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Chair: Ms. Mukashyaka (Vice-Chair) (Rwanda)
*Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions:* Mr. Ruiz Massieu

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In the absence of Mr. Ružička (Slovakia), Ms. Mukashyaka (Rwanda), Vice-Chair, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Item 132: Programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (continued)

Programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1 (A/69/658; A/C.5/69/13)

First performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (A/69/612 and A/69/661)

1. **Mr. Ramanathan** (Deputy Controller), introducing the statement submitted by the Secretary-General in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly on the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1 on modalities for the implementation of resolution 68/304, entitled "Towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes" (A/C.5/69/13) said that, under the terms of draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1, the General Assembly would establish an open ad hoc committee to elaborate, as a matter of priority during its sixty-ninth session, a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view, inter alia, to increasing the efficiency, stability and predictability of the international financial system and achieving sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable development, in accordance with national circumstances and priorities; decide that the ad hoc committee would hold three meetings in New York in 2015; and request it to submit a proposal to the General Assembly at its sixty-ninth session. To implement the requests contained in the draft resolution, it was proposed that an additional appropriation of \$251,900 should be approved under section 2, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 as a charge against the contingency fund.

2. Turning to the first performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (A/69/612), prepared in line with the recommendation made by the Advisory Committee in its first report on the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1978-1979 (A/32/8 and A/32/8/Corr.1), he said that the primary purpose of the performance report was to identify revised estimates required, as at the end of the

first year of the biennium, because of variations in the rates of inflation and exchange, standards and vacancy rates since the calculation of the initial appropriations. The performance report also took into account the decisions of policymaking organs and unforeseen and extraordinary expenses incurred.

3. The revised estimates for the expenditure sections amounted to \$5,573.3 million, an increase of \$34.7 million or 0.6 per cent over the initial appropriation for the biennium 2014-2015, including \$22.8 million for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses and \$11.9 million for recosting. The recosting adjustments comprised a decrease of \$24.5 million to reflect exchange rate variations, a \$5.3 million decrease to reflect variations in inflation, a \$32.1 million increase to reflect variations in standard costs and a \$9.6 million increase to reflect variations in vacancy rates.

4. The revised estimates for the income sections for the biennium 2014-2015 amounted to \$533.0 million, an increase of \$9.1 million or 1.7 per cent.

5. **Mr. Ruiz Massieu** (Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the report of the Advisory Committee on the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1 (A/69/658), said that the Advisory Committee had no objection to the amount of \$251,900 requested under section 2 of the programme budget. It therefore recommended that the Committee should inform the General Assembly that, should the Assembly adopt draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1, an additional appropriation of \$251,900 would be required, representing a charge against the contingency fund under section 2 of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.

6. Turning to the Advisory Committee's report on the first performance report (A/69/661), he said that the revised requirements under the expenditure sections for the biennium 2014-2015 would be \$5,573.3 million, an increase of 0.6 per cent over the appropriation level approved by the General Assembly. Revised estimates for the income sections amounted to \$533 million, reflecting an increase of 1.7 per cent over the initial estimates for the biennium. The Advisory Committee recommended that the General Assembly should approve the revised estimates contained in the report of the Secretary-General, subject to any adjustments that might be necessary as a

result of matters still under consideration by the Assembly.

7. With regard to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses incurred under the terms of General Assembly resolution 68/249, the Advisory Committee recommended that more detailed background information should be submitted to the Assembly concerning the commitments of \$6.9 million made on the Secretary-General's authority in 2014. It expressed concern that the \$8 million limit specified in the resolution had been exceeded by \$905,000 and recommended that the Assembly should request the Secretary-General to observe the established limits and provisions.

8. On the matter of currency exchange rate movements, a comprehensive assessment of the Secretary-General's experience of the utilization of forward purchasing was overdue.

9. With regard to the estimates of income arising from services to the public, which had been revised downwards consistently over the previous three bienniums, the Advisory Committee questioned the validity of the initial budget assumptions and would continue to monitor the matter.

10. **Ms. Rios Requena** (Plurinational State of Bolivia), speaking on behalf of the Group of 77 and China, said that the Group attached great importance to the Organization's smooth functioning and that the performance reports were an essential benchmark of the proper implementation of the budget process. The revised estimates under the expenditure sections for 2014-2015 amounted to \$5,573.3 million, an increase of \$34.7 million over the appropriation level approved by the General Assembly. Programme budget implications resulting from decisions of other Main Committees would affect the level of the revised appropriations. The General Assembly was responsible for approving the corresponding appropriation and determining the assessment necessary to cover the legitimate expenditure already incurred by the Organization.

11. Recosting was an integral part of the budget process established by General Assembly resolutions 41/213 and 42/211. Previous decisions to defer post-related recosting had jeopardized the implementation of programmed activities. The Group rejected any attempt to undermine the compromise achieved more

than 20 years earlier with regard to all aspects of the budget process.

12. With respect to the programme budget implications of draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1, the Group attached great importance to the establishment of a multilateral legal framework for sovereign debt restructuring processes with a view to increasing the efficiency, stability and predictability of the international financial system and achieving sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth and sustainable development. Draft resolution A/C.2/69/L.4/Rev.1 would allow the General Assembly to discuss the establishment of such a framework openly and democratically in 2015. The Group supported the provision of the additional resources requested by the Secretary-General and endorsed by the Advisory Committee in the amount of \$251,900, under section 2 of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015, as a charge against the contingency fund, should the General Assembly adopt the draft resolution. All mandates approved by intergovernmental bodies of the United Nations should be supported with adequate regular budget resources.

13. **Ms. Power** (Observer for the European Union) said that the revised requirements for the biennium, set out in the first performance report (A/69/612), amounted to \$5.573 billion, an increase of \$34.7 million compared with the appropriation approved by the Assembly in December 2013. That total did not include the revised estimates and statements of programme budget implications arising from resolutions considered by the Main Committees, which at the time of reporting had amounted to \$312.5 million. The impact of the programme budget implications was therefore significant. She recalled the importance of compliance with the rules and procedures related to such implications and of the Secretariat ensuring the due diligence necessary to enable negotiators in other Main Committees and the plenary Assembly, as well as elsewhere, to make informed decisions.

14. The Committee therefore lacked a complete picture of the revised requirements for the current biennium and was once again presented with a proposal comprising a mere list of additions to the budget rather than a genuine assessment of resource needs. Such an incremental approach to budgeting led to automatic growth with no evaluation of what was necessary to carry out mandated activities. The fact

that some of the proposed increases resulted from activities newly mandated with the approval of all Member States only reinforced the need for a more efficient budget process which better reflected the Organization's needs. Such a process required a reform of the current practice of recosting, which was outdated and unsustainable and should be comprehensively addressed by the General Assembly. The European Union hoped that the current report would be the last in which the costs of variations in inflation, exchange rates, standard costs and vacancies were presented as an add-on and in which no attempt was made to manage them. She looked forward to receiving further clarification regarding the Advisory Committee's observations on the use of unforeseen and extraordinary expenses and the decline in income.

15. **Mr. Ono** (Japan) said that in December 2013 the Member States had agreed on a regular budget of \$5.530 billion for the current biennium, 0.63 per cent less than the final appropriation of \$5.565 billion for the biennium 2012-2013. The United Nations could not afford to return to the previous trend of increasing the regular budget, which had more than doubled since 2000. In its report (A/69/661), however, the Advisory Committee stated that the figure for the current biennium could be as much as \$5.886 billion, which if approved by the General Assembly would be \$321 million more than the final appropriation for the previous biennium and also the largest ever United Nations budget, despite the severe financial constraints faced by Member States. According to his delegation's calculations, the updated budget for the current biennium was in fact \$5.896 billion, \$331 million more than the final appropriation for the previous biennium. Because the estimates for 2015 included only six-month interim requirements for two of the special political missions, the regular budget for the current biennium could exceed \$6 billion, an increase of around 10 per cent compared with the previous biennium. The United Nations had managed to contain the rate of budgetary increase from 2010 to 2013; in December 2013, few delegations had imagined that a year later they would witness a return to business as usual, with a proposal for such a substantial increase in the initial budget.

16. Although the establishment of new mandates by the Member States accounted for part of the increase, the Organization must find better ways of prioritizing its activities and staffing in order to tackle emerging

and urgent issues — as it had done, for example, with the establishment of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) — while discontinuing obsolete activities; and of making sense of its budgetary envelope and correcting the habits of managers accustomed to expecting that more resources would become available at the end of the budgetary cycle rather than operating within the resources initially approved.

17. The Secretary-General had requested the General Assembly to consider revised estimates that included around \$12 million deriving from so-called recosting, which took into account changes in exchange rates, inflation rates, standard costs and vacancy rates. His delegation emphasized that the Secretary-General must make every effort to meet additional recosting requirements within the approved envelope through efficiencies and cost savings. In particular, the adjustments in standard staff costs, which resulted in an increase of \$32.2 million, lacked clarity. The Secretariat should actively manage vacancy rates, since its failure to do so had resulted in an additional increase of \$9.6 million.

18. In section X of its resolution 67/246, the General Assembly had urged the Secretary-General to ensure that oral statements detailing resource requirements were presented in a timely manner before the adoption of substantive resolutions, in accordance with rule 153 of its rules of procedure, and to provide information on the full scope of additional resources needed. Expressing concern that the Secretariat had not honoured that request, he reiterated the call for the timely submission of resource requirements.

19. **Mr. Podlesnykh** (Russian Federation) said that a rational approach to budgeting for United Nations activities was needed and requests for the allocation of additional appropriations should be properly justified. At the same time, efforts to make savings within existing resources must not adversely affect the implementation of current mandates.

20. The revised estimates for the biennium 2014-2015 amounted to \$5.573 billion dollars for expenditure sections, an increase of \$34.7 million over the approved appropriation level, primarily owing to higher vacancy rates than expected and adjustments to standard staff costs. The increased expenditure had not been fully offset by decreases resulting from variations in the rates of inflation and currency exchange. If the

proposals being considered by the General Assembly were approved, the budget estimates for the biennium 2014-2015 could increase by a further \$312.5 million. The Committee had already approved some of those proposals.

21. Overall, his delegation supported the recommendations and comments in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/69/661). It noted in particular the Advisory Committee's observation that the Secretary-General had exceeded his commitment authority under General Assembly resolution 68/249 for matters pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security. The Russian Federation looked forward to receiving an explanation from the Secretariat, which should take steps to prevent such a situation from arising again. The Assembly should monitor the issue in order to ensure that the Secretary-General's use of his authority complied with its decisions and demands for budgetary discipline.

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council (A/69/363, A/69/363/Corr.1, A/69/363/Corr.2, A/69/363/Corr.3, A/69/363/Add.1, A/69/363/Add.2, A/69/363/Add.3, A/69/363/Add.3/Corr.1, A/69/363/Add.4, A/69/363/Add.5 and A/69/628)

22. **Mr. Ramanathan** (Deputy Controller), introducing the Secretary-General's reports on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council (A/69/363, A/69/363/Corr.1, A/69/363/Corr.2, A/69/363/Corr.3, A/69/363/Add.1, A/69/363/Add.2, A/69/363/Add.3, A/69/363/Add.3/Corr.1, A/69/363/Add.4 and A/69/363/Add.5), said that the budget proposals for special political missions for 2015 had once again been grouped into three thematic clusters. The total requirements for the 35 missions amounted to \$485.9 million net of staff assessment, of which \$435.1 million would be charged against the balance remaining in the provision for special political missions in the amount of \$1,081.1 million appropriated under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2014-2015.

23. Pending further developments and more clarity regarding the mandate and operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(UNSMIL), the Secretary-General's report (A/69/363) reflected six-month interim resource requirements for 2015 for those missions, based on a technical rollover of 50 per cent of the level of projected expenditures during 2014. Detailed budget proposals for 2015 would be prepared for consideration at the second part of the resumed sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

24. He noted that in the Secretary-General's first performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (A/69/612) an appropriation of \$1.7 million was requested for the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic.

25. The General Assembly was requested to approve an amount of \$37.1 million net of staff assessment in additional appropriations for special political missions for the biennium 2014-2015, taking into account underexpenditure of \$12.0 million in 2014.

26. The Secretary-General had recently announced a holistic review of special political missions, as the operational situation could merit a reassessment of the structure of the United Nations presence in various countries. The review might result in proposals for changes.

27. **Mr. Ruiz Massieu** (Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions), introducing the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/69/628), said that the Advisory Committee's recommendations would entail a reduction of \$9.7 million in the Secretary-General's proposals for 2015.

28. With regard to the level of resources requested for special political missions for 2015, the budget proposals were not comprehensive because they contained only six-month interim resource requirements for UNAMA and UNSMIL. Detailed budget proposals for 2015 for the two missions would be submitted for consideration at the second part of the resumed sixty-ninth session. Any additional resources requested for UNAMA and UNSMIL for 2015 would require an additional appropriation. The Secretary-General's budget proposals should, to the extent possible, cover the full 12-month financial period and any decision to propose an interim financing arrangement should be supported by strong justification. The Advisory Committee recommended

that full budget proposals for UNAMA and UNSMIL for 2015 should be submitted at the earliest opportunity.

29. The Advisory Committee noted the efforts to improve the format and presentation of the proposed budget estimates in respect of special political missions for 2015, but believed that those estimates should be further improved and standardized.

30. The Secretary-General indicated in his report (A/69/363) that one of the security options explored in recent years was the deployment of United Nations guard units. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) had had such a unit since 2004, and in 2013 three new units had been authorized for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), UNSMIL and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). The Advisory Committee would await the findings of the lessons learned exercise to be undertaken in 2015 before reviewing the use of such units, including the command and control structure.

31. The Advisory Committee stressed with renewed concern that the trend for growth in the numbers of senior-level positions had continued, and trusted that it would be addressed. On several occasions, requests for the establishment of such positions had been made with the justification that they would enable access to the highest levels of decision makers in a country. In the Advisory Committee's view, such justification should rather be based on operational requirements on the ground, responsibilities and functions of the posts and positions in the relevant countries and regions, and job classification standards. The Advisory Committee, having noted that the three new special envoys and advisers appointed by the Secretary-General in 2014 would be based at locations different from their predecessors, with no justification in the budget proposals, expressed the view that senior representatives who worked full-time for the Organization should, in general, be based with the missions they led.

32. Because the current budget proposals for 2015 were not comprehensive, the appropriation approved for 2014 and the current estimates for 2015 were not comparable. The requirements proposed for the 32 continuing missions for 2015 represented an increase of \$13 million, excluding UNAMA, UNSMIL and the

new United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB).

33. The proposed resources for air operations for 2015 amounted to \$34 million, an increase of \$6.9 million, not including the full requirements for UNAMA and UNSMIL. The Advisory Committee was of the view that the Secretary-General had not provided sufficient information regarding those significant increases. One factor for the increase related to the new arrangements for sharing fixed-wing aircraft costs among the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) and three other missions, yet the Secretary-General had not provided adequate justification for the significant increase in flight hours. In addition, in reaching cost-sharing arrangements, optimal ways of achieving efficiencies and cost-effectiveness should be identified. The Advisory Committee recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to monitor the actual flight hours and to keep the new cost-sharing arrangement under review.

34. For cluster I, the Advisory Committee recommended approval of the staffing changes proposed by the Secretary-General, except for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan. The Secretary-General should keep the arrangement for the location of the Special Envoy for Syria under review. The Advisory Committee recommended that the General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to review the location of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region and the structure of his Office, including the need for both the positions of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General.

35. For cluster II, the Advisory Committee recommended approval of the proposed establishment of two new positions of Political Affairs Officer at the P-4 and P-3 levels in the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, but recommended against the proposed reclassification of a position of Associated Political Affairs Officer from the P-2 to the P-3 level. The resources of \$653,200 required for the additional security officers for the Panel of Experts on Yemen and the Office of the Special Adviser on Yemen, further to the close protection teams established for the Panel and the Office in 2014, should be closely monitored.

36. With regard to cluster III, the estimated requirements for 2015 reflected a decrease of \$11.5 million compared with the 2014 appropriation, resulting mainly from reduced requirements for UNSMIL, for which only six months of interim funding was requested, partially offset by increased requirements for UNSOM and MENUB. The cluster III staffing changes proposed by the Secretary-General included 115 new positions, 2 abolishments and 4 reclassifications. While the Advisory Committee had no objection to most of those proposals, it recommended against the reclassification of the position of Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Asia from Assistant Secretary-General to Under-Secretary-General and called for a reduction in reliance on external consultants for activities which should in principle be performed by in-house mission staff.

37. On the basis of an Advisory Committee recommendation related to the 2014 UNAMI budget proposal, the General Assembly in its resolution 68/247 A had mandated the Mission to conduct a comprehensive staffing review. The Advisory Committee had been informed that the 2015 budget reflected the outcome of that review, but observed that the number and level of senior positions had not been addressed, given that the number of positions at the Director level and above for 2015 remained unchanged, and that the proposed structural realignments, consolidations and staffing requirements were not adequately justified. The Mission was proposing a net decrease of 42 national positions but only 9 international positions. The Advisory Committee was not convinced of the operational need to fill the proposed positions with international staff and recommended that the Secretary-General should strengthen the national staffing component, in view of the availability of qualified individuals in the local labour market. With regard to operational costs, further efforts should be made to ensure that UNAMI staff had a range of expertise in order to avoid the hiring of consultants, when possible.

38. **Mr. Dosseh** (Togo), speaking on behalf of the Group of African States, said that the Group was concerned about the late submission of reports on estimates in respect of special political missions, which ran counter to the General Assembly's request in its resolution 67/246 for the Secretary-General to present such proposals no later than the last week of October.

The Secretary-General should take decisive action to address the problem, which affected the Committee's deliberations.

39. Special political missions were essential to conflict prevention and resolution and the achievement of sustainable peace, reconciliation and development. Given the breadth and complexity of their mandates in conflict and post-conflict environments, adequate financial support was critical to their effectiveness.

40. The Group noted the information in the Secretary-General's report (A/69/363) on the performance of 38 special political missions for 2014, including the projected unencumbered balance of \$12 million, and the proposal for resources in the amount of \$485.9 million to finance 35 such missions in 2015. It welcomed the Secretary-General's efforts to improve the presentation and content of his report, but was concerned by the piecemeal approach to budgeting for such missions. The presentation of six-month estimates for UNAMA and UNSMIL was unacceptable; the Secretary-General's budget proposals should, to the extent possible, cover the full 12-month financial period and any decision to propose an interim financing arrangement, rather than a full budget, should be supported by strong justification based on technical budgetary assumptions and Security Council resolutions. He concurred with the Advisory Committee that the resources approved for 2014 and the estimates proposed for 2015 were not comparable and the final appropriation for the special political missions could reach \$1.25 billion, which would be more than the biennial provision initially approved.

41. The Group would seek clarification regarding various matters related to the budget proposal for special political missions. Although the rationale for the relocation of the offices of special envoys and advisers and their support staff was understandable, it was a matter of concern that such relocation resulted in significant resources being dedicated to administration rather than substantive core elements of the mandate.

42. The United Nations Office to the African Union was a separate entity with dedicated responsibilities and should be treated as such. The Group could not understand why a Head of Office at the level of Assistant Secretary-General had not been appointed, even though the General Assembly had allocated the required resources, and was concerned about the additional temporary responsibility given to the Special

Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan as Head of the Office. He would request additional information and clarification on the matter.

43. He reiterated the Group's position that a special and separate account for the funding of special political missions, which currently distorted the regular budget, should be established to enhance the transparency, governance and accountability of such missions.

44. **Ms. Karen Tan** (Singapore), speaking on behalf of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), said that the Association supported the role played by special political missions, which often addressed challenges others were unwilling or unable to tackle and filled a gap in the maintenance of peace and security. The Association was concerned that the Committee had failed to act on the recommendations of the Secretary-General and Advisory Committee on the need for holistic reform of the funding and backstopping arrangements for such missions. For the fourth consecutive year, the Committee was contending with the problems resulting from the lack of a separate account for the funding of special political missions.

45. Reform was necessary, given that the regular budget had not grown in real terms for several bienniums while the budgets for the missions had grown exponentially because, in every biennium, the Security Council had established more missions than the Secretariat had budgeted for. That trend was set to continue: the Secretariat had informed the Committee that the preliminary estimate for the biennium 2016-2017, excluding special political missions, would decrease by 0.1 per cent, but the budget for such missions was expected to increase by \$160 million, or 15 per cent.

46. If the overall budget remained frozen, increases in the mandates of special political missions would affect other parts of the budget, such as the development pillar. It was unreasonable, untenable and unhealthy for the Secretariat to make cuts and compromise the completion of other mandates to accommodate funding increases for those missions.

47. Of the current 35 special political missions, 33 had been established through decisions of the permanent members of the Security Council, which should therefore have primary responsibility for funding them. The General Assembly had reaffirmed in many resolutions that the special responsibilities of the

permanent members of the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security should be borne in mind in connection with their contributions to the financing of peace and security operations. The missions' financial needs should therefore be provided for in a manner analogous to the application of the scale of assessments for peacekeeping operations. If those who held the most influence over the missions could not bear the costs, then serious consideration should be given to expanding the permanent membership of the Security Council in order to distribute responsibility and power more equitably. The general membership of the United Nations should not be unduly taxed if they were not adequately represented in the establishment of and mandate-setting for such missions.

48. **Ms. Coto-Ramírez** (Costa Rica), speaking on behalf of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), said that the negotiations on the funding and backstopping of special political missions was of particular interest to the Community, which regretted the unwillingness of certain delegations to engage in those negotiations. It noted the proposed additional appropriation of \$40 million for the biennium 2014-2015, which included only six-month interim resource requirements for 2015 for UNAMA and UNSMIL. The total appropriation for the biennium 2014-2015 could amount to \$1.25 billion, over \$160 million more than the initial appropriation of \$1.081 billion. The Community was concerned by the distortion resulting from the funding of the missions from the regular budget. The proposed budget outline for the biennium 2016-2017 reflected a projected increase of \$169.3 million, or 15.6 per cent, in the provision for special political missions.

49. The mechanisms for financing special political missions were inadequate because they were linked to the regular budget and incompatible with the volatile nature of peace and security mandates. The budgets approved for such missions rarely satisfied their biennial needs and additional appropriations were often required. The changes proposed by the Secretary-General were essential to improving the missions' functioning.

50. CELAC supported the establishment of a separate account for special political missions, which should be budgeted, funded and reported on annually with a financial period of 1 July to 30 June, in the same way as peacekeeping operations, to enhance the efficiency,

transparency and fairness of the Organization's budgetary process. The permanent members of the Security Council had a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, which should be reflected in their financial contributions to all peace operations, including special political missions.

51. **Ms. Morgan** (Mexico) said that her Government supported the work of the special political missions, which was essential to international peace and security, and commended their staff, who often worked under difficult conditions. The Committee could best serve the missions by seriously considering what was needed to fulfil their mandates, including the necessary structural arrangements within the Organization. Their number and size and the complexity of their mandates had grown considerably in the preceding decade, and a new funding mechanism was therefore urgently required.

52. The administrative and budgetary arrangements for the missions were inadequate and adversely affected the regular budget as well as accountability, governance and transparency in the Organization. Her delegation was concerned by the missions' disorderly growth and the lack of oversight over the resources allocated to them, which amounted to 25 per cent of the regular budget. That unacceptable situation distorted the regular budget and put great pressure on resources which should be dedicated to areas such as development financing.

53. The Secretary-General's report (A/69/363) stated that additional resources of \$38 million were needed for special political missions for the biennium 2014-2015, showing once again that the missions' activities did not correspond with regular budget cycles and their administration did not allow adequate planning and oversight by the Member States. It had become a regular occurrence that the estimated resource requirements initially approved by the General Assembly did not reflect the missions' needs for the biennium. The situation compounded the difficulties faced by the Secretariat in providing the missions with adequate human and financial resources, particularly when they were starting up and when their mandates were renewed or expanded. To solve the problem, a special and separate account aligned with the annual budgetary cycle for peacekeeping missions of 1 July to 30 June should be established, and special political

missions should have access to the peacekeeping support account and the strategic deployment stocks.

54. Her delegation welcomed the decision of the Chair of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations to include an analysis of the financial aspects of the missions in the Panel's work, and hoped that the resulting recommendations would lead to progress.

55. **Mr. Al-Dabag** (Iraq) said that the Secretary-General's reports on the financing of special political missions must be issued early in the session, in order to allow Members States sufficient time to review them and hold in-depth and meaningful discussions.

56. Underscoring the importance of the Organization's ongoing role in Iraq, he reiterated his Government's commitment to providing UNAMI with the best possible services and support, so as to enable the Mission to fulfil the mandate established for it by the Security Council.

57. **Mr. Onuma** (Japan) said that, while his delegation supported the respective mandates of each special political mission, it had noted that the Secretary-General did not, in his proposed budget allocation of \$485,909,600, take into account the funding requirements of UNSMIL and UNAMA for the second half of 2015. Assuming that the requirements for the first and second halves of 2015 for the two missions would be equal, the total budget allocation would amount to \$612 million. Overall resources for special political missions for 2014-2015 must not exceed the total of \$1.081 billion set out in section 3 of the proposed programme budget. His delegation was therefore concerned that total requirements for the missions for 2014-2015 would exceed the approved provision by \$164 million, and would examine the matter in greater detail in informal consultations, with a view to achieving more efficient resource utilization. He welcomed the recommendations of the Advisory Committee, which had scrutinized the budget proposals in a balanced manner, taking into account the mandate of each mission. The Advisory Committee's recommendations would be a good starting point for the deliberations on the matter.

58. To address the wide range of demands in the field of peace and security, the United Nations should make best use of the tools at its disposal, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions, country teams, and regional and bilateral support

functions. It should take into consideration the specific characteristics of each activity to ensure that the measures taken were the best fit for the situations on the ground and could be adapted through timely and smooth transitions when those situations changed. Doing so would help the Organization to ensure that the missions were of an appropriate size and to achieve the best possible allocation of its limited resources. More collaboration among the Security Council, the Secretariat and the General Assembly was essential, and his Government welcomed the establishment of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which should consider methods of enhancing such collaboration in the interests of better and more transparent use of peace and security instruments.

59. With regard to the funding and backstopping of special political missions, his delegation was concerned that the establishment of a separate account would adversely affect the fiscal discipline of the United Nations and result in a budget increase, but would participate constructively in the deliberations on the matter.

60. **Mr. Carrera Castro** (Guatemala) said that his delegation was concerned to note that the resource requirements of the special political missions had been submitted late and resulted in substantial increases in the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015. It did not oppose the mandates of the missions, which furthered international peace and security objectives, but believed that the current financial arrangements, which were linked to the biennial programme budgets and clearly distorted the priorities established by the Member States, were unsustainable.

61. The structure of the regular budget had changed greatly in the preceding decade, with the special political missions accounting for an increasingly large share. A separate account for the missions should now be established to ensure their sustainability and more transparency and accountability for the Member States. Such an approach would allow the Committee to discuss the matters before it in a more logical order; it currently spent too long on relatively minor questions and had insufficient time to discuss more important ones, such as the resource requirements for the special political missions.

62. **Mr. González Sánchez** (Cuba) said that his delegation was concerned at the late submission of the reports on special political missions. Such delays

reduced the quality of the Committee's deliberations and hindered decision-making by the Member States, which depended on the timely submission of documents in all languages. His delegation would demand proper analysis of the reports despite their late submission.

63. The funding of special political missions through the regular budget was unsustainable, particularly given that most of them were established by the Security Council and should therefore be funded in the same way as peacekeeping operations. The resources allocated to such missions amounted to 23 per cent of the regular budget, or \$485 million, which represented a serious distortion of the priorities established by the General Assembly in its resolutions concerning the proposed programme budget. His delegation was also concerned about the procedure for establishing the missions, which comprised a mere exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Security Council, despite the extremely sensitive matters involved. That procedure and the procedure for monitoring the missions denied the General Assembly oversight of them, in contrast to peacekeeping operations.

64. With regard to thematic cluster I, Special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General, his delegation remained opposed to the inclusion of the responsibility to protect in the estimates for special political missions under the mandate of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, in the absence of an intergovernmental agreement on the matter. Such inclusion was a violation of the Regulations and Rules Governing Programme Planning, the Programme Aspects of the Budget, the Monitoring of Implementation and the Methods of Evaluation (ST/SGB/2000/8) and of successive General Assembly resolutions on programme planning and budgeting. His Government's position should not, however, be interpreted as a rejection of the work of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. On the contrary, Cuba condemned all acts of genocide and supported the Special Adviser's activities.

65. The presentation of the estimates made it impossible to distinguish clearly and transparently between the resources allocated to the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect and those allocated to the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide; a general analysis of the resources proposed for the

Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was therefore impossible, and his delegation requested that the Secretary-General should provide the General Assembly with information regarding those resources. The description of the performance of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was also imprecise and did not distinguish between the Special Adviser's activities and those of the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Such ambiguity made it difficult for the Member States to ascertain whether the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was fulfilling his mandates or pursuing objectives not approved by the Member States. Cuba was concerned about the assertion that the political, conceptual and operational development of the responsibility to protect had continued, given that the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect had received no General Assembly mandate to perform such development. Neither did she have a mandate to consult with Member States, whether in New York or in national capitals, or with regional and subregional organizations, civil society and the United Nations system on the implementation of the responsibility to protect principle. In its resolution 63/308, the General Assembly had decided to continue its consideration of the responsibility to protect. It was therefore the Assembly's prerogative to develop the concept and appoint a special adviser on the responsibility to protect, if the Member States so decided. His delegation would propose changes to the presentation of the estimates in respect of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.

66. **Mr. Ja'afari** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his Government had consistently supported the efforts of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria to arrive at a Syrian-led political solution to the crisis in the Syrian Arab Republic, without foreign intervention. In order to achieve that goal, the international community must join together to combat the terrorism that was plaguing Iraq, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. Accordingly, those States that supported terrorism must be compelled to cease arming, funding, training and hosting terrorists, and his Government would take every legal measure at the international level to ensure that that happened. The Syrian State and people must also be compensated fully by the Governments of those States, which included Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for the damages the terrorists had caused. In that connection, his delegation regretted that the Secretary-General's report (A/69/363/Add.1)

did not make reference to either the terrorism from which the Syrian Arab Republic suffered or Security Council resolutions 2170 (2014) and 2178 (2014), in which the Council condemned the acts of terrorism committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and the Nusrah Front.

67. His Government welcomed the Secretariat's decision to begin referring to the Special Envoy as the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General instead of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, particularly after it had been discovered that the League was playing a negative role in the Syrian crisis owing to the influence exerted on it by two of its members that supported terrorism. It also welcomed the fact that the report contained no references to the League, its Secretary-General and its Ministerial Council, or to the Ministerial Follow-up Committee of the League, in the paragraphs related to the Special Envoy's mandate. However, the report did refer to the League of Arab States and other regional organizations in relation to the reports presented and the press briefings given by the Special Envoy. His delegation requested the Secretariat to delete the reference to the League and other regional organizations, because the Special Envoy represented only the Secretary-General of the United Nations and presented his reports only to the United Nations and its principal organs.

68. His delegation was also concerned that the report referred to General Assembly resolutions on the situation in Syria, because those resolutions had not been adopted by consensus. Those resolutions reflected a single perspective and were biased, and their purpose was to misguide Member States and draw attention away from the use of Wahhabist terrorism as a political weapon to change the Syrian Government by force.

69. In conclusion, he said that his Government would continue to cooperate with the Special Envoy and support his mandate, and hoped that the entire budget proposed for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria would be adopted.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.