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**Army Concept Analysis Agency ltr., dtd
July 19, 1988.**

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FILE COPY

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED
OUTCOMES OF BATTLES AND WARS:
A DATA BASE OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

Final Report

DEC 4 1984

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Prepared for the US Army Concepts Analysis
Agency under Contract No.
MDA903-82-C-0363

June 1983

VOLUME VI

Part Two: Wars of the 20th Century
Vol. VI: World War II, 1939-1945; Campaigns
in France, 1940, on the Eastern
Front, and of the War Against
Japan. The 1967, 1968, and 1973
Arab-Israeli Wars.

HISTORICAL EVALUATION AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATION

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Summary

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE
INFLUENCED OUTCOMES OF BATTLES AND WARS:
A DATA BASE OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

In this report prepared by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, HERO has compiled data on 600 major battles of modern history from the beginning of the 17th Century through the first three quarters of the 20th Century, and presented this data in a combination of matrices and narratives. The matrices comprise seven tables which present all of the significant statistical data available on the battles and show how major factors of combat have influenced the outcomes of these battles. There is a concise narrative for each battle, which summarizes the principal sources consulted in the research for that battle. The data, information, and analysis are presented in Volumes II-VI, as follows:

- Volume II: 1600-1800
- Volume III: 1805-1900
- Volume IV: 1904-1940
- Volume V: 1939-1945
- Volume VI: 1939-1973

VI
This volume covers
World War II, 1939-1945
(Campaigns in France, 1940,
on the Eastern Front,
and of the War Against
Japan); and the
1967, 1968, and 1973
Arab-Israeli Wars.

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World War II

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Sedan-Meuse River 13-14 May

Malaya, 1941

Jitra 12 Dec

The Eastern Front, 1941-1945

Rovno (Operation "Barbarossa") 22-26 Jun 1941

The Defense of Moscow 30 Sep-3 Dec 1941

Soviet Counteroffensive at Moscow 5 Dec 1941-7 Jan 1942

The Pogoreloye Gorodishche Offensive 4-11 Aug 1942

Leningrad (Operation "Spark") 12-18 Jan 1943

Operation "Citadel":

The Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase I 4-6 Jul 1943

Southern Sector 5 Jul 1943

The Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase II 7-10 Jul 1943

The Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase III 11-15 Jul 1943

Prokhorovka 12-13 Jul 1943

Kursk Counteroffensive (Southern Sector) 3-23 Aug 1943

Belgorod 3-5 Aug 1943

The Melitopol Operation 26 Sep-5 Nov 1943

The Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation 24 Jan-17 Feb 1944

Nikopol Bridgehead 31 Jan-5 Feb 1944

The Eastern Front, 1941-1945 (Continued)

Sevastopol 5-9 May 1944

The Berezina River, Byelorussian Offensive 25-29 Jun 1944

The Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive 13-29 Jul 1944

Brody, Phase I 14 Jul 1944

Brody, Phase II 15 Jul 1944

Assault Crossing of the Vistula River, Phase I 29-31 Jul 1944

Vistula River Operation, Pulawy, Phase II 2-7 Aug 1944

The Yassy-Kishinev Operation 20-29 Aug 1944

The Vistula-Oder Offensive 12 Jan-3 Feb 1945

East Prussia 13-31 Jan 1945

Ciechanow, Phase I 14 Jan 1945

Ciechanow, Phase II 15 Jan 1945

Seelow Heights 16-17 Apr 1945

Manchuria, 1945

Mutankiang 9-16 Aug

The War Against Japan, 1943-1945

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Iwo Jima, Into the Main Defenses 20-24 Feb 1945

Iwo Jima, Suribachi 20-24 Feb 1945

Iwo Jima, Final Phase 11-16 Mar 1945

The Okinawa Campaign, 1945

US 7th Infantry Division Sector

Advance from the Beach 2-4 Apr

The Okinawa Campaign, 1945 (Continued)

US 7th Infantry Division Sector (Continued)

Advance through the Outposts 5-8 Apr

Tomb Hill-Ouki 9-11 Apr

Skyline Ridge and the Rocky Crags 19-23 Apr

Kochi Ridge-Onaga I 25-27 Apr

Kochi Ridge-Onaga II 28-29 Apr

Kochi Ridge-Onaga III 30 Apr-3 May

Japanese Counterattack 4-5 May

Kochi Ridge IV 6-7 May

Shuri Envelopment, Phase I 22-23 May

Japanese Counterattacks 24/25 May

Shuri Envelopment, Phase II 26-27 May

Shuri Envelopment, Phase III 29-31 May

Hill 95-I 6-8 Jun

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Yaeju-Dake 12 Jun

Hills 153 and 115 15-17 Jun

US 96th Infantry Division Sector

Advance from the Beachhead 2-4 Apr

Advance to the Shuri Line Outposts 5-8 Apr

Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges 9-12 Apr

Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarpment 19-23 Apr

Maeda Escarpment 26-29 Apr

Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, I 11-13 May

The Okinawa Campaign, 1945 (Continued)

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Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, II 14-18 May

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Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment 6-9 Jun

Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment 10-11 Jun

Capture of the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment 12-17 Jun

1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War)

West Bank

Jenin 5/6 Jun

Jerusalem 5-7 Jun

Kabatiya 6-7 Jun

Tilfit-Zababiba 6/7 Jun

Nablus 7 Jun

Sinai Front

Rafah 5 Jun

Bir Lahfan 5/6 Jun

Abu Ageila-Um Katef 5/6 Jun

El Arish 5/6 Jun

Jebel Libni 6 Jun

Gaza Strip 6-7 Jun

Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada 7 Jun

Mitla Pass 7 Jun

Bir Hammam-Bir Gifgafa 7/8 Jun

1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War) (Continued)

Sinai Front (Continued)

Nakhl 8 Jun

Bir Gifgafa 8 Jun

Golan Front

Tel Fchar-Banias 9 Jun

Rawiyeh 9 Jun

Zacoura-Kala 9 Jun

1968 Arab-Israeli War

Kerama 21 Mar

1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Suez Front

Suez Canal Assault-North 6 Oct

Suez Canal Assault-South 6 Oct

Second Army Buildup 7 Oct

Third Army Buildup 7 Oct

Kantara-Firdan 8 Oct

Egyptian Offensive-North 14 Oct

Egyptian Offensive-South 14 Oct

Deversoir (Chinese Farm I) 15/16 Oct

Deversoir (Chinese Farm II) 16-17 Oct

Deversoir West 18 Oct

Ismailia 19-22 Oct

1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Suez Front (Continued)

Jebel Geneifa 19-21 Oct

Shallufa I 22 Oct

Shallufa II 23-24 Oct

Suez 23-24 Oct

Adabiya 23/24 Oct

Golan Front

Kuneitra 6-7 Oct

Ahmadiyah 6-7 Oct

Rafid 6/7 Oct

Yehudia-El Al 7/8 Oct

Nafekh 7/8 Oct

Tel Faris 8-10 Oct

Hushniyah 8-10 Oct

Mount Hermonit 8-9 Oct

Mount Hermon I 8 Oct

Tel Shams 11-13 Oct

Tel Shaar 11-12 Oct

Tel el Hara 13 Oct

Kfar Shams-Tel Antar 15 Oct

Naba 16 Oct

Arab Counteroffensive 19 Oct

Mount Hermon II 21 Oct

Mount Hermon III 22 Oct

1. IDENTIFICATION
 War: World War II
 France, 1940 and Malaya, 1941

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Sedan-Meuse River, France	A 13-14 May 1940 D	France, 1940	Ger XIX Pz Corps Fr Second Army (+)	Gen Guderian Gen Billotte	2	9.0
Jitra, Malaya	A 12 Dec 1941 D	Malaya, 1941	Jap 5th Inf Div (-) Br 11th Indian Div	Lt Gen Matsui MG Murray-Lyon	1	8.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II
 France, 1940 and Malaya, 1941

Engagement	Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Sedan-Meuse River	A D	PD	RW	DST WH	ST WTr	Y X	X minor	X
Jitra	A D	H/PD						X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Sedan-Meuse River	A D	x x	x x	x x	N N	x x	N N	C C	x x	x x	5.0 11.0	8 8
Jitra	A D	x x	x 0	x 0	N N	x x	N C	x x	x x	x x	5 5	5 4

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II

Engagement	Sedan-Meuse River	Jitra	A D	A D	N N	N N	N N	Depth
Force Quality	x	x						
Reserves	x	x						
Mobility Superiority	x	x						
Air Superiority	x	x						
Force Preposition- derivative	N	N						
Weather	N	N						
Train, Roads		x	x					
Leader- ship		x	x					
Planning		x	x					
Surprise		x	x					
Mass, Narrow Front		x	x					
Logistics		N	N					
Fortifi- cations		N	N					

7. COMBAT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: World War II

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
			RivC	Secondary Attack		
Sedan-Meuse River	A D	RivC D/O	--	--	X	B WD
Jittra	A D	F D	--	--	X	B WIL

WORLD WAR II (FRANCE, 1940)

Sedan-Meuse River, 13-14 May 1940

After the opening drive into the Ardennes Forest on 10-12 May 1940, General Heinz Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps reached Sedan, on the Meuse River, which it was ordered to cross on the following day. Success of this operation was vital for the continuation of the German attack into France designed to cut off Allied forces lured northward by other German thrusts into the Low Countries.

Guderian had three panzer divisions in the XIX Panzer Corps, but only two, the 1st and the 10th, were along the Meuse in strength for the 13 May crossing. Following an intense artillery and air bombardment of French positions on the river's west bank, reinforced infantry elements of the 1st Panzer Division crossed near Flouing. A pontoon bridge was in place across the river by midnight on 13 May. To the north a smaller unit failed to cross the river, while to the south 10th Panzer Division elements established a small bridgehead. On 14 May the 1st Panzer Division expanded its bridgehead, and a French counterattack was repulsed with assistance from 2d Panzer Division units. Meanwhile, another crossing was made, north of Flouing, and by the evening of 14 May all three panzer divisions of the XIX Panzer Corps were across in force and driving west.

Significance: The XIX Panzer Corps, and the XLI Panzer Corps to its right, had cracked the weak French defenses along the Meuse River. In doing so, the German armored units kept up the momentum required for this part of the German offensive and permitted the attack to continue to the English Channel.

Source: T.1; T.2; T.3; T.4; T.5.

WORLD WAR II (Malaya, 1941)

Jitra, 12 December 1941

In late 1941, Great Britain's primary concern in Malaya was the protection of the naval base at Singapore, which was the prime objective of Japan. Instead of attacking by sea, where Singapore's defenses were focussed, elements of the Japanese Twenty-fifth Army drove overland from Thailand in order to proceed down the Malay Peninsula to Singapore. With air and naval superiority the well-led and experienced Japanese troops thwarted all attempts by the British to slow their offensive. Capturing British airfields and cutting off British forces in northwestern Thailand, they moved into Malaya.

Near Jitra, the British 11th Infantry Division was deployed in partly completed defenses along the north-south road, to stop the advance of the Japanese 5th Infantry Division. After pushing aside delaying forces north of Jitra, the Japanese arrived just north of the town on 11 December. Unaware of the density of the Jitra defenses, Japanese infantry attacked in the early morning of 12 December and were repulsed, but only after discovering gaps in the right of the British positions. At daybreak, having brought up artillery and reinforcements, the Japanese renewed their attack, concentrating on the weak spots of the right-hand British brigade. Poorly trained troops and inexperienced officers prevented the British from making an effective defense, and the 11th Division commander, Major General D.M. Murray-Lyon, requested permission to withdraw. With the route to the south threatened by Japanese forces advancing from the northeast, Murray-Lyon finally received permission to pull back during the night on 12 December. Under the cover of darkness and in heavy rain, the remnants of the division began to withdraw, in good order but leaving behind many vehicles and much equipment.

Significance: Having broken through the only prepared defense in northwestern Malaya, the Japanese were free to pursue the retreating British toward Singapore.

Sources: T.6; T.7.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: World War II, Eastern Front

Engagement	Date (s)	Campaign	Forces	Cowards	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Rovno, USSR	A 22-26 Jun 1941 D	Barbarossa	Ger First Pz Group Sov Southwestern AG (-)	Gen von Kleist Gen Kirponos	5	65.0
Defense of Moscow, USSR	A 30 Sep-3 Dec 1941 D	Typhoon	Ger AG Center Sov Western AG (+)	Fl von Röck Marshal Stalin	65	700.0
Moscow Counter- offensive, USSR	A 5 Dec 1941- D 7 Jan 1942	Moscow Counter- offensive	Sov Kalinin AG (+) Ger AG Center	Marshal Stalin Fl von Röck	33	1,060.0
Pogoreloye Goro- dissche, USSR	A 4-11 Aug 1942 D	The Rzhev Opera- tion	Sov Twentieth Combined Army Army Ger Ninth Army	Gen Hoyter Gen Model	8	36.0
Leningrad, USSR	A 12-18 Jan 1943 D	Leningrad	Sov Second Assault Army(?) Ger Eighteenth Army(-)	Gen Romanovskiy Gen Lindemann	13.0	
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase I, USSR	A 4-6 Jul 1943 D	Kursk Citadel	Ger XLVIII Pz Corps Sov Sixth Guards Army	Gen Knobelsdorff Gen Chistyakov	3	16.0
Operation Citadel, Southern Sector, USSR	A 5 Jul 1943 D	Kursk	Ger Fourth Pz Army Sov Sixth & Seventh Gds Armies	Gen Hoth Lt Gen Chistyakov	1	30.0
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase II, USSR	A 7-10 Jul 1943 D	Kursk Citadel	Ger XLVIII Pz Corps Sov Sixth Guards Army(?)	Gen Knobelsdorff Gen Chistyakov	4	20.0
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase III, USSR	A 11-15 Jul 1943 D	Kursk Citadel	Ger XLVIII Pz Corps Sov Sixth Guards Army(?)	Gen Knobelsdorff Gen Chistyakov	5	25.0
Prokhorovka, USSR	A 12-13 Jul 1943 D	Kursk Citadel	Sov Steppe Army Group II SS Pz Corps	Gen Konev Gen Hauser	2	25.0
Kursk Counter- offensive, USSR	A 3-23 Aug 1943 D	Kursk Counter- offensive	Sov Voronezh AG (+) Ger Fourth Pz Army (+)	Gen Vatutin Gen Hoth	20	250.0

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: World War II, Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Date (s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (km)
Belgorod, USSR	A 3-5 Aug 1943 D	Kursk Counter- offensive	Sov Fifty-Third Army Ger 167th Inf Div	Gen Managorov Lt Gen Triereisenberg	3	16.0
Melitopol, USSR	A 26 Sep- 5 Nov 1943 D	Race to the Dnieper	Sov Fourth Ukrainian AG Ger Sixth Field Army	Gen Tolbukhin Gen Hollidt	41	111.0
Korsun-Shevchenko, USSR	A 24 Jan-17 Feb D 1944	Ukrainian Campaign	Sov First Ukrainian AG Ger First Pz Army (-)(+)	Gen Vatutin (Gen Steinerman)	24	180.0
Nikopol Bridge- head, USSR	A 31 Jan-5 Feb D 1944	Dnieper Bridgehead	Sov 109th Rifle Div(?) Ger 335th Inf Div (+)	?	6	12.0
Sevastopol, USSR	A 5-9 May 1944 D	Crimea, 1944	Sov Fourth Ukrainian AG Ger Seventeenth Field Army	Gen Tolbukhin Gen Allendeinger	5	25.0
Berezina River, USSR	A 25-29 Jun 1944 D	Byelorussian Offensive	Sov III Gts Mech Corps Ger 299th Inf Div (+)	Lt Gen Obutkov ?	5	?
Ivov-Sandomierz, USSR	A 13-29 Jul 1944 D	Liberation of E. Poland	Sov First Ukrainian AG Ger Northern Ukraine Gen Harpe	General Kotov ?	17	440.0
Brody, Phase I, USSR	A 14 Jul 1944 D	The Lvov-Sando- mierz Operation	Sov XIV Rifle Corps Ger 913th Inf Reg (+)	Gen Tertishniy ?	1	5.5
Brody, Phase II, USSR	A 15 Jul 1944 D	The Lvov-Sando- mierz Operation	Sov XV Rifle Corps Ger 349th Inf Div (+)	Gen Tertishniy ?	1	7.0
Vistula River Operation, Phase I, Poland	A 29-31 Jul 1944 D	Poland, 1944	Sov XI Rifle Corps Ger 171st, 214th and 26th Inf Divs	Gen Volkov ?	3	10.0
Vistula River Operation, Phase II, Poland	A 2-7 Aug 1944 D	Poland, 1944	Sov XII Rifle Corps Ger 171st, 214th and 17th Inf Divs	Gen Volkov ?	6	12.0

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: World War II, Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Yassy-Kishinev, USSR	A 20-29 Aug 1944 D	Romania, 1944	Sov Second AG (+) Ger-Rom AG Southern Ukraine	Gen Malinovskiy Gen Priesner	10	590.0
Vistula-Oder, USSR	A 12 Jan-3 Feb D 1945	Liberation of W. Poland	Sov First Byelorussian AG (+) Ger AG "A"	Marshal Zhukov Gen Harpe	23	480.0
East Prussia, Germany	A 13-31 Jan 1945 D	East Prussia, 1945	Sov Second Byelorussian AG (+) Ger AG Center	Marshal Rokossovskiy Gen Reinhartd	19	500.0
Ciechanow, Phase I, Poland	A 14 Jan 1945 D	Russian Winter Offensive, 1945	Sov 90th Rifle Div Ger 7th Inf Div	Gen Lyashchenko ?	1	2.0
Ciechanow, Phase	A 15 Jan 1945 D	Russian Winter Offensive, 1945	Sov 90th Rifle Div Ger 7th Inf Div	Gen Lyashchenko ?	1	2.5
Seelow Heights, Germany	A 16-17 Apr 1945 D	Berlin, 1945	Sov 57th Gds Rifle Div (+) Ger 303d Inf Reg (+)	Gen Zaliznyak ?	2	2.0
Mutankiang, Manchuria	A 9-16 Aug 1945 D	Manchuria, 1945	Sov Fifth Combined Arms Army Jap Fifth Army	Col Gen Krylov Gen Solich	8	12.9

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, The Eastern Front

Engagement	Weather	Terrain	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Rovno	D PD	FM/RW	DST	ST	Y	complete	x
Defense of Moscow	D P/FD	FM	DSC/MIC/WIC	FT	N	--	x
Moscow Counteroffensive	D H/PD	FM	DSC/MIC/WIC	WT	Y	--	N
Pogoreloe	A D P/FD	Scamp/FM	DST/MLT/WIC	ST	Y	substantial	x
Leningrad	A D FD	FM	MLC	WT	N	minor	N
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase I	A D FD	FM	DST/MLT	ST	N	--	x
Operation Citadel, Southern Sector	A D PD	FM	MLT	ST	N	--	x
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase II	A D P/FD	FM	DST/MLT	ST	N	--	N
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase III	A D P/FD	FM	DST/MLT	ST	N	--	N
Prokhorovka	A D HD	FM	DST	ST	N	--	x
Kursk Counteroffensive	A D P/FD	FM	DST/MLT	ST	N	--	x

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Belgorod	A D FD	RW	DST	N	--	--	--	N
Melitopol	A D FD	RW	DST/DOT/ MLT	N	--	--	--	X
Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy	A D P/FD	RW	WHC/MOC	WT	N	--	--	N
Nikopol Bridgehead	A D FD	RW	MLC/MHC	WT	N	--	--	X
Sevastopol	A D FD	RW/Urban	DST	Spr	N	--	--	X
Berezina River	A D HD	RW/Marshy	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Lvov Sandomierz	A D PD	RW/RW	DST/MLT	ST	Y	X	minor	X
Brody, Phase I	A D P/FD	RW	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Brody, Phase II	A D PD	RW	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Vistula River Operation, Phase I	A D PD	RW	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Vistula River Operation, Phase II	A D PD	RW	DST	ST	N	--	--	X

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Defender	Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Yassy-Kishinev	A D	PD FD	FM	DST	ST	Y N	X N	minor	X
Vistula-Oder	A D	PD FD	FM/RM	DSC/MLC	WT	--	--	--	X
East Prussia	A D	FD	RW/Swamp	MLC/NHC	WT	--	--	--	X
Ciechanow, Phase I	A D	FD	R	MLC	WT	--	--	--	N
Ciechanow, Phase II	A D	FD	R	MLC	WT	--	--	--	N
Seelow Heights	A D	FD	RHM	DST	Spr	N	--	--	X
Mutankiang	A D	FD	rough	MLT/WT	ST	Y	X	minor	X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

Mar: World War II, The Eastern Front

Engagement	Strength				Arty* Pieces				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Total Inf.	Armor	HBT	Air Sorties	Total	t/Day	Armor Losses	Total	t/Day	Armor Losses	Total	t/Day	Arty Lost	Total	t/Day	Aircraft Losses	
Rome	A 132,000 D 150,000	765 852	215 420	550 432	366 450	1,200 88,000	0.6 11.7	60 560	1.6 13.1	? ?	-- --	?	-- --	?	-- --	?	-- --	
Defense of Moscow	A 1,100,000 D 1,372,200	1,800 950	?	?	5,746 6,678	?	253,000 385,000	0.4 1.0	990 840	0.8 1.4	?	3,400 310	0.8 1.8	600 210	590 0.3	?	?	
Moscow Counter-offensive	A 1,060,300 D 880,000	667 850	?	?	3,440 2,050	?	39,800 353,000	0.4 2.9	290 510	1.3 1.8	450 210	0.4 0.3	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Pogoreloe	A 70,150 D 39,300	539 258	?	?	876 ?	?	21,320 7,030	3.8 2.2	260 110	5.5 6.3	98 123	1.4 4.2	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Leningrad	A 120,000 D 30,000	316 20	90 0	226 182	1,173 140	350 20	28,000 4,150	3.3 2.0	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	-- --	-- --
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase I	A 62,000 D 45,000	320 55	?	?	410 1,180	?	1,364 5,680	0.7 4.2	42 45	4.4 27.3	?	31	2.5	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Operation Citadel, Southern Sector	A 140,000 D 75,000	868 155	?	?	470 2,115	?	3,180 4,900	2.3 6.5	134 88	15.4 56.8	?	99	4.7	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase II	A 60,000 D 149,000	280 450	?	?	375 1,600	?	3,500 25,800	1.5 4.3	110 292	9.8 16.2	43 ?	2.9	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Oboyan-Kursk, Phase III	A 56,000 D 129,000	205 310	?	?	323 1,490	?	2,900 30,200	1.0 4.7	85 139	8.3	?	-- --	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Prokhorovka	A 78,000 D 82,300	650 505	?	?	1,380 ?	?	5,700 5,100	3.7 3.1	390 200	29.2 19.8	47 25	1.7 3.0	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	
Kursk Counter-offensive	A 980,600 D 280,000	2,293 600	?	?	6,220 1,600	?	117,700 39,500	0.6 0.7	1,340 340	2.9 2.8	?	?	?	?	?	-- --	-- --	

*In most instances, mortars and infantry cannon are included.

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost		Aircraft Losses		
	Personnel Total	Total Ltr.	Armor	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	1/Day	Total	1/Day	Total	1/Day	Total	Sorties/Day
Belgorod	A 70,000 D 15,000	291 50	? 0	2,088 50	? 171	11,676 2,405	5.6 5.3	? --	-- --	? ?	-- --	-- ?	-- --
Melitopol	A 524,724 D 210,000	778 300	? ?	3,450 1,300	? ?	79,000 36,500	0.4 0.4	460 170	1.4 1.4	? ?	-- --	? ?	-- --
Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy	A 254,950 D 84,500	451 229	? ?	2,650 828	15,290 68,000	63,500 3.4	1.0 229	360 4.2	3.3 514	? 2.5	-- ?	? ?	-- --
Nikopol Bridgehead	A 25,100 D 8,230	6 0	0 --	6 44	201 ?	610 480	0.4 1.0	3 0	8.3 ?	? ?	-- --	? ?	-- --
Sevastopol	A 397,607 D 72,000	490 50	? ?	3,890 1,050	? ?	35,500 48,500	1.8 13.5	31 50	1.3 20.0	? ?	-- --	? ?	-- --
Berezina River	A 16,100 D 8,500	196 15	? ?	215 82	? ?	670 4,795	0.8 11.3	35 15	3.6 20.0	14 67	1.3 16.3	? ?	-- --
Lvov-Sandomierz	A 1,200,000 D 900,000	1,979 900	? ?	11,265 4,800	30,366 ?	37,400 198,000	0.2 1.3	1,285 520	3.8 3.4	? ?	-- --	? ?	-- --
Brody, Phase I	A 39,000 D 3,300	34 0	? --	730 44	139 ?	980 720	2.5 21.8	14 --	41.2 --	11 9	1.5 20.5	? ?	-- --
Brody, Phase II	A 38,500 D 12,900	55 103	? ?	718 103	3,288 ?	1,750 1,490	4.5 3.8	34 41	61.8 39.8	9 16	1.3 15.5	? ?	-- --
Vistula River Operation, Phase I	A 12,700 D 5,100	0 12	-- ?	-- ?	205 78	1,150 320	3.0 2.1	0 4	-- 11.1	6 2	1.0 0.9	? ?	-- --
Vistula River Operation, Phase II	A 17,550 D 6,400	34 24	? ?	308 156	?	3,040 3,784	2.9 2.0	27 18	13.2 12.5	9 6	0.5 0.5	? ?	-- --

Strengths and Casualties

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Armor Total	Lif.	NFL	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	%/Day	Armor Losses Total	Arty Total	%/Day	Total	Sorties/Day	
Yassy-Kishinev	A 1,250,000	1,428	?	?	10,469	?	135,000	0.1	335	?	--	?	--	
	D 800,000	400	?	?	5,320	?	690,000	8.6	380	9.5	?	--	--	
Vistula-Oder	A 2,200,000	4,230	?	?	17,990	?	46,900	0.1	1,396	1.4	?	--	--	
	D 560,000	1,200	?	?	3,050	?	147,400	1.1	750	2.7	?	--	--	
East Prussia	A 1,220,000	2,035	?	?	15,540	?	112,000	0.5	1,060	2.8	?	--	--	
	D 780,000	700	?	?	5,740	?	126,000	0.9	480	3.6	?	--	--	
Giechanow, Phase I	A 10,800	73	?	?	420	?	685	6.3	31	42.5	6	1.4	?	
	D 3,100	12	?	?	78	?	145	4.7	4	33.3	11	14.1	?	
Giechanow, Phase II	A 12,115	190	?	?	414	?	850	7.0	39	20.5	5	1.2	?	
	D 3,900	32	?	?	84	?	230	5.9	12	37.5	3	3.6	?	
Seelow Heights	A 13,600	78	?	?	233	?	160	4.7	54	34.6	?	--	?	
	D 3,710	5	?	?	26	?	150	2.0	3	30.0	?	--	--	
Mutankiang	A 147,000	770	?	?	1,786	?	800	10,000	0.9	?	--	?	--	
	D 75,000	105	105	0	584	?	120	36,000	6.0	84	10.5	?	--	

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II, The Eastern Front

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CF	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logistics	Morale	Intelli- gence	Techno- logy	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/day)	Mission Accomp.
Rovno	A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	24.0	8
	D	0	0	0	0	x	0	x	0	x	3	3
Defense of Moscow	A	x	x	x	c	x	x	x	x	x	5.5	6
	D	0	0	0	0	x	0	c	0	x	4.2	7
Soviet Counter- offensive	A	0	x	x	0	x	x	x	x	x	6.8	5
	D	x	0	0	c	0	c	c	0	x	6	6
Pogoreloe	A	0	0	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1.0	7
	D	x	x	x	0	x	N	c	0	x	4.3	4
Leningrad	A	C	x	x	x	0	c	c	x	x	8.0	6
	D	0	0	x	0	x	0	c	0	x	5.7	4
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, I	A	x	x	x	c	c	c	c	x	x	0.6	5
Operation Cita- del, Southern Sector	A	x	c	c	c	c	N	x	x	x	0	6
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, II	A	x	x	x	0	x	0	c	0	x	0	4
	D	0	0	x	0	x	0	c	x	x	7.0	8
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, III	A	x	x	x	0	x	x	c	0	x	0	6
Prokhorovka	A	0	c	0	x	0	x	x	0	x	0	4
	D	x	x	c	0	x	0	c	0	x	7.0	6
Kursk Counter- offensive	A	0	x	c	0	x	0	c	0	x	0	8
	D	x	x	c	0	x	0	c	0	x	0	6

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logistics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Belgorod	A	C	0	x	x	x	x	C	x	x	8.5	7
	D	x	x	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	4	
Melitopol	A	C	x	0	x	x	x	C	C	x	7.8	8
	D	x	0	x	0	x	0	C	C	x	6	
Korsun-Shev- chen Kovskiy	A	C	C	C	x	x	x	C	x	x	5.8	7
	D	x	0	0	0	0	0	C	C	x	5	
Nikopol Bridgehead	A	C	C	x	x	x	x	C	x	x	1.0	6
	D	0	x	0	x	0	x	C	x	x	4	
Sevastopol	A	x	x	0	x	x	x	C	x	x	3.5	9
	D	0	0	x	0	x	0	C	0	x	3	
Berezina River	A	C	C	x	x	x	x	C	x	x	32.0	7
	D	x	x	0	0	0	0	C	0	x	4	
Lyov-Sandomierz Offensive	A	C	x	C	x	x	x	C	x	x	18.8	8
	D	C	C	C	0	0	0	C	x	x	3	
Brody, Phase I	A	C	C	C	x	x	x	C	x	x	8.0	6
	D	x	C	C	C	x	x	C	x	x	6	
Brody, Phase II	A	C	C	C	x	x	x	C	x	x	7.0	6
	D	C	C	C	C	x	x	C	x	x	6	
Vistula River, Operation, Phase I	A	C	C	C	x	x	x	C	x	x	1.3	6
	D	C	C	C	C	x	x	C	x	x	6	
Vistula River, Operation, Phase II	A	C	C	D	C	C	C	C	x	x	0.4	7
									x	x	x	4

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (km/day)	Mission Accomp.
Yassy-Kishinev	A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	32.5	10
	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	3	3
Vistula-Oder	A	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	21.0	9
	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	4	4
East Prussia	A	x	c	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	6.6	7
	D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	5	6
Ciechanow, Phase I	A	c	c	c	x	x	c	c	x	x	4.0	6
	D	c	c	c	x	x	x	x	x	x	4.0	5
Ciechanow, Phase II	A	x	x	x	x	x	v	x	x	x	1.5	6
	D	0	0	0	0	0	v	0	0	x	4	4
Seelow Heights	A	x	c	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	20.0	9
	D	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	x	x	2	2
Mutankiang	A	x	c	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II The Eastern Front

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Force Prepon-derance	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Planning	Surprise	Measurver, Mass, Her-tow Front	Logistics	Portefit-cations	Depth
Belgorod	A D	X X	X N	X X	X X	N N	N X	X X	X X	N X	X X	X X	X X
Melitopol	A D	X A	X N	X X	X X	N X	N X	X X	X X	N X	X X	X X	X X
Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy	A D	X A	X N	X X	X X	N X	N X	X X	X X	N X	X X	X X	X X
Nikopol Bridgehead	A D	X A	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Sevastopol	A D	X A	X X	X X	X X	N X	N X	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Berezina River	A D	N X	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive	A D	X A	X N	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Brody, Phase I	A D	N X	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Brody, Phase II	A D	N X	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Vistula River Operation, Phase I	A D	N X	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X
Vistula River Operation, Phase II	A D	N X	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility	Supremacy	Air Superiority	Forces Preparation	Terrain Roads	Leadership	Supply Lines	Industrial Capacity	Political Will	Logistics	Depth
Vassy-Kishiven Operation	A	X	D	A	X	N	N	X	X	X	X	X	X
Vistula-Oder Offensive	D	X	A	D	X	X	N	X	X	X	X	X	X
East Prussia	A	D	A	D	A	N	N	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ciechanow, Phase I	D	A	D	A	D	A	D	X	X	X	X	X	X
Ciechanow, Phase II	A	D	D	A	D	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	X
Seelow Heights	A	D	A	A	D	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	X
Mutankieng													

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: World War II, The Eastern Front

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	A	D	F, RWC	E (RF)		
Defense of Moscow	A	D	F, E, HE D	--	F, E --	S R
Soviet Counteroffensive	A	D	F (RF) D	--	E (LF) --	B ML
Pogoreloye	A	D	F, E (RF), RWC D/O	--	HE (LF) --	P ND
Leningrad	A	D	F D	--	HE (LF) --	B A
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase I	A	D	F D/O	--	LF, RF --	P ND
Operation Citadel, Southern Sector	A	D	F D/O, F	--	E (LF) --	P ND
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase II	A	D	F D/O	--	--	S S
Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase III	A	D	F D/O	--	--	B S
Prokhorovka	A	D	F, HE D/O	--	E (LF) --	S
Kursk Counteroffensive	A	D	F, HE D/O	--	--	

7. COMBAT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Secondary Attack	Success	Resolution
	A	D	F	D			
Belgorod	A	D	F	D	E (LF) --	X	P, D
Melitopol	A	D	F, RivC, E (LF) D/O	--	E (RF) --	X	B, M/L
Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy	A	D	EE D/O	--	--	X	B, A
Nikopol Bridgehead	A	D	F, RivC D	--	E (LF) --	X	B, D
Sevastopol	A	D	F, EE D	--	E (LF) --	X	B, A
Berezina River	A	D	F, EE D	--	--	X	B, M/L
Lvov-Sandomierz	A	D	F, E (RF) D/O	--	E (LF) D/O	X	P, M/L
Brody, Phase I	A	D	F D/O, F	--	--	X	P, D
Brody, Phase II	A	D	F D/O, F	--	--	X	P, D
Vistula River Operation, Phase I	A	D	F D/O, F, E	--	--	X	P, D
Vistula River Operation, Phase II	A	D	F D/O, F, E	--	--	X	P, D

7. COMBAT FEATS AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT
War: World War II, The Eastern Front (Continued)

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack		
Yassy-Kishinev	A D	E D	F --	B A B (IP) --
Vistula-Oder Offensive	A D	F, E D	E (IP) --	B S B (IP) --
East Prussia	A D	F, E D/O	-- --	B S B (IP) --
Ciechanow, Phase I	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	B S B (IP) --
Ciechanow, Phase II	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	B S B (IP) --
Seelow Heights	A D	F D	-- --	B S B (IP) --
Mutinkiang	A D	R, RWC D	-- --	B (IP) --

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1941)

Rovno, 22-26 June 1941

In June 1941, the German First Panzer Group was positioned for breakthrough operations southwest of Kovel on the left flank of German Army Group South. The First Panzer Group consisted of four army corps, three of which were on line with the fourth in reserve form commitment where necessary. The panzer group's mission was to attack at the junction of the Fifth and Sixth Armies of the Soviet Southwest Army Group (in a region where the Soviets did not anticipate a major German effort) and to advance east through Soviet defenses to gain maneuver room for German armored units. The panzer group was attached to the German Sixth Army for the initial attack and was to be reinforced with and supported by infantry units of that army.

On the morning of 22 June the First Panzer Group attacked and secured several bridges across the Bug River along the Soviet Union's border. Surprise was complete. As infantry units broke through the first fortifications, armor was committed. The German Luftwaffe, destroying Soviet aircraft on the ground and in the air, quickly established air superiority over the battlefield. By the end of the first day of the invasion, the Germans had penetrated deeply into Soviet territory, especially in the XLVIII Corps's sector on the right along the axis Sokal-Berestechko. Over the next four days, the Germans made sweeping gains. Panzer elements crossed the Styr River and captured a number of cities to the east of it. Fighting was often bitter, as Soviet counter-attacks struck the flanks of the German penetration. The Soviets counterattacked in a piecemeal fashion, and although some minor successes were achieved, the Germans generally dispersed their formations and never lost momentum. On 26 June, the First Panzer Group was detached from the Sixth Army and prepared to exploit the breakthrough that it had achieved. By the end of June it advanced over 200 kilometers into the Soviet Union's territory toward the Dnieper River, cracking the Southwest Army Group down the center, enveloping and destroying Soviet forces west of the Dnieper.

Significance: The Germans had achieved the breakthrough they needed, capitalizing on surprise and superior strength. They could next exploit their first successes and proceed rapidly to the Dnieper River.

Sources: U.1; U.2; U.9; U.11; U.26; U.33; U.40.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1941)

The Defense of Moscow, 30 September-3 December 1941

The German offensive toward Moscow, code-named "Operation Typhoon" was carried out by the Army Group Center, under the command of Field Marshal Fedor von Bock, against four defending Soviet army groups (Western, Reserve, Bryansk, and Kalinin), under the overall command of the Soviet Supreme Headquarters (Stavka), headed by Stalin. The German drive started on 30 September 1941 with attacks by the Second Panzer Group and the Second Army against the Bryansk Army Group. On 2 October, the Second and Fourth Armies, supported by the Third and Fourth Panzer Groups, launched an assault against the Western and Reserve Army Groups.

At the outset the German operation was very successful. In the Bryansk and Vyazma areas eleven Soviet armies were encircled and destroyed, and 650,000 prisoners taken. Nearly 800 tanks, 3,500 artillery pieces, and large quantities of other weapons were either captured or destroyed. In mid-October, Army Group Center found itself only some 100 kilometers west of Moscow.

In the second half of October and early November, as the rainy season turned the roads into impassable quagmires, Soviet resistance stiffened. In the center, the advance of the Fourth Army and the Fourth Panzer Group bogged down at the Oka and Nara rivers and to the east of the Ruzza River. To the north, the Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Group were unable to reach Kalinin. In the southern sector, the Second Panzer Army (formerly Second Panzer Group) encountered heavy resistance south of Tula and was halted.

On 15 November, with the onset of frost, the Germans began a new, and "final," offensive on Moscow. In the north, the Ninth Army and the Third Panzer Group took Kalinin and Krasnaya Polyana and, on 29 November, after capturing a bridge over the Moscow-Volga Canal, had established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Canal. Moscow was about 20 kilometers away. In the center, the Fourth Army and the Fourth Panzer Group encountered stubborn Soviet resistance and advanced slowly. On 26 November German troops in the central sector were about 50 kilometers from the Kremlin. In the southern sector, south of Tula, the offensive failed. The Second Panzer Army was able to advance only a few kilometers per day.

Anticipating a continuous German drive toward Moscow, the Soviets brought in all available reserves and counterattacked on the flanks. The

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT 1941)

The Defense of Moscow, 30 September-3 December 1941 (Continued)

Germans suffered serious reverses, but persevered. On 1 December the Fourth Army launched a major attack across the Nara River between Panino and Korokhovo. However, after one day the German attack bogged down. Only one forward detachment reached Aprelevka (a suburb of Moscow) where it was stopped by tanks. On 3 December, Bock ordered the troops to return to the jump-off position and Army Group Center turned to defense along the entire front.

Significance: The successful defense of Moscow brought ended Hitler's hopes for victory in 1941. The German Army lost the initiative, which passed to the Red Army.

Sources: U.1; U.6; U.7; U.21; U.26; U.32; U.33; U.40; U.46; U.50.

WORLD WAR II (CONTINUED FROM 1942)

Soviet Counteroffensive at Moscow, 5 December 1941-7 January 1942

The Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow was planned and prepared while the German Army Group Center was still advancing on the Soviet capital. To the Soviet command it was imperative to strike as soon as the German offensive was halted, so that the Germans would not have time to organize their defenses.

The counteroffensive was launched on 5 December by the Kalinin Army Group, under General I. Rostov, northwest of Moscow. It was followed the next day in the central and southeastern sectors by the Western and Southwestern Army Groups, commanded respectively by General G. Zhukov and Marshal K. Timoshenko.

The Kalinin Army Group struck the German lines south of Kalinin and after a fierce battle crossed the Moscow-Kalinin railroad line, captured Kalinin, and continued to advance toward Rzhev. By 7 January, the Kalinin Army Group had reached the line Selizharovo-Dubtsov, where it took up defensive positions.

The Western Army Group attacked north and south of Moscow and then moved against the central sector. Army Group Center attempted to halt the advance but, under the threat of either encirclement or envelopment, had to retreat, leaving behind much equipment and many vehicles. On 25 December, the Western Army Group reached the Luga and Ruzza rivers, where it was stopped by strong German resistance. A few days later, however, after regrouping and bringing up reserves the army group continued to advance. On 30 December it took Kaluga, an important communications center, and soon after took up defensive positions.

On the left flank of the advancing Soviet forces, the Southwestern Army Group (reconstituted on 18 December into the Bryansk Army Group) advanced some 80 to 100 kilometers in ten days, and on 16 December it reached the line Lyubovschina-Pavlovka-Livny. There the army group regrouped and launched an attack toward the northwest in order to destroy the German Second Army. Early in January, unable to break through the stubborn German resistance, it stopped along the line Belev-Mtsensk-Verkhovye-Livny.

When the Soviet counteroffensive ended the Red Army had thrown the Germans back 100 to 200 kilometers from Moscow. Soviet Forces were holding a line that ran through Selizharovo, Rzhev, Volokolamsk, Ruzza, Kaluga, Mosalsk, Belev, Mtsensk and Novosil.

Significance: German Army Group Center suffered a severe setback from which, in fact, it did not recover.

Sources: U.6; U.7; U.11; U.12; U.19; U.21; U.29; U.32; U.33; U.45; U.46.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1942)

Pogoreloye-Gorodishche, 4-11 August 1942

In August 1942, on the right flank of the Soviet Western Army Group, some 200 kilometers west of Moscow, the Soviets launched an offensive toward Zubtsov, Rzhev, and Sychevka. The offensive was carried out by the Thirty-First and Twentieth Combined Arms Armies.

The Twentieth Combined Arms Army, under General M.A. Reyter, was to break through the German defenses in the Pogoreloye-Gorodishche area and advance southwest and west toward Sychevka. The sector was defended by the German Ninth Army, commanded by General W. Model.

The attack commenced on 4 August in the morning. In heavy fighting the Soviets broke through the German defenses in a seven-kilometer sector and by the evening of the first day had progressed nearly ten kilometers. The following day General Reyter committed his mobile group to combat. Under Soviet pressure the Germans retreated. The Twentieth Army widened its breakthrough sector to 18 kilometers and advanced an additional 20 kilometers.

Heavy fighting continued till 11 August. Both the Soviet and the German commands brought in reserves, including armored elements. The Ninth Army retreated slowly in organized manner, which permitted German reserves to take up defensive positions.

By August 1, overcoming stubborn resistance, the Soviets reached the Karmanovo defensive region, where they halted and regrouped for a subsequent assault.

Significance: Although the Soviet offensive did not reach the initial objective, it prevented the Germans from transferring several infantry and panzer divisions to the Stalingrad front, thus helping the Soviet defenders in the city.

Sources: U.12; U.26; U.32; U.42.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Leningrad Operation "Spark", 12-18 January 1943

In the fall of 1942, the Soviet command formulated plans for an offensive to break the siege of Leningrad, established by Finnish and German forces in September 1941, and to open a land route to the city. The Second Assault Army of the Volkhov Army Group was to attack south of Lake Ladoga and push west toward Leningrad, to link up with Soviet forces driving east from Leningrad. Between them was a 15-mile wide German corridor. The attack area consisted of forested marshland defended by units of the German Eighteenth Army in fortified positions. To insure success, the Soviets massed troops and weapons along the breakthrough front, giving them overwhelming numerical superiority over the Germans.

On 12 January 1943, a heavy artillery barrage opened the attack of the Second Assault Army, and engineers cleared paths through the first German fortifications. Supported by air strikes, assault units jumped off against intense German resistance. For seven days, fighting raged around fortified strongpoints, as the Germans bitterly contested the advance, frequently counterattacking and limiting the Soviets to only small daily gains. Soviet armored units, massed artillery, and air support (when the weather permitted) were used to neutralize the German defenses. Finally on 18 January, Second Assault Army units linked up with troops of the Leningrad Army Group, cutting off German units along the south shore of Lake Ladoga.

Significance: After 28 months the blockade of Leningrad was broken, and the Soviets established ground links with the city.

Sources: U.19; U.33; U.34; U.42; U.46; U.50.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Operation "Citadel": Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase I, 4-6 July 1943

In the spring of 1943, the German High Command decided to launch an offensive operation against the Soviet Kursk Salient. The German XLVIII Panzer Corps (of the Fourth Panzer Army, Army Group South) under General O. Knobelsdorf was to attack on the left flank of the Panzer Army in a 17-kilometer sector northward toward the Psel River and Oboyan, against the Soviet Sixth Guards Army commanded by General M. Chistyakov. The Soviets, aware of the German plans, were well prepared.

Combat operations started with a pre-offensive attack in the afternoon of 4 July in order to capture Soviet outposts and to bring the panzer corps close to the Soviet main line of resistance.

Early in the morning 5 July, the attack on the main effort axis was launched by two panzer and one panzer grenadier divisions. Two infantry divisions advanced on the flanks. From the start the thrust was not as successful as the Germans had expected. The Soviets offered formidable resistance, and the intensity of fighting increased hourly. Nevertheless, by the end of the day, the corps had advanced seven kilometers and had broken through the Soviet first defense zone.

On 6 July, despite heavy losses, both sides continued to fight with increased ferocity. The German troops assaulted the second defense zone, but were unable to break through. During the day, the corps advanced six kilometers.

Significance: The Panzer Corps did not penetrate as deep as planned. The resistance of the Soviet forces permitted the Soviet high command to introduce reserves in an organized fashion.

Sources: U.6; U.11; U.12; U.13; U.14; U.19; U.23; U.26; U.28; U.29; U.33; U.35; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Operation Citadel: Southern Sector, 5 July 1943

The Soviet counteroffensive during the winter of 1942/43 led to German defeats at Stalingrad, in the Caucasus, and along the Don River. Advancing westward the Soviet armies pushed out a large salient in the Kursk area where they were finally halted by the German armies. In April 1943 the German High Command decided to destroy the Soviet forces in the Kursk bulge. The German plan called for converging blows at Kursk: one launched from Orel in a southerly direction and the other from the Belgorod area in a northerly direction. The objectives were to encircle and annihilate the Soviet forces in the Kursk Salient and then advance east toward Moscow and southeast toward the Don and Volga rivers.

The Fourth Panzer Army of German Army Group South, commanded by Colonel General Hermann Hoth and deployed west of Belgorod, was to launch its attack on 5 July, break through the Soviet defenses, rapidly advance toward Oboyan and Prokhorovka, and then continue toward Kursk, where it was to link with elements of Army Group Center, advancing from the north. Facing the Fourth Panzer Army was the Soviet Sixth Guards Army of the Voronezh Army Group, under the command of Lieutenant General I.M. Chistyakov and some of the right flank units of the Seventh Guards Army. The Soviet forces were deployed in fortified positions to a depth of nearly 30 kilometers.

The Fourth Panzer Army -- the XLVIII Panzer Corps on the left, and the II SS Panzer Corps on the right -- jumped off at 0500 5 July after a short but intense artillery and air preparation. The immediate objective of the army was Oboyan, about 40 kilometers to the north. From the start of the attack the Germans met with well organized and determined resistance from the Soviet forces. Natural and man-made antitank obstacles made it difficult for the panzer divisions to maneuver and advance. One panzer division of the XLVIII Panzer Corps tried for hours to cross a water-filled gorge but was unsuccessful and had to shift its advance axis. The II SS Panzer Corps on the right flank of the army was able to break through only in a narrow sector.

By the end of the day the Fourth Panzer Army, despite numerous Soviet counterattacks, broke through the first zone of the defense, but in two sectors only, and advanced nearly eight kilometers. However, in the rear of the advancing German troops, the Soviets were still holding several strong-points, endangering the German army's lines of communication.

Significance: Although the German Fourth Panzer Army broke through the Soviet first defense zone and advanced eight kilometers, it did not fulfill its mission of the day. The German troops suffered heavy losses. The Soviets, although their losses were also very heavy, gained time and were able to bring up reserves and second echelons which they committed to combat the next day. The Soviet emphasis on strongly fortified field defenses paid off.

Sources: U.6; U.11; U.12; U.13; U.14; U.23; U.27; U.28; U.33; U.42; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Operation "Citadel": The Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase II, 7-10 July 1943

On 7 July, the XLVIII Panzer Corps planned to break through the Soviet second defense zone, reach the Psel River and establish a bridgehead on its northern bank. However, the Soviet command brought in reserves and repeatedly counterattacked. The panzer corps was unable to fulfill its mission. It broke through the second defense zone on the right flank only, where it advanced seven kilometers. On the left flank the advance was only four kilometers.

On 8 July, the Germans expected that they would finally break through the Soviet defenses and that a general Soviet retreat would follow. However, the Sixth Guards Army, now reinforced by elements of the First Tank Army and other units, carried out several strong counterattacks which seriously slowed down the German progress. During the day the XLVIII Panzer Corps had only advanced five kilometers. However, in its rear, a number of strongpoints which the Germans initially bypassed or blocked were still in Soviet hands.

During the next two days combat was very fierce. With the commitment of additional reserves, including tank elements, Soviet resistance grew stronger. At this crucial point, the Germans did not have reserves readily available. The German advance was slow. Progress was made mostly on the right flank. During 9 and 10 July the panzer corps advanced a total of five kilometers.

Significance: Despite advances that were amazing under the circumstances, German forces were unable to break through the Soviet defenses. Commitment of Soviet reserves including elements of a tank army brought the XLVIII Panzer Corps almost to a standstill.

Sources: U.11, U.12; U.16; U.22; U.23; U.25; U.28; U.29; U.37.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Operation "Citadel": Oboyan-Kursk Axis, Phase III, 11-15 July 1943

The German XLVIII Panzer Corps continued its efforts to break through to Oboyan and Kursk. On 11 July, overcoming stubborn Soviet resistance, it was able to make some headway, advancing in some sectors up to three kilometers.

But Soviet combat power, far from diminishing, seemed to be increasing. On 12 July, the panzer corps was brought to a standstill by counterattacking Soviet tank and infantry units. The Germans regrouped and, in order not to lose the initiative continued to attack in several places. But the attacks were beaten off, and the panzer corps was forced to turn to the defense.

On 16 July the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army, General H. Hoth, ordered the corps to withdraw to the jump-off positions it held on 4 July.

Significance: The offensive of the XLVIII Panzer Corps failed despite remarkable advances against stiff resistance. The corps suffered heavy losses and had to give up the territory it captured during the offensive. The German defeat set the stage for a long-planned follow-up Soviet counteroffensive.

Sources: U.6; U.11; U.12; U.13; U.14; U.23; U.28; U.29; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Operation "Citadel": Soviet Counterattack at Prokhorovka, 12-13 July 1943

On 5 July the II SS Panzer Corps under SS Colonel General P. Hausser, launched an attack on the Belgorod-Prokhorovka axis against General N.P. Pukhov's Seventh Guards Army, as part of the general Kursk offensive. By 11 July the SS Panzer Corps had advanced nearly 35 kilometers and reached the Prokhorovka area.

The German offensive was now running out of steam due to losses, stubborn Soviet resistance, and lack of reserves. The Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka), decided to commit its strategic reserves, the Steppe Army Group commanded by General Ivan Konev, to halt the advancing Germans and to deliver a final blow against the already weakened II SS Panzer Corps.

Konev counterattacked in the morning of 12 July with elements of the Fifth Guards Tank and Fifth Guards Combined Arms armies. But just as the Soviet tanks and infantry began this attack, the German panzer force resumed its advance on Prokhorovka. The ensuing meeting engagement lasted two days. The battle formations of the opposing armor units became intermingled in the first hours of the fierce encounter. Losses were very heavy on both sides. But finally the Germans were driven back, and took up defensive positions.

A few days later, under Soviet pressure, the II SS Panzer Corps began a withdrawal which took it back to the line it had occupied before the ill-fated offensive began.

Significance: The tank battle in the Prokhorovka area, in which nearly 1,200 tanks were involved was the largest tank battle in World War II. The failure of the German offensive forced the German Command to turn to strategic defense along the entire front.

Sources: U.12; U.16; U.23; U.26; U.28; U.33.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Kursk Counteroffensive (Southern Sector), 3-23 August 1943

The German offensive toward Kursk was halted on 15 July, and the German Fourth Panzer Army and Task Force Kampf of Army Group South were pushed back to the line of departure where on 23 July they took up defensive positions. The Soviet troops halted in front of the German fortified positions, which were some 10-15 kilometers in depth, to regroup and prepare for an offensive, which they codenamed "Rumyantsev." It was designed to smash the German forces in the Belgorod-Kharkov area and then drive to the Dnieper River, as part of the general Soviet offensive in the center of the Eastern Front.

On 3 August the Soviet Voronezh and Steppe army groups, commanded respectively by Generals N. Vatutin and I. Konev, launched the counteroffensive. The blow was directed at the boundary between the Fourth Panzer Army and Task Force Kampf and was aimed at splitting the German forces into several groups, destroying them piecemeal, and capturing Kharkov. Despite fierce resistance the Soviets advanced swiftly, and by the end of the first day they had broken through the main defense zone. Belgorod was taken on 5 August, and the German front was broken, opening the way for a further advance on Kharkov.

On 11 August the Steppe Army Group approached the outer defenses of Kharkov. On the same day the Voronezh Army Group cut the Kharkov-Poltava railway. This threatened the destruction not only of the German forces in the Kharkov area, but also in the entire Donets Basin region.

Aware of the danger, Army Group South regrouped in the Akhtyrka-Bogodukhov area. On 11 August it launched a massive counterattack against the Voronezh Army Group, directed mainly against the First and Fifth Guards Tank armies. Fierce fighting continued for a week. Despite heavy losses, which almost wiped out the First Guards Tank Army, the Soviets, after initial withdrawal, stood their ground, and repulsed the Germans. On 18 August, the First Guards Tank Army captured Bogodukhov, some 50 kilometers west of Kharkov, and the Fifth Guards Tank Army took Zolochev and Kazachya Lopan northwest of Kharkov, closing on the city from that direction.

While the Voronezh Army Group was fighting off German attacks, the Steppe Army Group intensified its efforts to reach Kharkov. On 13 August it broke through the outer defenses of the city and engaged the Germans at the outskirts of Kharkov. After an exceptionally grim battle, on 22 August the Germans, threatened by encirclement, began a withdrawal to the south, along the only remaining open road.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Kursk Counteroffensive (Southern Sector), 3-23 August 1943 (Continued)

The final assault on the city was mounted during the night 22/23 August, and in the morning of 23 August Kharkov was in the Soviet hands.

Significance: In three weeks Soviet forces advanced some 140 kilometers, setting the stage for a follow-up offensive toward the Dnieper River. The Soviet counteroffensive broke the backbone of German Army Group South, which lost the initiative and was forced to turn to defense along the entire front.

Sources: U.6; U.12; U.13; U.14; U.19; U.23; U.26; U.30; U.37; U.42; U.45.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

Belgorod, 3-5 August 1943

The Soviet Fifty-third Combined Arms Army, reinforced with the I Mechanized Corps and other units, was to make the initial breakthrough attack of the Steppe Army Group against fortified defenses occupied by the German 167th Infantry Division. The objective was to seize Belgorod.

On 3 August, following a prolonged artillery preparation, the attack began. German minefields delayed the supporting armor, but the Soviet infantry was able to penetrate the first line of trenches. The German 167th Division, even though it had suffered heavy losses in the Kursk offensive, fought stubbornly and inflicted considerable losses on the attackers. Despite poor coordination among the Soviet units, thanks to their overwhelming superiority in numbers and weapons they broke through the first German defense zone on 3 August and continued south. On 5 August Belgorod was captured, and the first phase of Rymantsev, the breakthrough of the main German defense zone, was accomplished.

Significance: With the capture of Belgorod and smashing of the main defense zone, Soviet forces could continue toward Kharkov. All along the center of the Eastern Front the German armies were retreating west to the Dnieper River.

Sources: U.12; U.23; U.26; U.45; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1943)

The Melitopol Operation, 26 September-5 November 1943

In order to clear the Germans from the east bank of the lower Dnieper River, the 4th Ukrainian Army Group, commanded by General F.I. Tolbukhin, was ordered to take Melitopol. The German Sixth Field Army under General K.A. Hollidt, was holding the area.

The offensive was launched along the entire army group front on 26 September. The main effort was made on the right flank north of Melitopol along the Mikhaylov axis. A secondary attack was delivered south of Melitopol. German resistance was fierce, severely limiting Soviet progress. Not until 9 October did the Twenty-Eighth Army pierce the German defenses south of Melitopol, and establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the Molochnaya River, on the outskirts of Melitopol.

This success on the secondary axis changed the operational plan. General Tolbukhin transferred his main effort and reserves to the southern sector. Bitter fighting for Melitopol lasted for ten days. The city was finally captured on 23 October. On 24 October the XIX Tank Corps and, a day later, the IV Guards Cavalry Corps were committed to exploit. Their mission was to raid German rear areas and cut off the main communication arteries. Facing the danger of encirclement, the Sixth Field Army withdrew westward toward the Dnieper.

Overcoming the resistance of the German rear guards, the 4th Ukrainian Army Group fought its way up to the lower reaches of the Dnieper and the Perekop Isthmus.

Significance: The Germans were cleared from the eastern bank of the Dnieper except for a small bridgehead at Kherson and a larger one in the Nikopol area. German troops in the Crimea were cut off from German forces on the mainland.

Sources: U.9; U.12; U.26; U.33; U.36; U.42; U.45.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy Operation, 24 January-17 February 1944

Early in January, the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) decided to liquidate German forces in the Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy bulge, west of the Dnieper River. For the operation the Soviets committed five combined arms and two tank armies, and one cavalry corps of the 1st and 2d Ukrainian army groups, commanded respectively by Generals Nikolai Vatutin and Ivan Konev. The two army groups were to advance on converging Axes, link up at Zvenigorodka, and destroy the German forces in the pocket.

The bulge was held by elements of the right wing of the First Panzer Army and of the left wing of the Eighth Field Army, both of Army Group South under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. Commanding the sector was General W. Stemmerman.

On 24 January, the assault forces of the 2d Ukrainian Army Group opened the offensive. By the end of the day they had broken through the German defenses on a 25-kilometer front and advanced over 15 kilometers. Konev committed his tank army through the breach and successfully exploited the breakthrough. On 26 January the attack of the 1st Ukrainian Army Group was launched. Despite stubborn resistance, the Soviets penetrated the German defenses and advanced toward Zvenigorodka where, on 30 January, they met with units of the 2d Ukrainian Army Group closing the encirclement ring. By 3 February the Red Army had formed two encirclement rings -- the inner, made up primarily of infantry to squeeze the Germans in the pocket, and the outer, made up of tank armies to repel the anticipated German counterattacks to relieve the encircled troops.

As expected, Manstein committed several panzer divisions to relieve the encircled troops. At the same time the surrounded units attempted to break out of the ring, attacking fiercely toward the panzer divisions pushing to their rescue. It soon became clear, however, that the outside help could not break through. General Stemmerman therefore decided to make an all-out attempt to break out during the night of 16/17 February. Despite Soviet efforts to prevent the escape, some of the encircled troops fought their way out of the pocket and joined the III Panzer Corps near Lysanka. However, all sick and wounded were left behind, and all heavy arms and equipment abandoned.

Significance: The removal of the bulge facilitated future Soviet operations, and enabled them to use the Dnieper River as a transportation artery.

Sources: U.12; U.16; U.19; U.26; U.33; U.45; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT)

Nikopol Bridgehead, 31 January-5 February 1944

In January 1944, the German 335th Infantry Division was deployed in a fortified defensive posture in the Nikopol bridgehead near the Dnieper River in the Ukraine. The division had based its defenses on a well-developed system of field fortifications, with a concentration of a great variety of weapons and a large number of obstacles. Facing the 335th Division was a Soviet rifle corps that had the mission of breaking through the German defenses in an offensive set to begin on 31 January. Following the breakthrough, the Soviets planned to advance to the river in 48 hours, to seize the river crossings at Bolshaya Lepatikha and prevent the evacuation of German units.

The Soviets, however, were unable to follow their plan. Instead of two days, as they had planned, it took them six days to reach the Dnieper. From 31 January to 3 February, the Soviets slowly made their way through the German fortified zone, about four kilometers deep, and it took them two more days, 4-5 February, to push the retreating Germans to the river.

The planned breakthrough was slowed mainly by the fortifications prepared by the Germans during the two months preceding the 31 January attack, and the bad weather, which rendered the roads almost impassable.

Significance: The relatively slow Soviet advance made it possible for the bulk of the 335th Division to withdraw across the Dnieper with only small losses. The Soviets now completely controlled the east bank of the Dnieper River.

Sources: U.12; U.26; U.39; U.42; U.45.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Crimea Operation: Assault on Sevastopol, 5-9 May 1944

On 8 April, the Soviet 4th Ukrainian Army Group, under General F.I. Tolbukhin, and the Independent Maritime Army, under General A.I. Yeremenko, launched an attack on the German Seventeenth Army in the Crimea, commanded by General Erwin Jaenecke, later replaced by General Karl Allmendinger.

The Soviets struck simultaneously from two directions. The 4th Ukrainian Army Group attacked from the north, across the Perkop Isthmus. The Independent Maritime Army attacked from the east, along the Kerch Peninsula. In one week of combat, German defenses fell apart and what was left of the Seventeenth Army fell back in confusion to the safety of strongly fortified Sevastopol. On 15 April forward elements of Tolbukhin's and Yeremenko's forces reached the outer ring of the Sevastopol defenses.

The final assault on the city was launched toward Northern Bay on 5 May. The attack was carried out under very difficult conditions, with Soviet troops forced to climb precipitous slopes under heavy fire. The fighting was particularly fierce at Sapun Hill, which was the key to German defenses. When it fell, German resistance was broken, and on 9 May Sevastopol was taken.

The remnants of the German troops fled to Cape Khersones where they were either killed or taken prisoner. Most of the several thousand men who tried to escape by ship were drowned when their ships were sunk by the Soviet Air Force. The operation was concluded by 12 May.

Significance: Germany lost the Crimea and the Seventeenth Army was destroyed.

Sources: U.10; U.12; U.20; U.26; U.28; U.33; U.34; U.39; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Berezina River, The Byelorussian Offensive, 25-29 June 1944

In June 1944 the Soviet Supreme Command launched a major offensive in Byelorussia code-named "Operation Bagration" in which four army groups with a total strength of some 1,400,000 troops were involved. The area was defended by the German Army Group Center, which had a strength of almost 1,200,000 men.

The objectives of the Soviet offensive were to break through German defenses in six widely separated sectors, envelop, encircle, and destroy the German troops, and liberate Byelorussia and parts of Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland.

The III Guards Mechanized Corps, commanded by Lieutenant General Victor T. Obukhov was a part of a mixed cavalry-mechanized mobile group which also included the III Guards Cavalry Corps. It was to be committed in the Fifth Combined Army zone as soon as the army broke through the German main line of defense and reached the Luchese River. The III Guards Mechanized Corps was to advance toward Bogushevsk, Senno, and Kholopenichi and, no later than the sixth day of the operation was to capture the crossing of the Berezina River south of Lake Palik, and then continue toward Pleshchenits.

Along the axis of the corps advance, the Germans had a force of divisional strength with supporting artillery, engineers, and about 15 tanks. The German defenses were organized primarily in and around a number of towns and villages.

Early in the evening of 24 June forward elements of the III Guards Mechanized Corps passed through the advancing rifle formations and around 2100 made contact with the Germans. Intense combat developed at the village of Kichino, where the Germans intended to stop the corps. During the night the defenders were overwhelmed and retreated westward.

By sunrise, forward detachments of the corps reached Senno, which was defended by an entrenched infantry battalion supported by artillery, mortars, and several tanks. Fierce fighting for the town lasted until midday, when the Soviets finally took the town and destroyed the garrison. The Soviet forces continued to advance and by the evening of 25 June took Tolpino. In the morning of 26 June they captured Staraya Belitsa, an important German defense center.

During the following three days the III Guards Mechanized Corps continued to press its attack in the rear of the German defense system. On 28 June the city of Lepel was taken, and late on the same day the corps reached the Berezina River in the Rozhno and Brod areas and began crossing operations. On 29 June the crossing of the Berezina River was completed.

Significance: The rapid advance of the III Guards Mechanized Corps was instrumental in assuring the success of the offensive of the 3d Byelorussian Army Group.

Sources: U.12; U.26; U.31; U.34; U.35; U.42; U.45; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive, 13-29 July 1944

The objective of the Lvov-Sandomierz offensive was to liberate western regions of the Ukraine and southern Poland. It was carried out by the 1st Ukrainian Army Group commanded by Marshal Ivan Konev. The area was defended by the German Army Group Northern Ukraine under General Josef Harpe.

The offensive was launched on 13 July on the right (northern) flank with an attack toward Rava Ruska. One day later Konev attacked in the center toward Lvov, and on 21 July he moved in the south, on the secondary axis, on Berezhany and Stanislav.

In spite of resolute German resistance, the advance on the Rava Ruska axis was very successful. On 16 July, the First Guards Tank Army pushed through a breach in the defense, advanced rapidly westward and, on 23 July, crossed the San River near Jaroslav and entered Poland. The attack on the Lvov axis was initially less successful. Only after Konev succeeded in opening a narrow corridor (the Koltov Corridor) and pushed two tank armies through it did German resistance weaken. By 18 July, the 1st Ukrainian Army Group broke through the German defenses in a 200-kilometer wide sector and advanced from 50 to 80 kilometers. In the Brody area the army group encircled and later destroyed eight German divisions. Lvov was enveloped by a deep flanking maneuver and encircled. On 27 July Soviet troops took the city. On the same day, the army group's left wing captured Stanislav and continued toward Striy in the Carpathian Mountains. This ended the first phase of the offensive. Soviet forces reached the line Vilkolaz-Nisko-Dubetsko-Przemysl-Sambor-Khodorov-Kalush.

Following new directives received from the Stavka (Soviet Supreme Headquarters), on 27 July, General Konev transferred his main effort to the right wing, where he deployed two tank armies, and advanced rapidly toward the Vistula River. Advance elements of the army group reached the Vistula near Baranov and Sandomierz on 29 July and immediately established two bridgeheads on the western bank of the river.

Significance: During the 17 days' offensive the 1st Ukrainian Army Group broke through the defenses of Army Group Northern Ukraine in a 440-kilometer wide sector and advanced over 300 kilometers. Army Group Northern Ukraine was defeated and suffered heavy casualties. Soviet forces entered southern Poland and began the liberation of that country.

Sources: U.9; U.10; U.12; U.16; U.18; U.20; U.22; U.24; U.26; U.28; U.32; U.33; U.43; U.44; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Lvov-Sandomierz Operation: Brody, Phase I, 14 July 1944

In July 1944 the 1st Ukrainian Army Group, commanded by Marshal Ivan Koniev, was ordered to strike toward Rava Ruska and Lvov, advance rapidly to the Vistula River, and establish a bridgehead on the western bank of the river near Sandomierz.

The XV Rifle Corps of the Sixtieth Army was committed on the main axis of the attack. The corps, commanded by Major General P.V. Tertishniy, was to break through the German defenses on a 5.5-kilometer front between Hill 3750 and Krugla Hill, and attack toward Perepelniki, Trotsyanets Maly, and Skarzava. By the end of the first day of combat it was to take Sasov and Zolochev.

Facing the XV Rifle Corps was the German 913th Infantry Regiment of the 349th Infantry Division, which was deployed in well prepared fortified positions, plus two infantry battalions in reserve. In case of a Soviet breakthrough the Germans could quickly reinforce the forces in the breakthrough sector with one SS infantry division and one or two panzer divisions.

On 14 June at 0515 the corps commenced its operation with a reconnaissance in force against the German forward positions. The Germans offered fierce resistance, and after an intense fight elements of the 336th Infantry Division made only slight progress. At 1430, a 90-minute artillery preparation signalled the beginning of the main assault. By evening the corps had captured the first three lines of German trenches (first defensive zone) and forced the Germans to retreat toward Perepelniki. Although the corps objectives for the day were not achieved, the corps advanced from five to eight kilometers and reached the line Manayuv, Matskovy Gaj, Garbuzov, Perepelniki.

Significance: The XV Rifle Corps broke through the German first defensive zone and forced the Germans to retreat to the second defensive zone. However, the relatively slow rate of advance thwarted Soviet plans and enabled the Germans to bring up reserves.

Sources: U.6; U.12; U.17; U.19; U.20; U.24; U.26; U.32; U.42; U.43; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Lvov-Sandomierz Operation: Brody, Phase II, 15 July 1944

In order to speed up the breakthrough of the entire German tactical defense zone in the Perepelniki area, General Tertishniy, commanding the XV Rifle Corps, requested and was given one mechanized brigade. The brigade, together with the 332d Rifle Division of the corps was to attack toward Trostyanets Maly and secure the commitment to combat of the IX Mechanized Corps.

During the night of 14/15 July, forward battalions of the Soviet first echelon divisions were very active and continued local attacks. The Germans, aware of the danger of a possible Soviet breakthrough, transferred the 30th SS regiment of the 14th SS Galician Division and elements of the 8th Panzer Division to the combat zone during the night.

At 0830, after an hour-long artillery preparation, the Soviet corps launched the attack. German infantry, supported by tanks and assault guns, counterattacked repeatedly, trying to halt the Soviet advance. In spite of heavy losses, the XV Rifle Corps pushed forward persistently along the Trostyanets Maly-Zolochev axis. In the afternoon the resistance of the German troops was even more fierce. The Soviet corps was making only slow progress.

During the day, the Soviet Air Force was very active. It carried out nearly 3,500 sorties, most of them against concentrations of German tanks, which were hindering the advance of the corps. The Soviet air support was largely responsible for the difficulties the 8th Panzer Division had in its counterattacks.

By the evening the XV Rifle Corps, after advancing about seven kilometers, broke through the German second defensive zone and reached Popelnya, Trostyanets Maly, and Na Kamenku. The corps was able to open a narrow corridor, four to six kilometers wide (later to be known as the "Koltuv Corridor") from Perepelniki through Srednya Bud to Trostyanets. On 16 July Marshal Konev committed the Third Guards Tank Army to combat through this corridor. The commitment of the tank army had a decisive influence on the battle. The outnumbered Germans were forced to retreat westward.

Significance: The Soviet XV Rifle Corps broke through the second German defensive zone and opened a corridor through the German defenses into which,

on 16 July, a Soviet tank army was committed. This permitted the Soviet tanks to reach the open space in the rear of the German forces and carry out a deep envelopment operation which led to the liberation of Lvov, a major German defense center.

Sources: U.6; U.12; U.16; U.17; U.20; U.24; U.26; U.28; U.32; U.33; U.34; U.42; U.43; U.45; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

Assault Crossing of the Vistula River: Puławy, Phase I, 29-31 July 1944

In July 1944 the Soviet 1st Byelorussian Army Group, pursuing fleeing German troops, liberated a considerable portion of Poland, and on 25 July took the provincial capital of Lublin. On 26 July the Soviet XCI Rifle Corps of the Sixty-Ninth Army was ordered to leave one of its divisions (the 312th Rifle Division) in Lublin and, with the remaining force plus the artillery of the 312th Rifle Division, advance to the Vistula River, cross it during the night of 27/28 July in the Kazimierz area, and establish a bridgehead on the west bank between Nasiluw and Wojszyn, southwest of Puławy. The corps commander, Major General F.A. Volkov, immediately organized a special forward detachment which, avoiding combat with retreating German forces, was to race to the river, cross it from the march, and establish a bridgehead. Late in the afternoon of the 27th and during the night of 27/28 July the commander of the forward detachment, Colonel Rusakov, attempted several times to accomplish his mission but had to abandon the effort because of fierce German resistance. General Volkov, after learning that the Germans had brought up fresh troops and deployed them in well prepared defensive positions along the western bank of the Vistula, decided to postpone the crossing until after plans for a crossing had been prepared and sufficient crossing equipment had arrived.

German forces deployed in the XCI Rifle Corps crossing sector consisted of six infantry battalions (five from the 171st Reserve Infantry Division and one from the 214th Infantry Division), a combat task force of the 26th Infantry Division, and elements of the 11th SS Police Regiment. In reserve, in the Nowy Janowiec area, were the 55th and 95th Infantry Regiments of the 17th Infantry Division.

During the night of 28/29 July, the Soviet corps commenced its crossing operations. The Germans, continuously illuminating the river with flares, discovered the crossing of the 370th Rifle Division and, opening an intensive artillery and mortar fire, forced the Soviets back to the east bank. More successful was the crossing of elements of the 117th Rifle Division. After a prolonged, fierce, and often hand-to-hand combat, about two companies were able to penetrate the German defenses to a depth of about 300 meters and consolidate their positions between Nasiluw and Wojszyn.

During the day (29 July) the Soviet corps prepared for a resumption of the night crossing operations. At 2200 the attempt at crossing began again. The German opened an intense fire from all types of weapons on the troops attempting to cross. They also repeatedly counterattacked against the Soviet units already entrenched at the bridgehead. All German counterattacks were beaten off. By morning, despite heavy resistance, the Soviet corps increased its strength on the bridgehead to more than one rifle battalion and supporting elements.

During the night of 30/31 July and on the next day, the corps continued crossing operations. Fierce fighting developed along the entire 10-kilometer corps front. At about 2000 hours 31 July the corps had most of its troops across the river and began the battle for the expansion of the bridgehead.

Significance: The capture of the bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula River was an important element in the Soviet strategic plan. It would permit the commencement of future offensive operations on the Berlin axis from a bridgehead on the western bank of the Vistula, thus avoiding the necessity for assault crossing operations over the 500 meter-wide river at the start of the subsequent offensive.

Sources: U.11; U.12; U.16; U.18; U.19; U.22; U.24; U.28; U.30; U.42; U.45.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

Vistula River Operation: Puławy, Phase II, 2-7 August 1944

In view of German resistance and the slow advance of XCI Rifle Corps units in the Puławy bridgehead, General Volkov, the corps commander, decided to regroup his forces and concentrate for a main effort in the Nasiluw area. The corps was reinforced by the 9th Ponton Battalion and the 22d Tank Destroyer Regiment.

The regrouping of the Soviet forces was completed on 2 August by 1145. At 1255, after a 15-minute artillery preparation, the Soviets attacked. However, German resistance was stubborn, and all the corps' efforts to break through were unsuccessful.

Since the XCI Rifle Corps' left neighbor, the LXI Rifle Corps, had achieved some success, General Volkov requested and received permission from the Army Commander, General Kilpachki, to attack toward Janowiec from the LXI Rifle Corps bridgehead. Consequently, Volkov ordered the 312th Rifle Division to cross the river at Zastow Polanowski during the night 2/3 August and, on the following night (3/4 August), relieve units of the LXI Rifle Corps in the sector. In the morning of 4 August the division would attack toward Janowice and Janowiec, and join advancing elements of the 117th Rifle Division in the Oblasy Sziese-Oblasy Dworskie area.

On 4 August, after a prolonged battle, the 312th Rifle Division broke through the German defenses and at about noon took Janowiec. However, attempts to take Oblasy Dworskie and link up with the 117th Rifle Division were unsuccessful. On 5 August the XCI Rifle Corps was engaged in intense fighting in the Wojszyn and Janowiec areas. The Germans launched several strong counterattacks, each in battalion strength supported by from three to five tanks and/or assault guns.

For the next two days the corps, while preparing to resume the attack, repulsed many fierce German counterattacks. On 7 August, in view of the stubborn German resistance, General Kilpachki ordered the attacks to cease in the entire zone of the Sixty-Ninth Army.

Significance: Stubborn German resistance halted the corps' advance. In spite of reinforcements the corps could not fulfill its mission. The Germans won time to bring up reserves and fortify their defense positions. The Soviets faced the danger of having their bridgehead overrun by the counterattacking German forces.

Sources: U.11; U.12; U.16; U.18; U.19; U.24; U.28; U.30; U.42; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Yassy-Kishinev Operation, 20-29 August 1944

In the summer of 1944 the Soviet Supreme Command (Stavka) decided to carry out a decisive strike in the southern sector of the front, and to drive into Romania.

Poised for the offensive on a 590-kilometer front stretching from Chernovtsy in the west to the Black Sea in the east were the 2d Ukrainian Army Group deployed on the right, and the 3d Ukrainian Army Group deployed on the left, commanded respectively by Generals R. Malinovskiy and F.I. Tolbukhin. The Soviet army groups were to breach German and Romanian defenses at two points some 200 kilometers apart (which made coordination very difficult) and, in a pincer movement, envelop and encircle the hostile troops. Facing the Soviets was the German Army Group Southern Ukraine under General Hans Friessner, consisting of two German and two Romanian armies.

The offensive was launched on 20 August. In the course of the first two days both Soviet army groups penetrated the entire tactical defense zone on a wide front, and tank and mechanized formations moved into open areas behind the German-Romanian defensive line.

Attempting to halt the Soviet advance, the Germans counterattacked frequently and fought fiercely for each position. General Friessner used up all of his reserves and was unable to stop the offensive. The main forces of Army Group Southern Ukraine were faced with imminent encirclement; the German Sixth and the Romanian Third armies were ordered to withdraw behind the Prut River.

The Romanian Third Army, its flanks deeply enveloped, surrendered on 23 August. On 24 August forward elements of the advancing Soviet army groups linked up at the towns of Husi and Leovo, closing the encirclement ring. Twenty divisions and several independent units were caught in a great pocket between the Dniester and the Purt.

Meanwhile, in Bucharest, King Michael ordered Romanian troops to cease hostilities and gave the Germans two weeks to leave the country. On 25 August, Romania declared war on Germany.

It was now impossible to extricate the German Sixth Army and the IV Army Corps, and they were left abandoned. Nevertheless, fierce fighting continued on 25 and 26 August during mopping-up operations. But there was no centralized command system, and most of the formations were badly disorganized. By 29

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1944)

The Yassy-Kishinev Operation, 20-29 August 1944 (Continued)

August all resistance stopped. Only a few units were able to slip through the Soviet ring, and retreat toward Hungary.

Significance: Army Group Southern Ukraine was totally destroyed. Romania, a German ally, declared war on Germany. Soviet forces occupied Romania. This enabled Soviet forces to advance toward Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Sources: U.12; U.16; U.19; U.26; U.34; U.39; U.42; U.43; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1945)

The Vistula-Oder Offensive, 12 January-3 February 1945

The Vistula-Oder offensive was aimed at destroying German forces between the Vistula and Oder rivers, liberating western Poland, plunging into the heart of Germany, and establishing favorable conditions for a final assault on Berlin. The operation was to be conducted by the 1st Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian army groups, commanded respectively by Marshals Georgiy Zhukov and Ivan Konev.

Facing the Red Army along a front of 480 kilometers was German Army Group "A" under Field Marshal Josef Harpe (replaced on 16 January by Field Marshal Ferdinand Schörner). Most of the army group was deployed against the Soviet bridgeheads on the western bank of the Vistula.

The 1st Ukrainian Army Group launched the offensive from the Sanokow bridgehead on 12 January against the Fourth Panzer Army. During the first day the army group advanced 20 kilometers. In an attempt to close the penetration, the Germans committed their reserves and counterattacked. The counterattack was unsuccessful, and the counterattacking troops retreated. On 15 January, in a skillful enveloping maneuver, Konev took Kielce. The Fourth Panzer Army was defeated and destroyed. Soviet tank armies reached the open country and raced almost unopposed toward the Oder.

Heavy fighting took place on the Krakow axis. Despite the stubborn resistance of the German Seventeenth Army, the Soviets pushed forward, and on 19 January took Krakow. However, to the west of the city, as the left wing of the army group approached the industrial region of Upper Silesia, the advance was temporarily stopped.

In the center and on the right flank the going was easier. The pre-war Polish-German border was crossed on 19 January. Between 30 January and 3 February Konev bypassed Breslau, reached the Oder at several points, and established bridgeheads on the western bank of the river.

The 1st Byelorussian Army Group jumped off from the Pulawy and Magnuszew bridgeheads against the Ninth Army on 14 January. The main German defenses were broken the same day, and the Soviets advanced from 12 to 20 kilometers. On 15 January the First Guards Tank Army was committed as a mobile group and advanced during the day some 50 kilometers up to the Pilica River. The Sixty-Ninth Army took Radom and rushed toward Lodz. Warsaw was enveloped and liberated on 17 January.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1945)

The Vistula-Oder Offensive, 12 January-3 February 1945 (Continued)

The drive to the Oder developed into a race. Lodz was taken on 19 January, the Warta River crossed one day later, and Poznan surrounded and by-passed. The First Guards Tank Army broke through the Maseritz fortified zone, and on 3 February, in a spectacular thrust, reached the Oder, where it seized a bridgehead on the west bank, near Kustrin. Berlin was only 70 kilometers away.

Significance: Almost all of Poland was liberated. German forces between the Vistula and Oder rivers were defeated and suffered extremely heavy casualties. The stage was set for the final assault on Berlin.

Sources: U.12; U.15; U.26; U.33; U.34; U.42; U.44; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1945)

East Prussia, 13-31 January 1945

The Soviet plan for the East Prussian operation called for cutting off German troops in East Prussia from those in Pomerania and Poland, pushing them toward the Baltic Sea, and destroying them piecemeal.

The offensive was to be carried out by the 3d Byelorussian Army Group under General Ivan Chernyakhovskiy and the 2d Byelorussian Army Group commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rokossovskiy.

Defending East Prussia and Northern Poland was German Army Group Center under General Hans Reinhardt (on 26 January the group was renamed Army Group North and put under General Lothar Rendulic), deployed along a 500-kilometer front from the estuary of the Nieman River in the northeast, to the confluence of the Bug and Vistula rivers in the southwest.

The 3d Byelorussian Army Group moved out on 13 January and attacked from the east and northeast toward Tilsit and Insterburg. Overcoming strong resistance from the Third Panzer Army, Soviet forces broke through the German main defense zone and during the first two days advanced 15 kilometers. The advance was slowed during following days because of difficult terrain and fortifications. Tilsit was taken on 19 January. On 22 January Chernyakhovskiy's troops captured Insterburg and pushed toward Konigsberg. By the end of January, Soviet forces bypassed Konigsberg after overcoming powerful fortifications at the Heilsberg defense area. They reached the Baltic Sea and seized part of the Samland Peninsula.

Meanwhile, on 14 January the 2d Byelorussian Army Group launched its main attack from Ruzhany and Serotsk bridgeheads toward Mlawa and Torun. Allenstein surrendered on 22 January. On 23 January, Rokossovskiy reached the Frisches Haff Bay on the Baltic shore.

The Red Army, by gaining the Baltic coast in the west, the center, and in the east, had split the German forces in East Prussia into three groups. This sealed the fate of Army Group North, which also was cut off from German forces in Pomerania.

Early in February the 2d Byelorussian Army Group, after taking Torun, and reaching the Vistula River on a wide front, was ordered to turn westward and advance into eastern Pomerania, leaving the mopping-up of the surrounded Germans to Chernyakhovskiy's forces.

Significance: Army Group North ceased to be a viable force. This meant that Soviet armies advancing across Poland on Berlin would not have to be concerned about their right flank or rear.

Sources: U.11; U.12; U.26; U.27; U.29; U.34; U.47.

Significance: The failure of the Soviet division to break through the entire German zone of defense slowed the offensive of the Second Shock Army. This failure was due to the neglect on the part of the Soviet command to plan realistically for the offensive.

Sources: U.11; U.12; U.26; U.28; U.29; U.32; U.34; U.42; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1945)

Ciechanow, Phase II, 15 January 1945

During the night 14/15 January the 90th Rifle Division conducted reconnaissance, regrouped, and readied itself for a resumption of the attack. At 0230 one regiment of the division attacked Czarnostuw Dwor. The German garrison offered stubborn resistance; the attacking troops came under heavy fire and failed to capture the place. At 0915 the Germans counterattacked with a battalion-size force supported by tanks and assault guns. The counterattack was repelled by heavy artillery fire.

On order of the corps commander, the Soviet division made an all-out attack at 1010. The advance, however, was slow because of fierce German resistance. In numerous places there was close combat. At 1500 General Polemov informed General Lyashchenko that at 1600 the VIII Tank Corps would be committed to combat from the line Czarnostuw-Budy Debiny and that two tank brigades of the corps, the 58th and 60th tank brigades, would advance in the 90th Rifle Division sector along the axis Czarnostuw-Golymin Stary-Ciechanow.

With the advantage of the VIII Tank Corps thrust, units of the rifle division broke into the positions of the German divisional reserve, where a very intense fight continued for several hours. At 1830, the Replacement Battalion of the German 7th Infantry Division, supported by more than ten tanks, counterattacked from the Krzemien area. The counterattack was beaten off.

By evening the 90th Rifle Division had reached Krzemien, Grochy Imbrzyki, and Grochy Krupy. During the day the division advanced four kilometers.

At about 2230 hours forward units of the division discovered that the German troops were withdrawing. General Lyashchenko ordered an immediate pursuit to capture Ciechanow by the end of the next day.

Significance: For the second day in a row, the 90th Rifle Division could not fulfill its mission. Only commitment of a strong tank force in the division's sector made it possible for the division to make limited progress.

Sources: U.11; U.26; U.28; U.29; U.32; U.34; U.42; U.45; U.46; U.47.

WORLD WAR II (EASTERN FRONT, 1945)

Seelow Heights, 16-17 April 1945

In the spring of 1945 German forces in Brandenburg were prepared to resist an imminent Soviet offensive toward Berlin from a system of field fortifications sited generally along the west bank of the Oder River. The Seelow Heights sector east of Berlin was especially well fortified, since it was considered by the Germans to be the key to the approach to their capital. Defended by the 303d Regiment of the 303d Infantry Division, the two-kilometer wide Seelow Heights defenses were heavily and deeply fortified, along the high bank of the dry river bed of the Old Oder River. Opposite Seelow in April was the Soviet 57th Guards Rifle Division with attached units and an independent tank brigade in reserve. The division's mission was to break through the main German defenses and, according to plan, advance 15 to 20 kilometers on the first day of the attack.

After preliminary operations that brought Soviet forces abreast of the main German defenses on the west bank of the Oder, the 57th Guards Division attacked on the morning of 16 April. A strong German defense stopped the Soviets after minimal gains had been achieved. On 17 April the Soviet reserve tank brigade was committed, but only after defenses on the flanks of the 303d Regiment had been broken did the Seelow defenders begin a rapid withdrawal.

Significance: The Germans had strengthened an already formidable natural obstacle and held their positions until threatened by envelopment. Once through the Seelow Heights defenses, the Soviets were within close range of Berlin.

Sources: U.12; U.15; U.26; U.34; U.41; U.46.

WORLD WAR II (MANCHURIA, 1945)

Mutankiang, 9-16 August 1945

With Japan on the verge of surrender, the Soviets moved swiftly to seize as much as possible of Manchuria. While the Trans Baikal Front made the main attack from the west, the Soviet Fifth Army struck the Japanese defense in rugged terrain in eastern Manchuria with massed forces of combined arms, backed by ample reserves.

Under cover of a heavy rain storm on the early morning of 9 August the Fifth Army attacked, taking the Japanese defenders by surprise. Having identified weak points in the Japanese defenses, the Soviet forces advanced to seize strategic strongpoints, road junctions, and terrain features. Protracted fighting developed along the approaches to the town of Mutankiang, lasting until 16 August, when the Soviets finally captured the town. By that time Japanese resistance elsewhere in Manchuria had ceased, and the war over.

Significance: The Fifth Army's success in eastern Manchuria helped to insure Soviet control of all of Manchuria and a claim to participation in the defeat of Japan.

Sources: U.26; U.34; U.45; U.47; U.49.

1. IDENTIFICATION
 War: World War II
 War Against Japan, 1943-1945

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (km)
Tarawa-Betio, Japan	A 20-24 Nov 1944 D	Central Pacific	US 2d Mar Div (-) Jap Gilbert Islands Garrison Force (-)	MG Smith Adm Shibusaki	5	1.2
Iwo Jima-Into the Main Defenses, Japan	A 20-24 Feb 1945 D	Bonin Islands	US V Amph Corps Jap 2d Ind Mixed Bde (+)	MG Schmidt Gen Kuribayashi	5	4.7
Iwo Jima-Suribachi, A Japan	20-24 Feb 1945 D	Bonin Islands	US 28th Mar Rgt Jap 2d Ind Mixed Bde (-) (+)	Col Liversedge Gen Kuribayashi	5	0.8
Iwo Jima-Final Phase, Japan	A 11-16 Mar 1945 D	Bonin Islands	US 3d Mar Div (+) Jap Chichi Jima Defense Force	Gen Smith Gen Kuribayashi	6	1.8

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II
War Against Japan, 1943-1945

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Tarawa-Betio	A D	M FD	DST	FT	N	--	--	X
Iwo Jima-Into the Main Defenses	A D	RB/RGB	DST	WT	N	--	--	X
Iwo Jima-Suribachi	A D	RgB	DST	WT	N	--	--	X
Iwo Jima-Final Phase	A D	RB	DST	Spt	N	--	--	X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

World War II
War: War Against Japan, 1943-1945

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Total Art.	Armor	Art. Pieces	Air Sorties Total	%/Day	Armor Losses Total	%/Day	Arty Pieces Lost Total	%/Day	Aircraft Losses Total	%/Sorties/Day		
Tarawa-Betio	A 9,000 D 4,836	46 14	0 14	46 53	278 ?	?	3,302 4,836	7.3 20.0	6 14	2.6 20.0	0 53	0 20.0	?	?
Iwo Jima-Into the Main Defenses	A 33,915 B 18,300	144 40	0 10	144 59	474 300	10	6,845 15,615	4.0 17.1	11 40	1.5 20.0	0 54	0 18.3	26 10	1.7 20.0
Iwo Jima-Suribachi	A 3,200 D 1,600	23 0	0 0	23 0	330 30	10	510 1,231	3.2 15.4	0 0	0 0	0 30	0 20.0	0 0	0 0
Iwo Jima-Final Phase	A 32,000 D 2,685	144 40	0 10	144 30	804 120	0	3,885 2,685	2.0 16.7	0 40	0 16.8	0 120	0 16.8	0 0	0 0

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: World War II
War Against Japan, 1943-1945

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Tarawa-Betio	A D	C C	C C	C C	X X	X X	X X	C X	X X	X X	0.2 0.2	7 4
Iwo Jima-Into the Main Defenses	A D	C C	C C	C C	X X	X X	X X	N N	X X	X X	1.2 0.2	7 5
Iwo Jima- Suribachi	A D	C C	C C	C C	X X	X X	X X	N N	N N	X X	0.2 0.2	7 4
Iwo Jima- Final Phase	A D	C X	C C	C X	X X	X X	N N	N N	N N	X X	0.2 0.2	3 4

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II

War Against Japan, 1943-1945

		N	N	X	X	Depth	
Engagement	Tarawa-Betio	A	D	A	D	A	D
	Iwo Jima-Into the Main Defenses						
	Iwo Jima-Suribachi						
	Iwo Jima-Final Phase						
Mobility		X	X	X	X		
Air Superiority		X	X	X	X		
Force Preparation-Defense		X	X	X	X		
Weather		N	N	N	N		
Roads		N	N	N	N		
Terrain		N	N	N	N		
Shipboard		N	N	N	N		
Planning		X	X	X	X		
Surprise		N	N	N	N		
Mass, Narrow Interv.		N	N	N	N		
Logistics		N	X	X	X		
Fortifications		X	X	X	X		
Depth							

7. CURRENT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF OPERAT

War: World War II
War Against Japan, 1943-1945

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack	Success	Resolution
	Plan and Maneuver	Plan and Maneuver			
Tarawa-Betio	A D	F D/O	--	X	B A
Iwo Jima- Into the Main Defenses	A D	F D/O	--	X	P A
Iwo Jima-Suribachi	A D	F D	--	X	B A
Iwo Jima-Final Phase	A D	F D	--	X	B A

WORLD WAR II (THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1945)

Iwo Jima: Into the Main Defenses, 20-24 February 1945

On 16 February 1945 the US Fifth Fleet, commanded by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, arrived off the coast of Iwo Jima Island. The US assault was lifting Marine Major General Harry Schmidt's Fifth Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine divisions, due to be landed on the island in an amphibious operation on 19 February. During the three-day period prior to the invasion the Japanese defenses of the island were subjected to an intense pre-invasion bombardment, both from the sea and from the air, by ships and aircraft of the Fifth Fleet.

When the Marines landed on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945, they faced what was perhaps the most elaborate and intricate defensive network erected by the Japanese during the war. Steel-reinforced concrete fortifications and less elaborate positions constructed of logs and stones covered with volcanic ash dotted the island. The Japanese had approximately 21,500 men on the island, of which about 13,500 were fighting troops. The backbone of the defensive force were the 2d Independent Mixed Brigade (five infantry battalions and an artillery battalion) and the 145th Infantry Regiment, consisting of three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion. Other units included five antitank, two machine gun, and two rocket companies. Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi was the Japanese commander.

The Japanese positions on the northern end of the island were well integrated and mutually supporting.

After the initial landings (19 February), the Marines on the 20th advanced both north into the main positions, and south against Suribachi. The Japanese artillery was employed effectively in resisting these attacks, and Marine casualties throughout the engagement were heavy. As the Marines advanced to the north, the Japanese artillery fire gradually diminished, but until the breakthrough of the main defenses was accomplished, no part of the island was immune to shelling.

The drive north began at 0830 hours 20 February. The preparation was intense and methodical, utilizing all available weapons on shore, afloat, and in the air. The 4th and 5th Marine Divisions made the assault. On the first day, the Marines overran Airfield Number One in the south central area of the island. On the second day of the attack the two Marine divisions

World War II (The War Against Japan, 1943)

Tarawa-Betio, 20-24 November 1943

The American offensive against Japan in the Central Pacific area began in November 1943 in the Gilbert Islands, over 3,800 kilometers southwest of Hawaii, where the Japanese had fortified and garrisoned the Tarawa chain of atolls, particularly the islands of Betio and Makin. The US V Amphibious Corps began the attack on 20 November 1943 with part of the 2d Marine Division (5,000 men) landing at Betio. The attack was preceded by an intense naval bombardment and air strikes, but the strongly fortified Japanese positions were relatively intact when the Marines landed. The 4,700-man strong Japanese garrison of the island was commanded by Admiral Nagji Shimanuki.

On the first day of the engagement, over 1,500 Americans were killed or wounded while establishing only two small beachheads, each less than 200 meters deep. Although casualties continued to be high, the American forces fought their way gradually across the island down a narrow corridor, capturing the island's airfield (later known as Hatties Field) by the evening of 21 November.

Once the beachheads were established, the fighting was a struggle to clear Betio of Japanese fortified pockets of resistance. The island was eventually won at a cost of 981 killed and 2,511 wounded. Nearly all of the Japanese defenders were killed.

Simultaneous with the Marine invasion of Betio, the US 27th Infantry Division took Makin Island, which was defended by approximately 900 Japanese soldiers and workers. The main island of the Tarawa chain, Betaritari, was taken by the 165th Infantry Regiment at a cost of 66 dead and 152 wounded. Japanese casualties were 440 -- all killed.

Significance: Tarawa was one of the costliest battles in American military history. This amphibious assault taught US military leaders valuable lessons in beach landing tactics that were effectively used later on in the war.

The airbases captured at Tarawa and in the Gilbert Islands enabled American forces to proceed forward in the offensive against Japan by attacking next the Marshall Islands (Kwajalein and Enewetak).

Sources: V.2; V.4; V.6.

WORLD WAR II (THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1945)

Iwo Jima: Into the Main Defenses, 20-24 February 1945 (Continued)

approached the high ground near a second airfield, located centrally on the island, and were pinned down by heavy and continuous defensive fire. This area was the covering zone of the main Japanese defensive position, which extended across the entire island. Heavy fighting began, and both sides incurred significant casualties. Ground gained by the Marines was measured in yards. Elements of the 3d Marine Division entered combat on D/2. Finally, on D/5, the fourth day of the engagement, the airfield fell to the attacking Marines, ending the engagement.

Significance: The capture of the two Japanese airfields on Iwo Jima fulfilled a major objective of the operation.

Sources: V.1; V.3; V.5.

WORLD WAR II (THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1945)

Iwo Jima: Mount Suribachi, 20-24 February 1945

The small island of Iwo Jima lies over 1,100 kilometers south of Tokyo. It is part of the Bonin Group of rocky, sparsely inhabited islands. Iwo Jima is 7.2 kilometers long by 4.0 kilometers wide. In 1945 it had a strategically important air base from which Japanese fighters would intercept US bombers on their way to Japan from their bases in the Marianas Islands. The Americans wanted to capture this island for two reasons: first, to eliminate the Japanese air base there, and second, to establish a facility to service crippled bombers returning from the bomb run over Japan.

On 19 February US Marine Corps Major General Harry Schmidt's Fifth Amphibious Corps, consisting of the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, made an amphibious invasion of the island, supported by the US Fifth Fleet. On the following day Marine RCT 28, commanded by Colonel Harry B. Liversedge, was ordered to seize the highest ground on the island, the extinct volcano Mount Suribachi, at the southern end of the island. The attack concept was to encircle the base of the mountain and maintain continuous pressure on the Japanese holding the position. The defenders were in caves and concrete fortifications around the base and along the slopes of the volcano. They were supported by artillery fire from points all over the island.

At 0830 on 20 February, the Marine attack commenced. Two battalions assaulted, supported by a third. Support was provided by artillery, aircraft, and gunfire from naval vessels. Tanks supporting the attack were extremely useful in neutralizing and eliminating Japanese strongpoints. Defensive fire from the slopes of the mountain caused heavy casualties among the Marines.

At 1015 23 February the US national flag was raised at the summit of Suribachi, and mopping-up operations began. By the end of 24 February organized Japanese resistance on the mountain had ended.

Significance: The capture of Mount Suribachi eliminated the best observation post the Japanese had on the island and provided a tremendous morale boost for the US forces. The main attack being made against Japanese defenses in the north was no longer exposed to fire from the rear.

Sources: V.1; V.3; V.5.

WORLD WAR II (THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1945)

Iwo Jima: The Final Phase, 11-16 March 1945

On 9 March 1945 the US 3d Marine Division broke through the main Japanese defenses to the northeastern shore of Iwo Jima Island. Over the following two days the other two Marine divisions, the 4th and the 5th, followed suit and broke through to the sea. In so doing, the US forces bypassed pockets of resistance which had to be overcome subsequently. Dug deeply into ridges and the sides of ravines throughout the northern part of the island, the Japanese still were capable of offering serious resistance, even though no continuous line existed.

The mopping-up process was difficult and costly. The Japanese defenders were still numerous and committed, and the sophisticated Japanese defenses, which included fortifications and fire positions linked by tunnels, required systematic reduction.

During this mopping-up period, the scope and intensity of the fighting is indicated by Marine casualties: 3,885 -- 765 from the 3d Marine Division, 720 from the 4th, and 2,400 from the 5th.

The last organized Japanese resistance ended on 16 March. Iwo Jima was secured. The next day, 16 US B-29 bombers returning from Japan made safe emergency landings.

Significance: The capture of Iwo Jima eliminated a Japanese air base for attacking the American B-29s pounding Japan, and provided an emergency landing field for bombers damaged over Japan.

Source: V.1; V.3; V.5.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: World War II; Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Advance from the Beach	A 2-4 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 1st Spec Estab Rgt	MG Arnold Lt Col Aoyanagi	3	1.6
Advance through the Outposts	A 5-8 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 62d Div (-)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Fujioka	4	2.2
Tomb Hill-Ouki	A 9-11 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 11th Ind Inf Bn (+)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Fujioka	3	2.6
Skyline Ridge - Rocky Crags	A 19-23 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 11th Ind Inf Bn (+)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Fujioka	5	3.4
Kochi Ridge-Onaga I	A 25-27 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 22d Inf Regt	MG Arnold Lt Col Yoshida	3	3.0
Kochi Ridge-Onaga II	A 28-29 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 22d Inf Rgt	MG Arnold Lt Col Yoshida	2	3.0
Kochi Ridge-Onaga III	A 30 Apr-3 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 22d Inf Rgt (+)	MG Arnold Lt Col Yoshida	4	3.0
Japanese Counterattack	A 4-5 May 1945 D	Okinawa	Jap 24th Div (-) US 7th Inf Div (+)	Lt Gen Amariya MG Arnold	2	1.8
Kochi Ridge-IV	A 6-7 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Div (-)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Amariya	2	2.2
Shuri Envelopment, Phase I	A 22-23 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 3d Spec Estab Rgt (F)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Ushijima	2	3.6
Japanese Counter-attacks	A 24/25 May 1945 D	Okinawa	Jap 24th Div (-) US 7th Inf Div (-)	Lt Gen Amariya MG Arnold	1	3.6
Shuri Envelopment, Phase II	A 26-27 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+)(+) Jap 24th Div (-)(+)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Amariya	2	4.0

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector, (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Shuri Envelop- ment, Phase III Hill 95-I	A 29-31 May 1945 D 6-8 Jun 1945	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Div (-)(+)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Amamiya	3	4.0
Hill 95-II	A 9-11 Jun 1945 D 12 Jun 1945	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 44th Ind Mixed Bde (-)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Ushijima	3	2.5
Yaeju-Dake	A 15-17 Jun 1945 D 115	Okinawa	US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 44th Ind Mixed Bde (-)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Ushijima	1	1.5
Hills 153 and 115			US 7th Inf Div (+) Jap 44th Ind Mixed Bde (-)	MG Arnold Lt Gen Ushijima	3	3.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Advance from the Beach	A D	Del	Rw/RW	DST	Spt	N	--	X
Advance through the Outposts	A D	FD	Rgw/FB	DST/MLT	Spt	N	--	X
Tomb Hill-Ouki	A D	FD	Rgw/FB	WHT	Spt	N	--	X
Skyline Ridge Rocky Crags	A D	FD	Rgw/RW	DST/DOT	Spt	N	--	X
Kochi Ridge-Onaga I	A D	FD	Rgw/RW	WLT	Spt	N	--	X
Kochi Ridge-Onaga II	A D	FD	Rgw/RW	DST	Spt	N	--	X
Kochi Ridge-Onaga III	A D	FD	Rgw/RW	DST/WHT	Spt	N	--	X
Japanese Counterattack	A D	HD	Rgw/RW	DST	Spt	N	--	X
Kochi Ridge-IV	A D	FD	Rgw/RW	DST/MLT	Spt	N	--	X
Shuri Envelopment, Phase I	A D	PD	Rgw/RW	WHT	Spt	Y	X	X
Japanese Counterattacks	A D	HD	Rw	WLT/WHT	Spt	Y	X	X
Shuri Envelopment, Phase II	A D	FD/Del	Rgw	WHT	Spt	N	--	X

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War : World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Shuri Envelopment, Phase III	A D FD/Del	Rgn/Rgn	WHT	Spr	N	--	--	X
Hill 95-1	A D FD	Rgn	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Hill 95-II	A D FD	Rgn	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Yaeju-Dake	A D FD	Rgn	DST	ST	N	--	--	X
Hills 153 and 115	A D FD	Rgn	DST	ST	N	--	--	X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign, US 7th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Strength				Air Sorties	Battle Casualties	Armor Losses	Arty Pieces Lost	Total Arty/Day	Total Aircraft/Day	Total Sorties/Day
	Personnel Total	Total Lt.	Armor M/S	Arty Pieces							
Advance from the Beach	A 22,888 D 1,400	134 0	73 0	61 0	95 0	395 0	158 628	0.2 14.9	0 0	?	--
Advance through the Outposts	A 18,398 D 2,900	134 0	73 0	61 32	173 0	158 0	286 2,120	0.4 18.3	5 0	--	--
Tomb Hill-Omaki	A 18,111 D 4,731	151 0	73 0	78 32	221 0	123 0	466 1,278	0.9 9.0	5 0	?	--
Skyline Ridge-Rocky Crags	A 16,291 D 2,600	125 0	56 0	69 38	221 0	526 0	740 1,661	0.9 12.8	18 0	--	--
Kochi Ridge-Onaga I	A 14,594 D 5,000	126 0	56 0	70 40	203 40	125 0	269 1,324	0.6 8.8	3 0	?	--
Kochi Ridge-Onaga II	A 15,986 D 4,500	123 0	56 0	67 40	226 40	129 0	182 814	0.7 9.0	11 0	?	--
Kochi Ridge-Onaga III	A 15,764 D 4,050	126 0	70 0	56 40	329 40	269 0	398 2,276	0.6 14.0	4 0	4.5	--
Japanese Counterattack	A 6,850 D 15,350	0 140	0 73	0 67	198 67	?	3,704 175	0.8 14.0	0 1.1	?	--
Kochi Ridge-IV	A 15,109 D 5,140	140 0	73 0	67 0	209 30	173 0	114 1,464	0.4 14.2	0 0	?	--
Shuri Envelopment, Phase I	A 16,043 D 3,338	0 0	0 0	0 0	50 2	21 0	170 478	0.5 7.2	0 0	?	--
Japanese Counter-attack	A 4,000 D 15,777	0 0	0 0	0 0	8 157	0 43	1,269 241	31.7 1.5	0 0	?	--
Shuri Envelopment, Phase II	A 15,840 D 3,000	0 0	0 0	0 0	171 24	0 0	124 434	0.4 7.1	0 0	?	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

Mar: World War II, Okinawa Campaign, US 7th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Total	Armor Lt.	NET	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	1/Day	Armor Losses	Arty Total	1/Day	Total	Sorties/Day	Aircraft Losses
Shuri Envelopment, Phase III	A D	15,205 2,600	79 0	17 0	62 0	150 3	47 0	182 2,564	0.4 34.2	0 0	0 0	?	--	?
Hill 95-I	A D	16,091 3,500	122 0	44 0	78 0	129 12	98 0	193 1,222	0.4 11.6	0 0	0 0	?	--	0
Hill 95-II	A D	16,002 2,500	122 0	44 0	78 0	180 12	53 0	248 1,470	0.5 19.6	0 0	0 0	?	--	0
Yaeju-Dake	A D	5,237 2,500	40 0	14 0	26 0	53 6	0 0	48 2,401	0.9 96.0	0 0	0 0	?	--	0
Hills 153 and 115	A D	15,808 2,000	109 0	39 0	70 0	141 6	27 0	317 1,971	0.7 32.9	0 0	0 0	?	--	0

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	C/I	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logistics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	5. OUTCOME	
											Distance Advanced (Km/day)	Mission Accomp.
Advance from the Beach	A	x	N	x	N	N	N	N	x	x	3.4	10
Advance thru the Outposts	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.8	8
Tomb Hill- Ozaki	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.1	8
Skyline Ridge- Rocky Craggs	A	C	C	C	x	N	C	N	x	x	0.3	8
Kochi Ridge- Onaga I	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.0	3
Kochi Ridge- Onaga II	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.0	7
Kochi Ridge- Onaga III	A	D	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	x	0.1	6
Japanese Counterattack	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	x	0.0	1
Kochi Ridge-IV	A	D	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	x	0.7	8
Shuri Envelop- ment, Phase I	A	D	C	C	C	x	N	N	N	C	x	0.5
Japanese Coun- terattacks	A	D	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	x	0.0	8
Shuri Envelop- ment, Phase II	A	D	C	C	C	x	N	C	N	C	x	0.5

5. OUTCOME

Date: March 11, Ondina Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Program	GE	Leader- ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Wisen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Start Develop- ment, Phase III	A	C	N	X	N	N	N	N	C	X	0.3	7
	D	N	N	X	N	N	N	N	C	X	0.5	7
Hill 95-I	A	D	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	8
	D	N	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	7
Hill 95-II	A	B	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	10
	B	A	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	3
Yedda-Pala	A	B	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	0.3	10
	B	A	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	3
Hills 155 and 115	A	D	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	0.3	10
	D	A	N	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	0.3	3

FACTORS AFFECTING CURTSE

World War II, Okinawa Campaign, US 7th Inf Div Sector

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign, US 7th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Force Preparation	Meatcher	Terrain, Roads	Leader-ship	Planning	Surprise	Mess, Narrow Front	Logistics	Portfolio-Captions	Depth	
Shuri Envelopment, Phase III	A D	X	N	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	N	X	X	X
Hill 95-I	A D	X	N	X	X	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	X	X
Hill 95-II	A D	X	N	X	X	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	X	X
Yaeju-Dake	A D	X	N	X	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	N	X	X	X
Hills 153 and 115	A D	X	N	X	X	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	X	X

7. COMBAT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 7th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Value of Forces		Success		Recognition
	Value	Score	Value	Score	
Advance from the Beach	A D	F D	F, E (LF)	--	X P WIL.
Advance through the Outposts	A D	F, E (WF)	--	X P WIL.	
Tomb Hill-Ouki	A D	F, E (WF) D/O	--	X P, S WIL.	
Skyline Ridge-Rocky Crags	A D	F D/O	--	X A	
Kochi Ridge-Onaga I	A D	EE D	--	X R, S	
Kochi Ridge-Onaga II	A D	E (LF)	--	X R, S	
Kochi Ridge-Onaga III	A D	EE D/O	--	X R, S	
Japanese Counterattack	A D	F, E (LF)	--	X R	
Kochi Ridge-IV	A D	F D	--	X P WIL.	
Shuri Envelopment, Phase I	A D	E (RF)	--	X P WD	
Japanese Counterattacks	A D	F, E (RF)	--	X R	
Shuri Envelopment, Phase II	A D	F D	--	X R, W	

7. COMBAT POWS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign, US 7th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Success	Resolution
	Plan and Maneuver	Secondary Attack		
Shuri Envelopment, Phase III	A D	F D	P	P, S
Hill 95-1	A D	F D	--	P, S
Hill 95-11	A D	F D	--	P, S
Yaeju-Dake	A D	F D	--	P, S
Hills 153 and 115	A D	F D	--	P, A

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Advance from the Beach, 2-4 April 1945

The 7th Infantry Division encountered little resistance on 1 April as it moved inland from the beachhead. The division captured Kadena Airfield and moved inland 4.8 kilometers. On 2 April the 7th Division's 17th Infantry met only token resistance as it traversed the width of the island to Nakagusuku Bay. Meanwhile, the division's 32d Infantry met stiffer resistance at a strongpoint south of Koza but employed tanks to reduce it and draw abreast of the 17th by late afternoon. On 3 April the 32d occupied the coastal plain and moved south to Kuba, facing the Japanese outpost, Hill 165. A brief fire fight ensued, but only 10 rounds of Japanese artillery fire hit the 7th Division's sector. On 4 April the 7th Division's drive south stalled when it met heavy fire from an outpost known as Castle Hill. The Japanese continued to hold the position throughout the day. The 7th Division had nonetheless done its part in the landing and the drive across Okinawa.

Significance: The 7th Division had taken a valuable airfield and won control of key areas of coastland on both the east and west coasts of the island. Moreover, its drive across Okinawa had helped cut the island in two, thereby isolating the Japanese forces on the southern part of the island from those on the north.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Advance through the Outposts, 5-8 April 1945

On 5 April the 7th Infantry Division at first advanced rapidly. On the division's left the 32d Infantry moved south along the coastal plain to Ukuma; on the right the 184th Infantry pushed along rougher terrain to a strongpoint known as the Pinnacle. The Japanese defenders repulsed an attack on the stronghold. It was not until the next day and after two more unsuccessful frontal assaults that the 184th was able to defeat the Japanese defenders by a flank attack. The Pinnacle was the northernmost outpost of the Shuri fortified zone. On 7 April, as the 32d continued to advance south on the east coast, virtually unopposed, the 184th came up against another fiercely defended strongpoint, Red Hill. Two frontal assaults were driven back; in the second of these attacks, two platoons of tanks were not enough to wrest the hill from the Japanese. A third attempt proved successful. Just as they had done on the previous day at the Pinnacle, the Americans tried a flanking maneuver; the envelopment of the Japanese left was successful. On 8 April, after two bloody assaults, the 184th took another formidable outpost from the Japanese, Triangular Hill, and the 32d slowed its advance to keep pace with the 184th.

Significance: By reducing three of the four strongpoints of the covering zone of the Shuri defense system the 7th Division was in position to attack the main strongpoints of the Shuri defense network.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Tomb Hill-Ouki, 9-11 April 1945

The 184th Infantry Regiment continued its determined push south against the Japanese outposts by assaulting Tomb Hill on 9 April. The regiment took the forward face of the hill, but an attempt to envelop the Japanese right failed to dislodge the enemy from the reverse slope of the hill. On the 7th Division's right flank, the 32d Infantry took advantage of the combat on Tomb Hill to seize the "Finger Ridges" overlooking Ouki. Heavy fire support from mortars and artillery enabled the 184th to win control of Tomb Hill before the end of the day. While the 184th warded off counterattacks on 10-11 April, the 32d attacked Ouki. Supported by tanks and artillery, the 32d Infantry took Ouki after a bitter fight. Mines and Japanese artillery fire prevented supporting tanks from entering the village of Ouki, forcing the infantry to withdraw from their tenuous position. The 7th Division's lines thus stabilized directly north of the Japanese strongholds on Hill 178 and on the Skyline Ridge.

Significance: The battle for control of Tomb Hill-Ouki demonstrated the importance of US combined arms tactics on Okinawa. Tank-infantry teams were very effective in this engagement. Months of training infantry and armored units to coordinate their attacks closely proved worth the effort. With Tomb Hill and the ridges to the east in American hands the 7th Division was in position to attack the formidable Japanese positions on Skyline Ridge and Hill 178 to the south.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Skyline Ridge-Rocky Crags, 19-23 April 1945

On 19 April the US XXIV Corps launched a major offensive to smash the Shuri defenses. As part of this offensive it was the 7th Infantry Division's mission to take the eastern anchor of the Japanese defense line, the Skyline Ridge, and take Hill 178 to the west of the ridge. Armored flamethrowers wiped out the Japanese troops on the forward slope of the Skyline Ridge, but mortar and machine gun fire thwarted the advance of the 32d Infantry. Against fierce Japanese counterattacks, it was all the regiment could do to hold the forward face of the ridge. Intense fire also halted the US advance on the right and in the center of the 7th Division's sector. Murderous fire emanating from the Japanese left revealed the Rocky Crags to be a formidable position.

On the next day the attack centered on Ouki. From Ouki Hill the 7th Division could strike east along the Skyline Ridge to reduce the enemy positions on the reverse slopes of the ridge. But it was courage and élan that finally secured Ouki Hill by the morning of 21 April. Personal heroism likewise played a decisive role in the capture of Skyline Ridge the same day. The Rocky Crags, however, were not taken until the morning of 23 April. Sustained fire from artillery and armored flamethrowers on 22-23 April were decisive in reducing this position.

Significance: Excellent cooperation between armor and infantry units was important in wresting control of these formidable defensive positions from the Japanese. But personal initiative on the part of the American infantrymen, both officers and enlisted men, at crucial moments played a decisive role in winning control of two key positions. American artillery and naval gunfire also played an important role in breaking the Japanese hold on these positions. The Japanese defenders likewise demonstrated great courage in their defense efforts; they made excellent use of terrain, fortifications, artillery, and mortar fire in slowing the American offensive.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kochi Ridge-Onaga I, 25-27 April 1945

Following the Japanese withdrawal to the south from Skyline Ridge, the US 7th Infantry Division advanced to the next series of outposts in the Shuri Defense Zone. On 25 April, the 17th Infantry, relieving the 184th, reached the slopes of Horseshoe Ridge, which lay between Kochi and Onaga, and faced the Kochi Ridge strongpoint. The 32d Infantry advanced on the left against Onaga. The following day the 17th Infantry attempted to take Kochi Ridge by launching separate attacks by its 1st and 2d battalions on the east and west sides of the ridge respectively. Because of a failure to coordinate these attacks, neither battalion was aware of the other's position. As they had throughout the campaign, the Japanese swept the areas of advance with sustained fire from mortars and machine guns. The attacking American infantrymen withdrew to their start line. On 27 April the 17th made another attempt to wrest Kochi Ridge from the enemy; rain and mud impeded any efforts at coordinating the attack. The Japanese repelled the attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the 17th Infantry. Because of the failure to make any headway against the Japanese position on Kochi Ridge, the 32d postponed its attack on the Japanese right.

Significance: The failure of the US forces to coordinate attacks, and sustained Japanese artillery and mortar fire, were sufficient to enable the defenders to maintain control of the Kochi-Onaga strongpoints. US naval gunfire knocked out at least five Japanese guns and destroyed a number of gun positions.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.16; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kochi Ridge-Onaga II, 28-29 April 1945

On 28 April the 3d Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, relieved the 1st Battalion, which was deployed on the regiment's right, facing the western slopes of Kochi Ridge. The battalion's commanding officer, Lt. Colonel Lee Wallace, attempted to envelop the left flank and rear of the Kochi Ridge position. This maneuver brought the 3d Battalion into the line of fire of four strongpoints that overlooked Kochi Ridge and flanked it on three sides. These defensive positions were: Hill 138, Zebra Hill, Item Hill, and How Hill. The US advance halted and, for the remainder of the day, the 3d Battalion remained pinned down. On 29 April, concentrated fire from 12 to 14 mortars enabled the Japanese to continue to repulse attacks launched by the 17th Infantry. Meanwhile, to the east in the 32d Infantry sector, armored flamethrowers made it to the village of Kuhazu when the 32d attacked the ridge southwest of Kuhazu. But there, too, intense Japanese mortar fire thwarted the attack. The following day five US tanks approached from the coast and attempted to advance on Onaga. One tank was disabled by a mine; this forced the others to attempt to maneuver in the mud off the road. Three of them became mired in the muddy terrain, and the remaining tank withdrew. Throughout the remainder of the day the 32d Infantry continued to attempt to relieve the pressure on the 17th Infantry at Kochi by attacking the Japanese positions on the high ground southwest of Kuhazu. However, the attacks failed to neutralize these positions.

Significance: Despite maneuver, use of armored flamethrowers, artillery, naval, and air support, the 7th Division failed to break the Japanese hold on Kochi Ridge-Onaga. The defenders skillfully used the rugged terrain and observation from high ground to bring an incessant rain of mortar and artillery fire upon the attacking US forces. As they had throughout the campaign the Japanese effectively used a fortified defense to hold off the determined and numerically superior Americans.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kochi Ridge-Onaga III, 30 April-3 May 1945

Before dawn on 30 April, the 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry, attacked the ridge southwest and west of Kuhazu and managed to put two rifle companies on the ridge. That night, when the 32d Infantry was being relieved, large numbers of Japanese troops infiltrated behind the US line. The 32d had to fight its way back to its assigned location in reserve, and did not complete its withdrawal until 1730 on 1 May. During the night of 1/2 May, one company of the 184th Infantry launched a surprise attack and captured the Gaja Ridge to the south of Kuhazu, but the gain was nullified late on 2 May when the company withdrew despite orders to hold the position. Meanwhile, in the 17th Infantry's sector, the Japanese employed intense machine gun fire from three positions to halt an attempted assault on Kochi Ridge; the Japanese inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking 2d Battalion. Five more Americans were killed in the defeat of an enemy counterattack. On 1 May an armored flamethrower struck at Kochi Ridge but failed to reach the strongpoints on the reverse slopes of the ridge. Although Onaga was neutralized on 1 May, heavy Japanese mortar fire turned back yet another attack on Kochi Ridge on 2 May. The following morning the 17th tried to launch a coordinated attack on the Ridge, preceded by a dawn artillery preparation. The Japanese brought the attack to a standstill by a massive barrage of artillery and mortar fire.

Significance: The 7th Division again failed to dislodge the Japanese from Kochi Ridge and its flanking strongpoints; as in earlier attacks on these positions, Japanese artillery fire, use of reverse slopes, and fortified defenses blunted the US advance. Nevertheless, through determined efforts the US troops were able to dent the Kochi defense network by taking Onaga.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Japanese Counterattack, 4-5 May 1945

Apparently believing that their Shuri position was deteriorating and that US forces had been sufficiently weakened, the Japanese launched a counterattack during the morning of 4 May. The attack, preceded by an artillery barrage, began at 0500. As 7th Division soldiers fell back to seek cover from the artillery fire, the Japanese advanced through their own artillery fire. In the 7th Division's center, defended by the 17th Infantry, the Japanese almost succeeded in breaking through. The initiative of individual US soldiers at key moments enabled the 17th to repel the attack at Onaga. On the right, near Kuhazu, the Japanese outflanked elements of the 184th Infantry, but when they reached an open area north and east of Kuhazu, they were pulverized by artillery fire. A Japanese penetration near the coast at Unaha was thwarted by the 3d Battalion, 184th Infantry. Recognizing the hopelessness of the situation the Japanese commanding officer ordered repeated Banzai charges, which were easily repulsed. This tactic was repeated across the length of the divisional front; moreover, the Americans placed artillery and heavy weapons and mowed down the Japanese trapped in open areas. Only at the boundary between the 7th and 77th Infantry divisions did the Japanese break through, but their exploitation efforts on 5 May failed.

Significance: The Japanese counterattack was a bloody disaster. Japanese manpower was in short supply, and the Japanese could ill afford the heavy casualties that resulted from this attack. The initiative once more passed to the US forces.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kochi Ridge IV, 6-7 May 1945

The failure of the Japanese counterattack seriously weakened the Shuri defense force. To follow up on the success of the US XXIV Corps's effort on 6 May, the 7th Division resumed the offensive. The 184th Infantry took Gaja Ridge with ease. But west of Gaja Ridge, at Kibara, Japanese mortar and artillery fire stalled the drive; machine gun and mortar fire also stymied the the regiment's advance on Conical Hill, while mines prevented the advance of tanks to support the 184th. The next day the 184th captured William Hill to the west of Kuhazu, and on 8 May the regiment occupied the forward slope of Easy Hill. On the division right, the 17th Infantry resumed the struggle for control of the Kochi Ridge defense network. On 7 May tank-infantry teams attempted to subdue a strongpoint on the road from the Zebra Hill outpost to Kochi Ridge but were forced to withdraw because of heavy artillery fire. Nonetheless, the 17th's 1st Battalion reduced How Hill and the 17th continued its resolute attack on the Kochi positions during 7-8 May. By the time the Division was relieved on 9 May, the entire Kochi defense network was under American control except for Zebra Hill and a cave strongpoint on the Kochi Ridge-Zebra Hill road.

Significance: After ten days of fierce combat the 7th Division had finally won control of virtually all of the Kochi Ridge-Onaga complex of strongpoints and was in position to advance toward Shuri.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Shuri Envelopment, Phase I, 22-23 May 1945

In an attempt to follow up on the gains made by the 96th Infantry Division on Conical Hill, Sugar Hill, and the Conical Hogback, the US 7th Division attempted to turn the Japanese right flank, advance south of Yonabaru, and then move west to envelop Shuri from the rear. At 0200 on 22 May, the 184th Infantry Regiment moved out from Gaja Ridge. Advancing through steady rain, the leading elements of the regiment made it to the top of Chestnut Ridge, 900 meters southeast of Yonabaru, by dawn. Not expecting the Americans to attack by night, nor anticipating that US forces would attack without armor and artillery support, the enemy was caught by surprise. The 184th continued its push on 23 May. By the day's end the regiment had forged a salient in the Japanese line that stretched from the eastern coast to Bamboo Hill, 900 meters to the west. The 184th then established blocking positions in order to permit the 32d Infantry to complete the envelopment by moving west behind the shield of the 184th. The 32d got a late start but passed through Yonabaru by 1045. The Regiment then turned west toward its first objective, a line of hills south and southwest of Yonabaru. Machine gun fire slowed the progress of the advancing infantrymen, and heavy rain caused its tank and assault guns to become mired in the Conical Hill assault area. Nonetheless, by dark on 23 May, the 32d was deployed 1.6 kilometers southwest of Yonabaru and ready to begin the decisive phase of the operation.

Significance: The US 7th Division achieved tactical surprise in its attack on Chestnut Ridge. The division made good progress, advancing through muddy terrain in bad weather. The gains made by the division were accomplished without the support of armor or artillery, and with only limited naval gunfire support.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Japanese Counterattacks, 24/25 May 1945

The Japanese line of defense against the westward thrust of the 32d Infantry ran from Mouse Hill directly west of Yonabaru, to Mabel Hill about three kilometers south of Shuri. The defense line protected Shuri from envelopment and covered the road network that was the major withdrawal route from Shuri. Antitank guns and automatic weapons were positioned all along this front. In order to resist the US advance on Shuri and cover the Japanese withdrawal which had begun on 22 May, the Japanese launched counterattacks in two sectors on the night of 24/25 May. Several attacks from the south in the 184th Infantry's sector were repulsed. At 0230 the 32d Infantry's right flank was assaulted, and it was not until after dawn that the attackers were repelled.

Significance: The Japanese night attacks achieved their objective -- delaying the US advance. Nonetheless the 7th Division had inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers. The Japanese could ill afford to sustain these losses.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Shuri Envelopment, Phase II, 26-27 May, 1945

Following the repulse of the Japanese counterattacks on the night of 24/25 May, the 32d and 184th Regiments of the US 7 Division did not attack the Japanese defenses on 25 May.

On 26 May the 7th Division attacked on two fronts. On the right, the 32d Infantry Regiment made a concerted effort to break Japanese resistance at the Dutch Hill and Mabel Hill strongpoints southwest of Yonabaru. After fierce combat, the 32d Infantry withdrew. On the left, the 184th Infantry Regiment fared better; the regiment took the Japanese positions on Hemlock Hill and Locust Hill to the south of Yonabaru. The next day the 184th Infantry met only token resistance as it moved south to Karadera.

Significance: The Japanese were able to use strong defensive positions to delay and even halt the 7th Division's attempt to envelop Shuri and to cover the withdrawal of men from Shuri in order to make a final stand in Southern Okinawa.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Shuri Envelopment, Phase III, 29-31 May 1945

After a lull on 28 May, the 32d Infantry Regiment resumed its drive west. On 29 May, a coordinated attack by the three battalions of the 32d Infantry reduced Oak, Ella, and June Hills. The next day Duck Hill and the forward face of Mabel Hill fell to the 32d, but the Japanese continued to maintain their grip on the reverse slope of Mabel and the town of Chan. In the 184th Infantry's sector, the Japanese engaged the US forces in a delaying action but then withdrew. The 184th pushed south of Karadera to the Chinen Peninsula.

Significance: The Japanese continued their determined resistance to the 7th Division's advance south and west; this enabled them to complete their withdrawal from Shuri.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Hill 95-I, 6-8 June 1945

By 3 June the Japanese forces were isolated on the southern tip of Okinawa. As they had throughout the campaign, the Japanese utilized rugged terrain, high ground, and fortifications to present the Americans with the difficult task of attacking a strong defensive network and defenders who were determined not to give or ask for quarter. In the 7th Division's sector the key Japanese positions were Hill 95 and a coral ridge directly in front of Hill 95. Encountering intense fire, the division advanced slowly. After three days the 184th Infantry had made only slight gains, and the 17th, on the division's right, had advanced only 1.6 kilometers to the base of the Yaeju-Dake Escarpment on the divisional boundary with the 96th Division.

Significance: Although the Japanese were badly outnumbered and were using many soldiers of inferior quality, they still put up fierce resistance. This not only attests to the determination of the defenders but also demonstrates the importance of fortifications in warfare.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Hill 95-II, 9-11 June 1945

On 9 June the US 7th Division, supported by armor, began a determined assault against Japanese positions on Hill 95, the coral ridge in front of Hill 95, and the eastern portion of Yaeju-Dake Escarpment on the divisional boundary. The 17th Infantry attacked the escarpment on the right. By early afternoon elements of the 17th Infantry had established control of the southeastern tip of the escarpment, thereby helping the 96th Division in its assault on the remainder of the escarpment. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion of the 32d Infantry worked its way through rough terrain to fight the Japanese at close quarters and established a foothold on the rim of the coral ridge late in the day. The next day the 32d Infantry resumed the attack; its advance on the coral escarpment was aided by extremely accurate naval gunfire and by artillery and tank support. Except for two caves, all Japanese positions on the ridge were reduced by early afternoon; armored flamethrowers flushed the Japanese defenders out of the caves and then BAR fire cut them down. On 11 June flamethrowers were employed again to force Japanese out of caves on Hill 95. In the 17th Infantry's sector, the regiment continued to support the efforts of the 96th Division in their struggle for control of Yaeju-Dake.

Significance: The successes on Hill 95 and the coral ridge in front of the hill broke the eastern anchor of the Japanese defense line. These actions demonstrated the effective use of coordinated attacks by armor and infantry and serve as good examples of the importance of coordinating land and naval forces at the tactical level.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Yaeju-Dake, 12 June 1945

Since gaining a foothold on the southeast rim of the Yaeju-Dake Escarpment on 9 June the 17th Infantry had made little headway against the Japanese positions on the high ground of the escarpment in the regiment's sector. The problem of the 170-foot cliff was solved by a predawn attack launched at 0400. Having gained the high ground, the 17th Infantry, supported by tanks and armored flamethrowers, continued to attack throughout the day and wiped out all Japanese opposition on the eastern portion of the escarpment.

Significance: By taking the eastern portion of the escarpment the 17th Infantry enabled the neighboring 96th Division to envelop the Japanese right in its attack zone. Also, the 17th Infantry's hold on Yaeju-Dake enabled it to coordinate its efforts with the 32d Infantry's advance on the Japanese positions at Hills 115 and 153 to the south.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Hills 153 and 115, 15-17 June 1945

Having taken the Japanese positions on Hill 95 and the eastern part of the Yaeju-Dake Escarpment, the US 7th Division moved south and, with strong support from tanks, armored flame throwers, and naval gunfire, reduced a number of enemy positions on crags, in caves, and in wooded areas. By 16 June the Division had advanced against the last two major strongpoints in its sector, Hills 153 and 115. These positions fell on 17 June after yet another day of bitter combat.

Significance: The fall of Hills 115 and 153 marked the end of organized resistance in the 7th Infantry Division's zone. After 77 days of brutal combat the battle in the southern part of Okinawa was at an end.

Sources: W.1; W.3; W.6; W.7; W.8; W.9; W.10; W.11; W.12; W.18; W.19; W.20; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Advance from the Beachhead	A 2-4 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Div (+) Jap 1st Spec Est Rgt (-)	MG Bradley Lt Col Aoyanagi	3	6.0
Advance to Shuri Line Outposts	A 5-8 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Div (+) Jap 12th Ind Inf Bn(+)θ	MG Bradley Lt Gen Fujioka	4	4.0
Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges	A 9-12 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Div Jap 12th Ind Inf Bn (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Fujioka	4	3.8
Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarp.	A 19-23 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Div (+) Jap 12th Ind Inf Bn (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Fujioka	5	2.3
Maeda Escarpment	A 26-29 Apr 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 62d Div (-) (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Fujioka	4	2.1
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank I	A 11-13 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Inf Div (-) (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Amamiya	3	2.3
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank II	A 14-18 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Inf Div (-) (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Amamiya	5	2.5
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank III	A 20-21 May 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Inf Div (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Amamiya	2	2.9
Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 6-9 Jun 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Inf Div (-)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Amamiya	4	3.0

1. IDENTIFICATION
 War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
 US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 10-11 Jun 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 24th Inf Div (-)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Amamiya	2	3.0
Capture of the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 12-17 Jun 1945 D	Okinawa	US 96th Inf Div (+) Jap 44th Ind Mixed Bde (-) (+)	MG Bradley Lt Gen Ushijima	6	3.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Advance from the Beachhead	A D	delay	RW/RGM	DST	SpT	N	--	--
Advance to Shuri Line Outposts	A D	FD	RW/RGM	DST	SpT	N	--	--
Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges	A D	FD	RW/RGM	WLT	SpT	N	--	--
Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarp.	A D	FD	RW/RGM	DST/DST	SpT	N	--	--
Maeda Escarpment	A D	FD	RW/RGM	WLT/DST	SpT	N	--	--
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank I	A D	FD	RW/RGM	DST	SpT	N	--	--
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank II	A D	FD	RW/RGM	DST	SpT	N	--	--
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank III	A D	FD	RW/RGM	WLT	SpT	N	--	--
Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	P/FD	RW/RGM	DST	ST	N	--	--

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Defender	Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level	Surprise	Air Superiority
Initial Attack on the A Yaza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	P/FD	RW/RGM	DOT	ST	N	--	--	--	--	X
Capture of the Yaza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	P/FD	RGM	DST	ST	N	--	--	--	X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

World War II, Okinawa Campaign

War: US 96th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses			
	Personnel Total	Total	Armor Lt.	MST	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	1/Day	Total	1/Day	Total	1/Day	Arty Pieces	Total	Sorties/Day	Aircraft Losses
Advance from the Beachhead	A 19,082 D 2,000	138 0	77 0	61 0	95 0	395 0	282 1,588	0.5 26.5	5 0	1.2 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Advance to Shuri Line Outposts	A 18,368 D 2,900	74 0	18 0	56 0	174 32	315 0	555 2,470	0.8 21.3	9 0	3.0 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Kakazu & Tombstone Ridges	A 21,247 D 3,030	0 0	0 0	0 0	246 32	166 0	1,079 2,468	1.3 20.6	0 0	0 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarp.	A 17,163 D 3,000	162 0	26 0	74 0	228 34	627 0	879 2,860	1.0 19.1	11 0	2.2 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Maeda Escarpment	A 18,095 D 3,900	97 0	31 0	66 0	200 36	225 0	479 3,810	0.7 24.4	10 0	2.6 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank I	A 19,714 D 5,284	121 0	45 0	76 0	157 34	162 0	502 4,038	0.8 25.5	6 0	1.7 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank II	A 26,973 D 4,757	129 0	59 0	70 0	210 34	240 0	590 4,328	0.6 18.2	4 0	0.6 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank III	A 19,658 D 4,227	140 0	73 0	67 0	183 34	45 0	313 3,022	0.8 35.7	3 0	1.1 0	?	?	0	0	0	
Advance to the Yuda-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 18,777 D 4,000	113 0	46 0	67 0	177 21	151 0	112 798	0.2 5.0	0 0	0 0	?	?	0	0	0	

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

World War II, Okinawa Campaign
War: US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses			
	Personnel Total	Armor	Art. Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day	Armor Losses	Total	\$/Day	Arty. Losses	Total	\$/Day	Aircr. t. Losses	
Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 18,660 D 4,250	117 0	67 0	172 11	0 0	88 1,066	0.2 12.5	2 0	0.9 0	?	?	--	0 0	0 0	0 0	
Capture of the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A 19,047 D 3,250	115 0	65 0	206 5	76 0	576 3,220	0.5 16.5	4 0	0.6 0	?	?	--	0 0	0 0	--	

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Advance from the Beachhead	A	x	N	x	N	N	N	N	x	x	2.2	6
O	D	O	O	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.4	4
Adv. to Shuri Line Outposts	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.4	5
D	D	D	D	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.1	7
Kakazu & Tomb-stone Ridges	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	2
B	D	D	D	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	8
Nishibaru Ridge	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	6
Tanabaru Esc.	D	D	D	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	4
Maeda Escarp-ment	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.4	5
D	D	D	D	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.4	4
Attack on the Shuri Line's E. Flank, I	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	5
D	D	D	D	C	N	N	N	N	C	x	0.3	5
Attack on the Shuri Line's E. Flank, II	A	C	C	C	x	N	N	N	C	x	0.1	5
D	D	D	D	C	x	N	N	N	C	x	0.1	5
Attack on the Shuri Line's E. Flank, III	A	C	C	C	x	N	N	N	C	x	0.5	7
D	D	D	D	C	x	N	N	N	C	x	0.5	5
Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A	x	N	x	x	o	N	N	N	x	0.5	3
D	D	D	D	x	x	o	N	N	N	x	0.5	3

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Nomen-clum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Initial Attack A on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	x	N	x	x	N	x	N	x	x	x	0.3	5
Capture of the A Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	x	N	x	x	o	x	N	x	x	x	0.3	7

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

World War II, Okinawa Campaign
War: US 96th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Force Quality	Air Mobility	Force Superiority	Reserves	Force Superiority	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Planned Surprise	Mass, Narrow Front	Logistics	Fortifications Depth
Advance from the Beachhead	A D	x	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Advance to Shuri Line Outposts	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarpment	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Maeda Escarpment	A D	N x	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank I	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank II	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank III	A D	N N	N N	x	x	N N	x	N x	N N	N N	N N
Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	N N	N N								

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Forcible Prepositioning	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Leader-ship	Planning Surprise	Mess, Narrow Front	Logistics	Depth
Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	N	N N	X	X X	N	X	N	X	X	N	N
Capture of the Yuza-Dake / Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	X	X	N	X	N	X	N	N	N	N	N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
 US 96th Inf Div Sector

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack	Success	Resolution
	Plan and Maneuver				
Advance from the Beachhead	A D	F D	--	x	P MDL
Advance to Shuri Line Outposts	A D.	F D	--	x	X.
Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges	A D	F, HE D	F --	x	R
Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarpment	A D	F, HE D	F --	x	P, MDL, S
Maeda Escarpment	A D	F D	F --	x	P, S
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank I	A D	F D	F --	x	P, S
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank II	A D	F D	F --	x	P, S
Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank III	A D	E(RF) D	F --	x	P, S
Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	F D	--	x	P, S

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: World War II, Okinawa Campaign
 US 96th Inf Div Sector (Continued)

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver			Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack			
Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	A D	F D	--	X	P, S
Capture of the Yuza-Dake/ A Yaeju-Dake Escarpment	D	F D	--	X	P A

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

The 96th Division's Advance from the Beachhead, 2-4 April 1945

After an unopposed amphibious landing on the west coast of Okinawa on 1 April 1945, the US 96th Infantry Division advanced inland against light opposition. On 2 April, rugged terrain and minor Japanese resistance slowed the division's advance, but the US troops made good progress. On 3 April, the division turned southward and, with the 7th Infantry Division to its left, established a line across the island, cutting the Japanese north-south communications line and isolating the main concentration of Japanese forces in southern Okinawa. On 4 April the 96th Division met increasing resistance in the outpost zone of the Japanese Shuri defense line. With two regiments abreast, the 383d on the right and the 382d on the left, the division advanced southward in coordination with the 7th Division.

Significance: The decision of the commander of the Japanese 32d Army, Lt. General Mitsusru Ushijima, not to defend the landing beaches greatly facilitated the US XXIV Corps's landing on Okinawa. The Okinawan conscripts of the Japanese 1st Specially Established Regiment delayed slightly the 96th Division's advance inland. Consequently, the XXIV Corps's initial objectives, securing a beachhead and nearby airfields and establishing a line across Okinawa, were achieved quickly.

Sources: W.2; W.4; W.5; W.14; W.15; W.16; W.17; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Advance to the Shuri Line Outposts, 5-8 April 1945

On 5 April, the US XXIV Corps began to meet formidable Japanese resistance as it drove south against Japanese fortified defenses on southern Okinawa. On the right (western) wing of the XXIV Corps, the 96th Infantry Division, with two regiments in line, encountered Japanese minefields and fire from machine guns, small arms, and mortars. On the division's right, the 383d Infantry Regiment failed to take Japanese positions on the commanding terrain of Cactus Ridge. The 382d Infantry to the left made minor advances against heavy Japanese opposition and repulsed a small Japanese counterattack with artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire.

On the morning of 6 April, two air strikes were called in on Cactus Ridge. The 2d Battalion, 383d Infantry, stormed the hill and cleared the western half. Following a night of unsuccessful Japanese attempts to infiltrate the division's lines, the rest of the ridge was cleared, and 96th Division troops moved to positions 500 meters north of the heavily fortified Kakazu Ridge. Naval gunfire and tactical air supported the division's advance. On 8 April, after a night of deadly Japanese artillery fire on the 382d Infantry, the entire division met heavy resistance as it advanced slowly southward.

The 96th Division reached the forward defenses of the Shuri Line on 8 April at Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges. The positions in front of these fortifications had proved to be formidable. Progress had been slow, but subsequently the division's advance would come to a virtual standstill in front of Kakazu Ridge.

Significance: The 96th Division, in its first encounter with Japanese fortified defenses on Okinawa, made deliberate progress against a determined defense. The fighting was characteristic of that to come.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.14; W.15; W.16; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges, 9-12 April 1945

On 9 April, the first of a series of attacks by the US 96th Division against the Japanese-held Kakazu Ridge began. This naturally defensible terrain feature was strengthened by a network of man-made positions and presented one of the most formidable barriers to the US advance on Okinawa. The US attack was not preceded by an artillery barrage, and the leading units of the 1st Battalion, 383d Infantry, reached the crest of the main Kakazu Ridge without alerting the Japanese. However, when the US troops were discovered, Japanese artillery and mortar fire began, and isolated the US troops in positions on the crest of the ridge. Japanese infantry counterattacks continuously hit the isolated troops, forcing a withdrawal from the crest of the ridge.

On 10 April, the 96th Division's attack against Kakazu Ridge continued with a two regiment assault. Resistance described as the bitterest yet encountered met the attacking units. Nevertheless, the 2d Battalion, 381st Infantry, secured positions on high terrain known as Kakazu West to the left (west) of the main Kakazu Ridge. By dark these troops were still in place, but the main Kakazu Ridge remained largely in Japanese hands. Rain throughout the day hindered the attack. To the east of Kakazu Ridge, the 382d Infantry attacked with three battalions in line against the heavily fortified Tombstone Ridge. However, muddy conditions, rain, and a fierce Japanese defense forced the 382d Regiment to relinquish the ground that it had gained. In both the Kakazu and Tombstone attacks, tanks had been prevented from supporting the infantry by muddy ground conditions and, around Kakazu, unsuitable terrain.

On 11 April renewed attacks were initiated between Kakazu West and Kakazu Ridge by elements of the 381st and 383d regiments. Heavy mortar and machine gun fire slowed the attack and eventually drove the 96th Division troops back to their original positions. On 12 April, after a night of intense Japanese mortar activity, the 1st Battalion, 381st Infantry, attacked Kakazu Ridge and, despite a preliminary air bombardment, was stopped by a tenacious Japanese defense. On 11 and 12 April the 382d Infantry mopped up bypassed Japanese positions and patrolled the front, testing Japanese defenses and improving its positions.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Kakazu and Tombstone Ridges, 9-12 April 1945 (Continued)

Significance: In this engagement the 96th Division encountered a well organized Japanese fortified defense in depth for the first time; the division's advance was stopped, and the Japanese inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking units.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.14; W.15; W.16; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarpment, 19-23 April 1945

The US XXIV Corps's attack on 19 April was preceded by massive naval gunfire, artillery, and air support. Good gains were achieved by the 382d Infantry on the Division's left, but heavy Japanese fire eventually slowed the advance. A gap opened between the division's right-hand regiment, the 381st Infantry, and the 27th Infantry Division on its right when Japanese positions on Kakazu Ridge were not neutralized by either division. On 20 April, the 382d Infantry consolidated gains on Tombstone Ridge, while the 381st Infantry advanced to Nishibaru Ridge, its right-hand units under a hail of fire from Kakazu Ridge. On 21 April the battle for the heights along Nishibaru Ridge-Tanabaru Escarpment began in earnest, as 96th Division troops attacked. Fire from Kakazu Ridge stopped an enveloping maneuver around the right shoulder of Nishibaru Ridge. Heavy casualties were incurred by the division, and only small gains were made. A similar attack around the left slope of Nishibaru Ridge was stopped by a tenacious Japanese defense on 22 April, and again only small gains were registered. On 23 April, however, the Japanese began to withdraw southward, their positions in front of the 96th Division having become untenable. Overwhelming US firepower superiority along the entire front had finally begun to have an effect on the Japanese defenders. US armor, including flamethrower tanks, was able to move up and support the infantry after a terrain obstacle that had previously held back the tanks was overcome. Although gains were small on 23 April, the Japanese defenses around Nishibaru Ridge were broken. On 24 April, the 96th Division was able to advance rapidly against minor resistance and mop up bypassed Japanese positions.

Significance: With support from tanks and armored flamethrowers, the 96th Division was able to penetrate one line of the Shuri defensive system after five days of heavy fighting.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.14; W.15; W.18; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Maeda Escarpment, 26-29 April 1945

On 25 April, the 381st and 383d Regiments of the US 96th Division made minor readjustments in their front lines in preparation for an attack on the Urasoe-Mura Escarpment, also called Maeda Escarpment, after the village just south of the ridge. This was a sheer cliff, heavily fortified, and impassable for tanks. On 26 April, the division attacked, with the 381st Infantry on the right directly in front of the escarpment and the 383d Infantry on the left between the eastern edge of the escarpment and the village of Kochi. Tanks and armored flamethrowers supported the attack where the terrain permitted. Moderate gains were made by both regiments, but the 381st Infantry was unable to advance beyond the crest of the escarpment, since fortified Japanese defenses commanded the reverse slope. On 27 April, despite muddy ground conditions caused by rains, armor again supported the division's attack. Moderate gains were made on the center and left, including penetrations to the town of Maeda, but the extreme right elements of the 381st Infantry met intense defensive fire on the Maeda Escarpment. On 28 April, strong Japanese resistance again prevented any major gains on the division's right, but the 383d Infantry, backed by armor, moved slowly southwest past the eastern edge of the escarpment. On 29 April, after a night of Japanese counterattacks, the 381st Infantry was relieved by the 307th Infantry, but the 307th Infantry was unable to make any additional gains after taking over front line positions. On the following day the entire 96th Division was relieved by the remainder of the 77th Division.

Easily defensible terrain and muddy ground conditions had hampered the 96th Division's attack and made supply difficult. Nevertheless, a penetration on the division's left had been achieved and might have been exploited sooner by the 77th Division had the Japanese not counter-attacked in early May.

Significance: The 96th Division had been able to advance around the eastern end of the Maeda Escarpment but thereafter was held up by stiff Japanese resistance. By the end of the engagement, when the division was relieved, the combat effectiveness of the troops had been greatly reduced by continual commitment.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.14; W.15; W.18; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, I, 11-13 May

On 11 May, after nine days of rest, the US 96th Infantry Division reentered the line and renewed its attack against Japanese positions on the far right (eastern) sector of the Shuri Line. This sector included heavily fortified positions on a series of hills on the perimeter of the inner defenses of the Shuri Line. Reduction of individual positions was extremely difficult, because the enemy strongpoints were mutually supporting.

The division's attack plan was to clear the high terrain on the western portion of the divisional sector to permit a drive south along the coast road through the town of Yonabaru, thus outflanking the Shuri defenses.

When the division attacked on 11 May, it immediately met stubborn resistance across the entire front. On the right, elements of the 382d Infantry outflanked positions on the crest of Zebra Hill and drove southwest to the base of the Dick Hill complex. Crossfire from machine guns to the front and on both flanks made the positions taken at the base of Dick Hill untenable. To the east the 383d Infantry made small gains around the town of Yonagusuku before being stopped by machine gun and mortar fire from hills to the south. On 12 May, both regiments continued their attacks, with the 382d Infantry making its main effort in the middle of the regimental zone. An attack against Dick Hill brought troops of the regiment to the lower slopes of the hill but, as in the previous day's fighting, intense fire drove the attackers back to their former positions. The 383d Infantry continued to advance slowly around Yonagusuku, some elements advancing up a northern spur of Conical Hill, the dominating hill mass on the extreme eastern end of the Shuri Line. On 13 May, in an attack coordinated with the 77th Division, the 382d Infantry consolidated positions on the northern part of Dick Hill. Around Yonagusuku, the 383d Infantry overcame all resistance, and elements of the Regiment drove to within 50 meters of the summit of Conical Hill, where they beat back a Japanese counterattack and held their newly-won positions. This toehold would prove to be a crucial factor in future operations to outflank the eastern end of the Shuri Line.

Significance: The Japanese defense of the eastern flank of the Shuri Line was maintained after three days of attacks by the US 96th Infantry Division. However, the attackers had made important gains against the Japanese extreme right in the area of Conical Hill; these gains were important for future operations.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.9; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, II, 14-18 May 1945

Japanese reinforcements reached Dick Hill on the night of 13/14 May. When the US attack was renewed the next morning only one battalion of the 382d Infantry made any significant gains against extremely heavy Japanese fire. The 383d Infantry (with armor support) made small gains on hills northwest of Conical Hill and extended its foothold on the northeastern slopes of Conical Hill. After heavy rain and Japanese infiltration attempts on the night of 14/15 May, the 96th Division made slow progress. US reinforcements were moved close to the crest of Dick Hill, but fire from Japanese reverse slope positions prevented any movement beyond the ridge. Northwest of Conical Hill, 383d Infantry elements took the summit of King Hill. The forward positions on the northeastern part of Conical Hill were strengthened. On 16 May an attack by 382d Infantry troops took the crest of Dick Hill. The 383d Infantry, without armor support, registered small advances around King Hill. Elements of the regiment on Conical Hill attempted to move down the southeast slope of the hill. On the extreme left of the Division's sector an armored reconnaissance in force penetrated to the outskirts of Yonabaru. On 17 May, the 381st Infantry began to move into the front lines to relieve elements of the 383d Infantry. On the reverse slopes of Dick Hill, 382d Infantry elements cleared numerous Japanese positions, using tanks and demolition teams. Tank-infantry teams drove slowly along the reverse slopes of King Hill and nearby Charlie Hill. On 18 May the 382d Infantry mopped up Japanese defenses, but no changes were made in the previous front lines. On Charlie and King Hills elements of the 383d Infantry also mopped up, while troops of one battalion of the 381st Infantry advanced around Conical Hill with support from tanks operating on lower terrain to the east.

In five days of heavy fighting the 96th Division had slightly improved its positions. No swift breakthrough was possible against fortified defenses on the heights overlooking the eastern coastal road. Only by heavy artillery fire in support of repeated attacks was the division able to wear the Japanese down through attrition.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, II, 14-18 May 1945 (Continued)

Significance: The 96th Division continued to advance slowly against the complex defenses of the Japanese in the hills on the eastern flank of the Shuri Line, but no breakthrough was achieved.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.9; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Attack on the Shuri Line's Eastern Flank, III, 20-21 May 1945

On 20 May 1945, the US 96th Division continued attacks against the eastern end of the Shuri defensive line. 382d Infantry elements attacked Oboe Hill, south of the Dick Hill complex, but Japanese machine gun fire forced a withdrawal after small gains were made. South of Conical Hill, 381st Infantry elements attacked toward Sugar Hill along the eastern slope of an interconnecting ridge called Hogback. After a heavy artillery preparation, the division renewed the attack on 21 May. Elements of the 382d Infantry drove to the crest of Oboe Hill. The 383d Infantry was still held up by Japanese defenses on the south slope of Charlie Hill. To the south of Conical Hill, the 381st Infantry outflanked the right of the Japanese Shuri defenses by securing Sugar Hill and advancing to within 200 meters of the Yonabaru-Shuri-Naha road. By attacking over more rugged but less heavily defended terrain on the eastern portion of the Conical-Sugar Hills complex, 96th Division units had penetrated a critical weak point on the Japanese defenses. The way was now open for a drive by the 7th Infantry Division down the eastern coastal corridor.

Significance: Elements of the 381st Infantry Regiment outflanked the eastern end of the Shuri Line, opening the way for a US drive down the eastern coastal road.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.9; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Advance to the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment, 6-9 June 1945

After heavy rains in late May 1945 had brought the 96th Division to a near standstill, the division renewed its attack against Japanese forces in southern Okinawa. During the first five days of June the division followed withdrawing Japanese units in continuous rains which hampered supply for the front lines troops. On 5 June, the division secured the last dominating terrain features north of the formidable defenses on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment.

On 6 June the 381st Infantry seized the towns of Yunagusuku and Tomuri in the left sector of the division's zone. On the right, the 383d Infantry made small gains against heavy Japanese resistance. Probes against the Japanese positions on the escarpment were driven back by heavy fire. For the next three days, the division failed to advance, because of stubborn resistance and supply difficulties caused by poor ground conditions. On 9 June artillery, naval gunfire, air support, and direct tank fire hammered the escarpment in preparation for an offensive slated for the following day.

Significance: The 96th Division advanced slowly against the last formidable position of the Japanese defenders of Okinawa.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Initial Attack on the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment, 10-11 June 1945

Early on 10 June 1945 the US 96th Division attacked the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake escarpment with two regiments abreast. On the right, the 383d Infantry advanced to an east-west railroad line about 700 meters north of the escarpment. Even with support from tanks, self-propelled guns, antitank guns, and recoilless guns, the regiment could not advance against intense Japanese machine gun fire. The regiment consolidated its positions north and east of the town of Yuza for the evening. In the 381st Regiment's zone, units of the regiment made repeated attempts to seize the lower of two levels of the escarpment in front of the regiment. By late afternoon, the troops had succeeded in gaining a toehold on the escarpment's lower level. After an intense artillery preparation on the morning of 11 June, the division continued working forward against strong enemy resistance. Elements of the 383d Infantry attacked the town of Yuza, but heavy defensive fire from high ground to the south forced the troops back to their previous position. Other units of the 383d Infantry reached the bottom of the escarpment. No significant gains were made in the 381st Regiment's sector on 11 June, but demolition patrols and tanks were employed to destroy bypassed Japanese fortifications.

Significance: The 381st Infantry Regiment gained a toehold on the lower level of the escarpment on the left of the 96th Division's zone.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.13; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

WORLD WAR II (THE OKINAWA CAMPAIGN, 1945)

Capture of the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment, 12-17 June 1945

On 12 June troops of all three battalions of the 381st Infantry, with armor support, attacked on the left of the division's sector. Elements of the regiment reached positions near the top of the lower level of the Yaeju-Dake escarpment. The 383d Infantry renewed its attack south of the town of Yuza, closing caves in this area and making small gains against intense Japanese machine gun fire. On 13 June elements of the 381st Infantry began to ascend the Yaeju-Dake escarpment on the left of the 96th Division's zone, while the 383d Infantry attacked south of Yuza, reaching the town of Ozato, west of high ground on Yuza-Dake. Both regiments employed armor in their advances, and the right-hand units of the 383d Infantry cooperated with the 1st Marine Division on the right of the 96th Division. High ground just below Hill 167 on Yuza-Dake was taken by the 383d Infantry on 14 June. On the same day, the 381st Infantry secured the pinnacle of Yaeju-Dake, breaking the Japanese defenses on the division's left. On 15 June the 2d Battalion of the 382d Infantry relieved the battle-weary 2d Battalion/383d Infantry, and attacked to the crest of Yuza-Dake. Working in conjunction with the 7th Division on the left of the 96th Division, the 381st Infantry made substantial gains on the reverse slopes of Yaeju-Dake. All three battalions of the regiment encountered strong Japanese opposition. On 16 June units of the 382d Infantry continued to relieve 383d Infantry troops, and the highest peak of Hill 167 on the crest of Yuza-Dake was cleared of Japanese by the 382d Infantry. To the left, the 381st Infantry advanced through disorganized but fierce Japanese resistance. The 96th Division spent 17 June eliminating isolated Japanese strongpoints, with medium, light, and flame tanks supporting. However, the gains of the previous day's attack had broken through the last organized Japanese defensive positions within the 96th Division's zone. Isolated groups, aided by the rugged terrain, would fight desperately for the next week, but an organized Japanese defense no longer opposed the 96th Division.

Significance: By taking the Yuza-Dake/Yaeju-Dake Escarpment the 96th Division cleared the last organized Japanese resistance in its attack zone.

Sources: W.2; W.3; W.13; W.14; W.15; W.19; W.21; W.22; W.23; W.24.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Jenin, Jordan	A 5/6 Jun 1967 D	West Bank	Is Peled Armd Div (-) Jor 25th Inf Bde	BG Peled Lt Col El Khalidi	1	5.0
Jerusalem, Jordan	A 5-7 Jun 1967 D	West Bank	Is Gur Para Bde (+) Jor 27th Inf Bde (Jerusalem Bde) (+)	BG Narkiss Brig Ata Al.	3	11.0
Kabatiya, Jordan	A 6-7 Jun 1967 D	West Bank	Is Bar Kochba's Armd Bde (+) Jor 40th Armd Bde (F)	BG Peled Lt Col El Khalidi	2	
Tilfit-Zababiba, Jordan	A 6/7 Jun 1967 D	West Bank	Is Ram Armd Bde Jor 40th Armd Bde (F)	Col Ram Lt Col El Khalidi	1	
Nablus, Jordan	A 7 Jun 1967 D	West Bank	Is Peled Armd Div Jor 25th Inf Bde (-)(+)	BG Peled Lt Col El Khalidi	1	
Rafah, Egypt	A 5 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Tal Div Eg 7th Inf Div (+)	BG Tal MG Soliman	1	24.0
Bir Lahfan, Egypt	A 5/6 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Yoffe Div Eg 3d Inf Div	BG Yoffe MG Nasser	1	10.0
Abu Ageila-Um Katef, Egypt	A 5/6 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Sharon Div Eg 2d Inf Div	BG Sharon MG Naguib	1	8.0
El-Arish, Egypt	A 5/6 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Tal Div (-) Eg 7th Inf Div (-)	BG Tal MG Soliman	1	7.0
Jebel Libni, Egypt	A 6 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Tal Div (-)(+) Eg 3d Inf Div (-)	BG Tal MG Nasser	1	2.0

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War) (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Gaza Strip, Egypt	A 6-7 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Reshef Task Force Pales 20th PLA Div (+)	BG Tal MG Hasni	2	9.0
Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada, Egypt	A 7 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Yoffe Div Eg 3d Inf Div	BG Yoffe MG Ghoul	1	2.0
Mitla Pass, Egypt	A 7 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Eg 3d Inf Div (-) Is Yoffe Div (+)	BG Yoffe	1	1.0
Bir Hama-Bir Gif-gafa, Egypt	A 7 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Tal Div Eg 3d Inf Div, 4th Armd Div (-)	BG Tal MG Ghoul	1	?
Nakhl, Egypt	A 8 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Is Sharon Div Eg 6th Mech Div	BG Sharon MG Hassan	1	?
Bir Gifgafa, Egypt	A 8 Jun 1967 D	Sinai	Eg Armd Bde Is Tal Div	Eg Armd Bde Col Gonen	1	?
Tel Fahar-Banias, Syria	A 9 Jun 1967 D	Colan	Is Golani Brig Syr 11th Inf Bde (+)	Col Efrat Col Amir	1	6.5
Rawiyeh, Syria	A 9 Jun 1967 D	Golan	Is Ram Bde Syr 8th Inf Bde (+)	Col Ram BG Tayan	1	5.0
Zacoura-Kala, Syria	A 9 Jun 1967 D	Golan	Is Mendler's Bde Syr 11th Inf Bde (+)	Col Mendler Col Amir	1	6.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Jenin	A D	P/D FD	RGM RGM	DSH DSH	ST ST	Y X	X X	substantial substantial
Jerusalem	A D	HD H/PD	RGM RGM	DSH DSH	ST ST	Y Y	X X	x x
Kabatiya	A D	HD H/PD	RGM RGM	DSH DSH	ST ST	Y Y	X X	minor minor
Tilfit-Zababiba	A D	H/PD P/FD	RGM RM/FD	DSH DSH	SD SD	Y Y	X X	substantial substantial
Nablus	A D	H/PD P/FD	FM/FD FD/RD	DSH DSH	SD SD	Y Y	X X	minor minor
Rafah	A D	H/PD P/FD	FM/FD FD/RD	DSH DSH	SD SD	Y Y	X X	substantial substantial
Bir Lahfan	A D	H/PD P/FD	FD/RD FD/RD	DSH DSH	SD SD	Y Y	N N	N N
Abu Ageila-Um Katef	A D	FD P/FD	FD/RD FD/RD	DSH DSH	SD SD	N N	-- --	-- --
El Arish	A D	P/FD PD/DeI	FM/FD FD/RD	DSH DSH	SD SD	N N	-- --	-- --
Jebel Libni	A D	PD/DeI						

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six Day War) (Continued).

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Gaza Strip	A D	P/FD	FM/FD	DSH	SD	Y	x minor	x
Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada	A D	Pn/Delay	FD/RD	DSH	SD	N	--	x
Mitla Pass	A D	HD	FD/FM	DSH	SD	N	--	x
Bir Hama-Bir Giffafa	A D	Delay	FD/FM	DSH	SD	N	--	x
Nakhl	A D	HD	FD/RD	DSH	SD	Y	x substantial	x
Bir Giffafa	A D	HD	FD/FM	DSH	SD	N	--	N
Tel Fahar-Banias	A D	FD	RGM	DSH	ST	N	--	x
Rawiyeh	A D	FD	RGM	DSH	ST	Y	x minor	x
Zaoura-Kala	A D	FD	RGM	DSH	ST	N	--	x

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties			Arty Pieces Lost			Aircraft Losses		
	Personnel Total	Armor Lt.	MBT	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties Total	#/Day	Armor Losses Total	#/Day	Arty Total	#/Day	Total	Sorties/Day	
Jenin	A 10,900 D 6,160	100 40	0 0	100 40	36 20	12 0	225 200	2.1 3.2	18 15	18.0 37.5	?	--	
Jerusalem	A 27,682 D 13,600	91 40	18 0	73 40	72 36	11 4	1,750 1,500	2.1 3.7	40 35	14.7 29.2	?	--	
Kabatiya	A 12,800	140	0	140	48	21	375	1.5	18	6.4	?	--	
Tilfit-Zabu'iba	A 5,350 D 5,450	90 60	0 0	90 60	24 24	21	250	4.7	18	20.0	?	--	
Nablus	A 10,700 D 8,640	180 84	0 0	180 84	48 24	52	375	3.5	18	10.0	?	--	
Rafah	A 19,520 D 19,500	240 197	105 13	135 184	84 68	38 51	700	3.6	15	6.3	?	--	
Bir Lahfan	A 10,450 D 10,050	180 180	60 20	120 160	48 48	76 20	2,700	13.8	70	35.5	?	--	
Abu Ageila-Um Katef	A 19,280 D 18,450	120 114	30 10	90 104	72 126	0	900	0.9	11	6.1	?	--	
El Arish	A 6,912 D 12,750	90 78	0 5	90 73	48 36	0	300	1.6	19	15.8	?	--	
Jebel Libni	A 10,800 D 3,000	184 60	20 0	164 60	48 48	52	70	0.6	10	5.4	0	--	
							450	15.0	32	53.3			

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War) (Continued)

Engagement	Personnel Strength			Arty Pieces			Air Sorties			Battle Casualties			Arty Pieces Lost			Aircraft Losses		
	Total	Total Lt.	Armor	MET	100	90	72	38	55	0.2	8	4.0	?	114	50.0	?	?	
Gaza Strip	A 12,150 D 17,450	100 134	10 124	90 114	72 10	40 0	48 24	38 0	626 550	1.8 18.3	90 30	6.8 75.0	?	50.0	?	?	?	
Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada	A 8,700 D 3,000	146 40	0 10	146 30	48 24	40 0	60 550	60 18.3	10 30	0.7 1.2	10 16	6.8 17.8	?	?	?	0	0	
Mitla Pass	A 22,000 D 7,250	224 90	20 0	204 90	114 48	0 20	550 90	2.5 1.2	100 16	100 16	44.6 17.8	2 ?	?	?	?	0	0	
Bir Hama-Bir Gifgafa	A 10,200 D 13,500	220 172	220 15	135 157	72 48	40 0	75 550	0.7 4.1	5 30	5 30	2.3 17.4	?	?	?	?	0	0	
Nakhly	A 18,780 D 18,450	120 114	0 10	120 104	72 72	0 0	122 625	0.3 3.4	60 60	4 52.6	3.3 72	?	?	?	?	0	0	
Bir Gifgafa	A 3,500 D 3,600	60 70	0 40	60 30	0 0	0 0	450 60	12.9 1.7	20 3	33.3 4.3	0 0	?	?	?	?	?	?	
Tel Fahar-Banias	A 5,375 D 8,160	10 75	0 0	10 75	24 70	0 0	119 850	5.6 10.4	300 20	5 26.7	50.0 ?	?	?	?	0	0	0	
Rawiyeh	A 5,350 D 4,350	90 50	0 0	90 50	24 76	0 0	150 300	2.8 6.9	30 20	33.3 40.0	?	?	?	?	0	0	0	
Zaoura-Kala	A 5,850 D 8,560	90 75	30 0	60 75	24 82	0 0	119 500	3.9 5.8	230 500	55 25	61.1 33.3	?	?	?	?	0	0	

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War)
West Bank

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Moien-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Jenin	A D	x C	C	C	N	N	C	C	C	x	5.0	7 4
Jerusalem	A D	x C	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	x	7.0	8 3
Kabatiyya	A D	x C	C	C	N	N	C	C	x	x	8.0	6 4
Tilfit-Zababiba	A D	x x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	x	8.0	6 4
Nablus	A D	x N	C	x	N	N	C	x	x	x	10.0	7 4
Rafah	A D	x x	x	x	N	N	N	x	x	x	10.0	8 4
Bir Lahfan	A D	x x	x	x	N	N	N	x	x	x	14.5	8 4
Abu Ageila-Um Katerf	A D	x x	x	x	C	N	N	x	N	x	20.0	10 3
El-Arish	A D	x x	x	x	x	N	x	N	N	x	8.0	9 2
Jebel Libni	A D	x x	x	x	x	N	x	N	N	x	5.0	8 8

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War) Sinai Front (Continued)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Men-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accompl.
Gaza Strip	A D	x x	x x	C	N	N	N	N	x	x	8.0	8 4
Bir Hasnna- Bir Thamada	A D	x x	x x	x x	N N	x N	N N	N N	x x	x x	28.0	7 5
Mitla Pass	A D	x x	x x	x x	N N	N x	N N	N N	x x	x x	0.0	3 8
Bir Hama- Bir Gifgafa	A D	x x	x x	x x	N N	N x	N N	N N	x x	x x	25.0	7 6
Nakhli	A D	x x	x x	x x	N N	N x	N N	N N	x x	x x	15.0	9 4
Bir Gifgafa	A D	x x	x x	C	N N	N N	N N	N C	x x	x x	0.0 5.0	3 8
Tel Fahar- Banias	A D	x x	x x	C	N N	N N	N N	N C	x x	x x	6.0	2 2
Rawiyeh	A D	x x	x x	C	N N	N N	N N	N C	x x	x x	7.5	7 2
Zaoura-Kala	A x	x x	x x									

**6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME
War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War)**

Engagement	Jenin	Jerusalem	Kabatiya	Tilfit-Zababiba	Nablus	Rafah	Bir Lahfan	Abu Ageila-Um Katef	El-Arish	Jebel Libni	Depth
Fortifi-cations	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	X
Logistics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	X
Moss, Narrow Ironton	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Surprise	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Planning	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Leader-ship	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Roads, Terrain,	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Weather	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force Prepon-derance	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Air Superiority	N	X	X	X	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Mobility Superiority	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Reserves	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Force Quality	X	X	D	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	D
	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	D	

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME
War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War) (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Force Services	Mobility Superiority	Force Superiority	Weather	Roads, Railways	Leadership	Surprise	Mess, Narrow Front	Logistics	Fortifications	Depth
Gaza Strip	A	N	X	X	N	N	X	X	N	X	X	N
Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada	D	X	N	X	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	X
Mitla Pass	A	D	N	N	X	X	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bir Hama-Bir Gifgafa	A	D	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	N	N	N
Nakhl	A	D	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bir Gifgafa	A	D	X	X	N	N	X	N	X	N	X	X
Tel Fahar-Banias	A	D	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	N	X	X
Rawiyeh	A	D	X	N	X	N	X	N	X	N	X	X
Zaoura-Kala	A	D	X	N	X	X	N	N	N	X	X	X

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
			Secondary Attack			
Jenin	A D	F, EE D/O, EE	-- --		X	P R, WD
Jerusalem	A D	EE D/O, F	-- --		X	B R, WDL
Kabatiya	A D	F D	E (RR) --		X	B, WD WD
Tilfit-Zahabibba	A D	F, E (RR) D	-- --		X	P WD
Nablus	A D	F, E (RR) D	-- --		X	B, Ps WD
Rafah	A D	EE D/O	-- --		X	B, Ps WDL
Bir Lahfan	A D	F, E (RR) D/O	-- --		X	B, Ps WDL
Abu Ageila-Um Katef	A D	E (LR) D/O	E (RR), FE --		X	B, Ps WDL
El-Arish	A D	F D	-- --		X	B, Ps WD
Jebel Libni	A D	F D	-- --		X	S S, WD

7. COMBAT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Six-Day War) (Continued)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Secondary Attack	Maneuver	Secondary Attack	Maneuver		
Gaza Strip	A D	F D	-- --	-- --	X	B
Bir Hassna-Bir Thamada	A D	F, E (LR) D	-- --	-- --	X	B WL
Mitla Pass	A D	F D/O, E (RR)	-- --	-- --	X	R, WL Ps
Bir Hama-Bir Gifgafa	A D	E (LR) D	-- --	-- --	X	P WL
Nakhl	A D	EE B	-- --	-- --	X	B
Bir Gifgafa	A D	F D/O, E	-- --	-- --	X	WL Ps
Tel Fahar-Banias	A D	F D	-- --	-- --	X	P WD
Rawiyeh	A D	F D	-- --	-- --	X	P WD
Zaoura-Kala	A D	F, E(RF) D	-- --	-- --	X	P WD

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Jenin, 5/6 June 1967

At 1500 on 5 June, Israeli forces crossed the West Bank border north and west of Jenin. While Colonel Aharon Avnon's infantry brigade pushed south along the Afula and Givat'oz roads, Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Bar Kochva's armored brigade, in two columns, converged on the Dotan Valley southwest of Jenin. After meeting southeast of Ya'abad, Bar Kochva's two columns swung eastward and encountered their first opposition west of Jenin. While the leading battalion of armor bypassed the Jordanians, an armored infantry battalion, attacking against determined resistance, overcame the opposition. By 0300 on 6 June, the armored infantry and armor had linked up southwest of Jenin and began an assault on the town.

Elements of the Jordanian 25th Infantry Brigade were deployed in three mutually supporting defensive lines south of Jenin. Against these defenses, Bar Kochva sent his armored infantry battalion, keeping his tanks concentrated behind the infantry ready to deal with a possible attack by Jordanian armored units. While heavy antitank fire prevented the Israeli armor from attacking the Jordanian infantry that held the hills dominating Jenin, Jordanian tanks moved in against the flanks of the Israelis in a double envelopment. Bar Kochva ordered two of his tank battalions to stop the Jordanian tanks. When he threw in yet a third tank battalion, the Jordanian thrusts were stopped after a confused nighttime armored battle. Meanwhile, with their flanks protected, the Israeli infantry had been able to overrun the Jordanian defense lines. Shortly before dawn, Avnon's infantry brigade arrived from the north and closed in on Jenin while Bar Kochva attacked from the south. Two of Bar Kochva's tank battalions spearheaded an assault into Jenin from the south in coordination with an attack by Avnon's brigade from the north. Following standard Israeli street-fighting doctrine, the two brigades moved into the town. When a Jordanian armored attack materialized south of Jenin, Bar Kochva left Avnon's infantry to mop up the scattered but fierce resistance still continuing in the town.

Significance: The capture of Jenin by Israeli forces did not guarantee that the West Bank would be cleared of Jordanian forces. But it was one of the first tactical objectives to be taken, and the Israeli

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Jenin, 5/6 June 1967 (Continued)

success facilitated further advances south and east into Jordanian territory.

Sources: X.1; X.2; X.3.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Jerusalem, 5-7 June

Shortly after 1600 on 5 June, four battalions of the Israeli Etzioni Brigade, with tank support, attacked Jordanian positions south of Jerusalem at Sur Baher and the recently occupied United Nations Headquarters at Government House, encountering moderately strong Jordanian resistance. Northwest of Jerusalem the Israeli Harel Brigade (mechanized) advanced along lightly defended hills north of the Jerusalem Corridor. Israeli aircraft in support disrupted the communications line of Jordanian Brigadier Ata Ali's forces around Jerusalem and, after dark, smashed a relief column of the Jordanian 60th Armored Brigade, coming from Jericho.

A little after 2300 on 5 June, Israeli artillery and mortars began to shell Jordanian positions north and northeast of Jerusalem in preparation for an assault by a paratroop brigade under Colonel Mordechai Gur. Early on 6 June, a small number of Israelis landed in helicopters north of the Old City. They were soon joined by the main body of paratroopers. By daybreak, the Israelis had reached the wall of the Old City near the Damascus Gate. As they moved through the environs of the Old City, the Etzioni Brigade attacked south of Jerusalem at Abu Tur. By nightfall Ata Ali's positions in and around Jerusalem were in peril of being surrounded. The Harel Brigade had pushed north of Jerusalem and sent elements to Ramallah after defeating tanks of the Jordanian 60th Armored Brigade at Tel el Ful, and an Israeli brigade under Colonel Moshe Yotvat had finally taken Latrun on the extreme western edge of Jordanian territory and was moving east to link up with the Harel Brigade.

Late on the night of 6 June, a Jordanian relief column from Jericho was stopped by Israeli air strikes and artillery near the site of the 60th Armored Brigade's earlier disaster. Learning of this defeat and that most Jordanian units had withdrawn from the West Bank, Ata Ali ordered his remaining troops to leave Jerusalem early on 7 June. This was successfully accomplished before dawn. By late morning, the Old City was occupied by Israeli troops.

Significance: Lack of a unified Jordanian command, coupled with Israeli air supremacy, prohibited an efficient and coordinated defense. The excellent,

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAEL WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Jerusalem, 5-7 June (Continued)

highly combat effective Israeli troops took advantage of Jordanian confusion to defeat the defenders in detail. The Israelis were therefore able to capture Jerusalem and the entire West Bank in a series of overwhelming victories during the Six Day War.

Source: X.1; X.2.

1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Kabatiya, 6-7 June 1967

On 6 June, the reconnaissance battalion of Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Bar Kochva's brigade, left behind at Kabatiya Junction as a rearguard to protect against a possible attack by Jordanian armor during the battle for Jenin, reported that Jordanian tanks were advancing from Tubas. Leaving infantry of Colonel Aharon Avnon's brigade to mop up in Jenin, Bar Kochva withdrew the rest of his brigade, regrouped his tank and armored infantry battalions, and then moved toward Kabatiya Junction.

Deployed southwest of Kabatiya Junction, the Israeli reconnaissance battalion was attacked and surrounded from the east by Jordanian armor before Bar Kochva's tanks appeared on the road from Jenin. Under cover of continuous waves of fighter attacks against the tanks of the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade, Bar Kochva refueled his command, and made plans to rescue the isolated reconnaissance battalion.

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Colonel Awad Mohammed El Khalidi had rallied much of his Jordanian 25th Infantry Brigade, dispersed in earlier fighting for Jenin and, with the tanks of the 40th Armored Brigade, by midmorning had formed a firm defensive position in and around Kabatiya. Repeated efforts by Bar Kochva's brigade to smash through the Jordanian defenses were thrown back. Fierce fighting continued for approximately 12 hours. Shortly after dark Bar Kochva sent one of his tank companies around the flank of the Jordanian position to smash a hole through the Jordanian cordon surrounding the reconnaissance battalion. The surrounded troops streamed out and fell back to join Bar Kochva's main body north of Kabatiya. Shortly after dawn on 7 June, Bar Kochva renewed his attack on Kabatiya Junction. At about the same time a battalion of Avnon's infantry brigade, which had swung to the west through Ya'abad, then southeast through Arraba, reached the western Jenin-Nablus road, threatening the rear of Jordanian positions at Kabatiya. The Jordanians at once withdrew to the southeast, toward Damiya.

Significance: Bar Kochva's quick reaction to the Jordanian threat and the timely appearance of Israeli air support prevented what might have been a surprise attack in the rear of Israeli positions at Jenin as well as rescuing the reconnaissance battalion. With persistence and the

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Tilfit-Zababida, 6/7 June 1967

During the early morning of 6 June, after the advance party of Colonel Uri Ram's Israeli armored brigade had passed through Tilfit en route to Nablus, the brigade's reconnaissance company encountered heavy fire from well concealed Jordanian armor on high ground to the west near the town of Zababida. Deploying his tanks on the heights across the valley from the Jordanian positions, Ram sent several halftracks into the valley to draw fire so that the Jordanians would reveal their locations by their tank gun muzzle flashes. This was the beginning of a long range, static armor battle, which lasted until dusk. Little damage was done by either side in this long range exchange. Just before dusk, the Israelis observed a Jordanian tank company shifting its position and called in an air strike which destroyed a number of these tanks. Then, as darkness fell, the Israelis were able to use the burning tanks as reference points to direct their guns on other Jordanian tank positions, as well as on the defenses in Zababida itself on the heights above.

After dark, and under the cover of a 20-minute artillery preparation, Ram began a night attack on Zababida, advancing in two columns of four tank companies each. One column advanced along the main Tilfit-Zababida road, while the other column moved downhill along some dirt tracks, blasting concrete antitank obstacles with tank guns and continuing up the far side of the valley, still undetected by the Jordanians. As the first column entered the valley, it encountered Jordanians around Tilfit. For the next hour a short-range tank battle was fought in the valley until Ram's other column attacked positions in the hills near Zababida. The Jordanian tanks in the valley immediately broke contact and withdrew up the hill to avoid being surrounded. By 0300 on 7 June, Zababida was in Israeli hands, and the Jordanians were retreating south down the main road toward Tubas.

Significance: Ram removed a threat to his reconnaissance company and cleared the way for an advance to Nablus.

Sources: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (WEST BANK FRONT)

Nablus, 7 June 1967

On the morning of 7 June 1967, a reconnaissance company and a tank company of Colonel Uri Ram's Israeli armored brigade occupied the center of Nablus against scattered opposition. Receiving reports that a large force of Jordanian armor was just west of the town, Ram at once sent for two tank battalions to join him from their positions around the Tubas-Damiya-Nablus road junction to the northeast. On the arrival of the two tank battalions a confused battle broke out in and around the western edge of the town. By late afternoon, one battalion from Lieutenant Colonel Moshe Bar Kochva's armored brigade had broken through at Kabatiya and struck the rear of the Jordanian units that were still engaging Ram's brigade west of Nablus. Finding themselves caught between two converging Israeli forces, the Jordanians withdrew in considerable confusion, some going to the south and some to the north of Nablus. Those to the north were soon joined by a tank battalion of the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade and another round of combat broke out.

By this time, however, the Jordanians' morale had plummeted. It was evident that they had suffered severe defeats throughout the West Bank, and more than half of the tanks of the 40th Armored Brigade had already been destroyed in and around Nablus. With reports of another Israeli infantry brigade approaching Nablus from the west, the surviving Jordanians fought to reach the Damiya Bridge road and by dusk were well on their way to Damiya and the bridge across the Jordan River.

Significance: Having secured Nablus by 1830 on 7 June, Israeli units advanced south from town to link up with forces coming from Ramallah and east to Damiya where the Israelis seized the bridge in mid-evening. With this action complete, the Israelis held all three bridges over the Jordan, assuring their control of the West Bank.

Sources: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (THE SINAI FRONT)

Rafah, 5 June 1967

About thirty minutes after Israeli pilots had begun a series of air strikes which would destroy the Egyptian air force, Brigadier General Israel Tal's Israeli armored division initiated a three-pronged attack against PLA and Egyptian positions at Rafah, southwest of Gaza. Tal intended to execute a classic double envelopment. He sent one brigade under Colonel Shmuel Gonen to penetrate Egyptian coastal defenses at Khan Yunis, northeast of Rafah, and then envelop the PLA left at Rafah, and he sent Colonel Menacheim Aviram's brigade through sand dunes to the south of Rafah to envelop the Egyptian right, while Colonel Rafael Eitan's reinforced paratroop brigade struck the Egyptian front in a holding attack.

Gonen achieved a speedy breakthrough at Khan Yunis and advanced in two columns against Rafah. The right-hand column hit the PLA positions from the rear, while the left-hand column struck them frontally. This maneuver overwhelmed the defenders. Gonen continued southwest and used a similar pincers tactic to reduce a strongly fortified Egyptian position at Sheikh Zuweid. In the center, Eitan's paratroop brigade, supported by armor, attacked the Egyptian positions frontally and, following Gonen's successful attacks at Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, consolidated Israeli gains there. Meanwhile, to the south, Colonel Aviram sent his mechanized infantry to attack the Egyptian right frontally in a holding attack while sending two battalions to envelop the Egyptian southern (right) flank. Unfortunately, Aviram made his turn too far north and passed between two Egyptian strong points. His second column was attacked from the rear. Confused, heavy combat ensued, and it was not until midnight that the Egyptians finally withdrew.

Significance: The Israelis had taken Rafah, a key Egyptian forward position controlling one of the two strategic routes across the Sinai. The Israelis were able to continue their advance to El Arish that afternoon. The ease of the Israeli victory enabled them to transfer a full brigade to Jerusalem.

Sources: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Bir Lahfan, 5/6 June 1967

On 5 June General Avraham Yoffe's division was advancing across the trackless and undefended desert between Generals Tal and Sharon. One of Yoffe's brigades, commanded by Colonel Isska Shadni, was headed west to the junction of Bir Lahfan. The other brigade moved southwest across the desert track just north of Sharon's division. The two brigades were expected to meet near Jebel Libni late on 6 June, combine with elements of both Tal's and Sharon's divisions, and wage a major battle for the central Sinai.

Shadni's brigade soon encountered Egyptian minefields along unmarked routes traditionally used by the local Bedouin which further slowed the advance over difficult terrain. It was therefore almost dark when Shadni's brigade reached the vicinity of Lahfan, after an advance of about eight kilometers. He waited until dark and then moved around the small Egyptian force entrenched around the road junction. Before midnight the brigade was in blocking positions across the three intersecting roads; north to El Arish, southwest to Jebel Libni, and southeast to Abu Ageila.

Meanwhile, two Egyptian brigades sent northeast from Jebel Libni along the road through Bir Lahfan, struck Shadni's roadblock southwest of Bir Lahfan at about 2100, precipitating an all-night engagement.

Soon after dawn, Gonen's brigade, spearheading Tal's advance toward Jebel-Libni, overran an Egyptian outpost midway between El Arish and Bir Lahfan. Informed of the major battle taking place southwest of Bir Lahfan, Gonen, after establishing radio contact with Shadni, sent his mechanized infantry smashing through the Bir Lahfan position to support Shadni. With his available tank battalions, Gonen turned right into the desert, to envelop the Egyptian west flank. The Egyptians then withdrew.

Significance: The Egyptian withdrawal from Bir Lahfan enabled Shadni and Gonen to advance to Jebel Libni in pursuit of the fleeing Egyptians. Shadni's successful road block near Bir Lahfan is an excellent illustration of the use of tactical defense to accomplish an offensive strategic objective.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Abu Ageila-Um Katef, 5/6 June 1967

At the Abu Ageila crossroad one road linked El Arish with the Gulf of Aqaba, while the other ran southwest to Ismailia on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Control of the intersection was essential to the advance of Israeli infantry and logistical support units. Guarding the approach to this crossroads, including Um Katef, ten kilometers to the east, was a formidable fortification system. It fell to Brigadier General Ariel Sharon's combined arms division to attack this stronghold. Sharon crossed the frontier at 0815 on 5 June. By 1500 hours the division had defeated Egyptians conducting a delaying operation and had blocked the highway northwest of Abu Ageila to prevent reinforcements from coming from Bir Lahfan. The attack began at dusk, when a paratroop battalion landed in the Egyptian rear to neutralize the Egyptian artillery, while the Israeli artillery hammered the Egyptian front. The paratroopers destroyed ammunition and vehicles and drove the Egyptian crews from their guns, then withdrew. Meanwhile a battalion of tanks, going through sand the Egyptians assumed was impassable, enveloped the Egyptian left and struck a secondary outpost from the rear. Overrunning this position, it continued south toward the main Egyptian positions in order to help repulse any counterattack. A second tank battalion launched a frontal pinning attack, then disengaged to envelop the Egyptian left and provide suppressive overhead fire for three battalions of infantry who, in the main effort, attacked the Egyptian flank at 2300 hours. The infantry then assaulted the triple line of trenches, destroying the defenders. When the anticipated Egyptian armored counterattack developed, the two Israeli tank battalions coordinated their attacks and destroyed over half of the Egyptian tanks.

Significance: The Egyptians were forced to withdraw by dawn. The Israelis had taken a key strategic point in the Sinai. Sharon's attack on Abu Ageila is a textbook example of a combined arms night attack. Having studied how to reduce Abu Ageila for eleven years, the Israeli attack demonstrates the importance of tactical planning exercises in modern staff colleges. Critical was the surprise achieved by making this main effort against the Egyptian left flank through sand that the Egyptians assumed was impassable to vehicles.

Sources: X.1; X.2; X.5.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

El Arish, 5/6 June 1967

While one column of his brigade was still fighting at Rafah, Colonel Shmuel Gonen ordered Colonel Barch Harel to take the rest of the armored brigade and move on Jiradi and El Arish. After a successful assault on Jiradi, Harel left a reconnaissance company there and advanced against the El Arish stronghold. Egyptians retreating from Rafah overran the Israeli reconnaissance company and by the time Gonen arrived with his battalion at Jiradi, he had to retake it. Harel was already fighting at El Arish. By 0500 his tanks had been refueled, and Gonen attacked the town. After several hours of fighting El Arish was in Israeli hands.

Significance: The fall of El Arish gave the Israelis control of the coastal road, one of the two strategic routes to the Suez Canal.

Sources: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Jebel Libni, 6 June

On 6 June the Israelis continued to advance in accordance with their plan. The Egyptian forces were retreating westward, in accordance with an order of the Egyptian Chief of Staff, unaware that it had been rescinded. Late in the afternoon the reconnaissance unit of Colonel Shadni's brigade, approaching Jebel Libni from Bir Lahfan, reached the minefields in front of the Jebel Libni defensive position, and came under long-range tank fire. Quickly Shadni and Gonen -- whose brigade followed Shadni's -- deployed their brigades for action and frontally attacked the Egyptian fortified camp. They were joined on the left by one of Yoffe's brigades, commanded by Colonel Elhanen Sela, who had just arrived from near Abu Ageila.

The battle for the Jebel Libni camp began at dusk and continued on into the night. Actually the Israelis were engaged by only the Egyptian rearguard, since the main body of the division was already moving down the road toward Bir Gifgafa and Ismailia. In their desperate defense the Egyptians lost 32 tanks. Finally under cover of darkness they withdrew westward toward Bir Hamma. The three Israeli brigade commanders decided to let their units, exhausted from two days of marching and fighting, rest and regroup until dawn.

Significance: This is one of those interesting anomalies of military history, a battle in which both sides accomplished their assigned mission. That of the Israelis had been to defeat the Egyptians at Jebel Libni, and capture the fortified camps and airfield there; the mission of the Egyptian rearguard had been to delay the Israelis for several hours, in order to permit the main body of the division to escape. Both sides could, and did, claim success.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Gaza Strip, 6-7 June

The Gaza Strip, extending northeast from the vicinity of Rafah to just north of Gaza, was heavily fortified and defended by the 20th PLA Division and several thousand armed civilians. A combined arms Israeli task force under the command of Colonel Yehuda Reshef had the task of seizing and occupying it. Colonel Rafael Eitan's paratroop brigade was to join Reshef when Rafah was secure.

On the morning of 5 June all but one battalion of Reshef's command followed Colonel Shmuel Gonen through Khan Yunis and turned north, clearing minefields and overrunning several small outposts. They then attacked and captured El Kuba and Ali Muntar in a hard fight that lasted until dark. During the night Eitan's brigade, supported by a tank company joined Reshef's force south of Gaza. At dawn on 6 June an all-out assault on positions in and around Gaza was heralded by a strike by Israeli aircraft. The assault was launched from the south, spearheaded by the light tank battalions, closely followed by paratroopers and an infantry battalion. The rest of the Israeli infantry closed in from the east and north. By noon, after severe street fighting, most of the town was in Israeli hands, and shortly thereafter the Egyptians surrendered. Eitan's paratroopers then tried to clear out the town of Khan Yunis, which had been bypassed earlier, but abandoned the attempt in the face of intense resistance. The following day, however, a second attack encountered little resistance, and the defenders, with no hope of reinforcement, surrendered.

Significance: The capitulation at Gaza on 6 June, and of Khan Yunis the following morning, brought an end to Arab resistance in western Palestine.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Bir Hassna-Bir el Thamada, 7 June 1967

At 0400 on 7 June in accordance with the plan to pursue, overtake, and block the Egyptian retreat, General Yoffe's division struck southwest from Jebel Libni toward Bir Hassna. The objective was to block the Egyptians withdrawal through both the Giddi and Mitla passes. Spearheading the advance, Colonel Shadni's brigade arrived at Bir Hassna shortly after dawn and encountered the Egyptian rear guard, deployed to take advantage of the existing fortifications. While one battalion attacked the fortifications Shadni sent his other two battalions to the Bir el Thamada road southwest of Bir Hassna. By 0900 the Egyptian positions at Bir Hassna had been overrun, and Shadni's third battalion continued down the road after the other two battalions, leaving one brigade to mop up the various outposts around Bir Hassna.

At Bir el Thamada -- now completely evacuated by the Egyptians -- Shadni divided his forces. He sent one battalion northwest to block the Giddi Pass; and with the other battalion he went southwest toward the Mitla Pass. The first battalion had a relatively uneventful time. Some Egyptian stragglers were pushed aside or overrun, and the battalion had little trouble in reaching the Giddi Pass. There it established a roadblock, and held off a number of scattered Egyptian units that tried to get through during the late afternoon and evening.

Significance: One key route of the Egyptian withdrawal was blocked; it remained for Shadni's other battalion to block the retreat of the Egyptians at the Mitla Pass.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Mitla Pass, 7 June 1967

Most of the withdrawing units of the Egyptian 3d and 6th Infantry divisions, an armored task force, and some elements of the 4th Armored Division, all converged on the road between Bir el Thamada and the Mitla Pass as Israeli Colonel Isska Shadni's tank battalion hurried southwest from Bir el Thamada to the eastern entrance to the pass. Shadni's tanks were running out of fuel, and by the time he reached his objective, at 1800 hours, he had only nine tanks, four of which were towed the last few kilometers, and a few APCs, with infantry and mortars. With these he set up an ambush at the eastern entrance to the pass.

As the Egyptian forces converged at the approach to the pass, Israeli aircraft strafed and bombed with high explosives, rockets, and napalm, and Shadni's small force attacked them, so that the passage was blocked with burned vehicles and an enormous traffic jam. The desperate Egyptians surrounded Shadni's unit, and Shadni called for help. Colonel Elhanen Sela's brigade was sent hurrying to his relief. En route, one company of Israeli tanks became intermingled with some Egyptian tanks in the darkness. The Israeli commander by radio ordered his tanks to leave the road in unison, turn on their searchlights, and fire on whatever remained on the road. Thus an Egyptian tank battalion was destroyed.

It was late morning before Sela reached the pass. By that time, the Egyptians, aware of his approach, had abandoned their vehicles and set off on foot through the hills and the desert.

Significance: The Egyptians lost about 100 tanks, and the combat efficiency of the 6th Infantry Division, and part of the 3d, was effectively destroyed.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Bir Hammam-Bir Gifgafa, 7 June 1967

In an attempt to interdict the pell-mell rush of the Egyptian Army for the Suez Canal General Tal sent Colonel Gonen's brigade west on the central axis to block the road to Ismailia. At Bir Hammam the Israeli tanks hit the rear guard of the 3d Infantry Division, and an infantry brigade with some supporting tanks. After a brief fight, the position was taken; the Egyptians, having accomplished their delaying mission, withdrew westward. During the course of the engagement Colonel Menachem Aviram's brigade had moved along the road past Gonen's force and become the spearhead. Aviram's tank units soon became involved in a running battle with the Egyptian units retreating from Bir Hammam. Pushing these Egyptians aside, the Israeli tankers continued their headlong drive westward on the road toward Bir Gifgafa, encountering more retreating Egyptian units as they went. The Israelis went around the Egyptians, drove them off the road, or pushed through them in a series of running battles. By early afternoon, Aviram's brigade had reached the road junction north of Bir Gifgafa. He sent his AMX battalion to the west to take a defensive position in the hills just beyond Bir Gifgafa, blocking the road from Ismailia. His tank battalion and motorized infantry battalion moved just south of the road junction to block the road to Bir el Thamada.

Meanwhile, Gonen's brigade had quickly regrouped and had moved close behind Aviram. Approaching the Bir Gifgafa road junction, Gonen swung to the south, hoping to encircle part or all of the Egyptian 4th Armored Division, which had been concentrated in the Bir Gifgafa area.

Significance: The plan to cut off the Egyptian retreat was a good one but the results were disappointing. One Egyptian armored brigade was caught and quickly destroyed by Aviram's battalion of Sherman tanks. Otherwise, except for a number of stragglers, the trap in Tal's sector was empty. Most of the 4th Armored Division was already west of the encirclements, and some of its elements were crossing the Suez Canal.

: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Nakhl, 8 June 1967

Following the Egyptian collapse on 6 June, it was General Ariel Sharon's mission to pursue the fleeing Egyptians and drive them into Israeli roadblocks at the key passes. Sharon's force moved slowly southwest toward Nakhl, hampered by terrain and minefields. Near dawn on 8 June his leading elements captured an entire brigade of abandoned JS-3 self-propelled guns. As Sharon approached Nakhl in mid-morning of 8 June, he learned by radio from Colonel Albert Mendler that he had just taken Thamad, and that the Egyptian force there, apparently an infantry brigade and an attached tank brigade from the Egyptian 6th Division, was withdrawing toward Nakhl. One tank battalion of Mendler's brigade was following closely and harassing the Egyptian rear guard.

Sharon's tank brigade reached Nakhl a few minutes before his patrols sighted the head of the Egyptian column retreating from Thamad. Quickly Sharon put his two tank battalions into ambush positions just east of Nakhl, and soon a furious battle was raging. Sharon himself took a mechanized infantry battalion and swung south to hit the middle of the Egyptian column, about 15 kilometers east of Nakhl. The double envelopment destroyed the fighting capacity of the Egyptian unit.

Significance: In four and a half hours of fighting Sharon's force and Mendler's battalion destroyed approximately 60 Egyptian tanks, about 100 guns, and more than 300 vehicles. Several hundred Egyptians were killed or wounded, and the rest, at least 5,000 men, dispersed in the hills and wadis south of the road.

Source: X.1; X.2.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Bir Gifgafa II, 8 June 1967

Although the Egyptian 4th Armored Division was already returning to the Suez Canal by 8 June, an armored brigade at the Canal was ordered to reinforce it near Bir Gifgafa. Shortly before midnight the brigade unexpectedly ran into the AMX-13 tank battalion of Israeli Colonel Menachem Aviram's brigade, blocking the road northwest of Bir Gifgafa.

The Israelis had positioned their tanks in a semicircle facing west, with their fuel, ammunition, and supplies on halftracks in the center rear. They had the advantage of a readied defensive position, but they had only 30 light tanks. The Egyptian force had between 50 and 60 T-54 and T-55 tanks with 100mm high velocity guns. The 75mm guns of the AMX-13s could penetrate them only at very short range.

The Egyptians attacked and soon scored a direct hit on an Israeli halftrack loaded with ammunition, resulting in a vehicle explosion. A chain reaction destroyed seven more halftracks and one tank. Shortly afterward two AMXs were destroyed by direct hits. After a desperate two-hour defense, the Israeli battalion began to withdraw. But at this moment a battalion of Colonel Shmuel Gonon's Centurions arrived to support the hard-pressed AMXs. The Egyptians, who had believed themselves victorious, were now suddenly surprised to find themselves enveloped by a force of medium tanks. In a few minutes ten Egyptian T-54's and T-55's were destroyed. The remainder withdrew in confusion toward the Canal.

Significance: The Israeli repulse of the Egyptian armored brigade at Bir Gifgafa marked an end to the only Egyptian counterattack launched from beyond the Suez in the course of the Six Day War.

Source: X.1; X.2.

1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Tel Fahar-Banias, 9 June 1967

After the success against Egyptian and Syrian forces in early June 1967, the Israelis planned to attack and seize Syrian positions on the Golan Heights. On the basis of long prepared plans, Brigadier General David Elazar, commanding the Israeli Northern Command, decided that the main effort should take place in the Tel Azaziyat-Kala-Zaoura area of the northern Golan Heights. The Golani Brigade, part of the division-size task force making the main attack, was to strike the Syrian fortifications at Tel Azaziyat and then drive eastward against Syrian positions on the heights of Tel Fahar. Such a drive, if successful, would help open the old road through Banias, at the foot of Mount Hermon, and permit an armored advance through Masa'ada toward Kuneitra from the north.

At 1130 on 9 June, the Golani Brigade jumped off from the vicinity of Dan, advancing in two columns, each preceded by tanks of the attached armored battalion. One of these columns took the old road toward Banias; the other went across country, between the Syrian positions of Tel Azaziyat and Tel Fahar. Tel Azaziyat was bypassed, and the two principal columns of the brigade converged on Tel Fahar. This Syrian position was surrounded by three double-apron barbed wire fences protected by mine-fields and consisted of a number of trenches, machine gun and antitank positions, and dugouts. It was not until after three hours of close combat in and around the trenches that the Israelis finally cleared this key fortification. The defenders of bypassed Tel Azaziyat, exposed to fire from their right rear, withdrew at dark, and the Golani Brigade soon occupied this height as well. Patrols were pushed further up the height, and by midnight the Israelis had secured positions at the top of the first crest, having achieved their first day's objective.

In the late afternoon on 9 June, the Syrians were withdrawing all along the western edge of the Golan Heights. The Golani Bridge's success had in part contributed to the forcing of this withdrawal and had helped pave the way for an advance to Kuneitra. The Israelis were unaware that their success had been facilitated by a general withdrawal order from Damascus, while the Syrians were seeking a cease-fire of the U.N.

1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN HEIGHTS)

Tel Fahar-Banias, 9 June 1967

Significance: The Golani Brigade took the high ground around Tel Azaziyat and Tel Fahar, accomplishing their first day's mission and securing ground important for the continuation of the Israeli offensive.

Sources: X.1; X.2; X.4.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Rawiyeh, 9/10 June 1967

In June 1967, the Israelis planned a secondary attack on the Golan Heights against the Syrian strongholds of Darbashiya, Dardara, and Jalabina, northeast of the Sea of Galilee. These positions were to be attacked and captured to break through the Syrian defenses into the central Golan Heights.

On 9 June, while the efforts of the main Israeli attack force met success along the northern part of the Syrian-Israeli border, the infantry brigades of Colonel Emanuel Shehed and Colonel Yehuda Gavish carried out their assigned missions, taking the Syrian positions at Darbashiya, Jalabina, and Dardara. Soon after nightfall Colonel Uri Ram's armored brigade, which had moved up from Jordan, jumped off from the vicinity of Gonen, north of Darbashiya, and pushed its way up a winding mountain road to seize the village of Rawiyeh on the Trans-Arabian Pipeline against moderate resistance. There was little firing between midnight and dawn, and the Israeli units regrouped, rested, and prepared to continue the advance the following day. The Syrian troops withdrew.

Significance: In conjunction with Israeli advances against Syrian positions all along the Golan Heights, the Ram Brigade's success contributed to the collapse of the Syrian defensive line, causing the Syrian forces to continue to withdraw hastily to the east.

Sources: X.1; X.2; X.4.

THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Zaoura-Kala, 9 June 1967

Late on 7 June, after a ceasefire on the Jordanian front had taken effect, Brigadier General David Elazar, chief of the Israeli Northern Command, received permission to attack the Golan Heights. On 8 June, the Israeli air force softened up the Syrian Golan defenses. On 9 June, after the Syrians had accepted the United Nations' ceasefire call of the previous day, the Israelis attacked.

The main breakthrough attempt was to be made in the Tel Azaziyat-Kala-Zaoura area of the northern Golan Heights by a division-size task force. Leading the assaulting forces was an armored brigade under Colonel Albert Mendler, whose mission was to attack over extremely rugged terrain north and east of Kfar Szold, seize high ground along a ridge inside the Syrian border, and gain ground to facilitate further advances eastward. Disposed facing the axis of the Israeli attack, and much dispersed over the rugged terrain through which the initial attack was to be made, was the Syrian 11th Infantry Brigade (reinforced by tanks).

At 1130, Mendler's brigade, reinforced by several companies of APC-mounted troops from the Golani Brigade, attacked, led by an engineer detachment and eight unarmored bulldozers, three of which were soon lost to fire from dug-in Syrian tanks. Unfamiliar with the Golan road net, the leading tank battalion took a wrong turn at a road junction along a mountain track and headed east to Kala instead of northeast at Zaoura. When the Israelis reached the fortified defenses at Kala, the mistake was discovered, but since the brigade had already secured the high ground, it was easily remedied by sending one battalion north to Zaoura. There, the Israelis quickly overcame the defenses and then turned south to envelop the Kala positions that still resisted Mendler's leading battalion. Faced with the possibility of encirclement, the Syrian defenders evacuated Kala after dark.

Significance: Due in part to the navigational error, elements of Mendler's brigade reached positions that the Israelis had not expected to take until the next day. The initial attack had advanced rapidly over formidable terrain, and Mendler's troops were in excellent position to continue the drive to the east.

Sources: X.1; X.2; X.4.

1. IDENTIFICATION
KID: The Arab-Israeli War, Jordan, 1968

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Kerama, Jordan	A D 21 Mar 1968	Jordan Valley	Is Gonen Task Force Jor 1st Inf Div	BG Gonen MC Haditha	1	5.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: The Arab-Israeli War, Jordan, 1968

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Kerama	A D	FM PD	DST	Spt	N	--	--	x

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: The Arab-Israeli War, Jordan, 1968

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Kerama	A D	C	C	C	N	N	x	C	x	x	5.0	7 6

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: The Arab-Israeli War, Jordan, 1968

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: The Arab-Israeli War, Jordan, 1968

Engagement	Main Attack and Plan and Maneuver			Success	Resolution
	Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack			
Kerama	A D	F, EE D/O, F	FE --	X X	P, S, WD S

THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR, JORDAN, 1968

Kerama, 21 March 1968

A major but isolated engagement of the Arab-Israeli War occurred at Kerama, Jordan, on 21 March 1968. Kerama, located on the east bank of the Jordan River, was a base of the Palestinian fedayeen, who frequently clashed with Israeli troops along the river and on roads into the Israeli-occupied West Bank region. In mid-March the Israelis began to build up opposite Kerama, preparing for a punitive strike at the Palestinian camp. The Israeli build-up was detected by observers of the Jordanian Army, and the Jordanian 1st Infantry Division, stationed east of the Jordan between Damiya and the Dead Sea, prepared to defend the Jordan Valley near Kerama.

The Israeli attack was made by a division-sized combined arms task force commanded by Brigadier General Schmuel Gonen. Gonen's force was divided into three task groups for the attack, one each for the Damiya, Hussein, and Abdullah bridges. The main effort, however, was at the Hussein bridge. In addition, a battalion of paratroopers was to be landed northeast of Kerama. To divert attention from Gonen's attack an Israeli armored battalion was to make a demonstration south of the Dead Sea along the axis Sedom-Safi.

The attack began at 0530 hours on 21 March 1968, without an artillery preparation. The Jordanian 1st Infantry Division resisted the main Israeli attacks from prepared positions at the three Jordan River bridges. Each bridge was covered by one brigade of infantry reinforced by a tank company. The division had a small mobile reserve south of Es Salt and deployed an infantry company and a tank platoon at Kerama to support the 500 fedayeen there.

The northernmost of the three Israeli columns successfully forded the Jordan south of the Damiya Bridge and established a small bridgehead but was unable to advance southward from Musri to Kerama. The central column, commanded by General Gonen, crossed the Hussein Bridge and drove on Kerama, which was captured after a stiff fight. The fedayeen camp was levelled. The Abdullah Bridge task group failed to obtain a foothold east of the Jordan, and the demonstration south of the Dead Sea was repulsed. It should be noted, however, that the three diversionary Israeli thrusts all accomplished their missions.

Significance: Both sides, with some justification, claimed victory in this engagement. The Israelis claimed that by destroying Kerama they had accomplished their mission. The Jordanians and the fedayeen, who had fought fiercely, asserted that they had repulsed an Israeli operation designed to establish a permanent east bank bridgehead. Fedayeen recruiting efforts benefitted greatly as a result of propaganda concerning the defense of the Kerama camp, and the fedayeen military organization subsequently expanded to the point that it rivalled that of the Jordanian Army. Nonetheless, the main fedayeen camps were moved further eastward where they were less vulnerable to the Israelis.

Sources: X.2.

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Suez Canal Assault A North, Egypt D	6 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Eg Second Army Is Sinai Def Force	MG Mamoun MG Mendler	1	110.0
Suez Canal Assault A South, Egypt D	6 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Eg Third Army Is Sinai Def Force	MG Wassel MG Mendler	1	38.0
Second Army Buildup, Egypt D	7 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Eg Second Army Is Sinai Def Force	MG Mamoun MG Mendler	1	110.0
Third Army Buildup, Egypt D	7 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Eg Third Army Is Sinai Def Force	MG Wassel MG Mendler	1	54.0
Kantara-Firdan, Egypt	A 8 Oct 1973 D	Suez, 1973	Is Adan Div	MG Adan	1	27.0
Egyptian Offensive North, Egypt D	A 14 Oct 1973 D	Suez, 1973	Eg Second Army Is Sasson Force and Sharon Div	MG Mamoun MG Mamoun MG Gonen	1	50.0
Egyptian Offensive South, Egypt D	A 14 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Eg Third Army Is Magen Div (-) (+)	MG Wassel BG Magen	1	50.0
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I), Egypt D	15/16 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Is Sharon Div Eg 16th Div ($\frac{1}{2}$), and 21st Div ($\frac{1}{2}$)	MG Sharon BG Hafiz, BG Owby	1	14.0
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II), Egypt D	16-17 Oct 1973	Suez, 1973	Is Adan Div (+) Eg 16th Div (-) (+)	MG Adan BG Hafiz	2	11.0
Deversoir West, Egypt	A 18 Oct 1973 D	Suez, 1973	Is Adan Div (+) Eg Second Army (-)	MG Adan MG Kalil	1	11.0

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Ismailia, Egypt	A D 19-22 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Sharon Div Eg Second Army (-)	MG Sharon MG Kalil	4	20.0
Jebel Geneifa, Egypt	A D 19-21 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Adan Div (+) Eg Third Army (-)	MG Adan MG Wassel	3	18.0
Shallufa I, Egypt	A D 22 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Adan Div Eg Third Army (-)	MG Adan MG Wassel	1	32.0
Shallufa II, Egypt	A D 23-24 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Adan Div (+) Eg Third Army (-)	MG Adan MG Wassel	2	32.0
Suez, Egypt	A D 23-24 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Adan Div Eg Third Army (-)	MG Adan MG Wassel	2	6.0
Adabiya, Egypt	A D 23/24 Oct 1973	Suez	Is Magen Div Eg Third Army (-)	BG Magen MG Wassel	1	13.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Defender	Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level	Air Superiority
Suez Canal Assault-North	A D	P/FD	RD	DSH	FD	Y	X	complete	N
Suez Canal Assault-South	A D	P/FD	RD	DSH	FD	Y	X	complete	N
Second Army Buildup	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Third Army Buildup	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Kantara-Firdan	A D	HD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Egyptian Offensive-North	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Egyptian Offensive-South	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	Y	X	substantial	N
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I)	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II)	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	N
Deversoir West	A D	H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Ismailia	A D H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X
Jebel Geneifa	A D H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X
Adabiya	A D H/PD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X
Shallufa I	A D HD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X
Shallufa II	A D HD	RD	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X
Suez	A D H/PD	RYU	DSH	FD	N	--	--	X

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Strength

Engagement	Personnel Total			Armor Total			Arty Pieces			Air Sorties			Battle Casualties			Armor Losses			Arty Pieces Lost			Aircraft Losses		
	Total	Lt.	Ilt.	Total	Mbt	67	50	17	623*	104	400	1.4	2	3.0	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	Total	Sorties/Day
Suez Canal Assault North	A 29,490	67	50	67	6	61	40	104	400	275	6.2	44	65.7	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Suez Canal Assault South	A 22,850	71	60	11	4	48	28	571**	104	350	1.5	20	28.2	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Second Army Buildup A	63,910	464	27	437	639	100	800	1.3	9	1.9	?	?	29.7	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Second Army Buildup D	14,000	192	0	192	40	67	450	3.2	57	29.7	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Third Army Buildup A	45,160	310	18	292	555	100	750	1.7	10	3.2	?	?	29.7	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Third Army Buildup D	10,980	148	13	135	24	67	400	3.6	44	44	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Kantara-Firdan A	25,850	530	50	480	44	66	700	2.7	78	14.7	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Kantara-Firdan D	67,440	516	30	486	639	100	700	1.0	27	5.2	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Egyptian Offensive North	A 81,160	1,002	70	932	585	44	1,700	2.1	120	12.0	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Egyptian Offensive North D	43,400	714	70	644	144	72	380	0.9	31	4.3	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Egyptian Offensive South	A 57,960	709	50	659	447	44	1,350	2.3	140	19.7	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Egyptian Offensive South D	28,600	348	40	308	96	72	260	0.9	17	4.9	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I)	A 22,790	344	30	314	96	0	100	0.4	56	16.3	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II)	A 28,900	444	40	404	72	267	950	1.6	40	4.5	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Deversoir West A	19,600	232	20	212	72	153	300	1.5	15	6.5	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--
Deversoir West D	18,180	293	23	270	119	80	800	4.4	64	21.8	?	?	?	?	--	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	--	--

* Plus about 600 tank guns. ** Plus about 400 tank guns.

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties				Arty Pieces Lost				Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Armor Total	LT.	MBT	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day	Total	#Sorties/Day
Ismailia	A 17,000	232	20	212	72	120	600	0.9	40	4.3	?	--	?	--
	D 23,860	246	17	229	137	72	1,800	1.9	92	9.3	?	--	?	--
Jebel Geneifa	A 16,200	318	30	288	48	240	300	0.6	30	3.1	?	--	?	--
	D 35,633	454	60	394	213	150	1,650	1.5	114	8.4	?	--	?	--
Adabiya	A 10,900	164	20	144	36	82	75	0.7	6	3.7	?	--	?	--
	D 14,620	190	15	184	83	37	400	2.7	29	14.6	?	--	?	--
Shallufa I	A 16,200	318	30	288	72	82	150	0.9	15	4.7	?	--	?	--
	D 25,600	445	35	410	160	40	1,100	4.3	35	7.9	?	--	?	--
Shallufa II	A 11,700	126	10	116	48	154	150	0.6	8	3.2	?	--	?	--
	D 22,570	259	18	241	139	57	1,100	2.4	68	13.1	?	--	?	--
Suez	A 14,681	225	20	205	60	154	340	1.2	26	5.8	?	--	?	--
	D 22,570	259	18	241	139	57	1,100	2.4	18	3.5	?	--	?	--

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom.
Suez Canal Assault-North	A 0 D x	0 x	C	C	N	x	x 0	C	C	x	5.0	8 4
Suez Canal Assault-South	A 0 D x	0 x	C	C	N	x	x 0	C	C	x	5.0	8 4
Second Army Buildup	A 0 D x	0 x	C	x 0	N	x	N	C	C	x	3.0	8 6
Third Army Buildup	A 0 D x	0 x	C	x 0	N	x	N	C	C	x	3.0	8 6
Kantara-Firdan	A 0 D x	0 x	C	0 x	N	x	0	C	C	x	0.0	3 4
Egyptian Offensive North	A 0 D x	0 x	C	x x	N	x	0	C	C	x	0.0	10 7
Egyptian Offensive South	A 0 D x	0 x	0	0 x	C	N	x	0	0	x	0.0	5 10
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I)	A 0 D x	0 x	0	0	0	0	x 0	C	0	x	7.0	7 4
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II)	A 0 D x	0 x	C	x	C	N	N 0	C	N	x	5.0	7 3
Deversoir West	A 0 D x	0 x	0	x 0	C	N	x	C	C	x	5.0	8 5

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

5. outcome

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Mat-tu- dun	Intelli- gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Ismailia	A D	x 0	x 0	C	C	N	x 0	C	x	x x	4.3	4 8
Jebel Geneifa	A D	x 0	x 0	C	N	x 0	x 0	C	x 0	x x	40.0	8 6
Adabiya	A D	x 0	x 0	x 0	N	x 0	N	C	x 0	x x	40.0	10 3
Shallufa I	A D	x 0	x 0	x 0	C	N	x 0	C	x 0	x x	10.0	9 4
Shallufa II	A D	x 0	x 0	x 0	C	N	x 0	C	x 0	x x	10.0	9 4
Suez	A D	x 0	x 0	x 0	N	x 0	N	C	x C	x x	22.0	8 6

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Force Preference	Weather	Roads	Planning	Surprise	Maneuver,	Narrow Mass,	Front	Logistics	Fortifications	Depth
Suez Canal Assault-North	A D	x x	x x	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Suez Canal Assault-South	A D	x x	x x	N N	N x	N x	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Second Army Buildup	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Third Army Buildup	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Kantara-Firdan	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Egyptian Offensive North	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Egyptian Offensive South	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I)	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II)	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N
Deversoir West	A D	x x	N N	N N	N x	N N	N N	N x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N x	N N

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME
War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Force Preposition-deriance	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Leader-ship	Planning	Surprise	Maneuver, Mass, Narrow Front	Logistics	Portfolios	Depth
Ismailia	A D	N x	N x	x x	N N	N N	x N	x N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	N N
Jebel Geneifa	A D	x N	x x	x x	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Adabiya	A D	x N	x x	x x	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	N N
Shallufa I	A D	x N	x x	x x	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	N N
Shallufa II	A D	x N	x x	x x	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	N N
Suez	A	x N	x x	x x	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	N N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack		Success	Resolution
	A	D	F D/O, F	--		
Suez Canal Assault-North	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	P R, WD
Suez Canal Assault-South	A	D	F D/O, F	E (LR) --	X	P R, WD
Second Army Buildup	A	D	F D/O	E (RR) D/O	X	P, S S
Third Army Buildup	A	D	F D/O	E (LF) --	X	P, S S
Kantara-Firdan	A	D	F D/O, E (LF)	E (RF)	X	R, S S
Egyptian Offensive-North	A	D	F D/O	--	X	R, WDL
Egyptian Offensive-South	A	D	F D	--	X	R, WDL
Deversoir (Chinese Farm I)	A	D	E (RR) D	F D/O	X	P, S S
Deversoir (Chinese Farm II)	A	D	F, EE D/O, E (LF)	--	X	P WDL
Deversoir West	A	D	F D/O, F	E (LR) --	X	P WD

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	A	D	Ind	Secondary Attack		
Ismailia	A D	F, EE D/O, F	--	--	X	R, S S
Jebel Geneifa	A D	F, EE D/O, F	--	--	X	B WD
Adabiya	A D	E (RR) D	--	--	X	B WD
Shallufa I	A D	F, EE D	--	--	X	P WD
Shallufa II	A D	F D	--	--	X	P WD
Suez	A D	F D	--	--	X	R, WD, S S

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Kuneitra, Syria	A 6-7 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 9th Inf Div (+) Is 7th Armd Bde (-)(+)	Col Tourkmani Col Ben Gal	2	3.0
Ahmadiyah, Syria	A 6-7 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 7th Inf Div (-) Is 7th Armd Bde (-)(+)	BG Abrash Col Ben Gal	2	4.8
Rafid, Syria	A 6/7 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 5th Inf Div (+) Is 188th Armd Bde (-)(+)	BG Aslan Col Ben Shoham	1	3.5
Yehudia-E1 Al, Syria	A 7/8 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 5th Inf Div (+) Is 240th Armd Div	BG Aslan MG Laner	1	4.0
Nafekh, Syria	A 7/8 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 1st Armd Div Is 79th Armd Bde (+)	Col Juhni Col Or	1	7.0
Tel Faris, Syria	A 8-10 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Is 146th Armd Div (+) Syr 5th Inf Div (+)	MG Peled BG Aslan	3	4.0
Hushniyah, Syria	A 8-10 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Is 240th Armd Div (+)(-) Syr 9th Inf Div (-)(+)	MG Laner Col Tourkmani	3	12.0
Mount Hermonit, Syria	A 8-9 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Syr 7th Inf Div (+) Is 7th Armd Bde (+)	BG Abrash Col Ben Gal	2	3.0
Mount Hermon I, Syria	A 8 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Is Golani Bde (-) Syr Para Bde (-)	Col Drori ?	1	1.0
Tel Shams, Syria	A 11-13 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Is 36th Mech Div Syr 7th Inf Div (-)(+)	BG Eitan BG Berakdar	3	17.0
Tel Shaar, Syria	A 11-12 Oct 1973 D	Golan	Is 240th Armd Div Syr 1st Armd Div (+)	MG Laner Col Juhni	2	16.0

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Tel el Hara, Syria	A D 13 Oct 1973	Golan	IR 3d Armd Div IS 240th Armd Div	BG Lafta MG Laner	1	12.0
Kfar Shams-Tel Antar, Syria	A D 15 Oct 1973	Golan	IS 240th Armd Div IR 3d Armd Div	(-) MG Laner BG Lafta	1	5.0
Naba, Syria	A D 16 Oct 1973	Golan	Jor 40th Armd Bde (+) IS 240th Armd Div	Brig El Majali MG Laner	1	9.0
Arab Counteroff- ensive, Syria	A D 19 Oct 1973	Golan	Syr 9th Inf Div (-) (+) IS 146th Armd Div	Col Tourkani MG Peled	1	25.0
Mount Hermon II, Syria	A D 21 Oct 1973	Golan	IS Golani Bde Syr Para Bde	Col Drori	1	1.0
Mount Hermon III, A Syria	D 22 Oct 1973	Golan	IS Golani Bde (+) Syr Para Bde	Col Drori	1	1.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Kuneitra	A D PD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial	N
Ahmadiyah	A D F/PD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial	N
Rafid	A D F/PD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial	N
Yehudia-El Al	A D HD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial	N
Nafekh	A D HD	RgB/RB	DST	FT	Y	X	substantial	N
Tel Faris	A D HD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	N	--	--	N
Hushniyeh	A D HD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	N	--	--	X
Mount Hermon I	A D F/PD	RgB	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial	X
Mount Hermon I	A D FD	RgM	DSH	FT	N	--	--	X
Tel Shams	A D FD	RM/RgB	DSH	FT	N	--	--	X
Tel Shaar	A D PD	RgB/RB	DSH	FT	N	--	--	X

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise	Air Superiority
Tel el Hara	A D	RgB/RB HD	DSH	FT	Y	x	substantial	x
Kfar Shams-Tel Antar	A D	RgB/RB HD	DSH	FT	N	x	substantial	x
Naba	A D	RgB/RB PD	DSH	FT	N	--	--	x
Arab Counteroffensive	A D	RgB/RB PD	DSH	FT	N	--	--	x
Mount Hermon II	A D	RgM FD	DSH	FT	N	--	--	x
Mount Hermon III	A D	RgM FD	DSH	FT	N	--	--	x

5. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)

Engagement	Personnel Total		Armor Strength		Arty Pieces		Air Sorties		Battle Casualties		Armor Losses		Arty Pieces Lost		Aircraft Losses	
	Total	Lt.	Total	NBT			Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day
Kuneitra	A 17,750 D 3,630	75 50	2 4	73 46	115 12	49 107	350 200	1.0 2.8	40 14	26.7 14.0	?	--	?	--	?	--
Ahmadiyah	A 22,750 D 5,745	147 78	4 7	143 71	131 16	100 191	700 250	1.5 2.2	96 30	32.7 19.2	?	--	?	--	?	--
Rafid	A 19,525 D 4,958	147 75	4 7	143 68	129 24	63 120	350 250	1.8 5.0	52 25	35.4 33.3	?	--	?	--	?	--
Yehudia-E1 Al	A 21,984 D 6,300	189 106	7 10	182 96	129 36	70 132	500 150	2.3 2.4	46 10	24.3 9.4	?	--	?	--	?	--
Nafekh	A 12,500 D 6,946	318 110	18 10	300 100	71 36	70 132	500 250	4.0 3.6	69 10	21.7 9.1	?	--	?	--	?	--
Tel Faris	A 17,833 D 23,750	249 253	39 11	219 242	60 151	70 111	250 1,125	0.8 1.6	30 117	4.0 15.4	?	--	?	--	?	--
Hushniyah	A 12,733 D 14,683	219 170	20 8	199 162	60 94	249 111	450 1,125	1.2 2.6	24 99	3.7 19.4	?	--	?	--	?	--
Mount Hermonit	A 31,650 D 5,395	182 38	6 3	176 35	155 24	53 149	1,200 400	1.9 3.7	100 24	27.5 31.6	?	--	?	--	?	--
Mount Hermon I	A 2,692 D 1,583	9 5	0 0	9 5	12 24	33 15	50 100	1.9 6.3	1 2	11.1 40.0	?	--	?	--	?	--
Tel Shams	A 16,100 D 19,400	270 329	30 18	240 311	60 110	330 120	525 1,200	1.1 2.1	30 126	3.7 12.8	?	--	?	--	?	--
Tel Shaar	A 14,700 D 21,500	318 387	30 20	288 367	60 130	220 80	280 900	1.0 2.1	20 88	3.1 11.4	?	--	?	--	?	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: 1973 Arab Israeli War (October War) (Continued)

Engagement	Strength				Battle Casualties			Arty Pieces Lost			Aircraft Losses	
	Personnel Total	Total	Lt.	Armor MBT	Arty Pieces	Air Sorties	Total	1/Day	1/Day Total	1/Day	Total	Sorties/Day
Tel el Hara	A 12,500 D 14,300	318 318	18 30	300 288	71 62	40 28	450 50	3.6 0.3	103 4	32.4 1.3	-- --	? ?
Kfar Shams- Tel Antar	A 11,000 D 12,000	212 269	20 15	192 254	40 70	30 20	100 200	0.9 1.7	6 34	2.8 12.6	-- ?	? ?
Naba	A 11,500 D 11,000	269 212	9 20	260 192	48 48	50 50	450 100	3.9 0.9	57 8	21.2 3.8	-- ?	? ?
Arab Counter-offensive	A 35,750 D 16,100	566 270	22 30	544 240	198 60	50 50	550 160	1.5 1.0	67 10	11.8 3.7	-- ?	? ?
Mount Hermon II	A 5,700 D 4,750	0 0	0 0	0 0	12 27	30 30	150 200	2.6 4.2	0 0	-- --	? ?	? ?
Mount Hermon III	A 11,400 D 4,750	0 0	0 0	0 0	24 27	60 30	100 250	0.9 5.3	0 0	-- --	? ?	? ?

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1973 Arab-Israel War (October War
Golan Front

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Women- tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Kuneitra	A	x	x	x	N	N	N	C	N	x	4.0	6
Ahmadiyah	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	C	N	x	0.5	3
Rafid	A	D	x	N	N	N	x	N	x	x	10.0	6
Yehudia-EI Al	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	C	N	x	N	5
Nafekh	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	C	x	x	0.0	3
Tel Faris	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	x	4.0	7
Hushniyah	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	x	1.7+	3
Mount Hermonit A	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	N	N	x	N	4
Mount Hermon I	A	D	N	N	C	N	N	N	N	x	0	3
Tel Shams	A	D	x	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	2.0	7
Tel Shaar	A	D	x	x	x	N	N	C	N	x	2.0	3

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)
Golan Front (Continued)

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Tel el Hara	A	D	x	x	N	N	x	C	x	x	2.0	1
Kfar Shams-Tel Antar	A	D	x	x	N	N	x	C	x	x	5.0	9
Naba	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	O	N	x	0	8
Arab Counter-offensive	A	D	x	x	N	N	N	C	N	x	0	2
Mount Hermon II	A	D	N	N	C	N	N	C	x	x	0	8
Mount Hermon III	A	D	x	x	C	N	N	C	x	x	5.0	6

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October Colgan Front)

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME
1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)
War: Golan Front (Continued)

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Air Superiority	Force Prepon-derance	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Leader-ship	Planning Surprise	Mass, Narrow Front	Logistics	Fortifi-cations	Depth
Tel el Hara	A D	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N x	N N	N N	N N	N N
Kfar Shams-Tel Antar	A D	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Naba	A D	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Arab Counteroffensive	A D	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Mount Hermon II	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Mount Hermon III	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N

7. CC-BAT FORKS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)
 Golan Front

Engagement	Main Attack and Maneuver		Secondary Attack	Success	Resolution
	Scheme of Defense	Plan and Maneuver			
Kuneitra	A D	F, E (LF) D	--	x x	P, S S
Ahmadiyeh	A D	F D	--	x	R, S S
Rafid	A D	F, E (RF) D	--	x	B WD
Yehudia-E1 Al	A D	F D/O	--	x	R, WD PS
Nafekh	A D	F D/O	--	x	R, WD PS
Tel Faris	A D	F, E (LF) D	--	x	P, PS WDL
Hushniyeh	A D	F D	--	x	P, PS WDL
Mount Hermonit	A D	F D/O	--	x	R, WDL
Mount Hermon I	A D	F D	--	x	--
Tel Shams	A D	F D	--	x	R, WD
Tel Shaar	A D	F D	E (LR)	x	P WD

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October War)
Golan Front (Continued)

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	A	D	F	D		
Tel el Hara	A D	D	--	--	X	R, WD --
Kfar Shams-Tel Antar	A D	E (RF) D	--	--	X	P, S S
Naba	A D	F D	E (LR) --	--	X	R S
Arab Counteroffensive	A D	F D	--	--	X	R, WD S
Mount Hermon II	A D	F D	--	--	X	R, WD --
Mount Hermon III	A D	F, E (RR) D	--	--	X	B WD

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Suez Canal Assault North, 6 October 1973

At 1405, 6 October 1973, under cover of an artillery barrage of approximately 2400 Egyptian weapons on the west bank of the Suez Canal, elements of the Egyptian Second Army began to cross the canal in rubber assault boats. The units involved were from the 18th, 2d, and 16th Infantry Divisions with their attached armored brigades. The artillery support came from the division artillery of these units plus the remaining Second Army divisions (a mechanized and an armored division) as well as the Second Army artillery, and about 100 tanks in firing positions on a sand embankment on the west bank of the Canal.

The Israeli units manning the Bar Lev Line and the remaining Israeli units of the Southern Command were taken by surprise. The Israeli troops involved were from the Israeli 252d Armored Division, an Israeli Regular Army unit assigned to this area. Elements of an infantry battalion manned the Bar Lev Line strongholds north of the Great Bitter Lake, and one armored brigade was in support positions a few thousand meters east of the Canal.

The Egyptian troops in the first wave did not stop to attack the Bar Lev bunkers but deployed to preassigned blocking positions about 1,000 meters past the embankment. The units armed with single Sagger missiles launchers placed themselves along likely armor routes while the men carrying Strella missiles took positions behind them to provide air defense. Successive waves followed, and there was a desperate battle between these Egyptians and the advancing Israeli armored unit.

As the cross-canal assaults began, the Egyptian Air Force struck Israeli forward air bases, communications facilities, and front area command posts. Egyptian assaults on selected strongholds of the Bar Lev line were subjected to intense fire, and only one stronghold fell to the first assault. Israeli tanks counterattacked continually throughout the afternoon and evening but were repulsed by the fire from Saggers and RPG-7 antitank missile launchers. The Israeli frontal assaults so successful during the 1967 war failed; the Israelis suffered severe tank and personnel losses.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Suez Canal Assault North, 6 October 1973 (Continued)

By 2000 the Egyptian Second Army units had advanced a distance of five kilometers. Meanwhile, engineers were operating ferries, cutting gaps in the east bank sand embankment, and installing bridges.

Both air forces were heavily engaged flying close air support of the ground units. The Egyptian Su-7s and MiG-17s flew 104 sorties while the Israeli F-4s and A-4s flew 70 sorties. The Israeli air operations were seriously inhibited by effective Egyptian air defense.

Significance: The Israelis were victims of complete surprise. The Egyptian invasion was well planned and well executed. But the Israeli prepared defenses on the Bar Lev line slowed the Egyptian advance.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SINAI FRONT)

Suez Canal Assault South, 6 October 1973

At 1405, 6 October 1973, while elements of the Egyptian Second Army were crossing the Suez Canal north of the Great Bitter Lake, units from the Egyptian Third Army were making similar crossings in the south, as far as the Gulf of Suez. (The description for Suez Canal Assault North is generally applicable to this engagement.) The artillery barrage supporting the Third Army crossing was approximately 1600 weapons on the west bank of the canal. The units of the Third Army in the assault were elements of the 7th and 19th Infantry Divisions with their attached armored brigades. As in the northern sector, Ranger detachments were dropped by helicopter, disrupting the flow of traffic in the Israeli rear. One detachment successfully blocked the Sudr Pass.

The Third Army units had a more difficult time breaking down the Israeli ramparts on the banks of the canal in this sector (they were hard packed earth, unlike the sand in the north, and tides were greater); so they did not have their bridges in place before the morning of 7 October.

The Third Army included the 130th Mechanized Brigade (3d Mechanized Division), a specially organized amphibious armored units, equipped with PT-76 light tanks. In mid-afternoon this brigade "swam" across the Little Bitter Lake and pushed toward the Giddi and Mitla Passes. By late afternoon the Egyptians were in sight of the passes, creating great alarm in Israeli rear area units. A reserve Israeli armored brigade, however, advancing from Bir Thamada, attacked the Egyptians with medium tanks, and the Egyptians withdrew their light tanks after suffering losses. Two platoons, however, penetrated as far as Bir el Thamada. One of these even shelled the air base at Bir el Thamada. Both finally withdrew on 7 October. Air support on the Egyptian side was 104 sorties, while the Israelis flew 70. Egyptian losses were 350 personnel and 20 tanks, while the Israelis suffered 225 personnel casualties and 42 tanks lost.

Significance: The Egyptians achieved complete surprise and had a sizable force across the Canal by the end of the day.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Second Army Buildup, 7 October

At dusk on 6 October, Egyptian helicopter-borne groups of Rangers had been deposited at carefully chosen points in the Sinai, ten to twenty kilometers east of the canal. These troops, armed with mines, demolitions, Saggers, and RPG-7s, were to set up roadblocks and ambushes on the four main roads leading toward the Canal from the east. Others attacked Israeli command and communications facilities. Although the results of this Ranger effort were not concretely significant, they created considerable alarm in Israeli rear area and slowed the rate of movement of Israeli reserves toward the canal.

During 7 October, the bulk of the armor of the 18th, 2d, and 16th Infantry Divisions had crossed to the east bank and now had a total of about 300 tanks. By the morning of the 7th, Mendlar's division had in action less than 150 of about 300 tanks that he had had on the 6th; of these about 100 (two brigades) were in this sector. During the fighting on the 7th his losses brought his tank strength to a little less than 100 operational tanks, about 50 in this sector. By this time two tank brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade of Adan's division were moving toward the canal along the northern axis through El Arish, followed a few hours later by an armored brigade of Sharon's division on the central road from Beersheeba. Ambushes by the Egyptians caused minor Israeli losses, but delayed the movement westward of these Israeli reinforcements.

Although the Egyptian objective was properly limited, their failure to exploit the serious Israeli disruption, and to advance several kilometers further, appears attributable to timidity at all levels of command.

Significance: In the first day and a half the Egyptians had established sizable forces firmly on the east bank of the canal. The Israelis had not yet been able to assemble forces large enough to halt the invasion.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Third Army Buildup, 7 October 1973

The buildup in the Egyptian Third Army sector did not go as smoothly as had the buildup in the north. Because of difficulties in cutting exit gaps through the Israeli embankment beside the canal, none of the Third Army bridges was in before 0900 on 7 October and it was dark when they were all completed. Meanwhile, the tank ferries remained in operation until the Third Army had 200 tanks on the east bank of the Suez. Meanwhile, the two infantry divisions were digging in and consolidating their positions, while attacking the Israeli Bar Lev line stronghold. A number of uncoordinated Israeli tank attacks were repulsed by Saggers and RPG-7s, with heavy losses in Israeli tanks.

Earlier that morning heliborne Egyptian Rangers had threatened the oilfields at Abu Rudeis near the Gulf of Suez. The Israelis, however, repulsed the probes. Another Ranger unit took the Sudr Pass in the southern sector.

Significance: In the first day and a half, the Egyptians succeeded in taking substantial forces across the Suez Canal in the Third Army sector. The Bar Lev strongpoints assisted the Israelis in their defense, but they had not been able to prevent establishment of a considerable Egyptian force on the east bank of the canal.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Kantara-Firdan, 8 October 1973

By 8 October the Egyptian Second Army had its three infantry divisions (18th, 2d, and 16th) with their attached armored brigades on the east bank of the canal, and the 18th Division had captured and occupied Kantara. The Israelis had two divisions, Adan's and Sharon's, consisting of six armored brigades. (An additional mechanized infantry brigade, under Adan's command, was occupied with the defense of the marshy area north of Kantara to the Mediterranean.) The boundary between Adan's and Sharon's divisions was a line running eastward from the canal near Firdan.

Shortly after 0800 Adan's division, in compliance with controversial and apparently confusing orders from Major General Shmuel Gonen, GOC Southern Command, initiated a series of aggressive probes toward the canal, with the objective of seizing an Egyptian bridge if possible. In compliance with the debatable instructions, Adan tried to begin a southward sweep, just east of the Canal. This soon proved impossible, due to the firmness of the Egyptian defense, and the attack became a series of uncoordinated probes. Soon after this (about 10:00 am) Adan was ordered by Gonen (who believed the Egyptians were close to breaking) to extend his front to Deversoir to permit Sharon's division to carry out a similar attack and bridge seizure between the Little Bitter Lake and Suez. About 10:00 am, without waiting for Adan, Sharon pulled out of his positions opposite Ismailia and started moving south along the Lateral Road.

However, not only were the Egyptians not close to breaking, between 1000 and 1200 they inflicted severe losses on two of Adan's brigades. In the second of these repulses one Israeli armored battalion was virtually destroyed. While trying to cope with these disasters, Adan committed his third brigade into the wide sector opposite Ismailia that had just been vacated by Sharon's division. That brigade was immediately engaged by an Egyptian 16th Division attack, and was forced to fall back. Adan requested Gonen's permission to withdraw.

By early afternoon Gonen became aware of the actual situation. He called Sharon -- moving south on the road south of Tasa -- ordering him to return north to help Adan. He ordered Adan to try to hold against the pressure of the three advancing Egyptian divisions. When it became evident that Adan was holding, Gonen decided not to commit Sharon (who had expressed reluctance to support Adan), since Sharon's division "was all that remained between the canal and Tel Aviv."

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Kantara-Firdan, 8 October 1973 (Continued)

The serious Israeli command failures seem to be essentially attributable to continuing post-surprise disruption.

Significance: The Egyptian Second Army was able to increase its strength on the east bank of the canal and expand its bridgehead. The Israeli reactions revealed post-surprise friction, causing poor coordination. Gonen's plan to shift Sharon to the south violated the classic principles of Mass, Simplicity, and Economy of Force.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Egyptian Offensive North, 14 October

At 0600 on 14 October an intensive artillery preparation signalled the start of an Egyptian offensive which was intended to relieve some of the pressure on the Syrians on the Golan Heights. In the northern half of the Sinai Front the Egyptian Second Army struck eastward with three armored columns from the 21st Armored Division, and the armored brigades of the infantry divisions. In addition to these armored thrusts there were a number of minor holding attacks all along the line. However, there was no major, coordinated effort by the Second Army; there was little more than one reinforced division making the three thrusts. This was a serious Egyptian command failure.

The northern of these three Egyptian armored attacks was made from Kantara in the 18th Infantry Division sector toward Romani. The next was from the 2d Infantry sector east toward Tasa and the Khatmia Pass, on a line north of and parallel to the Ismailia-Tasa Road. The third thrust from Talata in the 16th Infantry Division sector was intended to converge with the second at Tasa.

The northern thrust was against one of the brigades in the diversion of Brigadier General Sasseen. (This had just taken over the area formerly held by Adan, who was in reserve, preparing to take part in a cross-canal counter-offensive.) Adan's troops moved back in and with Sasseen's threw back the Egyptian column with heavy casualties. The central and southern thrusts were halted by Sharon's Division, also with heavy Egyptian casualties.

Significance: The effort of the Egyptians to breakout of their bridgehead had failed and the Israelis were prepared to assume the initiative. They had anticipated the attack and by this time had developed effective tactics for countering the Egyptian weapons, particularly the Saggers and RPG-7s.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Egyptian Offensive South, 14 October 1973

In the southern Sinai the Egyptian Third Army also sent three armored thrusts eastward against the Israelis. As in the north, the total attacking force was little more than the equivalent of a reinforced armored division. Most of the armor came from the 4th Armored Division and 6th Mechanized Infantry Division. The northernmost attack came from the 7th Infantry Division sector toward the Giddi Pass and Southern Command advance headquarters at Um Kusheiba. There was a second advance from the 19th Division sector toward the Mitla Pass and a third advance also from the 19th sector in which an armored brigade struck southeastward toward the Suir Pass, south of Mitla, and along the coastal road toward Ras Sudr. The Israeli defenders were from Brigadier General Kalinan Magen's division (formerly Mandler's division, he had been killed by Egyptian artillery on 13 October), Brigadier General Granit, Israeli's newly committed division, and Major General Yeshayahu Gavish's Southern Sinai Command.

Initially the Egyptian thrusts toward the Giddi and Mitla Passes had some success -- that against the Mitla briefly threatened a breakthrough. By early afternoon, however, the attacks were contained. The thrust toward the Sudr Pass had even greater success initially, and the column advanced along the coastal road more than 20 kilometers. A desperate defensive effort by Israeli paratroopers supported by some armor and considerable close air support, turned back the Egyptians with heavy losses of personnel and tanks. Although they had temporarily gained some ground, by the end of the day the Egyptians had returned to their original lines. This, of course, was largely due to their failure to make adequate use of their available resources.

Significance: The Egyptians were decisively defeated because of their failure to apply the Principle of Mass. Their armor losses were particularly serious and contributed to their subsequent failure to halt the Israeli counteroffensive.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Deversoir (Chinese Farm I), 15/16 October

At 1700 on 15 October, the Israelis launched Operation "Strongheart," the cross-canal invasion of Egypt. The plan called for one armored brigade of General Ariel Sharon's division to attack on the right, to divert the Egyptians' attention from the main effort. An hour later Colonel Amnon Reshev's armored brigade, reinforced, was to advance cross-country to the Great Bitter Lake, turn northwest along the shore to seize the Bar Lev stronghold of Matzmed, and then advance north to secure the crossing site. Colonel Dani Matt's paratroop brigade was to advance to the crossing point and cross in rubber boats. One battalion of Colonel Haim Erez's armored brigade was to cross behind the paratroopers; the remainder of the brigade was to bring up a prefabricated bridge and a ponton bridge whose sections could be used as ferries to take the tanks across the canal.

The diversionary attack did mislead the Egyptians. Reshev started late, moved to the Lake, and seized the Matzmed stronghold with little resistance. His reconnaissance battalion secured the area, while the other battalions went north and east to engage the night flanks of the Egyptian 16th and 21st divisions. The Israeli tanks were soon engaged heavily and unexpectedly with major Egyptian infantry and armor units. The paratroop battalion finally reached the crossing point sometime after midnight. After a heavy artillery preparation, the first paratroopers crossed at 0135. By dawn all the paratroopers and the tank battalion were across. The crossing continued until shortly after noon, when an order was issued to halt the crossings. Sharon, in the bridgehead, had already sent his tank battalion Erez on a raid westward, in which three SA-2 positions were destroyed and one SA-6 forced to displace. In the late afternoon Egyptian aircraft attacked the bridgehead.

Significance: The first Israeli forces were across the Canal, but behind them a bitter fight was developing, and there was disagreement among Israeli commanders as to how they should proceed.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Deversoir (Chinese Farm II), 16-17 October

General Adan's Division had been scheduled to cross the canal on 16 October, following Sharon, and driving south behind the Egyptian Third Army toward Suez. The Egyptian resistance to Sharon's crossing, however, was so severe, particularly in the Chinese Farm area, that Sharon's Division was cut off. The Egyptians held both roads behind Sharon, preventing the planned movement of two bridges to the crossing site. Adan was directed to get the bridges forward.

Heavy fighting took place during the next two days as Adan endeavored to reopen the corridor and to get the bridges to the canal. Reinforced by part of a paratroop brigade and one brigade of Sharon's division, he engaged the Egyptian 16th Infantry and 21st Armored Divisions and an armored brigade from the 23d Mechanized Division. In an effort to reopen the roads, the paratroopers were committed in the Chinese Farm area during the night of 16/17 October, but were immediately pinned down, and unable to advance or withdraw. However, the fierceness of this struggle distracted Egyptian attention from the southern of the two roads, shortly after dawn on the 17th Adan regained contact with Sharon, and began to move one of the bridges forward. By noon the paratroopers were extricated from the Chinese Farm, just as the Egyptian 65th Armored Brigade began a thrust northward from the Third Army bridgehead in an effort to reach the 16th Division, and again cut the Israeli corridor. There was, however, no coordination between the Egyptian units, and in an operation reminiscent of Hannibal's victory at Lake Trasimene, three of Adan's brigades virtually destroyed the 65th Brigade, which lost about 90 out of 100 tanks. This ended the battle, although heavy firing continued in the Chinese Farm area.

Significance: Adan had demonstrated tactical excellence and initiative and secured the corridor so that more forces could cross the canal and expand the bridgehead.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Deversoir West, 18 October

Adan's Division crossed the Suez Canal during the night of 17/18 October, taking over the left (southern) half of the bridgehead held by Sharon's Division. On the morning of the 18th, after a heavy artillery preparation, Adan's Division, consisting of three armored brigades (Baram's on the right, Amir's on the left, Karen's in reserve) started an attack across the Sweetwater Canal.

Baram's brigade broke out of the "green belt" to the west quickly, repelled a counterattack and pushed ahead about five kilometers to seize a fortified hill overlooking the main north-south Ismailia-Suez road. On the left, however, resistance was stronger. But by late afternoon Amir's brigade had advanced from the green belt about three kilometers to an elevation known as Tsach, where it was stopped. During the afternoon Adan received a directive from Gonen to raid SAM sites farther inland. Amir's brigade was being held up by strong resistance, but Adan sent two of Baram's battalions raiding westward and northwestward for more than 20 kilometers. They put three SAM sites out of action before returning to join the remainder of the division.

Significance: This action put Adan's division in positions to launch a full scale breakout the following day.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Ismailia, 19-22 October

On 18 October Sharon received approval for an offensive north against Ismailia. Early on the 19th he started a drive north toward that city. His paratroop brigade reinforced by armor, attacked north through the green belt toward Serafeum but was stopped by the Egyptian 182d Paratroop Brigade of the Second Egyptian Army. Sharon sent an armored brigade into the desert around the paratroopers' left flank; this unit also encountered heavy Egyptian resistance but was able to seize Orcha Hill, just west of Serafeum, before dark.

On the next day (20 October) the Israeli attack continued on a three brigade front with the paratroopers on the right and armored brigades in the center and on the left. (Sharon's third armored brigade was holding the communications corridor east of the canal.) For a time the Egyptian resistance seemed to weaken, and the Israelis moved forward, but Egyptian counterattacks brought about a seesaw battle just south of Lake Timsah. This was the position at nightfall.

On the third day the Israelis surrounded a key Egyptian defensive position at Touscan, but Egyptian counterattacks again held the Israelis, who were stopped south of the Ismailia-Nile Canal, just south of Ismailia. Meanwhile that same day (the 21st) Sharon was ordered to reinforce his armored brigade on the east bank, which was to attack the Talia hill mass to secure and widen the Israeli corridor to the crossing site. Sharon sent back five tanks in response to this order, but this negligible reinforcement did not enable the east bank brigade to regain initial gains, when a counterattack by the Egyptian 16th Infantry Division retook Talia. Sharon was ordered to make another attack on this position, but the order was countermanded from Tel Aviv (apparently as a result of a telephone call from Sharon to the Minister of Defense, Dayan).

On the 22d of October Sharon's three brigades on the west bank made a final but vain effort to capture Ismailia as the Egyptians held firm. When the cease fire took effect at 1852, the Israelis were still about 10 kilometers south of the city of Ismailia.

Significance: The Israeli failure must be attributed to Sharon's bull-headed failure to maneuver adequately, and to lack of coordination between his headquarters and higher headquarters.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Jebel Geneifa, 19-21 October 1973

On 19 October Adan's Division attacked west and south to break out of its west bank positions. Two of his three brigades attacked abreast to the west and then turned south, while the third brigade attacked directly south. They were opposed by Egyptian units of the Third Army on the west bank of the canal in the Third Army rear. At the end of the day (19 October) the leading elements of Adan's Division had reached the northern edge of the Geneifa Hills. Adan wanted to capture this hill mass as soon as possible so that the Egyptians would not be able to organize it for defense.

Assisted by effective close air support Adan's Division on the second day (20 October) was able to advance through the hill mass to the southern edge. One of his battalions had reached the vicinity of the Sarag Road (main Cairo-Suez road) but it was pulled back into the main position for the night.

On the third day the division, reinforced by about two more battalions, drove south of Asor and tried to cut the Sarag Road, which would cut off the Third Army from Cairo. Two Egyptian brigades counterattacked and halted the Israeli division short of its objective, the Sarag Road. However, long-range Israeli tank and artillery fire was able to harass Egyptian traffic on the road.

Meanwhile, Brigadier General Kalman Magen's division was cleaning up bypassed pockets of resistance and then moving southwest. By evening of 20 October Magen was 30 kilometers west of the Canal and within 100 kilometers of Cairo.

Significance: Adan's division made significant gains, cut one key east-west road, and disrupted the flow of traffic on another. The capture of the Fayid road opened a direct line of communications to the Deversoir bridgehead and gave the Israelis an air strip for the evacuation of wounded, flying in emergency supplies, and conducting reconnaissance missions.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Shallufa I, 22 October

Before dawn on 22 October General Adan, notified by General Gonen that a ceasefire would be in effect that evening, attacked south with two brigades and southeastward from Fayid with his other brigade toward Cabrit, Shallufa, and the canal. By mid-morning his two brigades in the south had secured the Asor Road and had reached the Sarag (main Suez-Cairo) Road. By this time stiffening Egyptian resistance to south and east caused Adan to be concerned about carrying out his mission. However, when Gonen ordered Magen to take over Adan's positions along the roads, Adan was able in the early afternoon to mount a tank "charge" eastward toward the canal by these two brigades.

The result was a wild and confused battle with Israeli and Egyptian units intermingled. When the ceasefire went into effect at 1852 Adan's units controlled part of the green belt between Geneifa and Shallufa. One battalion had reached the canal north of Shallufa, but had been driven back by Egyptian counterattacks. Within the area there were a number of Egyptian units, still effectively maintaining themselves. This situation was to cause trouble during later negotiations.

Significance: When the ceasefire went into effect at 1852 on 22 October, the Israelis had failed to achieve the decisive results west of the canal that they had hoped for. Although they had done severe damage to both the Second and Third Egyptian armies, both were still intact, and in communication with Cairo. The Israelis undoubtedly believed they would benefit from a resumption of hostilities.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Shallufa II, 23-24 October 1973

During the period 21-22 October Major General "Bren" Adan received more reinforcements, mostly from the Syrian front, rushed to him by helicopter and buses. Although he did not receive any more military vehicles Adan had captured a number of Egyptian APCs. He combined his newly arrived reinforcements with two battalions he had received a few days earlier to form a brigade, placed these troops under the command of his second in command, Brigadier General Dovic Tamari, and equipped them with the Egyptian APCs. While his other brigades attacked south toward Suez, Adan had Tamari's makeshift infantry brigade and Colonel Baram's armored brigade mop up north of Shallufa. Despite strong resistance from elements of the Third Army, Baram and Tamari's forces neutralized Egyptian resistance in the Shallufa area of the green belt by 24 October.

Significance: Adan's offensive thrust had played an important part in isolating Suez and hence cutting off the Egyptian Third Army from contact with Egypt.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Suez, 23-24 October

Although Adan and Magen had secured the Geneifa Hills and the area north to Deversoir, the intermingling of Adan's units with elements of the Egyptian Third Army's 4th Armored and 6th Mechanized Divisions and other Third Army units, particularly in the green belt, made observance of the ceasefire difficult, and its evasion easy. It is impossible to know what orders Adan received, but there is little doubt that the Israelis decided to take advantage of the confusing situation by continuing their offensive toward Suez and the Gulf of Suez.

Adan's Division had been strengthened with units from the east bank and the Syrian Front, and he combined these in a provisional mechanized brigade. He had two major tasks. One was to take -- or at least to isolate -- Suez; and the other was to clear and secure the green belt area along the west bank north of Suez. Adan decided to use two brigades to clear the green belt area and two brigades in a drive directly toward Suez.

The units attacking toward Suez advanced with a brigade on the right, west of the Havit Road, and one of the left between the road and the Sweetwater Canal. Charging ahead as fast as possible against determined Egyptian resistance the brigades reached the outskirts of Suez by nightfall on the 23d of October. One brigade had reached the Gulf of Suez at the old oil refinery southwest of the town, thus completely isolating most of the Third Army from Egypt to the west.

A second ceasefire was to go into effect on the 24th at 0700. In a pre-dawn radio conference, General Adan suggested that he could occupy Suez before the ceasefire was effective. Gonen said, "Yes, if it's Beersheba, no if it's Stalingrad." When Adan encountered delays in preparing for the attack, Adan was told to move without waiting for his planned artillery preparation. Even so, there is no question that the second ceasefire was already theoretically in effect before Adan began his attack.

The Israelis encountered unexpectedly strong resistance and some infantry units with little urban combat experience became surrounded in the confused fighting. The attack was decisively repulsed. During the night the surrounded men were extricated, and by dawn of the 25th the ceasefire was again in effect with the Israelis on the edge of town.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Suez, 23-24 October (Continued)

Significance: The Israelis' failure can only be partially explained by their surprise at the effectiveness and determination of the Egyptian defense. Lack of coordination between Southern Command and Adam's headquarters, and a faulty estimate of the situation by Adam, were also responsible.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (SUEZ FRONT)

Adabiya, 23/24 October

Brigadier General Kalman Magen's Division (formerly Mendler's) crossed into the Israeli west bank bridgehead during the night of 18/19 October. His mission during the following four days was to protect the right flank and rear of Adan's offensive toward Suez, and to mop up by-passed areas of resistance behind Adan.

Shortly before noon on 22 October Magen was ordered to take over from Adan the area where he had cut the main Suez-Cairo Road to permit Adan to drive eastward toward the canal in the Cabrit-Shallufa area. Meeting relatively little resistance, by nightfall Magen held much of the area between Suez and Jebel Ataka.

In the morning of the 23d, after the breakdown of the ceasefire, Magen was ordered to continue his drive southward, to reach the Gulf of Suez near Adabiya and Ras (Point) Adabiya. Beginning shortly after noon, two of Magen's brigades dashed southward about 45 kilometers, against sporadic but ineffective resistance, reaching Ras Adabiya shortly after midnight on the 24th. At dawn the Israelis seized Adabiya, again encountering ineffective resistance.

Significance: By reaching the Red Sea south of Suez, Magen had completely isolated the bulk of the Egyptian Third Army from its commander, and from all the rest of Egypt.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Kuneitra, 6-7 October

On 6 October 1973 three reinforced divisions of the Syrian Army attacked Israeli defenses along a 65-kilometer front on the eastern edge of the Golan Heights. The Syrian plan of attack provided for an initial double breakthrough attempt by the two flank divisions, the 7th Division on the north and the 5th Division on the south. Between them, the 9th Division had the limited mission of advancing south of Kuneitra to seize a line of hills southwest of the city to cut the Israeli lateral communications road, and then remain as a pivot for the two flank divisions making the main effort.

Troops of the Israeli 188th (Barak) Armored Brigade were deployed in front line defenses along the Golan Heights. Units of the 7th Armored Brigade were in reserve positions on the heights. Shortly after the Syrian attack began the commander of the Golan Defense Force, Brigadier General Rafael Eitan assigned responsibility for the area from Kuneitra to the south to Colonel Yitzhak Ben Shoham, commanding the 188th Brigade. Kuneitra, and the area to the north, were assigned to Colonel Avigdor Ben Gal, commanding the 7th Brigade. A battalion of the 188th north of Kuneitra was transferred to Ben Gal. One battalion of the 7th was placed in Command reserve. There were no Israeli troops in Kuneitra, which was an abandoned ghost town.

At 1405 on 6 October, after an intense hour-long air and artillery bombardment, the 9th Division attacked. After some initial confusion due to the leading column's poor road discipline, units of the division broke through the line of Israeli strong points northwest and west of Kudna. Farther north the 9th Division's right-wing brigade was stopped in its advance toward Kuneitra by elements of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade. However, other elements of the division reached their assigned objectives.

On 7 October the Israeli defenses around Kuneitra still held. Israeli reinforcements moved up to the front to help contain the Syrian attack. By the end of the day, the hard pressed Israelis had stopped the Syrian 9th Division's attack everywhere around Kudna. The Israeli situation remained precarious, with Syrian armored reinforcements pouring into the gaps in the Israeli lines south of Kudna and in the southern Golan Heights.

Significance: The successful Israeli defense of Kuneitra denied this important communications center to the Syrian 9th Division.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Ahmadiyah, 6-7 October 1973

At 1405 on 6 October 1973, the Syrian 7th Division attacked near Ahmadiyah as the north prong of a three-pronged attack to recover all or most of the Golan Heights occupied by the Israelis during the 1967 War. Most of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade was in reserve positions around the town of Nafekh.

The 4th Battalion of the Israeli 188th Brigade bore the brunt of the initial Syrian attack between Mount Hermonit on the north and a hill nicknamed "Booster" on the south, which overlooked a small valley just west of the Purple Line, the eastern boundary of the Golan. Soon after the attack began the brigade was placed under the command of the Brigade commander, Colonel Anigdor Ben Gal. Other units of the 7th Brigade were committed beside the 4th Battalion. Because of the danger of a Syrian breakthrough on the southern Golan Heights, Colonel Ben Gal was ordered to transfer one of his battalions to reinforce this threatened sector.

The Syrians lacked road discipline, and engineer vehicles required for bridging an Israeli antitank ditch were delayed in a traffic jam. Under effective Israeli tank fire, Syrian losses mounted, but bridges were finally laid over the ditch. Once across, the Syrian armor was still subjected to devastating fire from Israeli tanks hull-down in prepared ramps on the dominating high ground. By nightfall, Syrian infantry was dug in on an earthen embankment adjacent to the antitank ditch.

The battle continued through the night. Although the Syrians were better equipped with night vision devices than the Israelis, they were unable to push through the valley to high ground, even with intensive artillery support. By the morning of 7 October numerous Syrian tanks were scattered -- damaged and abandoned -- throughout the valley.

At 0800 on 7 October the Syrians renewed their attack against the 7th Brigade. Again, a tenacious Israeli defense stopped the Syrian attack. That night, newly committed Syrian Tanks infiltrated Israeli positions but were halted in a desperate battle as Syrian losses continued to rise.

Significance: Colonel Ben Gal's brigade was able to halt the opening Syrian attack because of superior combat effectiveness and the dominating positions it held. The 7th Brigade's successful defense helped to alleviate the danger the Israelis faced during the first two days of the Syrian attack, but it by no means eliminated the chances of an Israeli disaster.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Rafid, 6/7 October 1973

The Syrian 5th Infantry Division, reinforced by an armored brigade, attacked west on the southern flank of the Syrian front on the afternoon of 6 October. Like the divisions to the north, the 5th bypassed Israeli strongpoints on and behind the Purple Line. This division moved in good order on terrain that was easier for armor and less favorable for defense. The Israeli defenders were from the 188th Armored and Golani Infantry brigades. In spite of the more favorable attack conditions, the Syrians were held up all afternoon by vigorous and repeated Israeli counterattacks. After nightfall, however, the 5th Division made a clean breakthrough and fanned out in three columns. One column moved northwest along the TAP Line and then turned west toward Yehudia and the Arik Bridge. Another column struck south down the road from Rafid toward El Al, and the third drove westward from Ramat Magshimim.

By morning on the 7th of October the northern column had advanced about 10 kilometers, while the others were between Ramat Magshimim and El Al and west of Juhader. The 188th, or Barak Brigade as it was called, had had an almost impossible task with only 90 tanks to cover a front of 40 kilometers. By noon of 7 October the brigade was virtually destroyed as an effective fighting force.

Significance: The 5th Division's breakthrough put Syrian forces within sight of the Sea of Galilee and the Jordan River on 7 October. Only the piecemeal arrival of Israeli reinforcements prevented the complete collapse of the remnants of the Barak Brigade. On the right wing of the 5th Division, the way was open for the Syrian 1st Armored Division to exploit the Syrian penetration and continue the drive to the Jordan River.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Yehudia-E1 Al, 7/8 October 1973

By early afternoon of 7 October 1973, the second day of the Syrian offensive on the Golan Heights, the Syrian 5th Infantry Division threatened to break through Israeli positions in the southern Golan and drive to the Jordan River. The Israeli 188th Brigade was no longer an effective fighting force, and the entire Israeli defense on the Golan was critically endangered. About this time, the 1st Syrian Armored Division was being committed on the right of the 5th Infantry Division as a secondechelon unit exploiting the Syrian breakthrough.

However, elements of the Israeli 240th (Reserve) Armored Division under Major General Dan Laner had been mobilized and began to arrive at the front on the morning of 7 October. Laner committed his units piecemeal to block the path of the Syrian 5th Division. Operating with the remnants of the 188th Brigade, Laner's armor held a last-ditch defensive line on the western edge of the Golan Heights. Determined assaults by units of the Syrian 1st Armored and 5th Infantry divisions failed to break through. By the evening of 7 October, the Syrian attack had been halted, with heavy losses and an increasing shortage of supplies and reinforcements.

On 8 October, Laner's troops took the initiative and began to drive eastward. On the right of Laner's units, Major General Moshe Peled's 146th (Reserve) Armored Division deployed to support the counterattack in the southern Golan.

Significance: A combination of tenacious defense by the shattered 188th Brigade and quick mobilization and intervention by Laner's division prevented a major Syrian victory on the southern Golan Heights.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Nafekh, 7/8 October 1973

On 7 October 1973, the second day of the Syrian offensive on the Golan Heights, the Syrian 1st Armored Division was committed between the left of the 9th Division and the right of the 5th Division. These two infantry units had made substantial penetrations into the Israeli defenses on 6 October, and the 1st Armored Division was to exploit their success and advance to the Jordan River.

On 7 October, the 1st Armored Division penetrated to the Israeli command center at Nafekh. There a mixed force of Israeli units delayed the lead elements of the 1st Armored Division until tanks of the Israeli 79th Armored Brigade arrived from the southwest. A fierce armored battle ensued and lasted through the remaining hours of daylight. By dark the Nafekh position had been secured by the Israelis. Colonel Uri Or, commanding the 79th Armored Brigade, was then able to send elements of his brigade northeast toward Kuneitra, to take positions on the right of the heavily engaged Israeli 7th Armored Brigade.

On the following day, the Israelis seized the initiative in the central and southern Golan. Or's brigade, on the right wing of Brigadier General Rafael Eitan's 36th Mechanized Division, drove east from Nafekh toward Bin Zivan, Sindinia, and Ramtania. This advance was coordinated with movements of other Israeli units to the south and ended the danger of a Syrian breakout to the Jordan River.

Significance: The Syrian 1st Armored Division's spearhead was stopped at Nafekh, and the threat of a Syrian breakthrough in this sector was ended. The Israelis gained the initiative.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Tel Faris, 8-10 October 1973

At 1400 on 8 October 1973, the Israeli 146th Armored Division commanded by Major General Mashe Peled, joined the Israeli counteroffensive in the extreme southern sector of the Golan Heights, the 14th and 19th brigades on the division's left and the 20th Brigade to the southeast on the main northward road through El Al. As the Israeli advance gained ground, the 146th Armored Division's right wing and the left wing of Major General Dan Laner's 240th Armored Division threatened to envelop the Syrian 5th Division. The commander of the 5th Division, Brigadier General Ali Aslan, withdrew his forces and formed a defensive line farther east. By evening the 146th Armored Division's leading elements were attacking a Syrian antitank defense area south of the high ground at Tel Faris.

On 9 October, the 146th Armored Division continued to advance and in the process relieved most of the beleaguered Israeli strongpoints in the southern Golan, including the fortifications on Tel Faris that had been bypassed by the Syrians in the first two days of their offensive. By evening, after stopping several fierce Syrian counterattacks, the 146th Armored Division had reached the original boundary line on the eastern edge of the Golan Heights and advanced beyond in several places. The next day, one of the division's brigades cooperated with Major General Laner's division in encircling and destroying the remnants of two Syrian brigades near Hushniyah.

Significance: By late on 10 October, the Israeli counteroffensive had recaptured most of the ground taken by the Syrians during the first two days of their offensive. Israeli forces were now poised for an advance on to the Damascus Plain.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Hushniyah, 8-10 October 1973

By the morning of 8 October 1973, the Israelis had seized the initiative in the central and southern Golan Heights. Colonel Ran Sarig's 17th Armored Brigade of the Israeli 240th Armored Division commenced driving toward Hushniyah, in coordination with the 79th Armored Brigade, the right wing unit of the 36th Mechanized Division, to the north, and with newly-arrived units of the 146th Armored Division to the south. A final effort by the Syrian 1st Armored Division to take Nafekh was stopped, and after a day of intense fighting, the 17th Armored Brigade reached the Trans-Arabian Pipeline west of Hushniyah.

On 9 October, 240th Armored Division units reached the old ceasefire line in the vicinity of Tel Hazeika, captured Ramtania, and reached Hushniyah. Progress was slow all along the front, and the Syrians counterattacked frequently. On 10 October, with the commitment of the reconstituted Israeli 7th Armored Brigade on the northern Golan, the Israeli advance continued, and one brigade of the 146th Armored Division assisted the 240th Armored Division units in encircling and destroying the remnants of two Syrian brigades near Hushniyah.

Significance: By 10 October most of the ground captured by the Syrians in their offensive had been retaken by Israeli counterattacks. In the central Golan the 240th Armored Division was at the Purple Line, the ceasefire line established after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and was poised to strike eastward into the Damascus Plain.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Mount Hermonit, 8-9 October 1973

Late in the afternoon of 8 October the Syrian 7th Division commander, Brigadier General Omar Abrash, pulled back the depleted units of his first echelon and committed his second echelon. At dusk as he was preparing to attack with his armor he was killed in his tank and the attack postponed until morning. Shortly after dawn on 9 October the attack commenced, and supported by a heavy artillery concentration, the division moved ahead. By 0900 its tanks had reached the saddle between Mount Hermonit and Tel el Mekhafi. A paratroop battalion was landed in helicopters a few kilometers to the northwest. Under intense artillery fire, and threatened with envelopment, the remaining elements of the Israeli 7th Armored Brigade began to fall back. However, Brigadier General Rafael Eitan, the division commander, sent reinforcement, the remnants of the 188th Brigade -- about one battalion strong. At the same time word came by radio from one of the bypassed Israeli strongholds near Ahmadiyeh that the Syrians were starting to pull back.

The Syrians and Israelis had fought each other to a standstill on Mount Hermonit, but the superior training of the Israeli regulars, combined with the death of General Abrash, turned the tide in favor of the Israelis. By evening the Syrians had been driven back to the vicinity of the Purple Line.

Significance: The tenacious defense by the remnants of the Israeli 7th Brigade held the Syrian 7th Division until Israeli reinforcements arrived and stabilized the situation.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Mount Hermon I, 8 October 1973

In October 1973, the Israeli observation post on the southern part of Mount Hermon contained highly sensitive electronics surveillance equipment used to gather intelligence on the Syrian forces opposite the Golan Heights. From the observation post portions of Lebanon, Syria, and Israel are visible, and Syrian defenses facing Israeli positions on the Golan were carefully watched. On 6 October, at the outset of the general Syrian offensive, a Syrian commando raid captured the lightly defended post, driving out or killing the defenders and immediately establishing defensive positions to repulse Israeli counterattacks.

The threat of a Syrian breakthrough on the Golan Heights precluded an Israeli counterattack on 7 October, but on the following day an attempt was made to retake the position. Elements of the crack Golani Brigade attacked up the mountain against Syrian prepared defenses. Anticipating an attack, the Syrians threw back the Golani troops and allowed no gains. For the time being, the Israeli observation post and its excellent view of the Golan remained in Syrian hands.

Significance: The Syrian defeat of the Golani Brigade's counterattack allowed them to retain control of the important Israeli observation post on Mount Hermon.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Tel Shams, 11-13 October 1973

On 11 October at 1100 Eitan's Division advanced across the Purple Line into the Syrian defensive positions, on the left of a two division Israeli offensive. (Laner's Division was on the right; Peled's Division conducted local holding attacks further south.) Eitan's Division attacked with two brigades abreast: the northerly axis was along the foothills of Mount Hermon toward Hader and Mazrat Beit Jan, and the southerly brigade drove due east through Jubat and Hales toward Tel Shams. The Israelis were opposed by the Syrian 7th Infantry Division, reinforced with a tank brigade, and with a Moroccan brigade on its right. By late afternoon both Israeli spearheads had broken through the resistance to their immediate front but were being vigorously counterattacked. The Israelis had hoped that the Syrians, as they had done in 1967, would break and run, but they were soon disappointed as the 7th Infantry Division fought with determination, taking a toll of Israeli armor with their Saggers and RPG-7s.

Meanwhile the 3d Syrian Armored Division moved back into the previously-prepared Saassaa defensive line southwest of Damascus. This division, which had not been committed in the first five days of the battle, was fresh and battleworthy. When the Israeli advance reached the Saassaa line on the 12th and 13th of October, it was halted by these fresh troops. After heavy fighting the Israelis finally took Tel Shams on the night of 13/14 October, and ended their offensive.

Significance: The Israeli effort to drive to Damascus penetrated the Syrian defenses, but the Israelis had not achieved a breakthrough by 13 October.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Tel Shaar, 11-12 October 1973

On the morning of 11 October Israeli Major General Dan Laner's 240th Armored Division attacked eastward from the town of Kuneitra along the main Damascus road. Laner's mission was to aid in the attempt to break through Syrian defenses southwest of Damascus and support Brigadier General Raphael Eitan's 36th Mechanized Division on his left flank, prepared to follow Eitan's advance.

Using the 17th Armored Brigade as a spearhead, with the 79th Armored Brigade providing covering fire, the 240th Armored Division attacked two hours after the 36th Mechanized Division began its offensive. The 17th Brigade was almost immediately held up by determined Syrian resistance and lost a number of tanks. But reserve units of the brigade were committed, and the Israelis broke through to the crossroads at Khan Arnaba. The 79th Brigade proceeded to the northeast and the 19th Brigade to the southeast and the high ground at Tel Shaar against stiff resistance.

The division continued its advance eastward the next morning. At Nasej, elements of the division swung northward to envelop the strong Syrian defenses in front of Saassaa where the Syrian 3d Armored Division was holding up the advance units of the 36th Mechanized Division. From the dominating height of Tel Shaar, Laner observed that arrival of elements of an Iraqi armored division on his Division's right flank. Anticipating an Iraqi counterattack, he deployed his units to meet the Iraqi threat from the south.

But the Iraqi tanks did not counterattack. Nevertheless, their unexpected appearance disrupted Israeli plans and forced Laner to cut short his drive to the north and redeploy his division to fight the Iraqi armor.

Significance: Determined Syrian resistance slowed the Israeli attack; the fortuitous arrival of Iraqi armor, though not part of a planned Arab counteroffensive, forced the Israelis to change their plan of action.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Tel el Hara, 13 October 1973

On 12 October, while Major General Dan Laner's 240th Armored Division attacked northeast on the right wing of the Israeli counter-offensive into Syria, he discovered that Iraqi armored units had arrived south of his division's axis of advance. He called off the attack, and made preparations to meet an Iraqi attack. However, the Iraqis, failing to detect the Israelis, remained unaware that they were in a favorable position to strike the 240th Division's flank. Halting late on 12 October, they inadvertently permitted Laner to deploy his units in a hastily prepared ambush. Deploying his three brigades in a box-like formation facing generally east, leaving only light covering forces to contain the Syrians in the Saassaa line.

At dawn on 13 October, the Iraqis renewed their approach, driving straight into the Israeli trap, unaware that the tanks and artillery of the entire 240th Armored Division were awaiting them. The signal to open fire was given by tanks of the 19th Armored Brigade on the northern side of the ambush, as Iraqi tanks came within 200 meters of them. In a few minutes, many Iraqi tanks, most of them from the 8th Mechanized Brigade, were destroyed, and the Iraqi units were in disorder. Israeli casualties in this one-sided engagement were very low.

Significance: Although the Iraqis had suffered a devastating tactical defeat at the hands of General Laner's division, their presence at the front allowed the Syrians to shift units to the Syrian defensive sector to the north and forced Laner to suspend his enveloping attack against Syrian positions at Saassaa.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Kfar Shams-Tel Antar, 15 October 1973

By the evening of 13 October, the Israeli counteroffensive on the Damascus Plain had reached its farthest advance. Small actions during the next few days caused minor fluctuations in the line around Saassaa, but neither side achieved a breakthrough. On 14 October, the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade entered the front lines against the southern shoulder of the Israeli salient, between the Iraqi Third Armored Division and the Syrian 9th Infantry Division defending against the Israeli right. On 15 October, the Iraqi 3d Armored Division was preparing for a major counterattack west of Kfar Shams early the following morning. The Israelis noted the Iraqi preparations, and at 1600 on 15 October, Major General Dan Lerner launched his 240th Armored Division in a limited spoiling attack against the Iraqis, making a wide envelopment of their right flank, driving them off the high ground on Tel Antar, and forcing them to withdraw about five kilometers.

Significance: The preemptive attack by the Israeli 240th Armored Brigade disrupted the offensive preparations of the Iraqi 3d Armored Division, and resulted in its being unable to attack with the other Arab units the following day.

Source: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Nabe, 16 October 1973

On 14 October, the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade entered the front lines against the south face of the Israeli salient that jutted onto the Damascus Plain east of the Golan Heights. The Jordanians were positioned between the Iraqi 3d Armored Division on the right and the Syrian 9th Infantry Division on the left. Colonel Haled Hajhouj el Majali, commander of the 40th Armored Brigade (who was on that day promoted to brigadier) was placed under the command of the Iraqi 3d Division commander, Brigadier General Lafta.

On 15 October, Lafta was ordered by the Syrian Chief of Staff, Major General Youssef Chakkour, to plan for a major counterattack on the following morning which would include the 40th Armored Brigade. The Israelis noted the Iraqi preparations and launched a limited spoiling attack against the Iraqis, forcing them to withdraw about five kilometers.

As scheduled, the Jordanians, plus an attached Saudi Arabian contingent, and a Syrian brigade near Um Butne, attacked at 0500 on 16 October, only to discover that the Iraqis were not taking part. The attackers failed to gain any ground and by 0900 withdrew after suffering moderate losses. At about 1000 the Iraqis belatedly began their counterattack and were stopped immediately by the waiting Israelis. A few hours later the 40th Armored Brigade was detached from the Iraqi division and placed under the Syrian 9th Division.

Significance: Lack of coordination among the Arab units participating in the 16 October counterattack contributed to the failure of the action. The Israelis detected Arab preparations and were well prepared. Their readiness helped to prevent any Arab penetrations of the Israeli line.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Arab Counteroffensive, 19 October 1973

On 17 and 18 October, for the first time since the 1973 October War began, there was a lull all along the Syrian front. The Israelis took advantage of this lull to send Major General Moshe Peled's 146th Armored Division to relieve Major General Dan Lerner's fatigued 240th Armored Division on the eastern and southern faces of the Israeli salient on the Damascus Plain. Several battalions from all three Israeli divisions on the Syrian front were shifted south to the Sinai.

On 19 October the Syrian front again erupted into considerable activity with a series of Arab counterattacks. The principal Arab effort was against the south face of the Israeli salient, with Iraqi, Jordanian, and Syrian forces taking part. There was little coordination, however, between these individual attacks, and the Israelis had little trouble in beating them back - despite the fact that some units had been pulled out to go to the Sinai front. Late on the previous day the Israelis had occupied Um Butne; on 19 October they consolidated their hold on this town.

Significance: The Israelis had settled into prepared defensive positions and beat back all Arab counterattacks. Lacking coordination, the piecemeal attack of 19 October failed to penetrate Israeli positions.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Mount Hermon II, 21 October 1973

The Israeli observation post on Mount Hermon had been seized by the Syrians in a airborne and ground assault on 6 October 1973, the first day of the Syrian Golan offensive. On 21 October, the observation post was still in Syrian hands, defended by troops of a paratroop brigade who had improved the fortified positions on the high ground. An Israeli attempt to retake the position on 8 October had failed.

On 21 October, the Israeli 1st Infantry (Golani) Brigade attempted once again to retake the Mount Hermon observation post in a combined ground and helicopter assault. The effort failed, and at 1600, as the Israelis were pulling back, they were hit by Syrian fighter-bombers. Immediately, waiting Israeli fighters swept in to meet the attackers, and an air battle broke out over Mount Hermon.

Significance: Despite the Golani Brigade's efforts, the Mount Hermon observation post still remained in Syrian hands at the end of 21 October. With a UN-imposed ceasefire expected, it was crucial for the Israelis to capture the position to retain its commanding view of the Golan Heights before ceasefire lines were drawn up. One more attempt at recapture was planned for the following day.

Sources: X.2; X.3.

THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (GOLAN FRONT)

Mount Hermon III, 22 October 1973

On 21 October, after an unsuccessful Israeli attempt to retake the Mount Hermon observation post on the northern Golan Heights, Syrian helicopters flew in reinforcements and supplies for the paratroop brigade defending on Mount Hermon. On 22 October the Israelis launched another combined ground and helicopter assault. This was a larger and better planned attack than that of the previous day, involving not only the 1st Infantry (Golani) Brigade but also an airdrop of most of the 31st Paratroop Brigade.

While the Golani Brigade attacked the former Israeli observation post, the paratroopers made a surprise drop beside the Syrian observation post, higher up on the ridge and close to the summit of Mount Hermon. The Syrians, recognizing the threat to their position, attempted a heliborne counterattack against the Israeli paratroopers. However, after three large helicopters were shot down, they called off the effort.

The Israeli paratroopers then quickly overran and secured the Syrian position and began to move down the ridge to assist the Golani Brigade. The Golani units, advancing on the ground and by helicopter, had already surrounded their former observation post and were beginning a final assault. This attack was successful, and between 1930 and 2000 the Israelis secured their old observation post.

Significance: The Israelis retook their observation post on Mount Hermon after the scheduled UN ceasefire.

Source: X.2; X.3.

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