

## ALTER EGOS AND THEIR NAMES\*

Failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope.

I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of *non*-coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity.

## I. SAUL'S PUZZLE

Jennifer Saul<sup>1</sup> has drawn attention to sentences containing no propositional-attitude, modal or quotational constructions that exhibit apparent failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms. For example, whereas (1) and (2) are true, (1') and (2') are not:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "Substitution and Simple Sentences," *Analysis*, 57 (1997): 102-08; "Reply to Forbes," *Analysis*, 57 (1997): 114-18; "Substitution, Simple Sentences, and Sex Scandals," *Analysis*, 59 (1999): 106-112.

<sup>2</sup> These examples are mine; (3) and (3') are Saul's. Saul gives a number of examples, including

- (i) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out.
- (i') Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out.
- and
- (ii) Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Clark Kent.
- (ii') Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Superman.

- (1) Batman is Bruce Wayne in disguise.
- (1') Bruce Wayne is Bruce Wayne in disguise.
- (2) Clark Kent is Superman's secret identity.
- (2') Superman is Superman's secret identity.

Moreover, the truth of (3):

- (3) Clark Kent always arrived at the scene just after one of Superman's daring rescues.

does not guarantee the truth of (3'):

- (3') Superman always arrived at the scene just after one of Clark Kent's daring rescues.

Let us call this situation – that there are apparent failures of substitutivity in linguistic contexts containing no patent source of opacity – *Saul's Puzzle*.

Saul argues that there is no obvious resolution of her puzzle consistent with standard accounts of the semantics of opaque contexts. It cannot be resolved by a straightforward Fregean account, on which 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' would be taken to refer to their senses in the contexts (1)-(3'), since senses do not wear disguises or have secret identities or arrive at scenes.<sup>3</sup> Metalinguistic accounts also fail: (4) and (4'), for example, are just as puzzling as (1) and (1'):

- (4) The bearer of 'Batman' is the bearer of 'Bruce Wayne' in disguise.
- (4') The bearer of 'Bruce Wayne' is the bearer of 'Bruce Wayne' in disguise.

Saul also considers a solution on which (1') and (2') are true, (3) entails (3'), (ii) is false and (i) entails (i'), and intuitions to the contrary are explained away on the basis of pragmatic considerations. (For example, as due to our acceptance of the (in these cases false) implicature that the distinct names in (1), (2), (3), (i) and (ii) refer to distinct things (why else would different names be used in these sentences?).)<sup>4</sup> Although perhaps not everyone will accept Saul's intuitions about these cases, they strike me as essentially sound. I am not,

<sup>3</sup> "Substitution and Simple Sentences," p. 104

<sup>4</sup> Other solutions that Saul discusses and rejects will be discussed below. For further debate, see Graeme Forbes, "How Much Substitutivity?" *Analysis*, LVII (1997): 109-13 and "Enlightened Semantics for Simple Sentences," *Analysis*, LIX (1999): 86-91; Joseph G. Moore, "Saving Substitutivity in Simple Sentences," *Analysis*, 59 (1999): 91-105; and Stephen Predelli "Saul, Salmon, and Superman," *Analysis*, LIX (1999): 113-116.

therefore, prepared to sacrifice the falsity of (1') and (2'), the non-entailment of (3') by (3) and (i') by (i), and the truth of (ii) to a pragmatics-based solution.

Moreover, I do not share Saul's puzzlement about these cases; for it seems to me that the most straightforward explanation of the substitution failures – namely, that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent', 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman' are *not* coreferential – is correct. Saul considers this sort of solution, but rejects it on the grounds that it entails that (5) and (6) are false:

(5) Superman is Clark Kent.

(6) Batman is Bruce Wayne .

It is, for Saul, a condition of adequacy on any solution to her puzzle that it preserve the truth of (5) and (6).<sup>5</sup>

There are, however, strong motivations for defending this solution to Saul's Puzzle, in spite of the fact that it entails the falsity of (5) and (6). In addition to the effect on traditional explanations of opacity mentioned above, there is the further concern that, given that opaque contexts are those in which substitution of coreferential expressions can fail, Saul's examples seem to show that virtually *all* contexts are opaque.<sup>6</sup>

Of course, if the intuition that (5) and (6) are literally true really is non-negotiable, as Saul claims, then we really might have a puzzle. But I think we can sustain the thesis that (5) and (6) are literally false and explain away intuitions to the contrary on the grounds that sentences like (5) and (6) have fairly common non-literal uses on which they express closely related propositions that may be true.

I shall argue in this paper that 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are names of *alter egos*, that alter egos are distinct from the persons whose alter egos they are, and that utterances of identity sentences containing one or more occurrences of an alter-ego name should, if they are to be taken to be true, be interpreted as meaning either that the person named by one term of the identity is the person whose alter ego is named by the other, or (as in the case of (5); see below) that the alter egos named by the terms of the identity are alter egos of the same person.

In addition to providing an explanation of Saul's anti-substitution intuitions, my account will, I hope, also make them seem more plausible to those inclined to reject them.

<sup>5</sup> "Substitution and Simple Sentences," p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> Robert M. Adams brought this point to my attention, in conversation.

## II. PERSONAE AND THEIR INHABITANTS

One initially attractive move, which Saul does not consider, is to attribute the substitution failures to the fact that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are names of *fictional characters*. Because they are fictional characters, sentences like (1), (2) and (3) are not simple after all, but contain (implicit) *fiction operators*. And since fiction operators are intensional, it is no surprise that these sentences can exhibit substitution failures.

But fictionality has nothing to do with substitution failure in these cases. There are similar examples involving names of real people. Consider the case made famous in the book and film *The Three Faces of Eve*. A woman is purported to have three distinct personalities, and goes by three different names, ‘Eve White’, ‘Eve Black’ and ‘Jane’, depending on which personality is manifesting itself. Eve White, for example, is timid and repressed, whereas Eve Black is bold and seductive. Accordingly, (7) would seem to be true:

(7) Eve White is more timid than Eve Black.

Yet, substituting ‘Eve White’ for ‘Eve Black’ yields (7’), which is false:

(7’) Eve White is more timid than Eve White.

Another example, less well known (though perhaps less controversial), is that of Andre Charles, a relatively unassuming man who frequently affects the look and attitude of a glamorous female supermodel named ‘Ru Paul’. Thus, though Andre Charles goes by both ‘Andre Charles’ and ‘Ru Paul’, (8) seems, intuitively, to be true:

(8) Ru Paul is more glamorous than Andre Charles.

though, of course, (8’) is false:

(8’) Ru Paul is more glamorous than Ru Paul.<sup>7</sup>

‘Eve White’, ‘Eve Black’, ‘Andre Charles’ and ‘Ru Paul’ are not names of fictional characters, yet they exhibit the same failures of intersubstitutability; so it seems unlikely that the fact that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are fictional names will figure in an adequate solution of Saul’s Puzzle. In what follows, therefore, I shall ignore the differences between fictional and non-fictional cases.

<sup>7</sup> Other non-fictional examples include the Australian actor Barry Humphries, otherwise known as the meretricious dowager Dame Edna Everage, and the country musician Garth Brooks, who released a recording as the mysterious “international pop/rock superstar” Chris Gaines.

Note that it is not simply in virtue of there being two distinct *names* that substitutivity fails, as shown by the following examples:

(9) Mark Twain was a more successful writer than Samuel Clemens.

(9') Mark Twain was a more successful writer than Mark Twain.

which are *both* false.

There are suggestive differences among these examples. The name 'Mark Twain' is not associated with the sort of distinct *behavioral profile* one associates with the names 'Eve Black' and 'Ru Paul'. 'Mark Twain' is simply a *nom de plume*; whereas 'Eve White' and 'Eve Black' are associated with distinct *personalities*. Ru Paul, in contrast, seems not to be a distinct personality from Andre Charles; there is not the sort of *involuntary compartmentalization* one finds in cases like Eve White/Eve Black. Likewise with Clark Kent and Superman. Still, the behavioral (and sartorial) characteristics one associates with the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Ru Paul' are certainly different from those one associates with 'Andre Charles' and 'Superman'. The "assumed identities" of Superman and Andre Charles are more like *personae* – something along the lines of a *role* played by an actor (who will (usually) dress and behave differently when inhabiting the role), which may be voluntarily taken on and abandoned.

But there are important differences between actor's roles and *personae* in the sense that is relevant here. Compare the role of Hamlet and the *persona* of Ru Paul. If Derek Jacobi walks by in costume backstage during a production of *Hamlet*, it seems false to say "There goes Hamlet": what goes there is Derek Jacobi, dressed to play (and perhaps behaving like) Hamlet. Whereas if Andre Charles walks by in full Ru Paul regalia, acting like a supermodel, one may well remark, truly, "There goes Ru Paul."

So perhaps the thing to say is that Ru Paul and Clark Kent are *personae* – some sort of behavioral/sartorial *syndromes*; something *like* a part one plays – intermittently inhabited by Andre Charles and Superman. But this will not do, for reasons analogous to the reasons Saul gives for the failure of the Fregean account. At least as I have characterized them, it is not a *persona* that works at the Daily Planet and has a crush on Lois. *Personae* do not do any of the things that Ru Paul and Clark Kent do; they do not *do* anything at all. So if we are to take the referents of 'Clark Kent' and 'Ru Paul' to be distinct from the referents of 'Superman' and 'Andre Charles', they cannot be *personae*.

I think this is on the right track, however; for surely personae have something to do with distinguishing Superman from Clark Kent and Ru Paul from Andre Charles. Consider the case of Batman. Bruce Wayne decides that he is going to wear a leather bat costume and prowl Gotham City at night looking for criminals. He says to himself: “When I am out there fighting crime, wearing this costume and using all these bat-gadgets, I am *Batman*.” That is, he *dubs* himself, *qua inhabitant of a particular persona he has constructed*, ‘Batman’. Similarly, when Andre Charles discovered that he likes to dress as a woman and act like a supermodel, he created the persona of Ru Paul, and dubbed himself, *qua inhabitant of that persona*, ‘Ru Paul’. Thus, ‘Batman’ and ‘Ru Paul’ refer to Bruce Wayne and Andre Charles when they are inhabiting their respective relevant personae.

Let us call a person *qua inhabitant of a persona* an *alter ego* of that person, and the person him or herself the *primum ego* of that alter ego.<sup>8</sup> The thesis I want to develop is that Ru Paul, Batman, et alia, are alter egos, and ‘Ru Paul’, ‘Batman’, et alia are their names.

The case of Superman and Clark Kent is different in an important way. Neither Superman nor Clark Kent is, I claim, an alter ego of the other. Rather, they are *both* alter egos of the Kryptonian Kal El. Though Kal El was named ‘Clark Kent’ by his adoptive parents, in Metropolis he has two distinct personae, the Milquetoast reporter and the Man of Steel, and goes by ‘Clark Kent’ when inhabiting the former and ‘Superman’ when inhabiting the latter. So, one and the same person can inhabit distinct personae – can have different alter egos – at different times (Kal El is sometimes Clark Kent, sometimes Superman), or intermittently inhabit a single persona (Andre Charles is not always Ru Paul).

The recent Hollywood film *The Mask of Zorro* brings out another interesting point, for it shows that *different* people can inhabit the same persona at different times. The story has Don Diego de la Vega *passing* on the Zorro persona to Alejandro Murieta – someone else who will dress in a certain way and do certain sorts of things, and call himself ‘Zorro’ while he is doing them; someone, that is, who will inhabit the Zorro persona. So Zorro, once Don Diego de la Vega’s alter ego, becomes Alejandro Murieta’s alter ego. One can easily imagine Bruce Wayne doing the same thing with the Batman persona – handing it down to Dick Grayson, for example, or even Barbara Gordon (the police commissioner’s daughter, whose alter ego is Batgirl<sup>9</sup>).

<sup>8</sup> ‘Alter ego’ and ‘primum ego’ are correlative terms: one is not a primum ego unless one has an alter ego.

<sup>9</sup> One needn’t be male in order to have Batman as one’s alter ego. All that is required is that one *present oneself* as male.

Kal El, Andre Charles, Bruce Wayne and Don Diego inhabit their personae in something *like* the way an actor plays a dramatic role, though Ru Paul and (within their respective fictions), Clark Kent, Superman, Batman and Zorro are not fictional.<sup>10</sup> Nor are they *characters* portrayed by their creators, like Flip Wilson's Geraldine and Paul Rubens's Peewee Herman.<sup>11</sup> When Bruce Wayne inhabits the Batman persona, he is not *playing* or *portraying* Batman, he is *being* Batman; likewise when Kal El inhabits the Superman or Clark Kent persona, and when Andre Charles inhabits the Ru Paul persona. Derek Jacobi, in contrast, is not being Hamlet, he is playing him. No one could *be* a fictional character.

### III. PERSONAE, ALTER EGOS AND THE REFERENCE OF ALTER-EGO NAMES

The suggestion, so far, is that names like 'Superman', 'Ru Paul', 'Batman' and 'Zorro' refer to alter egos, where an alter ego is an individual qua inhabitant of a persona, and an individual qua inhabitant of a persona is distinct from that individual simpliciter.<sup>12</sup> More can be said about what sort of thing alter egos might be and how they differ from primum egos; and I shall do so in section V. First, however, let us explore the notion of a persona a bit more, as well as the relation of alter-ego names to their referents.

Personae, as I am construing them, consist (most often<sup>13</sup>) of behavioral and sartorial *guidelines* – specifications of general ways of dressing and behaving – which allow for a significant degree of freedom in their realization.<sup>14</sup> Thus, for a person to inhabit a persona is for that person to have, under certain conditions (see below), its characteristic properties. The properties characteristic of the Clark Kent persona include

<sup>10</sup> That is, Clark Kent and Superman are *no more* fictional than Kal El, and Batman is *no more* fictional than Bruce Wayne. (Of course not all dramatic characters are fictional, as witness the play *Tru*, which includes Truman Capote among its *dramatis personae*.)

<sup>11</sup> Such characters are subtly different from dramatic roles. Wilson and Rubens portray Geraldine and Peewee Herman as part of a performance, just as Jacobi might portray Hamlet; and (or so it seems to me) Geraldine and Peewee Herman are both fictional. But they are characters Wilson and Rubens created only for themselves to portray. Indeed, they involve specific behavioral profiles, distinctive voices and movements, that perhaps only their creators are capable of. Dramatic roles, in contrast, may be performed by anyone. (Though authors of dramatic roles might have rights to their characters in other ways. Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead* could conceivably have been the subject of a lawsuit had it been written while Shakespeare was alive.)

<sup>12</sup> And, further, an individual (a person) is different (though not intrinsically) from a primum ego: as noted above, only individuals with alter egos have primum egos; a person with an alter ego is a primum ego; a person without an alter ego is simply a person.

<sup>13</sup> One can imagine a *secret* persona, consisting of certain psychological properties – say, certain ways of thinking – that are never manifested publicly.

<sup>14</sup> This is another way in which personae differ from dramatic roles: whereas a role is *performed*, a persona is (something like) *improvised within*.

presenting oneself as male, being cowardly and feckless, wearing nondescript clothing (e.g., black horn-rimmed glasses, a plain grey suit and fedora), working at the Daily Planet, concealing one's super powers,<sup>15</sup> concealing one's relation to Superman and Kal El, etc. Among those characteristic of the Superman persona are presenting oneself as male, being courageous and capable, wearing a flashy costume (e.g., a blue leotard with a big red 'S' on it and a red cape), *not* concealing one's super powers, but using them to fight crime, concealing one's relation to Clark Kent, etc. Kal El inhabits the Clark Kent and Superman personae when he dresses and behaves in the appropriate ways. Kal El qua inhabitant of the Clark Kent persona *is* Clark Kent, and Kal El qua inhabitant of the Superman persona *is* Superman.

Within limits (to be discussed below), Kal El could modify either persona and still retain the Superman and Clark Kent alter egos. Superman could, for example, sing Wagner while he flies, or wear a costume with different colors or components, without ceasing to be Superman. And Clark Kent could be less cowardly, or wear fashionable glasses or suits, without ceasing to be Clark Kent. Likewise, Ru Paul could become a soprano or stop wearing wigs without ceasing to be Ru Paul; and Batman could act more like a bat (by, say, emitting high-pitched shrieks while chasing criminals), or wear a modified bat-suit, without ceasing to be Batman.<sup>16</sup>

Moreover, personae are like literary creations, and alter egos are like embodied characters such as Geraldine and Peewee Herman, in that their originators have certain *rights* with respect to them, such as the exclusive right to modify them and to determine who else (if anyone) may legitimately inhabit them (and, hence, take on the corresponding alter ego). It is not the case that just *anyone* inhabiting the Superman or Clark Kent persona is Superman or Clark Kent. Unless the Superman and Batman personae became public domain, no one could legitimately inhabit them or modify them without Kal El's or Bruce Wayne's permission – just as no one could legitimately portray or modify Geraldine or Peewee Herman without Flip Wilson's or Paul Rubens's

<sup>15</sup> Hence the truth of Saul's (12) ("Substitution and Simple Sentences," p. 105): 'Clark Kent can fly, though he conceals this fact'.

<sup>16</sup> Moreover, they could change the *names* of their alter egos without changing the alter egos themselves. Superman could change his name to 'Tim' without ceasing to be Superman, just as Kal El could change his name to 'Kelly' without ceasing to be Kal El.



permission (or without the characters becoming public domain). The *false* or *imposter* Supermans and Batmans that sometimes appear in the stories are illegitimate inhabitants of the respective personae.

An alter ego is, therefore, a person qua *legitimate* inhabitant of a persona, where a legitimate inhabitant is either the persona's originator or an authorized successor, and an authorized successor is either one to whom the persona is passed on by its creator (as in the case of Don Diego de la Vega and Alejandro Murieta) or who has otherwise acquired the right to inhabit it.<sup>17</sup>

If Don Diego stops inhabiting the Zorro persona, Zorro no longer exists (except timelessly). But if he passes the rights to it on to Alejandro Murieta, and Murieta inhabits it, then Zorro exists again, though as Murieta's alter ego and not Don Diego's. And if Murieta in turn passes it on to someone else, then Zorro becomes the alter ego of yet another person. A persona may be inhabited by a series of individuals authorized to do so, in something like the way actors can take over roles in a series of plays, television shows or movies. This may happen either if the persona has become public domain and a new person lays claim to it, or if the persona's originator explicitly transfers the right to inhabit it. If a persona has been legitimately inhabited by  $n$  people, then we might say that its corresponding alter ego is the fusion of the  $n$  distinct people-qua-inhabitants-of-that-persona.

There are, however, definite limits to the changes that a legitimate inhabitant may make to a persona, saving identity. The Superman persona *necessarily* includes the properties of presenting oneself as a man and having super powers: no one without super powers or presenting him- or herself as a woman could be Superman.<sup>18</sup> The Ru Paul persona necessarily includes the properties of presenting oneself as a woman and as glamorous: no one presenting him- or herself as male or a fashion victim could be Ru Paul. And the Batman persona necessarily includes the properties of presenting oneself in a bat-like way and as a man: no one presenting him-

<sup>17</sup> One can imagine legal confrontations arising from illegitimate or simultaneous claims to a persona. Andre Charles might sue someone for impersonating Ru Paul; and if Bruce Wayne died without passing the Batman persona on, Dick Grayson and Barbara Gordon might both claim an exclusive right to inhabit it and sue each other for (something like) trademark or copyright infringement.

<sup>18</sup> Though it does seem possible for Kal El to stop *using* his super powers to fight crime and still be Superman. Moreover, it seems that when Kal El *loses* his super powers, as sometimes happens in the stories, he *does* cease to be Superman.

or herself in a pelican-like way or as a woman could be Batman.

These restrictions might seem to commit me to a Fregean description theory of alter ego names; but they do not. There is no obstacle to taking such names to be directly referential rigid designators, in spite of the fact that their bearers must have certain properties in order to bear the names. It does not follow from a name's being directly referential that there are *no* properties a thing must have in order to be its referent. There are, for example, no possible worlds in which Nixon is a swarm of locusts<sup>19</sup>; but this does not mean that not being a swarm of locusts is part of the *meaning* of 'Nixon'. And there are no possible worlds in which the referent of 'Superman' is a weakling presenting himself as a woman, though it does not follow that not being a weakling and not presenting oneself as a woman are part of the meaning of 'Superman'.

Consider the following counterfactual story about 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. Suppose the ancient astronomers used 'the evening star' to fix the reference of 'Hesperus' and 'the morning star' to fix the reference of 'Phosphorus'. They believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus are distinct heavenly bodies. Now, on the actual story, when it was discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus are the same planet, astronomers came to accept 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' as true. But they might not have. They might have decided to retain 'Hesperus' as the name for Venus *appearing in the evening sky* and 'Phosphorus' as the name for Venus *appearing in the morning sky*. That is, they might have retained the names of Venus given under different conditions *as* names of Venus under those conditions.<sup>20</sup> Note that it still would not be the case either that 'Hesperus' means *the evening star* or that 'Phosphorus' means *the morning star* – or, for that matter, that they

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Saul Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 46.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Alan Gibbard, "Contingent Identity," *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 4 (1975): 187-221: "In rare cases, at least, one thing will be of two different kinds, with different persistence criteria, and whereas one proper name refers to it as a thing of one kind, another proper name will refer to it as a thing of another kind." (As, for example, 'Goliath' and 'Lumpl'.) I need not follow Gibbard in claiming that rigidity is sortal-relative, however, since in the case I am imagining 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' is *false*.

would mean *Venus appearing in the evening sky* and *Venus appearing in the morning sky*.<sup>21</sup> Such descriptions would merely serve to fix the references of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’.

On this counterfactual story, the properties expressed by the reference-fixing descriptions would nonetheless be *necessary* properties of Hesperus and Phosphorus: nothing could be Hesperus that was not Venus-appearing-in-the-evening; and nothing could be Phosphorus that was not Venus-appearing-in-the-morning. This is, of course, not true in general of the properties expressed by reference-fixing descriptions (contingent properties of an object may be used to fix it as the referent of a name). But in this case it is, given that there are in general properties named things must have in order to bear their names, and in the particular case imagined here those properties are also the properties used to fix the reference of the names.

There is an analogous counterfactual story for ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’. Let us say that Kal El creates the Superman and Clark Kent personae for himself, but does not name them. Moreover, as he goes about the business of being a superhero he does not speak to anyone, so no one has occasion to learn his name. Now let us say the people of Metropolis dub the guy who flies around fighting crime ‘Superman’, and Kal El’s neighbors dub the shy guy they see walking home at night ‘Clark Kent’. No one believes that Superman and Clark Kent have anything to do with each other. Now suppose that everyone finds out that it is one and the same guy, Kal El, inhabiting both of these personae. What will they do? One thing they *might* do is keep using ‘Clark Kent’ to refer to Kal El qua inhabitant of the Clark Kent persona and ‘Superman’ to refer to Kal El qua inhabitant of the Superman persona. In the actual case, Kal El dubs *himself* ‘Superman’ qua inhabitant of the Superman persona and ‘Clark Kent’ qua inhabitant of the Clark Kent Persona. But I cannot see that that makes any difference in what the names name.

So, in the case of an alter-ego name, there are particular discriminating properties an object must have in order to be its bearer, though these properties are not part of the sense of the name. What is baptized at the

<sup>21</sup> Moreover, it would not be the case that anything satisfying the descriptions ‘appearing (in Venus’s position) in the morning sky’ and ‘appearing (in Venus’s position) in the evening sky’ would be (respectively) Hesperus and Phosphorus. It is *that planet*, Venus, and no other heavenly body, which is Hesperus as it appears in the evening sky and Phosphorus as it appears in the morning sky.

creation of an alter ego is a person *qua inhabitant of a persona*. The properties constituting the persona at the time of the dubbing function to fix the reference of the alter-ego name, as well as to determine what properties the person must have in order to be the alter ego. So an alter-ego name refers to a particular person with the relevant persona properties; persons without the persona properties are not named by the alter-ego name.

If you are inclined to doubt the claim that an object-qua-instantiator-of-a-particular-property can be named, consider the following. First, note that there are in general words – namely *predicates* – that apply to objects only qua instantiators of particular properties. A predicate *F* (correctly and literally) applies only to objects instantiating *F*ness; and if *F*ness and *G*ness are distinct properties, then *F* and *G* can apply to different things, and it is false that *F*s are *G*s. Take ‘water’ and ‘snow’, for example. Though it is true that all snow is water, it is not true that all water is snow: water and snow are not the same thing.<sup>22</sup> Next, note that we may construct rigid referring expressions out of these predicates, e.g., ‘dthat water’ and ‘dthat snow’,<sup>23</sup> that will refer a particular collection of H<sub>2</sub>O molecules under different conditions – viz., exactly under those conditions under which the predicates differentially apply. ‘Dthat water’ designates the collection of H<sub>2</sub>O molecules in all worlds at all times; whereas ‘dthat snow’ designates it only in certain worlds at certain times – i.e., the ones at which ‘snow’ applies to it.

But if these rigid referring expressions can differentially refer to one and the same collection of H<sub>2</sub>O molecules under different conditions, then why not names? Imagine a particular quantity of snow in the shape of a man. Let us call this particular snowman ‘Fred’. And let us say that Fred melts, leaving a puddle of water on the floor. Is this puddle Fred? Well, this particular quantity of water – let us call it ‘Cal’<sup>24</sup> – is not a snowman (it is not even snow). Puddles of water are not snowmen; so Cal is not Fred. Cal and Fred do consist of the same *water*, however. So we can say that ‘Fred’ is a name that applies to a particular quantity of water – viz., Cal – only insofar as Cal is in a particular state. ‘Fred’, that is, applies to Cal-qua-instantiator-of-the-property-of-being-snow-in-the-shape-of-a-man.

<sup>22</sup> Other relevant examples are ‘stoat’/‘ermine’ and ‘salmon’/‘smolt’. The stoat is a brown short-tailed weasel that is called an “ermine” *when its fur turns white during the winter*. Thus, though ermines are stoats, stoats are not ermines. A smolt is a young salmon at the point in its development *when it assumes the color of an adult and is ready to migrate to the sea*. Though smolts are salmon, salmon are not smolts.

<sup>23</sup> Of course ‘snow’ and ‘water’ may themselves be rigid, if they are natural kind terms.

<sup>24</sup> It might be pragmatically odd to give a puddle of water a name: puddles are not the sorts of things one would ordinarily *need* a name for. But I cannot see that there is anything wrong with it semantically. One can name anything.

## IV. THE IDENTITY SENTENCES

On the account developed here, names of alter egos and names of their *primum* egos are not coreferential. An important consequence of this claim is that (5), (6) and (10) come out false:

(5) Superman is Clark Kent.

(6) Bruce Wayne is Batman.

(10) Andre Charles is Ru Paul.

For Saul, it is a condition of adequacy on any account of the substitutivity failures in sentences like (1), (2) and (3) that it preserve the truth of the identity sentences; and this is an intuition that no doubt many will share. Nevertheless, I think these sentences are not true, and that this explains why the substitutions do not go through.

The approach I prefer here is a pragmatic one, on which *literal* tokens of sentences such as (5), (6) and (10) (i.e., tokens having the meaning of their types) are false, but *non-literal* tokens of such sentences (i.e., tokens having meanings distinct from those of their types) may be true.<sup>25</sup>

Compare (5), (6) and (10) to (11), which appeared in a recent New York Times advertisement:

(11) Cathy Rigby is Peter Pan.

It seems clear that what is meant by this (printed) utterance is not that Cathy Rigby *is* Peter Pan (no one could *be* Peter Pan), but that Cathy Rigby is *playing* Peter Pan in a production of the musical. And we may suppose that this is what was meant without commitment either to relative identity (which would not help anyway: is the same *what?*) or to the 'is' of (11) being an 'is' of *role-portrayal* (or its converse).

The critic's rave

(12) Jacobi *is* Hamlet!

provides further support for this approach. Construed literally, (12) is, like (11), absurd (no person could be a fictional character). What the utterance means is that Jacobi's portrayal of Hamlet is perfect (or very close

<sup>25</sup> There are other possibilities. One might, following Peter Geach (*Reference and Generality* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), and *Logic Matters* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968)), claim that identity is sortal-relative, and argue that on any appropriate expansion of 'is' (5), (6) and (10) come out false. Alternatively, following David Wiggins (*Sameness and Substance* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980)), one might claim that identity sentences are ambiguous, and argue that (5), (6) and (10) are either identity claims and false or true but not identity claims. I prefer the pragmatic account since it avoids the controversies over sortal-relative identity and the proliferation of senses of 'is'.

to it), or something like that. The emphatic use of a literally absurd sentence (note the stress on 'is'), in this case, has the effect of communicating the critic's astonishment at the quality of the performance. It is a bit of hyper-hyperbole, like the once common graffito

(13) Clapton is God.<sup>26</sup>

Again, one need neither go relative (which would not help here, either) nor introduce a *portrays to perfection* or *ought to be worshiped as* (or whatever) sense of 'is'.

On the pragmatic approach, utterances of (6) and (10) may be taken to mean the same as (6') and (10'):

(6') Bruce Wayne is the person whose alter ego is Batman.

(10') Andre Charles is the person whose alter ego is Ru Paul.

(construed as literal identity claims). And utterances of (5) may be interpreted as meaning the same as (5'):

(5') The person whose alter ego is Superman is the person whose alter ego is Clark Kent

(again, construed as a literal identity claim).

It is instructive to compare (14) and (15):

(14) Dr Jekyll is Mr Hyde.

(15) Eve White is Eve Black.

both of which are simply false. Dr Jekyll is not Mr Hyde, and Eve White is not Eve Black. Nor is Dr Jekyll the person whose alter ego is Mr Hyde: 'Dr Jekyll' and 'Mr Hyde' are, arguably, names of distinct *persons* manifesting themselves in the same body. Likewise, Eve White is not the person whose alter ego is Eve Black: 'Eve White' and 'Eve Black' are (arguably) names of distinct *personalities* manifesting themselves in the same person. If we take these names to be names of, respectively, distinct persons and distinct personalities, we would have a straightforward explanation of substitution failures in cases like (7)-(7') and (16)-(16'):

(7) Eve White is more timid than Eve Black.

(7') Eve White is more timid than Eve White.

(16) Mr Hyde is meaner than Dr Jekyll.

(16') Mr Hyde is meaner than Mr Hyde.

In any case, the availability of reconstructions of (5), (6) and (10), each of which is motivated by the need to

<sup>26</sup> Clapton being of course the guitarist Eric Clapton.

explain independent facts about the use of identity sentences, ought to weaken the case for their non-negotiability. Thus, the implied falsity of (5), (6) and (10) is not *eo ipso* grounds for rejecting the account I have offered here.

#### V. WHAT ALTER EGOS MIGHT BE

I have argued that an alter ego is something like an embodied character, viz., a person-qua-inhabitant-of-a-persona. But what could such a thing *be*, such that it is a different *object* from a person simpliciter?

The approach I shall pursue here is to identify alter egos with *fusions of time-slices* of the individuals whose alter egos they are.<sup>27</sup> (Of course Saul considers and rejects an account in terms of time-slices, since it entails that (5) and (6) are false. But I have argued that this objection is not well motivated.)

Note that another way of describing the relation between Kal El, Superman and Clark Kent is to say that Kal El is Superman *when and only when* he is inhabiting the Superman persona, and is Clark Kent *when and only when* he is inhabiting the Clark Kent persona. The corresponding claim about the names is that ‘Superman’ refers to Kal El when and only when he is inhabiting the Superman persona and ‘Clark Kent’ refers to Kal El when and only when he is inhabiting the Clark Kent persona. And another way to supply distinct referents for the names is to take Superman and Clark Kent to be distinct fusions of distinct time-slices of Kal El.

Let us call the temporal intervals during which Kal El is inhabiting the Superman persona *Superman time-slices*, and the temporal intervals during which he is inhabiting the Clark Kent persona *Clark Kent time-slices*.

We can then identify Superman with the fusion of the Superman time-slices and Clark Kent with the fusion of

<sup>27</sup> Again, there are other possibilities. One might simply take alter egos to be *primitive*: they are just what they are, and are not reducible to anything else. (This might appeal to those who are prepared to recognize the irreducible existence of fictional characters.) Or one might recognize an object qua instantiator of a particular property as an entity distinct from that object qua instantiator of some other property, and from that object *tout court*. Such “qua-objects” – which might also, on analogy with time-slices, be called “property-slices” – would consist of an object and one or more of its instantiated properties (perhaps construed as *tropes*). There is also the possibility of construing alter egos as *stages*, which will be discussed below. As well, one might adopt an *endurantist* ontology and, along the lines set out in Trenton Merricks’s “Endurance and Indiscernability,” this JOURNAL, XCI, 4 (April 1994): 165-184, construe ‘Superman’ as coreferential with ‘Kal El at *t*’, for all times *t* such that Kal El is inhabiting the Superman persona at *t*. The *perdurantist* account I develop here should be taken as an example of how an ontology for alter egos might be worked out. Any ontology on which they are distinct from the persons whose alter egos they are will support the solution to Saul’s Puzzle advocated in this paper.

the Clark Kent time-slices.<sup>28</sup> Since those fusions are distinct, the referents of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are distinct, and the possibility of, e.g., (i)’s being true is explained.

A persons’s alter ego is the fusion of the time-slices of the person during which he or she inhabits a persona – that is, during which he or she instantiates the properties constituting the persona. What of the person him- or herself – the *primum ego*? There seem to be two options. One might construe a *primum ego* either as the fusion of the discontinuous segments *complementary* to the alter ego or as the fusion of the alter ego and its complements (i.e., the complete space-time worm of which the alter ego slices are slices).

The former option has objectionable consequences. Consider Bruce Wayne and Batman again. Were we to identify Batman with the fusion of the Batman-slices and Bruce Wayne with its complement, it would follow that Bruce Wayne *ceases to exist* during those times when Batman is around. But this does not seem plausible. For it is, after all, *Bruce Wayne* who is wearing the mask and cape. Moreover, on this account Bruce Wayne would go out of and into existence *at will*, which also does not seem plausible. That one’s *creations* may go out of and go into existence at one’s will seems plausible enough (think of Penelope weaving, unraveling and reweaving her tapestry; or Gibbard squashing *Goliath*). Batman might cease to exist when Bruce Wayne is out of persona, and would cease to exist permanently were Bruce Wayne to give up being Batman entirely and no one else to take the job. But it does not seem at all plausible that Bruce Wayne might go out of *and into* existence at *his own* will.

So let us say that an alter ego is a fusion of time-slices of an individual who continues to exist simultaneously with it. Alter egos are therefore *proper spatiotemporal parts* of the persons whose alter egos they are. And since they are proper parts of their *primum egos*, they are distinct from them. ‘Kal El’, ‘Bruce Wayne’, ‘Andre Charles’, et alia refer to complete spatiotemporal continuants, whereas ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, ‘Batman’, ‘Ru Paul’, et alia refer to distinct fusions of distinct proper parts of them.

<sup>28</sup> Fusions rather than sets or sequences, since sets and sequences are not concrete objects, and non-concrete objects cannot leap tall buildings or enter phone booths, whereas fusions of concrete objects, and their parts, can. Notice also that it would not be correct to identify *personae* with fusions of time-slices, since *personae* (or the rights to them) may be passed from one person to another, creating a new alter ego, whereas time-slice fusions cannot.



This proposal captures the intuitions about the cases quite well. On the time-slice account, Superman and Clark Kent are proper parts of Kal El, but neither is a part of the other; they are distinct objects.<sup>29</sup> Thus, (17)<sup>30</sup>:

(17) He hit Clark Kent once, but he never hit Superman.

could be true. Superman never gets hit when Clark Kent does, since they are never in the same place at the same time.

Moreover, since on this account what is true of an alter ego is true of its *primum* ego, though not vice versa, the following sorts of cases are also accommodated. Since it is Bruce Wayne who wears the bat costume and drives the Batmobile, (18) is false:

(18) Batman drives the Batmobile more often than Bruce Wayne.

as are (19):

(19) Superman leaps tall buildings more often than Kal El.

(20):

(20) He hit Superman once, but he never hit Kal El.

and (21):

(21) He saw Batman once, but he never saw Bruce Wayne.

Kal El leaps whenever Superman does, and he gets hit as often as Clark Kent; and Bruce Wayne is seen whenever Batman is. In contrast, Kal El and Clark Kent do lots of things Superman does not do. Likewise Bruce Wayne and Batman.

The time-slice account also provides a principled answer to Saul's question, "Which is he [Superman] when he's in the shower?" ("Substitution and Simple Sentences," p.104). The skeptical force of this question derives in part from a failure to appreciate that Superman and Clark Kent are both alter egos: when Kal El is in the shower, assuming he is not dressed as or behaving as either Superman or Clark Kent, he is *neither* Superman nor Clark Kent: he is just Kal El, the guy from Krypton. Compare the corresponding question with respect to Batman: when Bruce Wayne is in the shower, neither dressed nor behaving as Batman, he is just Bruce

<sup>29</sup> Kal El makes sure that the personae are inhabited in such a way that the alter egos are distinct. This does not appear to be necessary for alter egos in general, however. Properly constructed, they *might* overlap (imagine Andre Charles taking over the Batman role, but inhabiting it as Ru Paul).

<sup>30</sup> "Substitution and Simple Sentences," p. 103.

Wayne.

The example of Zorro is again instructive. After Don Diego passes the “rights” to the Zorro persona to Murieta, whenever Murieta inhabits it *he* is Zorro. Likewise anyone to whom Murieta might pass on the Zorro persona. So we should take alter ego names to name fusions of persona-instantiating time-slices of possibly more than one person. The alter ego is then extended to include time-slices of its successive *primum egos*.

Note, further, that the time-slice account can be applied to the counterfactual Hesperus/ Phosphorus case discussed above, as well as to the case of Fred and Cal. On the counterfactual scenario, Hesperus is the fusion of the evening time-slices of Venus (Venus during those temporal intervals in which appears in the evening), and Phosphorus is the fusion of the morning time-slices of Venus (Venus during those temporal intervals in which it appears in the morning). Hesperus, Phosphorus and Venus are distinct entities, though the former are both proper spatiotemporal parts of the latter. Likewise, we can think of Fred as the fusion of time-slices of Cal during which he is snow in the form of a man.

A similar sort of story might be told about Jekyll/Hyde and Eve White/Eve Black/ Jane, as well. We could identify Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde with distinct fusions of time-slices of Jekyll/Hyde's *body*, and Eve Black and Eve White as distinct fusion of time-slices of Jane (the *person* who emerges during the course of treatment). Persons, personalities and alter-egos would thus be three different kinds of time-slice fusions, where the kinds are determined by the sort of conditions that individuate the relevant slices.

## VI. SOME OBJECTIONS

One *prima facie* problem for my account is this. If Superman and Kal El are distinct objects, then it would seem that there are *two* individuals leaping tall buildings whenever Superman does, *two* individuals having the thoughts Superman has, etc. – since, after all, it is Kal El who wears the cape, etc. Another worry is that if alter egos are, as I have claimed, not *persons*, how could they do all the things that persons do, and how could they be physically and psychologically continuous with persons?

These concerns are easily answered. Though Kal El and Superman are distinct four-dimensional objects, they have four-dimensional parts that *overlap* (likewise Kal El and Clark Kent): any time-slice of Superman or Clark Kent is also a time-slice (of the very same spatio-temporal dimensions) of Kal El (though not, of course, vice versa). When Kal El is flying around as Superman, or reporting to work as Clark Kent, there is

only one individual present, with only one set of thoughts.<sup>31</sup> (Note, however, that this individual is *neither* Kal El *nor* Superman *nor* Clark Kent – each of whom is temporally too large to be identical to it – but, rather, a shared temporal part of each.) Thus, though alter egos are not persons, they are identical to proper temporal parts of persons, and may do all the things that those parts may do. And for the same reason, they are psychologically continuous with persons.<sup>32</sup>

An intuitively satisfying way of describing the relations among Kal El, Superman and Clark Kent is to say that *while* Kal El is inhabiting the Superman persona, he and Superman are *identical*; while he is inhabiting the Clark Kent persona, he and Clark Kent are identical; and while he is inhabiting neither persona, he is identical to neither. (Since the personae are never inhabited simultaneously, Superman and Clark Kent are never identical.) Of course, strictly speaking, Kal El is *never* identical to either Superman or Clark Kent, since (on my account) they are distinct four-dimensional objects: what *are* identical are specific spatio-temporal proper parts of each of them. If, however, we allow that the names ‘Kal El’, ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ may be used in a loose sort of way to refer to time slices of their respective referents, then we could accommodate this way of describing the relation between Kal El, Superman and Clark Kent.<sup>33</sup> We could also say that Kal El flying around as Superman (likewise Kal El reporting to work as Clark Kent) is a single individual bearing two names. And we could allow that it is true in a loose sort of way that, e.g., Superman is flying over Metropolis between noon and one p.m. on Friday, even though strictly speaking he is temporally too big to fit into that interval (what is strictly true is that a temporal part of Superman is flying over Metropolis, etc.). (This would also provide another way of taking particular utterances of the identity sentences to be true.<sup>34</sup>)

<sup>31</sup> The appeal to overlapping temporal parts is a standard four-dimensionalist way of avoiding coincident entities. See, for example, Mark Heller, *The Ontology of Physical Objects* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 14-16.

<sup>32</sup> Another way to respond to these worries would be to follow Ted Sider (“All the World’s a Stage,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1996): 433-453), in *identifying* persons with person-stages (i.e., time-slices), and alter-egos with alter-ego-stages – in which case Superman (Clark Kent) and Kal El are the same person (person-stage) when Kal El inhabits the Superman (Clark Kent) persona, but not when the persona is uninhabited.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Heller, *The Ontology of Physical Objects*, pp. 12-14.

<sup>34</sup> On a *three-dimensionalist* account of alter egos, this way of speaking could be taken to be literally true if identity were relativized to time. (The notion of time-relativized identity is explored by George Myro in “Time and Identity,” in *Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories and Ends*, R.E. Grandy and R. Warner, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 383-409. Myro credits the basic idea to Grice.)

Another possible problem for my account concerns apparent violations of Leibniz's Law. If at time  $t$  Bruce Wayne is being Batman, and it is denied that Bruce Wayne and Batman are at  $t$  distinct but coincident entities, then, given Leibniz's Law, anything true at  $t$  of Bruce Wayne ought to be true at  $t$  of Batman. But if there is some subsequent time  $t'$  at which Bruce Wayne is *not* being Batman, then there may well be things true at  $t$  of Bruce Wayne that are not true at  $t$  of Batman. For example, if on Monday Bruce Wayne is being Batman, then if it is true of Bruce Wayne that he will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday, it ought also to be true of Batman that he will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday. Yet, it might *not* be true of Batman that he will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday – if, for example, Bruce Wayne is planning not to be Batman on Tuesday. Thus, though on Monday Bruce Wayne is Batman, Bruce Wayne and Batman do not share all of their properties.

But the violation of Leibniz's law is only apparent, since, strictly speaking, Bruce Wayne and Batman are *not* identical. If, again, we allow the loose sort of talk on which utterances of names can refer to proper parts of their bearers, then it might be true that on Monday 'Bruce Wayne' and 'Batman' pick out the same object – a shared temporal part. But in this case it would not be true on Monday of Bruce Wayne that he will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday, since the Bruce Wayne of Tuesday (a particular 24-hour chunk of a four-dimensional object) is not identical to the Bruce Wayne of Monday (a distinct 24-hour chunk of the same four-dimensional object). The utterance on Monday of 'Bruce Wayne' in an utterance of 'Bruce Wayne will have lunch with Vicki Vale tomorrow', if it is to corefer with an utterance of 'Batman', will have to be taken to refer to a particular temporal part of Bruce Wayne. But *that* part will not exist on Tuesday; so the utterance will be false. It is *another* part of Bruce Wayne – one that is, crucially, not also a part of Batman – that will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday. So there is no violation of Leibniz's Law.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Another way to go here is, again, to follow Sider ("All the World's a Stage") and identify alter-egos with alter-ego-stages. To say that Batman will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday would, on this view, be to say that the Monday alter-ego-stage denoted by 'Batman' (and 'Bruce Wayne') is related in the way appropriate to alter egos (viz., the way appropriate to persons, *qua inhabitants of personae*) to a Tuesday alter-ego-stage bearing the name 'Batman' that has lunch with Vicki Vale. But this claim would be false if there *were* no Tuesday alter-ego-stage having lunch with Vicki Vale related in the proper way to the Monday alter-ego-stage, which would be the case if Bruce Wayne were not inhabiting the Batman persona at lunch on Tuesday. An endurantist account of alter egos could handle these sorts of cases by following Myro's suggestion ("Time and Identity," pp. 392-393) that Leibniz's law, which, given the temporal relativity of identity, is itself subject to temporal qualification – namely,

Another *prima facie* problem for the time-slice account concerns *modal* statements, such as (22):

(22) Superman might have not have built the Fortress of Solitude.

For, given that Superman is a particular proper part of a particular space-time worm, (23):

(23) Superman does not build the Fortress of Solitude.

the truth of which in some other possible world is sufficient for the truth of (22) in the actual world, would be true of a *different* particular part of a *different* particular space-time worm in some other possible world. But that space-time worm would not, on the account I have given, be Superman. Such problems have obvious solutions in counterpart theory.<sup>36</sup> But that theory is itself controversial. Here I will simply leave this as a cost of the time-slice account of alter-egos.

$(LL_t) (x)(y)(t)[x=y \text{ at } t \supset (Fx \text{ at } t \equiv Fy \text{ at } t)]$

be further restricted so as to exclude “temporal properties,” such as having lunch with Vicki Vale *on Tuesday*. That is, predicates substituted for *F* in the schema  $(LL_t)$  may not themselves include any temporal references. So, though it is true that Bruce Wayne will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday and false that Batman will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday, ‘will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday’ is not a permissible substituent for *F* in  $(LL_t)$ , and (temporalized) Leibniz’s Law is not violated. Sentences such as (iii):

(iii) Bruce Wayne will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday.

should be construed not as predications of temporal properties, but as temporally indexed predications of non-temporal properties, as in (iii’):

(iii’) On Tuesday, Bruce Wayne has lunch with Vicki Vale.

Thus, to say that it is true on Monday of Bruce Wayne that he will have lunch with Vicki Vale on Tuesday is to say that it is true on Monday that it is true on Tuesday that Bruce Wayne has lunch with Vicki Vale – or, in other words, that it is true on Tuesday that Bruce Wayne has lunch with Vicki Vale (the temporal operator ‘on Monday’ is in this case vacuous, since if it is true on Tuesday that *p*, then it is true on any day that it is true on Tuesday that *p*). Note that (iv) and (iii’) do not imply (v):

(iv) On Monday, Bruce Wayne is Batman.

(iii’) On Tuesday, Bruce Wayne has lunch with Vicki Vale.

(v) On Tuesday, Batman has lunch with Vicki Vale.

though of course (iv’) and (iii’) do

(iv’) On Tuesday, Bruce Wayne is Batman

The apparent violation of Leibniz’s Law involves an illicit shift in temporal operators.

<sup>36</sup> See David Lewis, “Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic,” this JOURNAL, LXV, 5 (March 7, 1968): 113-126; “Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies,” this JOURNAL, LXVIII, 7 (April 8, 1971): 203-211 (both reprinted in his *Philosophical Papers, Volume I* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); *On the Plurality of Worlds* (London: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

Note that on the time-slice account alter-ego names would not be rigid designators; though they may still be directly referential *quasi-rigid* designators (see Lewis, *On The Plurality of Worlds*, p. 256).

## VII. CONCLUSION

I have argued that Saul's Puzzle disappears once we recognize that 'Superman', 'Clark Kent', 'Batman', 'Ru Paul', 'Zorro', etc. are names of alter egos, which are distinct from the persons whose alter egos they are. Since the names of persons and the names of their alter egos are not coreferential, there is no puzzle about why they are not intersubstitutable, even in simple sentences. I have also reviewed several proposals for the ontology of alter egos and the interpretation of identity sentences with alter-ego names as constituents, as well as their costs. As a final consideration, note that since a person and his or her alter ego(s) are distinct entities, the Russellian propositions expressed by (24), (25) and (26) are distinct:

(24) Superman can fly.

(25) Clark Kent can fly.

(26) Kal El can fly.

and there is a straightforward explanation of how Lois can believe one and not the others that is consistent with the construal of names as directly referential. Of course this does not help the direct reference theorist in general, since there still remain examples like (9) and (9') embedded in belief contexts. But it does provide a unified solution to Saul's Puzzle and the corresponding puzzles about belief.

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