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ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED OUTCOMES
OF BATTLES AND WARS:
A DATA BASE OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS



Final Report

Prepared for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency
under Contract No.
MDA903-82-C-0363

June 1983

VOLUME II

HERO Summary and Introductory Materials
Part One: Wars of the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries
Volume II: Wars from 1600 through 1800

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Table of Contents

HERO SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS:

Summary	1
Introduction	1
Organization, Definitions, and Abbreviations	5
Appendix A: HERO's Mission Accomplishment Worksheet	25

BATTLE DATA: WARS FROM 1600 THROUGH 1800

List of Engagements Analyzed and Described in Volume II	1
The Netherlands' War of Independence and the Thirty Years' War	
Tables and Matrices	8
Narratives of Engagements	20
The English Civil Wars	
Tables and Matrices	41
Narratives of Engagements	47
European Wars, 1648-1678	
Tables and Matrices	56
Narratives of Engagements	68
European Wars, 1685-1718	
Tables and Matrices	78
Narratives of Engagements	96
The War of the Austrian Succession	
Tables and Matrices	112
Narratives of Engagements	118
The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745	
Tables and Matrices	125
Narratives of Engagements	131
The Seven Years' War	
Tables and Matrices	133
Narratives of Engagements	145
The American Revolution	
Tables and Matrices	163
Narratives of Engagements	175
The French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars through 1800	
Tables and Matrices	189
Narratives of Engagements	201
Bibliographies	223

Summary

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED OUTCOMES OF BATTLES AND WARS: A DATA BASE OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

In this report prepared by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency, HERO has compiled data on 600 major battles of modern history from the beginning of the 17th Century through the first three quarters of the 20th Century, and presented this data in a combination of matrices and narratives. The matrices comprise seven tables which present all of the significant statistical data available on the battles and show how major factors of combat have influenced the outcomes of these battles. There is a concise narrative for each battle, which summarizes the principal sources consulted in the research for that battle. The data, information, and analysis are presented in Volumes II-VI, as follows:

- Volume II: 1600-1800
- Volume III: 1805-1900
- Volume IV: 1904-1940
- Volume V: 1939-1945
- Volume VI: 1939-1973

This volume covers wars from 1600-1800.

ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT HAVE INFLUENCED
OUTCOMES OF BATTLES AND WARS:
A DATA BASE OF BATTLES AND ENGAGEMENTS

Introduction to Final Report

This study was performed by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO) pursuant to Contract MDA903-82-C-0363, for the US Army Concepts Analysis Agency (USACAA).

The purpose of this study was to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the factors that have significantly influenced the outcomes of the major battles of modern history, commencing with the Netherlands' War of Independence and the Thirty Years' War, and continuing through the Fourth Arab-Israeli War of 1973, to develop a matrix of significant factors concerning conflict as they relate to battle situations in past wars.

The 500 battles and engagements which are included are described and analyzed in Volumes II-VI and have been arbitrarily divided chronologically into two parts and five roughly equal groups, as follows:

- 1600-1800 Part One: Wars of the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries
 Volume II: Wars from 1600 through 1800
- 1805-1900 Part One: Wars of the 17th, 18th, and 19th Centuries
 Volume III: Wars from 1805 through 1900
- 1904-1939 Part Two: Wars of the 20th Century
 Volume IV: Wars from 1904 through 1939; the Russo-Japanese War, the Balkan Wars, World War I, the Russo-Polish War, the Spanish Civil War, the Mongolian and Manchurian Incidents, and the Russo-Finnish War.

- 1939-1945 Part Two: Wars of the 20th Century
Volume V: World War II, 1939-1945; Campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe.
- 1939-1973 Part Two: Wars of the 20th Century
Volume VI: World War II, 1939-1945; Campaigns in France, 1940, on the Eastern Front, and of the War Against Japan. The 1967, 1968, and 1973 Arab-Israeli Wars.

It will be noted that the majority of the battles and engagements included were fought in the 20th Century, and that about 30 percent of the total number were fought in or since World War II.

The authors of this work recognize that there has been no military historical effort of comparable scope, even though the need for such a work has long been recognized. The closest thing to such an effort is the massive Kriegslexicon of Gaston Bodart (Vienna, 1908) which -- while including more battles, and also a large number of sieges -- made no attempt to provide as much detail on the battles as does this work; its statistical contents are also less than completely reliable. Nevertheless, the authors of this work must acknowledge their substantial debt to Bodart and his Kriegslexicon; it was consulted for most of the battles which we have included through the Russo-Japanese War.

In reviewing what we have done in preparing this report, it is obvious to the authors that the value of the work -- both historically and for purposes of military analysis -- can be substantially enhanced in the future in the following respects:

- There is a need for inclusion of all the important battles that contributed to the outcome of any significant war that we have included (and possibly a few minor wars that we have overlooked). The reason for this is that it is not possible to make an overall assessment of the war itself, or even its campaigns -- as opposed to the individual battles we have considered in detail here -- without being reasonably

certain that the whole picture, quantitatively and qualitatively, is available to the analyst.

- There is a need to review the contents of this work in terms of types of operation -- including such specialized operations as river crossings, mountain warfare, and operations in desert and arctic regions -- to be sure that the contents reflect a suitable sample of actual historical experience in all kinds of operations. Again, the analyst will be able to benefit if he has assurance that the coverage of any specialized type of operation is truly representative, and reasonably comprehensive.

- There is need for a substantial sampling of wars and battles before the 17th Century. This is not just for reasons that might be considered pedantically historical. Rather, it is perceived as a service to analysts who are interested in war as a human experience, from which important insights, and even lessons, can be drawn. Again, such analysts will have more confidence in the results of their work if they can be certain of the universality and comprehensiveness of their data base.

- Possibly most important, there is a need for the most thorough, rigorous, and critical review of the contents of this work as herein presented. What we have done here has been based upon a truly massive research effort, but the work has been carried out in a very short period of time, considering the nature of the subject matter. We know there are sources which, when located, will enable us to fill some of the gaps, expand and correct some of the narrative details, and thus some of the analytical assessments, as well as to be more precise in our statistics.

This latter point is an important one. We do not wish either to be overmodest or to claim too much. We know we have -- within strict limitations in time -- produced a work of which we can be proud. We are equally aware that the combination of those time strictures and our own limitations has resulted in a work that is less than perfect. We hope it can be perfected, and thus we welcome all responsible comments, suggestions, and criticisms.

The one person most responsible for the strengths of this work is HERO's Executive Director for Research, C. Curtiss Johnson. Next most responsible is HERO's former Vice President, now retired, Grace P. Hayes. Other staff members who have made significant contributions are: Brian Bader, Arnold Dupuy, Michael Eisenstadt, Gay M. Hammerman, Paul Martell, Edward Oppenheimer, Brendan Rehm, Richard G. Sheridan, and Charles R. Smith. All of us are indebted to the secretarial staff that has helped us put this together, including Alane A. Fraser, Robyn Lucas, Virginia Rufner, and Mary Stolzenbach, and to Vicki Stumpf, HERO's Executive Director for Administration. The undersigned admits his own substantial contribution to the details, the concept, and the organization of this work, and assumes full responsibility for it.

T.N. Dupuy
Col., USA, Ret.
President

ORGANIZATION, DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Organization

The battles and engagements treated in this work have been divided, by chronology, into five approximately equal groups, defined by the following time periods:

- 17th and 18th Centuries (1600-1800; Volume II)
- 19th Century (1805-1900; Volume III)
- early 20th Century (1904-1940; Volume IV)
- mid-20th Century to 1945 (1939-1945; Volume V)
- 20th Century since 1939 (1939-1973; Volume VI)

Within each time period, major wars are listed, and within each war significant details of a number of selected battles and engagements are presented. In the cases of wars from which we have selected only a few engagements, all these engagements are often grouped together, primarily for organizational simplicity.

For each major war, or group of wars, we have prepared a comprehensive matrix in which we have attempted to summarize all important elements of data and qualitative information concerning each battle, plus a historical assessment of the factors that were important to the course of the battle and its outcome. Following each such matrix or group of matrices are narrative summaries of the battles listed in the matrix or matrices. These narrative summaries include a brief assessment of the significance of the battle, and also list the sources consulted with respect to the presentation for that battle.

Discussed below are the significant definitions for each of the seven major tables of the matrix, as well as the abbreviations and symbols used for the presentation.

Definitions

All terms defined below were developed by HERO and are used in this

report to characterize the nature and outcomes of the various engagements analyzed.

The terms and the definitions developed for each of them are as follows:

Table 1. Identification (For abbreviations see p. 19)

A. Engagement

-- In this report the term is used in a broad sense and comprehends significant combat encounters between hostile forces at various levels of aggregation from small unit up to and including corps, army, and army group. The descriptor used in each case provides the engagement name and (in Table 1 only) the geopolitical area in which the engagement took place.

B. Dates

-- The point or period of time at or within which a particular engagement takes place. Overnight engagements are designated by the use of the virgule [/]. For example, the date of the overnight engagement at Rafid during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war is given as 6/7 October 1973, not 6-7 October, which would indicate a two-day engagement (see the definition of engagement duration below).

C. Campaign

-- The recognized or appropriate designation for a connected series of military operations forming a distinct stage in a war.

D. War

-- A contest by military force, involving extreme violence, waged between two or more nations, states, or other politically organized bodies.

E. Attacker

-- That military force which, at the beginning or in the first phase of an engagement, initiates and sustains significant

offensive action against its opponent.

F. Defender

-- That force which, at the outset or in the first phase of an engagement, chooses to maintain or is forced to adopt a defensive posture.

G. Attacker CO

-- The officer or general officer who exercises command over the defending force.

H. Defender CO

-- The officer or general officer who exercises command over the defending force.

I. Duration

-- The extent of time, expressed in number of days, during which an engagement takes place. For purposes of this report, a portion of a day is considered a full day. The sole (and logical) exception to this rule occurs in cases of overnight engagements in which significant combat began in the late afternoon or evening of one day and was concluded before noon of the following day. In such cases the engagements are considered one-way engagements, since the duration was less than 24 hours.

J. Width of Front

-- The space from side to side or flank to flank occupied or covered by a force just before the onset of the engagement. This distance is measured in kilometers, the measurement generally following the front and ignoring minor salients or reentrants. Where there is a significant difference between the fronts occupied by the opposing forces in an engagement, the width of the attacker's front is entered as the descriptor.

Table 2. Operational and Environmental Variables (For abbreviations see p. 21)

A. Defender Posture

-- The level of resistance to, or protection from, any

and all forms of enemy attack. Five basic levels are identified for purposes of this study:

Hasty defense: A defense normally organized while in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. It is characterized by improvement of the natural defensive strength of the terrain by utilization of foxholes, emplacements, and obstacles; if occupied for a protracted period the hasty defense position can be improved to the status of prepared or fortified defense.

Prepared defense: A defense system prepared by a defender who has had time to organize the defensive position, but which (due to lack of time or resources) has less than the strength of a fortified position.

Fortified defense: A comprehensive, coordinated defense system prepared by a defender with sufficient time to complete planned entrenchments, field fortifications, and obstacles in such a manner as to permit the most effective possible employment of defensive firepower.

Delay (delaying action): A retrograde movement in which, in successive positions, the defender inflicts maximum delay and damage on an advancing enemy to gain time, without becoming decisively engaged in combat or being outflanked.

Withdrawal from action: A retrograde maneuver whereby a force disengages from combat, or contact with an enemy force, in accordance with the will of its commander. Frequently,

it should be noted, descriptors entered in this category reflect a defensive posture best defined as a combination or average of two of the five basic categories. For example, a defender may adopt two postures during the course of an engagement, or the level of defensive preparation may not be uniform across a lengthy front or throughout the depth of a defended zone.

B. Terrain

-- The nature of the ground on which the engagement was fought, described by its most prominent characteristics.

C. Weather

-- The meteorological conditions prevailing at the time of the engagement, described generally.

D. Season

-- The season during which the engagement took place: spring, summer, fall, or winter. This descriptor is valuable principally for providing a rough measure of the hours of daylight available for the employment of weapons.

E. Surprise

-- For each engagement considered, a determination was made as to whether or not surprise had been achieved by one side or the other, and if it had been, by whom and to what degree.

Surprise is here defined as a condition which comes into existence when one military force (or its commander) is able to confront the opponent with circumstances that the opponent did not anticipate or adequately provide for. Surprise may be achieved with respect to time, place, or performance.

For this study, three degrees of surprise were posited: complete, substantial, and minor. Assessments of the degree of surprise achieved were subjective military historical judgments based on the historical record.

F. Air Superiority

-- This factor is applied only to engagements of World War I (where applicable) and later. It identifies the side whose air force has established a degree of capability over the opposing air force which permits it to conduct air operations at the time and place of the engagement without prohibitive interference from the opposing air force.

Table 3. Strengths and Combat Outcomes

This table presents, for attacker and defender, quantitative descriptors of personnel strengths, battle casualties, and, for major items of materiel, strengths and losses. It also provides, for battles fought before the advent of the tank in warfare, an indicator of the successful force, whether attacker, defender, or both sides. (This column, labelled "Success," was omitted from Table 3 on the matrices for battles fought since the advent of the tank in order to make room for columns providing quantitative data on tank strengths and losses.) Finally, the table shows the distance advanced, in kilometers, on a per day basis.

A. Strength

-- This category provides, where appropriate or known, data on the personnel and major materiel strengths of the opposing forces.

1. Total [personnel]. The sum, at the start of an engagement, of all personnel subject to enemy fire, including generally combat and combat support troops but also service troops if subject to enemy fire. For lengthy engagements in which both sides were significantly reinforced after the beginning of the engagement, an average of the daily start strength(s) was entered.
2. The number of mounted troops, including dragoons and mounted infantry, at the start of the engagement. This category was employed for engagements prior to World War I.
3. Artillery Pieces. Complete projectile-firing weapons,

including cannon, artillery mortars, and multiple rocket launchers.

4. Armor. Armored track-laying vehicles mounting a cannon-type weapon. In this report the armor total includes tanks, armored, self-propelled antitank guns, and armored assault guns, such as the World War II German sturmgeschutz. Where the available data permits, the armor total is further broken-down according to whether the armored vehicles employed were light or MBT (i.e., main battle tank). This breakdown was made according to the standards or nomenclature employed by the user force. In the absence of such guidance, the following criteria were employed to differentiate between the two categories:

a. Light. Includes armored fighting vehicles up to 25 tons in weight, usually fast and mobile, with primary missions of security and reconnaissance.

Does not include armored cars, halftracks, infantry carriers, and armored infantry fighting vehicles.

b. MBT. Armored fighting vehicles over 26 tons in weight; including, generally, the principal AFV of armored divisions with the primary mission of engaging and defeating the enemy's armor, all self-propelled antitank guns, and all armored assault guns.

5. Air Sorties. The number of single aircraft missions flown by aircraft against enemy targets in the engagement area. The number includes sorties by fighter, fighter-bomber, and bomber aircraft.

B. Battle Casualties.

-- The number of personnel killed, wounded, or missing (including prisoners) during the engagement. Does not include personnel losses resulting from illness, disease, or non-battle injuries. Battle casualties are entered as

the arithmetical total over the course of the engagement (not including prisoners taken in pursuit following the termination of significant combat) and as a figure representing percent per day casualties.

C. Artillery Pieces Lost.

-- Artillery pieces destroyed, damaged (i.e., out of action for at least one day), or captured as a result of enemy action. Such losses are entered as an arithmetical total and as a figure representing percent per day losses.

D. Armor Losses.

-- Tanks and other AFVs (according to the definition above) destroyed, damaged, or captured as a result of enemy action. Such losses are entered as an arithmetical total and as a figure representing percent per day losses.

E. Aircraft Losses.

-- Combat aircraft lost as a result of enemy action. Such losses are represented as an arithmetical total and as a figure representing aircraft losses calculated on a percent sorties per day basis.

In all cases above involving enumerations or figures, instances in which a number is not known or is not ascertainable from the historical record are indicated by a "?". In such cases it was not possible to calculate percent per day or percent per sortie rates for casualties and materiel losses (or no loss occurred); in these cases the use of a dash ["--"] indicates the absence of a calculable figure. The same system applies to calculations of advance rates, although in this case the use of a dash indicates that the defender had no measurable advance.

F. Success

-- The victor, if not apparent from the decisive resolution of the combat in favor of one side or the other, is determined by an assessment of the extent to which each side was successful in accomplishing its mission. In many engagements, neither side can be designated the victor. Success is designated by the entry of an "x" in the line for attacker or defender. In drawn battles or battles in which both sides attained success, an "x" is entered

for both attacker and defender.

G. Distance Advanced

-- The distance, in kilometers, from the line of departure to the farthest point reached by significant maneuver elements of the attacking force, measured along the axis of advance. The distance advanced, if negligible, is indicated by an 'N'; if unknown or not ascertainable from the record, it is indicated by a "?".

Table 4. Intangible Factors (Indicators). (For abbreviations see p. 23)

For each of these factors, judgments based on the military historical record are made. These judgments assess whether the factor was:

- a. Comparable for both sides
- b. No factor
- c. Advantage
- d. Disadvantage

With respect to the
attacker and defender in
each engagement analyzed

A. Combat Effectiveness

-- A complex factor, subsuming--among other elements--leadership, training and experience, morale, and logistics.

B. Leadership

-- The art of influencing others to cooperate to achieve a common goal, including, for military leaders at all command strata, tactical competence and initiative.

C. Training and Experience.

-- Training: the relative adequacy of instruction and preparation to meet the exigencies of campaign and combat.

-- Experience: the relative amount of time spent under field and combat conditions, thus gaining knowledge, skills, and techniques otherwise unavailable.

D. Morale

-- Prevailing mood and spirit conducive to willing and dependable performance, steadiness, self-control, and courageous, determined conduct despite danger and privations.

E. Logistics

-- Supply capability.

- F. Momentum
 - An advantage comprised of both space and time factors and having to do with impetus.
- G. Intelligence
 - Information about the organization, dispositions, intentions, and activities of the forces of the opponent.
- H. Technology
 - The application of scientific knowledge, methods, or research to the art of warfare.
- I. Initiative
 - An advantage gained by acting first, and thus forcing the opponent to respond to one's own plans and actions, instead of being able to follow his own plans.

Table 5. Outcome

This table provides assessments of combat outcomes in three categories: Victor, Distance Advanced, and Mission Accomplishment. The definitions of these categories are:

- A. Victor
 - The definition of victory is identical to that employed to assess success (see the definition of success, Table 3, Entry F, above).
- B. Distance Advanced (kilometers/day)
 - Identical to the definition for the same entry in Table 3, Entry G, above.
- C. Mission Accomplishment.
 - The numerical score on a scale of 0-10 indicates the extent to which each force was successful in accomplishing its mission. The score is determined by the use of HERO's Mission Accomplishment Worksheet (see Appendix A). The Mission Accomplishment Worksheet is a score sheet which allows the assignment of quantitative values of from 0-2 in each of five categories determined to indicate the relative success or failure of a force in accomplishing its mission during an engagement. The scores awarded in each category are totalled to give the total

mission accomplishment score. Scores assigned are the result of the application of experienced subjective military historical judgment. Occasionally, as the blank score sheet indicates, penalties or bonus points may be deducted or awarded for extraordinarily poor or good performances in one or more of the five categories. Definitions of the five elements of mission accomplishment follow:

1. Conceptual Accomplishment. The relative success or failure of the force in executing the operational plan of the commander.
2. Geographical Accomplishment. The relative success or failure of the force in taking or holding positions or position areas in conformity with the operational plan of the commander.
3. Prevent Hostile Mission. The relative success or failure of a force in denying to the enemy the fulfillment of his objectives.
4. Command and Staff Performance. An evaluation of the efficiency and efficacy of the decisions made and actions taken by the officers in command and staff positions in connection with the onset, course, and outcome of an engagement.
5. Troop Performance. An evaluation of the overall combat efficiency and effectiveness of the troops engaged in the course of an engagement.

Table 6. Factors Affecting Outcome (For abbreviations see p. 23)

Here are listed those factors, tangible and intangible, that seem to have had particular effect upon battle outcomes; the extent to which these are relevant in each battle is indicated. The factors are:

Force Quality. The relative combat capability of the forces engaged, including the quality of lower-level and intermediate leadership, but not that of top leadership, which is considered to be a discrete factor.

Reserves. The extent to which reserves were available and were committed in a timely manner.

Mobility superiority. The relative quality or numbers of mounted forces, whether horse, horse-drawn, or automotive, expressed in terms of tanks and armored and unarmored vehicles.

Air Superiority. The effect one force's command of the air space above the battlefield, if present, had on the outcome of the engagement.

Terrain, Roads. The extent to which terrain considerations affected one side to a significantly greater extent than the other.

Leadership. The relative capability of top leadership.

Planning. The relative effectiveness of pre-battle plans and preparations.

Surprise. How surprise, if present, aided one side or the other.

Maneuver. The effect of a commander's decision, and action implementing the decision, to position his forces for optimum effectiveness in accomplishing his mission, to include the massing of forces on a narrow front.

Logistics. The extent to which logistics influenced a battle, remembering that the effects of logistics usually affect a campaign, rather than a single battle.

Fortifications. The influence of a defender's fortifications.

Depth. The impact of either the attacker or defender being arrayed in depth.

Table 7. Combat Forms and Resolution (For abbreviations see p. 24)

This table permits representation, through symbols and abbreviations, of the general nature of the combat in a battle, in terms of force dispositions and maneuver, plus representation of the outcome and immediate after-effects of the battle or engagement. This is shown in terms of the following:

Main attack and scheme of defense: Abbreviations show various forms of deployment and maneuver of both sides.

Secondary attack: This is shown in the same fashion.

Success: Indicates which side was successful.

Resolution: Shows what happened as a result of the battle to both sides.

Bibliographical Note

Lists of sources consulted in the course of research for each volume are appended to each volume. These bibliographies are arranged by group, each group representing a block of sources, either general, that is, consulted frequently for many of the engagements researched, or specific, that is, consulted only for engagements in a particular subset of engagements--for example, the 17th Century.

Each block of sources is assigned a letter which identifies it for reference purposes. When sources are cited following each engagement narrative, this letter is the first element of the citation.

Individual sources--books, articles, etc.--are organized in alphabetical order within each block. Each source is assigned a number which identifies it for reference purposes. This number is the second element of each citation; it follows the block letter identifier and is separated from it by a point. For example, the source identified as "A.1" is Gaston Bodart's Kriegslexicon: the "A" is a reference to the General Bibliography (block A), and the "1" refers to the first entry in that block of sources.

Occasionally it is necessary to provide an identifier for the volume number of a work cited. When this is done an arabic number citing the referenced volume is utilized and forms the third element of the citation, separated from the source identifier by a point. For example, "B.9.5" is a reference to volume 5 of source B.9, the Documenta Bohemica. The one exception to this rule is in the citation of individual volumes of the 16-volume British official history of operations on the Western Front during World War I. In this case individual volumes are referenced as in the original--by year of operation and volume. For example, the citation L.9.1916.2 is a reference to the second volume of the British official history's account of operations on the Western Front during 1916.

Note on Primary Sources

The research for volumes IV-VI of this report has utilized original records to the extent they were available and accessible. Generally, the original records searched fall into four categories: 1) the operational

records of US units in World War II, on deposit at the US National Archives, or, in the cases of the US 1st and 2d Divisions in World War I (and the German units opposing them), on deposit at the Library of Congress, the US Military History Institute (USMHI), Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, and the US Marine Corps Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 2) The operational records (War Diaries) of British units in World War II, on deposit at the Public Record Office, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, England; 3) The operational records of German and Italian units in World War II, on deposit with the US National Archives; and 4) The extensive collection of historical manuscripts (Foreign Military Studies) written by German officers for the Historical Division, Headquarters, US Army, Europe, during the immediate post-World War II period. These manuscripts are on deposit at the US National Archives and the USMHI, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Abbreviations and Symbols

A system of abbreviations and symbols is used for matrix entries. These are shown below.

Table 1: Identification

The symbols used in this table are as follows:

National or Other Forces, Units, and Ranks

Am	American
Amph	Amphibious
Armd	Armored
Aus	Austrian
Bav	Bavarian
Bde	Brigade
Bn	Battalion
Boer	Boer
Boh	Bohemian
Br	British
Br Exped Force	British Expeditionary Force
Brig	Brigadier
Brig Gen	Brigadier General
Bul	Bulgarian
Cav	Cavalry
Col	Colonel
Cov	Scots Covenanter
CCA	Combat Command A
CCB	Combat Command B
CCR	Combat Command Reserve
CG	Commanding General
Co	Company
Cos	Companies
Cr Pr	Crown Prince
CS	Confederate States [of America]
Cumb'd	Cumberland
Dan	Danish

Det	Detachment
Dk	Duke
Du	Dutch
Eg	Egyptian
elms	Elements
Eng	English
Eth	Ethiopian
Fld	Field
FM	Field Marshal
Ft Rgt	Foot Regiment
Fr	French
Ger	German
Gds	Guards
Gr	Grenadier
Han	Hanoverian
Imp	Imperialist
Ind Inf Bn	Independent Infantry Battalion (Japanese)
Is	Israeli
It	Italian
Jap	Japanese
Jgr	Jaeger
Jor	Jordanian
KG	Kampfgruppe (German combat team)
Mam	Mameluke
Mar	Marine
Mech	Mechanized
Mes	Mesopotamian
Mex	Mexican
MG	Major General
Para	Paratroop
Parl	Parliament
PG	Panzer Grenadier
Pied	Piedmontese (Piedmont-Savoy or Piedmont-Sardinia)
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army

Pol	Polish
Port	Portuguese
Pr	Prussian
Prot	Protestant
Reb	Rebel
Res	Reserve
Rgt	Regiment
Rom	Romanian
Roy	Royalist
Russ	Russian
Sax	Saxon
Serb	Serbian
Sp	Spanish
Sp Rep	Spanish Republican
Spec Estab Rgt	Special Established Regiment (Japanese)
Sov	Soviet
Sw	Swedish
Syr	Syrian
TF	Task Force
Tk	Turk
U/I	Unidentified [unit]
US	United States
VG	Volks Grenadier
Vol	Volunteers
(+)	Reinforced
(-)	Elements, part, or a portion of a unit

Table 2. Operational and Environmental Variables

Defender Posture:

- HD - Hasty defense
- PD - Prepared defense
- FD - Fortified defense
- WDL - Withdrawal
- Del - Delay

Terrain:

RD - Rolling, desert
RgB - Rugged, bare
RgM - Rugged, mixed
RgW - Rugged, heavily wooded
RB - Rolling, bare
RM - Rolling, mixed
RW - Rolling, heavily wooded
FB - Flat, bare
FM - Flat, mixed
FW - Flat, heavily wooded
FD - Flat, desert
R Dunes - Rolling dunes
U - Urban or built-up area
M - Marsh or swamp

Weather:

DSH - Dry, sunshine, hot
DST - Dry, sunshine, temperate
DSC - Dry, sunshine, cold
DOH - Dry, overcast, hot
DOT - Dry, overcast, temperate
DOC - Dry, overcast, cold
WLH - Wet, light, hot
WLT - Wet, light, temperate
WLC - Wet, light, cold
WHH - Wet, heavy, hot
WHT - Wet, heavy, temperate
WHC - Wet, heavy, cold

Season:

<u>Months</u>	<u>Northern Hemisphere</u>	<u>Southern Hemisphere</u>
March, April, May	Spring	Fall
June, July, August	Summer	Winter
September, October, November	Fall	Spring
December, January, February	Winter	Summer

Season Codes

SpT	- Spring, temperate
ST	- Summer, temperate
FT	- Fall, temperate
WT	- Winter, temperate
SpTr	- Spring, tropical
STr	- Summer, tropical
FTr	- Fall, tropical
WTr	- Winter, tropical
SpD	- Spring, desert
SD	- Summer, desert
FD	- Fall, desert
WD	- Winter, desert

Surprise

- Y: Surprise achieved.
N: Surprise did not influence outcome of battle.
x: Symbol showing which side achieved surprise.

Table 4. Intangible Factors

- C: Comparable for both sides
N: Not a Factor
x: Advantage
0: Disadvantage

Table 5. Outcome

- x: Designates successful side
N: Negligible advance

Table 6. Factors affecting Outcome

- Same as for Table 4, with the following additions:
x: Advantage decisively affecting outcome
0: Disadvantage decisively affecting outcome

Table 7. Combat Forms and Resolution

Main Attack plan and Scheme of Defense:

F: Frontal attack
E: Single envelopment
EE: Double envelopment
FE: Feint, demonstration, or holding attack
D: Defensive plan
D/O: Defensive-offensive plan
(LF) Left flank
(RF) Right flank
(LR) Left flank and/or rear
(RR) Right flank and/or rear
P: Penetration
RivC: River crossing
--: No secondary attack

Success: Indicated by an "x"

Resolution:

S: Stalemate
R: Repulse
P: Penetration
B: Breakthrough
WD: Withdraw
WDL: Withdraw with serious loss
A: Annihilated
Ps: Pursued

Appendix A

Mission Accomplishment Worksheet

Engagement name: _____

Engagement date: _____

Assessment date: _____

Assessor's Initials: _____

Attacker

Unit: _____

Conceptual Accomplishment:

0

1

2

Geographical Accomplishment:

0

1

2

Block Hostile Mission:

0

1

2

Command and Staff Performance:

0

1

2

Troop Performance:

0

1

2

Bonus or Penalty:

Explain: _____

Defender

Unit: _____

Conceptual Accomplishment:

0

1

2

Geographical Accomplishment:

0

1

2

Block Hostile Mission:

0

1

2

Command and Staff Performance:

0

1

2

Troop Performance:

0

1

2

Bonus or Penalty:

Explain: _____

Total Score: _____

Total Score: _____

Table of Contents

List of Engagements Analyzed and Described in Volume II	1
The Netherlands' War of Independence and the Thirty Years' War	
Tables and Matrices	8
Narratives of Engagements	20
The English Civil Wars	
Tables and Matrices	41
Narratives of Engagements	47
European Wars, 1648-1678	
Tables and Matrices	56
Narratives of Engagements	68
European Wars, 1685-1718	
Tables and Matrices	78
Narratives of Engagements	96
The War of the Austrian Succession	
Tables and Matrices	112
Narratives of Engagements	118
The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745	
Tables and Matrices	125
Narratives of Engagements	131
The Seven Years' War	
Tables and Matrices	133
Narratives of Engagements	145
The American Revolution	
Tables and Matrices	163
Narratives of Engagements	175
The French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars through 1800	
Tables and Matrices	189
Narratives of Engagements	201
Bibliographies	223

ENGAGEMENTS ANALYZED AND DESCRIBED IN VOLUME II

The Seventeenth Century

Netherlands' War of Independence

Nieuport (the Dunes) 2 Jul 1600

Thirty Years' War

White Hill (Weisser Berg) 8 Nov 1620

Wimpfen 6 May 1622

Dessau Bridge 25 Apr 1626

Lutter 27 Aug 1626

Breitenfeld I 17 Sep 1631

The Lech 15-16 Apr 1632

Alte Veste 3-4 Sep 1632

Luetzen 16 Nov 1632

Nordlingen I 6 Sep 1634

Wittstock 4 Oct 1636

Breitenfeld II 2 Nov 1642

Rocroi 19 May 1643

Tuttlingen 24 Nov 1643

Freiburg 3-9 Aug 1644

Jankau 6 Mar 1645

Mergentheim 2 May 1645

Allerheim (Nordlingen II) 3 Aug 1645

Lens 10 Aug 1648

English Civil War

Edgehill 23 Oct 1642

The Seventeenth Century (Continued)

English Civil War

Marston Moor 2 Jul 1644

Tippermuir 1 Sep 1644

Kilsyth 15 Aug 1644

Newbury II 27 Sep 1644

Naseby 14 Jun 1645

Second English Civil War

Preston 17-19 Aug 1648

Dunbar 3 Sep 1650

Worcester 3 Sep 1651

The Fronde, 1648-1653

St. Antoine 5 Jul 1652

Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659

The Dunes 14 Jun 1658

Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683

The Raab 1 Aug 1664

Vienna 12 Sep 1683

Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677

Chocim II 11 Nov 1673

Dutch War, 1672-1678

Sinsheim 16 Jun 1674

Seneff 11 Aug 1674

The Seventeenth Century (Continued)

Dutch War, 1672-1678

Enzheim 4 Oct 1674

Turckheim 5 Jan 1675

Fehrbellin 28 Jun 1675

Monmouth's Rebellion

Sedgemoor 6 Jul 1685 (O.S.)

King William's War

Killiecrankie 27 Jul 1689

Walcourt 25 Aug 1689

Fleurus 1 Jul 1690

The Boyne 11 Jul 1690

Aughrim 22 Jul 1691

Steenkerke 3 Aug 1692

Neerwinden (Landen) 29 Jul 1693

Marsaglia 4 Oct 1693

Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Zenta 11 Sep 1697

The Eighteenth Century

Great Northern War

Poltava 28 Jun 1709

War of the Spanish Succession

Blenheim 13 Aug 1704

The Eighteenth Century (Continued)

War of the Spanish Succession

Ramillies 23 May 1706

Oudenarde 11 Jul 1708

Malplaquet 11 Sep 1709

Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Peterwardein 5 Aug 1716

War of the Austrian Succession

Mollwitz 10 Apr 1741

Chotusitz 17 May 1742

Dettingen 27 Jun 1743

Fontenoy 11 May 1745

Hohenfriedberg 4 Jun 1745

Sohr 30 Sep 1745

Kesseldorf 14 Dec 1745

Jacobite Rebellion, 1745 ("the '45")

Stonypans 21 Sep 1745

Culloden 16 Apr 1746

The Seven Years' War

Lobositz 1 Oct 1756

Prague 6 May 1757

Plassey 23 Jun 1757

Kolin 18 Jun 1757

Hastenbeck 26 Jul 1757

The Eighteenth Century (Continued)

The Seven Years' War

Rossbach 5 Nov 1757

Louthen 5 Dec 1757

Crefeld 23 Jun 1758

Zorndorf 25 Aug 1758

Hochkirch 14 Oct 1758

Bergen 13 Apr 1759

Minden 1 Aug 1759

Kunersdorf 12 Aug 1759

Plains of Abraham (Quebec) 13 Sep 1759

Maxen 21 Nov 1759

Warburg 31 Jul 1760

Liegnitz 15 Aug 1760

Torgau 3 Nov 1760

American Revolution

Bunker Hill 17 Jun 1775

Quebec 31 Dec/1 Jan 1775

White Plains 28 Oct 1776

Trenton 26 Dec 1776

Princeton 3 Jan 1777

Freeman's Farm 19 Sep 1777

Germantown 4 Oct 1777

Bemis Heights 7 Oct 1777

Monmouth Court House 28 Jun 1778

Camden 16 Aug 1780

Cowpens 17 Jan 1781

The Eighteenth Century (Continued)

American Revolution (Continued)

Guilford Court House 15 Mar 1781

Hobkirk's Hill 25 Apr 1781

Butaw Springs 8 Sep 1781

The Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, 1791-1815

War of the First Coalition

Valmy 20 Sep 1792

Jemappes 6 Nov 1792

Neerwinden 18 Mar 1793

Hondschoote 6 Sep 1793

Wattignies 15-16 Oct 1793

Fleurus 26 Jun 1794

Lodi 10 May 1796

Castiglione 5 Aug 1796

Neresheim 11 Aug 1796

Wurzburg 3 Sep 1796

Arcola 15-17 Nov 1796

Rivoli 14-15 Jan 1797

Pyramids 21 Jul 1798

Mount Tabor 16/17 Apr 1799

War of the Second Coalition

Stockach I 25 Mar 1799

Zurich I 4 Jun 1799

Novi 15 Aug 1799

Zurich III 24-25 Sep 1799

The Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, 1791-1815 (Continued)

War of the Second Coalition (Continued)

Moskirch 5 May 1800

Marengo 14 Jun 1800

Hohenlinden 3 Dec 1800

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Nieuport, Spanish Flanders	A D 2 Jul 1600	Nieuport, 1600 Du Army of the States General	Sp Netherlands Army Du Army of the States General	Albert of Austria Maurice of Nassau	1	0.9
War: The Thirty Years' War						
White Mountain (Weisser Berg), Bohemia	A D 8 Nov 1620	Bohemia, 1620	Imp/Boh Reb Army	Bucquo Christian of Anhalt-Bernberg	1	1.5
Wimpfen, Palatinate	A D 6 May 1622	Palatinate, 1622	Holy League/Sw Army	Tilly and Cordova Baden-Durlach	1	?
Dessau Bridge, Anhalt	A D 25 Apr 1626	Danish Invasion of Germany, 1625-26	Prot Union Army Imp Army	Mansfeld Wallenstein	1	?
Lutter, Brunswick	A D 27 Aug 1626	Danish Invasion of Germany, 1625-26	Holy League Army Dan Army	Tilly Christian IV	1	?
Breitenfeld I, Saxony	A D 17 Sep 1631	Leipzig, 1631	Imp/Holy League Army Sw/Sax Army	Tilly Gustavus Adolphus	1	3.2
The Lech, Bavaria	A D 15-16 Apr 1632	Bavaria, 1632	Sw Army Imp Army	Gustavus Adolphus Tilly	2	9.7
Alte Veste, Franconia	A D 3-4 Sep 1632	Nuremberg, 1632	Sw Army Imp Army	Gustavus Adolphus Wallenstein	2	2.3
Luetzen, Saxony	A D 16 Nov 1632	Saxony, 1632	Sw Army Imp Army	Gustavus Adolphus Wallenstein	1	4.4
Nordlingen I, Bavaria	A D 6 Sep 1634	Pavaria, 1634	Sw Army Sp/Imp Army	Saxe-Weimar and Horn Cardinal-Infante & Ferdinand	1	?

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Wittstock, Brandenburg	A D 4 Oct 1636	E Germany, 1636	Sw Army Imp/Saxon Army	Bauer Hatzfeld and John George	1	4.4
Breitenfeld II, Saxony	A D 2 Nov 1642	Saxony, 1642	Sw Army Imp Army	Torstensson Leopold William	1	?
Rocroi, France	A D 19 May 1643	NE France, 1643	Fr Army Sp Netherlands Army	Enghien Mello	1	2.4
Tuttlingen, Baden- Wuerttemberg	A D 24 Nov 1643	Swabia, 1643	Imp Army Fr Army of Germany	Mercy Rantzau	1	?
Freiburg, Swabia	A D 3-9 Aug 1644	Swabia, 1644	Fr Army Imp Army	Conde and Turenne Mercy	3 (combat)	6.4
Jankau, Bohemia	A D 6 Mar 1645	Bohemia, 1645	Imp Army Sw Army	Hatzfeld Torstensson	1	3.1
Mergentheim, Bavaria	A D 2 May 1645	Bavaria, 1645	Imp Army Fr Army	Mercy and Werth Turenne	1	7.0
Allerheim (Nordlingen II), Bavaria	A D 3 Aug 1645	Bavaria, 1645	Fr Army Imp Army	Conde Mercy and Werth	1	3.2
Lens, France	A D 10 Aug 1648	NE France, 1648	Fr Army Imp Army	Conde Leopold William	1	?

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
 War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Nieuport	A D	HD	R Dunes	DST	ST	N	-
War: The Thirty Years' War							
White Mountain	A D	PD	RM	DST	WT	N	-
Wimpfen	A D	HD	RM	DSH	SpT	N	-
Dessau Bridge	A D	PD	RM	DST	SpT	Y	X Substantial
Lutter	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	-
Breitenfeld I	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	-
The Lech	A D	PD	RM	DST	SpT	N	-
Alte Veste	A D	PD	RgM	WLT	FT	N	-
Luetzen	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	-
Nordlingen I	A D	PD	RM	DST	FT	N	-

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Wittstock	A D	PD	RM	DST	FT	X	Minor
Breitenfeld II	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	-
Rocroi	A D	HD	RM	DST	SpT	N	-
Tuttlingen	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	Y	Substantial
Freiburg	A D	PD	RgM	DST	ST	N	-
Jankau	A D	HD	RgM	DST	SpT	Y	Complete
Mergentheim	A D	HD	RM	DST	SpT	Y	Complete
Allerheim	A D	PD	RM	DST	ST	N	-
Lens	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	Substantial

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties			Arty. Pieces Lost			Advance Rate (%)	
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Success	Failure
Nieuport	A 11,500 D 11,300	1,500 1,400	8 6	4,000 1,000	34.8 8.8	8 0	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	-- N	--
War: The Thirty Years' War											
White Mountain	A 40,000 D 21,000	7,500 11,000	12 10	400 5,000	1.0 23.8	0 10	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	1.0 --	--
Wimpfen	A 20,000 D 21,000	4,000 11,000	8 10	5,000 5,000	25.0 23.8	0 10	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	1.0 --	--
Dessau Bridge	A 8,500 D 16,000	2,500 10,000	9 ?	3,000 1,000	35.3 6.3	9 0	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	2.0 --	--
Lutter	A 17,000 D 20,000	7,000 10,000	12 22	2,000 7,000	11.8 35.0	0 22	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	3.0 --	--
Breitenfeld	A 32,000 D 37,850	11,000 12,850	26 100	13,600 6,100	42.5 16.1	26 0	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	2.0 --	--
The Lech	A 33,000 D 27,000	?	70	1,000	1.5	0	--	--	x x	1.6 --	--
Alte Veste	A 46,000 D 60,000	16,000 13,000	?	4,000 2,000	4.3 1.7	?	--	--	x x	0.7 --	--
Luetzen	A 18,996 D 21,770	6,210 9,200	60 25	4,000 5,000	21.1 23.0	?	--	--	x x	1.5 --	--
Nordlingen I	A 25,000 D 35,000	10,000 15,000	80 50	12,000 2,000	48.0 5.7	80 0	100.0 --	100.0 --	x x	?	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties			Arty. Pieces Lost			Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Success		
Wittstock	A 22,000 D 30,000	12,000 14,000	? 42	7,000 18,000	31.8 60.0	?	100.0	x	1.5 --	
Breitenfeld II	A 25,000 D 30,000	10,000 8,000	? 46	5,000 15,000	20.0 50.0	-- 46	100.0	x	? --	
Rocroi	A 23,000 D 26,000	7,000 7,000	12 18	4,000 14,000	17.4 53.8	0 18	-- 100.0	x	1.0 --	
Tuttlingen	A 22,000 D 18,000	5,000 8,000	? 10	1,000 7,000	4.5 38.9	10	100.0	x	? --	
Freiburg	A 19,000 D 16,000	8,000 8,000	37 28	8,000 4,000	14.0 8.3	0 28	-- 100.0	x	3.0 --	
Jankau	A 15,000 D 15,000	10,000 9,000	26 80	8,500 2,000	56.7 13.3	26 0	100.0 --	x	2.0 --	
Mergentheim	A 10,000 D 11,000	5,000 5,000	? 15	700 3,500	7.0 31.8	?	-- 40.0	x	3.0 --	
Allerheim	A 18,000 D 16,000	5,000 5,000	? 28	7,500 6,000	41.7 37.5	4 15	? 53.6	x	1.0 --	
Lens	A 14,000 D 18,000	5,000 8,000	? 38	4,000 10,000	26.6 55.6	0 38	-- 100.0	x	? --	

War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Nieuport	A D	x	x	C	C	x	C	C	x	x	N	3 8
War: The Thirty Years' War												
White Mountain	A D	C	C	C	C	x	C	C	x	x	1.0	8
Wimpfen	A D	C	x	C	C	x	C	C	C	x	1.0	2
Dessau Bridge	A D	C	x	C	C	N	C	C	x	x	2.0	3
Lutter	A D	C	x	C	x	C	C	C	N	x	3.0	10
Breitenfeld I	A D	C	x	C	C	N	C	C	C	x	0.7	3
The Lech	A D	C	x	C	C	N	C	C	N	x	2.0	4
Alte Veste	A D	C	C	C	0	N	N	C	N	x	1.6	9
Luetzen	A D	C	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	0.7	6
Nordlingen I	A D	C	x	C	C	C	N	N	C	N	1.5	8

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	CE	4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS						5. OUTCOME				
		Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Mo-men-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Wittstock	A D	x	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	1.0	10 3
Breitenfeld II	A D	C	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	?	10 4
Rocroi	A D	C	x	C	C	x	x	C	x	x	1.0	10 5
Tuttlingen	A D	C	x	C	C	N	x	C	x	x	?	10 2
Freiburg	A D	C	C	C	C	N	x	C	x	x	3.0	7
Jankau	A D	C	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	2.0	6
Mergentheim	A D	C	x	C	C	N	x	C	x	x	3.0	10 3
Allerheim	A D	C	C	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	1.0	7
Lens	A D	C	x	C	C	N	x	C	x	x	?	10 3

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Nieuport	A D	x	x	N	depth
Mobility	Superiority	N				
Force	Quality					
Services						
Force	Preposition-	N				
Weather	Terrain,	N				
Roads	Leader-		x			
Planning	Ship	N				
Surprise	Menevuer,	N				
Mass		N				
Logistics	Portfolios	N				
N						

War: The Thirty Years' War

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: Netherlands' War of Independence

	Engagement	Force Quality	RCS/TEWS	Mobility Superiority	Force Preparation-deployment	Wcathcr	Terrain, Roads	Leadcr-ship	Planning	Surprise	Maneuver, Mass	Logistics	Fortifi-cations	Depth
Wittstock	A D	x N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x o	x x	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Breitenfeld II	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Rocroi	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Tuttlingen	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Freiburg	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Jankau	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Mergentheim	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Allerheim	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N
Lens	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	x N	N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: Netherlands' War of Independence

		Plan and Maneuver		Success		Resolution	
		Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack			
Engagement	A	F D/O, F	--	--	X	R, MD	--
Nieuport	D						
War: 30th Y's War							
White Mountain	A D	F D	--	--	X	B, Ps WDL	
Wimpfen	A D	F D	--	--	X	B, Ps WDL	
Dessau Bridge	A D	F D/O, EE	--	--	X	WDL B, Ps	
Lutter	A D	F D/O	--	--	X	B, Ps WDL	
Breitenfeld I	A D	F, E(LF) D/O, E(LR)	--	--	X	P, R, WDL B	
The Lech	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	X	S MD	
Alte Veste	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	X	R, MD --	
Luetzen	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	X	P MD	
Nordlingen I	A D	E(RF) D/O	FE(LF)		X	R, WDL Ps	

1. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: Netherlands' War of Independence

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Min Attack and Defense	Secondary Attack		
Wittstock	A D	E(RF) D/O, F	F --	X B, Ps MDL
Breitenfeld II	A D	E(IF) D/O	F --	X B, Ps A
Rocroi	A D	E(IF) D/O, F	F --	X B, Ps MDL
Tuttlingen	A D	F D	-- --	X P MD
Freiburg	A D	F D	H(IF)	X E(RR) --
Jankau	A D	F D	--	X R, A Ps
Mergentheim	A D	F D	--	X B, Ps MDL
Allerheiligen	A D	F D/U	E(RF) E(RF)	X S MD
Lens	A D	E D	--	X B, Ps MDL

THE NETHERLANDS' WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

Nieuport, 2 July 1600

The Dutch States General ordered Prince Maurice, despite his objections, to conquer the Spanish-held coastal strip of West Flanders, including the seaports of Dunkirk and Nieuport. The Spanish, with a large portion of their Netherlands Army in mutiny, appeared to be too weak to resist. Maurice crossed the Scheldt (21-22 June), drove off Spanish forces blockading Ostend, and descended on Nieuport, which he prepared to besiege (1 July).

The Spanish viceroy, Archduke Albert, won over the mutineers by appealing to their patriotism and professional pride as soldiers and by promising to make their arrears of pay his first order of business once Maurice had been defeated. By a remarkable effort he gathered an army together and marched to relieve Nieuport.

Maurice, on learning of the approach of the Spanish, began to concentrate his army (which was divided by the Yser estuary) on the east bank of the Yser. Since the process of fording the Yser estuary, and forming for battle would take several hours, Maurice detached 2,500 men to delay the Spanish approach march at Leffinghem Bridge. This detachment was destroyed by the Spanish in a brief morning action, and Albert's army continued toward Nieuport, following the beach from Westende-Bed. The Dutch, meantime, drew up on the beach east of Nieuport. The tide began to change when the armies came into contact, and both armies shifted into the tract of dunes adjoining the beach. In a hard-fought battle, Maurice sacrificed his vanguard division in a fight with the Spanish vanguard, main body, and rear guard. The Dutch cavalry defeated the Spanish cavalry, and the Spanish infantry, entirely committed, became jumbled together and lost cohesion. Maurice launched a counterattack with his infantry reserves and cavalry, and the Spanish, much fatigued by days of hard marching, collapsed entirely.

Maurice did not pursue the Spanish, since his lines of communication were still threatened from Spanish Flanders. Instead, he raised the siege of Nieuport and retreated to Holland.

Significance: A defeat for the Spanish, but Maurice was unable to exploit his victory because of the vulnerability of his lines of communication.

Source: B.24.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

White Mountain (Weisser Berg), 8 November 1620

The rebellious Protestant provisional government of Bohemia elected a Protestant prince, Frederick, Elector Palatine, as their king (August 1619) and continued to defy the central authority of the Austrian emperor. Bohemia, which had been in rebellion since May 1618, was supported by Lusatia, Silesia, and Moravia. The Emperor Ferdinand II issued an ultimatum directing Frederick to withdraw from the throne of Bohemia, but Frederick defied the Imperial mandate. An Imperialist army invaded Bohemia, where it was joined by the army of the Catholic League (Bavaria). The combined Imperialist/League army attacked the Bohemian Rebel army at the White Hill west of Prague (8 November 1620) and utterly routed it after a brief combat. The Bohemian infantry resisted stoutly in the Stern gardens, where some units fought to the last man, but the Bohemian cavalry, which had a large contingent of irregular horsemen, mainly Hungarians, was unable to stand up to the heavy cavalry of the Austro-Bavarians, and fled the field. At least 1,000 troops of the defeated army drowned attempting to swim the Moldau to safety.

The victors entered Prague in triumph, and Frederick fled to Breslau, becoming the refugee "Winter King" of Bohemia. The Protestant Estates of the Empire, eventually backed by foreign Protestant powers, rallied to his cause and continued the war, but Bohemia's short-lived independence was ended.

Significance: White Mountain was the first major field battle of the Thirty Years' War. A crushing defeat for the imperial pretensions of Frederick, Elector Palatine, it marked, more significantly, the end of Bohemian independence until the emergence of Czechoslovakia after World War I.

Sources: A.1; B.9.2; B.11.1.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Wimpfen, 6 May 1622

The Margrave of Baden-Durlach led an army of the Protestant Evangelical Union in pursuit of a Catholic League army under Count Johan Tilly that had recently been defeated by another Protestant army at Mingolsheim (27 April 1622). Tilly was reinforced by a Spanish army under General Gonzales de Cordova and turned to confront his pursuer at Wimpfen in the Palatinate.

The two armies fought an inconclusive action during the morning but broke off combat at midday because of intense heat. The Protestant army fell back behind a wagon laager. When the battle resumed the Leaguers attacked the wagon laager and won a victory.

Significance: The League victory broke up the margrave's army, one of three Protestant armies in the field in the Rhineland-North German theater. Tilly and Cordova marched to confront the remaining armies.

Sources: A.1; B.11.1.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Dessau Bridge, 25 April 1626

A Protestant League army commanded by the soldier of fortune Count Ernst von Mansfeld attempted to force a crossing of the Elbe River at Dessau in Anhalt by attacking a fortified bridgehead held by a small contingent of Count Albrecht von Wallenstein's Imperialist army.

Wallenstein, with the main force, had been preparing to attack the army of Danish King Christian IV but moved to the aid of the defenders of the bridgehead. On 25 April he passed his army into the bridgehead and, aided by surprise, counterattacked Mansfeld's force, winning a complete victory. Wallenstein pursued Mansfeld's remnants into Silesia. Mansfeld died soon afterward.

Significance: Mansfeld's army, one of the two Protestant forces operating in North Germany, was defeated and eventually broken up. This was a severe blow to the Protestant cause. Wallenstein's reputation as a military leader was established.

Sources: A.1; B.9.4; B.19.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Lutter, 27 August 1626

A Danish army led by King Christian IV was withdrawing northward through the Duchy of Brunswick followed closely by the army of the Holy League, commanded by Count Tilly. At Lutter am Bareberg in the Harz Mountain district the Danish King decided to make a stand. Tilly, whose forces had recently been reinforced by a contingent from Wallenstein's army, attacked at once.

The morale of the Danish troops was reportedly low because of the failure of the English subsidy on which their pay depended, but nonetheless they fought bravely at first, counterattacking the League force. However, the Danish cavalry was defeated and driven into a morass, and the infantry attack collapsed entirely. A rout ensued, and the Leaguers won a lopsided victory, destroying or capturing the bulk of Christian's force and capturing all of the Danish artillery and baggage. Christian fled to his stronghold of Holstein with the remnants of his army.

Significance: Brunswick and other North German territories submitted to the Empire. Protestant fortunes were at low ebb.

Sources: A.1; B.16.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Breitenfeld I, 17 September 1631

Breitenfeld I was the major engagement of the Leipzig Campaign of 1631. The prelude to the battle was the Imperialist ravaging of Saxony and seizure of the city of Leipzig (15 September). The Swedes, led by their great warrior-king, Gustavus Adolphus, joined the inexperienced army of their Saxon ally (11 September) and marched on Leipzig to do battle with the Imperialists. The Imperialist commander, Count Tilly, marched out of the city with his army to meet the Swedes at Breitenfeld, about 6½ kilometers north of Leipzig.

The battle was opened by a cannonade and Imperialist cavalry charges launched from both flanks. The right wing of Imperialist cavalry drove the Saxon army, which formed the left wing of Gustavus's army, pell mell from the field but, unfortunately for Imperialist hopes, pursued them too far and too long. The left wing of Imperialist cavalry was defeated by the Swedish cavalry. Tilly attempted to fall on the exposed left flank of the Swedish infantry, but the Swedish left and left-center changed face from front to flank with remarkable agility and stopped this threat. Gustavus then led his victorious right-wing cavalry around Tilly's left and rear, rolling up the Imperialist army from flank to center. The Imperialist infantry, hemmed in on three sides and under fire from its own artillery (captured by Gustavus) and that of the Swedes, collapsed and routed. The Swedes pursued until nightfall.

Significance: The victory resulted in the extension of Swedish-Protestant power over all of northwest Germany. The Saxons followed up by seizing Prague in Bohemia. Gustavus captured Mainz and went into winter quarters. The Emperor, threatened by 80,000 Swedish and allied troops, recalled the ambitious and politically dangerous Czech soldier of fortune, Wallenstein, from retirement to raise a new army to resist Gustavus.

Sources: A.3.2; B.23; B.26.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

The Lech (Rain), 15-16 April 1632

Following Breitenfeld I, the Swedish Army entered the Rhineland and captured Mainz, where it went into winter quarters. In the spring of 1632 Gustavus led it into Bavaria to attack the reorganized army of the Imperialists and the Holy League, still commanded by Count Tilly.

The armies met in the Battle of the Lech River. Tilly's force occupied a strong position on the east bank of the river, having constructed a fortified camp which barred the route to Munich and southern Bavaria. Gustavus used massed artillery fire to cover the establishment of a bridgehead on the east bank and constructed ponton bridges linking the bridgehead with the west bank. Imperialist counterattacks were beaten back, and the Swedes crossed the bridges and built up for an assault against the Imperialist position (15 April).

On the 16th the Imperialists again attempted to eliminate the bridgehead, but once again, the crossfire of the Swedish artillery repelled them. The Swedish cavalry forded the Lech on the right flank of the bridgehead and attacked and routed the Imperialist cavalry. Tilly and his second-in-command, Johan von Aldringen, were wounded, depriving the Imperialist army of direction. The Imperialist infantry then fell back to its entrenched camp. During the night the Elector of Bavaria, Maximilian, decided to withdraw. Gustavus did not order a pursuit.

Significance: Following the engagement the Swedish army occupied Augsburg, Munich, and all southern Bavaria. Count Tilly died of his wound two weeks after the battle.

Sources: A.1; B.10.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Alte Veste, 3-4 September 1632

Following the Battle of the Lech the League army united with an Imperialist army raised by Wallenstein. The combined army, under Wallenstein's command, marched to Nuremberg, where Gustavus was concentrating his numerically much inferior army following his successes in Bavaria. Arrived at Nuremberg, Wallenstein found the Swedish army strongly entrenched. The Imperialist general instituted a blockade of the approaches to the city and the camp in order to starve the Swedes and their allies out and established his own army in a fortified camp west of the city.

As time wore on both armies suffered from lack of supplies, and the Imperialists were much reduced by desertion and disease. On 31 August the Swedish army debouched from its entrenchments and offered battle, but Wallenstein refused to budge from his camp. During 1-2 September the Swedes marched north and reduced an Imperialist post at Fuerth in a surprise assault. They then wheeled to the south and began to dig approaches to the most formidable portion of the Imperialist lines, the tall Burgstall Hill crowned by the castle of Alte Veste. On the night of 2/3 September Gustavus received a false report that Wallenstein was planning to withdraw, and he ordered an infantry assault for the next day.

At 1000 hours on 3 September the Swedish infantry advanced -- without artillery support, since it was not possible to deploy guns in the rugged terrain. Wallenstein reinforced the threatened sector, and furious to-and-fro fighting on the Burgstall Hill continued for twelve hours until, finally, after nightfall, the Swedes withdrew.

On 4 September the Swedes renewed the attack, but Wallenstein counterattacked with fresh troops, and Gustavus was forced to concede the field to the Imperialists. The Swedes withdrew to the vicinity of Fuerth and constructed a fortified camp west of the town. For two weeks following the battle the armies remained in their fortified camps, using up the last resources of the devastated Nuremberg region and suffering greatly from disease and starvation. Finally, Wallenstein marched off -- to invade Saxony.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Alte Veste, 3-4 September 1632 (Continued)

Significance: The Alte Veste engagement was the first battle between Wallenstein and Gustavus, two of the greatest commanders of the time. It was a serious defeat for the Swedish king but ultimately signified little. The war was now transferred to Saxony.

Sources: A.1; B.10.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Luetzen, 16 November 1632

In October 1632, following the Battle of Alte Veste, Wallenstein and his army invaded Saxony, threatening Gustavus's line of communication and the Swedish King's ally, John George, Elector of Saxony. Gustavus followed the Imperialist generalissimo northward. Wallenstein, who had interposed his army between those of Gustavus and John George, missed a superb strategic opportunity when he failed to take advantage of his central position and superiority in numbers. Indeed, perceiving that the Swedish king, who was awaiting reinforcements, was going into winter quarters, Wallenstein split his own force, sending a large contingent under Count Pappenheim to Halle, about a day's march from the main body at Luetzen near Liepzig.

Gustavus quickly took advantage of the opportunity presented to him. On 15 November he marched to attack the Imperialist main body at Luetzen. On learning of Gustavus's approach Wallenstein sent an urgent summons to Pappenheim to rejoin him immediately with his contingent.

On 16 November Gustavus's army attacked the Imperialists, who were drawn up in a strong position behind a ditched road. The battle raged from late morning into the night, and neither side was able to gain a clear advantage. Gustavus was killed during a cavalry melee, and Duke Bernard of Saxe-Weimar took command of the Swedish forces. Pappenheim's contingent arrived during the afternoon to reinforce the defenders, who were hard pressed. Pappenheim was killed by a round of case shot. Finally, after dark, Wallenstein ordered a withdrawal, abandoning his artillery and baggage. The Swedes, who were exhausted, did not pursue.

Significance: The Swedes had won a victory, but the cost had been heavy. The death of Gustavus, the Protestant champion, was mourned throughout Europe, and the fragile alliance he had forged with the German Protestants was threatened. Wallenstein withdrew with the remnants of his army into Bohemia. His power, arrogance, and independence of the court at Vienna had made him many enemies. On 24 February 1634 he was assassinated by a group of his own officers.

Sources: A.1; B19; B.30.6.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Nordlingen I, 6 September 1634

A combined Spanish and Imperialist army, commanded by royal cousins -- Ferdinand, Cardinal-Infante of Spain, and Ferdinand, King of Hungary (son of the Emperor) -- laid seige to Nordlingen in Bavaria, which was garrisoned by a Swedish force. A Swedish-Protestant army commanded by Duke Bernard and Field Marshal Gustavus Horn marched on Nordlingen to raise the siege.

The Swedish-Protestant plan of battle was poorly conceived and poorly executed. The army was divided, Horn taking the left to attack the Imperialist right, commanded by King Ferdinand, and Bernard, with the left wing, marching to demonstrate against the Spanish contingent on the Imperialist right. Horn was at first successful, carrying the Imperialist entrenchments on a commanding hill, but his troops fell into confusion (which was heightened when a captured powder magazine exploded) and were driven back by a counterattack. Horn then ordered a withdrawal and sent word to Bernard to cover his retirement. Bernard's troops, meantime, were broken by a counterattack and fled. This exposed Horn's force, which was retiring across Bernard's rear through a defile, to the full fury of the Imperialist and Spanish attack. The Catholic forces fell on the flanks of Horn's columns and overwhelmed them; the Swedish army was virtually annihilated.

Significance: The battle was a catastrophe for Sweden and her Protestant allies. France, led by the able Catholic Cardinal Richelieu, was forced to declare war on Spain (21 May 1635), bringing the struggle between Bourbon and Hapsburg into the open. The war entered its last phase (called by historians the French Period, 1634-1648), and France assumed leadership of the anti-Hapsburg coalition.

Sources: A.1; B.4.

THE THIRY YEARS' WAR

Wittstock, 4 October 1636

Swedish Marshal Johan Baner engaged a strongly positioned Imperialist army commanded by Count Hatzfeld and the Elector of Saxony at Wittstock in eastern Germany. Baner's plan was to make a holding attack against the Imperialist front, which was arrayed on the Vineyard Hill, while his left wing, commanded by General King, enveloped the enemy's right flank and rear. King's approach march, which would traverse 11 kilometers, would be concealed by woods and scrub.

Baner's holding attack was launched in the morning and achieved minor surprise. The Saxon contingent of the Imperialist army fled immediately, but the Bavarians and Austrians fought stubbornly and counterattacked, eventually driving the Swedes from the hill. By sunset the Imperialists were close to victory, and Baner looked anxiously for King, who had not yet appeared. Baner's line was on the verge of dissolving when King's attack finally developed in the rear of the Imperialists. The Imperialist army was caught between two forces and routed. The Swedish pursuit was pressed throughout the night and the following day. Baner won a great victory by the narrowest of margins.

Significance: Wittstock restored the reputation of the Swedish army at a time when the Swedish cause seemed hopeless -- following the disaster of Nordlingen and the defection of Saxony to the Empire.

Sources: A.1; B.31.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Breitenfeld II, 2 November 1642

An Imperialist army commanded by Archduke Leopold William marched on Leipzig to relieve the Imperialist garrison of the city, which was being blockaded by a Swedish army commanded by Count Lennart Torstensson.

The Swedes fell back before the Imperialist approach but turned about suddenly and formed for battle at Breitenfeld, the scene of the battle between Gustavus and Tilly in 1631. The Imperialists were not so quick to form as the Swedes. The Imperialist left wing cavalry was still deploying when it was hit by the cavalry of the Swedish right wing and overthrown. The victorious Swedish cavalry then wheeled left and fell on the flank of the Imperialist infantry in the center, which was already at "push of pike" with the Swedish infantry. The Imperialist infantry collapsed under the weight of this attack. Having disposed of the infantry, the Swedish cavalry continued its attack down the Imperialist line and engaged the Imperialist right wing cavalry, driving it off after a hard fight.

Significance: The Swedish victory deprived the Emperor of an army and placed the Imperialist cause in great jeopardy. Torstensson followed up by ravaging Bohemia and Moravia.

Sources: A.1; B.11.2.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Rocroi, 19 May 1643

The Franco-Spanish War of 1635-1659, which began during the Thirty Years' War and continued after that and was concluded by the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), was marked by fighting on France's northeastern frontier, where the Spanish held Spanish Flanders (largely modern Belgium) and by operations on the Pyrenees front. A serious Spanish threat to France occurred in May 1643, when Francisco de Mello led 26,000 men of the Spanish Netherlands Army through the Ardennes toward Paris. Mello stopped to besiege the fortress town of Rocroi and rendezvous with reinforcements before proceeding. The French army covering the northeast frontier was commanded by Louis, Duc d'Enghien (the future "Great Conde"). Enghien marched on Rocroi and, mindful of the imminent arrival of 6,000 Spanish reinforcements under Beck, decided to attack Mello's larger force at once (18 May). Mello failed to block Enghien's approach march through a narrow wooded defile, and both armies bivouacked on the plain southwest of the town.

Shortly after dawn on 19 May Enghien attacked. The duke personally led a cavalry charge against the Spanish left wing cavalry, which he routed. He then wheeled and descended on the exposed flank of the Spanish infantry in the center. Meantime, the French cavalry on the left flank had engaged the Spanish right-wing horse and been defeated and driven into swampy ground. When Enghien heard of this disaster, he rode through the rear of the Spanish army and attacked the victorious Spanish right-wing cavalry from the rear. When these horsemen were defeated, the Spanish infantry in the center was isolated. The Spanish infantry formed a huge block facing their antagonists on all sides and refused offers to surrender. Two French infantry attacks against this square were beaten back, but, finally, Enghien had some guns dragged forward to batter the square into surrender. Seeing this, the Spanish asked for quarter. When Enghien rode forward to treat with their officers he was fired upon by Spanish musketeers who assumed the duke and his party were leading another assault. The French army was enraged by this event and furiously attacked the square from all sides. The defenders were overwhelmed, and many butchered in cold blood.

Rocroi, continued

This ended the battle. The Spanish casualties -- 14,000 out of 26,000 engaged -- had fallen mainly on the fine, veteran infantry of the Spanish Netherlands army. This army was, in effect, destroyed, and the century or so of Spanish military predominance in Europe ended. Rocroi was the first victory of Enghien, one of France's greatest military leaders.

Enghien followed up his victory by capturing the fortress of Thionville (23 June 1643). This secured Lorraine and the Rhine Valley area against the threat from the Spanish Netherlands and Germany.

Significance: An important victory for France and her young king, Louis XIV. The old Spanish Netherlands Army was destroyed, and Enghien followed up by capturing the city of Thionville. The victory ended the threat against France from Spanish Flanders.

Source: A.1; B.3.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Tuttlingen, 24 November 1643

The French Army of Germany, led by General Josias Rantzau, a Dane in French service, invaded Bavaria and penetrated to Tuttlingen, a town on the Danube about 45 miles east of Freiburg. There, on 24 November, the French were surprised and routed by a Bavarian army commanded by Baron Franz von Mercy. Rantzau was captured. French field marshal Viscount Henri de Turenne succeeded to the command of the remnants of the Army of Germany and withdrew into Alsace.

Significance: Tuttlingen was a severe setback for France, diminishing much of the prestige the French had won by their victory at Rocroi and weakening the position of French diplomats at the preliminary peace negotiations of the Congress of Münster (1644).

Sources: A.1; B.33.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Freiburg, 3-9 August 1644

Following French General Josias von Rantzau's defeat and capture by Count Franz von Mercy at Tuttlingen, Marshal Turenne took command of the French Army of Germany and reorganized it in Lorraine. In the spring of 1644 he led this force into the Black Forest region near the headwaters of the Danube to contend with Count Mercy's Bavarians. Turenne, however, was too weak to prevent the Bavarians from taking Freiburg. He camped near the town and awaited reinforcements. These arrived in July, when Prince Louis II of Bourbon and Conde conveyed the French Royal Army to Breisach and joined Turenne and assumed command of the united armies. The Bavarians, meantime, improved their position near Freiburg by constructing fortifications and obstacles on the approaches to the town.

On 3 August Conde attacked, sending Turenne's army through a mountain valley to envelop the Bavarian position, while the Royal Army, under Marshal Grammont, made a frontal attack on it. Turenne's movement was stopped by entrenched Bavarians, but Grammont's men stormed the Bavarian camp and broke in before being repulsed. Mercy, threatened by Turenne's turning movement, withdrew during the night to a second entrenched position based on his old lines of countervallation at Freiburg.

On 5 August the French assaulted this position without success. Both armies were exhausted, and combat was suspended until 9 August, when Turenne again marched against the Bavarian line of communications and caused Mercy to withdraw from his entrenchments. Mercy set off through the Black Forest for Wuertemberg and clashed sharply with Turenne's advance guard. The Bavarians were able to overcome this force and continue on their way.

Significance: "The Three Days of Freiburg" was a great victory for Conde, although he had lost half his army. The French followed up by taking many fortresses in the Palatinate.

Sources: A.1: A.5; B.8.1.

THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Jankau, 6 March 1645

A Swedish army commanded by Torstensson invaded Bohemia to assist Sweden's ally, George I Rakoczy, Prince of Transylvania. An Imperialist army commanded by Count Melchior Hatzfeld intercepted Torstensson's march at Jankau and barred the route to the Danube and rendezvous with Rakoczy.

On the night before the battle the armies were encamped close to one another in broken country, the Swedes seemingly secure on a commanding hill. The Imperialist General Goetz, however, persuaded Hatzfeld to risk a surprise attack before first light and outlined an ingenious plan by which the Imperialist infantry would drive the Swedes from their camp on the hill into the plain beyond, where the cavalry, having made a long circuit, would fall on them and complete the victory.

The attack of the Imperialist infantry, led by Goetz, was brilliantly executed and achieved complete surprise. The Swedes were driven from position to position and not allowed any time to form, but, at a most inopportune moment, Goetz was killed by a stray bullet and his infantry, leaderless, lost cohesion. A large number of them began to pillage the Swedish baggage, and Torstensson, allowed a respite, rallied his men and led them on to attack the disorganized Imperialist infantry. The Imperialist cavalry, meantime, was still proceeding toward the plain, unable to intervene as envisioned by the plan because the infantry's success had been so sudden.

The rallied Swedes drove the Imperialist infantry into a region of ponds and hillocks and cut them to pieces. The remnants of the Imperialist army, including the cavalry, fled through a narrow pass where many were captured by the pursuit.

Significance: Jankau eliminated the Emperor's last field army defending the approaches to Vienna. Torstensson and Rakoczy immediately marched on Vienna, but Rakoczy, suborned by the Emperor's promises and a message from the Sultan (he was a tributary of the Sultan) to cease hostilities, defected. Torstensson was too weak to attempt to take Vienna alone and fell back to Brünn and then into Bohemia.

Sources: A.1; B.11.2; B.31.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Mergentheim (Marienthal), 2 May 1645

The French Marshal Turenne invaded Bavaria, crossing the Rhine and the Neckar and penetrating to within 30 kilometers of Wurzburg. Unaware of the close presence of an Imperialist army commanded by Mercy and Werth, he went into camp at Mergentheim and permitted his force to disperse in widely separated cantonments. The Imperialists made a surprise attack on the French cantonments and routed Turenne's force--much to the Frenchman's embarrassment.

Significance: Turenne prevented a greater disaster by conducting a skillful retreat; the remnants of his force joined a strong Franco-Swedish army led by Conde at the Rhine and prepared for further offensive operations against Bavaria.

Sources: A.5; B.11.2; B.33.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Allerheim (Nordlingen II), 3 August 1645

The armies of Conde and Turenne, united after Turenne's retreat from Mergentheim, advanced on Nordlingen, which was defended by an Imperialist army commanded by Mercy and Werth.

The Imperialists were entrenched in a strong position, and the battle that ensued was desperate, described by Turenne (with some exaggeration) as the greatest of the war. The French attacked the Imperialist center, but were checked. The Imperialists counterattacked and began to make headway against the French right. Turenne then led the French left wing against the Imperialist right, which he threatened to envelop. The battle continued after nightfall, and the commanders on both sides performed prodigies of valor. Finally, Mercy, who had inspired the defense, was killed. The Imperialists quit the field, withdrawing in order. The French were too exhausted to pursue.

Significance: Conde, who had been wounded three times, fell ill, and Turenne ordered a withdrawal across the Rhine. Bavaria gained a temporary respite from invasion.

Sources: A.1; B.5; B.11.2; B.33.

THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

Lens, 10 August 1648

Austrian Archduke Leopold William led an Imperialist army across Artois in pursuit of Conde's French army. At Lens Conde doubled back on the Imperialists and struck their column while it was on the march. The surprise was complete, and Conde won an overwhelming victory.

Significance: Conde's victory, described as a "second Rocroi," helped to induce the Emperor Ferdinand to sign the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War. The Franco-Spanish War continued.

Sources: A.1; A.5; B.11.2.

1. IDENTIFICATION

War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Edgehill, England	A D 23 Oct 1642	Edgehill	Eng Roy Army Eng Parl Army	Charles I Essex	1	3.2
Marston Moor, England	A D 2 Jul 1644	York	Eng Parl Army Eng Roy Army	Manchester Rupert	1	2.8
Tippermuir, Scotland	A D 1 Sep 1644	Aberdeen	Scot Cov Army Scot Roy Army	Elcho Montrose	1	1.1
Kilsyth, Scotland	A D 15 Aug 1644	Kilsyth	Scot Roy Army Scot Cov Army	Montrose Baillie	1	0.7
Newbury II, England	A D 27 Sep 1644	Newbury II	Eng Parl Army Eng Roy Army	Manchester Charles I	1	2.8
Naseby, England	A D 14 Jun 1645	Naseby	Eng Roy Army Eng Parl Army	Charles I Fairfax	1	1.6
Preston, England	A D 17-19 Aug 1648	Preston	Eng Parl Army Scot Roy Army	Cromwell Hamilton	2 (combat)	1.0
Dunbar, Scotland	A D 3 Sep 1650	Dunbar	Eng Parl Army Scot Roy Army	Cromwell Leslie	1	1.8
Worcester, England	A D 3 Sep 1651	Worcester	Eng Parl Army Scot Roy Army	Cromwell Charles II	1	5.6

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Edgehill I	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Marston Moor	A D	HD	RM	WHT	ST	N	--
Tippermuir	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Kilsyth	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Newbury II	A D	H/PD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Naseby	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Preston	A D	HD	RM	WHT	ST	Y	X
Eunbar	A D	H/PD	RM	WLT	FT	Y	X
Worcester	A D	H/PD	RM	DST	FT	N	--

3. STRENGTHS AND OUTCOMES
War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Edgehill	A 13,500 D 13,630	3,500 2,500	20 15	4,000 1,000	29.6 7.7	0 7	-- 46.6	x	1.0 --
Marston Moor	A 27,000 D 17,500	9,000 6,500	25 16	1,500 6,000	5.6 34.3	0 16	-- 100.0	x	1.0 --
Tottenham	A 6,800 D 3,000	800 0	7 0	3,000 1	44.1 0.0	7 0	-- 100.0	x	-- 0.5
Kilsyth	A 4,900 D 6,800	500 800	0 0	6 6,000	0.1 88.2	0 0	-- --	x	0.8 --
Newbury II	A 22,000 D 10,000	9,500 2,000	? ?	500 500	2.3 5.0	?	--	x	?
Naseby	A 9,000 D 13,000	5,000 6,000	12 13	6,000 1,000	66.7 7.7	12 0	-- 100.0	x	1.0 --
Preston	A 9,000 D 21,000	3,000 3,600	? ?	5,000 N	-- 11.9	0 ?	--	x	?
Dunbar	A 11,000 D 22,000	3,500 6,000	? 30	30 13,000	0.3 59.1	0 30	-- 100.0	x	0.8 --
Worcester	A 28,000 D 16,000	9,000 4,000	? ?	1,000 9,000	3.6 56.3	0 ?	--	x	2.0 --

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Wom-en-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accompl.
Edgehill	A	C	C	O	C	N	N	C	X	X	1.0	7
	D	D	D	O	C	N	N	C	N	X	--	4
Marston Moor	A	C	X	C	C	N	N	C	N	X	1.0	8
	D	D	D	C	C	N	N	C	N	X	--	5
Tippemuir	A	D	X	X	C	C	N	C	X	X	0.5	3
	D	D	X	X	C	C	N	C	X	X	0.8	9
Kilsyth	A	C	X	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	--	10
	D	D	C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	?	4
Newbury II	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	1.0	5
	D	D	C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	--	6
Naseby	A	C	X	X	X	C	N	N	X	X	?	9
	D	D	X	X	X	C	N	N	X	X	--	3
Preston	A	X	X	X	X	C	N	C	X	X	0.8	9
	D	D	X	X	X	C	N	N	C	X	--	4
Dunbar	A	C	X	X	X	C	N	N	N	N	2.0	10
	D	D	X	X	X	C	N	N	C	X	--	5
Worcester	A	X	D									

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME
War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

Engagement	Force Quality	Reserves	Mobility Superiority	Force Projection	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Planning	Surprise	Maneuver, Mass	Logistics	Portfolios - Categories	Depth
Edgehill	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Marston Moor	A D	N N	N N	X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Tippemuir	A D	N N	N N	N N	O X	N X	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	X
Kilsyth	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N O	N N	N N	N N	N N	X
Newbury II	A D	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N X	X X	X X	X X	X X	X
Naseby	A D	N N	N N	N N	N X	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Preston	A D	X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Dunbar	A D	X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Worcester	A D	X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: THE ENGLISH CIVIL WARS, 1642-1651

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	A	D	F D/O, F	--		
Edgehill	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	B WD
Marston Moor	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	B, Ps P, R, WDL
Tippermuir	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	R, WDL Ps
Kilsyth	A	D	F D	--	X	B, Ps WDL
Newbury II	A	D	F D	--	X	P, R WD
Naseby	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	P, R, WDL Ps
Preston	A	D	F, EE D	--	X	B, Ps WDL
Dunbar	A	D	E(RF) D	F	X	B, Ps WDL
Worcester	A	D	F D/O, F	--	X	B, Ps WDL

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR

Edgehill, 23 October 1642

The main Parliament army, commanded by the Earl of Essex, sought to secure the region of the Severn River Valley for the Parliament. The Royalist army, commanded by King Charles I, aimed to take Oxford and, ultimately, London. Charles managed to get between Essex and London, and the two armies met in battle at Edgehill, north of Oxford.

The Royalists descended from Edgehill to attack the Parliament army. The Royalist cavalry drove off the weaker and less skillful cavalry of the Parliament on both wings but pursued too far and too long. Meantime, the infantry of both armies clashed, and in a long, stubborn fight, the Parliamentary infantry won the upper hand. The Royalists reformed, however, and checked the advance of the Parliamentary infantry. This ended the battle, and both sides withdrew.

Significance: Essex abandoned the battlefield and seven guns to the Royalists. Charles won the initiative but wasted it by a slow advance to Oxford and then to the environs of London. At Turnham Green, west of London, Essex's army combined with the London Trained Bands to stop Charles's advance in a bloodless confrontation. The King returned to Oxford, which became his capital for the rest of the war.

Sources: A.1; A.3.1; B.6.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1644

Marston Moor, 2 July 1644

Prince Rupert of the Rhine, commanding a Royalist army, relieved the besieged city of York and pursued the Earl of Manchester's Parliament and Scottish Allied army to the south. He caught up with Manchester at Marston Moor but was delayed attacking him by the tardiness of his infantry, coming from York.

Both armies were deployed in line of battle in the late afternoon when the Parliament forces suddenly and unexpectedly attacked. The Parliamentary left wing of horse, led by Generals Oliver Cromwell and David Leslie, overthrew Rupert's right wing and made a circuit around the Royalist rear to attack the Royalist left wing of cavalry, which had routed its opponents, including the bulk of the Scottish infantry. Cromwell and Leslie defeated the Royalist left wing and then combined with the Parliamentary foot to defeat the Royalist foot in the center. The fighting continued after nightfall, the last of the Royalist foot, deserted by its horse, making a brave stand to the last man in an enclosure.

Significance: The largest battle of the English Civil War, Marston Moor was a disaster for the Royalist cause, since it cost the King an army and the north of England. York and Newcastle capitulated to the Parliament on 16 July and 16 October respectively.

Sources: A.1; B.6; B.35.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR

Tippermuir, 1 September 1644

The Scottish nobleman James Graham, Marquis of Montrose, raised the Highland clans for King Charles I in Perthshire and, joined by a contingent of veteran Irish musketeers from Antrim, marched on Aberdeen. At Tippermuir, on 1 September 1644, Montrose's army was attacked by an army of Scots Covenant militia, led by Lord Elcho.

The Covenant army outnumbered Montrose's better than two to one, but Montrose deployed his men in shallow lines, three deep, so that they would not be outflanked and could bring all their firepower to bear on the Covenanters. The Covenanters attacked Montrose's right wing with infantry and cavalry but were broken by the salvo fire of the Irish. Montrose then ordered a general counterattack, and the Irish and Highlanders charged ferociously with clubbed muskets and claymore swords. The Royalist attack was more than the Covenant militia could stand, and they fled the field in disorder.

Significance: Montrose had won the first in a series of great victories and was able to advance on Aberdeen, which he took after a battle (13 September) with the Covenant militia garrison, led by Lord Burleigh. The Royalist cause in Scotland was revived.

Sources: B.13; B.22.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR

Kilsyth, 15 August 1644

The Royalist Marquis of Montrose, campaigning in Stirlingshire, Scotland, met the Covenant army of General William Baillie at Kilsyth. Baillie's army initially had the advantage of position, but the Convenanting Committee advising the general persuaded him to march his men to the right (across Montrose's front) to secure a hill and prevent the "escape" of Montrose's army.

While Baillie's force was on the move, cavalry leading, Montrose launched his attack. The Royalist cavalry defeated the Covenant cavalry at the head of Baillie's column, and Montrose's Irish and Highland infantry attacked the isolated Covenant infantry in the center. Baillie's army collapsed and fled from the field.

Significance: Montrose had won another lop-sided victory and might have occupied Edinburgh but was prevented from doing so by an outbreak of plague in the city. Within a month, on 13 September, Montrose's small army was surprised by a large force of Covenant cavalry while it was encamped at Philiphaugh, near Selkirk. After a brave stand, the Royalists surrendered on terms. The Covenanters then massacred them. Montrose escaped but years later was captured and executed for treason.

Sources: A. 7; B.13.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1644

Newbury II, 27 September 1644

King Charles I, having campaigned successfully in the south and southwest of England, was returning to the Thames River Valley when he was confronted at Newbury by a Parliamentary army commanded by the Earl of Manchester. The Royalists took up a strong position, which they entrenched.

Manchester attacked the Royalist position from the front and sent a force under Sir William Waller to attack the Royalist left, which was commanded by Prince Maurice. This flank attack failed, and the Parliamentary frontal attack was repulsed. The battle ended at darkness. During the night the Royal army withdrew.

Significance: The Royalists were outnumbered but fought fiercely, preventing the destruction of their army. The battle preceded a truce, the so-called Treaty of Uxbridge (January-February 1645), during which the king considered, but rejected, Parliament's peace proposal.

Sources: A.3.1; B.35.

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1645

Naseby, 14 June 1645

The King's army and the Parliament army commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax clashed at Naseby, in the Midlands, after the Royalists had taken Leicester by storm and threatened the "Eastern Association" stronghold of the Parliament. The Parliamentary army outnumbered the Royalist army, but the King chose anyway to fight.

The Royalists attacked. Prince Rupert leading the Royalist horse of the right wing, drove the left wing of the Parliamentary horse, commanded by General Henry Ireton, from the field. Rupert's cavalry, however, got out of control and pursued Ireton's wing too far. Meantime, General Oliver Cromwell's cavalry on the Parliamentary right defeated its opponents and turned against the Royalist foot, who were driving the Parliamentary infantry in the center. When the King refused to employ his reserve to aid his infantry the battle was lost. The Royalist foot was for the most part killed or captured.

Significance: Naseby was the mortal blow to the King's cause. The last significant Royalist army was destroyed, and the King lost all hope of retrieving his throne. Charles fled and the last minor Royalist field forces and strongholds were defeated or surrendered within a year.

Sources: A.1; B.6; B.35.

THE SECOND ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1648

Preston, 17-19 August 1648

In the summer of 1648 a Scottish/Royalist army commanded by the Duke of Hamilton invaded England. The Scottish march was disorderly, and Hamilton permitted his forces to become dispersed. By mid-August the Scottish column, as it approached the bridge over the Ribble River at Preston, was extended over 30 miles of road. Cromwell, hoping to cut the Scots in two at the bridge, chose this moment to attack with a smaller force of Parliamentary troops.

On the 17th, in "filthy weather," Cromwell struck the Scottish cavalry and some infantry at Preston, achieving surprise, capturing 4,000 men, and driving the rest off in disorder. The remnants of the Scottish army attempted to draw off, but, on the 19th, the Parliament forces caught up with the Scots infantry at Winwick and destroyed it after a fierce fight. Cromwell then pursued the remnants of the Scottish cavalry, which surrendered in a group on the 25th.

Significance: The Battle of Preston was decisive; the Scots army was destroyed, and the Second Civil War ended. King Charles I was seized by the army, tried by a court composed of members of the House of Commons, and executed (30 January 1649).

Sources: A.3.1; B.1; B.2; B.17.

THE SECOND ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1648-1651

Dunbar, 3 September 1650

When the Parliament executed King Charles I (January 1649), Scotland declared for the Royalists and proclaimed his son, Charles II, king. In July 1650, Cromwell, leading a Parliament army, invaded Scotland. The Scottish commander, Sir Alexander Leslie, conducted a brilliant scorched-earth campaign which forced Cromwell to rely on supply by sea. In late August-early September, Cromwell's army, much reduced by privation and sickness, fell back to Dunbar, east of Edinburgh, where the Scots maneuvered it into a valley and took up a position threatening its evacuation.

At this juncture Leslie erred, and Cromwell, by a brilliant maneuver, won an overwhelming victory. Leslie, listening to the mistaken advice of a committee of the Scottish Estates, moved his army down from its commanding position on the hills near Dunbar and offered battle. Worse still, during the stormy night of 2/3 September, he permitted five of every six of his musketeers to extinguish their matches. Cromwell, offered the opportunity, made a surprise attack at dawn against the Scottish right wing, which collapsed. The Scottish army was rolled up from flank to flank with heavy losses -- but few of the infantry escaping.

Significance: Leslie withdrew with the remnants of his army to Stirling, while Cromwell occupied southern Scotland and Edinburgh.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.12.1.

THE SECOND ENGLISH CIVIL WAR, 1648-1651

Worcester, 3 September 1651

Following the Battle of Dunbar, Cromwell's illness and Leslie's skillful maneuvering prevented any major action from occurring in Scotland. The Scots initiated peace talks with the English Parliament, but these failed. When Cromwell recovered (June 1651), he maneuvered against Leslie's lines of communications, deliberately leaving the road to London open. King Charles II, seeing (as Cromwell intended) an opportunity to regain his throne by a march, invaded England with the Scots army.

Charles, following the west coast route, reached Worcester. Cromwell concentrated by convergent marches four separate contingents of Parliament regulars and militia against the Royalists, achieving an overwhelming superiority of numbers on the battlefield. The Battle of Worcester that followed was anticlimactic. The Scots, having fortified their position, fought manfully, but were submerged by the strength and professionalism of the Parliament army.

Significance: Few of the Scots escaped. The Battle of Worcester was the final field engagement of the English civil wars. King Charles II fled to France, where he lived in exile until 1660, when, following Cromwell's death (1658) and the failure of Cromwell's son, Richard, to control either the army or the Parliament, he was restored to his throne.

Sources: A.1; A.12.1.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: The Fronde, 1648-1653

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
St. Antoine, France	A D 5 Jul 1652	The Fronde	Fr Roy Army Fr Reb Army	Turenne Conde	1	1.0
War: Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659						
The Dunes, Spanish Netherlands	A D 14 Jun 1658	Dunkirk, 1658	Fr Army Sp Army	Turenne Don Juan	1	4.0
War: Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683						
The Raab, Hungary	A D 1 Aug 1664	Hungary, 1664	Dark Army Imp Allied Army	Ahmed Koprulu Montecuccoli	1	3.8
Vienna, Austria	A D 12 Sep 1683	Austria, 1683	Imp Allied Army Turk Army	Lorraine & Sobieski Kara Mustafa	1	8.8
War: Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677						
Chocim II, Poland	A D 11 Nov 1673	Chocim	Pol Army Turk Army	Sobieski Hussein Pasha	1	?

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Dutch War, 1672-1678

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Sinsheim, Germany	A D 16 Jun 1674	Rhineland, 1674	Fr Army Imp Allied Army	Turenne Caprara	1	?
Seneff, Spanish Netherlands	A D 11 Aug 1674	Spanish Nether- lands, 1674	Fr Army Du Allied Army	Conde Orange	1	?
Enzheim, Germany	A D 4 Oct 1674	Rhineland, 1674	Fr Army Imp Allied Army	Turenne Bournonville	1	5.6
Turckheim, Germany	A D 5 Jan 1675	Rhineland, 1675	Fr Army Imp Allied Army	Turenne Bournonville	1	?
Fehrbellin, Brandenburg	A D 28 Jun 1675	Brandenburg, 1675	Pr Army Sw Army	Frederick William Wrangel	1	?

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: The Fronde, 1648-1653

Engagement	Defender Posture		Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
St. Antoine	A D	H/PD	U	DSH	ST	N	--	--

War: Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659

The Dunes	A D	HD	R Dunes	DST	ST	Y	X	minor

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683

The Raab	A D	HD	RM/TM	DST	ST	N	--	--
Vienna	A D	H/PD	RM	DST	FT	Y	X	substantial

War: Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677

Chocim II	A D	PD	RM	WLC	FT	Y	X	complete

War: Dutch War, 1672-1678

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Sinsheim	A D	RM HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Senef	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	x substantial
Enzheim	A D	H/PD	RM	WHT	FT	N	--
Turckheim	A D	HD	RM	DST	WT	Y	minor
Fehrbellin	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: The Fronde, 1648-1653

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties			Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day			
St. Antoine	A 12,000 D 6,000	?	?	4,000 2,000	33.3 33.3	?	-- ?	x	1.0 --	
						7				

War: Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659

The Dunes	A 15,000 D 12,000	6,000 7,000	?	2,000 7,000	13.3 58.3	0 0	-- --	x	2.1 --	

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683

The Raab	A 60,000 D 30,000	20,000 10,000	20 25	8,000 2,000	13.3 6.7	20 0	-- 100.0	x	1.5 --	
Vienna	A 76,000 D 107,000	34,000 47,000	186 500	2,000 10,000	2.6 9.3	0 370	0.0 74.0	x	4.0 --	

War: Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677

Chocim II	A 50,000 D 80,000	?	?	1,000 30,000	2.0 37.5	?	-- --	x	?	

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: Dutch War 1672-1678

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Sinsheim	A 9,500 D 7,500	6,000 6,000	6 0	1,500 2,500	15.8 33.3	0 0	0.0 --	x	?
Seneff	A 50,000 D 70,000	15,000 15,000	? ?	10,000 14,000	20.0 20.0	4 4	?	x	4.8 --
Enzheim	A 22,000 D 31,700	10,000 14,500	30 58	3,500 2,500	15.9 7.9	0 10	17.2	x	2.4 --
Turckheim	A 33,000 D 30,000	? ?	? ?	1,100 3,400	3.3 11.3	?	?	x	?
Fehrbellin	A 6,000 D 6,400	6,000 6,400	13 38	500 2,500	8.3 39.1	0 6	15.8	x	?

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: The Fronde, 1648-1653

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logistics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Technol- ogy	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
St. Antoine	A	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	1.0 --	8 5

War: Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659

The Dunes	A	x	x	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	2.1 --	8 3
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War: Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683

The Raab	A	x	x	x	C	N	N	N	C	N	X	1.5 --	4 10
Vienna	A	x	x	x	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	4.0 --	9 3

War: Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677

Chocim II	A	x	x	C	C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	?
	D												8 3

4. JOINT BATTLESTUDY
War: Dutch War, 1672-1678

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Sinsheim	A	C	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	?	9
	D	C	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	--	4
Senef	A	D	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	4.8	8
	C	x		C	C	N	N	C	x	x	--	5
Enzheim	A	D	x	C	C	N	N	C	N	x	2.4	9
	C	x		C	C	N	N	C	x	x	--	5
Turckheim	A	D	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	?	9
	C	x		C	C	N	N	C	x	x	--	4
Fehrbellin	A	D	x	C	C	N	N	C	x	x	?	10
	C	x		C	C	N	N	C	x	x	--	4

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: The Fronde: 1648-1653

		Depth	N
Fortifications		X	
Logistics		N	
Mass, narrow front		N	
Surprise		N	
Planning		N	
Leader-ship		N	
Roads, terrain,		N	
Weather		N	
Preposition-force	X		
Mobility, superiority	N		
Reserves	X	O	
Force quality	N		
Engagement	A	D	
	St. Antoine		

Mat: *François-Séraphin Mercier*. 1653-1659

War: Airstrip-Turkish War. 1662-1683

Wozniak, Steve: Apple II Computer

6 Dutch War, 1672-1678

Engagement	Sinsheim	Seneff	Enzheim	Turckheim	Fehrbellin	Depth
Force	N	N	A	D	A	Fortifications
Quality	N	N	D	N	N	Logistics
Resources	N	N	N	N	N	Mass
Flexibility	N	N	N	N	N	Surprise
Planning	X	X	X	X	X	Surprise
Leadership	X	X	X	X	X	Surprise
Roads	X	N	N	X	X	Mass
Terrain	N	N	N	N	N	Mass
Weather	N	N	N	N	N	Surprise
Walls	N	N	N	N	N	Logistics
Water	N	N	N	N	N	Fortifications
Depth	N	N	N	N	N	Surprise

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: The Fronde, 1648-1653

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack	Success	Resolution
	A	D			
St. Antoine	F D	-- --	--	X	P MD
War: Franco-Spanish War, 1653-1659					
The Dunes	A D	E(RF) D/O, F	F --	X	B, PS MDL
War: Austro-Turkish War, 1662-1683					
The Raab	A D	F D/O, EE	--	X	R, MD --
Vienna	A D	E(RF) D	F --	X	B, PS MD
War: Polish-Turkish War, 1671-1677					
Chocim II	A D	F D	E(LR) --	X	B, PS MDL

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: Dutch War, 1672-1678

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack		
Sinsheim	A D	F D/O, F	EE --	X P WD
Senef	A D	F D	-- --	X P, WD WD
Enzheim	A D	F D/O, F, E(LR)	-- --	X P, WD P, WD
Turckheim	A D	E(RF) D	FL --	X P WD
Fehrbellin	A D	F D/O, F	E(RF) --	X B, PS WD

THE FRONDE, 1648-1653

Faubourg Saint Antoine, 5 July 1652

The French Marshal Turenne, leading a Royalist army, attacked the army of the Frondist rebels, led by the Prince of Conde, at the Paris suburb of Saint Antoine, on 5 July 1652. The Frondists, who were outnumbered, made use of entrenchments dug earlier by the inhabitants of the suburb for their own protection and, in addition, barricaded streets and homes for defense. The Frondists were in a desperate situation, fighting with their backs to the Seine River and the battlements of Paris. (The city was nominally neutral, having closed its gates to both parties.)

The Royalist attack was made so vigorously that the Frondists were pushed back from the trenches and gardens outside the suburb and into the streets leading to the gate of Paris guarded by the Bastille fortress. The street fighting that ensued was fierce, but the Frondists gave ground and might have been destroyed completely had not the citizens of the city opened the gate and permitted them inside the walls. Turenne's force was denied entry. The Frondists then marched through the city and eventually escaped to the northeast. Turenne followed the Frondists, initiating operations against them and their allies north and east of Paris.

Significance: The Royalist victory was a significant setback for the Frondists. In subsequent operations Turenne was successful, and the rebellion collapsed (February 1653). The French war with Spain, which had supported the rebels, continued.

Sources: A.1; B.12; B.29.

FRANCO-SPANISH WAR, 1653-1659

The Dunes, 14 June 1658

In May 1658 French Marshal Turenne, commanding a French army reinforced by a contingent of English infantry (Protector Oliver Cromwell's English Commonwealth was allied with France), laid siege to the Spanish fortress town of Dunkirk in Spanish Flanders. The Spanish attempted to raise the siege, sending against Turenne an army commanded by Don Juan, the natural son of King Philip IV and the actress Maria Calderon. Don Juan's army included a force of French rebels led by the Prince of Conde, Turenne's old comrade in arms.

The Spanish approached Dunkirk from the northeast, along the coastal strip of dunes from Furnes. Don Juan left his artillery behind at Furnes and, on the day of battle, unwisely allowed his cavalry to disperse for forage. Turenne drew his army out of the siege lines for battle and marched to attack the Spanish in battle order on the morning of 14 June. The Spanish were surprised by the approach of the French but nonetheless formed for battle, minus a large proportion of their cavalry.

Turenne, utilizing combined arms tactics to perfection, made his main effort against the Spanish right, where the Spanish infantry had taken up a position somewhat inland because of the presence of an English fleet. The English infantry, supported by artillery, successfully stormed a high dune and broke a Spanish regiment defending it; the French cavalry, meantime enveloped the Spanish right. This was the decisive action of the battle, although Conde, with the cavalry of the Spanish left, made a series of charges that were contained and defeated by the French right. The Spanish were routed, pursued from the field.

Significance: Turenne won a complete victory, and Dunkirk subsequently surrendered. The Peace of Pyrenees, ending the French-Spanish War, followed in November 1659. Spain ceded much of Flanders and other frontier regions to France.

Sources: A.1; A.7; B.25; B.29.

AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR, 1662-1683

The Raab (St. Gotthard-Mogersdorf), 1 August 1664

In the late spring of 1664 a Turkish army commanded by the Grand Vizier Ahmed Koprulu marched northwest up the Drau River from Esseg in Hapsburg Hungary. On 2 June, at Zrinyvar, Koprulu's army began to march due north, threatening Vienna. The Imperialist commander, Field Marshal Count Raimondo Montecuccoli, chose to defend the approaches to Vienna along the line of the Raab River. Montecuccoli's army consisted of Austrians, troops from the German Empire states, and French.

In late July the two armies maneuvered along the line of the Raab, the Turks on the southern bank, seeking an unopposed crossing place. On 31 July the armies were encamped opposite each other, upstream from St. Gotthard, separated by the Raab, which was fordable in several places. Montecuccoli's so-called Coalition Army had Austrian troops on the right, German Empire troops in the center, and the French contingent on the left. These troops defended a broad bend in the river which curved toward the Turks on the opposite bank.

At 0600 hours on 1 August the Turks attacked violently, crossing the river in two places with infantry and cavalry. The main effort was made in the center against the Empire troops, and a holding attack was made against the Austrian cavalry on the Turkish left. By 1000 hours the Coalition Army's center had collapsed under the Turkish onslaught, but the French and Austrians, pinching in from the flanks, had contained the Turkish penetration. The Turks attacking the Austrian cavalry on the Coalition Army's right wing were easily stopped and defeated.

In the afternoon the Austrians and the French counterattacked, driving the Turks steadily into the bend of the river, where the mass of Turkish troops masked their own artillery opposite the one ford. By 1800 hours the battle was over. The Turks trapped in the river bend were cut down. The Coalition Army did not pursue the Turks, who withdrew, abandoning their camp to the Christian Allies.

Significance: Montecuccoli's victory was followed in ten days by the signing of the Peace of Vasvar by which Austria and Turkey agreed to a 20-year truce.

Sources: B.21; B.37; B.38.

AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR, 1662-1683

Relief of Vienna, 12 September 1683

In June 1683 a large Turkish army commanded by the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa invaded Austria. By mid-July the Turks were before Vienna, which was defended by a small Imperial garrison, the court having fled to safety and the main Imperial field army having fallen back on Linz. The Turks invested Vienna and began to raid the Danube Valley.

Duke Charles of Lorraine, commanding the Imperial field army, was reinforced during the summer by troops of the German states and a Polish army, led by King John Sobieski, which joined the Austrians and Germans west of Vienna. The Christian allied army then marched to relieve the beleaguered city.

On the morning of 12 September the allies descended on the Turkish camp in a surprise attack from the Kahlenberg Hill in the Weinerwald about five and one-half miles northwest of the city, Duke Charles and the Imperial army on the left (Danube) flank, the Saxon and German contingents in the center, and Sobieski's Poles on the right. The Allies planned to envelop the Turkish right and push the Turks toward Sobieski's wing, which was largely cavalry. In hard fighting, which lasted until mid-afternoon, the allies succeeded in their plan; Sobieski's Poles finally delivered the crowning blow, a furious cavalry charge which swept the Turks from the field and their camp in confusion.

Significance: Following the battle the allies (chiefly the Poles) conducted a cautious pursuit, liberating much of northwestern Hungary by the end of the year. The Imperial reconquest of Hungary was completed in 1688.

Sources: A.1; A.3.2; A.7.

THE POLISH-TURKISH WAR, 1671-1677

Chocim II, 11 November 1673

The Turks, seeking to assert their authority over the Polish Ukraine, declared war on Poland on 9 December 1671. Poland was unprepared for war and suffered a number of humiliating setbacks. In 1673, however, Polish Grand Hetman John Sobieski rallied the nation and led an army against a Turkish army that was dug in along the Dniestr River at Chocim, south of Zwaniec.

The Turks were dug in on the west bank of the river with a bridge leading to the east bank, where they had a small bridgehead. On 11 November the Poles attacked the west bank defenses all along the front with infantry supported by artillery. The Turkish cavalry counterattacked the Polish right center with some success but was beaten back by the Polish cavalry reserves. Meantime, on the Polish right, the Poles broke through the defenses, and Polish cavalry flooded into the breach. Also, a detachment of the Polish right wing cavalry crossed the river and moved against the Turkish bridgehead. When the Turkish counterattack was beaten a panic developed, and the Turks began to flee toward their bridge. Large numbers of Turks were killed by the Poles in the pursuit on both sides of the river.

Significance: Sobieski's victory rid Poland of the immediate Turkish threat.

Sources: B.27.

THE DUTCH WAR, 1672-1678

Sinsheim, 16 June 1674

The French Marshal General Turenne took the offensive in the Rhineland against an Imperialist army commanded by General Enea Sylvio Caprara. On 16 June Turenne encountered the Imperialists at Sinsheim near Philipsburg.

Caprara's force was defending a very strong position. A detachment of the Imperialist army defended Sinsheim, a walled village protected by the Elsenz River. Beyond the village, defending a narrow defile from high ground, was the bulk of the Imperialist army. Turenne's army forced a passage of the Elsenz, took Sinsheim, and formed for battle in the cramped space at the mouth of the defile. The French then advanced on the Imperialists, who counterattacked. A fierce melee involving the infantry and cavalry of both armies ensued, and the French gradually gained the upper hand. Eventually, the Imperialists broke off the combat and retreated. The French were too fatigued to pursue.

Significance: Considering the strength of the Imperialist position, Sinsheim must rank as one of Turenne's greatest victories. However, the French were too weak to exploit their success, and Turenne recrossed the Rhine to Alsace.

Sources: A.1; B.8.1; B.25; B.33.

THE DUTCH WAR, 1672-1678

Seneff, 11 August 1674

The Prince of Conde, commanding one of three French armies arrayed against the Dutch in Flanders, constructed a fortified camp at Reton, near Charleroi. Prince William of Orange, Stadholder of Holland, moved against Conde with superior numbers but declined to attack the Frenchman in his camp. Instead, Orange marched around Conde's left, toward Seneff, attempting to draw him from his trenches. The Dutch army became much dispersed and exposed on its march, and Conde, with the cavalry of his army, attacked the closest elements. These were driven from Seneff but rallied on another portion of the Dutch army at St. Nicholas au Bois, and Conde had to call for reinforcements. Both sides fed men piecemeal into a stubborn, bloody battle that lasted until dark; then the armies withdrew. Conde returned to the battlefield the next day with his entire army but found that Orange had continued his withdrawal, leaving the French masters of the field.

Significance: Conde justifiably claimed a victory. Orange's plan to force the line of the Meuse and invade France had been foiled.

Sources: B.8.1; B.12.

THE DUTCH WAR, 1672-1678

Enzheim, 4 October 1674

The French Marshal General Turenne, having ravaged the Palatinate (July 1674), campaigned in Upper Alsace against the Imperialists and their German allies under the Prince of Bournonville. In early October Turenne received information that the Imperialists would soon receive a large reinforcement from the Elector of Brandenburg, who had declared war on France. Since the Imperial army was already much stronger than the French army, Turenne resolved to attack immediately in order to defeat the Imperialists before the reinforcement arrived.

Turenne encountered the Germans at their camp on a plain near the village of Enzheim. The Germans were in a strong position, entrenched and with practically their entire front covered by ditches. In a thick fog, Turenne attacked the Imperialist left, which was entrenched in a wood. A severe fight developed, and both sides fed men into the battle. After three hours the French appeared to have gained an advantage, and Turenne's left wing commander advanced his cavalry to pressure the Germans on his front. This move was met by a great charge of the German cavalry, which swept around the French left and threatened the French rear. The French cavalry and infantry recovered, however, and beat back this threat. Heavy rain and darkness put an end to the fighting.

Both armies withdrew during the night, but Turenne prepared to renew the battle on the 5th. To his surprise, he discovered that the Germans had withdrawn completely, despite their superiority in numbers.

Significance: The Battle of Enzheim was inconclusive. Following the battle, the Germans were reinforced by the troops of the Elector of Brandenburg. Turenne constructed an entrenched camp and awaited reinforcements.

Sources: A.1; B.8.1; B.25; B.33.

THE DUTCH WAR, 1672-1678

Turckheim, 5 January 1675

Following the Battle of Enzheim the forces of the Imperialists and their German allies opposing French Marshal General Turenne's French army in the Rhineland were substantially reinforced. The opposing armies took up winter quarters, the Germans in Alsace and the French in Lorraine. Turenne received a reinforcement from the Prince of Conde's army and resolved to strike a blow at the Germans while they were dispersed in their camps.

Using the Vosges Mountains to shield his concentration and subsequent march, Turenne, in mid-December, began a march that brought him into the rear of the German cantonments. In early January, as Turenne approached Colmar, the Germans, commanded by the Prince of Bournonville and the Elector of Brandenburg, took up a strong position between Colmar and Turckheim to oppose him. The German line was protected along its front by a stream and on both flanks by rivers, although the Fecht River at Turckheim on the German right was fordable.

On 5 January Turenne attacked this position, demonstrating against the German center and left and making his main effort against Turckheim with a view to enveloping the German right. The French took Turckheim and, in hard fighting that continued into the night, forced the German right back. At dawn Turenne discovered that Bournonville had withdrawn.

Significance: The German allies recrossed the Rhine and left the French in possession of Upper Alsace. Turenne's winter campaign is regarded as one of the most brilliant in military history.

Sources: A.1; B.8.1; B.25; B.33.

THE DUTCH WAR, 1672-1678

Fehrbellin, 28 June 1675

In January 1675 a Swedish army commanded by Count Carl Gustav Wrangel invaded Brandenburg with the object of forcing the Elector, Frederick William (the Great Elector), from his alliance with the Empire. The Swedes plundered and burned and by May were threatening Berlin. In mid-June the Elector moved against Wrangel, catching up with the Swedes at Fehrbellin in a heavy mist on the morning of 28 June. The Brandenburg army consisted entirely of cavalry and dragoons and 13 guns. It was much weaker than that of the Swedes, but the Brandenburgers took the initiative and kept the Swedes off balance throughout the engagement.

The Brandenburger advance guard charged the Swedes on their line of march at 0600 hours, surprising them and creating confusion. The Swedes were forced to deploy. At 0800 hours the Brandenburg main body came up and took up a position opposite the Swedish right. The Brandenburg artillery, commanded by Derflinger, deployed on a hill behind the Swedish right flank and held its fire until the cavalry charged. The Swedes were again thrown into confusion but rallied and charged Derflinger's guns. A two hour struggle for the guns ensued, but eventually the Swedish right was crushed. The Swedish center and left then withdrew. The Brandenburgers did not pursue but followed the Swedes to the border with Mecklenburg.

Significance: Frederick William followed up his victory by invading Swedish Pomerania, taking Stettin, Stralsund, and Greifswald. The defeat was a severe blow to Swedish military prestige. The monument erected at Fehrbellin in 1800 reads: "Here the brave Brandenburgers laid the foundation of Prussia's greatness."

Sources: A.1.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Monmouth's Rebellion

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (km)
Sedgemoor, England	A D 6 Jul 1685	Sedgemoor	Eng Reb Army Eng Army	Monmouth Feversham	1	0.8

War: King William's War

Killiecrankie, Scotland	A D 27 Jul 1689	Killiecrankie	Scots Reb Army Eng Army	Dundee Mackay	1	1.0
Walcourt, France	A D 25 Aug 1689	Flanders, 1689	Fr Army Allied Army	D'Humieres Waldeck	1	1.0
Fleurus, Spanish Netherlands	A D 1 Jul 1690	Fleurus, 1690	Fr Army Allied Army	Luxembourg Waldeck	1	?
The Boyne, Ireland	A D 11 Jul 1690	Boyne	Eng Army Eng-Irish Reb Army	William III James II	1	8.0
Aughrim, Ireland	A D 22 Jul 1691	Aughrim	Eng Army Eng-Irish Reb Army	Ginkel St. Ruth	1	?
Steenkerke, Spanish Netherlands	A D 3 Aug 1692	Flanders, 1692	Allied Army Fr Army	William III Luxembourg	1	2.4
Neerwinden (Landen), Spanish Netherlands	A D 29 Jul 1693	Flanders, 1693	Fr Army Allied Army	William III Luxembourg	1	5.7
Marsaglia, Piedmont	A D 4 Oct 1693	Piedmont, 1693	Fr Army Allied Army	Catinat Duke of Savoy	1	?

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Zenta, Hungary	A D 11 Sep 1697	Hungary, 1697	Aus Army Turk Army	Eugene Mustafa II	1	?
War: Great Northern War						
Poltava, Russia	A D 28 Jun 1709	Poltava	Sw Army Russ Army	Charles XII Peter the Great	1	?
War: War of the Spanish Succession						
Blenheim, Bavaria	A D 13 Aug 1704	Blenheim	Allied Army Fr/Bav Army	Marlborough & Eugene	1	6.4
Ramillies, Spanish Netherlands	A D 23 May 1706	Ramillies	Allied Army Fr/Bav Army	Tallard, Marsin & Max Emmanuel of Bavaria	1	4.8
Oudenarde, Spanish Netherlands	A D 11 Jul 1708	Oudenarde	Allied Army Fr/Bav Army	Marlborough Villeroy & Max Emmanuel of Bavaria	1	6.4
Malplaquet, Spanish Netherlands	A D 11 Sep 1709	Malplaquet	Allied Army Fr/Bav Army	Marlborough & Eugene Willars & Boufflers	1	8.2

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Peterwardein, Kingdom of Hungary	A D 5 Aug 1716	Hungary, 1716	Aus Army Turk Army	Eugene Ali Pasha	1	?

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: Monmouth's Rebellion

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Sedgemoor	A D	HD	FM	WLT	ST	Y X	minor
War: King William's War							
Killiecrankie	A D	HD	RGM	DST	ST	N	--
Walcourt	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Fleurus	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
The Boyne	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Aughrim	A D	H/PD	RM	DST/MIT	ST	N	--
Steenkerke	A D	H/PD	RGM	WLT	ST	N	--
Neerwinden (Landen)	A D	H/PD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Marsaglia	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Engagement	Defender Posture		Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Zenta	A D	PD	FM	DST	FT	Y	X	minor
War: Great Northern War								
Poltava	A D	PD	FM	DST	ST	N	--	--

War: War of the Spanish Succession

Blenheim	A D	HD	FM	DST	ST	N	--	--
Ramillies	A D	H/PD	FM	DST	Spt	N	--	--
Oudenarde	A D	HD	FM	DST	ST	N	--	--
Malplaquet	A D	PD	FM	DST	FT	N	--	--

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Peterwardein	A D	HD	FM	DST	ST	N	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War:

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	\$/Day		
Sedgemoor	A 4,000 D 3,000	800 510	4 16	1,500 300	37.5 10.0	4 --	100.0 --	x	-- 1.0

War: King William's War

Killiecrankie	A 2,800 D 3,400	100 --	?	?	?	?	?	x	0.8 --
Walcourt	A 24,000 D 35,000	20 130	2,000 0.4	8.3 --	6 --	30.0 --	x	x	3.6 --
Fleurus	A 50,000 D 38,000	6 50,000	6,000 19,000	12.0 50.0	-- 49	-- 100.0	x	x	? --
The Boyne	A 35,000 D 23,000	50 5,000	2,000 1,500	5.7 6.5	0 6	-- 100.0	x	x	2.0 --
Aughrim	A 18,000 D 25,000	6 6	2,700 4,400	15.0 17.6	-- 6	100.0 --	x	x	1.2 --
Steenkerke	A 63,000 D 57,000	70 60	8,000 7,000	12.7 12.3	10 8	14.3 13.3	x	x	0.8 --
Neerwinden (Landen)	A 80,000 D 50,000	71 20,000	9,000 14,000	11.3 28.0	-- 84	-- 100.0	x	x	1.0 --
Marsaglia	A 40,000 D 36,000	30 11,000	3,000 11,000	7.5 30.6	-- 31	100.0 --	x	x	? --

5. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day		
Zenta	A 50,000 D 100,000	16,000 40,000	60 200	500 30,000	1.0 30.0	0 145	-- 72.5	x	?
									--

War: Great Northern War

Poltava	A 21,500 D 80,000	8,500 8,500	4 100	9,600 1,300	44.7 1.6	4 --	100.0 --	x	?

War: War of the Spanish Succession

Blenheim	A 52,000 D 56,000	20,000 17,000	60 90	12,883 34,190	24.8 61.1	-- 60	-- 66.7	x	2.7 --
Ramillies	A 62,000 D 60,000	16,000 17,000	120 70	3,620 19,000	5.8 31.7	-- 54	-- 77.1	x	3.0 --
Oudenarde	A 80,000 D 85,000	21,000 20,000	32 50	4,000 15,000	5.0 17.6	-- 25	-- 50.0	x	2.4 --
Salslaquet	A 110,000 D 80,000	25,000 25,000	100 60	24,000 12,000	21.8 15.0	-- 16	-- 26.7	x	1.4 --

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	\$/Day		
Peterwardein	A D	63,000 60,000	22,000 20,000	?	4,500 6,000	7.1 10.0	0 159	-- 100.0	x ?

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: Monmouth's Rebellion

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Sedgemoor	A	D	x	x	x	C	N	N	C	x	1.0	5 8

War: King William's War

Killiecrankie	A	C	x	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.8	10 5
Malcourt	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	3.6	5
St. Fleurus	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	?	10 4
The Boyne	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	2.0	10 5
Aughrim	A	D	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	1.2	9 4
Steenkerke	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	0.8	6 7
Neerwinden (Landen)	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	1.0	10 4
Marsaglia	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	C	x	?	10 4

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	OE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Zenta	A	x	x	x	C	N	x	C	x	x	?	10
	D											2

War: Great Northern War

Poltava	A	x	C	x	C	O	N	N	C	x	x	?
	D											

War: War of the Spanish Succession

Blenheim	A	C	x	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	x	2.7
Ramillies	A	C	x	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	x	3.0
Oudenarde	A	C	x	C	C	N	N	N	x	x	x	2.4
Malplaquet	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	N	C	x	x	1.4

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accom-p.
Peterwardin	A D	x x	x x	C	N	N	N	C	N	x	?	10 4

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: Monmouth's Rebellion

Engagement		A	D	x	x		
Sedgemoor							

War: King William's War

Killiecrankie	A	N	D	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Walcourt																			
Fleurus																			
The Boyne																			
Aughrim																			
Steenkerke																			
Neerwinden (Landen)																			
Marsaglia																			

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Engagement	Zenta	A D	x N	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	Depth
Logistics										Tortilla- cations
Morale, Honor, Mass										Honourer,
Surprise			x			x				
Planning				0						
Cadet- ship					x					
Roads, Trainin,										
Watches										
Force decisions- lition-										
Superiority										
Quality										

War: Great Northern War

Poltava	A D	x x	x x	N N	x x	N N	N N	N N	O x	x

War: War of the Spanish Succession

Blenheim	A D	N N								
Ramillies	A D	N N								
Oudenarde	A D	N N								
Malplaquet	A D	N N								

6. ACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Engagement	Peterwardein	A D
Force Quality	A X	
Force Services	N N	
Mobility Superiority	N N	
Force Projection	X	
Weather	N	
Terrain, Roads	X	
Landscape, Ship	X	
Surprise	N	
Planned	X	
Mass Maneuver,	N	
Logistics	N	
Portfolios, Categories	X	
Depth	N	

7. CCBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: Monmouth's Rebellion

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
			Secondary Attack			
Sedgemoor	A D	F D/O, EE	-- --		X	R, WDL B, Ps
War: King William's War						
Killiecrankie	A D	F D	-- --		X	B, Ps WD
Walcourt	A D	F D/O, EE	-- --		X	P, WDL P
Fleurus	A D	EE D	-- --		X	B, Ps WDL
The Boyne	A D	F, E(LR) D/O, F	-- --		X	P WD
Aughrim	A D	F D	-- --		X	B, Ps WD
Steenkerke	A D	F D	-- --		X	P, R, WDL WD
Neerwinden (Landen)	A D	F D	-- --		X	B, Ps WD
Marsaglia	A D	F, E(LF) D	-- --		X	B, Ps WDL

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: Austro-Turkish War, 1688-1699

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Successor	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack		
Zenta	A F D	-- --	X	B, Ps A
War: Great Northern War				
Poltava	A D	F D/O, F	-- EE	X X
War: War of the Spanish Succession				
Bjørnheim	A D	F D	-- --	X B, Ps WDL
Ramillies	A D	E(RF) D	F --	X B, Ps WDL
Oudenarde	A D	F D/O, F	EE --	X B, Ps WDL
Malplaquet	A D	F D/O, F	E(LF) --	X P WDL

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: Austro-Turkish War, 1716-1718

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack		
Peterwardein	A F D/O, F	-- --	x	P,B,PS P,R,WD

MONMOUTH'S REBELLION

Sedgemoor, 6 July 1685 (O.S.)

The Duke of Monmouth, the natural son of King Charles II, proclaimed himself rightful king of England after his father's death in 1685. Monmouth entered England from Holland and raised a rebellion against King James II among the Protestants of the economically depressed west of England. Royalist forces commanded by Lord John Churchill and the French Huguenot expatriate, Louis Duras, Earl of Feversham, marched against the Rebels in Cornwall in a campaign that lasted less than a month. In early July Monmouth was trapped by the Royalists near Bridgwater in a flat lowland cut up by ditches and dikes. Desperate, he attempted a night surprise attack on the Royalist camp at Westonzoyland.

Monmouth's approach march of five miles was masked by a fog rising from the moors. His guide lost his way. In the confusion, his men were discovered by Royalist cavalry who gave the alarm. The Royalist army formed for battle. At about 0200 hours, 5 July (Old Style), a firefight developed between the two forces. This lasted until dawn, when Feversham directed a double envelopment of the Rebels, who broke and fled. Monmouth was captured. His men were hunted down and many of them butchered in cold blood.

Significance: Monmouth was executed at London on 15 July. The Rebels were ruthlessly punished by the famous "Bloody Assizes." Sedgemoor was the last battle fought on English soil.

Sources: C.3.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Killiecrankie, 17 July 1689

After the flight of King James II from England his Scottish supporters, led by John Graham of Claverhouse, Viscount Dundee, opposed the decision of the Scots Convention to accept King William and Queen Mary as sovereigns. Dundee led a rebellion of Highlanders for James II, raising an army to oppose the "Glorious Revolution" which had placed William and Mary on the throne.

A Williamite army commanded by General Hugh Mackay marched into the highlands to oppose Dundee and met the Jacobite army at the Pass of Killiecrankie on the road from Perth to Inverness. The Williamites formed for battle on a narrow plain within the pass. The Jacobites attacked at dusk, led by Dundee. The Williamites loosed one volley at the charging Highlanders and were fumbling with their awkward plug bayonets when the Highland charge collided with their line. The Highlanders won an easy victory, but Dundee was killed in the melee.

Significance: The Jacobites won a complete victory, but Dundee's death caused his army to disband. Within a year most of the Highland chiefs had sworn allegiance to King William III. The pacification of the Highlands was carried out with extreme severity, including the famous Massacre of Glencoe (1692). The result was a fastening hatred of the English royal government among the Highlanders that led to Highland support for Jacobite rebellions in 1715 and 1745.

Sources: A. 7.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Walcourt, 25 August 1689

On 24 August 1689 a Dutch Allied army commanded by the Prince of Waldeck crossed the Sambre River from Flanders and entered French territory at Walcourt. Waldeck stopped at Walcourt and sent our foraging parties. The French Marshal d'Humieres on 25 August marched against Waldeck and, at 0900, attacked Waldeck's outposts and their supports. For two hours, a single English infantry regiment posted north of Walcourt delayed the French, conducting a masterful fighting withdrawal. Finally, at noon, the French were able to deploy opposite the main Allied position, which included the town of Walcourt and a hill on the eastern side of the town. D'Humieres ordered an infantry attack on the town, and, although this attack was pressed most gallantly, it was repulsed. The French marshal then attempted to widen the front, moving troops against the Allied right flank, but the Allies conformed and extended their line to the west of Walcourt, thwarting the French move. Waldeck then ordered a double envelopment of the French line, sending Dutch infantry around the French left and English infantry and cavalry under the Earl of Marlborough around the French right. This attack was made at 1800 hours. The French infantry was trapped and might have been destroyed but for the intervention of the numerous French cavalry, commanded expertly by the Duke of Villars. D'Humieres withdrew, having lost 2,000 men and six guns.

Significance: Walcourt was the only success of the Allies in 1689, but it had no important effect on the overall military situation. D'Humieres was sacked and replaced by the Marshal Duke of Luxembourg, a master of the art of war.

Sources: C.4.1.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Fleurus, 1 July 1690

The campaign of 1690 in Flanders was initiated by the French army commanded by Marshal Duke Francois de Luxembourg in late May. Luxembourg advanced boldly into the Spanish Netherlands (Belgium), seeking battle with the Allied army commanded by Prince Georg Friedrich von Waldeck. The two armies met at Fleurus, northeast of Charleroi, on 1 July. Waldeck took up a defensive position facing east; Luxembourg approached from the west. Luxembourg took advantage of his superiority in numbers and Waldeck's inertia to attempt a remarkable tactical maneuver that resulted in a great victory. Dividing his army in the near presence of the enemy, he left his left wing at Fleurus to demonstrate against Waldeck's right and marched his right wing around the Allied left. The ground between the two wings, which was not suitable for the deployment of a line of battle, was covered by artillery with weak infantry supports. Luxembourg's daring envelopment succeeded. The French descended on the Allied left from the northwest, and the Allied army was driven steadily from the field. An attempt by Waldeck to reinforce his left was made too late. The Allied disaster might have been greater but for the heroic conduct of the Allied infantry, which fought a stubborn rear guard action into the night.

Significance: Luxembourg wished to exploit his victory by striking deep into Holland and Germany, but King Louis XIV forbade him to do so and ordered him to conform to the sluggish movements of other French armies maneuvering on the Meuse and the Moselle.

Sources: A.1; A.12.1; A.16.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

The Boyne, 11 July 1690

The Irish Jacobites (supporters of deposed English King James II), having failed in their attempt to reduce the Williamite stronghold of Londonderry (April-July 1689) in northeast Ireland, withdrew south when a Williamite army commanded by the Duke of Schomberg landed near Belfast. Both armies wintered in the region north of Dublin.

In the summer of 1690, the Williamites, led by King William III, took the offensive, marching against the Jacobites, led by King James II, who took up a strong defensive position on the south bank of the Boyne River, north of Dublin. William, with superior numbers, attacked the Jacobites on 11 July, making his main effort against the Jacobite right-center -- where the Duke of Schomberg was killed in an assault river crossing -- and sending a column to envelop the Jacobite left. Both attacks were successful, and the Jacobites were driven from the field, their withdrawal covered by a disciplined rear guard action by French infantry loaned by King Louis XIV. William's army camped on the battlefield, and the Jacobites retreated through Dublin to the west of Ireland.

Significance: The Williamites' victory delivered Dublin and about three-fourths of Ireland to them. James fled to exile in France. The Irish Jacobites now prepared to defend Galway from the line of the River Shannon.

Sources: A.1; A.3.1.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Aughrim, 22 July 1691

Following their victory at the Battle of the Boyne the Williamites consolidated their hold on Ireland, laying seige to the Jacobite stronghold of Limerick and taking Cork and Kinsale. On 21 July 1691 the Franco-Irish Jacobite army, commanded by the French Marquis de St. Ruth, met the Williamite army, commanded by the Dutch General Godert de Ginkel, at Aughrim, in Galway, in the decisive battle for the control of Ireland.

The Jacobites were strongly posted, occupying a hill fronted by a marsh and intersected with hedges. The Williamites attacked all along the front and won after a bitter day-long struggle in which St. Ruth was killed by a cannon shot, and the Irish, unable to coordinate the defense following his death, attempted to withdraw in a thunderstorm. Casualties on both sides were heavy, but the Irish suffered terribly in the pursuit.

Significance: The defeat destroyed the last Irish Jacobite field army and ended Jacobite hopes in Ireland. Limerick fell in October, and William, free from preoccupation with Ireland, could devote all his efforts to the war against France on the Continent.

Sources: A.1; A.3.1.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Steenkerke, 3 August 1692

In the Flanders Campaign of 1692 the French were, as usual, the first to take the field, and profited by the capture of Namur, following a siege conducted by King Louis XIV himself. When Louis quit the army for the court, he left the Marshal Duke of Luxembourg in command with strictly defensive orders. The Allied army, commanded by the English King and Dutch Stadholder, William III, marched on Namur. Luxembourg, however, drew the Allies off by moving toward Brussels. The French eventually camped in difficult country near the village of Steenkerke.

William, hoping to achieve surprise, made a night march against the French camp, which he attacked on the morning of 3 August. The Allied march and subsequent deployment, however, were poorly planned, and the result was that only a fraction of the Allied army was able to get into action initially. An apparent misunderstanding of orders and lack of initiative compounded these failures, and the Allied infantry that did attack was not supported, even though the bulk of the Allied army was massed in proximity to the bitter fighting that developed on the French right. Luxembourg reinforced his right wing, and eventually the French prevailed. The Allies withdrew, having suffered a bloody setback.

Significance: The victory at Steenkerke allowed the French to prevail in Flanders in 1692. Heavy losses in the English contingent of William's army caused much adverse comment in the English Parliament.

Sources: A.1; A.5; A.12.1.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Neerwinden (Landen), 29 July 1693

The King of England and Dutch Stadholder, William of Orange, entrenched his Allied army near Landen in the Spanish Netherlands to resist the advance of a French army commanded by Marshal Duke Francois de Luxembourg. In late July William foolishly weakened his army by detaching a force to support Liege, which was threatened by another French army. Luxembourg, now by far the stronger, moved immediately to attack the Allies.

Since the Allied flanks were covered by water obstacles that made them virtually unassailable, Luxembourg massed his troops before the Allied center and, after three unsuccessful assaults, penetrated the Allied defenses. The French cavalry, which had made the initial penetration, poured into the Allied rear, completing the victory. In the rout that ensued, Allied casualties and material losses were heavy. The French, who had suffered severely themselves, did not pursue beyond the battlefield.

Significance: The French followed up their victory by taking Charleroi and consolidating control over the Sambre region southwest of Namur.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.12.1.

KING WILLIAM'S WAR

Marsaglia, 4 October 1693

The French Marshal Nicolas de Catinat, campaigning in Savoy in the fall of 1693, forced a Piedmontese (Savoyard) army commanded by Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy to raise the siege of Pinerolo and retire on Turin. Catinat followed the duke's army and brought it to battle at Marsaglia, southwest of Turin, on 4 October.

The duke formed for battle on a plain between the Cisola River, on his left, and an open wood but neglected to occupy a height to his left front. When Catinat came up he directed his right wing to occupy the height, thus threatening the duke's left. The French center and left deployed opposite the duke's line in the plain.

The French initiated the engagement by attacking the Savoyard line all along its front. Then the French right enveloped the Savoyard left and pushed it back on its center. The Savoyard left and center were crushed, and the remnants of the duke's army fled the field in disorder.

Significance: The French victory forced the Duke of Savoy to conclude peace on terms favorable to France. Catinat's army then marched north to reinforce the French armies on other fronts.

Sources: A.1; A.5.

THE AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR, 1688-1699

Zenta, 11 September 1697

Prince Eugene of Savoy led an Austrian army to oppose a major Turkish invasion of Hungary. The Turkish army, commanded by Sultan Mustafa II, advanced from Belgrade. Both armies were on the right (southern) bank of the Thieß River in early September. The Turks had built a bridge of boats protected by earthworks across the river at Zenta and were endeavoring to cross the river and move eastward into Transylvania. The Austrian army marched to Zenta on 11 September, arriving in the late afternoon. Eugene saw that a portion of the Turkish army had already crossed to the left bank and decided to attack at once, while the Turkish army was divided.

The Turkish earthworks were assaulted all along the front, and the Turkish infantry, ill organized and confined in a narrow space, were pushed backward toward the river and the single escape route of their bridge of boats. In a short period of time the Turks lost all cohesion and were routed. The Austrian infantry gave no quarter, and in Eugene's words, "a frightful bloodbath" ensued. The Turkish army was destroyed.

Significance: The Austrian victory at Zenta ended the last serious Turkish threat to Hungary. By the Treaty of Karlowitz (26 January 1699) Turkey ceded all of Hungary and Transylvania, except the Banat, to Austria.

Sources: A.1; A.7; C.10.

THE GREAT NORTHERN WAR

Poltava, 28 June 1709

On 1 January 1708 the Swedish King Charles XII, leading an army of veterans, invaded Russia. Charles advanced on Moscow but turned south and made for the Ukraine, where the Cossack Hetman Mazeppa promised an anti-Russian uprising. The Russian Tsar, Peter I, meantime assembled a large army, well equipped, disciplined, and trained -- in contrast to the Russian armies that had opposed the Swedes earlier in the war -- and prepared to combat the Swedish invaders.

In the Ukraine Charles besieged the Russian fortress of Poltava, but his situation gradually deteriorated. Mazeppa's insurrection did not materialize, and a Swedish army, moving south from Livonia with supplies for Charles's army, was destroyed by the Russians. In May 1709 Tsar Peter, with the main Russian army, appeared near Poltava and began to maneuver against Charles's smaller army. Charles decided to attack.

The Russians had constructed a prepared defense in depth near Poltava, with a series of redoubts blocking the way to their main camp, which was entrenched. The Swedes attacked with the bayonet in columns on the morning of 28 June. Charles, who had been wounded in an earlier skirmish, directed the attack from a litter. The Swedes, despite their weakness in numbers, were at first successful, capturing the outlying Russian redoubts and advancing on the Russian camp, where Peter waited with the bulk of his force. Reaching the camp, the Swedes formed into line and prepared for a final assault, but this was broken up by massed artillery fire, and the Russians counterattacked, driving the Swedes from the field. The remnants of the Swedish army were pursued and captured in a group at Perevolchna, on the Dnieper, two days later. Charles fled to Turkey.

Significance: Poltava is considered one of the great decisive battles of world history. It signalled the military and political decline of Sweden from great power status and indicated the rise of Tsarist Russia as a great power. Peter followed his victory by occupying Poland; his allies made other territorial acquisitions at Sweden's expense.

Sources: A.1; A.7.

WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1701-1714

Blenheim, 13 August 1704

In an attempt to rescue the beleaguered Austrian capital from the designs of Louis XIV and his ally, the Elector of Bavaria, the Duke of Marlborough, with his Allied Army, joined forces with the Austrian Army of Prince Eugene of Savoy on 12 August near Donauwörth. Eleven kilometers to the southwest the Franco-Bavarian Army was encamped near Blenheim. Marlborough and Eugene decided to attack. Marlborough's army, on the left, would make the main effort against Marshal Tallard's French army, while Eugene was to contain the French-Bavarian left with an aggressive holding attack. The Allied armies moved out at 0200, and Marlborough's force surprised the Franco-Bavarian outposts at 0700. Eugene's army did not arrive until nearly noon, because it had to travel on a longer more difficult route. Marlborough and Eugene attacked simultaneously. Marlborough initially attacked the villages of Blenheim (beside the Danube) and Oberglaub (3 kilometers west). Although the British suffered heavy casualties, Tallard was forced to commit his reserves. Meanwhile, as planned, Eugene advanced very slowly against strong resistance on the Franco-Bavarian left. At 1630 Marlborough launched his cavalry in an attack which after about an hour of tough fighting broke through Tallard's center. Tallard's army was shattered, and he was captured. Marlborough then began to swing right, but the commanders of the Franco-Bavarian left wing, the Elector and Marshal Marsin, were able to withdraw most of their command from the planned double envelopment.

Significance: Vienna was saved. The Elector of Bavaria had to flee his country, which was annexed by Austria. Perhaps equally important, the prestige of France and the French armies was shattered. There is probably no finer example in history of allied coordination and cooperation than that of Eugene and Marlborough in this campaign and battle.

Sources: A.1; A.7; C.3; C.4.2.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION, 1701-1714

Ramillies, 23 May 1706

In an attempt to seize the initiative and prevent the British Allied army of the Duke of Marlborough from seizing Namur, on 18 May the French Duke of Villeroy marched south toward Namur from his positions by the Dyle River. Marlborough marched southwest and intercepted the French at Ramillies. The French deployed on high ground in a defensive position, partially entrenched. Marlborough deployed his British troops on his right and feinted against the French left, causing Villeroy to shift his reserves and draw some units out of his right wing. Meanwhile, Marlborough's Dutch troops, on the Allied left (southern) flank, seized two key positions on the French right at the villages of Franquenay and Taviers. Villeroy dispatched dragoons to regain these positions, but their counterattack was repulsed. A Dutch cavalry charge virtually annihilated the retreating dragoons. Villeroy continued to commit his troops piecemeal on his beleaguered right flank, while the Dutch and French infantries battled in the center. However, the French commander's main concern was the English holding attack on his left. Marlborough then withdrew the bulk of his cavalry from his right flank and passed them behind his center to the left flank. They charged, smashing the French right. In the north the British troops demonstrating against the French left were withdrawn and reformed as a reserve behind the Allied center. Villeroy attempted to form a new line on his right flank at a right angle to his center to cover a withdrawal. Marlborough formed a new line on his left and, attacking, broke both the center and the right flank of the French line. His cavalry pursued, inflicting heavy casualties on the retreating French.

Significance: The destruction of the French Army of Villeroy enabled Marlborough to win control over the Spanish Netherlands.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.12.1; C.3; C.4.3.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

Oudenarde, 11 July 1708

Having seized the initiative in the spring of 1708, the Duke of Burgundy's French force, actually commanded by the Duke of Vendome, captured Ghent and Bruges on 4 July and then turned south to threaten the Allied garrison at Oudenarde. But the Duke of Marlborough, whose Allied army was west of the Scheldt River, was eager for battle, and prepared to move.

While Burgundy and Vendome argued about whether to avoid battle, the French army stood scattered north of Oudenarde, instead of moving to block the allies from crossing the Scheldt. Marlborough, joined by Prince Eugene of Savoy, whose army had not yet arrived in the area, marched his army 44 kilometers in 22 hours. As the Allies, with Marlborough commanding on the left and Eugene on the right, were crossing the Scheldt in the morning of 11 July, the French finally deployed defensively on the heights north of Oudenarde. An advance guard of British infantry and Prussian cavalry overran the French advance guard north of the fortress, and the Prussian cavalry boldly attacked the entire left wing of French cavalry before Marlborough and Eugene started the general attack, at about 1400. Almost simultaneously, Vendome ordered his men to attack. There was little plan on either side, and the result was a long, confused, bloody struggle in which the allies held a slight advantage due to the vigor, determination and generalship of their joint commanders. By dusk Marlborough had achieved an envelopment of the French right, and, as Eugene continued to press forward, the allies drove the French from the field in the gathering darkness.

Significance: Vendome withdrew to Ghent, where he rallied his defeated troops, repulsing an allied force of forty squadrons which Marlborough had sent in pursuit. Thus, the French retained control of western Flanders and regained a secure line of communications to France.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.12.1; C.3; C.4.3.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

Malplaquet, 11 September 1709

In the Flanders Campaign of 1709 the Allied army commanded by John, Duke of Marlborough, was opposed by a French army commanded by Marshal Duke Claude de Villars. At the outset of the campaign the French stood behind their extensive fortified Lines of La Bassée in the vicinity of Bethune. Marlborough feinted against these lines and then moved to reduce the French-held fortress of Tournai. Tournai surrendered on 5 September, and Marlborough moved on to besiege Mons. Villars countered by moving to Malplaquet, southeast of Mons, where he entrenched, knowing that this threat to the besieging forces would attract the allies to attack him.

Leaving a small force to continue the siege of Mons, Marlborough and his co-commander, Prince Eugene of Savoy, moved to attack Villars (9-10 September). On 11 September the Allies advanced to the attack with Eugene on the right as usual, and Marlborough on the left. The Allies planned holding attacks against the French left and right with a main effort by English troops under Marlborough's command against the French center, when French reserves were committed to oppose the Allied attacks against the flanks.

The Allied attack proceeded according to plan. Marlborough's main effort penetrated the French center but was driven back by a counterattack organized by Marshal Duke Louis Francois de Boufflers, who succeeded Villars when the latter was badly wounded. The Allies, however, renewed their efforts and were able once again to penetrate the French center. Boufflers thereupon ordered a general withdrawal, which was carried out in good order. Casualties on both sides were extremely heavy, and the Allies were unable to pursue.

Significance: The Allied victory, which was due to the absolute determination and persistence of Marlborough and Eugene, had no result other than to permit the Allies to continue the siege of Mons, which fell on 20 October. Both armies then went into winter quarters.

Sources: A.1; A.7; C.3.

AUSTRO-TURKISH WAR, 1716-1718

Peterwardein, 5 August 1716

An Austrian army commanded by Prince Eugene of Savoy encountered a Turkish army commanded by Damad Ali Pasha at Peterwardein, Hungary (modern Yugoslavia). Eugene deployed his army in a formidable position: his left flank rested on the Danube River, and his right was protected by the fortifications and guns of the Austrian fortress of Peterwardein. His front was protected by a double line of entrenchments constructed some 20 years before. These defensive arrangements were made necessary by the numerical superiority of the Turkish army, but Eugene did not intend to fight a defensive battle.

The Austrians opened the engagement on 5 August by attacking the Turkish right center with infantry. The Turks counterattacked against the Austrian center fiercely, achieving a brief success. Eugene, however, reinforced his center and directed his left wing infantry to turn right and take the Turkish counterattack in the flank. To cover this move Eugene ordered his left flank cavalry to charge the Turkish cavalry opposite them. The Austrian infantry overwhelmed the Turkish infantry in the center, and the Austrian and Hungarian cavalry charging on the left swept the Turkish cavalry off the field completely. The Turkish commander was killed trying to rally his men.

Significance: The Turkish army was routed and entirely broken up. Eugene capitalized on his victory by capturing the Turkish fortress of Temesvar. This was an important prelude to the recapture of Belgrade.

Sources: A.1; C.10.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: The War of the Austrian Succession

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Mollwitz, Silesia	A 10 April 1741 D	Silesian	Aus Army Pr Army	Neipperg Frederick II	1	2.7
Chotusitz, Bohemia	A 17 May 1742 D	Bohemia, 1742	Aus Army Pr Army	Lorraine Frederick II	1	3.4
Dettingen, Bavaria	A 27 Jun 1743 D	Dettingen	Br-Han Army Fr Army	George II Noailles	1	2.3
Fontenoy, Aus. Netherlands	A 11 May 1745 D	Fontenoy	Br Allied Army Fr Army	Cumberland Saxe	1	2.8
Hohenfriedberg, Silesia	A 4 Jun 1745	Hohenfriedberg	Pr Army Aus-Sax Army	Frederick II Lorraine	1	4.8
Soor, Silesia	A 30 Sep 1745 D	Soor	Pr Army Aus-Sax Army	Frederick II Lorraine	1	3.5
Kesselsdorf Saxony	A 14 Dec 1745 D	Elbe	Pr Army Sax Army	Anhalt-Dessau Rutowski	1	4.4

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
War: The War of the Austrian Succession

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Surprise	Level
Mollwitz	A D	HD	RW	MLC	Spt	N	-	-
Chotusitz	A D	HD	RW	DST	Spt	Y	X	minor
Dettingen	A D	HD	RW	DST	ST	N	-	--
Fontenoy	A D	H/PD	RW	DST	Spt	N	-	--
Hohenfriedberg	A D	HD	RW	DST	ST	Y	X	minor
Soor	A D	HD	RW	DST	FT	N	-	--
Kesseleldorf	A D	HD	RW	DST	WT	Y	X	substantial

5. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: The War of the Austrian Succession

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties			Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day	\$/Day		
Mollwitz	A 18,100	9,711	19	4,551	25.1	7	36.8	x	1.6	--
	D 22,000	4,000	50	4,850	22.0	0	--	--	--	2.7
Chotusitz	A 29,000	10,000	40	6,332	21.8	16	40.0	x	--	--
	D 24,500	7,000	82	4,819	19.7	?	--	--	--	1.2
Dettin	A 35,000	8,000	98	2,500	7.1	1	1.0	x	--	--
	D 26,000	4,000	56	4,000	15.4	0	--	--	--	1.3
Fontenoy	A 50,000	10,000	101	12,000	24.0	32	31.7	x	--	--
	D 60,000	15,000	100	6,000	10.0	0	--	--	--	1.8
Hohenfriedberg	A 50,000	19,900	192	4,737	9.5	?	--	x	--	--
	D 66,000	22,000	121	13,176	20.0	63	52.1	--	--	1.2
Soor	A 22,562	5,852	60	3,876	17.2	?	--	x	--	--
	D 41,000	12,700	98	7,444	18.2	19	19.4	--	--	2.0
Kesselsdorf	A 31,000	9,000	33	5,000	16.1	0	--	x	--	--
	D 31,200	7,000	42	6,630	21.3	40	95.2	--	--	--

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: The War of the Austrian Succession

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Mollwitz	A D	X X	C	C	N	N	N	C	N	X	1.6	4
Chotusitz	A D	X X	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	2.7	5
Dettingen	A D	X C	C	C	N	N	N	C	N	X	1.2	8
Fontenoy	A D	C X	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	1.3	4
Hohenfriedberg	A D	X O	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	1.8	8
Soor	A D	X O	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	1.2	3
Kesselsdorf	A D	X O	C	C	N	N	N	C	X	X	2.0	4
												9
												5

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: The War of the Austrian Succession

Engagement	Mobilility	Resource Quality	Reserves	Mobilility Superiority	Force Proportionality	Weather	Terrain Roads	Leader-ship	Planning	Surprise	Measurer, Mass	Logistics	Portefei-l-ations	Depth	
Mollwitz	A	x		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Chotusitz	D	x		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bettlingen	A	C		N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Fontenoy	D	A		D	A	D	A	D	A	x	x	x	x	x	x
Hohenfriedberg	A	D		A	D	A	D	A	D	A	A	A	A	A	A
Soor															
Kesselsdorf															

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: The War of the Austrian Succession

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
			Secondary Attack			
Mollwitz	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- E(RR)	X X	R, MD --
Ghotusitz	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- FE	X X	R, MD B, Ps
Dettingen	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- FE	X X	P, Ps R, MD
Fontenoy	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- E(LR)	X X	R, MD --
Hohenfriedberg	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- E(LR)	X X	B, Ps MD
Soor	A D	F D	-- --	-- --	X X	P, Ps MD
Kesselsdorf	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	-- --	X X	B, Ps MD

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Mollwitz, 10 April 1741

In December 1740 a Prussian army commanded by King Frederick II invaded Silesia, precipitating the War of the Austrian Succession. An Austrian army commanded by Count Adam von Neipperg concentrated in Bohemia to oppose the invasion. The two armies met in combat at Mollwitz, when the Prussians attempted to surprise the Austrians in their camp southeast of the Silesian capital of Breslau. However, the Prussians experienced difficulty in forming for battle, and the Austrian cavalry of Neipperg's left wing initiated the engagement by charging and routing Frederick's right wing of cavalry. Frederick was advised by Field Marshal Kurt Christoph von Schwerin to flee the field, and the young king, much to his later embarrassment, did. The victorious Austrian cavalry then wheeled right to crush the Prussian infantry, but the Prussians fought stubbornly and drove them off. The Prussian infantry then advanced on the Austrian infantry and engaged them in a fire fight which wore them down. At dark Neipperg withdrew from the field. Frederick rejoined his army the next day.

Significance: The Prussian victory ended temporarily the Austrian threat to the Prussian hold on Silesia. Frederick initiated a training program to remedy the defects in his army that had been revealed by the engagement.

Sources: A.2.3; C.5.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Chotusitz, 17 May 1742

In May 1742 Prussian King Frederick II fell back on Silesia from Moravia in order to protect his line of communications from the activities of the excellent light troops of the Austrian army of Field Marshal Prince Charles of Lorraine. The Prussians were camped at Chotusitz when the Austrians, attempting a surprise attack, marched up to do battle. The Prussian cavalry, however, seized the initiative and attacked the cavalry wings of the Austrian army while the Prussian infantry formed. These Prussian cavalry attacks were pressed home vigorously and met with success. The cavalry of the Prussian left wing broke through the Austrians opposed to them and swept into the Austrian rear in pursuit. But these horsemen then went out of control and took no further part in the combat. The Prussian right wing of cavalry broke through the first line of the Austrians opposed to them but was driven off when it was attacked as it attempted to reform.

When the Austrians recovered from these shocks, they made an infantry attack in the center. This was successful until the previously unengaged right wing of Prussian infantry counterattacked and drove the Austrian infantry back. At this point, Charles, seeing that he had failed to achieve the surprise on which his attack depended, ordered a withdrawal.

Significance: Chotusitz and other setbacks induced Austrian Empress Maria Theresa to make peace with Frederick, ending the First Silesian War.

Sources: A. 7; C.5.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Dettingen, 27 June 1743

English King George II led a multinational British Allied army up the Rhine and into the Main and Neckar valleys against a French army commanded by Marshal Duke Adrien M. Noailles. The two armies approached each other in the Main Valley, between Hanau and Aschaffenburg. Noailles, far more skillful than George II, soon had the Allied army virtually blockaded in the Main River defiles.

At Dettingen on 27 June the Allied army advanced against the French in an attempt to break out of Noailles's trap. The French were strongly positioned: their right rested on the Main River and their left against a chain of hills. French batteries on the far bank of the Main were positioned to fire into the left flank of the Allied army. As the Allies advanced they were fired on by the French artillery and met by a French cavalry charge that came very close to overwhelming their left wing. King George, fighting dismounted, led the English and Hanoverian infantry in a counterattack that forced the French from the field. Noailles ordered a withdrawal that degenerated into a rout, and many French soldiers drowned trying to swim the Main to safety.

Significance: Noailles withdrew across the Rhine. Attempts by the Allied army to invade France by crossing the Rhine were frustrated by George's ineptitude. The opposing armies then went into winter quarters. Dettingen was the last time that an English monarch personally commanded and led his troops on the battlefield.

Sources: A.7; A.12.2.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Fontenoy, 11 May 1745

In May 1745 a British Allied army commanded by William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland, marched to relieve Tournai, Belgium, which was being besieged by a French army commanded by Marshal Count Maurice de Saxe. Saxe prepared a line of defense against the Allies five miles southeast of Tournai at Fontenoy.

The unimaginative Cumberland attacked this line on 11 May, making his main effort in the center, where a massive column of Allied infantry enjoyed some early success in penetrating a portion of the French line which Saxe had not fortified. Saxe, however, organized a counterattack of his infantry and cavalry reserves, and this succeeded in first halting, and then driving back Cumberland's column. Following this repulse Cumberland ordered a withdrawal. Saxe did not pursue.

Significance: Saxe followed up his victory by conquering Flanders.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; A.12.2.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Hohenfriedberg, 4 June 1745

An Austro-Saxon army commanded by Field Marshal Prince Charles of Lorraine invaded Lower Silesia from Bohemia, marching toward Breslau. The Austrians, unaware of the near presence of the Prussian army commanded by King Frederick II, camped near Hohenfriedberg. Frederick marched quickly and secretly against the Austrians during the night of 3/4 June, and before dawn drew his army up in order of battle.

At dawn the Prussians struck, completely overwhelming the Austrians and their Saxon allies. The Saxons, camped on the left of the Austrians, were struck first and were routed by 0700 hours. The Prussians then drove in the left flank and front of the main body of the Austrian infantry. By 0800 hours the battle was over. The combat was remarkable for the charge of the Prussian Bayreuth Dragoon Regiment, which pierced the Austrian center, capturing 2,500 men and 66 colors. The remnants of the Austro-Saxon army fled to Bohemia.

Significance: Frederick had repelled the first Austrian attempt to regain Silesia. He pursued the Austro-Saxon army vigorously into Bohemia.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Soor (Sohr), 30 September 1745

In the fall of 1745 Austrian Field Marshal Prince Charles of Lorraine made a second attempt to regain Silesia, marching against King Frederick II's Prussians, who were positioned at Soor (Sohr), southwest of Landshut. Charles made a surprise night march and gained the heights overlooking the Prussian right rear by dawn, cutting the Prussian line of retreat. Under heavy Austrian fire, Frederick responded by swinging his entire army around to face the Austrians in a great right wheel. As this maneuver was being carried out the Prussian pivot suddenly advanced against the Austrian left wing. The result was an oblique formation, overlapping the Austrian left. The Prussians advanced resolutely on the Austrians, who had not expected an attack. They smashed the Austrian left and center, and the dazed Austrians withdrew to the northwest.

Significance: The second Austrian effort to regain Silesia was defeated.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; A.7; C.7.

THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Kesselsdorf, 14 December 1745

In October-November 1745 two Austro-Saxon armies advanced on Berlin through Saxony. While Prussian King Frederick II dealt with one, his lieutenant, Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau (the "Old Dessauer"), marched to encounter the other, which was commanded by Saxon Field Marshal Count Rutowski. The two armies made contact at Kesselsdorf, just west of Dresden, on 14 December.

The Austro-Saxons were deployed for defensive combat behind a stream, with their left flank anchored on a village. Leopold led most of his army across their front from the Austro-Saxon left to their right and sent a small force to drive in their left. When the Prussians were formed for the attack, Leopold led them in prayer, then gave the perfunctory command: "In the name of Jesus, march!" The Prussian lines then advanced deliberately and in just two hours drove the Austro-Saxons from the field in disorder.

Significance: Dresden surrendered two days after the battle, and the remnants of the Allied armies (Frederick had also beaten his opponents) fell back to the Bohemian border. On Christmas Day the belligerents signed the Treaty of Dresden, which ended the Second Silesian War. Saxony paid Prussia reparations, and Austria recognized Frederick's right to rule Silesia.

Sources: A. 7; C.5.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745 ("The '45")

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Prestonpans, Scotland	A 21 Sep 1745 D	Prestonpans	Scot Reb Army Br Army	Pr. Charles Edward Cope	1	0.6
Culloden, Scotland	A 16 Apr 1746 D	Culloden	Scot Reb Army Br Army	Pr. Charles Edward Cumberland	1	0.7

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
 War: The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745 ("The '45")

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Prestompans	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	Y	X
Culloden	A D	HD	RM	DST	SpT	N	--
							--

5. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745 ("The '45")

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Prestonpans	A 2,400	40	2	110	4.6	0	--	x	1.0
	D 2,200	?	6	1,800	81.8	6	100.0	--	--
Culloden	A 5,400	400	12	1,558	28.9	12	100.0	x	0.5
	D 9,000	?	16	3,09	5.4	0	--	--	--

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745, ("The '45")

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Prestonpans	A D	C C	x x	O O	C C	N N	x 0	C C	x 0	x x	1.0 --	9 3
Culloden	A D	C C	x x	O O	C C	N N	N N	C C	x x	x x	0.5 --	4 9

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
 War: The Jacobite Rebellion, 1745 ("The '45")

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver			Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack			
Prestonpans	A D	F D	-- --	X	B, Ps ML
Culloden	A D	F D/O, EE	-- --	X	P, R, ML --

THE JACOBITE REBELLION, 1745 ("THE '45")

Prestonpans, 21 September 1745

Encouraged by the success of the French against the English in Flanders (see the Battle of Fontenoy) and mindful of the unpopularity of King George II in Scotland and England, the exile Jacobite Prince Charles Edward Stuart (the so-called Young Pretender) returned to Scotland to lead a rising of Scottish Jacobites. In August 1745 Charles raised his standard at Glenfinnan and recruited an army of Highlanders and disaffected Scots nobles. He subsequently took Edinburgh with ease -- the Royalist army of Sir John Cope avoiding battle -- but was unable to reduce the castle of the city, which held out for the king.

Cope's army camped at Prestonpans, east of Edinburgh, and the Jacobites marched out to do battle with it. On 21 September the Jacobites surprised the Royalists, descending on them unexpectedly in a wild charge. The Royalists barely had time to form before they were overwhelmed by the Highlanders, who cut them to pieces. Those Royalists who could, fled the field in disorder.

Significance: Charles returned to Edinburgh and wasted six weeks holding court and recruiting his army in preparation for an invasion of England. The Royalists, meantime, gathered an army of 18,000 at Newcastle; the Duke of Cumberland, King George II's son, returned from Flanders with his army. The Jacobite invasion (October-December 1745) reached Derby, but Charles decided to turn back for Scotland, since the Jacobites were opposed by three Royalist armies, each twice as strong as the Jacobite army. The stage was set for the final battle of Culloden.

Sources: A.1; C.15.

THE JACOBITE REBELLION, 1745 (THE '45')

Culloden, 16 April 1746

The British Royalist army, commanded by the Duke of Cumberland, advanced from Nairn, Scotland, and engaged the Jacobite Army, commanded by Prince Charles Edward, at Culloden Moor. The battle opened with a cannonade, and the Royalist artillery quickly dominated the poorly served guns of the Jacobites. The Jacobite Highland infantry was then subjected to a prolonged bombardment, while Charles, sunk in indecision, mulled what to do. Finally, the Highland infantry surged forward all along the line. This attack was met by concentrated artillery and musketry and was defeated before it reached the Royalist line everywhere, except on the left, where the Stewarts of Appin broke into the ranks of Barrell's Regiment. Barrell's was forced back on Semphill's Regiment, but in the ensuing melee, the Highlanders were overcome. The Royalist cavalry then advanced on both flanks, enveloping the remnants of the Jacobite army. The Jacobites were routed, but Cumberland did not order a pursuit.

Significance: Culloden was the decisive battle of "the '45." The Jacobite army was destroyed, and Prince Charles Edward, after many adventures, fled to Europe. The Royalist army occupied the Highlands and by stern measures wiped out the last pockets of rebellion.

Sources: C.15.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Lobositz, Bohemia	A D 1 Oct 1756	Pirma-Labositz	Pr Army Aus Army	Frederick II Browne	1	3.2
Prague, Bohemia	A D 6 May 1757	Bohemia, 1757	Pr Army Aus Army	Frederick II Lorraine	1	4.8
Plassey, Bengal	A D 23 Jun 1757	W. Bengal	Bengali Army Br Army	Siraj ud-Daula Clive	1	3.2
Kolin, Bohemia	A D 18 Jun 1757	Bohemia, 1757	Pr Army Aus Army	Frederick II Daun	1	5.2
Hastenbeck, Hanover	A D 26 Jul 1757	Hastenbeck	Fr Army Br Army	Estrees Duke of Cumberland	1	5.5
Rossbach, Saxony	A D 5 Nov 1757	Rossbach	Pr-Ger Army	Soubise; Saxe-Hildburghausen	1	2.7
Leuthen, Silesia	A D 5 Dec 1757	Leuthen	Pr Army Aus Army	Frederick II Lorraine	1	4.3
Crefeld, Westphalia	A D 23 Jun 1758	Rhineland, 1758	Pr Allied Army Pr Army	Ferdinand Clement	1	10.5
Zorndorf, Prussia	A D 25 Aug 1758	Zorndorf	Pr Army Russ Army	Frederick II Fedor	1	3.4
Hochkirch, Saxony	A D 14 Oct 1758	Hochkirch	Aus Army Pr Army	Daun Frederick II	1	5.6
Bergen, Rhineland	A D 13 Apr 1759	Bergen	Pr-Allied Army Fr Army	Brunswick Broglie	1	3.2

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Minden, Rhineland	A D 1 Aug 1759	Minden	Pr- <u>Allied Army</u> Fr Army	Brunswick Contades	1	0.6
Kunersdorf, Prussia	A D 12 Aug 1759	Kunersdorf	Pr Army Russ-Aus Army	Frederick II Saltykov	1	5.4
Plains of Abraham, Canada	A D 13 Sep 1759	Quebec	Fr Army Br Army	Montcalm Wolfe	1	1.0
Maxen, Saxony	A D 21 Nov 1759	Maxen	Aus Army Pr Army	Daun Finck	1	?
Warburg, Westphalia	A D 31 Jul 1760	Hanover, 1760	Pr- <u>Allied Army</u> Fr Army	Brunswick May	1	5.0
Liegnitz, Silesia	A D 15 Aug 1760	Silesia, 1760	Aus-Russ Army Pr Army	Daun & Landon Frederick II	1	2.4
Torgau, Silesia	A D 3 Nov 1760	Silesia, 1760	Pr Army Aus Army	Frederick II Daun	1	8.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Lobositz	A D HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--	--
Prague	A D HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--	--
Plassey	A D HF	RM	WHT	STR	N	--	--
Kolin	A D HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--	--
Hastenbeck	A D PD	RM	DSH	FT	Y	X	substantial
Rossbach	A D HD	RM	IST	FT	Y	X	substantial
Leuthen	A D HD	RM	WLT	WT	Y	X	minor
Crefeld	A D HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	X	--
Zondorf	A D HD	RM	IST	ST	N	--	--
Hochkirch	A D PD	RM	WLT	FT	Y	X	substantial
Bergen	A D H/PD	RM	DST	ST	N	--	--

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Minden	A D	HD	RM	WHT	FT	N	--
Kunersdorf	A D	PD	RB	DSH	ST	N	--
Plains of Abraham	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Maxen	A D	HD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Warburg	A D	HD	RM	WLT	ST	Y	X
Liegnitz	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Torgau	A D	PD	RM/RW	WLC	FT	N	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Strength		Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)	
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Lobositz	A 29,000 D 34,500	10,800 7,500	97 94	2,906 2,873	10.0 8.3	— 3	— 3.2	x	2.0
Prague	A 65,000 D 62,000	17,000 12,600	214 177	14,300 13,400	22.0 21.6	5 60	2.3 33.9	x	1.6
Plassey	A 50,050 D 2,975	15,000 0	53 12	500 63	1.0 2.1	53 0	100.0 —	x	--
Kolin	A 32,000 D 44,000	14,000 14,000	88 145	13,768 9,000	43.0 20.5	45 —	51.1 —	x	1.0
Hastenbeck	A 60,000 D 36,000	10,000 5,000	68 28	2,500 1,500	4.2 4.2	11 7	16.2 25.0	x	5.0
Rossbach	A 42,000 D 22,000	10,000 5,400	115 79	10,150 548	24.2 2.5	72 —	62.6 —	x	--
Leuthen	A 33,000 D 65,000	11,000 14,000	167 210	11,589 22,000	35.1 33.8	— 131	— 62.4	x	2.0
Crefeld	A 32,000 D 50,000	? ?	? ?	1,800 8,200	5.6 16.4	8 8	— —	x	3.2
Zortendorf	A 36,000 D 43,300	10,500 6,382	193 230	12,797 18,500	35.5 42.7	26 103	13.5 44.8	x	5.0
Hochkirch	A 80,000 D 31,000	28,000 10,000	340 200	7,587 9,097	9.5 29.3	10 101	2.9 50.5	x	--
Bergen	A 24,000 D 30,000	? ?	21 45	2,800 1,800	11.7 6.0	2 ?	9.5 --	x	1.5

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty. Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Minden	A 45,000 D 60,000	-- --	187 170	2,762 7,086	6.1 11.8	0 43	-- 25.3	X	0.4 --
Kunersdorf	A 50,900 D 59,500	15,000 10,000	240 248	19,100 15,500	37.5 26.1	172 0	71.7 --	X	N --
Plain, of Abraham	A 4,500 D 4,800	-- --	? ?	1,500 650	33.3 13.5	?	--	X	0.2 --
Maxen	A 42,000 D 12,000	? ?	?	500 12,000	0.7 100.0	0 17	-- 100.0	X	?
Wardburg	A 19,000 D 17,000	5,700 4,000	?	1,300 3,700	6.8 21.8	?	--	X	7.0
Liegnitz	A 30,000 D 30,000	9,000 7,500	130 120	6,000 3,600	20.0 12.0	74 10	56.9 8.3	X	N --
Torgau	A 44,000 D 53,000	12,000 20,000	?	16,670 11,200	37.9 21.1	?	--	X	2.0 --

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS
War: The Seven Years' War

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logistics	Momen- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Lobositz	A C D	C x C	C C	C C	N N	N N	C C	C X	X X	2.9 --	8 7	
Prague	A C D	x x	x x	x x	N N	N N	C C	X N	X X	1.6 --	9 6	
Plassey	A D A	x C	x C	x C	N N	N N	C C	N N	X X	-- 1.0	2 9	
Kolin	A C D	x C	x C	x C	N N	N N	C C	N N	X X	0.4 --	5 9	
Hastenbeck	A C D	C x	C x	C x	N N	N N	O C	C X	X X	5.0 --	7 4	
Rossbach	A D D	x x	x x	x x	N N	N N	x C	x C	X X	-- 2.0	3 10	
Leuthen	A D A	x C	x O	x x	N N	N N	N C	N X	X X	3.2 --	10 5	
Grefeld	D A	x x	x x	x x	N N	N N	O C	X C	X X	5.0 --	9 6	
Zorndorf	A D A	x C	x C	x C	N N	N N	N X	N C	X X	1.0 --	7 5	
Hochkirch	D A	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	N O	N C	X X	1.5 --	10 4	
Bergen	A D A	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	N O	N C	X X	-- 1.0	3 3	

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: The Seven Years' War

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Dis-tance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Minden	A D	X C	X C	C	C	N	N	C	N	X	0.4	9 2
Kunersdorf	A D	C D	C C	C	C	N	0	C	N	X	N --	3 9
Plains of Abraham	A D	C C	C C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	0.2 --	5 9
Maxen	A D	C C	C C	C	C	N	N	C	N	X	? --	10 2
Warburg	A D	C D	C C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	7.0 --	9 2
Liegnitz	A D	C X	C C	C	C	N	N	C	N	X	N --	2 2
Torgau	A D	C D	C C	C	C	N	N	C	X	X	2.0 --	8 4

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Force Quality	Mobility	Superiority	Force Prepon-derance	Weather	Terrain, Roads	Leader-ship	Planning	Surprise	Maneuver, Mass	Logistics	Fortifi-cations	Depth
Icbositz	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Prague	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Plassey	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Kolin	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Hastenbeck	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Rossbach	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Leuthen	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Crefeld	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Zorndorf	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Hochkirch	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	N
Bergen	A D	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

War: The Seven Years' War

6. THE FRENCH OUTCOME

Engagement	Minden	Kunersdorf	Plains of Abraham	Maxen	Worbung	Liegnitz	Torgau	Depth
Force Quality	A D	X N	N A	A D	N A	N A	X A	N
Force Quantity	N D	N D	N A	N D	N D	N A	X A	N
Reserves	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Mobility Superiority	N O	N N	N O	N X	N N	N N	N N	N
Force Preparation	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	O N	N
Weather	N N	N N	N N	N N	N X	N N	O N	N
Roads	- X	X N	X N	N N	N N	N N	O N	N
Cavalry	X N	N N	X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Planning	X X	X X	X X	N N	X X	N N	N N	N
Surprise	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N
Maneuver, Mass	N N	X N	N N	N N	X N	N N	N N	N
Logistics	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	X N	N
Fortifications	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	X N	N
Depth	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver			Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack		
Lobositz	A D	F D/O, F	--	X	P WD
Prague	A D	F D/O, F	E(RF) --	X	B, Ps WD
Plassey	A D	F D/O, F	-- --	X	R, WD --
Kolin	A D	F D/O, F	E(RF) --	X	R, WD PS
Hastenbeck	A D	F, E(RR) D/O, F	-- --	X	P, WD P, WD
Rossbach	A	E(LF)	--	X	R, WDL
Leuthen	D	D/O, F, E(RF)	--	X	B, Ps
Crefeld	A D	E(LF) D/O, F	EE	X	B, Ps WD
Zondorf	A D	E(LR) D/O, F	--	X	P, WD R, WD
Hochkirch	A D	F, EE D	--	X	B, Ps WD
Bergen	A D	F D	--	X	P, WD --

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: The Seven Years' War

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	A	D	A	D		
Minden	F	--	--	--	X	P, PS R, WD
Kumersdorf	F	--	FE (LR)	--	X	R, WD --
Plains of Abraham	F	--	--	--	X	--
Maxen	D/O, F	--	--	--	X	A
Warburg	E	--	FE	--	X	P, PS WD
Liegnitz	D/O, F	--	--	--	X	P WD
Torgau	E(RR)	--	F, E(RF)	--	X	P WD

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Lobositz, 1 October 1756

Upon learning the intentions of the allied coalition organized against him, Prussian King Frederick crossed the Saxon frontier and occupied Dresden. The vastly outnumbered Saxon forces fell back to the fortified camp of Pirna, on the Elbe, where they were blockaded. A substantial Austrian army commanded by Field Marshal Maximilian von Browne was dispatched to relieve the Saxons. Frederick marched south and met the Austrians at Lobositz. In a confused day-long fight, obscured by fog during the morning hours, the Prussians attacked all along the line: Prussian infantry on the left flank cleared Austrian Croat light infantry from a hill on the Austrian right; Prussian infantry in the center advanced directly on the town of Lobositz; and the massed Prussian and Austrian cavalry clashed on the Prussian right. Eventually, the Prussians prevailed and drove the Austrians from the battlefield. Subsequently, the Saxons at Pirna surrendered, and Saxony fell into Frederick's possession. The Saxon troops were incorporated into the Prussian army.

Significance: The Austrians did not succeed in saving the Saxons. However, the fighting spirit of the Austrians earned them the respect of the Prussians, who grudgingly admitted that they were no longer facing "the same old Austrians" they had beaten so often before.

Sources: A.2.3.; A.7; A.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Prague, 6 May 1757

Intent on capturing Prague, Prussian King Frederick sent his troops against the Austrian forces located in a strong position to the east of the city. His initial frontal attack against the Austrian right was repulsed, so he sent his cavalry to envelop the Austrian right flank. A gap developed in the Austrian formation as the defenders tried to meet the envelopment. Penetrating the gap, Frederick broke the Austrian army in two and threw it back into the city, which he invested.

Significance: The battle resulted in the brief and unsuccessful Prussian siege of Prague.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Plassey, 23 June 1757

In Bengal, India, British forces commanded by Robert Clive, pursued the French-sponsored Bengali army of Suraj ud Daula and found them entrenched on the far side of the Bhagirathi River near the village of Plassey. Crossing the river, Clive bivouacked in a mango grove only a short distance from Daula's army. Seizing the initiative, the Indian forces moved against the British encampment, forming a large semicircle around the British position and massing artillery against the British left. The battle began with an artillery duel that lasted several hours, and inflicted modest but unacceptable losses on the vastly outnumbered British force. However, a sudden rainstorm wet the Indians' powder and denied them the use of their artillery. Consequently they launched a cavalry charge against the British position. This was turned back with heavy losses by the British artillery, which had protected its powder from the rain. Clive then ordered an advance against the Indian entrenchments. After repulsing an Indian infantry attack, Clive made a frontal attack on the Indian position and succeeded in driving the Indian force from the field.

Significance: The Battle of Plassey sealed the fate of Bengal, which passed under British control.

Sources: A.7; A.12.2.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Kolin, 18 June 1757

The Austrian Field Marshal Leopold von Daun approached the besieged city of Prague with the intention of relieving it; Prussian King Frederick, to preempt him, collected all the forces he could spare from the siege lines and attacked Daun's forces, arrayed on a range of hills near Prague. The Prussian attack, intended to strike the Austrian right flank, was poorly executed and instead hit the Austrian center, exposing the attacking force to the full fury of Austrian artillery and small arms fire. Meanwhile, the Prussian cavalry of the left wing was attacked by the Austrian cavalry. The timely arrival of Prussian infantry reinforcements prevented a catastrophe. These reinforcements held off the counterattacking Austrians, and the Prussians were able to withdraw in order from the field, having suffered terrible casualties.

Significance: The Prussians were compelled to leave the siege of Prague and evacuate their forces from Bohemia.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Hastenbeck, 26 July 1757

The British Duke of Cumberland, endeavoring to protect Hanover from invasion by the French, established a defensive position on favorable ground southeast of Hamelin. French General d'Estrees, believing that the English were withdrawing to the north, prepared to pursue, but on the morning of 25 July was surprised to find the English army deployed in battle order. The French prepared an attack, which they executed on the following day. This entailed an envelopment of the English right flank and rear, made in conjunction with a frontal attack on the English center. The French attacks were successful, and it appeared to Cumberland that his army was in danger of envelopment. In fact, counterattacking English units retook much of the ground lost initially. Due to the "fog of war" neither commanding officer was apprised of the situation on the battlefield, and both were ready to believe rumors of defeat; consequently, both ordered retreat. But d'Estrees soon learned of Cumberland's withdrawal order and sent his troops back to Hastenbeck, which they occupied without a fight. The English retreated to a point beyond Hamelin, unwittingly conceding victory to the French.

Significance: Cumberland's defeat at Hastenbeck was followed by his signing of the Convention of Kloster-Zeven (6 September), which entailed the dissolution of his army and the abandonment of Hanover and Brunswick to the French.

Sources: A.2.3; C.14.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Rossbach, 5 November 1757

The Allied leaders Hildburghausen and Soubise, who were advancing on Berlin with a French-Allied army and being shadowed by Frederick's weaker Prussian army, decided to attack the Prussians at Rossbach in Saxony. Their plan called for an envelopment of Frederick's left flank and rear, but the Prussian king had correctly discerned his enemy's intentions. As three parallel Allied columns marched south, Frederick pretended to withdraw his men from the ground east of Rossbach. His cavalry swung wide to the east, while his infantry changed direction to the south, screened by hills from the sight of the Allies. As a result, when the Allied army completed its circuit around the original Prussian flank and marched north, it was met head on by heavy Prussian artillery fire, supported by infantry. At the same time the Prussian cavalry charged into the Allied right flank, throwing the columns into confusion. Prussian efforts were then devoted to attacking the enemy mass in echelon, from the left. In less than one and a half hours the Allied army was completely routed. In fact, most Allied casualties were incurred during the Prussian cavalry pursuit.

Significance: Frederick's easy triumph at Rossbach left him free to deal with Austrian forces that were threatening Breslau, in Silesia.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Leuthen, 5 December 1757

Following Prussian King Frederick II's victory at Rossbach, he hurried back to Silesia, where Prussian forces were hard pressed by Austrian forces commanded by Prince Charles of Lorraine and Field Marshal Leopold Daun. On 6 December Frederick marched to encounter the army of Prince Charles, which was deployed on a five-mile front west of Breslau. Frederick advanced in a line of march columns, as if intending to strike the Austrian right and center but, shielded by a ridge line, turned his columns to the right and marched beyond the Austrian left. Meantime, Frederick's cavalry demonstrated against the Austrian right. When the Prussian columns had advanced beyond the Austrian left, they faced left, forming battle lines, and then descended on the exposed Austrian flank. Benefiting from overwhelming numerical superiority at the point of contact, the Prussians rolled up the Austrian line, pushing the left wing of the Austrian army back on its center. The Austrians fought bravely and managed to form a new line at a right angle to their former flank, but nightfall alone enabled them to escape.

Significance: Frederick, in Napoleon's words, had accomplished a "masterpiece of maneuver and resolution." The Austrian army was shattered, and the Prussians followed up by retaking the fortress of Breslau.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Crefeld, 23 June 1758

In the spring and early summer of 1758 the British Allied army of Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick maneuvered against the French under the Count of Clermont in the Rhineland. Clermont took up a strong defensive position at Crefeld and awaited the attack of the Allies. The French were deployed southwest of the town, their front covered by a dike and their left flank and rear covered by a long drainage ditch. These were formidable obstacles to the attacker.

The Allied plan of attack called for main efforts against the French left and left rear while demonstrations were made against the French front and right in order to mask the real point of attack. The initial demonstrations were successful. Clermont was at first unable to discern the true thrust of the attack, which he believed would be on his right wing. However, as the attacks on his left and left rear intensified, he correctly grasped the situation and belatedly dispatched reinforcements to these areas. Despite initial difficulties associated with crossing the ditch behind the French left and rear and some inconclusive initial struggles, the allies were able to bring superior force to bear in this area and throw back the defenders. The French, facing the danger of an allied envelopment, then withdrew in order to the southeast to Neuss. There was no pursuit.

Significance: The French withdrew across the Rhine River. Ferdinand moved to reduce Dusseldorf.

Sources: A.2.3; C.14.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Zorndorf, 25 August 1758

In August 1758 a Prussian army commanded by King Frederick II confronted a Russian army invasion commanded by Count Wilhelm Fermor, across the Oder River at Kustrin (Kostrzyn), which the Russians were besieging. Frederick feinted a concentration and river crossing at Kustrin, then moved north in a night march and crossed the Oder north of the town; he subsequently marched behind the Russian army, threatening its line of communications with the east. Fermor raised the siege of Kustrin and withdrew a short distance to high ground at the village of Zorndorf, where he formed his army in an enormous square and awaited Frederick's attack.

On 25 August the Prussians approached the Russian position from the north but found it too difficult to assault on that face. Frederick directed his army to swing around the Russian eastern flank and assault the position from the south. The Russians, in their square, simply faced about to confront the new threat from the opposite direction. Following a prolonged artillery bombardment the Prussian infantry attacked but were repulsed. When the Russian infantry on the right (west) flank counterattacked, they were smashed by a charge of Prussian cavalry commanded by General Frederick Wilhelm von Seydlitz, who had led his men through a swamp onto the Russian flank. The Russians were much reduced but formed a new right flank with reserves and repulsed another attack by Prussian infantry and Seydlitz's cavalry. Fierce fighting on the Russian right continued until well after nightfall, and both armies sustained terrible casualties. On the following day Fermor ordered a withdrawal. The Prussians were too exhausted to pursue.

Significance: The Prussian victory, won at great cost, ended the Russian threat for the time being.

Sources: A.2.3; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Hochkirch, 14 October 1758

Following the Battle of Zorndorf, Prussian King Frederick II marched to southeast Saxony, where he confronted the Austrian army of Field Marshal Leopold Daun. At dawn on 14 October the Prussians were camped at Hochkirch, when they were surprised by Daun's army, which had surrounded their camp and was approaching from all directions in battle order. The surprise was so complete that hundreds of Prussian soldiers were killed in their tents. The Prussian army formed rapidly and fought bravely against overwhelming odds. Finally, an escape route was opened and held by General Hans J. von Zeithen's cavalry. This permitted the majority of the Prussian troops to escape. The Austrians were so shaken by the intense fighting and their heavy losses that no pursuit was made.

Significance: Frederick's losses were heavy, but he had avoided a catastrophic defeat. Reinforced, he was able to check Daun's progress in Saxony.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Bergen, 13 April 1759

Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick, having received a reinforcement of British troops, led an Allied army up the valley of the Main River to Bergen, near Frankfurt am Main. Ferdinand's objective was to drive the French army of Marshal Duke Victor Francois de Broglie back over the frontier into France. The French were based on Frankfurt and Wesel.

The French, alert to the threat, deployed on favorable defensive terrain north of Bergen. Ferdinand attacked on 13 April in three echeloned columns; his objective was to capture Bergen. The Allies made five successive attacks, each of which was defeated by intense French fire and infantry counterattacks. At nightfall the battle was stalemated. That night Ferdinand decided not to renew the battle the next day. The Allies then withdrew unmolested to Rossdorf.

Significance: Ferdinand's defeat allowed the French to strengthen their hold on the Main Valley. They followed up by seizing the crossings of the Weser at Minden and installing their army in a strong defensive position there.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; C.14.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Minden, 1 August 1759

With a French force moving north to threaten Hanover, one of Prussia's ally states, Ferdinand of Brunswick moved an allied force to the northwest of Minden to block the French advance. The French forces were positioned strongly southwest of Minden. In order to draw them out, Ferdinand scattered his forces over a wide area northwest of Minden, leaving a small force north of the town as a lure for the French. The French swallowed the bait and debouched from their impregnable position in order to attack. Ferdinand immediately assembled his scattered forces in preparation for an attack. In the course of doing so, orders were evidently misunderstood, and Ferdinand's British infantry launched a precipitous and unsupported attack against the strong French left, which consisted of cavalry deployed in three lines. While artillery played on the British, the French cavalry attacked. Three times the British infantry threw back the attacks of the French cavalry, each time without the assistance of their own cavalry which, to Ferdinand's disgust, remained inactive despite repeated orders to support the infantry. Nonetheless, the British infantry won the day. The French retreated toward Cassel under the harassing fire of Ferdinand's British artillery.

Significance: The Allied victory saved Hanover. Ferdinand followed the French army to the Rhine, where he checked his progress and sent reinforcements to Frederick.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; C.14.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Kunersdorf, 12 August 1759

Trapped between Austrian Field Marshal Leopold Daun's army and a substantial Russo-Austrian force, Frederick II of Prussia moved to attack the latter (which was entrenched in the sand hills just east of Frankfort on the Oder) in order to prevent it from uniting with Daun's army. Attempting a double envelopment, his columns lost their way in the woods en route, and their attacks were delivered piecemeal. Thrown back at all points, Frederick insisted upon continuing his attacks and lost almost 20,000 men and 172 guns in six hours -- the greatest calamity ever to befall him. Finally, completely discouraged, he withdrew. Fortunately for the Prussians, the allies were too sluggish to pursue.

Significance: Frederick's army was much reduced in numbers; however the allies were also weak and demoralized and consequently failed to follow up their success. The Russians -- short of supplies -- left for home.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

The Plains of Abraham (Quebec), 13 September 1759

In the summer of 1759 a British army, commanded by General James Wolfe and assisted by a squadron of the Royal Navy, laid siege to the French fortress city of Quebec in Canada. The forces defending Quebec were commanded by the Marquis of Montcalm. The French defended an almost impregnable fortress, which stood high above the St. Lawrence River. For two months all Wolfe's efforts to gain a foothold were foiled. Then a lightly guarded footpath winding up the precipitous cliffs just north of the city was discovered. During the night of 12/13 September Wolfe moved a large part of his army by boat up the St. Lawrence close to the path. The men disembarked and proceeded up the path to the Plains of Abraham, north of the walls of Quebec's landward fortifications. Montcalm reacted by marching his army out of the city to do battle.

On the morning of the 13th the two armies met. The British were drawn up in a line on the plateau. The French advanced in assault columns, covered by Canadian militia skirmishers. The battle was decided quickly by the excellence of the British musketry, which mowed down the heads of the French columns and scattered the remaining French troops in disorder. Both Wolfe and Montcalm were mortally wounded in the exchange of fire. The French army withdrew behind the walls of the city, which capitulated on 18 September.

Significance: Wolfe's victory broke the backbone of French resistance in Canada. The British garrisoned the city. In April 1760 a French attempt to retake the city was repelled.

Sources: A.7; A.12.2.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Maxen, 21 November 1759

As part of a series of moves and counter-moves involving the Prussian and Austrian armies south of Dresden, Frederick ordered one of his corps to hold the plateau of Maxen. The Austrians attacked this unsupported force with overwhelming strength, and after a brief battle, the Prussians surrendered.

Significance: The unwise decision to station an isolated corps at Maxen cost Frederick 14,000 men (largely POWs), further weakening his already depleted force.

Sources: A.2.3; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Warburg, 31 July 1760

On 31 July 1760 Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, commanding an Allied army of British, Hanoverians, and other Germans, marched to do battle with a French army commanded by the Chevalier Du Muy, which was camped northwest of Warburg in Hesse, Germany. The French were camped on a long, low ridge running northwest from the town of Warburg. The Allied approach march was covered by an early morning fog.

The Allied main effort achieved substantial surprise. While a fraction of the Allied army demonstrated against the French center, the main attack was made against the French left, which was enveloped and driven southeast down the ridge. After a brief but intense resistance Du Muy ordered a withdrawal. As this was being carried out the French were attacked by the British cavalry. Led by Lieutenant General Sir John M. Granby, the cavalry swept across the ridge in a tremendous charge, capturing 1,500 men and 10 guns. This was the coup de grace.

Significance: The sweeping British victory shattered the cohesion of the French army and redeemed the honor of the British cavalry for Lord Sackville's disgraceful behavior at Minden. The French were pursued from the field. Ferdinand, outnumbered as usual, drove the French back to the Rhine.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; C.14.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Liegnitz, 15 August 1760

In early August 1760 Prussian King Frederick II marched into Silesia from Saxony. Three armies of the anti-Prussian coalition opposed him -- two Austrian, commanded by Field Marshal Leopold Daun and General Baron Gideon Ernst von Laudon, and one Russian, commanded by General Czernichev. Frederick's situation worsened when these three separated armies began to close in on him. At Liegnitz on 15 August Frederick discovered that the forces of Daun and Laudon were close enough to cooperate against him and that Czernichev too was close by. In a remarkable night attack made against Laudon's army, Frederick cut his way to safety along the only road open to him.

Significance: Frederick avoided a trap that would have led to the destruction of his army. When Czernichev retreated (he was tricked by a Prussian stratagem), only Daun's force remained to be dealt with.

Sources: A.1; A.2.3; C.5.

THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

Torgau, 3 November 1760

After capturing and ransacking Berlin (October 1760) the Austrian army of Marshal Leopold Daun withdrew from the city to a formidable position on high ground near Torgau, west of the Elbe. Frederick II of Prussia, advancing from the south, planned to move half of his army entirely around the Austrian right, through dense woods, and attack the Austrian rear. General Hans von Ziethen, with the other half of the Prussian army, was to make a simultaneous frontal attack. Through a combination of human error and bad weather, Frederick's wing became disorganized. Surprise was lost, and the Austrians regrouped their forces to meet the threat. Meanwhile Ziethen opened a premature attack. Frederick, assuming Ziethen was assaulting the main Austrian position, threw his own forces in piecemeal. For two and a half hours all his attacks were repulsed. By dusk all of Frederick's reserves had been committed, and Ziethen's force had finally reached the position from which they were to have launched the planned initial assault. So they attacked once again, while Frederick renewed his assaults despite the darkness. Austrian resistance finally collapsed, and the Austrians withdrew across the river.

Significance: The two armies had fought each other to exhaustion. The campaigns of 1760 were ended and the armies went into winter quarters.

Sources: A.2.3; A.7; C.5.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Bunker Hill, Massachusetts	A 17 Jun 1775 D	Siege of Boston	Br Army Am Patriots	Gage Prescott	1	2.0
Quebec, Canada	A 31 Dec 1775/ D 1 Jan 1776	Canada Invasion, 1775-1776	Am Army Br Army	Montgomery Carleton	1	1.6
White Plains, New York	A 28 Oct 1776 D	New York, 1776	Br Army Am Army	Howe Washington	1	4.8
Trenton, New Jersey	A 26 Dec 1776 D	New Jersey, 1776- 1777	Am Army Raill's Hessian Bde	Washington Raill	1	0.9
Princeton, New Jersey	A 3 Jan 1777 D	New Jersey, 1776- 1777	Am Army Det., Br Army	Washington Mawhood	1	0.3
Freeman's Farm, New York	A 19 Sep 1777 D	Saratoga	Br Army Am Army	Burgoyne Gates	1	3.2
Germantown, Pennsylvania	A 4 Oct 1777 D	Philadelphia, 1777-1778	Am Army Br Army	Washington Howe	1	13.5
Bemis Heights, New York	A 7 Oct 1777 D	Saratoga	Br Army Am Army	Burgoyne Gates	1	3.2
Monmouth Court House, New Jersey	A 28 Jun 1778 D	New Jersey, 1778	Br Army Am Army	Clinton Washington	1	2.0
Camden, South Carolina	A 16 Aug 1780 D	Camden	Br Army Am Army	Cornwallis Gates	1	1.0
Cowpens, South Carolina	A 17 Jan 1781 D	Southern, 1780- 1781	Br Army Am Army	Tarleton Morgan	1	1.2

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Guildford Court House, North Carolina	A 15 Mar 1781 D	Southern, 1780-1781	Br Army Am Army	Cornwallis Greene	1	1.2
Hobkirk's Hill, South Carolina	A 25 Apr 1781 D	Southern, 1780-1781	Br Army Am Army	Randon Greene	1	1.6
Eutaw Springs, South Carolina	A 8 Sep 1781 D	Southern, 1780-1781	Am Army Br Army	Greene Stewart	1	0.4

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Bunker Hill	A D	H/PD FD	RW U	DST W/C	ST WT	N N	-- --
Quebec	A D	FD	RW	DST W/C	FT WT	-- --	-- --
White Plains	A D	HD	U	W/C RW	Y Y	X X	Complete Substantial
Trenton	A D	HD	U	W/C RW	Y WT	-- --	-- --
Princeton	A D	HD	U	DOC DST	FT FT	Y N	Minor
Freeman's Farm	A D	HD	U	WLT RW	FT DST	N Y	-- --
Germantown	A D	HD	U	WLT RW	FT DST	N Y	-- --
Bemis Heights	A D	FD	U	WLT RW	ST DST	N N	-- --
Monmouth Court	A D	HD	U	WLT RW	ST DST	N N	-- --
Camden	A D	HD	U	WLT RW	ST DST	N N	-- --
Compens	A D	HD	U	WLT RW	ST DST	N N	-- --

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Guildford Court House	A D	RW HD	DST	SprT	N	--	--
Hobkirk's Hill	A D	FM HD	DST	SprT	Y	X	Minor
Eutaw Springs	A D	FM H/PD	DST	FT	Y	X	Minor

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES
War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty: Pieces	Total	\$/Day	Total	\$/Day		
Bunker Hill	A 2,650 D 3,200	0 0	?	1,054 1,479	39.8 15.0	?	83.3	x	2.0
Quebec	A 1,100 D 1,800	?	6 14	486 18	44.2 1.0	1 0	100.0	x	-
White Plains	A 13,000 D 13,000	?	?	313 150	2.4 1.2	0 ?	-	x	0.2
Trenton	A 2,420 D 1,520	20 20	18 6	12 996	0.5 65.5	0 5	-	x	0.6
Princeton	A 4,800 D 1,200	?	5 2	44 215	0.9 17.9	0 2	100.0	x	-
Precman's Farm	A 4,400 D 7,000	?	10 0	556 316	12.6 4.5	0 0	-	x	0.9
Germantown	A 11,200 D 9,000	?	?	1,090 551	9.7 6.1	0 0	-	x	1.5
Bemis Heights	A 5,000 D 11,000	0 0	?	10 ?	600 130	12.0 1.2	0 0	x	-
Monmouth Court House	A 13,000 D 11,000	?	?	16 14	358 362	2.8 3.3	0 0	x	3.2
Charleston	A 2,100 D 3,050	-	-	4 9	324 1,050	15.4 34.4	0 9	-	2.0
Cowpens	A 1,100 D 1,025	350 125	2 0	929 72	84.5 7.0	2 -	100.0 -	x	1.5

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Strength			Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Arty: Pieces	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Gulford Court House	A 1,900	155	2	532	28.0	0	-	x	2.4
	D 4,449	200	4	420	9.4	4	100.0	-	-
Hobkirk's Hill	A 900	60	0	258	28.7	-	-	x	3.2
	D 1,551	200	4	420	27.1	0	-	-	-
Bataw Springs	A 2,200	-	4	554	25.2	4	100.0	x	0.5
	D 2,000	-	5	693	34.7	1	20.0	-	-

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: The American Revolutionary War

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Men-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accompl.
Bunker Hill	A	x	C	x	C	N	x	C	N	x	2.0	7
	D	C	C	o	C	N	N	C	x	-	-	6
Quebec	A	D	C	x	C	x	C	C	x	-	0.2	5
White Plains	A	x	C	x	C	x	C	C	x	x	0.6	8
	D	O	o	o	C	N	x	C	o	x	-	7
Trenton	A	C	x	o	C	N	x	C	x	x	0.9	5
	D	C	x	o	C	N	x	C	o	x	-	7
Princeton	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	x	x	1.5	2
	C	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	x	x	-	10
Freeman's Farm	A	C	x	x	C	N	N	N	N	x	1.0	8
	D	D	C	x	C	N	N	N	N	x	-	2
Germanstown	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	x	x	3.0	5
	C	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	x	x	-	7
Benis Heights	A	D	C	x	C	O	N	C	N	x	3.2	4
	C	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	N	x	-	9
Monmouth Court House	A	C	C	C	C	N	N	C	N	x	2.0	6
	D	D	C	C	C	N	N	C	N	x	-	7
Camden	A	D	x	x	x	N	N	C	N	x	1.5	3
	O	D	o	x	C	N	N	C	N	x	-	6
Copps	A	D	C	x	C	N	N	C	C	x	1.0	10

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: American Revolutionary War

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accompl.
Guilford Court House	A D O	C C C	X X X	C C C	N N N	N N N	O O O	C C C	N O N	X X X	2.4 -	7 7
Hobkirk's Hill	A D	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	X O	C C	X O	X X	3.2 -	9 3
Butaw Springs	A D	O X	C X	O X	N N	N N	X O	C C	N -	-	0.5 -	6 8

6. FACTORS AFFECTING OUTCOME

War: American Revolutionary War

War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Force Quality	Services	Mobility Superiority	Force Preparation	Weather	Roads	Ladder-ship	Planning	Surprise	Mass Maneuver,	Logistics	Mortifi-cations	Help!
Guildford Court House	A D	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N	N	X
Hobkirk's Hill	A D	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Bataw Springs	A D	X	N	N	N	O	N	X	X	N	N	N	N

7. COMBAT FORCES AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Main Attack and Maneuver		Secondary Attack		Success
	Scheme or Defense	Plan and Maneuver	--	--	
Bunker Hill	A D	F D	--	--	X MD
Quebec	A D	F D	--	--	R, MD --
White Plains	A D	F D	--	--	MD
Trenton	A D	F D	EE	--	B, Ps A
Princeton	A D	F D	--	E(LF)	B MD
Freeman's Farm	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	S, MD
Germantown	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	R, MD --
Bemis Heights	A D	F D/O, F	--	--	R, MD --
Monmouth Court House	A D	F D	--	--	R, MD --
Caarden	A D	F D	--	--	B, Ps MD
Compens	A D	F D/O(EE)	--	--	R, A B, Ps

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT

War: American Revolutionary War

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense	Secondary Attack		
Guildford Court House	A D	F D/O, F	X	P MD
Hobkirk's Hill	A D	F D/O , F	X	P MD
Butaw Springs	A D	F D	X	P/M/D

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Bunker Hill, 17 June 1775

In order to put pressure on the British in Boston, during the night of 16/17 June and the morning of the 17th, a force of about 1,200 men under Colonel William Prescott moved to occupy Breed's Hill on the peninsula Charlestown, across the Charles River from Boston, and constructed a redoubt a breastwork reaching part way northeast to the Mystic River. Lieutenant General Thomas Gage, commander of the British force in Boston, could not countenance American artillery in range of British vessels in Boston Harbor, and, in addition to a constant naval bombardment, sent a force under the command of Major General Sir William Howe across by boat to destroy the American position. British light infantry and grenadiers attacking on the patriot left were driven back by accurate musketry, and a frontal assault up Breed's Hill also failed, as the defenders held their fire until the attackers were in close range. A second charge in full force also failed, suffering almost 50% casualties. Reinforced by about 400 more troops, Howe led a third charge against the fortifications, with bayonets fixed. Overwhelmed, and with more British soldiers coming in from both sides, the Americans gave up and fled back across Bunker Hill and the narrow Charleston Neck, back to the heights beyond.

Significance: The British victory had been won at great cost in casualties to the assaulting force. However, it merely restored the situation as it had been prior to the night of 16/17 June. The American Provincial Army had fought well in defense from behind breastworks, proving itself a formidable adversary to the British regular troops. The bravery of the Americans boosted morale throughout the colonies. The siege of Boston continued until March, when General Washington ordered Dorchester Heights fortified in an operation similar to that by which the provincials had fortified Breed's Hill. This compelled the British to evacuate the city (17 March).

Sources: C.1; C.11; C.13.

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Quebec, 31 December 1775-1 January 1776

At the beginning of December, after a gruelling march through the wilderness of Massachusetts and Canada, Colonel Benedict Arnold reached the vicinity of the British stronghold of Quebec where he was joined by Brigadier General Richard Montgomery, who came downriver from Montreal. Their objective was the citadel of Quebec, and they proposed to reach it by attacking from the north and south of the Lower Town, built on the bottom land around the base of the cliff and fighting up through the Sault au Matelot, a narrow, crooked street, to the narrower and steep passage to the Upper Town. Meanwhile diversionary attacks would be made on the western walls of the Upper Town. In command of a mixture of British Regulars, British and French-Canadian militia, and British sailors was Lieutenant General Sir Guy Carleton.

The attack began at 0400 on 31 December 1775, in a howling blizzard. Montgomery's men trudged two miles before reaching and forcing two unguarded barricades. Beyond the second was a house occupied by a few Canadian militiamen with a 3-pounder gun. A blast of grapeshot from this instantly killed Montgomery and eleven others. A second blast, accompanied by musket fire, sent the attackers fleeing.

In the north, Arnold was wounded as the attackers approached the first barricade, and command passed to Daniel Morgan, who led his riflemen in a violent attack through three barricades and into the Sault au Matelot. There, by prearrangement, they waited for Montgomery, giving Carleton time to man the barricades and gun positions that made the buildings in the Sault au Matelot a series of deadly little fortresses. Morgan's men attacked at dawn and at considerable cost pushed ahead house by house. But Carleton sent about 200 men around through the Lower Town to enter the Sault au Matelot behind the Americans. Trapped fore and aft, the Americans surrendered.

Significance: Reaching Quebec at all had been a great test of endurance. The plan of attack was clever, but it was beyond the capabilities of the attackers to achieve. After the battle Arnold remained nearby and waited for reinforcements that never came and prepared for a British attack that never was made. Eventually it became evident that Canada could not be won for the American cause.

Sources: C.6.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

White Plains, 28 October 1776

In mid-October 1776, General George Washington began to move his troops from Harlem Heights to White Plains, where he could block a British move from the shore of Long Island Sound. There he reorganized his army into seven divisions, one of which was left at Fort Washington in Manhattan. The British, under General Sir William Howe, delayed to establish a supply base at New Rochelle before approaching the White Plains positions. On 23 October they started to move, and on 27 October encountered American outposts about four miles south of White Plains.

The American defenders were deployed in a shallow curve on a line of low hills, stretching from a millpond on the left to the Bronx River on the right. The British force was initially met by an American delaying force, posted behind stone walls, about a half mile south of the main position, which held up the British for about an hour, and then withdrew as planned to the main position. This gave Washington time to improve defenses on Chatterton's Hill, across the Bronx River, at the right end of his line, and send reinforcements there, to raise the strength to about 1,600 men.

Howe, believing that Chatterton's Hill was the key to the American position, sent a force of about 4,000 men, British and Hessian, up the west side of the Bronx River to take it. Attacking up the slopes from the south they encountered stubborn resistance, but when British units swung around to attack up the western slopes, the American militia broke and fled, and the Continental soldiers could not long hold the position. Washington then withdrew his forces and with the rest of his line took up new positions north of the town.

Significance: The American forces had succeeded in delaying the British advance, giving Washington time to withdraw to a planned position.

Sources: C.6.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Trenton, 26 December 1776

With morale at a low ebb and little hope of holding his army together through the winter unless something were done to improve it, General George Washington decided to cross the Delaware River from his camps on the west bank and strike the Hessian garrison at Trenton, New Jersey. With a force of 2,400 men he would cross the river about nine miles above Trenton, while two smaller forces crossed, one south of Trenton, to cut off retreat in that direction, and the other north of the town, to prevent retreat toward Princeton. Neither of the latter forces crossed the river or participated in the battle, having been discouraged by the weather.

It was miserable weather, cold, with sleet, on Christmas night when the crossing was made. At about 0400, the Americans headed toward Trenton. Dividing his force, Washington sent one division, under Brigadier General John Sullivan, to attack from the south, while the other, under Brigadier General Nathanael Greene, attacked from the north. Although it was 0800 when the order to attack was finally given, much later than Washington had planned, the Hessians had been celebrating Christmas and their commander, Colonel Johann Rall, was confident that in such bitter weather no attack could come. Most of the defenders, of whom there were about 1,500 men, were still asleep in their beds when the attack began.

Pushing in from north, west, and east, the American forces prevented the defenders from organizing a resistance, although they turned out quickly and formed up east of the town. After a short, chaotic clash, the three regiments surrendered in scarcely more than an hour. There were 996 Hessian casualties. The remainder of the garrison, including some British light cavalry, escaped.

Significance: This stunning victory boosted American morale throughout the colonies. Washington gained full support from the Continental Congress to raise more infantry, set pay rates, and appoint and promote officers. The British on the other hand took immediate steps to reestablish their positions in the area.

Sources: C.6; C.11.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Princeton, 3 January 1977

At the end of December General George Washington led his small force across the Delaware River to Trenton, as the first move of an attempt to drive the British, under British General Lord Charles Cornwallis, from New Jersey. On 2 January the bulk of the British forces proceeded from Princeton to Trenton, their advance repeatedly challenged by soldiers of an American detachment at every creek and defile. By the time they reached Trenton Washington had established his army south of Asumpink Creek. During the night Washington led his men out of their camp, evading Cornwallis, to attack Princeton, where three British regiments, under Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mawhood, had been left behind.

In the early morning of 3 January two regiments and some light dragoons of Mawhood's force proceeded toward Trenton with some supplies for Cornwallis. One regiment, the 17th Foot, met a brigade under the command of Brigadier General Hugh Mercer at a hill not far from Stony Brook, and just south of Princeton. The British, armed with bayonets, of which the Americans had few, badly cut up Mercer's brigade and the militia of Cadwalader, which arrived to help. Washington himself, coming up on a scene of demoralized American troops, rallied the men, and, when more American troops came up, counterattacked. The British fled, pursued along Stony Brook, and many of them were taken prisoner. In the meantime another American column, commanded by Major General John Sullivan, had encountered the other two British regiments on the outskirts of Princeton. After a brief resistance they retreated into the town, pursued by the Americans. Many surrendered; others escaped into the countryside.

Following this battle Washington took his men into winter quarters at Morristown.

Significance: This victory helped Washington keep his army together. Soon after it, General Howe removed his forces from New Jersey, ending the threat to Philadelphia.

Sources: C.11; C.12; C.13.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Freeman's Farm, 19 September 1777

On the morning of 19 September, Lieutenant General Sir John Burgoyne with about 6,000 men advanced south on the west bank of the Hudson River. He was about five miles north of the camp of the American army at Bemis Heights, 24 miles north of Albany, Burgoyne's objective, and directly in his path. The American commander, Major General Horatio Gates, had 1,200 Continentals, commanded by Brigadier General Benedict Arnold, 500 riflemen under Colonel Daniel Morgan, and several thousand militia of varying quality. Burgoyne's force proceeded in three columns, the right, including light infantry and grenadiers commanded by Brigadier General Simon Fraser, the left under Baron von Riedesel, and the center with Burgoyne himself in command.

As the picket in front of Burgoyne's column entered a wooded ravine just beyond a clearing known as Freeman's Farm, they were surprised by Morgan's riflemen, whose accurate, aimed fire drove them back to the main body and the shelter of the farm buildings on the far side of the clearing. The pursuing riflemen in their turn dispersed when the redcoats, hastily drawn up, fired a few volleys at them. The British troops moved into the clearing, about 900 of them, and advanced toward the woods, only to be greeted by aimed fire that picked off officers whenever they were spotted. An attempt by Morgan's men to infiltrate the British right flank was repelled by Fraser's men.

At 1400 Brigadier General Enoch Poor's Continental Brigade was sent to reinforce Morgan's men. Six times the combined forces attacked, six times the British rallied and counterattacked, driving the Americans back. Burgoyne's force was taking heavy casualties; Morgan and Poor were being fed militia reinforcements throughout the afternoon. At 1700, when the British situation seemed hopeless, Baron von Riedesel arrived, leading two regiments of Brunswickers in a bayonet charge, which surprised the Americans and drove them back into the woods, abandoning the fight.

Significance: Although Burgoyne lost about 600 men, killed and wounded, because the Americans left the field he considered it a British victory and decided to attack again.

Sources: C.6; C.11.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Germantown, 4 October 1777

Following the British occupation of Philadelphia on 26 September 1777, General Sir William Howe set up his headquarters in Germantown, about six miles north of the city. At dawn on 4 October, General George Washington's army, having moved from Worcester Township, 16 miles northwest of Germantown, during the night, marched to attack the British at Germantown. His plan, too complicated as it turned out, was for one column of militia to strike the British left near the Schuylkill River, another column of militia to attack the British camp from the rear, while a center column of regulars advanced down the main street of Germantown to Market Square, and a fourth column of regulars attacked down the Mill Road to join the third at the square. To increase the problems of coordinating the action of the four columns, a heavy fog filled the area as the columns advanced toward Germantown.

The action started just after daybreak, when the leading elements of the center column encountered a British picket. Behind it British light infantry soon turned the encounter into a general battle. As the Americans pushed ahead, six companies of British infantry sought shelter in a strongly built stone house known as Chew House for its owner, Attorney General Benjamin Chew, and diverted a disproportionate amount of American effort in a fruitless attempt to capture or destroy the building and its defenders. The battle in all areas was hotly contested, as the units of the four American columns attempted to achieve their objectives with little coordination. The Americans seemed for a time to be winning, but in the end they withdrew, without accomplishing their purpose.

Significance: Although Germantown was a British victory, the American soldiers had for the most part fought well. The battle was viewed by the French Foreign Minister, Count Charles de Vergennes, as of considerable importance, and it helped to bring French support to the American cause.

Sources: C.11; C.13.

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Bemis Heights, 7 October 1777

At 1100 on 7 October, Lieutenant General Sir John Burgoyne, having fortified his position near Freeman's Farm, deployed his troops about a half mile in front of the fortifications constructed since the first battle, to initiate an attack on the American positions on Bemis Heights. Informed of the British movement, the American commander, Major General Horatio Gates, ordered his forces out, Colonel Daniel Morgan, with riflemen, light infantry, and militia, striking toward Simon Fraser's men on the British right flank and rear, Brigadier General Enoch Poor's Continentals hitting the grenadiers under Major Acland on the British left, and Brigadier General Ebenezer Learned's brigade moving out in the center, all augmented by militia units. Although Brigadier General Benedict Arnold had been relieved of command, he nevertheless dashed in to lead the attack in the center.

First Poor attacked. His charging men were greeted by repeated volleys and bayonets. The strength and determination of the attackers caused many casualties, and when, after about an hour of close and heavy fighting, Major Acland was fatally wounded, his men surrendered. On the left the Americans swarmed from three sides, forcing Fraser to fall back. Arnold led Learned's men in the center and overcame the Germans under Baron von Riedesel, who retreated in total disorder, in spite of Fraser's attempt to rally them, an attempt that cost him his life. One of the British redoubts held, but the other fell to an attack by Morgan and Arnold. When darkness fell, the British troops retreated to their fortified camp, having lost 600 men to the Americans' fewer than 200. The next night the British quietly started moving north, only to be cut off by the pursuing Americans, who surrounded the British at Saratoga, and on 17 October Burgoyne surrendered.

Significance: The Battle of Bemis Heights and the surrender that followed it constituted the first major victory for the Americans in the war, and as such it gave a great boost to morale. Even more important, it caused French King Louis XVI to approve a formal treaty of alliance with the American side, and he was followed by most of the nations of Europe.

Source: C.11.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Monmouth Court House, 28 June 1778

In late June the British army commanded by General Sir Henry Clinton was moving slowly across New Jersey, headed for Sandy Hook and New York. On a roughly parallel route General George Washington had followed, waiting for a chance to interfere. On 28 June a detachment from Washington's force, commanded by Major General Charles Lee, encountered the rear element of the British column, commanded by Lieutenant General Earl Cornwallis, about a mile and a quarter east of Freehold. Cornwallis, warned by an early morning clash between American units and British, had drawn his force up in line of battle to await the American attack. Lee's troops came up but with no plan for coordinated action, and although some units engaged the British, when Cornwallis's men began to advance Lee ordered a general retreat. Pursued by the British on a broiling hot day, the Americans withdrew slowly and in considerable confusion until Washington arrived, dismissed Lee, and organized a line of defense, at the same time ordering the rest of his army to come up. The next four hours saw attacks and counterattacks in the hot afternoon. Washington's line held against repeated attempts by Clinton to break it. A final attempt by Washington to assault Clinton's position was aborted when the exhausted troops fell victim to the heat. Neither side could claim victory.

Significance: Clinton moved his men out during the next night and proceeded to Sandy Hook and evacuation to New York City by sea. Washington marched north to White Plains, where his army remained until 1781.

Sources: A.; C.11; C.13.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Camden, 16 August 1780

Having lost an opportunity to surprise the British army under General Earl Cornwallis at Camden, American Major General Horatio Gates deployed the forces of the Southern Department, of which he had recently taken command, outside Camden, on either side of the road to the town in an area of sparse pine woods, flanked on both sides by swamps. From left to right Gates put Virginia militia, North Carolina militia, and his Continental troops from Delaware and Maryland. To the left and rear of the Virginia militia were cavalry and mounted infantry, and behind the center was the 1st Maryland Brigade of Continentals. Gates and his adjutant, Colonel Otho Williams, were behind the center, and Major General Baron Johann de Kalb commanded the right wing. Cornwallis arrived and deployed his forces, with British Regulars on the right, Tory infantry on the left, two battalions of infantry and some cavalry in reserve.

The British Regulars advanced, fired a volley, then charged with bayonets fixed. The American militia broke and ran, and the mounted units behind them also fell back. Gates too departed in haste. Williams took command of the 1st Maryland Brigade, since its commander also had disappeared, and brought it forward to help de Kalb, whose Continentals alone were left on the field. But the British drove a wedge between the two American forces, and, hammering at the Marylanders from both sides, drove them off. Although outnumbered four to one and surrounded by British troops, de Kalb ordered a bayonet charge. After intense hand-to-hand fighting de Kalb fell, mortally wounded, and the surviving Americans surrendered.

Significance: American losses were very heavy. Gates was replaced by a more capable commander, Major General Nathanael Greene, and the series of events that led to Yorktown began.

Sources: C. 3; C.13.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Cowpens, 17 January 1781

Early in the morning of 17 January, Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, with a detachment from the army of General Nathanael Greene and a body of militia under Colonel Andrew Pickens, drew up his men in line of battle in a clearing in the woods of northwestern South Carolina, to await the imminent arrival of British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his army. Morgan, aware of the fact that his militia could not stand up against British regulars, planned his battle on the assumption that these troops would run from the field after firing a few shots. He deployed his troops in a river bend, so they could not run too far.

The British arrived and drew up in line of battle about 300 yards from Morgan's skirmishers at about 0630. Fifteen minutes later they started to move forward. In rapid succession the British took heavy and accurate fire from the American militia riflemen, who then broke and fled, and from Pickens's militia, who after firing twice, also left the field, at first in orderly fashion, then in some confusion, as Morgan had expected. They were pursued by British dragoons, but American cavalry under Lieutenant Colonel William Washington drove them off. Morgan's third line, Regulars from Virginia and Maryland, fired, then slowly withdrew toward the crest of the hill, where following Morgan's instructions, they turned and fired into the faces of the British soldiers, then about 30 paces away. This stopped the British attack. Meanwhile Morgan had rallied the militia in the river bend, then sent them back into the battle on the right of his line. As Pickens's militia swarmed in from behind the hill on the right of the American line, Washington's mounted troops charged and drove into the British line from the American left. The battle was over by about 0800.

Significance: This brilliantly planned and executed battle deprived British General Earl Cornwallis of most of his light troops, an insurmountable handicap when he subsequently tried to catch Morgan and American General Nathanael Greene. Cowpens was the first of a series of British disasters that ended British plans for controlling the south.

Sources: C.11; C.13.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Guilford Courthouse, 15 March 1781

Major General Nathanael Greene returned to North Carolina from Virginia in March 1781 to confront General Earl Cornwallis, who has pursued him as far as the Dan River in January. Greene selected the place for the first battle, the southern slopes of the ridge upon which sat Guilford Courthouse. He drew up his force in three lines, the North Carolina militia in the front line with 200 Virginia riflemen, some Continental infantry from Delaware, Colonel Henry Lee's Legion of light infantry and cavalry on their left. In the second line was the Virginia militia, and in the third the Virginia and Maryland Continentals. Greene was following the same plan Morgan had used at Cowpens.

Cornwallis was 12 miles away when he learned of Greene's approach, and early in the morning of 15 March he hastened to confront him, with his British and Hessian troops, all Regulars.

The battle began at 1330 hours. The North Carolina militia fired two volleys, then fled as the British charged, with bayonets fixed. The British pushed back Lee's troops on the far left as the rest of the Americans fell back to the second line, which finally crumbled. The Continentals poured heavy fire on the advancing British left, while the British right was halted in heavy fighting. Greene failed to exploit the advantage, and the battle swung back and forth until Cornwallis ordered grapeshot fired into the midst of the struggle, causing the Americans to fall back. When Cornwallis ordered a final assault, Greene ordered his men to withdraw.

Significance: Although Cornwallis could claim victory, he had lost about 28 percent of his army. Unable to afford another such battle, he withdrew to Wilmington. Later he took a circuitous route to Virginia and Yorktown.

Sources: C.12; C.13.

AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Hobkirk's Hill, 25 April 1781

On 19 April Major General Nathanael Greene, with about 1,500 men, of whom 1,100 were Continentals, took up a position on Hobkirk's Hill, overlooking Camden, South Carolina, to await the arrival of reinforcements. Camden was held by approximately 1,500 men, commanded by Colonel Lord Francis S. Rawdon.

On 25 April Rawdon, with 900 men, surprised Greene by striking at his outposts below Hobkirk's Hill. While a light infantry unit conducted a delaying action at the foot of the hill, Greene deployed his army, with the Maryland Brigade on the left and the Virginia Brigade on the right, and his dragoons and a small number of militia in reserve. In the center he placed his four guns. Rawdon, approaching, realized that the wider American line overlapped his, and promptly sent the units in his rear to the ends of his line, so that they overlapped the Americans.

Rawdon was still deploying his troops when Greene's artillery opened fire and the Continentals charged. The British line opened fire, the 1st Maryland Regiment halted to fire a volley, and the rest of the American line faltered. When Rawdon ordered his men to charge the 1st Maryland broke and ran, followed by the 5th Maryland and the 4th Virginia. While the 5th Virginia, one company of the 1st Maryland, and the light infantry covered, the dragoons came up and rescued the guns. Greene managed to rally his troops and form a new line at the top of the hill. But Rawdon decided to withdraw, and Greene did not attempt to follow him.

Significance: Both sides lost heavily. Ultimately, beset by supply problems and problems with mutiny among his troops, Rawdon left Camden.

Sources: C.6; C.13.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Eutaw Springs, 8 September 1781

In late August-early September 1781, American General Nathanael Greene, with a small army of Continentals and militia, advanced into the region near Charleston, South Carolina, controlled by British forces. A British force commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Stewart, camped at Eutaw Springs on the south bank of Eutaw Creek, barred Greene's approach to Charleston along the Santee River Road. Before dawn on 8 September the American force moved to attack Stewart. Warned by deserters of the Americans' approach, Stewart sent out a reconnaissance party that was attacked and thrown back. This gave him time to form for battle, and to send out a delaying force, which attacked and slowed the advancing Americans in a bloody encounter. Greene deployed his forces in the thick woods and advanced toward the British position, approaching to within less than 50 yards before being halted by British fire. A short time later a bayonet charge by Stewart's left forced the militia units of the center and right of the American line to flee back toward the North and South Carolina Continentals, who moved up to fill the gaps. A general advance at Greene's order pushed the British back, until Stewart counterattacked with his reserve infantry, and the Continentals fell back. Another American attack again disrupted the British, but an impetuous charge by a cavalry unit without waiting for the accompanying infantry was disastrous, and the unit suffered heavy losses. Another American attack caused the majority of the British to flee, but the pursuing Americans halted as they came up to the British camp and stopped to loot. It was the British who realized first that the bulk of the American army had ceased to pursue. Both sides rallied, the British to attack and the Americans to attempt to hold them. The battle ended with the Americans withdrawing into the woods, both sides having suffered heavy casualties and too weary to continue fighting.

Significance: Although technically Eutaw Springs was a drawn battle or a British victory, Stewart had lost more than 30 percent of his army, and the next day he withdrew to Charleston. Thus Greene accomplished his objective.

Sources: A.7; C.6; C.13.

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (km)
Valmy, France	A 20 Sep 1792 D	France, 1792	Allied Army Armies of North & Center	Brunswick Dumouriez	1	7.0
Jemappes, Austrian Netherlands	A 5 Nov 1792 D	Flanders, 1792	French Army of North Allied Army	Dumouriez Teschen	1	5.0
Neerwinden, Aust. Netherlands	A 18 Mar 1793 D	Flanders, 1793	French Army of North Austrian Army	Dumouriez Saxe-Coburg	1	13.0
Hondschoote, France	A 6 Sep 1793 D	Flanders, 1793	French Army of North Br-Han Army	Houchard York	1	8.0
Watignies, Aust. Netherlands	A 15-16 Oct 1793 D	Flanders, 1793	French Army of North Austrian Army	Jourdan Saxe-Coburg	2	10.0
Fleurus, Austrian Netherlands	A 26 Jun 1794 D	Flanders, 1794	Austrian Army French Army of North	Saxe-Coburg Jourdan	1	16.0
Lodi, North Italy	A 10 May 1796 D	Italy, 1796	French Army of Italy Austrian Army	Bonaparte Beauchamp	1	1.6
Castiglione, North Italy	A 5 Aug 1796 D	Italy, 1796	French Army of Italy Austrian Army	Bonaparte Wurmser	1	8.0
Neresheim, Germany	A 11 Aug 1796 D	1796 Germany	Aus Army Fr Army of the Rhine and Moselle	Archduke Charles Moreau	1	40.0
Wurzburg, Germany	A 3 Sep 1796 D	1796 Germany	Aus Army Fr Army of the Sambre and Meuse	Archduke Charles Jourdan	1	20.0

1. IDENTIFICATION
War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Date(s)	Campaign	Forces	Commanders	Duration (days)	Width of Front (Km)
Arcola, North Italy	A 15-17 Nov 1796 D	1796 Italy	Fr Army of Italy Aus Army	Bonaparte Alvintzi	3	5.0
Rivoli, North Italy	A 14-15 Jan 1797 D	1797 Italy	Aus Army Fr Army of Italy	Alvintzi Bonaparte	2	6.0
Pyramids, Egypt	A 21 Jul 1797 D	Egypt	Fr Army Mameluke Army	Bonaparte Murad Bey	1	5.0
Stockach I, Germany	A 25 Mar 1799 D	1799 Germany	Fr Army Aus Army	Jourdan Archduke Charles	1	7.0
Mt. Tabor, Palestine	A 16/17 Apr 1799 D	Egypt (Palestine)	Turk Army Fr Army	Abdallah Pasha Bonaparte	1	15.0
Zurich I, Switzerland	A 4 Jun 1799 D	1799 Switzerland	Aus Army Fr Army	Archduke Charles Massena	1	8.0
Novi, North Italy	A 15 Aug 1799 D	1799 Italy	Allied Army Fr Army of Italy	Suvorov Joubert/Moreau	1	13.0
Zurich III Switzerland	A 24-25 Sep 1799 D	1799 Switzerland	Fr Army Allied Army	Massena Korsakov	2	14.0
Moskirch Germany	A 5 May 1800 D	1800 Germany	Fr Army Aus Army	Moreau Kray	1	16.0
Marengo, North Italy	A 14 Jun 1800 D	1800 Italy	Aus Army Fr Army of the Reserve	Melas Bonaparte	1	4.0
Hohenlinden, Germany	A 3 Dec 1800 D	1800 Germany	Aus Army Fr Army	Archduke John Moreau	1	18.0

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Valmy	A D	HD	RM	DOR	ST	N	--
Jemappes	A D	PD	RM	DST	FT	N	--
Neerwinden	A D	PD	RM	DST	SPr	N	--
Hondschoote	A D	PD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Wattignies	A D	PD	RM	DST	FT	Y	minor
Fleurus	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--
Lodi	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	substantial
Castiglione	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	minor
Neresheim	A D	HD	RM	WIT	ST	Y	minor
Wurzburg	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	N	--

2. OPERATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Defender Posture	Terrain	Weather	Season	Surprise	Surpriser	Level Surprise
Arcola	A D	H/PD	M	DST	FT	X	minor
Rivoli	A D	H/PD	RgM/RM	DST	WT	--	--
Pyramids	A D	H/PD	FD	DSH	SD	--	--
Stockach I	A D	HD	RgW/RW	DST	Spt	--	--
Mt. Tabor	A D	HD	RB	DSH	Spt/Spt	N	--
Zurich I	A D	P/FD	RgM/RM	DST	ST	N	--
Novi	A D	PD	RM/RgM	DST	ST	--	--
Zurich III	A D	P/FD	RM/RgM	DST	FT	X	minor
Moskirch	A D	HD	FW	DST	Spt	N	--
Marengo	A D	HD	RM	DST	ST	Y	minor
Hohenlinden	A D	HD	RW/RM	WT	N	--	--

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Strength		Arty. Pieces		Battle Casualties		Arty. Pieces Lost		Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day	Total	%/Day		
Valmy	A 34,000 D 36,000	2,000	58 54	350 400	1.0 1.1	?	?	?	x	N --
Jemappes	A 40,000 D 13,000	3,000 ?	100 54	3,000 2,500	7.5 19.2	?	?	?	x	4.0 --
Neerwinden	A 45,000 D 43,000	6,000 10,000	45 ?	4,000 3,000	8.9 7.0	?	30	66.7	x	N --
Hondschoote	A 42,000 D 13,000	5,000 2,200	40 ?	3,000 3,000	7.1 23.1	?	6	--	x	2.0 --
Wattignies	A 44,000 D 23,000	?	?	4,500 3,000	5.1 6.5	?	?	--	x	1.5 --
Fleurus	A 46,000 D 72,000	14,000 10,000	?	4,000 7,000	8.7 9.7	?	?	--	x	N --
Lodi	A 17,000 D 10,000	?	24 18	900 1,850	5.3 18.5	0	16	88.9	x	2.0 --
Castiglione	A 30,000 D 25,000	?	60 30	1,500 3,000	5.0 12.0	8	20	13.3 66.7	x	2.5 --
Neresheim	A 40,000 D 45,000	?	?	3,000 3,000	7.5 6.7	?	?	--	x	N --
Murzburg	A 44,000 D 30,000	13,000 5,000	?	1,500 7,000	3.4 23.3	?	?	--	x	3.0 --

3. STRENGTHS AND COMBAT OUTCOMES

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Strength		Arty. Pieces	Battle Casualties		Arty. Total	Pieces Lost \$/Day.	Success	Advance (Km/Day)
	Total	Cavalry		Total	'Day				
Arcola	A 17,300 D 12,700	?	32 37	4,500 7,000	8.7 18.4	0 11	0 9.9	x	1.0 --
Rivoli	A 28,000 D 20,500	?	35 20	14,000 5,000	25.0 12.2	?	--	x	--
Pyramids	A 25,000 D 21,000	?	30 40	300 5,000	1.2 23.8	0 20	0 50.0	x	3.0 --
Stockach I	A 38,000 D 50,000	5,000 12,000	?	4,500 6,000	11.8 12.0	?	--	x	N --
Mt. Tabor	A 35,000 D 4,500	25,000 ?	2 18	6,500 60	18.6 1.3	2 0	100.0 0	x	N --
Zurich I	A 40,000 D 25,000	9,400 5,000	?	3,400 1,600	8.5 6.4	?	--	x	N --
Novi	A 50,000 D 35,000	9,000 2,000	?	9,000 11,000	18.0 31.4	?	--	x	2.0 --
Zurich III	A 35,000 D 23,000	3,500 3,500	?	4,000 8,000	5.7 17.4	?	100	100.0	4.0 --
Moskirch	A 60,000 D 60,000	10,000 15,000	?	4,000 5,000	6.7 8.3	?	--	x	1.0 --
Marengo	A 31,000 D 29,000	7,600 7,000	100 29	11,000 7,000	35.5 24.1	40 13	40.0 44.8	x	-- 3.0
Hohenlinden	A 57,000 D 55,000	12,000 12,000	?	20,000 2,500	35.1 4.5	90 ?	?	x	N --

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leader-ship	Training/ Experience	Morale	Logis- tics	Women- tum	Intelli- gence	Tech- nology	Initia- tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accomp.
Valley	A	x	C	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	N	4
Jemappes	A	D	x	C	x	N	N	N	x	x	5	5
Neerwinden	A	D	x	C	x	N	N	N	x	x	4.0	6
Hondschoote	A	D	x	C	x	N	N	N	x	x	N	4
Wattignies	A	D	x	C	x	N	N	N	x	x	2.0	6
Fleurus	A	D	x	C	x	N	O	N	N	x	1.5	4
Lodi	A	D	x	x	x	N	N	x	x	x	2.0	4
Castiglione	A	D	x	x	x	C	C	C	N	N	2.5	5
Neresheim	A	D	C	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	N	6
Murzburg	A	D	C	x	x	N	N	N	N	x	3	7

4. INTANGIBLE FACTORS

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

5. OUTCOME

Engagement	CE	Leadership	Training/Exper.	Morale	Mis-tics	Momen-tum	Intelli-gence	Tech-nology	Initia-tive	Victor	Distance Advanced (Km/Day)	Mission Accompl.
Arcola	A D	x C	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	x x	1 3.0	8 10
Rivoli	A D	x A	x x	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x x	x x	5 2	5 2
Pyramids	A D	x C	x x	C N	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	x N	6 N	9 N
Stockach I	A D	x A	x D	C C	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	1.8 N	18 N
Mt. Tabor	A D	x C	x C	x C	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	4.0 2.0	4 6
Zurich I	A D	x A	x C	C C	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	2 N	4 N
Novi	A D	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	N N	N N	x N	x N	1.0 N	4 N
Zurich III	A D	C C	x C	C C	N C	N C	N C	N C	N C	N C	0 N	2 N
Moskirch	A D	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	3.0 N	7 N
Marengo	A C	C x	C C	C C	N C	N C	N C	N C	N C	N C	4 N	4 N
Hohenlinden	A D	C C	C C	C C	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	3 N	7 N

o. FACTORS AFFECTING CULTURE

Star: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Valley	Jesepes	Neerwinden	Hondschoote	Wattignies	Fleurus	Lodi	Zastiglione	Neresheim	Murzburg
Force Quality	A D	N A D	N X A D	N A D						
Reserves	N N	N N	N X N	X X N	N N	N X X	N X X	N N	N N	X N
Mobility Superiority	N N	N N	N X N	N X N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	X N
Force Prepon- derance	N N	X X	N X N	X X X	N N	N X X	N N	N N	N N	N N
Weather	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	O O	N N	O O	N N
Roads	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Shipboard Leadership	N N	X X	N N	N N	N N	N N	X X	N N	X X	X X
Planning Surprise	N N	N N	N N	N N	X X	N N	X X	X X	X X	N N
Mass Deliverer, Logistics	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Fortified Positions	N N	N N	N N	X X	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N
Attack	X X	N N	N N	N N	N N	N N	X X	N N	N N	N N

War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Arcola	Rivoli	Pyramids	Stockach I	Mt. Tabor	Zurich I	Novi	Zurich III	Moskirch	Marengo	Hohenlinden	Leipsic
Mobilility	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	X	N	N	N	N
Force Preposition	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	X	N	N	N	O
Wastelander	N	N	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	O
Terrain Roads	N	N	O	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Leather-shielder	X	X	X	X	X	N	N	X	N	X	N	N
Planning	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N	N
Surprise	X	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N	N
Maneuver, Mass	X	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N
Logistics	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N
Fortifications	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N	N	N	N
Support	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	X	N	N	N	N
Revolts	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Plan and Maneuver		Success	Resolution
			Secondary Attack			
Valmy	A D	F D	--	--	X	S, MD S
Jemappes	A D	F, E D	E	--	X	P MD
Neerwinden	A D	F, E D/O	--	--	--	R, MD --
Hondschoote	A D	F D	E	--	--	P MD
Wattignies	A D	F, EE D	P	--	--	P, R, MD --
Fleurus	A D	F D	--	--	X	P MD
Lodi	A D	F D	F, P, RiwC D	--	X	P MD
Castiglione	A D	E (LR) D	FE D/O	--	X	S, MD S
Neresheim	A D	F, E D	--	--	X	P MD
Murzburg	A D	F, E D	--	--	X	P MD

7. COMBAT FORMS AND RESOLUTION OF COMBAT
War: French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars

Engagement	Plan and Maneuver				Resolution	
	Main Attack and Scheme of Defense		Secondary Attack			
	Success	Failure	Success	Failure		
Arcola	A D	F, D D	E D	X	P ND	
Rivoli	A D	F D/O	X	X	ND Ps	
Pyramids	A D	D/O D	F	X	B, Ps ML	
Stockach I	A D	F, E D	--	X	R, ND --	
Mt. Tabor	A D	F D/O	--	X	ML B	
Zurich I	A D	F D	E D	X	R S, ND	
Novi	A D	F D	--	X	B ML	
Zurich III	A D	RivC, F, E D/O	--	X	B A	
Moskirch	A D	F, E D	--	X	P ND	
Varengo	A D	F D/O	--	X	ML B, Ps	
Hohenlinden	A D	F, E D/O	--	X	R, ML Ps	

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Valmy, 20 September 1792

Early in August 1792, even as the Paris mob was storming the Tuilleries, an allied army under the command of Karl Wilhelm, Duke of Brunswick, a Prussian general, representing an alliance of the Holy Roman Empire, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Sardinia, advanced slowly into France for the purpose of restoring royal authority there. The army included some 42,000 Prussians, 30,000 Austrians, about 6,000 Hessians, and about 2,000 French émigrés. On 1 September Verdun was captured.

The French Assembly had raised several hundred thousand troops, almost all raw recruits, and positioned them along the borders of France. Opposing the Duke of Brunswick's advance was the Army of the Center, under General François Kellerman, with field strength of about 25,000 men. The largest French force was the Army of the North, in northeastern France and southern Belgium. Having replaced the Marquis de Lafayette as its commander with General Charles Dumouriez, the French Assembly ordered him to halt the Duke of Brunswick's invasion.

With part of his army Dumouriez hastened south to join Kellerman. He soon found that the allied army was between him and Kellerman, and closer to Paris than he was, as he took up a position near Valmy, where he threatened the allied line of communications. By a circuitous route Kellerman joined him in mid-September, bringing the combined strength to about 36,000 men.

Early in the morning of 20 September, in a dense fog, the allied army, about 34,000 strong, approached the French defensive positions. Dumouriez had deployed Kellerman's troops in front, on high ground on both sides of the shallow valley of the Aube River, and placed his own in depth to the rear. As the allies approached, French artillery, which had been sited to cover the principal roads, opened fire. Brunswick deployed his troops across the valley, just below the high ground at Valmy. As the fog lifted the more numerous and better-trained allied artillery opened fire, causing casualties and confusion among the inexperienced French troops. Kellerman, despite having his horse shot from under him by a cannonball, rallied his shaken men, and they held their positions. In previous engagements the raw French troops had fled under artillery fire; so Brunswick ordered his cannoneers to intensify their fire. But to his surprise the French held their positions. The artillery fire trailed off on both sides.

Amazingly Brunswick failed to order his infantry into action. His army remained in front of Valmy for a week. Neither side took the initiative. Brunswick then decided to go into winter quarters and withdrew, first to Verdun, then to Luxembourg.

Significance: The inconclusive cannonade of Valmy saved the new French Republic from near-certain disaster. There was no organized force that could have prevented Brunswick from reaching Paris.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.4; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Jemappes, 6 November 1792

While the main allied force under the Duke of Brunswick was invading eastern France via Verdun, a smaller Austrian army advancing from the Austria Netherlands, under General J.P. Beaulieu, laid siege to the French city of Lille. After Brunswick retreated from Valmy, Dumouriez took his troops north to deal with this threat. As he approached, the allies abandoned their siege of Lille. With nearly 50,000 men, Dumouriez advanced on Austrian force defending Mons, in southern Belgium. To cover the city, the local Austrian commander, Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen, had about 13,000 troops, well entrenched in strong redoubts near the town of Jemappes just west of Mons.

Dumouriez approached this fortified area on November 6, and decided to attack at once. His plan was to combine a frontal assault of the Austrian defenses with an envelopment of the Austrian left flank. The flanking force, however, failed to perform as expected, and the battle was essentially a frontal assault of a fortified position. The French were inspired by the recent victory at Valmy, and attacked with a vigor and gallantry that surprised the seasoned Austrian defenders. After several hours of often hand-to-hand combat the badly outnumbered Austrian withdrew from their positions. Teschen then abandoned Mons.

Significance: This victory, following so soon after Valmy, temporarily cleared France of invasion threat, and added to soaring French morale. The allies withdrew to Brussels, and then further east, behind the Meuse River. Thus most of Belgium was handed to the French without further battle.

Sources: A.1; A.7; D.7.1..

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Neerwinden, 18 March 1793

Early in March 1793 Prince Friedrich Josias of Saxe-Coburg, with an allied army of about 40,000 men, crossed the Meuse River near Liege and began to march into central Belgium, in an attempt to recover from the French the Austrian Netherlands, as Belgium was called. French General Charles Dumouriez, who already was invading Holland, with a slightly larger army, quickly moved to oppose this advance.

Dumouriez advanced vigorously eastward from the Dyle River and drove the Austrian advanced units back from Tirlemont on the Great Geete River. The Austrians withdrew behind the Little Geete River, and took up defensive positions on a line north and south of Neerwinden. Dumouriez's force advanced in eight attack columns, the one on the left having been given the mission of turning the Austrian right. The French advanced vigorously, and their elan gave them early successes, despite the greater experience of the Austrian troops. However, the Austrians soon recovered, commanded by the Archduke Charles. The left wing of the French army collapsed. Although the French were able to hold the Austrians elsewhere, it was evident to Dumouriez that his left was too seriously threatened to permit any hope of victory. Both armies bivouacked on the battlefield, and early the next morning the French withdrew to Tirlemont. With his army melting away through desertion, Dumouriez soon had to withdraw further, and had to give up most of Belgium.

Significance: Neerwinden demonstrated that the raw French levies could not stand successfully against seasoned troops, and that elan could not by itself bring victory. Dumouriez was accused of treason by the National Convention. He tried to turn his army against the Convention, proposing to march to Paris to restore the monarchy. His troops refused, and he fled to the allies. So disappeared from the stage of history the man who had saved France at Valmy.

Sources: A.1; A.7; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Hondschoote, 8 September 1793

The allies drove the French from most of Belgium in the months following Neerwinden. During July 1793 the allies crossed the frontier into France, capturing Conde and Valenciennes. Soon after that, an Anglo-Hanoverian Army, under Prince Frederick Augustus, Duke of York, besieged Dunkirk. A Dutch force under the Prince of Orange was on the border linking the Austrian and British forces. The French Army of the North, nearly demoralized, retreated to Arras, under its new commander, General Jean Nicolas Houchard.

The Convention sent reinforcements and ordered Houchard to raise the siege of Dunkirk and to drive the British into the sea. In late August he advanced north toward Dunkirk with an army of 42,000 men, and attacked the principal force of the Duke of York, some 13,000 troops covering the siege, just east of Dunkirk at Hondschoote. The French deployed in several attack columns and assailed the more disciplined English and Hanoverian troops in a series of uncoordinated but vigorous frontal attacks. A French effort to turn the defenders' left flank failed because the column given this mission became lost. By force of numbers, however, the Duke of York was driven back, and had to give up the siege of Dunkirk. He retreated in good order but had to abandon all of his siege artillery.

Houchard, who had not distinguished himself in the battle, failed to move against the British with sufficient vigor to take advantage of the victory he had won. Instead he turned south and successfully attacked the Duke of Orange at Menin, east of Valenciennes, a week later. But again he failed to pursue.

Significance: The elan of the French Revolutionary soldier was clearly demonstrated. Houchard had finally ended the series of French defeats, and had stabilized the frontier. However, his lack of aggressiveness, and failure to exploit his victories, angered the Convention. He was relieved of command and executed.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Wattignies, 15-16 October 1793

Following the Battle of Menin, Houchard was replaced as commander of the French Army of the North by General Jean Baptiste Jourdan. The French War Minister, General Lazare Nicolas Carnot, a member of the Committee of Public Safety which was virtually the ruling body of France, soon joined Jourdan and became virtually a co-commander. He brought with him the Committee's orders to relieve Maubeuge, then under siege by an Austrian army under the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. To protect the siege force of 30,000, Saxe-Coburg deployed about 23,000 troops, who would meet the French army of about 44,000.

Secret plans had been made for the French garrison, more than 40,000 strong, to break through the siege lines as the French army attacked from the west, but the effort fizzled.

The French approached through a forested area, and when they attacked on 15 October, they achieved some surprise, from which the disciplined Austrians quickly recovered, however. The French forces, attacking in three columns, with main efforts on the flanks, were poorly coordinated, and were thrown back, first on the flanks, then in the center. The French right reached Wattignies, on a plateau dominating the battle area, but was repulsed. After night fell, Carnot and Jourdan reinforced their right flank, reducing the strength of the two other elements of the Army, and at dawn on the 16th the attack on Wattignies was renewed. With more than a two-to-one superiority, French elan triumphed over Austrian discipline, and in the afternoon Coburg ordered a withdrawal. He gave up the siege of Maubeuge, and pulled back across the Sambre. After some inconclusive maneuvering the two armies went into winter quarters.

Significance: This battle, like Hondschoote and Menin, demonstrated an amazing will-to-win of the new French levies, inspired by patriotism, and disciplined by terror at all ranks. (The guillotine was on all minds.) At Wattignies, too, this raw army first demonstrated a capability to maneuver. The raw recruits, amalgamated with a few surviving veterans -- mostly officers of the old army -- were becoming a formidable fighting force. This was due largely to the administrative genius and leadership of Carnot, a stern and uncompromising soldier of the ancien regime. His efforts, and their results, caused him to become known as the "Organizer of Victory."

Sources: A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Fleurus, 26 June 1794

In June 1794, General Jean Jourdan was placed in command of the newly designated French Army of the Sambre and Meuse, about 75,000 strong, and crossed the Sambre River into Belgium to attack the allied army commanded by the Prince of Saxe-Coburg. He invested Charleroi on 12 June, and in a fiercely contested fight, drove off the allies at Hooglede on 17 June. As Coburg prepared for a renewed effort to relieve Charleroi, its garrison surrendered, on 25 June. Jourdan hastily deployed his army just north of the city to meet Coburg, who had about 46,000 men. Although numerically inferior, Coburg (not yet aware of the surrender of Charleroi) was confident that the quality of his army was much higher than that of the French.

The French army was deployed in an arc, with the right flank curving back to rest on the Sambre River near Fourchies and the left curving back to a small tributary. Coburg reflected this deployment by forming his army in five widely separated columns whose fronts formed a huge semicircle. At dawn on the 26th all five columns moved against the French positions in frontal attacks.

Initially all five allied columns were successful. The inadequately disciplined French, who had won victories (with superior numbers) by virtue of elan on the offensive, were not able to hold firm under the steady volleys of the attacking Austrian and Prussian troops. However, the French situation became critical at only one point, the village of Lambussart, south of Fleurus. Jourdan threw in his reserves there, and in a desperate fight stopped the attackers.

Late in the afternoon, Cobourg learned of the surrender of Charleroi. He decided to stop the attack -- which might have been successful if pressed harder -- and withdrew, leaving the field to the French. After spending a few days to rest and reorganize, Jourdan pursued into central Belgium.

Significance: The French victory gave increased confidence to leaders and troops. The allies, dispirited by their failures, began to withdraw from Belgium. The English embarked for home, while the Austrians and Prussians withdrew eastward across the Rhine River. In following months the French overwhelmed the Dutch, and by mid-winter they had consolidated their control of Holland. The climactic event took place early in 1795, when French cavalry captured the Dutch fleet, its ships frozen into the Texel anchorage.

Sources: A.8; A.15; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Lodi, 10 May 1796

After defeating the Piedmontese Army, General Napoleon Bonaparte turned northeast to advance against General J.P. Beaulieu's Austrian army, which was deployed on the north bank of the Po River. Bonaparte sought to have his French Army of Italy envelop Beaulieu's army by demonstrating on a wide front along the river and then crossing the Po at Piacenza on the Austrian rear. The maneuver was well executed, a classic demonstration of the futility of a cordon defense. But Beaulieu managed to elude Bonaparte's trap by making a hasty crossing of the Adda River and withdrawing east. Beaulieu left General Sebottendorf and a force of 10,000 at Lodi to delay the French. Bonaparte, who had pushed his army hard in order to overtake the Austrians, made it to Lodi on 10 May. Seeing that Sebottendorf had deployed his infantry and artillery to cover the approaches to the bridge at Lodi, Bonaparte sent cavalry units to search for a ford in order to envelop the Austrian positions. He also positioned 24 guns on the west bank, south of the Austrians, in order to cover the advance of his infantry. A frontal assault failed, but Bonaparte himself led a second assault, which drove the Austrian defenders from the bridge. A counterattack nearly regained the bridge, but the arrival of two more French divisions decided the issue in favor of the French. The reinforcements broke the center of the Austrian line. Then the French cavalry, having located a ford upstream, arrived on the Austrian flank. Sebottendorf wisely called retreat.

Significance: Bonaparte failed to achieve one of his major objectives, the envelopment of Beaulieu's army. Nonetheless his quick crossing of the Po River and subsequent rapid march along that river assured the fall of Milan. Bonaparte's leadership and the bravery in the assault of the Lodi Bridge inspired both his officers and men and won him their unstinting admiration.

Sources: D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Castiglione, 5 August 1796

On 5 August 1797 Count Dagobert Wurmser's Austrian Army occupied a strong defensive position along the heights overlooking Castiglione, on a front that extended 8 kilometers from Mount Medolano, beside the main road to Mantua, east to Solferino. Napoleon Bonaparte had already ordered General Jean Serurier to march his division from Marcaria northeast to the Castiglione-Mantua road, behind Wurmser's left flank. The remainder of Bonaparte's plan called for two divisions to launch a holding attack on the Austrian front. Feinting a retreat, these divisions would entice the Austrians to counterattack, causing them to over-extend their line. At the propitious moment Serurier's division would fall on the Austrian rear; this would be followed by an assault of Wurmser's left flank at Monte Medolano by three battalions of grenadiers supported by horse artillery and cavalry. The feigned retreat was perfectly executed, but the attack on the Austrian rear was launched too soon. Wurmser withdrew his advancing soldiers to the high ground and had his second line move to his rear to form a second front. Nonetheless Bonaparte's combined arms task force penetrated the Monte Medolano sector. On the French left grenadiers drove the defenders from Solferino, forcing Wurmser to order a general withdrawal.

Significance: Through the victory at Castiglione the French kept control of northern Italy, and the Austrians failed to relieve the siege of Mantua. However, not only was the attack on Wurmser's rear premature, one division proved insufficient to bar the Austrian retreat. Nor did Bonaparte achieve a complete breakthrough on the Austrian right as he had planned. The young French general had nonetheless defeated an accomplished tactician and had developed a tactical plan that would serve him well in future engagements.

Sources: A.7; D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLIONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Neresheim, 11 August 1796

On 10 June 1796 French General J.B. Jourdan crossed the Rhine River at Dusseldorf, and lured the Archduke Charles and the main Austrian army in Germany away from the French main effort. Two days later French General Jean V. Moreau began crossing the Rhine at Strasbourg, taking advantage of the Austrian response to Jourdan's feint. Charles hurried south to oppose him, but Moreau's larger army forced him to withdraw slowly toward the Danube River, whither Jourdan began to move, across central Germany.

Charles halted north of the Danube, between Ulm and Donauwörth, and turned to attack Moreau, planning then to move against Jourdan. He had about 40,000 men; Moreau had about 45,000.

Before dawn on 11 August the Austrian army advanced north from the Danube, its four corps, each about 10,000 men, in parallel columns, their progress slowed by heavy rain. Soon after daybreak they encountered the French, stretched along a front of about 40 kilometers from Heidenheim through Neresheim to Nordlingen. The distance, combined with rain, prevented Charles's left flank corps from accomplishing its mission of attacking the flank of the French right wing. The three other Austrian corps were initially successful, but they were too far apart to coordinate their actions. Progress was slow in rain and on muddy roads, and by dark the Austrian attack had bogged down. It was a drawn battle, in which Charles had only partially accomplished his objective. However, Moreau, failing to realize the Archduke's strategy, was badly shaken by the battle, and temporarily halted his advance. The next day Charles withdrew and crossed to the south bank of the Danube.

Significance: The Battle of Neresheim significantly slowed the advance of Moreau's army into central Germany, and gave Charles an opportunity to move to capture or defeat Jourdan. He promptly seized the opportunity.

Sources: A.1; A.15; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Murzburg, 3 September 1796

Archduke Charles, with 27,000 men, crossed the Danube River at Ingolstadt on 14 and 15 August, and marched north to try to cut French General J.B. Jourdan's line of communications and perhaps destroy his army. Jourdan, who was pursuing Austrian General Alexander H. Wartensleben east of Amberg, learned of the approach of Charles on the 22d, and hastily began to retreat. Charles badly defeated his rearguard at Amberg on the 24th, the same day that French General Jean Victor Moreau attacked and defeated Latour at Friedburg.

But Charles was now between the two French armies, and his army, united with Wartensleben's, was superior in strength to that of Jourdan. Realizing that Jourdan was retiring toward Murzburg, Charles also marched directly west, south of the French army, and his advanced guard reached Murzburg on 1 September, before Jourdan -- closely pursued by Wartensleben -- arrived. The Austrians quickly overcame the French garrison. The main French and Austrian armies converged on Murzburg on the 2d, and prepared for battle.

The French line was approximately 20 kilometers long, extending northeast from Murzburg to the Main River near Heiligenthal. Although all of Wartensleben's troops had not yet arrived, Charles advanced from the south and east against the French, as soon as the fog had lifted on the morning of the 3d. For several hours the outcome was in doubt. By noon the French left wing was actually threatening the Austrian bridges over the Main River, across which Wartensleben's troops were still pouring. However, a mid-afternoon counterattack, just west of the river, drove the French back to Heiligenthal, and soon rolled up Jourdan's left wing. Jourdan had no reserves, while Charles still had fresh troops coming across the river. Jourdan withdrew.

Next day the French began a hasty retreat to the Rhine, closely pursued by Charles. Moreau, learning of Jourdan's defeat, also retreated to the Rhine. The French invasion of Germany had been turned back.

Significance: In a brilliant campaign, worthy of comparison with that being fought in Italy, the Archduke Charles had, with inferior forces, frustrated the French effort to bring the war to a conclusion by invading Germany.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Arcola, 15-17 November 1796

After a night march along the south bank of the Adige River Bonaparte's force crossed the river at Ronco on the morning of 15 November. General André Massena's division marched northwest to Porcile in order to cover the rear. General Charles Augereau's division marched east to the Alpone River, and then north to Arcola. The division was to cross the Alpone at Arcola and march north to Villanova, to menace Austrian Baron Joseph d'Alvintzi's supply trains, forcing Alvintzi to countermarch and meet the French on a narrow, marshy front that would negate the Austrians' numerical superiority. Alvintzi had deployed 2,000 men and well-positioned guns covering the approach to the bridge at Arcola. Frontal assaults failed for two days to take the bridge. On the third day, while Massena attacked at the bridge, Augereau's force crossed the river below Arcola, and a detachment of cavalry rode to the rear of the Austrian position, blowing bugles. Fearful of being encircled, the Austrian troops broke and fled.

Significance: Bonaparte's bold offensive thrust enabled him to occupy a position between two numerically superior forces. Alvintzi dispersed his force following this battle, so that the French had superior numbers everywhere. Bonaparte's plan and execution of it were textbook examples of the use of tactical offensive to fulfill a defensive strategic objective.

Sources: A.1; A.7; D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE WAR OF THE FIRST COALITION

Rivoli, 14-15 January 1797

On 14 January 1797, Austrian Baron Joseph d'Alvintzi launched a six-column attack on General Napoleon Bonaparte's position on the Rivoli plateau. Alvintzi sent three columns to attack frontally, two columns to envelop Bonaparte's flanks, and a sixth column down the east bank of the Adige River to cross behind the French positions and reinforce the Austrian garrison at Mantua.

Napoleon met the frontal assault with one division under General Barthélémy C. Joubert. On the left the French troops were driven back. By noon the Austrian column was threatening the French right flank. At that stage Massena arrived with reinforcements, which enveloped the Austrian troops on the right. The frontal attack was driven off, and, in a counterattack, the French pushed the Austrians back beyond the village of San Giovanni. Troops redeployed from the center and well-aimed artillery fire scattered the Austrian attackers on the left. Having thwarted the Austrian offensive, Napoleon sent a force south to prevent the column from crossing the Adige. The following day Joubert repulsed another Austrian attack on Rivoli and pursued the attackers, capturing between four and five thousand Austrians and three guns.

Significance: The repulse of the Austrian attack on Rivoli and the subsequent rout of the bulk of the Austrian Army spelled the ruin of Austrian efforts to drive the French from northern Italy.

Sources: A.7; D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

Pyramids, 21 July 1798

After more than three weeks of arduous marching through desert terrain from Alexandria, General Bonaparte and four divisions arrived in the vicinity of Cairo on 20 July. The next day Bonaparte attacked the Mameluke army of Mirad Bey. Half of the French force deployed in infantry squares to meet the onslaught of the Mameluke cavalry. the Mameluke horsemen were repulsed with heavy losses. Meanwhile Bonaparte dispatched his remaining two divisions to assault the Mameluke fortress at the nearby village of Embabeh. With the support of naval gunfire from the French flotilla on the Nile, the French infantry stormed and captured the fortress.

Significance: The French victory led to the collapse of Mameluke resistance and the capitulation of Cairo (23 July 1798).

Sources: A.1; D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Stockach I, 25 March 1799

After the Treaty of Campo Formio, France remained at war only with Great Britain and Naples (allied to Britain). However, in late December 1798 Czar Paul I of Russia entered into an alliance with Great Britain, creating the Second Coalition, soon joined by Austria, the Vatican, and Naples.

Early in March 1799, General J.B. Jourdan crossed the Rhine River at Kehl and Huningen, and advanced on a broad front into southern Germany through the Black Forest. At Ostrach on 23 March, he was met and defeated by a superior allied army under the Archduke Charles. Jourdan fell back west of Stokach, just north of Lake Constance, followed by Charles. Jourdan had 40,000 men, Charles over 60,000. On 25 March, as Charles was sending about half of his army in three columns on a reconnaissance in force west of Stokach, Jourdan decided to start an attack of his own, with his main effort on his left, to drive the Austrians into Lake Constance.

The two armies met in a meeting engagement at dawn. The numerical superiority of the French quickly forced the Austrians to the defensive. They fell back, and Charles sent back for the remainder of his army. In intensive fighting, much of it in heavily wooded areas, with units scattered and not able to coordinate readily with each other, the French almost overwhelmed the Austrian right wing. Charles took command on that wing himself, and then when reinforcements arrived, in mid-afternoon, counterattacked. It soon became evident to Jourdan that he had not been able to win the surprise victory he had anticipated. He ordered a general withdrawal.

Significance: By seizing the initiative, Jourdan almost succeeded in defeating the superior Austrian army. However, by coolness and excellent tactical leadership Charles saved the day. Jourdan retreated to the Rhine.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: THE EGYPTIAN CAMPAIGN

Mount Tabor, 16/17 April 1799

In mid-April 1799, while besieging the Turkish fortress of Acre, General Bonaparte was informed that a Turkish relief army was moving to the aid of the garrison. Bonaparte dispatched a force of 1,500 men commanded by General J.P. Kleber to counter this threat. Kleber discovered that the Turkish relief force was 25,000 men strong -- too numerous for his small contingent to defeat. He therefore formed his units in infantry squares for all-around defense and sent a message to Bonaparte for help. Bonaparte made a night march to reinforce Kleber, and on 17 April the recombined French force defeated the attacks of the Turks by infantry and artillery firepower. The Turks were routed.

Significance: Bonaparte's prompt reinforcement of Kleber's beleaguered force saved the detachment from annihilation. The Turkish attempt to relieve Acre was thwarted.

Sources: A.1; D.4; D.6; D.23.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Zurich I, 4 June 1799

In mid-May 1799 the Archduke Charles brought part of his army from Germany, and took command of Austrian forces in Switzerland. In late May he forced French covering forces back into their defenses at Zurich, where General Andre Massena had about 25,000 men to hold a line some 8 kilometers long. On 4 June the Austrians attacked, sending about 26,000 men against the French entrenchments, while another 8,000 participated in a wide turning movement. Another 8,000 were held in reserve, and never committed. The French repulsed the frontal attack. The enveloping force was contained and didn't get into the battle.

Despite his successful defense, Massena knew that the Archduke could bring overwhelming strength against him, and he mistrusted the restive Swiss population of the city. He therefore withdrew behind the Limmat River, and the Austrians decided not to push further after him in view of their extended line of communications.

Significance: Although tactically successful at Zurich, strategically Massena had been driven out of central Switzerland. Minor and inconclusive operations continued through the early summer.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Novi, 15 August 1799

Following three major French defeats earlier in 1799 (Magnano, 5 April; Cassano, 27 April; and the Trebbia, 17-19 June), Russian Field Marshal Aleksander Suvarov had almost driven the French out of Italy. With about 60,000 men in early August he pushed south from Alessandria toward the Bocchetta Pass and Genoa. The French Army of Italy, now commanded by General Barthelemy C. Joubert, was only 35,000 men strong. However, Joubert held a strong position across the Serivia Valley at Novi. The line was 13 kilometers long, and Joubert did not hold out a reserve.

As the Austro-Russian army approached, early on 15 August, Joubert attempted to seize the initiative by launching his own attack. However, the numerically superior Austrians and Russians soon regained the initiative, and began to advance. As the left-center of his line was being threatened, Joubert galloped forward to steady his troops and received a mortal wound. Moreau immediately assumed command, and succeeded in re-establishing the position.

By mid-afternoon there came a lull in the battle, with the French still holding all of their positions. Suvarov now committed his reserve against the French right, on the Serivia River. The fresh troops, added to the already numerically superior force engaging the French on this flank, were too much for the defenders. They fell back, slowly at first, then in considerable confusion. The whole French line then collapsed. Moreau withdrew the remnants of his command through the Bocchetta Pass.

Significance: This battle virtually completed the allied reconquest of the territory that had been won by Bonaparte in 1796 and 1797. The victor of this campaign, Suvarov, demonstrated that the reputation he had gained fighting the Turks was well-deserved. It was, however, his last victory.

Sources: A.1; D.7.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Zurich III, 24-25 September 1799

In September 1799 Marshal Aleksander Suvarov, commanding a largely Russian allied army, was sent from Italy to Switzerland to drive the French army of Marshal Andre Massena back into France. General Alexander M. Korsakov was in Switzerland, with about 40,000 allied troops.

Learning of Suvorov's move, Massena sent a force of 12,000 men under General Lecourbe to block the St. Gothard Pass, through which he expected Surarov to come. He himself, with about 35,000 men, advanced against Zurich, which was held by Korsakov with about 25,000 men. On 24 September Massena drove back a Russian covering force and, by a combination of power and deception, fought his way across the Limmat River at Dietikon, in a brilliant river crossing operation. His forces rapidly converged on Zurich on both sides of the river. By evening the city was encircled, and part of the Russian army was isolated northwest of the city.

Korsakov collected his remaining troops, about 15,000 men, and next morning attempted to fight his way out to the north, toward Winterthur. The Russians fought stubbornly, but the French overwhelmed them by the vigor of their attack and drove most of the Russians back into the city, where they surrendered. By evening the remainder of Korsakov's army was completely routed and fleeing in disorder.

Meanwhile, Suvarov was fighting his way through the St. Gothard Pass, at great cost. When he learned about the disaster at Zurich, he fought across the central Alpine spine, to meet the Archduke Charles (who had returned to Switzerland after learning of Zurich). But the great soldiers could not agree, and while they were arguing, Czar Paul withdrew from the coalition.

Significance: Massena's overwhelming victory at Zurich ended all major hostilities in Switzerland, and completely ruined the allies's strategic plans. Charles stopped his advance through Germany, and returned to secure southern Germany against a possible further thrust by Massena.

Sources: A.1; A.7; A.15; D.7.1.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Moskirch, 5 May 1800

On 9 October 1799, General Napoleon Bonaparte arrived back in France from Egypt. A month later he had seized control of the French government, with the title of First Consul. He attempted to make peace with the allies, but was rebuffed. He thereupon began to raise a new army in France -- the Army of the Reserve -- and at the beginning of 1800 surveyed the strategic situation.

General Jean Victor Moreau had an army of about 130,000 men in Switzerland and upper Alsace. Opposite him in southern Germany was an Austrian army of 140,000 under General Paul Kray von Krajowa. After his victory at Zurich, Massena had been sent to Genoa to take over the remnants of the Army of Italy, about 40,000 strong, and to try to stop, and if possible throw back, the Austrian army of about 100,000 men, under Baron Michael Melas, pressing toward France in northwestern Italy. While Bonaparte was pondering whether he should take the Army of the Reserve through Switzerland to cooperate with Moreau against Kray, or to move into northern Italy to cooperate with Massena against Melas, he received word that Massena had been badly defeated, and was besieged in Genoa, while Melas was marching along the Riviera coast to Nice and France. He thereupon decided to go to Italy, and ordered Moreau to advance into southern Germany against Kray.

On 25 April Moreau's army began to move across the Rhine from Kehl to Basel. On 3 May the Austrians were driven from Stokach. The next day the two main armies confronted each other near Moskirch. On the morning of the 5th the French army advanced northeastward in a broad line of columns. The rightmost column was given the mission of turning the Austrians' left flank, near Moskirch, and thus threatening their line of communication to the east. In turn, Kray put his main effort on his right, to threaten the French line of communications. The battle flared throughout the day along the entire 16-kilometer front. But the principal actions took place around Moskirch. By evening that place was in French hands, and Kray felt obliged to retire to the east.

Significance: By these successes at Stokach and Moskirch, Moreau had secured his own line of communications both through Switzerland and along the upper Rhine to Alsace, while the road to Bavaria was now open to him. Although the opportunity was clear, he was slow in exploiting it. However, Kray was equally dilatory. So the campaign continued to move slowly eastward.

Sources: A.1; A.7; D.7.2.

THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Marengo, 14 June 1800

In the spring of 1800 First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte received word that Austrian General Baron Michael Melas had overwhelmed French forces in Italy under General Andre Massena. Massena was besieged in Genoa, and Melas was advancing along the Riviera coast into France. Napoleon decided to take his small Army of the Reserve across the Alps into Italy, to cut Melas's lines of communications to Vienna and force him either to surrender or to fight desperately, under unfavorable circumstances, to restore his communications.

With 37,000 men Bonaparte crossed the Alps at the St. Bernard Pass between 14 and 24 May, brushing aside small Austrian forces that were guarding the pass, and surprising everyone. By 7 June Napoleon had captured Milan and Pavia, cutting the Austrian line of communications. Learning of this, Melas, who had reached Turin, advanced toward Alessandria, which he reached on 13 June. There he assembled 34,000 men.

Thinking Melas was still at Turin, on the 13th and 14th Bonaparte, who by this time had about 32,000 men, advanced toward Alessandria on a broad front, his divisions widely scattered to collect provisions. About midmorning of 14 June, Bonaparte's main body of about 18,000 men unexpectedly was struck by Melas, who had about 31,000 men on the battlefield. Napoleon rallied his surprised troops and fell back slowly in a defensive battle, having sent messengers to bring his other troops to the battlefield. By 1300 contact had been broken and Bonaparte fell back farther to reorganize and await the arrival of General Desaix's corps.

Melas, thinking he had won the battle, ordered his troops in march formation and began slowly to follow the French. By 1700 Bonaparte had assembled more than 28,000 men, and he attacked the unsuspecting Austrians in front and flank. In less than an hour the Austrian army was shattered, its remnants fleeing back into Alessandria. The next day Melas surrendered.

Significance: The Second Italian Campaign was virtually a one-battle campaign. Bonaparte's bold thrust into northern Italy made the outcome almost a foregone conclusion. His carelessness on the morning of the 14th nearly cost him a tactical defeat, but his strategic success was hardly threatened. His calm and his quick reaction soon overcame the temporary disadvantage, and he won a tactical victory as resounding as his strategic success.

Sources: A.7; D.7.2.

THE REVOLUTIONARY-NAPOLEONIC WARS: WAR OF THE SECOND COALITION

Hohenlinden, 3 December 1800

Between 15 July and 13 November an armistice held the armies of France and Austria quietly facing each other across the Inn River. With the armistice over, Archduke John, with about 83,000 men, planned to cross the lower Inn and throw his army astride the line of communications of the French army of 90,000 men, under the command of General Jean Victor Moreau. Because of bad weather, cold rain and snow, the Austrians, in three columns, moved slowly, and Moreau promptly met the threat by ordering his army to assemble in the vicinity of Hohenlinden. By the morning of 3 December Moreau had only about half of his army under his personal control. The advancing Austrians had cut off the remainder, which lay to the south.

However, more by good fortune than design, in mid-morning the French corps of General Richepanse, about 10,000 strong, coming up from the south to join the main army, found itself approaching the flank of the corps of Austrian General Kollwrat, part of the lefthand Austrian column. Although realizing he was outnumbered, Richepanse attacked, hoping to break through to join the main army. However, he accomplished much more. The whole left wing of the Austrian army was thrown into confusion, and began to withdraw. Richepanse continued to advance to the north, and attacked the rear of the Austrian central column, then engaged in fierce conflict at Hohenlinden. The center of the Austrian army began to dissolve, and the battle was soon over.

Significance: The Battle of Hohenlinden left open to the French the road to Vienna. Moreau began to march east, with additional French forces from Switzerland and Italy converging with him against the Austrian capital. On 25 December Austria sued for peace, and withdrew from the alliance. The War of the Second Coalition was over.

Sources: A.7; D.7.2.

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