American National Election Study (ANES). In those trends, black Democrats consistently expressed greater disdain for Republicans and their presidential performance relative to white Democrats. Yet they also consistently expressed less anger under those Republicans than white Democrats. This anger gap comported with widening disparities in turnout between white and black Americans. Not coincidentally, these were instances marked by Republican domination in presidential elections.

Trends from the 2016 Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey (CMPS) highlighted another manifestation of the anger gap in the dawn of Donald Trump. Once again African Americans expressed significantly less anger than Whites. Additionally, anger carried a substantially larger mobilizing effect on the political participation of white individuals relative to African Americans. Not only were whites more likely to register anger over the political environment, but anger mattered much more for the political action of white people compared to black people.

Of course, the lone exception to this pattern came in the domain of system-challenging actions, particularly protest. It is not hard to imagine why black people's anger would most effectively steer them toward the type of political activity that challenges the political system from the outside. After all, the very political rhetoric that contributes to the black anger gap posits that black people's demands exist only on the periphery of the political sphere. If black grievance is constructed as outside the bounds of conventional politics, then it makes sense for black people who do see red over politics to view themselves as outsiders.

Black figures on the forefront of radical and counter-institutional movements for black justice, from Fred Hampton to Malcolm X to Alicia Garza, have conceptualized black anger as a critical tool in black mobilizing. Thus, while the anger gap is manifest in the electoral participation disparity between black and white Americans, it is perhaps most keenly felt in the participation of African Americans in insurgent movements. Because anger mobilizes black people most robustly toward activist

activity, the paucity of black people seeing red inhibits the full force of black participation in such actions.

While I could identify the ways in which the anger gap manifested in politics, I could not pinpoint the degree to which it was rooted in the fear of being labeled an angry black person, versus the engrained sentiment of resignation that precludes anger from emerging. Evidence at times pointed to both factors. Black respondents in the ANES exhibited a greater likelihood to express anger toward the out-partisan when speaking with a black interviewer, thus indicating they felt inhibited from letting their anger be known to a white interviewer. On the other hand, black participants in my Race, Anger and Participation (RAP) Study demonstrated a stark lack of belief in their racial group's political agency relative to whites.

Does the lack of collective agency inhibit anger from emerging? Or does the fear of being *angry while Black* inhibit African Americans from expressing their anger? Rather than *either/or*, the answer is likely *yes and*. I do not view these factors as working at cross-purposes. On the contrary, they complement and reinforce one another. Both an unwavering skepticism that the political system is responsive to the group's input and the calculation of the negative consequences that emerge from expressing anger are rooted in the same underlying belief. The belief that the sociopolitical order imposes restrictive bounds on what black people can expect to receive from the system, as well as how they can freely behave when navigating that system. As long as these boundaries shape the ways in which black people engage in politics, they will limit the emotions that are engendered and expressed by African Americans within the political environment. Thus, less important is the particular attribution of the anger gap than its myriad consequences for politics.

Assessing the Consequences of the Anger Gap

The anger gap is most clearly impactful for the political behavior and influence of African Americans. But it is also distinctly impactful for the Democratic Party. Finally, the anger gap is meaningful for people of color broadly, not only because other people of color demonstrate their own respective anger gaps in politics, but because of the distinct potential for interracial solidarity that emerges from people of color's expressed anger.

The impacts on black participation in the political sphere are plainly apparent. Restrictions on early voting. Limits on registration procedures. Imposition of voter ID requirements. Such measures have been passed in

states across the nation since Obama's first presidential victory in 2008. And these laws have disproportionate effects on the capability of African American to cast ballots in elections.⁴

Even in the absence of these laws, black people generally face stiffer barriers to engaging in political action. An outsized proportion of the black body politic is impacted by felon disenfranchisement.⁵ Further, African Americans are less likely than whites to have attained the material resources typically associated with greater political activity, such as a college degree, stable employment or homeownership. These factors have long been demonstrated to contribute to the racial participation disparity.⁶ In addition to these factors, anger constitutes another political resource to which white Americans have disproportionate access to leverage toward political action.

I noted in Chapter 1 the element of dynamism to the anger gap compared to other factors that shape participation outcomes between white and black Americans. Laws take considerable time to pass, change and be implemented. Material resources require intensive time and effort to be attained or augmented. But emotions can change in nearly an instant. The right messaging about a political candidate, platform or issue can animate an immediate and particular emotional reaction, which in turn can influence how – or whether – people choose to act in response.

So while the anger gap represents another inhibitor to black political participation, it is one for which there is a fairly straightforward and simple corrective. Remove the socially imposed bounds on black anger and craft political messaging that acknowledges African Americans' political grievances rather than marginalizing them. In the absence of such changes, the anger gap will continue to augment the participation disadvantage generally faced by African Americans relative to whites.

This participation divide matters because black and white Americans generally carry widely divergent views on what makes for the best policy approaches. For example, a study by public opinion scholar Vincent Hutchings revealed that even among liberals and ardent Obama supporters, clear racial divides were evident in beliefs over the proper role of government in alleviating racial disparities.⁷ These disparities are consistent with decades' worth of findings showing that African Americans

⁴ Sobel and Smith (2009).

⁵ Manza and Uggen (2008).

⁶ Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie (1993).

⁷ Hutchings (2009).

typically hold positions on issues such as healthcare, policing, social welfare policy and education spending that are notably more liberal than similarly positioned white Americans.⁸

These divergent policy preferences add an element of zero-sum competition to the patterns of political participation between black and white Americans. If African Americans or their committed allies are not sufficiently represented in positions of political power, then black interests will consistently take a backseat to the opposing interests of whites – even within Democratic regimes. So maximizing black participation is of paramount importance. That the anger gap contributes to a dampening of black participation – both in electoral and oppositional domains of action – means the anger gap is attributable to distancing African Americans from achieving their policy goals.

A black disparity in electoral participation increases the odds that elected officials unsympathetic to black interests ascend to or maintain their positions in the halls of power. Meanwhile, a paucity of black participation in the domain of counter-institutional actions means less pressure is applied to political power holders of all stripes, disincentivizing them from shifting their priorities to meet the demands being made by black activists.

This is the chief consequence of the anger gap for African Americans. It leverages its effect not simply by widening the participation disparity between black and white Americans, but by dimming the chances that black people see their interests advanced in the competitive political arena.

As noted throughout the book, the anger gap also has a keen impact on the Democratic Party. Chapter 6 indicated how African Americans and Asian and Latina/o Americans are only increasing their share and influence within the Democratic voter base. Between demographic shifts and the continued racial polarization of parties – with the Democratic and Republican Parties increasingly becoming the homes to people of color and whites respectively – the participation of people of color will only continue to become more vital to determining the Democratic Party's electoral fate in national, statewide and local elections.

The fact that all three non-white groups exhibited a racial anger gap in 2016 should force the Democratic Party to engage in serious introspection of how it seeks to fire up the base, both during and beyond the Trump era. Will a mobilization strategy based upon whipping up an

⁸ See, for example, Kinder and Sanders (1996) and Brown, Brown, Phoenix and Jackson (2016).

anti-Trump fervor only prove effective for the white liberal base? How can the party adequately acknowledge the unique threats that a Trump administration poses to varying groups of color without engendering an action-flattening resignation rather than indignation? In the midst of the #Resistance era, can Democrats credibly forge positive messaging that effectively animates an action mobilizing enthusiasm among racial minorities?

Simply taking the step of asking these questions would indicate that the Democratic Party is acknowledging a truth hidden in plain sight. There can be no one-size-fits-all approach to mobilizing the party's multi-racial base. The various groups comprising the Democratic coalition are animated and mobilized by distinct emotions. Accordingly, the party cannot afford to default to a rhetorical and outreach strategy based on a conventional wisdom that in reality applies only to white partisans.

If the party chooses to speak in the emotional languages most resonant to each respective group, it must acknowledge the groups' distinct histories, challenges and grievances, which have too often ignored by prior vanguards of the party. What might this new messaging strategy entail? One can imagine. No longer would African Americans be told to stop complaining, and that "ordinary" Americans' demands will come before their own. Latina/o Americans will no longer be condescended to as a sleeping giant stirred to action only by immigration controversies, as opposed to the bread-and-butter issues about which Latina/os – like any other American – care. Meanwhile, Asian Americans would be spoken *to* rather than spoken *about* – the subject of political discourse, rather than an object that is abstracted and projected as a high-achieving yet threatening other.

Embarking on such a strategy may constitute a departure from the Democratic Party's standard operating procedure. But as it faces intense internal debates about whether to make a pronounced shift to the left or continue seeking to win over an ideological middle that many claim no longer exists, the party may find itself in dire need of drastic change.

The final place where the anger gap is most keenly felt is in the political associations between racial minority groups. Chapter 6 illuminated an intriguing dimension to the anger expressed by black, Latina/o and Asian Americans in the 2016 CMPS. The anger expressed by these groups was positively associated with taking positions on issues or ideas promoting a sense of racial intergroup solidarity. Even if anger was not the most effective mobilizer of political action for these groups relative to white Americans, this emotion state nonetheless steered people of color

toward attitudes and policy preferences that would facilitate the building of interracial alliances.

The anger gap, therefore, not only portends limits on how these groups engage in politics. It also imposes limits on the potential for coalition building across races. Fewer people of color seeing red can equate to fewer people of color seeing members of other racial groups as valued political allies. This in turn can sap broad-based racial movements of the people power that could be leveraged to advance change.

The post-Obama landscape is characterized by many intersecting challenges to the well-being and political viability of various peoples of color. The imposition of strict limits on immigration, and the continued lack of a comprehensive policy plan for undocumented immigrants and Dreamers. A severe weakening of labor protections, which disproportionately affects people of color who are overrepresented in low-wage work such as in the retail sector. A racial wealth gap that shows no indication of narrowing. The Department of Justice's discontinuation of police monitoring practices intended to improve oversight of police units with troubling records of mistreatment of minorities.

These are just a subset of the ongoing issues that demand urgent action from people of color. And the potential impacts of any political action taken would be amplified if multiple groups work in solidarity with one another, both through influencing election outcomes and challenging institutions through activism. Political anger could be a key determinant in sustaining those partnerships. But the anger gap can be an inhibitor to such alliances. As a result, people of color could be left even more vulnerable to the current tide of racial retrenchment in policy and practice.

The Future is Black and Red All Over: Signs of Change on the Horizon?

The consequences of the anger gap are varied and deep. And in the age of Trump, those consequences may be especially felt by African Americans, among other racial minority groups. However, as noted before, the anger gap is a dynamic rather than static force. Is there any reason to believe that the anger gap may be dissipating? Could there be evidence of an evolution in the political landscape, which could shift being angry while black from the domain of political outsiders to the reserve of an emergent set of black electoral leaders and their support bases?

I highlight here a few examples of the latest set of black political figures aiming to bridge the divide between electoral and insurgent politics. Detected within the messaging of these various figures is a desire to legitimize and leverage black grievance within the mainstream political sphere, as well as a recognition that the black body politic has every right to be mad as hell over the political status quo. Interrogating these figures, who operate at the national, state and municipal levels of politics, may provide the blueprint for how to alleviate the anger gap and unlock for people of color the full force of seeing red.

I turn first to Nina Turner. A former Cleveland City Councilwoman and Ohio state Senator, Turner first rose to the national spotlight as a fiercely supportive surrogate for the Sanders presidential campaign. In June 2017, Turner was tapped to lead “Our Revolution,” the political organization that sprung from Sanders’ presidential campaign group. This organization identifies, grooms and offers support resources for progressives seeking to win elective office in races around the nation.

Both prior to and during her tenure as head of Our Revolution, Turner has been unequivocal about holding the Democratic Party to account for its failures to adequately address the demands of its black support base. In issuing challenges to the Democratic Party, Turner has drawn inspiration from trailblazing voting rights activist Fannie Lou Hamer. In 1964, Hamer co-founded the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party to provide a counter to the state Democratic Party apparatus, which excluded Mississippi’s sizeable African American population. Turner noted her belief that “Our Revolution” is a spiritual successor to that group: “the traditional Democratic Party was not serving [black people’s] needs. And that is what we need in the 21st century: an awakening of coalition-building that recognizes that.”⁹

Turner has also spoken forthrightly about what she perceives to be the Democratic Party benefitting from black electoral support without reciprocating with policy responsiveness to the group’s needs. For example, when discussing the non-trivial number of Democrats in the House and Senate who voted in support of bank deregulations, Turner asserted:

We were being told [black women are] the backbone of the Democratic Party. Yet and still, you have Democrats who would dare vote for a bill that they knew would cause harm and pain [to] the very communities that those black women live in.”¹⁰

⁹ Starr (2018).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

When pressed to clarify whether these Democrats truly know that bank deregulation would harm black women, Turner did not mince words: “They know, but they don’t give a damn.” Coursing through Turner’s critiques of the party is an unapologetic candor, which belies the fear of being stigmatized as an angry black woman.

Also clearly apparent is Turner’s refusal to be resigned to the party’s failure to protect the interests of its African American constituent base. Turner used her national platform to project high expectations, to which she held the party to account for failing to meet. Additionally, Turner has projected a brash defiance of societal norms demanding black people in the political mainstream be tempered and poised. On the contrary, Turner has willingly expressed anger over the political status quo. And in the process, she has offered insight into how to leverage black anger over failed expectations to exact pressure on the Democratic Party to better meet the needs of its African American base.

Additionally, Nina Turner has modeled how to speak about issues of economic injustice without marginalizing racial injustice. Throughout his presidential campaign, Bernie Sanders’ efforts to connect with black voters (and to an extent voters of color more broadly) were somewhat stymied by his insistence that issues of race were either subsumed by or should take a backseat to class issues. Turner took a divergent track. While stressing the common challenges that unite working-class people across social cleavages, she still acknowledged the fact that intersecting factors of race and class create a unique vulnerability for African Americans.

[W]e have more in common than not. Everybody in the working class is important, whether you’re black or white and that’s what I want them to feel and know from Our Revolution. I don’t want our white working-class sisters and brothers to feel as though their pain is not important because it is. But at the same time, I want my white sisters and brothers to understand that when we talk about income and wealth inequality, that disproportionately African Americans suffer a little more. That’s an honest conversation.¹¹

What Turner labeled here an honest conversation stands in stark contrast to the narratives on race and class commonly offered by political figures in the national spotlight – which is apparent when comparing this quote to the messages highlighted in Chapter 2. Departing from the well-worn rhetorical path that prioritizes only the grievances of white Americans, Turner offers an alternative approach to mobilizing the left. This approach conceptualizes black anger over the extant state of affairs

¹¹ Meyerson (2017).

not as an anathema to be discarded, but rather as a foundation upon which to build an influential electoral movement.

Nina Turner has received an intense amount of scrutiny and criticism since she took the reins of Our Revolution. There are certainly valid questions to be raised over the credentials of the individuals that Turner has elevated to executive positions, as well as the decision making process governing the organization's selection of races to enter and candidates to endorse under her watch.¹² But I view some of the critiques leveled against Turner as reactionary to the intemperance she puts on regular display. Refusing to conform to the bounds of respectability, Turner has endeavored to make meaningful advances in party politics, while demonstrating the expressions of black grievance typically reserved for actors operating outside the party system. I see in her efforts the potential to blaze a new trail for black leaders and rank-and-file people seeking to leverage anger within mainstream electoral politics.

In her historic quest for statewide office, former minority leader in the Georgia House of Representatives Stacey Abrams potentially ushered in a similar paradigm shift in another domain of electoral politics. A Democrat representing Georgia's 89th district in the General Assembly, Abrams became the first African American to hold the position of House minority leader, as well as the first woman to lead a party caucus in the state Assembly. In May 2018, Abrams won the state's Democratic gubernatorial primary, becoming the first black woman to be a major-party nominee for governor in American history.

During the November 2018 election, Abrams earned more votes than any other Democratic candidate who had ever run for statewide office in Georgia. Nevertheless, after a prolonged period of vote counting and intense conflicts over the outcome, Abrams narrowly lost the gubernatorial race to Brian Kemp, the GOP nominee and then Secretary of State.¹³ During her speech acknowledging electoral defeat, Abrams pointedly refused to take the typical conciliatory route of concession. On the contrary, Abrams issued a bold, fiery, and indeed *indignant* proclamation that Kemp was an "architect of voter suppression" who was "deliberate and intentional in his actions" as overseer of the election in which he was running to improperly discount votes. She further declared:

[T]his is not a speech of concession, because concession means to acknowledge an action is right, true or proper. As a woman of conscience and faith, I cannot

¹² Devere (2018).

¹³ Williams (2019).

concede that. But, my assessment is the law currently allows no further viable remedy ... I don't want to hold public office if I need to scheme my way into the post. Because the title of governor isn't nearly as important as our shared title – voters. And that is why we fight on.¹⁴

On full display in Abrams' *non-concession speech* is a kind of defiance from which black electoral figures often feel the need to shy away in order to not be doomed with the label of the angry black person. Rather than frame the election discrepancies in the Georgia race as a mere bump in the long winding road to racial salvation, Abrams painted them as a flagrant injustice, a violation over which champions of the Democratic process – and yes, black voters in particular – should feel mad as hell.

Such defiance, and a general willingness to flout the boundaries regularly placed on mainstream black political actors, has been a long-running thread in Abrams' political career. Running on a staunchly progressive platform, Abrams shared in common with Nina Turner a commitment to disrupting the narrative that prioritizing the needs of the most vulnerable populations necessarily comes at the expense of the needs of those more privileged. This mindset is evident in her remarks to a conference on black women in politics: "I grew up working poor in Mississippi. And I'll tell you this: I've never met a poor person who hates rich people. We hate being poor."¹⁵

With these comments, Abrams intentionally sought to establish here that *have-nots* are not simply foils from which the *haves* must act to protect their resources. In turn, she seeks to disrupt the notion of zero-sum competition between the two groups. By challenging the stigma attached to the claims made by the poor for political redress, Abrams establishes a blueprint for other African Americans to make distinct claims on the system without being labeled undeserving or meritless.

A profile in *Mother Jones* contains an illuminating anecdote about Stacey Abrams' political awakening while an undergraduate at Spellman College. The year was 1992, and in the wake of the not-guilty verdict handed down to the police officers in the Rodney King case, African Americans erupted in a vociferous and at times violent response. Black people took to the streets across the country, from Los Angeles to the West End neighborhood in Atlanta, mere blocks from the Spellman campus. Abrams took great umbrage with the local news media's depiction of black youth who were seeing red over the verdict. And her response

¹⁴ Krieg (2018).

¹⁵ King (2018).

demonstrated that Abrams does not abide by well-worn narratives that conflate black expressions of anger with an existential threat to the polity.

As the Atlanta police moved in with tear gas against the students and residents of nearby public housing projects, Abrams grew furious at the media's characterization of the young people in the streets as "angry vandals, rather than complex human beings who had seen in a single verdict an indictment of our humanity," as she later wrote. She began calling up local TV stations to complain about their coverage. When they kept hanging up on her, she enlisted her dormmates to make calls.¹⁶

A television producer at one of the stations contacted by Abrams invited her to participate in a town hall with Maynard Jackson, Atlanta's first black mayor. When Jackson employed the same characterization of Atlanta's black youth as an existential threat, remarking they were "wreaking havoc on the city," Abrams pushed back. The college sophomore went so far as to press the mayor on what his administration had done for the city's displaced youth.

Long before her spirited call to action against voter suppression efforts in the wake of the contested Georgia gubernatorial race, Stacey Abrams showed no hesitation to challenge both journalists and revered black political elites who trafficked in the stereotypical depictions of the angry black person. The entirety of Abram's political track record indicates her view that expressions of black anger constitute a legitimate political expression – one she herself has been willing to exhibit when mounting a vociferous response to an outcome deemed unjust.

Perhaps the strongest signal that Stacey Abrams represents a potential sea change in the place occupied by black anger in the political imagination is the response to her display of indignation on the national stage following the governor's race. Rather than be relegated to the margins of Democratic Party politics, stigmatized as an angry black woman registering unjustified grievance, Abrams was given center stage by the party. In February 2019, Abrams became the first black woman to provide the response to the State of the Union address, wherein she continued to advocate against practices that disenfranchise voters, while explicitly denouncing "racism from our past and in our present."

While Abrams fell just short of making political history, she nonetheless appeared to have established a political path that can serve as a model for a new direction in black electoral politics. Abrams has proven that a governing strategy premised upon acknowledging and responding

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

to black expressions of grievance, and a rhetorical strategy unbound by the suppression of black anger, can indeed be politically viable in prominent spheres.

My last example highlights an African American political actor shifting the political paradigm at the municipal level. Since June 2017, Chokwe Antar Lumumba Jr. has served as the mayor of Jackson, the largest city in Mississippi. While Lumumba has expressed a desire to make Jackson serve as a model for progressive politics, he has described himself not as a liberal, but as a revolutionary.

When describing his political philosophy, Lumumba often employed the language of self-determination – a concept that was central to the leaders of the Black Power movement.¹⁷ Like Nina Turner, Lumumba also drew inspiration from Fannie Lou Hamer. He has sought to use the Freedom Farm Cooperative created by Hamer as a model for establishing community-owned cooperative businesses within Jackson. This is part and parcel of Lumumba's stated goal of "abandoning the traditional model of how you build a city."¹⁸ Indeed, Lumumba sought to chart a new path in city governance, specifically by injecting into city politics the ideological tenets espoused by the likes of Hamer, Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael.

Lumumba's efforts to integrate black radical politics into municipal policymaking actually make him a chip off the old block. His father, Chokwe Lumumba Sr., was long active within the black nationalist group the Republic of New Afrika. This group sought to establish black autonomous political rule in the antebellum South, while pressing the US government for reparations for slavery.¹⁹

After working for decades to secure sociopolitical and economic agency for black Americans through activist organizing, Lumumba Sr. decided in 2009 to enter the arena of electoral politics, winning a seat in Jackson's city council. Four years later, Lumumba ran for mayor, his campaign demonstrating that the narratives and ideas of black insurgent politics could indeed be reconcilable with conventional electoral politics. Exemplary of this was his declaration in 2013 that "a system that is built on white supremacy, a system which is based upon capitalist exploitation, is not a system which is going to save people." As discussed in Chapter 4, this type of searing critique of the US system has long been

¹⁷ Lartey (2017).

¹⁸ Guttenplan (2017).

¹⁹ Lartey (2017).

made by black leaders advancing counter-institutional routes of political action. But Lumumba made such remarks the bedrock of his campaign for office. And his mayoral victory in 2013 – which stunned many pundits – suggested that such messaging can actually find resonance within the voting public.

In a tragic turn, Lumumba Sr. died suddenly just seven months into his tenure as mayor. His son and namesake would ultimately strive to carry out his vision, ascending to mayoral office in 2017 after first losing the special election to replace his father in 2014. Lumumba Jr. offered illuminating reflections on his father's approach to municipal governance in an interview within the *Guardian*. His comments demonstrate that both father and son viewed their elected positions as a critical means toward the ultimate goal of empowering black people across the nation.

For quite some time I think a lot of his work was more antagonistic to electoral politics than anything. Many of his comrades were hardliners and so people would ask him, "Chokwe, how do you plan on [having reparations paid] by fixing potholes." A pothole may seem like a small thing in the grand scheme, but what [Chokwe Sr.] said is that ultimately we have to connect pothole to pothole and community to community so that people in Jackson, Mississippi understand why there is a community that looks just like theirs in Gary, Indiana or Detroit, Michigan, or New Orleans Louisiana, all of which are economically depressed, predominantly black cities.²⁰

These comments indicate that neither Lumumba Sr. nor Jr. discarded their radical political ideology or ambitions in seeking elective office. On the contrary, they came to view the power wielded by holding office as a valuable tool to be leveraged toward making transformative investments in the black community, with reverberations felt far outside of Jackson. Like his father, Lumumba Jr. recognized that such meaningful impacts will only come from disrupting the conventional playbook and energizing a black electorate base that is often rendered dormant by political messaging seeking to placate black demands, rather than acknowledge and act upon them.

To that end, Lumumba Jr. has instituted a practice designed to allow Jackson's residents to offer meaningful input on the practices of his administration – which means providing those residents a space in which their expressions of grievances over city outcomes feel validated rather than stigmatized. Lumumba Jr. established a People's Assembly, a forum held four times a year in which city residents get to hold serve with the mayor

²⁰ Lartey (2017).

and other city officials about their local concerns. Lumumba Jr. described these sessions as offering the people a chance to be true stakeholders in the direction of their community.

Three minutes on a microphone does not make community participation. Instead it should be an information exchange, where we go to the community and say, “This is what’s going on. This is what’s going to impact your community.” And the community can say, “This is what is happening on the street. This is what you need to be concerned about.”²¹

With these forums, Lumumba Jr. was not simply disrupting the conventional city council meeting structure, which allows only for nominal resident input. In this overwhelmingly black city (African Americans make up 81 percent of the population), he also disrupted the longstanding notion that black Americans’ grievances with their political system are inherently less valid and worthy of attention from political elites. Lumumba Jr.’s actions as mayor signaled to Jackson’s black constituents that, in what may be a break with the past, their voices will be heard, and their critiques will be considered. Accordingly, this constituent base can perceive an actual value to registering their political anger. Because as Lumumba acts on his promise when elected to make Jackson “the most radical city on the planet,” his administration carries unique potential to meet black anger with substantive policy action, rather than the usual responses from elected officials of erasure or stigmatization.

Nina Turner, Stacey Abrams and Chokwe Lumumba Jr. are three different types of black political actors who represent a potential sea change in how the grievances of African Americans are processed and acted upon within various institutions of the US political structure. Are these individuals and their respective political movements sowing seeds for the diminishment of the anger gap? Or are they simply exceptions to a still-standing rule that black anger simply does not carry the same import or influence in mainstream politics as white anger?

The answer to those questions will ultimately come with time. One trend from the CMPS provides indication that such movements may indeed represent a changing of the guard. Recall that the anger gap between black and white Americans was statistically negligible among people under the age of 30. This suggests that the generation of African Americans who have begun to come into their own politically either during or immediately after the Obama era may not carry the same

²¹ Guttenplan (2017).

reservations about seeing red over politics. It is this generation that may be particularly energized by Our Revolution, or the unapologetically progressive platforms of the likes of Abrams and Lumumba. Perhaps this generation will showcase a fuller potential of black political participation – across multiple domains of action – by unlocking the anger that has often been subdued among greater numbers of African Americans from prior generations.

At the same time, the contemporary era contains no shortage of indicators that suppressions of black anger will continue to be the norm. And these may portend a continuation of the anger gap. Two years after Colin Kaepernick first kneeled in protest, NFL players continued to face stiff consequences for expressing dissent, from the threat of disciplinary action by the league to being lambasted by the sitting Commander-in-Chief. Throughout 2018, the popular social media hashtag #whileblack chronicled an exhaustingly long and ever-expanding list of black people having police called upon them for taking part in everyday activities. A family barbequing in a public park in Oakland, California. A Yale student napping in a dormitory common room. An eight-year-old girl selling bottled water in a San Francisco neighborhood. A woman attempting to make a purchase with a coupon at a drugstore in Chicago. An Oregon state Representative canvassing a neighborhood in her district.²²

Discussion and dissection of these incidents across the new-era iterations of the nineteenth-century public salons, i.e., Twitter, Facebook and blog posts, reinforced African Americans' collective perceptions that they are constantly surveilled and perceived to be existential threats. If black people perceive an ever-present risk of incurring the wrath of law enforcement when navigating their day-to-day lives, how much agency will they feel to be angry #whileblack?

A Requiem for Black Anger

I turn one last time to the words of Stokely Carmichael, who provided an assessment of the political institutions comprising the American political system, and inquired as to how black people are to navigate that system: "seems to me that the institutions that function in this country are clearly racist, and that they're built upon racism. And the question, then, is how can black people inside of this country move?"²³

²² Ortiz (2018); Caron (2018).

²³ Carmichael (1966).

In essence, this book has attended to the very question of how black people can move inside of this country. Their collective movement is often restricted, bounded by the artificial limits imposed by a political system that invalidates black people's political grievance and censures their expressions of anger. Thus, the anger gap manifests, inhibiting African American participation in multiple domains of politics.

Black people pay many costs for this anger gap, both measurable in the form of election and policy outcomes, and immeasurable in the tolls enacted on the collective black psyche. For after the rage within the conscious black individual curdles into a staid resignation, that resignation festers. It eats away at one's sense of agency. It robs one of the possession of self-determination.

Even as racial resignation erodes the collective senses of confidence and command that can promote political action, the prospect of the racial Promised Land can retain its action-mobilizing effect. Black people may even feel a distinct sense of political enablement when fixing their gaze upon the mountaintop in the distance, summoning energy to act on the prospect of a rare political victory. But within a racially stratified system, black people perceive occasions to act on political opportunity to be far less frequent than occasions to stave off threat.

Thus, we are left to consider the many effects of the anger gap on the collective black body. To grapple with how the resignation that arises from the rage of black consciousness burdens African Americans, who are asked to bear such a heavy load without being able to express openly the natural emotional response to it. Perhaps the toll of this burden is best expressed in Langston Hughes' *Harlem*, as the final lines of his requiem on dreams deferred could just as easily apply to the rage that black people must shoulder in secret.

Maybe it just sags
like a heavy load.
Or does it explode?

Bibliography

- Adler, M. (2009, March 15). "Before Rosa Parks, there was Claudette Colvin." *NPR Weekend Edition*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/2009/03/15/101719889/before-rosa-parks-there-was-claudette-colvin.
- Aistrup, J. A. (2015). *The southern strategy revisited: Republican top-down advancement in the South*. University Press of Kentucky.
- Albertson, B. & Gadarian, S. K. (2015). *Anxious politics: Democratic citizenship in a threatening world*. Cambridge University Press.
- Alcindor, A. (2016, August 1). "Black Lives Matter coalition makes demands as campaign heats up." *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/02/us/politics/black-lives-matter-campaign.html.
- Alibutud, J. R. (2016, August 12). "Philippines talks of barring Donald Trump for calling it a 'terrorist nation'." *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/13/world/asia/philippines-trump-terrorist-nation.html.
- Amos Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992). "Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty." *Journal of Risk and Uncertainty*, 5(4), 297–323.
- Anderson, W. H. (1942, February 9). "The question of Japanese-Americans." *Los Angeles Times*.
- Ansell, A. E. (1997). "Introduction: The New Right – storm-troopers in the name of liberty." In A. E. Ansell (ed.), *New Right, New Racism*, 1–24. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Anscombe, S. & Iyengar, S. (1997). *Going negative: How political advertisements shrink and polarize the electorate*. The Free Press.
- APIAVote/AAJC/AAPIData. (2016, May 22). *Inclusion not exclusion: Spring 2016 Asian American voter survey*.
- Avery, J. M. (2007). "Race, partisanship, and political trust following Bush versus Gore (2000)." *Political Behavior*, 29(3), 327–342.
- Bailey, H. (2009, September 9). "Meet Joe Wilson, the GOP Rep who heckled Obama." *Newsweek*. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/meet-joe-wilson-gop-rep-who-heckled-obama-211670.

- Baker, E. (1960). "Bigger than a hamburger." *Southern Patriot*, 18(5), 4.
- Baldwin, J., Capouya, E., Hansberry, L., Hentoff, N., Hughes, L., & Kazin, A. (1961). "The Negro in American culture." *CrossCurrents*, 11(3), 205–224.
- Banks, A. J. (2014). *Anger and racial politics: The emotional foundation of racial attitudes in America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Banks, A. J. & Bell, M. A. (2013). "Racialized campaign ads: The emotional content in implicit racial appeals primes White racial attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 77(2), 549–560.
- Banks, A. J. & Valentino, N. A. (2012). "Emotional substrates of white racial attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(2), 286–297.
- Banks, A. J., White, I. K., & McKenzie, B. D. (2018). "Black politics: How anger influences the political actions blacks pursue to reduce racial inequality." *Political Behavior*, 1–27.
- Bar-Tal, D. (2011). *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: A social psychological perspective*. Psychology Press.
- Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & De Rivera, J. (2007). "Collective emotions in conflict situations: Societal implications." *Journal of Social Issues*, 63(2), 441–460.
- Bates, K. G. (2014, July 14). "Why did black voters flee the Republican Party in the 1960s?" *NPR Morning Edition*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/07/14/331298996/why-did-black-voters-flee-the-republican-party-in-the-1960s.
- Beltrán, C. (2010). *The trouble with unity: Latino politics and the creation of identity*. Oxford University Press.
- Bernstein, I. (1991). *The New York City draft riots: Their significance for American society and politics in the age of the Civil War*. Oxford University Press.
- Black, R. & Sprague, A. (2016, September 22). "The rise and reign of the welfare queen." *New America*. Retrieved from www.newamerica.org/weekly-edition-135/rise-and-reign-welfare-queen/.
- Bowler, S. & Segura, G. (2011). *The future is ours: Minority politics, political behavior, and the multiracial era of American politics*. Sage.
- Bowler, S., Nicholson, S. P., & Segura, G. M. (2006). "Earthquakes and aftershocks: Race, direct democracy, and partisan change." *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(1), 146–159.
- Brader, T. (2005). "Striking a responsive chord: How political ads motivate and persuade voters by appealing to emotions." *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(2), 388–405.
- (2006). *Campaigning for hearts and minds: How emotional appeals in political ads work*. University of Chicago Press.
- Brader, T., Valentino, N. A., & Suhay, E. (2008). "What triggers public opposition to immigration? Anxiety, group cues, and immigration threat." *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(4), 959–978.
- Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). "Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation." *American Political Science Review*, 89(2), 271–294.
- Branigin, A. (2017, October 31). "Why some black and brown people can't trust Bernie Sanders, in 1 quote." *The Root*. Retrieved from www.theroot.com/why-some-black-and-brown-people-cant-trust-bernie-sande-1820017450.

- Brown, D. L. (2017, December 16). "Long before sinking Roy Moore's candidacy, black women in Alabama were a force for change." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/12/16/long-before-sinking-roy-moores-candidacy-black-women-in-alabama-have-been-a-force/?utm_term=.b14c91fff640.
- Brown, R. E., Brown, R. K., Phoenix, D., & Jackson, J. S. (2016). "Race, religion, and anti-poverty policy attitudes." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 55(2), 308–323.
- Browning, R. P., Marshall, D. R., & Tabb, D. H. (1984). *Protest is not enough: The struggle of blacks and Hispanics for equality in urban politics*. University of California Press.
- Bump, B. (2015, July 31). "Democrats are heavily dependent on the black vote. That's an opportunity for the GOP." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/07/31/democrats-are-heavily-dependent-on-the-black-vote-thats-an-opportunity-for-the-gop/?utm_term=.86ao591233bd.
- Bump, P. (2016, May 18). "Donald Trump somehow thinks Ferguson and Oakland are dangerous like Iraq." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/05/18/donald-trump-somehow-thinks-ferguson-and-oakland-are-dangerous-like-iraq/?utm_term=.cdebfdf4622ac.
- Burge, C. D. (2014). *Fired up, ready to go: The effects of group-based and intergroup emotions in politics* (doctoral dissertation). Vanderbilt University.
- Butler, D. M. & Broockman, D. E. (2011). "Do politicians racially discriminate against constituents? A field experiment on state legislators." *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3), 463–477.
- Byers, D. (2012, January 6). "What Newt said about food stamps." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/01/what-newt-said-about-food-stamps-109836.
- Cain, B. E., Kiewiet, D. R., & Uhlauer, C. J. (1991). "The acquisition of partisanship by Latinos and Asian Americans." *American Journal of Political Science*, 35(2), 390–422.
- Campbell, A. L. (2003). "Participatory reactions to policy threats: Senior citizens and the defense of social security and medicare." *Political Behavior*, 25(1), 29–49.
- Carmichael, M. (2011, December 16). "Occupy the dream." *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from www.huffpost.com/entry/occupy-the-dream_b_1152329.
- Carmichael, S. (1966, October 29). *Black Power address at UC Berkeley*. Berkeley, CA. Retrieved from <http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/blackspeech/scarmichael.html>.
- Caron, C. (2018, May 9). "A black Yale student was napping, and a white student called the police." *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2018/05/09/nyregion/yale-black-student-nap.html.
- Carver, C. S. (2004). "Negative affects deriving from the behavioral approach system." *Emotion*, 4(1), 3.
- Cassidy, J. (2016, December 19). "Obama and the 'Angry Black Man' factor." *New Yorker*. Retrieved from www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/obama-and-the-angry-black-man-factor.

- CBS News. (2017, September 17). "Hillary Clinton on why she lost and 'the most important' mistake she made." *CBS Sunday Morning*. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/news/hillary-clinton-what-happened-sunday-morning-jane-pauley/.
- Chang, C. (2017, December 6). "The forgotten history of America's radical Asian activists." *Splinter News*. Retrieved from <https://splinternews.com/the-forgotten-history-of-america-s-radical-asian-activi-1821046399>.
- Choi, S. (2011). Diversity and representation in the US federal government: Analysis of the trends of federal employment. *Public Personnel Management*, 40(1), 25–46.
- Chokshi, N. (2016, September 2). "'Taco trucks on every corner': Trump supporter's anti-immigrant warning." *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/us/politics/taco-trucks-on-every-corner-trump-supporters-anti-immigration-warning.html.
- Chong, D. & Rogers, R. (2005). "Racial solidarity and political participation." *Political Behavior*, 27(4), 347–374.
- Clinton, H. (2016, September 8). *Address to National Baptist Convention*. Kansas City, MO. Retrieved from www.c-span.org/video/?41495-1/hillary-clinton-addresses-national-baptist-convention.
- Clinton, W. (1992, July 16). *Acceptance Speech at Democratic National Convention*. New York. Retrieved from http://articles.latimes.com/1992-07-17/news/mn-3671_1_place-called-hope/2.
- Coates, T. (2016, January 19). "Why precisely is Bernie Sanders against reparations?" *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/01/why-precisely-is-bernie-sanders-against-reparations-contd/431490/.
- Cohen, C. J. (1999). *The boundaries of blackness: AIDS and the breakdown of black politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- (2010). *Democracy remixed: Black youth and the future of American politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Cohn, A. M. (2011, September 18). "Cleaver: If Obama wasn't president, we would be 'marching on the White House'." *The Hill*. Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/182209-cbc-chairman-if-obama-wasn't-in-office-we-would-be-marching-on-white-house>.
- Conway, M. M. & Wong, J. (2004). *The politics of Asian Americans: Diversity and community*. Routledge.
- Cooper, B. (2018). *Eloquent rage: A black feminist discovers her superpower*. St. Martin's Press.
- Corbin, D. A. (2015). *Life, work, and rebellion in the coal fields: The Southern West Virginia miners, 1880–1922*, 2nd Edition. West Virginia University Press.
- Crocker, J. & Knight, K. M. (2005). "Contingencies of self-worth." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 14(4), 200–203.
- Davenport, C. (2009). *Media bias, perspective, and state repression: The Black Panther Party*. Cambridge University Press.
- Dawson, M. C. (1994). *Behind the mule: Race and class in African-American politics*. Princeton University Press.
- (2001). *Black visions: The roots of contemporary African-American political ideologies*. University of Chicago Press.

- (2011). *Not in our lifetimes: The future of black politics*. University of Chicago Press.
- De Bourmont, M. (2018, January 30). "First prosecution of a 'Black Identity Extremist'?" *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/30/is-a-court-case-in-texas-the-first-prosecution-of-a-black-identity-extremist/>.
- Demby, D. (2015, May 13). "I'm from Philly. 30 years later, I'm still trying to make sense of the MOVE bombing." *NPR Code Switch*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2015/05/13/406243272/im-from-philly-30-years-later-im-still-trying-to-make-sense-of-the-move-bombing.
- D'emilio, J. (2003). *Lost prophet: The life and times of Bayard Rustin*. Simon and Schuster.
- Denton, H. H. (1982, January 19). "Urban League chief attacks Reagan rights record." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/01/19/urban-league-chief-attacks-reagan-rights-record/7fb8ac4a-64b9-4fc5-ae21-b2ee0c364fbo/.
- Devere, E. (2018, May 21). "Bernie's army in disarray." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/story/2018/05/21/bernie-sanders-democrats-2018-599331.
- Douthat, R., Douthat, R. G., & Salam, R. (2009). *Grand new party: How Republicans can win the working class and save the American dream*. Anchor.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. (1897). *Strivings of the Negro people*. Atlantic Monthly Company.
- Du Bois, W. E. B. & Marable, M. (2015). *Souls of black folk*. Routledge.
- Egan, P. & Anderson, E. (2016, December 20). "Emergency managers, city officials charged in Flint water crisis." *Detroit Free Press*. Retrieved from www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/flint-water-crisis/2016/12/20/schuette-flint-water-charges/95644964/.
- Equal Justice Initiative. (2017). *Lynching in America: Confronting the legacy of racial terror*. Equal Justice Initiative.
- Fager, C. E. (1974). *Selma, 1965*. Scribner.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017, August 3). "Black identity extremists likely motivated to target law enforcement officers." *FBI Intelligence Assessment*.
- Feiler, B. S. (2009). *America's prophet: How the story of Moses shaped America*. HarperCollins e-books.
- File, T. (2017, May 10). "Voting in America: A look at the 2016 presidential election." *US Census*.
- Folger, R. (1987). "Reformulating the conditions of resentment. A referent cognition model." In J. C. Masters and W. P. Smith (eds), *Social comparison, social justice, and relative deprivation, 183–215*. Oxford University Press.
- Fraga, B. L. (2018). *The turnout gap*. Cambridge University Press.
- Frijda, N. H. (1986). *The emotions*. Cambridge University Press.
- Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P., & Ter Schure, E. (1989). "Relations among emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 57(2), 212.
- Garcia-Rios, S. I. (2015, August 28). "The 'Jorge Ramos effect' could hurt Donald Trump." *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/4013713/donald-trump-and-the-jorge-ramos-effect/>.

- Garza, A. (2016, March 18). "Why black lives matter." *Citizen University annual national conference 2016*. Retrieved from <http://opentranscripts.org/transcript/why-black-lives-matter/>.
- Gause, L. (2016). The advantage of disadvantage: Legislative responsiveness to collective action by the politically marginalized (unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
- Gavett, G. (2012, July 12). "Timeline: 30 years of AIDS in black America." *PBS Frontline*. Retrieved from www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-30-years-of-aids-in-black-america/.
- Gay, C. (2001). *The effect of minority districts and minority representation on political participation in California*. Public Policy Institute of California.
- Gilens, M. (2009). *Why Americans hate welfare: Race, media, and the politics of antipoverty policy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Gillion, D. Q. (2013). *The political power of protest: Minority activism and shifts in public policy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Gramlich, J. (2018, January 30). "5 Facts about crime in the US." *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/03/5-facts-about-crime-in-the-u-s/.
- Gray, J. A. (1990). "Brain systems that mediate both emotion and cognition." *Cognition & Emotion*, 4(3), 269–288.
- Groenendyk, E. W. & Banks, A. J. (2014). "Emotional rescue: How affect helps partisans overcome collective action problems." *Political Psychology*, 35(3), 359–378.
- Guillen, J. (2014, August 22). "Private firm to look at Detroit Water Department, seek cost savings." *Detroit Free Press*. Retrieved from www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2014/08/22/private-firm-hired-amid-bankruptcy-talks-to-evaluate-detroit-water-department/14444589/.
- Gurciullo, B. (2016, April 22). "Trump impersonates Indian call-center worker." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/blogs/2016-gop-primary-live-updates-and-results/2016/04/donald-trump-indian-impersonation-222337.
- Guttenplan, D. D. (2017, November 17). "Is this the most radical mayor in America?" *The Nation*. Retrieved from www.thenation.com/article/is-this-the-most-radical-mayor-in-america/.
- Hajnal, Z. L. & Lee, T. (2011). *Why Americans don't join the party: Race, immigration, and the failure (of political parties) to engage the electorate*. Princeton University Press.
- Hale, J. F. (1995). "The making of the New Democrats." *Political Science Quarterly*, 110(2), 207–232.
- Halperin, E. & Gross, J. J. (2011). "Emotion regulation in violent conflict: Reappraisal, hope, and support for humanitarian aid to the opponent in wartime." *Cognition & Emotion*, 25(7), 1228–1236.
- Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., & Gross, J. J. (2011). "Emotion and emotion regulation in intergroup conflict: An appraisal-based framework." In D. Bar-Tal (ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: A social psychological perspective*, 83–103. Psychology Press.
- Hampton, F. (1969) "Power anywhere there's people." Speech given in Chicago, IL. Retrieved from www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/fhamptonspeech.html.

- Harris, D. B. (1998). "The logic of Black urban rebellions." *Journal of Black Studies*, 28(3), 368–385.
- Harris, F. C. (1994). "Something within: Religion as a mobilizer of African-American political activism." *Journal of Politics*, 56(1), 42–68.
- Hensch, M. (2016, December 19). "Michelle Obama: 'Angry black woman' label hurt me." *The Hill*. Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/311033-michelle-obama-angry-black-woman-label-hurt-me>.
- Huddy, L., Feldman, S., & Cassese, E. (2007). "On the distinct political effects of anxiety and anger." In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, M. Mackuen and A. N. Crigler (eds), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior*, 202–230. University of Chicago Press.
- Hui, I. & Sears, D. O. (2018). "Reexamining the effect of racial propositions on Latinos' partisanship in California." *Political Behavior*, 40(1), 149–174.
- Hunt, M. O. & Wilson, D. C. (2009). "Race/ethnicity, perceived discrimination, and beliefs about the meaning of an Obama presidency." *Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race*, 6(1), 173–191.
- Hutchings, V. L. (2009). "Change or more of the same? Evaluating racial attitudes in the Obama era." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 73(5), 917–942.
- Isen, A. M., Daubman, K. A., & Nowicki, G. P. (1987). "Positive affect facilitates creative problem solving." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52(6), 1122.
- Jackson Jr., J. (2004, June 28). "Reagan: A legacy of state's rights." *The Nation*. Retrieved from www.thenation.com/article/reagan-legacy-states-rights/.
- Jackson, J. (1984, January 16). "Presidential campaign announcement." Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Retrieved from www.4president.org/speeches/1984/jessejackson1984announcement.htm.
- (1984, July 18). "Address at the Democratic National Convention." San Francisco, California. Retrieved from www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jessejackson1984dnc.htm.
- Jamieson, A., Shin, H. B., & Day, J. (2002). "Voting and registration in the election of November 2000." *Population*, 92(76), 2–15.
- Jamieson, J. P., Koslov, K., Nock, M. K., & Mendes, W. B. (2013). "Experiencing discrimination increases risk taking." *Psychological Science*, 24(2), 131–139.
- Jo, M. H. (1984). "The putative political complacency of Asian Americans." *Political Psychology*, 5(4), 583–605.
- John, A. (2014, April 22). "A timeline of the rise and fall of 'tough on crime' drug sentencing." *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/04/a-timeline-of-the-rise-and-fall-of-tough-on-crime-drug-sentencing/360983/.
- Johnson, J. (2016, August 22). "Donald Trump to African American and Hispanic voters: 'What do you have to lose?'" *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/08/22/donald-trump-to-african-american-and-hispanic-voters-what-do-you-have-to-lose/?utm_term=.cd424d8c9178.
- Jones, J. J. (2016). "Talk 'like a man': The linguistic styles of Hillary Clinton, 1992–2013." *Perspectives on Politics*, 14(3), 625–642.

- Jones, J. M. (2003, March 8). "Blacks showing decided opposition to war." *Gallup*. Retrieved from <https://news.gallup.com/poll/8080/blacks-showing-decided-opposition-war.aspx>.
- Jordan, M. (2016, July 13). "The mainstream response to Donald Trump affirms Latino political power." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-mainstream-response-to-donald-trump-affirms-latino-political-power/2015/07/12/678e4405-676a-4440-b23d-2cc18fa29485_story.html?utm_term=.99b06f903b69.
- Jordan-Zachery, J. S. (2017). "Beyond the side eye: Black women's ancestral anger as a liberatory practice." *Journal of Black Sexuality and Relationships*, 4(1), 61–81.
- Just, M. R., Crigler, A. N. & Belt, T. L. (2007). Don't give up hope: Emotions, candidate appraisals, and votes. In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, M. Mackuen and A. N. Crigler (eds), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior*, 231–259. University of Chicago Press.
- Katzenbach, I. (2005). *When affirmative action was white: An untold history of racial inequality in twentieth-century America*. WW Norton & Company.
- Khrais, R. (2012, October 14). "More Asian-Americans seeking higher political office." *NPR All Things Considered*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/2012/10/14/162881272/more-asian-americans-seeking-higher-political-office.
- Kim, C. J. (1999). "The racial triangulation of Asian Americans." *Politics & Society*, 27(1), 105–138.
- Kinder, D. R. & Sanders, L. M. (1996). *Divided by color: Racial politics and democratic ideals*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kinder, D. R. & Sears, D. O. (1981). "Prejudice and politics: Symbolic racism versus racial threats to the good life." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 40(3), 414.
- King Jr., M. L. (1968, April 3). "I've been to the mountaintop." Memphis, Tennessee. Retrieved from www.afscme.org/union/history/mlk/ive-been-to-the-mountaintop-by-dr-martin-luther-king-jr.
- King, J. (2018, May/June). "America has never had a black woman governor. Stacey Abrams has something to say about that." *Mother Jones*. Retrieved from www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/04/america-has-never-had-a-black-woman-governor-stacey-abrams-has-something-to-say-about-that/.
- Koschut, S. (2018). "Speaking from the heart: Emotion discourse analysis in international relations." In M. Clement and E. Sangar (eds), *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, 277–301. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koseff, A. (2016, November 15). "Colin Kaepernick has never registered to vote in any election." *Sacramento Bee*. Retrieved from www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article114803073.html.
- Krieg, G. (2018, November 18). "Stacey Abrams says 'democracy failed' Georgia as she ends bid for governor." CNN.com Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2018/11/16/politics/stacey-abrams-concession/index.html.
- Krings, A., Kornberg, D., & Lane, E. (2018). "Organizing under austerity: How residents' concerns became the Flint Water Crisis." *Critical Sociology*. DOI: 0896920518757053.

- Krogstad, J. M (2016, July 28). "5 facts about Latinos and education." *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/28/5-facts-about-latinos-and-education/.
- Kurtzleben, D. (2016, March 1). "Understanding the Clintons' popularity with black voters." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/2016/03/01/468185698/understanding-the-clintons-popularity-with-black-voters.
- Kwong, J. (2018, March 1). "H1B visa program and Trump: How high-skilled immigrants are being threatened by President's administration." *Newsweek*. Retrieved from www.newsweek.com/h-1b-visa-program-trump-administration-824688.
- Labaree, B. W. (1964). *The Boston tea party* (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
- Lartey, J. (2017, September 11). "A revolutionary, not a liberal: Can a radical black mayor bring change to Mississippi?" *Guardian*. Retrieved from www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/11/revolutionary-not-a-liberal-radical-black-mayor-mississippi-chokwe-lumumba.
- Lee, M. (2015, July 8). "Donald Trump's false Comments connecting Mexican immigrants and crime." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/08/donald-trumps-false-comments-connecting-mexican-immigrants-and-crime/?utm_term=.codc7d2b2371.
- Lee, T. (2002). *Mobilizing public opinion: Black insurgency and racial attitudes in the civil rights era*. University of Chicago Press.
- Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice. *Cognition & Emotion*, 14(4), 473–493.
- Lewis, M. (2011). Entry for "The self-conscious emotions." In Centre of Excellence for Early Childhood Development (ed.), *Encyclopedia of Early Childhood Development*. Retrieved from www.child-encyclopedia.com/emotions/according-experts/self-conscious-emotions.
- Lien, P. T. (2010). *Making of Asian America: Through Political Participation*. Temple University Press.
- Lien, P. T., Collet, C., Wong, J., & Ramakrishnan, S. K. (2001). "Asian Pacific-American public opinion and political participation." *PS: Political Science and Politics*, 34(3), 625–630.
- Light, M. T. & Miller, T. (2018). "Does undocumented immigration increase violent crime?" *Criminology*, 56(2), 370–401.
- Long, M. (2016, February 2). "Bayard Rustin in his own words: 'I must resist'." *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-g-long/bayard-rustin-in-his-own_b_2881057.html.
- Lopez, M. H. (2011). "The Latino electorate in 2010: More voters, more non-voters." Pew Research Center. Retrieved from www.pewhispanic.org/2011/04/26/the-latino-electorate-in-2010-more-voters-more-non-voters/.
- Lopez, M. H., Gonzalez-Barrera, A., & Krogstad, J. M. (2014, October 29). "Latino support for democrats falls, but democratic advantage remains." Pew Research Center. Retrieved from www.pewhispanic.org/2014/10/29/latino-support-for-democrats-falls-but-democratic-advantage-remains/.
- Louis Masotti, L. H. & Bowen, D. R. (1968). *Riots and rebellion: Civil violence in the urban community*. Sage.

- Luhby, T. (2016, March 15). "Are blacks worse off under Obama, like Trump Says?" *CNN Money*. Retrieved from <https://money.cnn.com/2016/03/15/news/economy/blacks-trump-obama/>.
- Mabry, J. B. & Kiecolt, K. J. (2005). "Anger in black and white: Race, alienation, and anger." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior*, 46(1), 85–101.
- Mack, J. (2017, September 19). "Flint is nation's poorest city, based on latest census data." *MLive*. Retrieved from www.mlive.com/news/2017/09/flint_is_nations_poorest_city.html.
- MacKuen, M. B., Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & Keele, L. (2007). "The third way: The theory of affective intelligence and American democracy." In W. R. Neuman, G. E. Marcus, A. N. Crigler and M. MacKuen (eds), *The affect effect: Dynamics of emotion in political thinking and behavior*, 124–141. University of Chicago Press.
- Madison, L. (2012, January 3). "Santorum targets blacks in entitlement reform." *CBS News*. Retrieved from www.cbsnews.com/news/santorum-targets-blacks-in-entitlement-reform/.
- Manza, J. & Uggen, C. (2008). *Locked out: Felon disenfranchisement and American democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Manzano, S. (2016, September 2). *Latino voters and the 2016 election*. Seattle, WA: Latino Decisions. Retrieved from www.latinodecisions.com/files/4014/7282/4681/AV_Wave_2_Natl_Deck_Sept_2016.pdf.
- Marcus, G. E., Neuman, W. R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). *Affective intelligence and political judgment*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mason, L. (2018). *Uncivil agreement: How politics became our identity*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mason, L. & Wronski, J. (2018). One tribe to bind them all: How our social group attachments strengthen partisanship. *Political Psychology*, 39, 257–277.
- Masuoka, N. (2006). "Together they become one: Examining the predictors of panethnic group consciousness among Asian Americans and Latinos." *Social Science Quarterly*, 87(5), 993–1011.
- McAdam, D. (1982). *Political process and the development of black insurgency, 1930–1970*. University of Chicago Press.
- McClain, C. J. (1994). *In search of equality: the Chinese struggle against discrimination in nineteenth-century America*. University of California Press.
- Mendelberg, T. (2001). *The race card: Campaign strategy, implicit messages, and the norm of equality*. Princeton University Press.
- Mervosh, M. (2018, June 20). "Kirstjen Nielsen is confronted by protesters at Mexican restaurant: 'Shame!'" *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/kirstjen-nielsen-protesters-restaurant.html.
- Meyerson, C. (2017, June 30). "Nina Turner: It is not our job to fit into the Democratic establishment." *The Nation*. Retrieved from www.thenation.com/article/nina-turner-it-is-not-our-job-to-fit-into-the-democratic-establishment/.
- Mfume, K. (1997, July 13). "A shining and powerful dream." Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Retrieved from www.blackpast.org/major_speeches/1997-kweisi-mfume-shining-and-powerful-dream/.

- Miller, A. H., Gurin, P., Gurin, G., & Malanchuk, O. (1981). "Group consciousness and political participation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 25(3), 494–511.
- Miller, J. M. & Krosnick, J. A. (2004). "Threat as a motivator of political activism: A field experiment." *Political Psychology*, 25(4), 507–523.
- Molina, N. (2010). "The power of racial scripts: What the history of Mexican immigration to the United States teaches us about relational notions of race." *Latino Studies*, 8(2), 156–175.
- Morano, M (2008, July 7). "Clinton honored as 'first black president' at black caucus dinner." *CNS News*. Retrieved from www.cnsnews.com/news/article/clinton-honored-first-black-president-black-caucus-dinner.
- National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. (2017). *The economic and fiscal consequences of immigration*. National Academies Press.
- NBC. (2017, October 30). *Late Night with Seth Meyers*.
- NBC News. (2016, May 26). "Bernie Sanders asks if American economy is 'moral'?" Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/bernie-sanders-asks-if-american-economy-moral-n364541.
- Neidig, H. (2016, June 6). "Trump doubles down on judge attacks: 'He's a Mexican. We're building a wall'." *The Hill*. Retrieved from <https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/282172-trump-doubles-down-on-judge-attacks-hes-a-mexican-were>.
- Nelson, S. [Director] (2016). *Vanguard of the revolution: The Black Panther Party* [video file]. Retrieved from www.netflix.com/title/80049128.
- Newport, F. (2014, December 8). "Obama loses support among white millennials." *Gallup*. Retrieved from <https://news.gallup.com/poll/179921/obama-loses-support-among-white-millennials.aspx>.
- Nixon, R. M. (1968, August 8). "Address accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention." Miami, Florida. Retrieved from www.nixonfoundation.org/1968/08/richard-nixon-accepts-the-republican-presidential-nomination/.
- Norton, M. I. & Sommers, S. R. (2011). "Whites see racism as a zero-sum game that they are now losing." *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6(3), 215–218.
- Nunnally, S. C. (2012). *Trust in Black America: Race, discrimination, and politics*. New York University Press.
- Obama, B. (2011, September 24). "Congressional Black Caucus Foundation annual Phoenix Awards dinner." Retrieved from <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/24/remarks-president-congressional-black-caucus-foundation-annual-phoenix-a>.
- Olsson, G. H. [Director] (2011). *The Black Power mixtape* [video file]. Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=6bryhoIFMhg&t=3603s.
- Ortiz, E. (2018, July 6). "#WhileBlack: Calling police on black people become teachable moments for law enforcement." *NBC News*. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/whileblack-calling-police-black-people-becomes-teachable-moments-law-enforcement-n889276.
- Ovington, M. W. (1996). *Black and white sat down together: The reminiscences of an NAACP founder*. Feminist Press at City University New York.
- Pantoja, A. D., Ramirez, R., & Segura, G. M. (2001). Citizens by choice, voters by necessity: Patterns in political mobilization by naturalized Latinos. *Political Research Quarterly*, 54(4), 729–750.

- Parker, C. S. & Barreto, M. A. (2014). *Change they can't believe in: The Tea Party and reactionary politics in America, updated edition*. Princeton University Press.
- Peterson, S. A. (1992). "Church participation and political participation: The spillover effect." *American Politics Quarterly*, 20(1), 123–139.
- Phoenix, D. L. & Arora, M. (2018). "From emotion to action among Asian Americans: assessing the roles of threat and identity in the age of Trump." *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 6(3), 357–372.
- Quarshie, M. (2018, January 18). "Is the women's march more inclusive this year?" *USA Today*. Retrieved from www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/01/18/womens-march-more-inclusive-year/1038859001/.
- Rafferty, J. (2016, January 3). "Poll: Whites and Republicans rank as angriest Americans." *NBC News*. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/poll-whites-republicans-rank-angriest-americans-n488636.
- Ramanathan, L. (2017, January 24). "Was the women's march just another display of white privilege? Some think so." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/was-the-womens-march-just-another-display-of-white-privilege-some-think-so/2017/01/24/0obbdcca-1ea0-11e6-a547-5fb9411d332c_story.html?utm_term=.b6c257583a4f.
- Ramírez, R. (2013). *Mobilizing opportunities: The evolving Latino electorate and the future of American politics*. University of Virginia Press.
- Roller, E. (2014, August 14). "How Congress helped create Ferguson's militarized police." *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/how-congress-helped-create-fergusons-militarized-police/455118/.
- Ross, J. & Lee, T. (2011, October 14). "Occupy the Hood aims to draw people of color to Occupy Wall Street." *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/14/occupy-the-hood-occupy-wall-street_n_1009850.html.
- Ruiz, N. G. (2017, April 27). "Key facts about the US H-1B visa program." *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/27/key-facts-about-the-u-s-h-1b-visa-program/.
- Sanders, S. (2016, March 28). "#BernieMadeMeWhite: No, Bernie Sanders isn't just winning with white people." *NPR Morning Edition*. Retrieved from www.npr.org/2016/03/28/472160616/berniemademewhite-no-bernie-sanders-isnt-just-winning-with-white-people.
- Savage, C. (2017, August 1). "Justice dept. to take on affirmative action in college admissions." *New York Times*. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2017/08/01/us/politics/trump-affirmative-action-universities.html.
- Schnurer, E. (2016, June 2). "Politics is not recession proof." *US News and World Report*. Retrieved from www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-06-02/the-great-recession-wrought-donald-trumps-rise.
- Sears, D. O. (1988). "Symbolic racism." In P. A. Katz and D. A. Taylor (eds), *Eliminating racism*, 53–84. Springer.
- Shafer, J. (2016, November 5). "How Trump took over the media by fighting it." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/11/2016-election-trump-media-takeover-coverage-214419.

- Smith, R. C. (1996). *We have no leaders: African Americans in the post-civil rights era*. Suny Press.
- Snyder, C. R. (1994). *The psychology of hope: You can get there from here*. Simon and Schuster.
- Sobel, R. & Smith, R. E. (2009). "Voter-ID laws discourage participation, particularly among minorities, and trigger a constitutional remedy in lost representation." *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 42(1), 107–110.
- Stamets, B. [Director] (2015). *Chicago politics: A theatre of power*.
- Starr, T. J. (2018, June 4). "The progressive revolution is being led by a black woman." *The Root*. Retrieved from www.theroot.com/the-progressive-revolution-is-being-led-by-a-black-woman-1826453201.
- Tate, K. (1991). Black political participation in the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. *American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1159–1176.
- (1994). *From protest to politics: The new black voters in American elections*. Harvard University Press.
- Taylor, P., Kochhar, R., Fry, R., Velasco, G., & Motel, S. (2011, July 26). "Wealth gaps rise to record highs between Whites, Blacks and Hispanics." *Pew Social and Demographic Trends*. Retrieved from www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2011/07/SDT-Wealth-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
- Tracy, J. L. & Robins, R. W. (2007). "Emerging insights into the nature and function of pride." *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 16(3), 147–150.
- Trickey, E. (2016, October 2). "How hostile poll-watchers could hand Pennsylvania to Trump." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/2016-election-pennsylvania-polls-voters-trump-clinton-214297.
- Trump, D. J. (2015, June 15). "Presidential campaign announcement." New York. Retrieved from <http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/>.
- (2016, July 21). "Address accepting the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention." Cleveland, Ohio. Retrieved from www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974.
- Ture, K. & Hamilton, C. V. (1992). *Black power: The politics of liberation*. Vintage.
- Tyler, T. R., Boeckmann, R. J., & Smith, H. J. (1997). *Social justice in a diverse society*. Westview Press.
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner. (2016, May 3). "Flint: 'Not just about water, but human rights' – UN experts remind ahead of President Obama's visit." Retrieved from www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19917&LangID=E.
- Uslaner, E. M. (1998). "Social capital, television, and the 'mean world': Trust, optimism, and civic participation." *Political Psychology*, 19(3), 441–467.
- Valentino, N. A., Brader, T., Groenendyk, E. W., Gregorowicz, K., & Hutchings, V. L. (2011). "Election night's alright for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation." *Journal of Politics*, 73(1), 156–170.
- Valentino, N. A., Gregorowicz, K., & Groenendyk, E. W. (2009). "Efficacy, emotions and the habit of participation." *Political Behavior*, 31(3), 307.

- Van Zomeren, M., Spears, R., Fischer, A. H., & Leach, C. W. (2004). "Put your money where your mouth is! Explaining collective action tendencies through group-based anger and group efficacy." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 87(5), 649.
- Varga, G. (2016, September 6). "Maná kicks off Latino power 2016 tour Friday at SDSU." *San Diego Union-Tribune*. Retrieved from www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/music/sdut-mana-latino-power-tour-preview-2016sep06-htmlstory.html.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., & Brady, H. E. (1995). *Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics*. Harvard University Press.
- Verba, S., Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H., & Nie, N. H. (1993). "Race, ethnicity and political resources: Participation in the United States." *British Journal of Political Science*, 23(4), 453–497.
- Walsh, J. (2011, October 13). "The man who blocked John Lewis speaks." *Salon.com*. Retrieved from www.salon.com/2011/10/13/the_man_who_blocked_john_lewis Speaks.
- Walton Jr., H. (1985). *Invisible politics: Black political behavior*. Suny Press.
- Wang, F. K. (2015, August 27). "Trump's 'offensive' Asian parody sparks criticism." *NBC News*. Retrieved from www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/trumps-offensive-asian-parody-sparks-criticism-n416926.
- White, I. K., Philpot, T. S., Wylie, K., & McGowen, E. (2007). "Feeling the pain of my people: Hurricane Katrina, racial inequality, and the psyche of Black America." *Journal of Black Studies*, 37(4), 523–538.
- Williams, D. R., Yu, Y., Jackson, J. S., & Anderson, N. B. (1997). "Racial differences in physical and mental health: Socio-economic status, stress and discrimination." *Journal of Health Psychology*, 2(3), 335–351.
- Williams, J. (2011, September 29). "Barack Obama speech reopens rift with black critics." *Politico*. Retrieved from www.politico.com/news/stories/0911/64680_Page3.html.
- Williams, J. (2013). *From the bullet to the ballot: The Illinois chapter of the Black Panther Party and racial coalition politics in Chicago*. UNC Press Books.
- Williams, L. F. (2010). *Constraint of race: Legacies of white skin privilege in America*. Penn State Press.
- Williams, V. (2016, November 2). "Black women – Hillary Clinton's most reliable voting bloc – Look beyond defeat." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/black-women--hillary-clintons-most-reliable-voting-bloc-look-beyond-defeat/2016/11/12/86d9182a-a845-11e6-ba59-a7d93165c6d4_story.html?utm_term=.6c6a17989a27.
- (2019, January 20). "Abrams looks at her options after the narrow loss in a Georgia election marred by disputes over voting irregularities." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/stacey-abrams-looks-at-her-options-after-the-narrow-loss-in-a-georgia-election-marred-by-disputes-over-voting-irregularities/2019/01/20/fe56ace8-1b55-11e9-9ebf-c5fed1b7a081_story.html?utm_term=.39c6bdd3d402.

- Williams, V. & Clement, S. (2016, May 14). "Despite Black Lives Matter, young black Americans aren't voting in higher numbers." *Washington Post*. Retrieved from www.washingtonpost.com/politics/despite-black-lives-matter-young-black-americans-arent-voting-in-higher-numbers/2016/05/14/e1780b3a-1176-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story.html.
- Wong, J. S., Lien, P. T., & Conway, M. M. (2005). "Group-based resources and political participation among Asian Americans." *American Politics Research*, 33(4), 545–576.
- Woodruff, J. (2016, July 27). "Castro brothers on how Donald Trump has motivated US Latinos." *PBS News Hour*. Retrieved from www.pbs.org/newshour/show/castro-brothers-donald-trump-motivated-u-s-latino.
- X, Malcolm. (1963, December 10). "Message to the grassroots." Detroit, Michigan. Retrieved from <http://xroads.virginia.edu/~public/civilrights/ao147.html>.
- Yglesias, M. (2007, November 9). "Reagan's race record." *The Atlantic*. Retrieved from www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2007/11/reagans-race-record/468751.
- Zepeda-Millán, C. (2014). "Perceptions of threat, demographic diversity, and the framing of illegality: Explaining (non) participation in New York's 2006 immigrant protests." *Political Research Quarterly*, 67(4), 880–888.
- (2017). *Latino mass mobilization: Immigration, racialization, and activism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Zylan, Y. & Soule, S. A. (2000). "Ending welfare as we know it (again): Welfare state retrenchment, 1989–1995." *Social Forces*, 79(2), 623–652.

Index

- Abrams, Stacey, 255–258, 260
activist movements, 230–231
affective intelligence theory, 31, 32, 57
affirmative action, 70, 227–228
African Americans, 1–3, 5, 7–9, 17, 27,
 39–40, 42, 44–45, 208, 261
anger, 218, 230, 231
anger gap, 198
emotions, 208
hope, 211
policing forum, 137, 138–140
political agency, 245–247
pride, 211
turnout, 196, 197
see also black people
Albertson, Bethany, 32
American National Election Study (ANES),
 12, 72, 100–101, 155, 247, 248
anger, 6, 7, 11–13, 24, 25–26, 29–30, 33,
 35–36, 37–38, 72–73, 78, 100,
 101–102, 158, 221, 228
anger gap, 12, 13–14, 19–20, 21, 24–25,
 231–232, 245, 248, 252, 262, *see also*
 racial anger gap
appraisal theory, 35, 78
Asian Americans, 27, 186, 198–199,
 204–208, 227–228, 230, 231, 251
anger, 209, 218, 230
anger gap, 197–198, 209
emotions, 208, 211
fear, 209, 215–216, 218
hope, 211, 217
political agency, 211–214
political anger, 214
political participation, 214
pride, 211, 217
turnout, 196, 197
Baker, Ella, 103
Baldwin, James, 244
Banks, Antoine J., 24, 35, 39
Battle of Blair Mountain (1921), 112
black activism, 19, 21, 23, 55–57, 102,
 114, 115, 127–130
black activist leaders, 114, 115, 117–118
Carmichael, 10, 119–120, 261
Davis, 114–115, 120
Hampton, 16, 45, 59, 110, 120, 159,
 170, 195
Malcolm X, 116–117, 120
Rustin, 118–119
black anger, 12–13, 15, 17–19, 20–21,
 25, 26, 27, 31, 45–46, 55, 60–62, 74,
 83–86, 93–94, 97, 100, 101, 114, 115,
 244–245, 248
black anger gap, 14, 25, 94–97
black Democrats, 12, 13, 62, 75–78
anger, 76, 78, 82, 100–101
enthusiasm advantage, 176
fear, 78
hope, 170, 171
political participation, 171
Trump election turnout, 97–100
 turnout, 86–91
black identity, 22, 49–51, 142
Black Identity Extremists (BIE), 16–17, 246

- Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement, 127–129, 221–222
 Black Panther Party for Self Defense, 16, 133
 black participation, 1–2, 3, 21–25, 26, 49–50, 102, 115, 144, 247–250, 262
 black people, 17, 39–40, 51, 112–113
 DWSD issue, 162, 163–164, 166–168, 169–170
 emotions, 155–157, 177–178
 hope, 176, 178, 185
 policing forum, 142, 144–145
 political agency, 142
 political anger, 122–129, 130, 136, 144–145
 political participation, 185–186
 pride, 177, 178, 181, 182–183, 185
 protest participation, 130–133, 135–136
 racial discrimination, 138–139, 144
see also African Americans
 black political leaders, 182, 253
 black political movements, 19, 120–121
 black politics, 21, 102–103, 110–111
 Black Power movement, 10, 119–120, 258
 black Republicans, 12, 13, 62–63
 black slaves, 159
 black turnout, 1–2, 3, 23, 25–26, 72
 black women, 84–85, 95–96, 132–133
 Bloody Sunday (1965), 111, 246
 Boeckmann, Robert J., 36
 Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (2005), 202
 Boston Tea Party (1773), 112
 Brader, Ted, 6, 32, 33, 57
 Brown, Michael, 136
 Burge, Camille D., 24
 Bush, George H.W., 78, 80, 81
 Bush, George W., 81, 82, 91
 Carmichael, Stokely, 10, 119–120, 261
 Carson, Clayborne, 133
 Castro, Julian, 201–202
 Clinton, Bill, 11, 29, 74, 120, 171–173, 196, 197
 Clinton, Hillary, 30, 57–58, 59–60, 95, 96, 220
 CMPS (Collaborative Multi-racial Post-election Survey), 92–93, 116, 220–221, 228–229, 247
 Cohen, Cathy J., 225
 collective agency, 183–185
 Colvin, Claudette, 129–130
 Cooper, Brittney, 24
 Crocker, Jennifer, 182
 Daniels, Christopher, 17
 Davis, Angela, 114–115, 120
 Dawson, Michael C., 43–44, 49, 81–82
 Democratic Party, 14–15, 52, 81, 153–154, 196–197, 218–220, 230, 248, 250–251
 anger, 76
 double consciousness, 49–50, 142
 DuBois, W.E.B., 49, 160, 170, 181–182
 DWSD (Detroit Water and Sewerage Department), 161–164, 166–168, 169–170, 173
 elections, *see* black participation; presidential elections; turnout; white participation
 emotions, 5–8, 9–12, 22, 23–24, 25, 27–28, 30–31, 35, 57, 63, 73, 97, 147, 155, 198, 208, 217–218, 221
 Enough is Enough video, 41–42
 enthusiasm, 6–8, 57, 62–63, 157
 enthusiasm advantage, 26–27, 174–176
 fear, 32, 33, 78, 158, 215–216
 Flint water crisis, 58–60
 Folger, Robert, 36
 Frijda, Nico H., 6
 Gadarian, Shana, 32
 Garza, Alicia, 121, 182–183
 Goethe, C.M., 200
 Gregorowicz, K., 32, 33
 Groenendyk, Eric W., 32, 33, 35
 group consciousness, 49–50
 group identities, 35–37, 39
 Hamer, Fannie Lou, 11
 Hampton, Fred, 16, 45, 59, 110, 120, 159, 170, 195
 Hands ad, 37, 38, 39–40, 115
 Harvard University lawsuit, 228
 Helms, Jesse, 37, 115, 246
 hope, 157–159, 160–161, 170–171, 174
 Hughes, Langston, 244, 262
 Hutchings, V. L., 32, 33
 Jackson, Jesse, 70, 72, 102, 153–154, 158, 196
 Jordan-Zachery, Julia, 24

- Kaepernick, Colin, 122
 Kiecolt, K. Jill, 36
 Kim, Claire J., 205, 227, 228
 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 10, 56
 Knight, Katherine, 182
- Latina/o Americans, 27, 186, 198–204, 206, 207–208, 225–227, 229, 231, 251
 anger, 209, 218, 230
 anger gap, 197–198, 208
 emotions, 208, 211
 fear, 209
 hope, 211, 217
 political agency, 211–214
 political anger, 214
 political participation, 214
 pride, 211, 217
 turnout, 197
- Lumumba, Chokwe Antar, Jr., 258, 259–260
 Lumumba, Chokwe Antar, Sr., 258–259
- Mabry, J. Beth, 36
 Malcolm X, 116–117, 120
 March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (1963), 116, 118
 Mason, Lilliana, 174–176
 Masuoka, Natalie, 203
 Mexican immigrants, 222–224
 Mfume, Kweisi, 10, 20, 50–51
 Molina, Natalia, 200
 MOVE bombing (1985), 111
- NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People), 10, 195
 National Movement for Black Lives, 121–122, 195
 New York City Draft Day riots (1863), 112
 Nixon, Richard M., 80, 112–113
- Obama, Barack, 1–2, 7, 18, 54–56, 72, 155, 156, 159, 173, 174, 196, 197, 245
 Obama, Michelle, 18
 Occupy Movement, 8–9, 247
 Olvera, Fernando, 201
- Parks, Rosa, 130
 partisanship, 12–13, 75
 Patton, Stacey, 8, 9, 247
 policing forum, 137, 138–140, 142
- political agency, 45, 46, 47–49, 50, 92, 142, 214
 political anger, 7, 18–19, 86, 115–116, 122–123, 140–142, 228–230, 251–252
 political environment, 5, 12, 50, 59, 61, 74, 96, 97, 158, 186, 210, 211, 247
 political messaging, 15, 35, 36–37, 55, 60–62, 80, 249, *see also* Enough is Enough video; Hands ad
- political participation, 5, 26, 47, 72–73, 115–116, 171–172
 political threats, 3, 35–36, 43, 46, 220, 230
 politics, 110
 presidential elections, 1–2, 3, 25–26
 turnout, 1–2, 3, 23, 25–26, 72
 pride, 174, 181, 218, 221, 231
 Proposition 187, California, 203
 protest participation, 130–136, 247
- racial anger, 60–62
 racial anger gap, 22, 24, 28, 48–49, 69, 74, 81, 97, 100, 219, *see also* anger gap
 racial discrimination, 42–43, 67–69, 92, 138–139
 racial identity, 38–39, 42–43, 44–45, 49–50, 92, 157
 racial participation gap, 19, 22, 245, 248–250
 racial profiling, 224–225
 racial resignation, 10–11, 173, 245, 247, 262
 racial salvation, 56, 117, 118, 120, 144, 157, 170, 173, 185
 racial stratification, 136–138, 140–142
 Rainbow Coalition, 195, 196
 RAP (Race, Anger and Participation Study, 2018), 25, 46–48, 63–69, 116, 248
 Reagan, Ronald, 70–71, 79–80, 81, 91, 115, 246
 Republican Party, 52, 81, 218
 resignation, sense of, 10–11, 19, 67, 69, 78, 92, 95
 Rubio, Marco, 33, 34–35, 36, 37
 Rustin, Bayard, 118–119
- Sanders, Bernie, 40–42, 44, 52–54, 55, 115, 120, 220, 245
Saturday Night Live sketch, 4–5, 7, 9
 self-determination, 258, 262
 Smith, Heather J., 36
 Stahly-Butts, Marbre, 121–122

- Tea Party, 3
 terrorism, threat of, 32, 33, 34–35
 threats, 31–33, 34–37, 136–137
 Trump election, 3–4, 7, 92, 93, 95–96, 123,
 209–210, 219–220
 Asian Americans, 204, 205, 206
 Latina/o Americans, 199–202, 205
 turnout, 97–100
 Trump, Donald J., 26, 91–92, 96, 97, 113,
 120, 199–200, 219, 246
 Turner, Nina, 253–255, 260
 turnout, 86, 89
 black Democrats, 86–91
 presidential elections, 1–2, 3, 23,
 25–26, 72
 Trump election, 97–100
 white Democrats, 86–91
 white Republicans, 86, 89
 see also political participation.
 Tyler, T. R., 36
 urban uprisings, 111–114
 Valentino, Nicholas A., 6, 32, 33
 Vargas, Arturo, 201
 Washington, Harold, 183
 white Americans, 5, 8, 11, 18, 38–39,
 44–45, 56, 61, 208
 anger, 209–210, 218
 DWSO issue, 162, 163–164,
 166–168, 169
 emotions, 155–156, 178, 208
 hope, 176
 political agency, 142
 political anger, 123, 214
 pride, 178, 217, 218
 protest participation, 131–132, 133, 135
 white anger, 12–13, 15, 19, 25, 39, 55,
 71, 74, 81, 83–84, 86, 93–94, 101,
 114, 115
 white Democrats, 12, 13, 62, 75, 76–78
 anger, 82, 100–101
 fear, 78
 hope, 170–171
 political participation, 171
 Trump election turnout, 97–100
 turnout, 86–91
 white Republicans, 12, 13, 62–63
 anger, 82
 enthusiasm advantage, 174–176
 hope, 170–171
 political participation, 171
 Trump election turnout, 97–100
 turnout, 86, 89
 white turnout, 1–2, 26, 72, 81
 Women’s March on Washington, 3–4, 7
 young black people, 85, 96, 260–261
 protest participation, 133–135, 136