

## REPORT 60C6444F777A4E00187ECCD5

Created Sun Jun 13 2021 17:45:51 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Number of analyses 1

User 60c63fab8bfa125f70f292e8

# **REPORT SUMMARY**

Analyses ID Main source file Detected vulnerabilities

c2092122-eca6-4da8-b97c-259ebcf2885a

masterChef.sol

65

Started Sun Jun 13 2021 17:46:01 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Finished Sun Jun 13 2021 18:31:57 GMT+0000 (Coordinated Universal Time)

Mode Deep

Client Tool Remythx

Main Source File MasterChef.Sol

## **DETECTED VULNERABILITIES**

(HIGH	(MEDIUM	(LOW
0	28	37

### **ISSUES**

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "renounceOwnership" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to SWC-000 mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
\ensuremath{^{\star}} thereby removing any functionality that is only available to the owner of the second s
623
                                                                            function renounceOwnership() public onlyOwner |
emit OwnershipTransferred(_owner_address(0));
624
625
626
628
629
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "transferOwnership" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to SWC-000 mark it as "external" instead.

```
631 | * Can only be called by the current owner.
      function transferOwnership(address newOwner) public onlyOwner ____transferOwnership(newOwner);
633
634
635
636
637
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "decimals" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
719 | * @dev Returns the token decimals
720
     function decimals() public override view returns (uint8) {
721
     return _decimals;
723
724
725
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "symbol" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
726 | * @dev Returns the token symbol
     function symbol() public override view returns (string memory) {
728
     return _symbol;
729
730
731
     /**
732
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "allowance" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

```
760 * @dev See {BEP20-allowance}.
761
     function allowance(address owner, address spender) public override view returns (uint256) {
     return _allowances[owner][spender];
763
764
765
     /**
766
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "approve" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
771 | * - 'spender' cannot be the zero address.
772
  773
774
775
776
  }
777
778
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "increaseAllowance" is marked "publio". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
* - `spender` cannot be the zero address.
815
  817
  return true;
818
819
820
821
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "decreaseAllowance" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to SWC-000 mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

```
833 | * `subtractedValue`.
834
                             nce(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue) public returns (bool) {
835
836
     _approve(
837
838
      _allowances[_msgSender()][spender].sub(subtractedValue, 'BEP20: decreased allowance below zero')
839
840
     return true;
841
842
843
844
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "mint" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
contract DLPHToken is BEP20('Dolphin Token', 'DLPH') {
967
968
     function mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {
969
     require(_amount != 0, "DLPH::mint: mint value should not be zero");
970
971
      _moveDelegates(address(0), _delegates(_to|, _amount);
972
973
974
     function \ burn(uint 256 \ value) \ public \ only Owner \ \{
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "burn" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

```
973
974
       function burn(uint256 value) public onlyOwner {
975
      require(value != 0. "DLPH::burn: burn value should not be zero");
uint totalSupply = totalSupply();
976
977
      require(value <= totalSupply);</pre>
978
979
       _burn(msg.sender, value);
980
982
      function\ transfer(address\ \_to,\ uint 256\ \_value)\ public\ virtual\ override\ returns\ (bool\ success)\ \{
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "transfer" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
Locations
```

```
981
982
      function transfer(address _to, uint256 _value) public virtual override returns (bool success) {
983
     require(_value != 0, "DLPH::transfer: transfer value should not be zero");
984
      uint256 toBurn = _value / 100;
986
     if(super.transfer(_to, _value - toBurn)) {
987
      _burn(msg.sender, toBurn);
988
         oveDelegates(_delegates[msg_sender], _delegates[_to], _value - toBurn);
990
991
992
     return false;
993
994
995
     function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public override returns (bool success)
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

The function definition of "transferFrom" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it SWC-000 as "external" instead.

```
994
      function transferFrom(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value) public override returns (bool success)
996
997
     require(_value != 0, "DLPH::transfer: transfer value shouldnot be zero");
998
      uint256 toBurn = _value / 100;
999
1000
     if(super.transferFrom(_from, _to, _value - toBurn)) {
1001
1002
          veDelegates(_delegates[_from], _delegates(_to], _value - toBurn),
1003
1005
1006
     return false;
1007
1008
1009
     // Copied and modified from YAM code:
1010
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "mint" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1248 | contract FoamBar is BEP20('FoamBar Token', 'FOAM') {
     /// @notice Creates `_amount` token to `_to`. Must only be called by the owner (MasterChef).
1249
     function mint(address _to, uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {
1250
     1251
1252
1253
1254
    function burn(address _from ,uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {
1255
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "burn" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1253
1254
      function burn(address _from ,uint256 _amount) public onlyOwner {
1255
          rn(_from, _amount);
1256
           eDelegates(_delegates[_from], address(0), _amount);
1257
1258
1259
      // The Dolphin Token!
1260
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "safeDLPHTransfer" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

```
1269
      // Safe DLPH transfer function, just in case if rounding error causes pool to not have enough DLPHs.
1270
      function safeDLPHTransfer(address _to, uint256 _amount  public onlyOwner |
uint256 DLPHBal = DLPH balanceOf(address(this));
1271
1272
      if (_amount > DLPHBal) {
      DLPH.transfer(_to, DLPHBal);
1275
      DLPH.transfer(_to, _amount);
1276
1277
1278
1279
      // Copied and modified from YAM code:
1280
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "updateMultiplier" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1622
1623
      function updateMultiplier(uint256 multiplierNumber) public onlyOwner {
1624
     BONUS_MULTIPLIER = multiplierNumber;
1625
1627
     function poolLength() external view returns (uint256) {
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "add" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
1632 // Add a new lp to the pool. Can only be called by the owner.
      \ensuremath{//}\xspace XXX DO NOT add the same LP token more than once. Rewards will be messed up if you do.
      function add(uint256 _allocPoint, IBEP20 _lpToken, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner {
1634
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
      if (_withUpdate) {
1636
1637
1638
      uint256 lastRewardBlock = block number > startBlock ? block number : startBlock;
1639
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
      poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
1641
      lpToken: _lpToken,
      allocPoint: _allocPoint,
1643
      lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock,
1645
      depositFeeBP: _depositFeeBP
1646
1647
1648
1650
     // Update the given pool's DLPH allocation point. Can only be called by the owner.
```

The function definition of "set" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

SWC-000

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1650
      \ensuremath{//} Update the given pool's DLPH allocation point. Can only be called by the owner.
1651
      function set(uint256 _pid, uint256 _allocPoint, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner {
1652
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "set: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
1653
      if (_withUpdate) {
1655
1656
      uint256 prevAllocPoint = poolInfo[_pid] allocPoint;
1657
      poolInfo[_pid] allocPoint = _allocPoint;
1658
      poolInfo[_pid]_depositFeeBP = _depositFeeBP;
1659
      if (prevAllocPoint != _allocPoint) {
1660
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.sub(prevAllocPoint).add(_allocPoint);
1661
      updateStakingPool();
1662
1664
      function updateStakingPool() internal {
1666
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "getPerBlock" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file

masterChef.sol

```
1704
1705
      function getPerBlock() public view returns (uint256) {
1706
      return DLPHPerBlock;
1707
1708
1709
1710
     // Update reward variables for all pools. Be careful of gas spending!
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "deposit" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

```
1748
        // Deposit LP tokens to MasterChef for DLPH allocation.
1749
1750
        function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
       require (_pid != 0, 'deposit DLPH by staking');
1752
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1754
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg sender];
1755
        address DLPHaddr = address(DLPH);
1756
1757
            atePool(_pid);
1758
        if (user.amount > 0) {
1759
        uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1760
        safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1762
1763
1764
       if (_amount > 0) {
1765
1766
       {\color{red}\textbf{pool.lpToken}.safeTransferFrom(address(\textbf{msg.sender}),~address(\textbf{this}),~\_\textbf{amount});}
       if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
1767
        uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
1768
1769
       \label{local_pool_pool} \textbf{pool_lpToken}. safe \textbf{Transfer} (\textbf{treasuryaddr}, \ \ \textbf{depositFee.} \ \textbf{div}(2)),
1770
       pool lpToken safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee div(4));
pool lpToken safeTransfer(DLPHaddr, depositFee div(4) div(4) mul(3));
pool lpToken safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee div(4) div(4));
1772
1773
1775
       user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1776
1777
        user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1778
1779
       user rewardDebt = user amount mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1780
       emit Deposit(msg sender, _pid, _amount);
1781
1782
1783
       // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "withdraw" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
Locations
```

```
1783
1784
      // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
      function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
1785
1786
      require (_pid != 0, 'withdraw DLPH by unstaking');
1787
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1788
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1789
      require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1790
1791
      updatePool(<u>pid</u>);
1792
      uint256 pending = user amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user rewardDebt);
1793
1794
       if(pending > 0) {
       safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1795
1796
      if(_amount > 0) {
1797
      user amount = user amount sub(_amount()
pool lpToken safeTransfer(address(msg sender), _amount()
1798
1799
1800
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1801
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1802
1803
1804
      // Stake Dolphin Tokens to MasterChef
```

SWC-000

The function definition of "enterStaking" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

```
1804
1805
      // Stake Dolphin Tokens to MasterChef
      function enterStaking(uint256 _amount) public {
1806
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[0];
1807
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[0][msg_sender];
1809
      if (user.amount > 0) {
1810
      uint256 pending = user amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1811
      if(pending > 0) {
1812
      safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1813
1814
1815
      if(_amount > 0) {
1816
      pool lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount ;;
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1818
1819
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1820
1821
1822
      foam.mint(msg.sender, _amount);
1823
1824
      emit Deposit(msg.sender, 0, _amount);
1825
1826
1827
1828
     // Withdraw Dolphin Tokens from STAKING.
```

The function definition of "leaveStaking" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead. SWC-000

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1827
      // Withdraw Dolphin Tokens from STAKING.
1828
1829
      function leaveStaking(uint256 _amount) public {
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[0]:
1830
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[0][msg.sender];
1831
     require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1832
1833
      uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1834
      if(pending > 0) {
1835
      safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1836
1837
      if(_amount > 0) {
1838
      user.amount = user.amount.sub(_amount);
1839
1841
     user rewardDebt = user amount mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1842
1843
      foam.burn(msg.sender, _amount);
1844
1845
     emit Withdraw(msg sender, 0, _amount);
1846
     // Withdraw without caring about rewards. EMERGENCY ONLY.
1848
```

MEDIUM Function could be marked as external.

SWC-000

The function definition of "emergencyWithdraw" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as "external" instead.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
1847
       // Withdraw without caring about rewards. EMERGENCY ONLY.
1848
1849
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1850
1851
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
      {\bf pool.lpToken.safeTransfer} ({\bf address}({\bf msg.sender}), \ {\bf user.amount})_{i}
1852
      emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg sender, _pid, user.amount);
1853
1854
      user.rewardDebt = 0;
1855
1856
1857
      // \ {\tt Safe DLPH \ transfer \ function, \ just \ in \ case \ if \ rounding \ error \ causes \ pool \ to \ not \ have \ enough \ DLPHs.}
```

The function definition of "dev" is marked "public". However, it is never directly called by another function in the same contract or in any of its descendants. Consider to mark it as

SWC-000

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1862
      \ensuremath{//} Update dev address by the previous dev.
1863
       function dev(address _devaddr) public {
      require(msg sender == devaddr, "dev: wut?");
1865
      devaddr = _devaddr;
1867
1868
```

### MEDIUM

Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

SWC-113

This call is executed following another call within the same transaction. It is possible that the call never gets executed if a prior call fails permanently. This might be caused intentionally by a malicious callee. If possible, refactor the code such that each transaction only executes one external call or make sure that all callees can be trusted (i.e. they're part of your own codebase).

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
356
     // solhint-disable-next-line avoid-low-level-calls
     (bool success, bytes memory returndata) = target call{value weiValue}(data);
358
     if (success) {
     return returndata;
360
```

## MEDIUM

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "updateStakingPool" in contract "MasterChef" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file

masterChef.sol

```
1667 | uint256 length = poolInfo.length;
      uint256 points = 0;
1668
      for (uint256 pid = 1; pid < length; ++pid) {</pre>
      points = points.add(poolInfo[pid].allocPoint);
1670
1671
```

## MEDIUM

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "massUpdatePools" in contract "MasterChef" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
function massUpdatePools() public {

uint256 length = poolInfo.length;

for (uint256 pid = 0; pid < length; ++pid) {

updatePool(pid);

}
```

## LOW

A floating pragma is set.

SWC-103

The current pragma Solidity directive is "">=0.4.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
3  // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
4
5  pragma solidity >=0.4.0
6
7  /**
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

300-107

Source file masterChef.sol

```
UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), user.amount);

emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, _pid, user amount);

user.amount = 0;

user.rewardDebt = 0;
```

Write to persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg.sender), user.amount);
emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, _pid, user.amount);

user amount = 0;

user.rewardDebt = 0;

}
```

### LOW

Write to persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

masterChef.sol

Locations

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
1765     if (_amount > 0) {
1766         pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
1767         if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
1768                uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
```

## LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file masterChef.sol

Write to persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

masterChef.sol Locations

```
1775
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1776
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
1778
1779
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file

masterChef.sol Locations

```
1778
     user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1780
      emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1782
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file masterChef.sol

```
1778
1779
      user.rewardDebt = user amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
      emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1781
1782
```

Write to persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
1778 }
1779 }
1780 user rewardDebt = user amount muli pool accDLPHPerShare) div(1e12);
1781 emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1782 }
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
    uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool depositFeeBP).div(10000);

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));
```

## LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file masterChef.sol

```
uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFee8P).div(10000);

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr, depositFee.div(4).mul(3));
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr, depositFee.div(4).mul(3));
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4).mul(3));

pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
```

## LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file masterChef.sol

```
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4).mul(3));
pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
```

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
1771
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr,\ depositFee.div(4).div(4).mul(3));
1773
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
1774
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
1771 | pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(this), depositFee.div(4));
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(DLPHaddr,\ depositFee.div(4).div(4).mul(3));
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
1774
     user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1775
```

### LOW

Read of persistent state following external call.

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

SWC-107

Source file

masterChef.sol Locations

```
1773 | pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
1774
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
      }else{
1776
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount);
```

Write to persistent state following external call.

SWC-107

The contract account state is accessed after an external call. To prevent reentrancy issues, consider accessing the state only before the call, especially if the callee is untrusted. Alternatively, a reentrancy lock can be used to prevent untrusted callees from re-entering the contract in an intermediate state.

Source file masterChef.s

```
masterChef.sol
Locations
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
returns (uint256)

1142 {

1143 require(blockNumber < block number, "DLPH::getPriorVotes: not yet determined");

1144

1145 uint32 nCheckpoints = numCheckpoints[account];
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
internal

i
```

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file

```
masterChef.sol
```

```
returns (uint256)

{

require(blockNumber < block number, "DLPH::getPriorVotes: not yet determined");

uint32 nCheckpoints = numCheckpoints[account];
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
internal

internal

{

uint32 blockNumber = safe32(block number, "DLPH::_writeCheckpoint: block number exceeds 32 bits");

if (nCheckpoints > 0 88 checkpoints[delegatee][nCheckpoints - 1].fromBlock == blockNumber) {
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
massUpdatePools();

1638  }

1639  uint256 lastRewardBlock = block number > startBlock ? block.number : startBlock;

1640  totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);

1641  poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
```

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
massUpdatePools();
1638
}
1639    uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock ? block number : startBlock;
1640    totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
1641    poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
DLPHPerBlock = 25*10**16;

1697

1698

if (block number > pool.lastRewardBlock & lpSupply != 0) {

1699

uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block.number);

1700

uint256 DLPHReward = multiplier.mul(DLPHPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
if (block.number > pool.lastRewardBlock & lpSupply != 0) {

uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block.number);

uint256 DLPHReward = multiplier.mul(DLPHPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);

accDLPHPerShare = accDLPHPerShare.add(DLPHReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
```

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {

PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];

if (block number <= pool.lastRewardBlock) {

return;

1724 }
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

```
1725    uint256    lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
1726    if (lpSupply == 0) {
1727        pool.lastRewardBlock = block number;
1728    return;
1729    }
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

Source file masterChef.sol

Locations

```
DLPHPerBlock = 25*10**16;

1737

1738

uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block number);

uint256 DLPHReward = multiplier.mul(DLPHPerBlock).mul(pool.allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
```

### LOW

Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.

SWC-120

The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

```
| 1744 | }
| 1745 | pool.accDLPHPerShare = pool.accDLPHPerShare.add(DLPHReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
| 1746 | pool.lastRewardBlock = block number;
| 1747 | }
```

## LOW Requirement violation.

A requirement was violated in a nested call and the call was reverted as a result. Make sure valid inputs are provided to the nested call (for instance, via passed arguments).

SWC-123

Source file masterChef.sol

```
UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][_user];

uint256 accDLPHPerShare = pool.accDLPHPerShare;

uint256 lpSupply = pool lpToken balanceOf/address this |

if(dayTimestamp < now 86 now < firstWeekTimestamp)
```

Source file masterChef.sol

```
Locations
      1526
             // Have fun reading it. Hopefully it's bug-free. God bless.
      1527
             contract MasterChef is Ownable {
             using SafeMath for uint256;
      1529
             using SafeBEP20 for IBEP20;
       1530
      1531
             // Info of each user.
             struct UserInfo {
      1533
             uint256 amount; // How many LP tokens the user has provi
       1534
              uint256 rewardDebt; // Reward debt. See explanation below.
       1535
       1536
              // We do some fancy math here. Basically, any point in time, the amount of DLPHs
       1537
              // entitled to a user but is pending to be distributed is:
      1538
       1539
              // pending reward = (user.amount * pool.accDLPHPerShare) - user.rewardDebt
      1540
       1541
              // Whenever a user deposits or withdraws LP tokens to a pool. Here's what happens:
       1542

    The pool's 'accDLPHPerShare' (and 'lastRewardBlock') gets updated.
    User receives the pending reward sent to his/her address.

       1543
       1544
              // 3. User's 'amount' gets updated.
// 4. User's 'rewardDebt' gets updated.
       1545
       1546
       1547
       1548
              // Info of each pool.
      1549
       1550
              IBEP20 lpToken; // Address of LP token contract.
       1551
             uint256 allocPoint: // How many allocation points assigned to this pool. DLPHs to distribute per block, uint256 lastRewardBlock; // Last block number that DLPHs distribution occurs.
       1552
       1553
             uint256 accDLPHPerShare, // Accumulated DLPHs per share, times 1e12. See below.
       1554
              uint16 depositFeeBP; // Deposit fee in basis points
       1555
      1556
              // The Dolphin Token
      1558
             DLPHToken public DLPH;
      1559
              // The FOAM TOKEN!
       1560
             FoamBar public foam;
       1561
              address public devaddr;
      1563
       1564
              address public treasuryaddr;
       1565
              // Dolphin Tokens created per block.
       1566
       1567
              // Bonus muliplier for early DLPH makers.
       1568
              uint256 public BONUS_MULTIPLIER;
       1569
       1570
```

```
1571
       uint256 public dayTimestamp;
       uint256 public firstWeekTimestamp;
1573
      uint256 public secondWeekTimestamp;
1574
      uint256 public thirdWeekTimestamp;
1576
       // Info of each pool
1577
      PoolInfo[] public poolInfo;
       // Info of each user that stakes LP tokens.
1578
      mapping (uint256 => mapping (address => UserInfo)) public userInfo.
1579
1580
          Total allocation points. Must be the sum of all allocation points in all pools.
      uint256 public totalAllocPoint = 0;
1581
1582
      // The block number when DLPH mining starts.
1583
      uint256 public startBlock;
1584
      event Deposit(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid, uint256 amount),
event Withdraw(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid, uint256 amount),
1585
1586
      event EmergencyWithdraw(address indexed user, uint256 indexed pid, uint256 amount);
1587
1588
      DLPHToken _DLPH,
1590
1591
      FoamBar _foam,
1592
      address _devaddr,
      address <u>treasuryaddr</u>,
1593
1594
      uint256 _DLPHPerBlock,
1595
      uint256 _startBlock,
      uint256 _multiplier
1596
1597
1598
      DLPH = _DLPH;
1599
      foam = _foam;
1600
      devaddr = _devaddr;
1601
      treasuryaddr = _treasuryaddr;
      DLPHPerBlock = _DLPHPerBlock;
1602
      startBlock = _startBlock;
1603
1604
      BONUS_MULTIPLIER = _multiplier;
1606
      dayTimestamp = now + 1 days
1607
      firstWeekTimestamp = now + 1 weeks;
1608
      secondWeekTimestamp = now + 2 weeks;
1609
      thirdWeekTimestamp = now + 3 weeks;
1610
      // staking pool
poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
1611
1613
      lpToken: _DLPH,
1614
      allocPoint: 1000,
      lastRewardBlock startBlock
1615
1616
      accDLPHPerShare: 0,
1617
      depositFeeBP: 0
1618
1619
      totalAllocPoint = 1000;
1620
1622
1623
1624
      function updateMultiplier(uint256 multiplierNumber) public onlyOwner {
1625
      BONUS_MULTIPLIER = multiplierNumber;
1626
1627
1628
      function poolLength() external view returns (uint256) {
      return poolInfo.length;
1630
1631
      ^{\prime\prime} Add a new lp to the pool. Can only be called by the owner.
1632
1633
      // XXX DO NOT add the same LP token more than once. Rewards will be messed up if you do.
```

```
1634
       function_add(uint256 _allocPoint, IBEP20 _lpToken, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate) public onlyOwner {
1635
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "add: invalid deposit fee basis points");
1636
      if (_withUpdate) {
1637
1639
      uint256 lastRewardBlock = block.number > startBlock ? block.number : startBlock;
1640
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.add(_allocPoint);
1641
      poolInfo.push(PoolInfo({
1642
1643
      allocPoint: _allocPoint,
1644
      lastRewardBlock: lastRewardBlock.
1645
      accDLPHPerShare: 0,
1646
      depositFeeBP: _depositFeeBP
1647
1649
1650
1651
      // Update the given pool's DLPH allocation point. Can only be called by the owner.
1652
      function_set(uint256 _pid, uint256 _allocPoint, uint16 _depositFeeBP, bool _withUpdate    public onlyOwner {
1653
      require(_depositFeeBP <= 10000, "set: invalid deposit fee basis points");</pre>
1654
      if (_withUpdate) {
1655
1656
1657
      uint256 prevAllocPoint = poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint;
1658
      poolInfo[_pid].allocPoint = _allocPoint;
1659
      poolInfo[_pid].depositFeeBP = _depositFeeBP;
1660
      if (prevAllocPoint != _allocPoint)
1661
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint.sub(prevAllocPoint).add(_allocPoint);
1662
1663
1664
1665
      function updateStakingPool() internal {
1667
      uint256 length = poolInfo.length;
1668
      uint256 points = 0;
      for (uint256 pid = 1; pid < length; ++pid) {
1669
      points = points add(poolInfo[pid].allocPoint);
1670
1671
1672
      if (points != 0) {
1673
      points = points.div(3);
      totalAllocPoint = totalAllocPoint_sub(poolInfo[0]_allocPoint).add(points);
1674
      poolInfo[0].allocPoint = points;
1677
1678
1679
      // Return reward multiplier over the given _from to _to block.
1680
      function getMultiplier(uint256 _from, uint256 _to) public view returns (uint256) {
      return _to.sub(_from).mul(BONUS_MULTIPLIER);
1681
1682
1683
      // View function to see pending DLPHs on frontend.

function pendingDLPH(uint256 _pid, address _user) external returns (uint256) [
1684
1685
1686
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1687
     UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][_user];
1688
      uint256 accDLPHPerShare = pool accDLPHPerShare;
      uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
1690
1691
      if(dayTimestamp < now 88 now < firstWeekTimestamp)</pre>
1692
1693
      else if(firstWeekTimestamp < now 88 now < secondWeekTimestamp)
1694
     DLPHPerBlock = 5*10**17;
1695
     else if(now > secondWeekTimestamp)
1696
     DLPHPerBlock = 25*10**16;
```

```
1697
1698
      if (block number > pool lastRewardBlock 88 lpSupply != 0) {
1699
      uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool lastRewardBlock, block number);
1700
      uint256 DLPHReward = multiplier.mul(DLPHPerBlock).mul(pool allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
1701
      accDLPHPerShare = accDLPHPerShare.add(DLPHReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
1702
1703
      return user.amount.mul(accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1704
1705
1706
      function getPerBlock() public view returns (uint256) {
1707
      return DLPHPerBlock;
1708
1709
1710
       // Update reward variables for all pools. Be careful of gas spending!
       function massUpdatePools() public {
      uint256 length = poolInfo.length;
      for (uint256 pid = 0; pid < length; ++pid) {</pre>
1714
             Pool(pid);
1715
1718
1719
       // Update reward variables of the given pool to be up-to-date.
1720
      function updatePool(uint256 _pid) public {
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
      if (block number <= pool lastRewardBlock) {</pre>
1723
1724
1725
      uint256 lpSupply = pool.lpToken.balanceOf(address(this));
1726
      if (lpSupply == 0) {
1727
      pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
1728
1729
1730
1731
      if(dayTimestamp < now 88 now < firstWeekTimestamp)</pre>
1732
      DLPHPerBlock = 1*10**18;
1733
      else if(firstWeekTimestamp < now 88 now < secondWeekTimestamp)</pre>
      DLPHPerBlock = 5*10**17;
1735
      else if(now > secondWeekTimestamp)
1736
      DLPHPerBlock = 25*10**16;
1737
      uint256 multiplier = getMultiplier(pool.lastRewardBlock, block number);
1738
1739
      uint256 DLPHReward = multiplier.mul(DLPHPerBlock).mul(pool allocPoint).div(totalAllocPoint);
1740
1741
      if (DLPHReward > 0) {
1742
      DLPH.mint(devaddr, DLPHReward.div(10));
1743
      DLPH.mint(address(foam), DLPHReward);
1744
1745
      pool accDLPHPerShare = pool accDLPHPerShare add(DLPHReward.mul(1e12).div(lpSupply));
1746
      pool.lastRewardBlock = block.number;
1747
1748
1749
      // Deposit LP tokens to MasterChef for DLPH allocation.
1750
      function deposit(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
1752
      require (_pid != 0, 'deposit DLPH by staking');
1753
1754
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1755
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1756
      address DLPHaddr = address(DLPH);
1757
1758
      updatePool(_pid);
      if (user.amount > 0) {
```

```
1760
       uint256 pending = user amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1761
       if(pending > 0) {
1762
       safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1763
1764
1765
      if (_amount > 0) {
1766
      pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender), address(this), _amount);
      if(pool.depositFeeBP > 0){
1768
       uint256 depositFee = _amount.mul(pool.depositFeeBP).div(10000);
1769
      pool lpToken safeTransfer(treasuryaddr, depositFee.div(2));
1770
      1773
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(devaddr, depositFee.div(4).div(4));
1774
1775
      user.amount = user.amount.add(_amount).sub(depositFee);
1777
      user amount = user amount add(_amount);
1778
1779
1780
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1781
      emit Deposit(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1782
1784
       // Withdraw LP tokens from MasterChef.
1785
      function withdraw(uint256 _pid, uint256 _amount) public {
1786
1787
      require (_pid != 0, 'withdraw DLPH by unstaking');
1788
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1789
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg sender];
1790
      require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1791
1792
         atePool(_pid);
       uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1794
      if(pending > 0) {
1795
       safeDLPHTransfer(msg_sender, pending);
1796
1797
      if(_amount > 0) {
1798
      user.amount = user.amount.sub(_amount);
1799
      pool.lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg_sender), _amount);
1800
1801
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
      emit Withdraw(msg.sender, _pid, _amount);
1803
1804
      // Stake Dolphin Tokens to MasterChef
function enterStaking(uint256 _amount) public
1805
1806
1807
      PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[0];
1808
      UserInfo storage user = userInfo[0][msg.sender];
1810
      if (user.amount > 0) {
      uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
      if(pending > 0) {
1813
      safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1814
1815
1816
      if(_amount > 0) {
1817
      {\tt pool.lpToken.safeTransferFrom(address(msg.sender),\ address(this),\ \_amount);}
1818
1819
1820
      user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1821
1822
      if (_amount > 0)
```

```
1823
       foam.mint(msg.sender, _amount);
1824
1825
       emit Deposit(msg sender, 0, _amount);
1826
1827
1828
       // Withdraw Dolphin Tokens from STAKING.

function leaveStaking(uint256 _amount) public (
1829
1830
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[0];
1831
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[0][msg.sender];
1832
       require(user.amount >= _amount, "withdraw: not good");
1833
1834
       uint256 pending = user.amount.mul(pool.accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12).sub(user.rewardDebt);
1835
       if(pending > 0) {
1836
       safeDLPHTransfer(msg.sender, pending);
1837
1838
       if(_amount > 0) {
       user amount = user amount sub(_amount);

pool lpToken safeTransfer(address(msg sender), _amount ...
1839
1840
1841
1842
       user.rewardDebt = user.amount.mul(pool accDLPHPerShare).div(1e12);
1843
1844
       foam.burn(msg.sender, _amount);
1845
       emit Withdraw(msg.sender, 0, _amount);
1846
1847
       // Withdraw without caring about rewards. EMERGENCY ONLY.
function emergencyWithdraw(uint256 _pid_ public
1848
1849
1850
       PoolInfo storage pool = poolInfo[_pid];
1851
       UserInfo storage user = userInfo[_pid][msg.sender];
1852
      pool lpToken.safeTransfer(address(msg sender), user amount/
emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg sender, _pid, user amount/
1853
1854
1855
       user.rewardDebt = 0;
1856
1857
1858
       // Safe DLPH transfer function, just in case if rounding error causes pool to not have enough DLPHs.
       function safeDLPHTransfer(address _to, uint256 _amount internal |
foam safeDLPHTransfer(_to, _amount) |

1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
       function dev(address _devaddr) public {
1865
       require(msg.sender == devaddr, "dev: wut?");
1866
      devaddr = _devaddr;
1867
1868
```

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "sqrt" in contract "SafeMath" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file

```
masterChef.sol
```

```
181 | z = y;

182 | uint256 x = y / 2 + 1;

183 | while (x < z) {

184 | z = x;

185 | x = (y / x + x) / 2;
```

### LOW

Potentially unbounded data structure passed to builtin.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "delegateBySig" in contract "DLPHToken" depends on the size of data structures that may grow unboundedly. Specifically the "1-st" argument to builtin "keccak256" may be able to grow unboundedly causing the builtin to consume more gas than the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file masterChef.s

```
masterChef.sol
Locations
```

```
1085    abi.encode(
1086    DOMAIN_TYPEHASH,
1087    keccak/256 bytes name()),
1088    getChainId(),
1089    address(this)
```

### LOW

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "getPriorVotes" in contract "DLPHToken" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file masterChef.sol

```
Locations

1160 | uint32 lower = 0;
```

```
uint32 lower = 0;
uint32 upper = nCheckpoints - 1;
uint32 upper = nCheckpoints - 1;

while (upper) lower) {
uint32 center = upper - (upper - lower) / 2; // ceil, avoiding overflow

Checkpoint memory cp = checkpoints[account][center];
```

Potentially unbounded data structure passed to builtin.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "delegateBySig" in contract "FoamBar" depends on the size of data structures that may grow unboundedly. Specifically the "1-st" argument to builtin "keccak256" may be able to grow unboundedly causing the builtin to consume more gas than the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

Source file masterChef.sol Locations

LOW

Loop over unbounded data structure.

SWC-128

Gas consumption in function "getPriorVotes" in contract "FoamBar" depends on the size of data structures or values that may grow unboundedly. If the data structure grows too large, the gas required to execute the code will exceed the block gas limit, effectively causing a denial-of-service condition. Consider that an attacker might attempt to cause this condition on purpose.

```
uint32 lower = 0;
uint32 upper = nCheckpoints - 1;
while (upper > lower) {
uint32 center = upper - (upper - lower) / 2; // ceil, avoiding overflow
Checkpoint memory cp = checkpoints[account][center];
```