



# General Assembly

Sixty-fourth session

Official Records

Distr.: General  
2 December 2009

Original: English

---

## Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee)

### Summary record of the 15th meeting

Held at Headquarters, New York, on Friday, 23 October 2009, at 10 a.m.

*Chairperson:* Mr. Al-Nasser . . . . . (Qatar)

## Contents

Agenda item 33: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects

---

This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

09-57393 (E)



Please recycle A recycling symbol consisting of three chasing arrows forming a triangle.

*The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.*

**Agenda item 33: Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects** (A/64/359-S/2009/470, A/64/494)

1. **Mr. Le Roy** (Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations) said during the past year he had visited most of the 17 peacekeeping missions and their host Governments, as well as regional partners, and, both at Headquarters and in the capitals of troop and police-contributing countries, had discussed the challenges and opportunities facing peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was an increasingly complex and dangerous undertaking; it was also a shared endeavour, resting on the partnership of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat.

2. Reviewing key developments during 2009, he said that more traditional missions with clear tasks, such as those in Cyprus and the Golan Heights, were continuing to contribute to peace and security and provide stability; they were cost-effective, but often witnessed little political progress.

3. Large, complex missions faced major, wide-ranging problems. In the Sudan, the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement was threatened by delays in the preparation of the referendum and in the elections and inter-tribal violence in the south. In Darfur, the need for a political solution was critical; displaced civilians remained vulnerable and troop and equipment capacities still lagged behind the provisions of the mandate. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo there were new opportunities to address the presence of armed groups, both foreign and Congolese. A number of serious challenges remained, including the protection of civilians, but the re-establishment of State authority in the east could help in building a credible army and police.

4. Other, more mature missions needed to consolidate gains made in security and advance the peacebuilding effort on the ground. To that end, training of the national police and military was being supported by the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). Although reintegration of former combatants had been completed, much remained to be done to strengthen the national security sector, promote good governance and foster economic recovery. The 2011 elections would be a critical test of the stability achieved thus far; current troop levels would be

maintained to ensure adequate security. The United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) provided critical security support while assisting national efforts to strengthen the rule of law and foster economic development. Haiti's recovery and governance agenda enjoyed significant international support, not least through the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Haiti; that momentum must be maintained. In Côte d'Ivoire, preparations for the November presidential elections were going well, although the limited capacity of national institutions and, in some instances, a lack of political will had resulted in serious delays. The United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) played a key role in helping national institutions overcome their limitations.

5. Each situation had its own complexity, but there were also common denominators. For a peacekeeping operation to succeed, it must be accompanied by a comprehensive political process supported by all stakeholders, for the duration of the mission. Peacekeeping personnel, who worked hard, in extremely difficult environments, to win the trust of local stakeholders, and deliver on wide-ranging mandates, deserved praise for their dedication. There was a need for clear and achievable mandates; the Security Council must set clearer priorities, and expectations needed to be scaled against the realities on the ground. Peacekeeping personnel needed support and resources to meet the challenge of protecting civilians in volatile environments. The gap between mandates and resources hampered rapid and robust reaction and the deployment of capabilities, notably the provision of critical aviation assets for the largest missions. Missions were capable of assuming certain early peacebuilding tasks but those tasks must be better defined and there must be better planning with partners before such tasks can be entrusted to other actors in predictable and sufficiently well-resourced frameworks, while making sure that early gains were sustainable. Finally, the enormous logistical challenges involved in missions could not be underestimated; the Department of Field Support was developing a support strategy which included a stronger client orientation.

6. He was gratified by Member States' broad support for peacekeeping. Troop and police-contributing countries were ready to assist further but had expressed the desire to be better consulted in mission planning and policy development and wanted clear and

achievable mandates. Yet the strains on the system were real. Some contributors struggled to meet the equipment and mobility requirements; others sought greater clarity on the tasks required or improved training support; for others, reimbursement was seen as insufficient or simply came too slowly.

7. Four main priority areas had been identified as the basis for a new partnership agenda for peacekeeping. That agenda built on previous work while taking into account new challenges.

8. The first priority area was developing practical guidance on critical roles for modern United Nations peacekeeping. There was an urgent need to clarify policy and guidance for the protection of civilians, robust peacekeeping and the linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. On the protection of civilians, there were real limits to what could be done in the midst of ongoing conflict and across vast territories. All partners must have a common and realistic understanding of what could be achieved that could guide mandates, capabilities and expectations. A dialogue on the protection of civilians would draw on an independent study that would be issued shortly, a draft concept paper prepared by the Department, and consultations with Member States. Peacekeeping operations were already doing much to mitigate harm to civilians. The United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) and the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) had all taken steps to enhance monitoring and patrolling among the local population and in camps.

9. Progress was being made in defining and developing policy for robust peacekeeping, always within the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping and the Charter of the United Nations, including consent of the main parties and impartiality. At the operational and tactical level, robustness meant the willingness and capability to deter and confront attempts to undermine a mission's mandate. A three-day meeting of over 30 troop-contributing countries and Governments held in May 2009, together with senior officials from the United Nations and regional organizations and peacekeeping experts, had concluded that robust peacekeeping was a political issue, requiring strategic guidance; that greater consultation with contributors was necessary, both prior to and during deployment; that forces must be more mobile in

order to confront threats to missions, mandates or populations; that peacekeeping operations must be conducted in a flexible manner, with a coherent and accountable chain of command; that there must be a greater intelligence capacity; and that the delivery of robust logistics needed to be improved.

10. Guidance was being clarified and developed on critical early peacebuilding tasks in post-conflict situations. A strategy with clear benchmarks would be developed for efforts to establish the rule of law and to strengthen security institutions in a way that would ensure consistent, high-quality work across the missions. A framework for international police peacekeeping was being developed and the integrated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standards were being updated. Rapidly deployable justice and corrections experts deployed alongside police capacities were essential in providing assistance to national rule of law institutions from the outset of a mission. Proposals were being developed for the achievement of that objective while being consistent with the human resource management reform approved by the General Assembly.

11. The second priority area was building the capabilities needed to meet current challenges. While the base of troop contributors needed to be expanded, especially to ensure specialized capabilities, there was a need to agree on the baseline capabilities that were expected for each core component of a peacekeeping operation. Contributors would then train police and troops to those standards. The Department was engaged with the commanders in the field to define the priority components of a capability-driven approach to peacekeeping; generic task lists were being identified for different components of a peacekeeping operation; pilot projects would then be undertaken for the development of operational standards and associated training guidance in specialist military and police areas. Work had begun to review the functions, capacities and readiness requirements of formed police units and similar efforts could be considered for other areas such as engineering and field hospitals and for the standards required for staff officers. That approach would help better link the needs of contributing countries with ongoing bilateral and global capacity-building programmes.

12. The third priority area was putting in place stronger United Nations field support arrangements, which would improve the ability of missions and

contributing countries to deliver on the ground. A critical dimension was the development of a wider support framework, including the support strategy of the Department of Field Support.

13. The fourth priority area was ensuring more consultative and effective arrangements for the planning and oversight of missions. Stronger cooperation was needed between contributing countries, the Security Council and the Secretariat throughout the mission planning and implementation cycle. Consultation and reporting were being strengthened in order to improve planning and oversight of missions. In October 2009 a directive had been issued to all staff at Headquarters and in the field to play an active role in systematically engaging contributors prior to mandate renewals or changes on the ground and include feedback in reports to Member States; brief the Member States concerned on the parameters of technical assessment missions and report on their findings; and develop mission-specific benchmarks for the assessment and monitoring of mission progress.

14. Issues of safety and security were of the highest concern. The Organization had the obligation to ensure that risks to staff were at acceptable levels. In the light of recent incidents, in which United Nations personnel had been directly targeted, work had begun to improve security threat and risk assessments and to move certain mission functions away from high-risk areas. Safety was a second area of concern; with a relatively low financial investment, a realistic occupational safety programme would be put in place over the next few years. He paid tribute to the 86 United Nations peacekeepers who had died to date in 2009 in the cause of peace.

15. **Ms. Malcorra** (Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Department of Field Support) said that the Department of Field Support had become an important feature in the institutional landscape, delivering support to 15 peacekeeping missions, 13 special political missions and one African Union-led mission, while administering about 22,000 international and local civilian staff, and managing combined annual budgets of over \$8 billion and annual procurement costs of almost \$2.7 billion. The Department was focused on the very specific mandate of getting the right staff on board, securing sufficient financing and providing the necessary equipment and logistical services to the field in the quickest time possible. The

business of mission support had become a large, complex global enterprise requiring a professional, systematic yet adaptable approach to the different operating environments and mandate demands and the various stages of a mission life cycle.

16. To give some examples of particularly challenging support requirements in the past year, there had been the tripartite negotiations needed to secure safe and steady passage of personnel and equipment to UNAMID; the redeployment, across a vast country and largely by air, of most of the military component of MONUC; the complex legal, operational and transitional arrangements needed to transfer authority from the European Union-led Military Force (EUFOR) in Chad; the logistical support for the recent elections in Afghanistan, amid a worsening security situation; and the unprecedented arrangements for United Nations logistical, food, medical and communications support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under very poor security conditions. Mention should also be made of the significant resizing of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the unexpected liquidation of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) or less volatile missions such as those in Haiti or Timor-Leste that required special support services.

17. The third priority area of the new partnership agenda for peacekeeping was the support strategy that would chart the work of the Department of Field Support over the next five years. The Department needed to develop a business model that was equal to the demands and that recognized the need to evolve from mission-centric support to a global, integrated delivery system. Among the key elements driving that approach were: the need to update the operating framework, balancing the demand for effective delivery and the obligation to comply with rules, regulations and internal procedures; the need to strike a balance between the risks of delay and those stemming from increased operational empowerment and decentralized authority; the need to augment the readiness capacities which allowed for an immediate response to any current or future field requirement; the need to maximize the safety and security of United Nations personnel while ensuring acceptable living and working conditions in field locations; the recognition that all missions went through a life cycle and that real results in a shorter timespan depended upon strategic investment at critical stages; the need to improve the

timeliness of deployments; and, lastly, the desire to exert a more productive, economical impact on operations in the field by relying more on local or regional procurement and learning a more environmentally sensitive “footprint”.

18. The new support strategy would have a significant impact on how the Department of Field Support was organized, staffed and resourced. A report was being prepared which would outline the elements of the strategy in detail.

*The meeting rose at 11.05 a. m.*