Verified Time Balancing of Security Protocols

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Motivation

- ASD manually verifies vendor code with containing cryptographic processes.
- ► Formal Methods: A mathematically based approach to the specification and verification of software.
- ► Can we reduce some of the resources ASD spends on manual verification by replacing with automatic verification?
- A case study, also work towards more secure protocols.

Formally Verifying a Time Balanced Security Protocol

- Attackers can gain information from message timing.
- ► Can we model a time-invariant protocol?
- ► A naive approach considers all operations have the same running time.
- Can we ensure that assumptions on this model hold for the implementation?

The ZRTP Protocol

- ▶ Initially started with ZRTP.
- ▶ ZRTP is complex and makes many decisions.
- ➤ Simplified version that contains just enough detail to allow us to attempt to prove some interesting things!

The Simplified Protocol

- ► Commit messages contain hashes of 256 bit random nonce.
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange contains modulo arithmetic.
- How can we formally guarantee the timing of operations?

Approach

- We can use the notion of propositions as types.
- ▶ Dependently typed functional programming languages also act as theorem provers for a higher-order constructive logic.
- ▶ We can model this protocol in such a language, Idris.
- We can express proofs about properties of the protocol.

Quick Background 1 - Currying

All functions treated as taking a single argument.

$$f: \mathbb{N} \to (\mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N})$$
$$f = +$$

Applying an argument to a multi argument function returns the rest of the function! (Arrow associates to the right)

$$f(2): \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$$
$$f(2) = 2+$$

Finally all arguments are applied.

$$f(2,3): \mathbb{N}$$

 $f(2,3) = 2 + 3 = 5$

Quick Background 2 - Propositions as Types

Logic Term	Logic Symbol	Idris Symbol	Idris Type
Implication	$p\Rightarrowq$	p -> q	Function
Conjunction	$p \wedge q$	(p, q)	Pair / Tuple
Disjunction	p∨q	Either p q	Tagged Union
Negation	¬ p	p -> Void	Void Type
IFF/Eq	$p \equiv q, p \iff q$	(p -> q, q -> p)	Pair Arrows
Universal	∀ x. P x	p -> Type	П Туре
Existential	∃ x. P x	(x ** P x)	Σ Type
		p = q	Type Equality

Quick Background 3 - Idris Syntax and Values as Types

Building a vector type in Idris:

```
data Vec : Nat -> Type -> Type where
Nil : Vec 0 a
(::) : (x : a) -> Vec n a -> Vec (n + 1) a
```

We can parameterise types over values to capture invariants in the model.

```
append : Vec n a \rightarrow Vec m a \rightarrow Vec (n + m) a append Nil ys = ys append (x :: xs) ys = x :: append xs ys
```


Building a type of Prg n

Statement	Continuation	Result	Description
Halt	Prg 1	Prg 1	Terminate
AssC	Prg k	$Prg\;(k+1)$	Asn constant.
AssV	Prg k	$Prg\;(k+1)$	Asn variable.
UnOp	Prg k	$Prg\;(k+1)$	Asn result of unary op.
BinOP	Prg k	$Prg\;(k+1)$	Asn result of binary op.
Do	Prg k	Prg(m*n+k)	Run Prg m, n times.
Cond	Prg k	$Prg\;(n+k)$	Branch on Prg n.

Conditionals require both branches to be Prg n. Ensuring That all branches of the program are correct by construction.

What about more expressive time parameters?

Elaboration and Compilation of a Correct Core



- The small, correct core language can be elaborated to a more full-featured language.
- The size of the core language makes the burden of proofs much lighter.
- The compiler can map the core language expressions down to something more real world (e.g C, assembler).

Contributions

- Formal description of a simplified protocol.
- ▶ Prg: A small language parameterised over computational time
- Some small proofs of Prg correctness.

Further Work

- ▶ Implement the simplified protocol in Prg.
- ► Modulo arithmetic cases.
- ▶ Relax some of the (many) assumptions.
- Investigate elaboration and compilation with regard to invariants.