

Government Monitoring and Political Participation in the United States: The Distinct Roles of Anger and Anxiety

American Politics Research

39(1) 85–117

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X10380848

<http://apr.sagepub.com>



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Abstract

The past decade has spurred interest in the potential connection between U.S. government monitoring and political activity. Interestingly, these recent studies demonstrate that rather than chilling political activity, government monitoring in the United States positively associates with political engagement. This article seeks to determine why, for ordinary Americans, government monitoring positively relates to political participation. We argue that the balance of discrete negative emotional reactions to government monitoring provides an answer. We propose that U.S. government monitoring generates more anger than anxiety. Furthermore, we suggest that anger about government monitoring will positively associate with political activity whereas anxiety about monitoring will negatively associate with political engagement. We find support for these hypotheses using data drawn from a unique probability sample survey of U.S. residents. The dominant and discrete reaction of anger about monitoring trumps the less common reaction of anxiety, which leads to a net positive association with political activity.

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Keywords

political participation, privacy, government monitoring, civil liberties, anger, anxiety, cognitive appraisal theory, cognitive tendency theory, voting

Government monitoring of citizens' legal activities and communications plays a key role in prominent theories of politics, which typically propose that actual or perceived monitoring hinders free political expression (e.g., Foucault, 1979; Mill, 1991; Westin, 1967). Empirical studies have followed this general framework, with Almond and Verba (1963) notably attributing the comparatively low levels of public political discussion in postwar Italy and Germany to the legacy of monitoring and suppressing political dissent. Considering only the United States, the best-known general population studies of political participation exclude government monitoring as a potential explanatory factor (e.g., Leighley, 1995; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995) despite pervasive political monitoring by the U.S. government throughout much of the 20th century (e.g., Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990; Cunningham, 2004; Donner, 1980). However, related research does suggest similar mechanisms at work in the United States; individuals with higher U.S. government privacy concerns have been shown to participate less in the U.S. census (Singer, Mathiowetz, & Couper, 1993). Moreover, following de Tocqueville, a well-developed U.S. literature demonstrates that citizen intolerance and social monitoring reduces political engagement and increases conformity (Finifter, 1974; Gibson, 1992, 2006; Hayes, Scheufele, & Huge, 2006; Huckfeldt & Sprague, 1988).

Whatever the past veracity of the near complete exclusion of government monitoring in the best-known general models of political participation in the United States, the most recent wave of U.S. government monitoring laws and executive orders has spurred scholarly interest in the potential connection between U.S. government monitoring and political activity.¹ James Gibson (2008) suggests that political repression recently has increased in the United States: "a reasonable view of public policy in the current period is that freedom has been restricted . . . [and] an appreciable threat exists that more draconian restraints on political freedom will be put in place in the future" (p. 97). Importantly for this study, government monitoring of citizen behavior and communication has been central to these recent government initiatives, with mainstream media widely reporting that nonviolent political activities have been monitored by the federal government (e.g., Lichtblau, 2005). As significant, individuals seem to have internalized these media revelations, with one study demonstrating that U.S. residents perceive that engaging in

political activity increases their odds of becoming an object of U.S. government monitoring (Best & Krueger, 2008).

Interestingly, the recent studies considering the influence of government monitoring on ordinary political activity find that government monitoring in the United States *positively* associates with political activity (Cho, Gimpel, & Wu, 2006; Krueger, 2005, 2008). Rather than chilling activity and expression, the recent evidence suggests that government monitoring in the United States seems to motivate individuals to act politically. These studies use individual and aggregate data, consider the U.S. general population and subgroup (i.e., Arab Americans) samples, conceive government monitoring as an individual cognitive perception and an aggregate contextual factor, and predict a range of ordinary political activity from registering to vote, to signing Internet petitions, to discussing politics, to contacting elected officials.

Studying U.S. residents, Krueger (2005, 2008) finds that even after controlling for an array of other relevant factors, individual perceptions that the government monitors ordinary Americans positively associate with various forms of political participation. The increased political engagement reaction to perceived monitoring is interpreted as a form of resistance to excessive government power, although it is unclear why a pattern of resistance to surveillance, rather than quiescence, occurs. In related research, Cho et al. (2006) show that Arab Americans increasingly register to vote when exposed to more news stories about the USA PATRIOT Act, which the authors view chiefly as a surveillance tool.² Cho and colleagues (2006) suggest that threatening government policy induces individuals to engage in electoral politics, which conforms to other policy threat studies (e.g., Miller & Krosnick, 2004). However, the authors concede that their finding is “even more remarkable” than most policy threat studies given the unique nature of the surveillance threat (p. 990).

Although an important finding, the demonstration of a positive association between U.S. government monitoring and political activity does not explain why this pattern occurs. Ideally, given that negative and positive relationships have been found between monitoring and political activity across contexts, an analytical framework considering this puzzle should specify the conditions that government monitoring positively and negatively relates to political participation. Without a dual explanatory framework it is difficult to comprehend this U.S. pattern, have guidance about when a mobilization response should be found in other contexts, or make predictions about this relationship’s likely persistence in the U.S. context.

To answer the question, why do ordinary Americans seem to react to government monitoring by engaging in politics rather than becoming politically

docile, the next section proposes that an answer may be found by considering discrete negative emotional reactions to government monitoring. Specifically, we expect that government monitoring simultaneously produces distinct negative affects, anger and anxiety, which respectively should positively and negatively associate with political engagement. A net positive association should occur when government monitoring primarily produces anger reactions, as we expect in the U.S. case. When government monitoring primarily produces anxiety reactions, a net negative association should occur. If empirically supported, then this approach offers a framework for comprehending why government monitoring sometimes negatively and sometimes positively associates with political participation.

Discrete Negative Affect and Government Monitoring

Over the past decade, political behavior scholars have shown an increasing interest in the study of emotions. The dominant theoretical framework specifies two weakly related affective dimensions, one dimension includes all positive emotions and one includes all negative emotions. Though several prominent researchers use a two-dimension valence framework, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen's (2000) affective intelligence theory (AIT) deservedly receives the most attention for its depth of development and predictive reach.

Although this two-dimensional valence approach often explains the variance in individual emotions, and political scientists use this approach to comprehend important political phenomena, two-dimensional frameworks offer no guidance regarding the differential influence of discrete negative emotions such as anger and anxiety. Until recently, scholars such as Ted Brader (2005) could rightfully admonish political scientists for "glid[ing] over distinctions in types of negativity" (p. 403). Yet following a long tradition in psychology (e.g., Frijda, 1986), a growing line of research in political science does fruitfully consider distinct negative emotions. For example, Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese (2007) demonstrate that Americans have diverse negative affective reactions to terrorism. Some individuals react with anger and some with anxiety, which leads to different attitudes about support for the Iraq War and the risks associated with war. Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenedyk (2009) demonstrate that anger and anxiety about the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates positively influence political participation. The authors of *Affective Intelligence* also have begun incorporating an additional dimension of negative affect in their recent work.

Unlike earlier, AIT work that explicitly combines anger and anxiety into one negative dimension, this work finds that, at times, an additional negative dimension (labeled *aversion*) separates from the core anxiety dimension (Marcus, MacKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006; Wolak & Marcus, 2007). This research shows that although anger and anxiety diversely influence political learning and compromise, both anger and anxiety positively associate with campaign participation.

Just as the prospects of future terrorism produce different degrees of anger and anxiety, this study expects that the prospects of government monitoring will produce distinct negative emotional reactions. Cognitive appraisal theory suggests that how people cognitively view a situation, through their predispositions and degree of prior information, conditions their emotional response. Emotion and cognition are intimately tied, with different types of cognitive appraisals leading to distinct emotional responses. Because people often appraise the same situation differently, cognitive appraisal theory helps comprehend why people experiencing the same phenomena or event may exhibit different emotions of the same valence. Psychologists have identified various appraisal dimensions that link to discrete emotions, with appraisals of personal control, identifiable responsibility, and uncertainty most relevant for our analysis of anxiety and anger (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988). Most importantly, this framework can predict, from the patterns of likely cognitive appraisals associated with particular phenomena, the likely discrete emotional outcomes.

From this cognitive appraisal perspective, anger is often thought to result when individuals attribute responsibility to an external agent for inappropriately blocking a goal, acting unfairly, violating a shared norm, or damaging a cherished value. As Gross and D'Ambrosio (2004) explain, "anger arises when one person perceives another as having violated a commitment or having transgressed a rule" (p. 2). As important, anger is thought to result not only when individuals perceive injustice but also when individuals perceive some control over the situation (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lazarus, 1993). Because freedom from improper government interference is rooted firmly in American political culture, and the U.S. government's actions are at least indirectly controlled by citizens through elections in the United States, perceptions that the government monitors ordinary Americans likely would produce considerable anger.

By contrast, unlike anger, anxiety is often thought to result from unexpected threats, appraisals of uncertainty about negative events occurring, and appraisals of having little control over these events (e.g., Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Because the invisible nature of contemporary

electronic monitoring techniques creates uncertainty about precisely when one may be monitored and the government has been guarded about the uses of this information once collected, considerations of government monitoring could produce anxiety. It also is likely that many individuals feel disempowered to do anything about this monitoring, as much of the decision making has been made outside of deliberative public policy-making venues, which may lead to appraisals of low personal control over the situation (e.g., G.W. Bush's secret NSA surveillance program). Taken altogether, cognitive appraisal theory suggests that government monitoring should produce both anger and anxiety. Given the intensely held value of limited government in U.S. political culture, especially concerning First and Fourth Amendment type issues (Conover, Crewe, & Searing, 1991), we expect the "blame the government responsible for inappropriate behavior" appraisal to dominate in the U.S. context, which would lead to more anger than anxiety.³

This study not only expects that government monitoring will generate anger and anxiety but also anticipates that anger reactions will positively relate to political engagement whereas anxiety reactions will negatively associate with political engagement. This notion that anger should positively relate to political activity is consistent with the best-known theoretical and empirical work in political science (e.g., Brader, 2005; Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenedyk, 2009; Wolak & Marcus, 2007). This expectation is also consistent with various emotions studies in psychology, in particular with appraisal tendency theory (an extension of cognitive appraisal theory) that identifies the behavioral and cognitive tendencies that arise from discrete emotions (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

Neuroscientists demonstrate that anger is unique among negative affects in that it stimulates left-anterior cortical activity, which corresponds with approach-related motivation (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). Behavioral tendency studies demonstrate that anger generally leads to aggressive activity when threatened (Izard, 1991). A related cognitive study using appraisal tendency theory demonstrates that anger increases the likelihood of potentially dangerous activity by reducing the personal risk assessments associated with that activity. This same work finds that anger increases optimism about having personal control of the situation (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001). From this functional appraisal tendency perspective, anger helps individuals resolve threats by supplying energy for directly confronting a threat. Because past work has shown that individuals perceive higher odds of becoming an object of government monitoring when acting politically (Best & Krueger, 2008), engaging in politics is a risky activity in that it increases individual's perceived odds of exposure to the threat. Consequently, appraisal tendency

theory suggests that anger about government monitoring should function to attenuate the perceived risks associated with political participation and provide the motivation to act in a threatening environment.

Whereas our expectation about a positive relationship between anger and political participation is consistent with past work, our expectation that anxiety and political participation should negatively associate in this context might come as a surprise, as no study assessing this relationship has shown a negative association—all empirical studies have shown a positive or null association (e.g., Brader, 2006; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino, Hutchings, Gregorowicz, Groenendyk, & Brader, 2006; Wolak & Marcus, 2007). Yet as Valentino et al. (2008) review, much psychological research suggests anxiety can produce “either flight or fight” (p. 311). Given that the dominant approach suggests a positive relationship between anxiety and activity, below we focus on evidence suggesting that anxiety about government monitoring and political participation may negatively relate.

Much theory and evidence suggests, at least in some contexts, that anxiety leads to withdrawal. Brain scans by neuroscientists demonstrate that anxiety stimulates the right-frontal region, which is known to trigger withdrawal motivation (Morinaga et al., 2007). Appraisal tendency theory also suggests a withdrawal tendency for anxious individuals. Studies demonstrate that anxiety often leads to defensive withdrawal from immediate threats (Izard, 1991). When considering various dangerous activities, anxiety increases risk assessments and decreases perceived control over the outcome, which decreases the likelihood of engaging in hazardous action (Lerner & Keltner, 2001). From this appraisal tendency perspective, anxiety often functions to reduce the threat through withdrawal, as individuals perceive that they cannot proactively control the aversive situation. More specifically, when a potential activity would increase exposure to a threat, anxiety should increase an individual’s risk perceptions of that activity and lead to defensive withdrawal (rather than engagement in the activity). Because past work has shown that individuals perceive that engaging in political activity increases their odds of being monitored by the government (Best & Krueger, 2008), we expect that anxiety about monitoring would depress political participation, as anxious individuals would evade the perceived threat of monitoring by withdrawing from activity that increases their risk of monitoring.

Our supposition that anxiety, *in certain situations*, should negatively relate to political participation has been briefly considered by other political scientists (Brader, 2005; Valentino et al., 2009; for a similar perspective see Huddy et al., 2007), even if this negative relationship has never been empirically

demonstrated. As Brader (2005) explains, "the motivational impact of fear is less certain, as it can stimulate constructive action to deal with threat, withdrawal, or immobility" (p. 390). As detailed below, our framework is most original in specifying the conditions when anxiety should negatively associate with political activity, as all past work in political science has considered scenarios where anxiety and political participation should positively covary or not covary (e.g., Brader, 2006; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2006; Wolak & Marcus, 2007). Our expectation that anxiety about monitoring will negatively relate to political participation can be explained by considering the unique nature of government monitoring as a threat. Most commonly, in the political science literature, negative stimuli that produce negative emotions take the form of political leaders (e.g., Marcus & MacKuen, 1993), the economy (Conover & Feldman, 1986), public policy (e.g., Wolak, MacKuen, Keele, Marcus, & Russell Neuman, 2003), political advertisements (e.g., Brader, 2005), and out-groups (e.g., Kuklinski, Riggall, Ottati, Schwarz, & Wyer, 1991). When these stimuli trigger anxiety, the conventional approach suggests that individuals increase their attention to politics, gather more political information, reassess their beliefs, and engage in political activity to help resolve the threat producing the anxiety. Political activity works to relieve anxiety because it helps change or eliminate the source of these threatening stimuli (e.g., replacing politician in power, changing public policy). When an action, such as political participation, helps relieve the source of anxiety, anxious individuals should respond by engaging in activity.

We propose a different connection between anxiety and activity in a government surveillance context; anxiety and political activity should negatively relate because the act of participation potentially exacerbates rather than potentially resolves anxiety. Given the long history of political monitoring in the United States, it is unsurprising that recent research demonstrates that individuals perceive that engagement in political activity increases their odds of being monitored by the U.S. government (Best & Krueger, 2008). Consequently, many individuals anxious about monitoring likely would perceive that political engagement would expose them to the threat that makes them anxious. Withdrawal from political action is the functional solution to resolving anxiety about monitoring, as it decreases the odds of exposure to the threat. In sum, when an action, such as political participation, potentially increases exposure to the source of anxiety, anxious individuals should respond by withdrawing from that action.

Hypotheses

Overall, for this framework to help explain the positive association between government monitoring and political participation in the contemporary U.S. environment, several testable conditions must be met.

Hypothesis 1: Anger and anxiety reactions to government monitoring of ordinary Americans form related but distinct negative affective dimensions.

Hypothesis 2: Individuals react to government monitoring with more anger than anxiety.

Hypothesis 3: Anxiety about monitoring independently negatively relates to political activity.

Hypothesis 4: Anger about monitoring independently positively relates to political activity.

If support for the above hypotheses can be found, then it seems that distinct negative emotional reactions importantly link U.S. government monitoring to political engagement. The dominant and discrete reaction of anger about monitoring trumps the less common reaction of anxiety about monitoring, which on balance positively relates to political activity.

Data and Key Measures

As part of a larger project designed to investigate political attitudes and behaviors during the summer of 2007, the Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut administered a RDD telephone sample of adult, noninstitutionalized residents of the contiguous United States. From August 15 through September 12, 2007, telephone numbers were dialed daily. Interviewers attempted up to eight calls to contact potential respondents and used a computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) system to administer questions and record responses.⁴ Only the key measures receive a detailed discussion below; Appendix 1 contains the question wording of all measures used in the analysis.

Anger and anxiety about U.S. government monitoring represent the central independent variables in the analysis. To measure these variables, interviewers first ask respondents to consider government monitoring: "Now, we would like to know how you feel when you think about the government monitoring the activities of people like you." After this initial government monitoring prime, we then randomly rotate a series of six separate questions using

one of the following emotions: anxious, worried, scared, angry, annoyed, and outraged. "How _____ does it make you feel—very _____, somewhat _____, a little _____, or not at all _____?" Past work demonstrates that this technique elicits specific emotions rather than general emotions (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2006). In other words, this technique differentiates between angry people generally (i.e., trait anger) from people who get angry when considering a specific circumstance or target (i.e., state anger).⁵ Following Huddy and colleagues who use similar indicators⁶, we expect that the angry, annoyed, and outraged responses should form an anger dimension and the anxious, scared, and worried responses should form an anxiety dimension. The three anger measures are combined using factor analysis (principal factors extraction method); the mean of the anger factor loadings equals .87, with a low loading of .83. Similarly, the three anxiety measures are combined using factor analysis; the mean of the anxiety factor loadings equals .76, with a low loading of .75. Although the two extracted factor scores for anger and anxiety are used in the analyses to reduce measurement error, a simple additive scale reveals respective Cronbach's alphas of .91 and .84.

Political participation is the key dependent variable in the analysis. We measure respondent's level of political participation over the past 12 months with answers to the following questions: "Have you personally gone to see, made a phone call to, or sent a postal letter to an elected representative, government official, or candidate for office to express your opinion about a local, national, or international issue?" "Have you signed a written petition about a local, national, or international issue?" "Have you contributed money to a political party, candidate, organization, or some other political cause over the telephone, by postal mail, or in person?" "Have you telephoned, written a letter, or spoken with someone in an effort to persuade that person to adopt your view on a local, national, or international issue?" Respondents answering yes to a question immediately receive this follow-up: "How often have you done it—just once, a few times, or on many occasions?" We combine these four-category participation measures using factor analysis (principal factors extraction method), which suggests one participatory dimension. The mean of the factor loadings equal .68, with a low loading of .52. The extracted factor score is used in the subsequent analysis; a simple additive scale of these individual participation items reveals a Cronbach's alpha of .67.

Method and Modeling

Because the first hypothesis suggests that the anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring measures will form related but distinct negative

affective dimensions, we begin with a factor analysis including all six affective measures. We use a principal factors extraction method with an oblique oblimin rotation, which allows for nonorthogonal dimensions. Only factors with eigenvalues greater than or equal to 1 are extracted. The hypothesis would receive support if the angry, annoyed, and outraged measures form one dimension and the anxious, worried, and scared measures form a distinct dimension. The second hypothesis suggests that individuals will react to government monitoring by displaying higher levels of anger compared with anxiety. To test this expectation, we assess the descriptive statistics from the six individual anger and anxiety measures. A paired samples *t* test is used to compare the difference in means.

The third and fourth hypotheses suggest that anxiety about monitoring independently negatively relates to political activity whereas anger about monitoring independently positively relates to political activity. The political participation dependent variable is a factor score of four traditional participatory acts. As such, ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is an appropriate statistical technique to estimate the independent relationship between political engagement and anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring. To help prevent spurious relationships between our key affective measures and political participation, we control for standard factors previously found to predict political activity including political interest, government trust, external political efficacy, civic engagement, partisan identification, age, income, education, gender, race, and community size.⁷ In addition, because the executive branch controls the surveillance apparatus, negative affect toward monitoring could simply represent cognitive assessments of the president (George W. Bush). Although not a common independent variable in empirical models of political participation, we also control for presidential approval to separate negative cognitive attitudes toward George W. Bush and anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring.⁸

Finally, after testing the third and fourth hypotheses with the baseline OLS model, we consider several alternative models that account for potential criticisms and demonstrate the robustness of the general findings. We rerun the baseline analysis with ordered logistic regression using the individual political activities as the dependent variables rather than the overall factor score, which demonstrates the reliability of the general findings. Next we respecify the baseline model with an additional control variable, anxiety about terrorism, which should ease concerns that the anxiety about monitoring variable merely captures trait anxiety. Finally, because there may be a reciprocal relationship between political participation and monitoring affect, we employ an instrumental variable estimation technique to account for potential endogeneity.

Table 1. Anger and Anxiety Measures, Factor Analysis With Oblique Oblimin Rotation

	Anger factor	Anxiety factor
Angry	.910^a	-.003
Annoyed	.819^a	.023
Outraged	.881^a	-.011
Anxious	.019	.755^a
Worried	.064	.749^a
Scared	-.051	.782^a

Note: Factor correlation equals .64.

a. $p < .01$

Results

Table 1 reports the results from the factor analysis involving the six monitoring affect items. Hypothesis 1 suggests that these items should form two related but distinct dimensions. The results from the factor analysis provide strong evidence for this expectation. Angry, annoyed, and outraged all load highly onto one component whereas anxious, worried, and scared load highly onto the second component. Importantly, none of the individual items load on the alternate dimension at even the .10 level. This suggests that the individual items represent distinct types of negative affect, which empirically justifies discrete treatment of the anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring factor scores in the subsequent analysis. Of course, the results also indicate that the anger and anxiety affective dimensions are related ($r = .64$). As previously noted, given that individuals often simultaneously experience multiple negative emotions, we do not expect strict orthogonality but rather suggest that one simple dimension often fails to best capture the variance in negative affect.

Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the six monitoring affect items. Hypothesis 2 expects to find higher levels of anger about monitoring than anxiety about monitoring. The descriptive data provides support for this expectation, as the sample means for anxious, scared, and worried each differ from angry, annoyed, and outraged with at least 99% confidence. Nearly half the respondents feel at least somewhat angry, annoyed, and outraged when considering the government monitoring people like themselves, yet only about one in four respondents feel comparably anxious, worried, and scared. When considering only the high end of the scale, 10%, 12%, and 8% of

Table 2. Frequency Percentages for Anger and Anxiety About Government Monitoring

	Not at all (%)	A little (%)	Somewhat (%)	Very (%)	N
Anxious	54.1	17.6	18.5	9.8	1,029
Worried	54.0	15.5	18.6	11.9	1,030
Scared	63.2	13.2	15.7	7.9	1,030
Angry	45.4	12.0	20.1	22.4	1,032
Annoyed	35.2	13.7	19.0	32.1	1,032
Outraged	47.4	13.1	19.8	19.8	1,023

Note: Anxious, Worried, and Scared means each differ from Angry, Annoyed, and Outraged means at the $p < .01$ level (paired samples t test).

respondents, respectively feel very anxious, very worried, and very scared whereas 22%, 32%, and 20%, respectively feel very angry, very annoyed, and very outraged. Taken altogether, these results demonstrate that considerable minorities react emotionally to the prospects of government monitoring in the United States, with very strong anger reactions about twice as common as very strong anxiety reactions.

Finding that U.S. residents react to government monitoring with more anger than anxiety does not alone help illuminate how government monitoring positively relates to political activity in the United States. Crucially, as Hypotheses 3 and 4 specify, anxiety about monitoring must negatively relate and anger about monitoring must positively relate to political participation. Table 3 displays the results from the baseline OLS model of political participation, which allows for a test of the independent association between political activity and monitoring affect.⁹ The results offer strong evidence to support the hypotheses.

Both the anxiety about monitoring and anger about monitoring coefficients are distinguishable from zero with high degrees of confidence ($p < .01$). As expected, anxiety negatively and anger positively relates to political participation even after controlling for a host of other theoretically relevant factors. Moreover, the standardized coefficients suggest these relationships are not trivial when compared with other longstanding independent predictors. The magnitude of the anger coefficient (Beta = .185) ranks among the most potent variables, whereas anxiety's (Beta = -.136) degree of influence is only somewhat less important. Given that U.S. residents display higher levels of anger about monitoring than anxiety about monitoring, that anger

Table 3. Political Participation Factor Score Model, Ordinary Least Squares Estimation

Independent variables	Political participation	Beta
Monitoring anxiety	-.136*** (.038)	-.136 ^a
Monitoring anger	.183*** (.041)	.185 ^a
Political interest	.248*** (.038)	.197 ^a
External efficacy	.074*** (.026)	.087 ^a
Government trust	-.090** (.041)	-.069 ^a
Presidential approval	.013 (.034)	
Republican	-.104 (.093)	
Independent	.019 (.070)	
Gender (1 = female; 0 = not female)	-.109* (.059)	-.054 ^a
Race (1 = White; 0 = not White)	.036 (.069)	
Age	.009*** (.002)	.153 ^a
Education	.133*** (.030)	.150 ^a
Income	.032 (.024)	
Community size (1 = rural; 0 = not rural)	-.079 (.074)	
Civic engagement	.140*** (.023)	.182 ^a
Constant	-2.054*** (.191)	
Adjusted R ²	.202	
N	982	

Note: Coefficients are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

a. Standardized coefficients.

*Significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test. **Significant at $p < .05$. ***Significant at $p < .01$.

about monitoring positively relates to political engagement, and that anxiety about monitoring less strongly negatively relates to political participation, it appears that emotional reactions to government monitoring help explain the overall positive association between government surveillance and political engagement in the United States.

Alternate Models

Because the four individual political activities combine to form the dependent variable of overall political participation with merely an acceptable degree of reliability ($\alpha = .67$), we disaggregate the combined measure into its constituent participatory acts. In other words, one type of political activity may diverge from the general pattern of association, which perhaps unduly

leverages the estimates. To test this possibility, we use ordered logistic regression, with the four individual political acts specified as the dependent variables (see Table 4). Across the ordered logistic regression models, each of the eight coefficients for anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring can be differentiated from zero with at least 90% confidence using a conservative two-tailed test. As important, the four anger coefficients indicate a positive association whereas the anxiety coefficients indicate a negative relationship. It appears that the findings from the baseline model of overall participation apply across each of the four participatory acts.¹⁰

Because Huddy and colleagues (2007) find that specific anxiety measures, though not specific anger measures, correlate relatively highly across different targets such as terrorists and Saddam Hussein, the anxiety about monitoring finding may simply represent generally anxious people avoiding multiple forms of engagement. Fortunately, the survey instrument contains a specific measure of anxiety about terrorism, which has no *a priori* connection to lower levels of political engagement in politics apart from the possibility of also identifying generally anxious individuals. If the specific anxiety measures predominantly tap into generalized anxiety that negatively associates with political activity, then we should find at least one of the following conditions: (a) anxiety about terrorism and anxiety about monitoring correlate highly, (b) anxiety about terrorism negatively relates to political participation when entered into the baseline model, (c) the inclusion of the anxiety about terrorism measure into the baseline model attenuates the anxiety about monitoring coefficient, and (d) anxiety about terrorism negatively relates to political participation when replacing anxiety about monitoring in the baseline model.

Collectively, the results presented in Table 5 suggest that the anxiety about monitoring measure predominantly taps into a discrete form of anxiety. The anxiety about terrorism measure correlates modestly with the anxiety about monitoring measure ($r = .18$). The anxiety about terrorism coefficient is not confidently differentiated from zero when entered into the model of political participation. With the anxiety about terrorism measure included as an independent variable, the anxiety about monitoring coefficient does not appreciably attenuate compared with the baseline model ($-.136$ vs. $-.131$). Moreover, when anxiety about terrorism replaces anxiety about monitoring in the political participation model, its coefficient is not confidently distinguishable from zero. Therefore, no evidence implies that the anxiety about monitoring measure simply represents generalized trait anxiety.

Of course, the negative anxiety about monitoring coefficient alone offers support for our assertion of independence. As previously discussed, researchers routinely find a positive relationship between anxiety and political

Table 4. Individual Political Acts Model, Ordered Logistic Regression Estimation

Independent variables	Dependent variables			
	Contact	Petition	Donate	Persuade
Monitoring anxiety	-.356*** (.117)	-.225** (.106)	-.311** (.131)	-.263** (.136)
Monitoring anger	.463*** (.124)	.338*** (.113)	.261* (.136)	.276** (.141)
Political interest	.689*** (.142)	.504*** (.126)	.648*** (.157)	.867*** (.182)
External efficacy	.166** (.077)	.049 (.074)	.232*** (.085)	.212** (.093)
Government trust	-.341*** (.129)	-.244** (.123)	-.097 (.137)	-.354** (.158)
Presidential approval	.027 (.103)	-.032 (.099)	.136 (.111)	-.046 (.130)
Republican	.226 (.293)	-.216 (.275)	-.147 (.310)	-.429 (.362)
Independent	.252 (.220)	-.005 (.196)	-.079 (.239)	.066 (.244)
Gender (1 = female; 0 = not female)	-.235 (.179)	-.130 (.167)	-.060 (.194)	-.314 (.214)
Race (1 = White; 0 = not White)	.353 (.226)	.245 (.199)	-.471** (.225)	.424 (.264)
Age	.033*** (.006)	.003 (.005)	.025*** (.006)	-.003 (.006)
Education	.318*** (.090)	.170** (.086)	.147 (.096)	.459*** (.108)
Income	.009 (.075)	.137** (.069)	.206** (.080)	-.072 (.088)
Community size (1 = rural; 0 = not rural)	.018 (.226)	-.910*** (.261)	.065 (.242)	-.344 (.291)
Civic engagement	.371*** (.065)	.165*** (.062)	.267*** (.067)	.224*** (.073)
McFadden pseudo R^2	.138	.073	.100	.121
N	982	982	982	982

Note: Coefficients are ordered logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

*Significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test. **Significant at $p < .05$. ***Significant at $p < .01$.

McFadden pseudo R^2 is the proportionate reduction in R^2 times the log of the likelihood function (logistic regression finds the coefficients that make R^2 log likelihood as small as possible). McFadden pseudo R^2 is merely an approximation of the R^2 found in the baseline OLS model.

Table 5. Political Participation Factor Score Model With Terrorism Anxiety, Ordinary Least Squares Estimation

Independent variables	Dependent variables	
	Political participation (with both anxiety measures)	Political participation (without monitoring anxiety)
Monitoring anxiety	-.131*** (.039)	
Monitoring anger	.179*** (.041)	.094*** (.033)
Political interest	.250*** (.038)	.251*** (.039)
External efficacy	.074*** (.026)	.079*** (.026)
Government trust	-.090** (.041)	-.103** (.041)
Presidential approval	.012 (.034)	.011 (.034)
Republican	-.103 (.093)	-.096 (.093)
Independent	.022 (.070)	.041 (.070)
Gender (1 = female; 0 = not female)	-.104* (.059)	-.113* (.059)
Race (1 = White; 0 = not White)	.034 (.069)	.045 (.069)
Age	.009*** (.001)	.009*** (.002)
Education	.131*** (.030)	.134*** (.030)
Income	.032 (.024)	.034 (.024)
Community size (1 = rural; 0 = not rural)	-.074 (.074)	-.076 (.075)
Civic engagement	.141*** (.023)	.136*** (.023)
Terrorism anxiety	-.011 (.019)	-.026 (.019)
Constant	-2.019*** (.200)	-1.980*** (.201)
Adjusted R ²	.201	.192
N	982	982

Note: Coefficients are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

*Significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test. **Significant at $p < .05$. ***Significant at $p < .01$.

activity (e.g., Brader, 2006; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2006; Wolak & Marcus, 2007), with no study demonstrating a negative association. Given that we find a negative relationship between anxiety about monitoring and political participation, if anything, then these previous findings offer support for our assertion that anxiety about monitoring is discrete from other types of anxiety.

The theoretical model presented suggests that anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring influence political engagement. However, these affect measures may not be completely exogenous independent variables,

with the connection possibly best conceived as a cycle. Political activity perhaps triggers anger at government monitoring, as individuals think their engagement makes them a more likely target of surveillance. Because anxiety about monitoring negatively relates to political activity, a reciprocal relationship might be explained by individuals becoming desensitized to and less anxious about government monitoring as they increasingly participate in politics. If a reciprocal relationship exists, then to assess the influence of monitoring affect on political engagement we must first purge the estimates of any potential endogeneity. To do so, we use two-stage ordinary least squares.

In the first-stage models, estimates for each endogenous variable (anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring) are obtained using instruments that are correlated with the endogenous variables but not with the second-stage model's error. In other words, valid excluded instruments should not independently associate with political participation, although they should associate with anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring. Six measures are used as instruments that have no prior theoretical connection to political engagement¹¹: (a) perceptions of the effectiveness of reducing terrorism if the government monitors American's e-mail, (b) feelings of anxiety about another serious terrorist attack in the United States, (c) attitudes about the government requiring Arab Americans to carry a special ID card, (d) trust in law enforcement to do what is right, (e) whether respondents have had their car searched by the police, and (f) attitudes about the security-liberty trade-off. As detailed below, we rely on diagnostic statistical evidence to assess the validity of these instruments.

We run two tests of the validity of the excluded instruments. First, much of the variance explained in the first-stage models of anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring should come from the excluded instruments (Bartels, 1991). If the excluded instruments do not sufficiently predict anger about monitoring and anxiety about monitoring, then the two-stage procedure will not represent the true model in a more efficient manner than the baseline OLS model. To test this condition, we use a weak identification test. Because we instrument more than one endogenous variable, the Craig-Donald *F* statistic is used for the Stock-Yogo weak identification test (Stock & Yogo, 2005). The Craig-Donald statistic (13.75) clearly exceeds the critical value (9.48), demonstrating that the instruments are not weak and plausibly can be used in the analysis.

We undertook a second critical test. To be valid, excluded instruments also cannot independently predict the second-stage model's error. In other words, the excluded instruments should not predict political participation once

controlling for the other independent variables in the model. This can be tested in overidentified models using a Sargan statistic. The Sargan statistic (1.16) does not approach conventional levels of statistical significance ($p = .88$), demonstrating high confidence that the excluded instruments are orthogonal to the error term in the second-stage equation. Together, these two tests confirm the appropriateness of using these variables as instruments.

Table 6 displays the results from the second-stage model of political participation; the results from the first stage models are presented in Appendix 2. Both the instrumented anxiety about monitoring and anger about monitoring coefficients can be confidently differentiated from zero. Also, the coefficients' signs do not change from the baseline model; anxiety about monitoring negatively relates and anger about monitoring positively relates to political activity. Therefore, these results suggest that the relationship between U.S. government monitoring affect and political participation is not likely explained by political engagement solely driving emotions about government monitoring.¹²

Conclusion

Although a long history of questionable government monitoring exists in the United States (e.g., Churchill & Vander Wall, 1990; Cunningham, 2004; Donner, 1980), empirical political scientists have seldom incorporated U.S. government monitoring in general models of U.S. political engagement. This lack of attention has changed in the post-September 11 environment, with studies demonstrating that government monitoring, variously conceived and measured, positively associates with engagement in politics (Cho et al., 2006; Krueger, 2005, 2008). This study attempts to understand why Americans seem to react to government monitoring by engaging in politics rather than becoming politically docile, as much theoretical and empirical work anticipate (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Foucault, 1979; Mill, 1991; Westin, 1967). We propose that the consideration of discrete negative emotions offers a solution. Specifically, this project demonstrates that U.S. government monitoring produces distinct negative emotions, anger and anxiety, which respectively positively and negatively relate to political engagement. Moreover, because U.S. residents react to government monitoring with more anger than anxiety, a net positive association occurs, which provides an explanation for this puzzling positive relationship found in the extant literature.

By focusing on the varied emotional reactions to government monitoring, one of the strengths of this framework is that it can comprehend the diverse

Table 6. Political Participation Factor Score Model, Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation

Independent variables	Political participation
Monitoring anxiety ^a	-.324*** (.137)
Monitoring anger ^a	.256** (.105)
Political interest	.253*** (.039)
External efficacy	.062** (.027)
Government trust	-.077* (.044)
Presidential approval	-.001 (.038)
Republican	-.121 (.093)
Independent	.001 (.073)
Gender (1 = female; 0 = not female)	-.077 (.063)
Race (1 = White; 0 = not White)	.010 (.071)
Age	.009*** (.002)
Education	.129*** (.031)
Income	.026 (.025)
Community size (1 = rural; 0 = not rural)	-.067 (.075)
Civic engagement	.147*** (.024)
Constant	-2.013*** (.197)
N	982

Note: Coefficients are unstandardized two-stage least squares regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses. Craig-Donald Statistic for Stock-Yogo Weak Identification Test = 13.75 (90% critical value = 9.48). Sargan Statistic = 1.16 ($p = .88$).

a. Signifies instrumented variable.

*Significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test. **Significant at $p < .05$. ***Significant at $p < .01$.

relationships between monitoring and political activity found across contexts. Accordingly, future research could use this framework to propose testable hypotheses about when monitoring would show a positive or negative association with political activity. For example, because a well-developed literature exists predicting the varied causes of anger and anxiety, extending current surveillance trends may help envisage future reactions to government monitoring in the United States. Given the massive expansion of monitoring throughout many aspects of contemporary life, individuals may get accustomed to monitoring as a ubiquitous, unalterable, and perhaps even necessary part of life. From a cognitive appraisal perspective, anger is often thought to occur when individuals feel an external actor blocks a goal, damages a cherished value, or acts unfairly (e.g., Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). Therefore, if more citizens come to not expect a surveillance-free environment, then it seems likely that anger reactions would attenuate from current

levels. If this scenario transpires, then our approach would suggest the net pattern of association between government monitoring and political activity would change from positive to null or even negative.

This project also contributes to the study of emotions in politics. In particular, it demonstrates that the common formulation that proposes threatening stimuli produce anxiety, which leads to increased attention, learning, and action to resolve the threat, is inadequate for comprehending government monitoring and political engagement. Brader (2005) as well as Valentino et al. (2009) explicitly have recognized this oversimplification in theorizing about the role of anxiety and political action, though their own work shows the conventional positive (or null) empirical connection between anxiety and political action. To date, researchers have exclusively demonstrated how anxiety leads to political action (e.g., Brader, 2006; Brader, Valentino, & Suhay, 2008; Huddy et al., 2007; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2006; Wolak & Marcus, 2007), with no studies showing anxiety leading to political demobilization. This study offers a framework for predicting when anxiety leads to lower levels of political engagement. We suggest that when participating in politics itself is perceived to increase the odds of exposure to threatening stimuli, such as government monitoring, anxious individuals can be expected to diminish the threat by decreasing their participation in politics.

The recent study of emotions in political science has coincided with a conscious effort to change the normative view of emotions' role in democratic citizenship (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Marcus, 2002; Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino et al., 2008; Wolak et al., 2003). Instead of being antithetical to rational decision making and constructive citizenship activity, scholars often claim that emotions compliment these normatively desirable practices. In this regard, anxiety overwhelmingly receives the most accolades. Studies consistently demonstrate that anxiety promotes information searches and attention to politics (e.g., Marcus et al., 2000; Valentino, 2008), deliberation (e.g., Huddy et al., 2007), political knowledge and learning (e.g., Marcus & MacKuen, 1993), the willingness to compromise (e.g., Wolak & Marcus, 2007), and political action (e.g., Brader, 2006). In short, anxiety is often explicitly praised as a lubricant of democracy by virtue of its role in inducing multiple "citizenship behaviors"¹³ (Wolak & Marcus, 2007).

Alternately, anger, when considered, is most often cast as the normatively bad negative emotion. Though anger is sometimes shown to positively associate with political activity, studies also demonstrate that it associates with the disregard of contrary information about the risks of war (Huddy et al., 2007), the contraction of the breadth and depth of information searches (Redlawsk, Civettini, & Lau, 2007), and the refusal to compromise (Wolak & Marcus, 2007). Marcus and colleagues (2000) attest that anger "surely

produces less admirable consequences” than anxiety, even suggesting that anger is the emotion most connected to “ethnic cleansing” and “genocide” (p. 139).

Our work questions this common dichotomy of anxiety as the normatively good negative emotion and anger as the bad negative emotion.¹⁴ Our functional view is that emotions help individuals manage diverse stimuli, which depending on the context may or may not serve the interests of democratic citizenship. Though anger may lead individuals to disregard the risks of war and refuse to compromise about public policy, it also may supply a crucial civic commodity, courage. Only anger provides the energy to act politically in some types of threatening environments, notwithstanding the increased hazard (perceived or real) to individuals through their political action. Theorists from Locke (2003), to Paine (1944), to M. L. King Jr. (1960) argue that individuals often must engage in political action, even if the action poses some risk to individuals, in the face of inappropriate government behavior to maintain the health of the polity. Our analysis suggests that anger promotes political action in these types of environments whereas anxiety encourages political demobilization.

Appendix I

Question Wording

Political Participation. “People are active in their community and express their beliefs in many ways. I will now list some activities that people sometimes take part in to stay active and to express their beliefs. For each, please tell me if you have done it in the last 12 months. First . . .”

“Have you personally gone to see, made a phone call to, or sent a postal letter to an elected representative, government official, or candidate for office to express your opinion about a local, national, or international issue? How often have you done it—just once, a few times, or on many occasions?”

“Have you signed a written petition about a local, national, or international issue? How often have you done it—just once, a few times, or on many occasions?”

“Have you contributed money to a political party, candidate, organization, or some other political cause over the telephone, by postal mail, or in person? How often have you done it—just once, a few times, or on many occasions?”

(continued)

Appendix I (Continued)

“Have you telephoned, written a letter, or spoken with someone in an effort to persuade that person to adopt your view on a local, national, or international issue? How often have you done it—just once, a few times, or on many occasions?”

Surveillance Affect. “Now, we would like to know how you feel when you think about the government monitoring the activities of people like you . . .”

“How anxious does it make you feel—very anxious, somewhat anxious, a little anxious, or not anxious at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

“How worried does it make you feel—very worried, somewhat worried, a little worried, or not worried at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

“How scared does it make you feel—very scared, somewhat scared, a little scared, or not scared at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

“How angry does it make you feel—very angry, somewhat angry, a little angry, or not angry at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

“How annoyed does it make you feel—very annoyed, somewhat annoyed, a little annoyed, or not annoyed at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

“How outraged does it make you feel—very outraged, somewhat outraged, a little outraged, or not outraged at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

Control Variables

Political interest: “Generally speaking, how much interest would you say you have in what’s going on in government and public affairs: a great deal, a fair amount, only a little, or no interest at all?” [response order reversed in analyses]

External efficacy: “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does. (probe: agree/disagree strongly/somewhat)” [response order reversed in analyses]

Government trust: “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—Just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?” [response order reversed in analyses]

(continued)

Appendix I (Continued)

Presidential approval: "To begin, do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? (probe: strongly/somewhat approve/disapprove)" [response order reversed in analyses]

Partisan identification: "Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?"

Gender: Interviewer records gender.

Race: "What racial or ethnic group would you most identify yourself with? Black, White, Asian, Native American, or something else? Are you of Spanish or Hispanic origin or descent?"

Age: "In what year were you born?"

Education: "What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed and gotten credit for?"

Income: "For classification purposes only, is the total yearly income of all the members of your family now living at home less than US\$50,000 or is it US\$50,000 or more? (for those less than US\$50,000) Is it more than US\$25,000 or below US\$25,000 . . . (For those US\$50,000 or more) Is it US\$50,000 to US\$74,999, is it US\$75,000 to US\$99,999, or is it more than US\$100,000."

Community size: Extracted from the sample's Nielson community rating.

Civic engagement: "How often do you go to group meetings of organizations like fraternal groups, community groups, school groups, or civic groups? (Probe: more than once a week, once a week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year or never)" [response order reversed in analyses]

Excluded Instruments

Terrorism anxiety: "When you think about the possibility of another serious terrorist attack, how anxious does it make you feel—very anxious, somewhat anxious, a little anxious, or not anxious at all?" [response order reversed in analyses]

Monitoring efficacy: "Do you think reading ordinary Americans' email messages will or will not be effective in reducing the threat of terrorism?" [response order reversed in analyses]

Automobile searched: "Have you ever had your car searched by law enforcement officials?"

Law enforcement trust: "How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right—just about always, most

(continued)

Appendix I (Continued)

of the time, only some of the time, or almost never?" [response order reversed in analyses]

Security–liberty trade-off: "Which comes closer to your view: The government should take all steps necessary to reduce the threat of terrorism in the United States even if it means violating the personal privacy of ordinary Americans, or the government should take steps to reduce the threat of terrorism but not if those steps would violate the personal privacy of ordinary Americans?"

Arab ID card: "Do you support or oppose the government requiring Arab Americans to carry a special identification card?" [response order reversed in analyses]

Appendix 2

First Stage Models

First Stage Models of Anger and Anxiety, Two-Stage Least Squares Estimation

Independent variables	Dependent variables	
	Anger about monitoring	Anxiety about monitoring
Terror anxiety ^a	.029* (.017)	.124*** (.019)
Monitoring efficacy ^a	-.553*** (.058)	-.283*** (.066)
Automobile searched ^a	-.058 (.063)	-.173** (.072)
Law enforcement trust ^a	-.187*** (.038)	-.147*** (.043)
Security–liberty trade-off ^a	-.538*** (.063)	-.464*** (.071)
Arab ID card ^a	-.029* (.017)	.043** (.019)
Political interest	.133*** (.034)	.093** (.039)
External efficacy	-.068*** (.022)	-.078*** (.026)
Government trust	-.058 (.037)	.061 (.042)
Presidential approval	-.157*** (.029)	-.106*** (.033)
Republican	-.009 (.081)	-.062 (.092)
Independent	.080 (.062)	-.069 (.070)
Gender (1 = female; 0 = not female)	.164*** (.053)	.141** (.061)
Race (1 = White; 0 = not White)	-.001 (.061)	-.095 (.069)
Age	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Education	.060** (.027)	.036 (.030)
Income	-.039* (.021)	-.034 (.024)

(continued)

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Independent variables	Dependent variables			
	Anger about monitoring		Anxiety about monitoring	
Community size (1 = rural; 0 = not rural)	.004	(.065)	.006	(.074)
Civic engagement	-.006	(.020)	.035	(.023)
Constant	.908***	(.197)	.102	(.224)
	.423		.234	
Partial R^2 , excluded instruments	.226		.119	
F test, excluded instruments	46.73***		21.71***	
N	982		982	

Note: Coefficients are unstandardized ordinary least squares (OLS) regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.

a. Signifies excluded instrument.

*Significant at $p < .10$, two-tailed test. **Significant at $p < .05$. ***Significant at $p < .01$.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

Notes

1. The volume of this literature should not be overstated. James Gibson (2008), discussing repression more generally in the post–September 11th environment suggests that “social scientists have been slow to contribute to the debate over intolerance and repression in the contemporary United States” (p. 3). Gibson’s recent related work focuses on the ramifications of citizen’s political intolerance, citizen’s perceptions of their own freedom, and their views about whether the government would allow them to engage in various political activities. He does not consider the implications of those individuals who feel they are allowed to act but will be monitored by the government if they do act. Other related research considers public opinion toward government monitoring and restrictions to civil liberties in the post–September 11th environment (Best & Krueger, 2006; Davis & Silver, 2004; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, & Lahav, 2005).

2. Cho et al. (2006) argue that the USA Patriot Act has three basic components, two of which involve government monitoring: "This legislation gave the government broad new investigative authority, the power to detain and deport those judged to be a special threat, to conduct secret searches, and to deploy wiretaps and other surveillance tools" (p. 979).
3. This expectation of more anger than anxiety parallels Ted Robert Gurr's (1970) well-developed consideration of citizen responses to government repression. Gurr not only is best known for his work on severe government repression and violent citizen revolts but also has developed theory to comprehend emotional reactions to soft forms of state repression. His framework proposes that individuals should emotionally react with more anger than anxiety when the government merely uses soft forms of domestic repression—explicitly including government surveillance (p. 232). The key to understanding emotional responses is the degree of threat associated with the government action. For Gurr, modest government threats, such as surveillance, would need to be coupled with more threatening forms of repression to trigger anxiety as the dominant negative emotion. U.S. government surveillance alone would not likely pose a great enough threat to individuals to produce extensive anxiety and therefore will likely produce more anger than anxiety. Following Gurr, we expect that anger reactions typically would be more pronounced than anxiety reactions in the United States, given that the surveillance found in the United States would not be perceived as an existential threat for the overwhelming majority of U.S. citizens.
4. The response rate was 36.2% (using AAPOR Response Rate 6), which yielded more than 1,000 respondents. Although not as high as some national surveys such as the National Election Studies or the General Social Surveys, research has shown that this response rate is now common and does not necessarily yield lower quality data (Keeter, Miller, Kohut, Groves, & Presser, 2000).
5. Huddy and colleagues (2007) find that whereas anger is quite distinct across targets, anxiety has higher across target correlations. Accordingly, in the subsequent data analysis, we control for a related but distinct form of anxiety, terrorism anxiety. We find a modest .18 correlation between monitoring anxiety and terrorism anxiety, which suggests that the monitoring anxiety measure does not simply tap into a single underlying anxiety dimension.
6. For their context-specific anxiety dimension, they use the terms *nervous*, *scared*, and *afraid*. For this article, the terms *anxiety* and *fear* will be used interchangeably. For their anger dimension, they use the terms *angry*, *hostile*, and *disgusted*.
7. See Appendix 1 for control variable question wording.
8. The correlation between George W. Bush approval and the monitoring measures suggest considerable independence. Presidential approval and monitoring anger correlate at $-.46$ whereas presidential approval and monitoring anxiety correlate

- at $-.29$. Each correlation suggests that cognitive assessments of the president account for less than one fifth of the variance in monitoring affect.
9. Diagnostics suggest no multicollinearity problems in the model. The mean variance inflation factor is 1.3, with a maximum VIF of 2.1.
 10. The control variable findings generally conform to previous studies and therefore require little additional attention. Yet one of the control variables, external efficacy, deserves further consideration. Past work by Valentino and associates (2006) demonstrates that anger may well have a stronger relationship to political participation when individuals possess high levels of external efficacy, which could help individuals turn their anger into action. We tested this potential conditional relationship by creating an interaction between external efficacy and anger. Next, we reran the baseline OLS model with the External efficacy \times Anger interaction term included. The external efficacy and anger interaction term did just achieve statistical significance ($p = .09$). Substantively the conditional effect is modest, however. The anger variable's Beta coefficient in the baseline model equals .185. For those with the lowest degree of external efficacy, Beta is attenuated by .031. For those with the highest degree of external efficacy, Beta is increased by .039.
 11. We ran an alternate two-stage model with presidential approval specified as one of the exogenous variables because it is not traditionally included as a predictor of political participation. The results from this alternate model are not appreciably different compared with the presented two-stage model. We decided to exclude presidential approval because of potential claims that participation during this period was energized by anti-Bush sentiment. Nonetheless, the diagnostic empirical evidence suggests that presidential approval would be a valid instrument.
 12. An anonymous reviewer noted that the relationship between monitoring affect and political engagement may be accounted for by some unmeasured third variable, a possibility always present in observational studies relying on multivariate regression for control. For example, it could be that those engaged in politics simply pay more attention to political news and thus learn about government monitoring, which triggers emotional reactions. To account for the possible correlation between the first-stage disturbance terms (anxiety and anger models), we also ran a three-stage ordinary least square regression. The monitoring anxiety and monitoring anger results are nearly identical in terms of both substance and significance.
 13. Anxiety's positive relationship to citizenship behaviors is even used to justify the lack of attention given to other types of emotions. Wolak and colleagues (2003) suggest that "[b]ecause the activation of the surveillance system predicts the strongest impact on the quality of citizenship, we focus on the factors that produce emotional reactions of fear and anxiety more so than those that

make people angry or proud” (p. 4). In addition, Valentino and associates (2008) explicitly entitle their recent article with a normative question: “Is a Worried Citizen a Good Citizen?” They answer yes, “anxiety can boost learning, while anger may lead people away from the kind of deliberation many democratic theorists cherish” (p. 267).

14. To be sure, we are not the first to ascribe anger as a potentially constructive emotion. Aristotle (2004) expresses the idea that anger often is beneficial for the prevention of injustice,
the man who is angry at the right things, and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praisedFor those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools . . . for such a man is thought not to feel things nor to be pained by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one’s friends is slavish (pp. 59-60).

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