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| ﻿CHAPTER 1 THE TRANSITION IN THE YEAR 2000 | ﻿**第一章 二零零零年的过渡** |
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| "It feels like something big is about to happen: graphs show us the yearly growth of populations, atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, Web addresses, and Mbytes per dollar. They all soar up to an asymptote just beyond the turn of the century: The Singularity. The end of everything we know. The beginning of something we may never understand" Danny Hillis PREMONITIONS | “感觉好像有什么大事要发生：图表向我们展示了每年增长的人口、大气中二氧化碳的浓度、网络地址，以及单位字节存储价格的年度变化。它们都在世纪之交后飙升到一个渐近点：奇点（The Singularity）——我们所知道的一切的结束，也是一切的我们所无法理解东西的开始。”丹尼•希利斯《预言》一书 |
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| The coming of the year 2000 has haunted the Western imagination for the past thousand years. Ever since the world failed to end at the turn of the first millennium after Christ, theologians, evangelists, poets, and seers have looked to the end of this decade with an expectation that it would bring something momentous. No less an authority than Isaac Newton speculated that the world would end with the year 2000. Michel de Nostradamus, whose prophecies have been read by every generation since they were first 1 Danny Hillis, "The Millennium Clock," Wired, Special Edition, Fall 1995, p.48. | 二零零零年的到来在过去的一千年里，一直困扰着西方人的想象。世界在基督之后的第一个千年之交未能结束，从那时起，神学家、福音传教士、诗人和预言家们一直在期待这十年的结束，期待它能带来一些重要的东西。比艾萨克·牛顿更权威的人推测世界将在二零零零年结束。米歇尔·德·诺斯特拉达穆斯，他的预言从一开始就被每一代人阅读。丹尼·希利斯，《千年时钟》，《连线杂志》特别版，1995年秋。 |
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| A sense of disquiet about the future has begun to color the optimism so characteristic of Western societies for the past 250 years. People everywhere are hesitant and worried. You see it in their faces. Hear it in their conversation. See it reflected in polls and registered in the ballot box. Just as an invisible, physical change of ions in the atmosphere signals that a thunderstorm is imminent even before the clouds darken and lightning strikes, so now, in the twilight of the millennium, premonitions of change are in the air. One person after another, each in his own way, senses that time is running out on a dying way of life. As the decade expires, a murderous century expires with it, and also a glorious millennium of human accomplishment. All draw to a close with the year 2000. | 对未来的不安感，已经开始给过去250年来西方社会涂上特有的乐观主义色彩。各地的人们都在犹豫不决，忧心忡忡。你可以从他们的脸上看到，也在他们的谈话中听到。看到它反映在民意调查中，并登记在投票箱里。就像云层变暗和闪电击中前，大气中离子无形的物理变化预示着雷雨即将来临。现在，在千禧年的黄昏，变化的预感也在空气中弥漫。一个接一个的人，以自己的方式，感觉到时间正在以一种死亡的方式流逝。随着这十年的结束，一个凶残的世纪将随之结束，人类成就光辉的千年也将随之完结。一切都随着贰零零零年的到来而告一段落。 |
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| We believe that the modern phase of Western civilization will end with it. This book tells why. Like many earlier works, it is an attempt to see into a glass darkly, to sketch out the vague shapes and dimensions of a future that is still to be. In that sense, we mean our work to be apocalyptic in the original meaning of the word. Apokalypsis means "unveiling" in Greek. We believe that a new stage in history-the age of the Sovereign Individual is about to be "unveiled." | 我们相信，西方文明的现代阶段将随之结束。这本书讲述了原因。像许多早期作品一样，这本书试图在黑暗中看到一个玻璃杯，勾勒出一个模糊的未来形状，描绘它的尺寸。这意味着我们的作品在这个词的原始含义上是世界末日。Apokalypsis在希腊语中是“揭幕”的意思。我们相信，历史的一个新阶段 —— 主权个体的时代即将揭开帷幕。 |
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| "Violence shall no more be heard in thy land, wasting nor destruction within thy borders." ISAIAH | “愿你的土地上从此没有暴力的声音，愿你的国家不再荒芜，不再毁灭。”《以赛亚书》 |
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| THE FOURTH STAGE OF HUMAN SOCIETY | **人类社会的第四阶段** |
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| The theme of this book is the new revolution of power which is liberating individuals at the expense of the twentiethcentury nationstate. Innovations that alter the logic of violence in unprecedented ways are transforming the boundaries within which the future must lie. If our deductions are correct, you stand at the threshold of the most sweeping revolution in history. Faster than all but a few now imagine, microprocessing will subvert and destroy the nationstate, creating new forms of social organization in the process. This will be far from an easy transformation. | 本书的主题是新的权力革命，这场革命以20世纪民族国家的消失为代价，解放了个体。以前所未有的方式改变暴力逻辑的创新正在改变未来的边界，这条边界必然存在。如果我们的推论是正确的，你们就站在历史上一场最彻底革命的门槛上。除少数人外，微信息处理（microprocessing）的速度比现在想象的要快，它将颠覆和摧毁民族国家，在这个过程中创造出新的社会组织形式。这将远远不是一个简单的转变。 |
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| The challenge it will pose will be all the greater because it will happen with incredible speed compared with anything seen in the past. Through all of human history from its earliest beginnings until now, there have been only three basic stages of economic life. (1) hunting-and-gathering societies; (2) agricultural societies; and (3) industrial societies. Now, looming over the horizon, is something entirely new, the fourth stage of social organization: information societies. | 它所带来的挑战将更大，因为与过去的任何事情相比，它将以难以置信的速度发生。在人类历史上，从最早的开始到现在，只有三个基本的经济生活阶段。第一，狩猎和采集社会；第二，农业社会；第三，工业社会。现在，地平线上出现了全新的东西，也就是社会组织的第四阶段：信息社会。 |
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| Each of the previous stages of society has corresponded with distinctly different phases in the evolution and control of violence. As we explain in detail, information societies promise to dramatically reduce the returns to violence, in part because they transcend locality. If the new millennium, the advantage of controlling violence on a large scale will be far lower than it has been at any time since before the French Revolution. This will have profound consequences. One of these will be rising crime. Ericka Cheetham, The Final Prophecies of Nostradamus (New York: Putnam,1989), p.424. | 以前每一个社会阶段，暴力的演变和控制都明显与不同阶段相对应。正如我们详细解释的那样，信息社会将有望大幅减少暴力所带来的回报，部分原因是它们超越了地域性。如果在新的千年里，控制大规模暴力所带来的优势将远低于法国大革命之前的任何时候，这将产生深远的影响。 其中之一就是不断上升的犯罪率。Ericka Cheetham, The Final Prophecies of Nostradamus |
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| When the payoff for organizing violence at a large scale tumbles, the payoff from violence at a smaller scale is likely to jump. Violence will become more random and localized. Organized crime will grow in scope. We explain why. | 当组织大规模暴力的回报率下降时，较小规模的暴力的回报率可能会跃升。暴力将变得更加随机和地方化。有组织犯罪的范围将扩大。我们解释一下原因。 |
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| Another logical implication of falling returns to violence is the eclipse of politics. There is much evidence that adherence to the civic myths of the twentiethcentury nationstate is rapidly eroding. The death of Communism is merely the most striking example. As we explore in detail, the collapse of morality and growing corruption among leaders of Western governments is not a random development. It is evidence that the potential of the nationstate is exhausted. Even many of its leaders no longer believe the platitudes they mouth. Nor are they believed by others. | 暴力回报率下降的另一个逻辑含义是政治的消亡。有很多证据表明，对二十世纪民族国家公民神话的坚守，正在迅速削弱，共产主义的死亡只是最突出的例子。正如我们详细探讨的那样，道德的崩溃和西方政府领导人的日益腐败并非偶然发生，它证明民族国家的潜力已经耗尽。甚至许多领导人都不再相信他们口中的陈词滥调，其他人也不相信他们。 |
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| History Repeats Itself | **历史重演** |
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| This is a situation with striking parallels in the past. Whenever technological change has divorced the old forms from the new moving forces of the economy, moral standards shift, and people begin to treat those in command of the old institutions with growing disdain. This widespread revulsion often comes into evidence well before people develop a new coherent ideology of change. So it was in the late fifteenth century, when the medieval Church was the predominant institution of feudalism. | 这种情况在过去有着惊人的相似之处。每当技术变革使旧的形式脱离新的经济运行力量时，道德标准就会发生变化，人们开始越来越不屑于对待那些指挥旧体制的人。这种普遍的反感往往在人们形成一种全新的、连贯的变革意识形态之前就已经显现出来。十五世纪末就是这样，当时中世纪的教会是封建主义的主要机构。 |
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| Notwithstanding popular belief in "the sacredness of the sacerdotal office," both the higher and lower ranks of clergy were held in the utmost contempt-not unlike the popular attitude toward politicians and bureaucrats today. | 尽管人们相信 “圣职的神圣性”，但高级和低级的神职人员都受到了极大的蔑视 —— 这与今天人们对政治家和官僚的态度并无不同。 |
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| We believe that much can be learned by analogy between the situation at the end of the fifteenth century, when life had become thoroughly saturated by organized religion, and the situation today, when the world has become saturated with politics. | 我们相信，通过对十五世纪末的情况和今天的情况进行类比，可以学到很多东西，当时的生活被有组织的宗教彻底浸泡，而今天的世界也同样沉浸在无所不在的政治中。 |
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| The costs of supporting institutionalized religion at the end of the fifteenth century had reached a historic extreme, much as the costs of supporting government have reached a senile extreme today. | 15世纪末，支持制度化宗教的成本已经达到了一个历史性的极端，就像今天支持政府的成本同样达到了一个衰老的极端。 |
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| We know what happened to organized religion in the wake of the Gunpowder Revolution. Technological developments created strong incentives to downsize religious institutions and lower their costs. A similar technological revolution is destined to downsize radically the nationstate early in the new millennium. | 我们知道，火药革命之后，有组织的宗教发生了什么。技术的发展创造了强大的激励机制来缩小宗教机构的规模，并降低它的成本。类似的技术革命注定要在新千年的初期，从根本上缩小民族国家的规模。 |
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| The Information Revolution | **信息革命** |
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| As the breakdown of large systems accelerates, systematic compulsion will recede as a factor shaping economic life and the distribution of income. Efficiency will rapidly become more important than the dictates of power in the organization of social institutions. An entirely new realm of economic activity that is not hostage to physical violence will emerge in cyberspace. The most obvious benefits will flow to the "cognitive elite," who will increasingly operate outside political boundaries. They are already equally home in Frankfurt, London, New York, Buenos Aires, Los Angeles, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. Incomes will become more unequal within jurisdictions and more equal between them. | 随着大型系统崩溃的速度加快，作为影响经济生活和收入分配的因素，系统性的强制力会逐渐消退。在社会机构的组织中，效率将迅速变得比权力的支配更重要。一个不受身体暴力制约的全新的经济活动领域将在网络空间出现。最明显的好处将流向“认知精英”，他们将越来越多地在政治边界之外运作。他们在法兰克福、伦敦、纽约、布宜诺斯艾利斯、洛杉矶、东京和香港已经有同样的家。辖区内的收入将变得更加不平等，而辖区间的收入则更加平等。 |
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| The Sovereign Individual explores the social and financial consequences of this revolutionary change. Our desire is to help you to take advantage of the opportunities of the new age and avoid being destroyed by its impact. If only half of what we expect to see happens, you face change of a magnitude with few precedents in history. | 《主权个体》探讨了这一革命性变化的社会和财务后果。我们的愿望是帮助你利用新时代的机会，避免被其影响所摧毁。如果我们期望看到的情况只发生一半，你将面临历史上少有的巨大变化。 |
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| The transformation of the year 2000 will not only revolutionize the character of the world economy, it will do so more rapidly than any previous phase change. Unlike the Agricultural Revolution, the Information Revolution will not take millennia to do its work. Unlike the Industrial Revolution. its impact will not be spread over centuries. | 贰零零零年的变革不仅将彻底改变世界经济的特征，而且将比以前的任何阶段性变化更加迅速。与农业革命不同，信息革命将不需要几千年的时间来完成其工作。与工业革命不同，它的影响不需要好几个世纪才能扩散开。 |
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| The Information Revolution will happen within a lifetime. | 信息革命将在我们的有生之年内发生。 |
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| What is more, it will happen almost everywhere at once. Technical and economic innovations will no longer be confined to small portions of the globe. The transformation will be all but universal. And it will involve a break with the past so profound that it will almost bring to life the magical domain of the gods as imagined by the early agricultural peoples like the ancient Greeks. To a greater degree than most would now be willing to concede, it will prove difficult or impossible to preserve many contemporary institutions in the new millennium. When information societies take shape they will be as different from industrial societies as the Greece of Aeschylus was from the world of the cave dwellers. | 更重要的是，它几乎会同时在各地发生。技术和经济创新将不再局限于全球的一小部分地区。这种转变几乎是普遍的。它将涉及到与过去的深刻决裂，以至于它几乎将使古希腊等早期农业民族所想象的，那些神奇的神的世界变为现实。在一个比大多数人现在愿意承认的更大的程度上，在新的千年里，将证明很难或不可能保留许多当代机构。当信息社会形成时，它们将与工业社会有很大的不同，就像埃斯库罗斯的希腊与山洞居民的世界一样。（中译书注：埃斯库罗斯是古希腊悲剧诗人，伟大的悲剧作家，被称为“悲剧之父”。代表作有《复仇女神》、《阿伽门农》、《被缚的普罗米修斯》。下一节名叫“解绑的普罗米修斯”，也来源于埃斯库罗斯写的这部悲剧的名字。） |
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| PROMETHEUS UNBOUND: THE RISE OF THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL | 解绑的普罗米修斯：主权个体的崛起 |
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| The coming transformation is both good news and bad. The good news is that the Information Revolution will liberate individuals as never before. For the first time, those who can educate themselves will be almost entirely free to invent their own work and realize the full benefits of their own productivity. Genius will be unleashed, freed from both the oppression of government and the drags of racial and ethnic prejudice. In the Information Society, no one who is truly able will be detained by the ill-formed opinions of others. It will not matter what most of the people on earth might think of your race, your looks, your age, your sexual proclivities, or the way you wear your hair. | 即将到来的转型既有好消息也有坏消息。好消息是，信息革命将使个人得到前所未有的解放。那些能够进行自我教育的人，将几乎完全自由地发明他们自己的工作，获得他们自己生产力的全部利益，这是有史以来的第一次。天才将被释放出来，摆脱政府的压迫、种族的偏见、以及民族的拖累。在信息社会中，没有一个真正有能力的人会受制于其他人的错误观点。地球上绝大多数人对你的种族、长相、年龄、发型或者性取向的那些看法，将不再重要。 |
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| In the cybereconomy, they will never see you. The ugly, the fat, the old, the disabled will vie with the young and beautiful on equal terms in utterly color-blind anonymity on the new frontiers of cyberspace. | 在网络经济中，他们将永远看不到你。在网络空间的新领域，那些丑陋、肥胖、衰老、残疾的人，将会与那些年轻美丽的人进行匿名的、平等的、完全没有肤色差别的竞争。 |
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| Ideas Become Wealth | 思想成为财富 |
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| Merit, wherever it arises, will be rewarded as never before. In an environment where the greatest source of wealth will be the ideas you have in your head rather than physical capital alone, anyone who thinks clearly will potentially be rich. The Information Age will be the age of upward mobility. It will afford far more equal opportunity for the billions of humans in parts of the world that never shared fully in the 4 prosperity of industrial society. The brightest, most successful and ambitious of these will emerge as truly Sovereign Individuals. | 功绩，无论在何处出现，都将得到前所未有的奖励。在这样一个环境中，财富的最大来源将是你头脑中的想法，而不仅仅是物质资本，任何思维清晰的人都有可能成为富人。信息时代将是向上流动的时代。它将为世界上那些从未充分分享工业社会繁荣的数十亿人提供更多的平等机会。其中那些最聪明、最成功、最有抱负的人将成为真正拥有主权的个体。 |
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| At the highest plateau of productivity, these Sovereign Individuals will compete and interact on terms that echo the relations among the gods in Greek myth. The elusive Mount Olympus of the next millennium will be in cyberspace-a realm without physical existence that will nonetheless develop what promises to be the world's largest economy by the second decade of the new millennium. By 2025, the cybereconomy will have many millions of participants. Some of them will be as rich as Bill Gates, worth over $10 billion each. The cyberpoor may be those with an income of less than $200,000 a year. There will be no cyberwelfare. No cybertaxes and no cybergovernment. The cybereconomy, rather than China, could well be the greatest economic phenomenon of the next thirty years. | 在最高的生产力的水平上，这些主权个体将会像希腊神话中众神之间的关系那样，进行竞争和互动。下一个千年难以找到的奥林匹斯山将在网络空间，这虽然是一个没有实体存在的领域，但仍有望在新千年的第二个十年成为世界上最大的经济体。到2025年，网络经济将有数百万的参与者。其中一些人将像比尔盖茨一样富有，他们每个人的身价都将超过100亿美元。网络穷人可能是那些年收入低于20万美元的人。那里将不会有网络福利，没有网络税，也没有网络政府。相比于中国经济，网络经济更可能成为未来30年最伟大的经济现象。（中译书注：你所看到的、听到的这版中文翻译来自《主权个体》原著面世的25年之后，中国经济与网络经济两者究竟谁是更伟大的经济现象，相信你会有你自己的答案。） |
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| The good news is that politicians will no more be able to dominate, suppress, and regulate the greater part of commerce in this new realm than the legislators of the ancient Greek city-states could have trimmed the beard of Zeus. The liberation of a large part of the global economy from political control will oblige all remaining forms of government to operate on more nearly market terms. They will ultimately have little choice but to treat populations in territories they serve more like customers, and less in the way that organized criminals treat the victims of a shakedown racket. | 好消息是，政治家们将无法在这个新领域中支配、压制和管理大部分商业贸易，就像古希腊城邦的立法者无法修剪宙斯的胡须一样。全球经济的很大一部分从政治控制中解放出来，将迫使所有剩余的政府形式在更接近市场的条件下运作。他们最终将别无选择，只能像对待客户一样对待他们所服务的地区的人民，而不是像有组织的罪犯那样，对待敲诈勒索的受害者。 |
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| Beyond Politics | **超越政治** |
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| What mythology described as the province of the gods will become a viable option for the individual-a life outside the reach of kings and councils. First in scores, then in hundreds, and ultimately in the millions, individuals will escape the shackles of politics. As they do, they will transform the character of governments, shrinking the realm of compulsion and widening the scope of private control over resources. | 神话中描述的众神的世界会成为个体的一个可能选择，也就是生活在国王或议会范围之外。首先是几十人，然后是几百人，最后是几百万人，个人将摆脱政治的桎梏。当他们这样做时，他们将改变政府的性质，缩小强制的领域，扩大私人控制资源的范围。 |
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| The emergence of the sovereign individual will demonstrate yet again the strange prophetic power of myth. Conceiving little of the laws of nature, the early agricultural peoples imagined that "powers we should call supernatural" were widely distributed. | 主权个体的出现将再次证明神话的奇怪预言能力。早期的农业人口对自然法则知之甚少，他们想象“我们应该称之为超自然的力量”是广泛分布的。 |
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| These powers were sometimes employed by men, sometimes by "incarnate human gods" who looked like men and interacted with them in what Sir James George Frazer described in The Golden Bough as "a great democracy" | 这些力量有时由人使用，有时由“化身成人的神”使用，他们看起来像人，并在詹姆斯·乔治·弗雷泽爵士在《金枝》中描述的 "伟大的民主 "中与他们互动 4 |
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| When the ancients imagined the children of Zeus living among them they were inspired by a deep belief in magic. They shared with other primitive agricultural peoples an awe of nature, and a superstitious conviction that nature's works were set in motion by individual volition, by magic. In that sense, there was nothing self-consciously prophetic about their view of nature and their gods. They were far from anticipating microtechnology. They could not have imagined its impact in altering the marginal productivity of individuals thousands of years later. They certainly could not have foreseen how it would shift the balance between power and efficiency and thus revolutionize the way that assets are created and protected. Yet what they imagined as they spun their myths has a strange resonance with the world you are likely to see. | 当古人想象宙斯的孩子生活在他们中间时，他们受到了对自己深刻信仰魔法的启发。他们与其他原始农业民族一样敬畏自然，并迷信自然界的工作是由个人的意志和魔法启动的。从这个意义上说，他们对自然和神灵的看法没有任何自我察觉的预言性。他们远远没有预见到微观技术。他们不可能想象到它在几千年后改变个体边际生产力的影响。他们当然不可能预见到它将如何打破权力和效率之间的平衡，从而彻底改变创造和保护资产的方式。然而，他们在编织神话时所想象的，与你可能看到的世界有着奇怪的共鸣。 |
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| Alt.Abracadabra | 咒语：Abracadabra （中译书注：这句咒语类似中国古代神话济公中的那句：哦妈咪妈咪轰） |
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| The "abracadabra" of the magic invocation, for example, bears a curious similarity to the password employed to access a computer. In some respects, high-speed computation has already made it possible to mimic the magic of the genie. Early generations of "digital servants" already obey the commands of those who control the computers in which they are sealed much as genies were sealed in magic lamps. The virtual reality of information technology will widen the realm of human wishes to make almost anything that can be imagined seem real. Telepresence will give living individuals the same capacity to span distance at supernatural speed and monitor events from afar that the Greeks supposed was enjoyed by Hermes and Apollo. The Sovereign Individuals of the Information Age, like the gods of ancient and primitive myths, will in due course enjoy a kind of "diplomatic immunity" from most of the political woes that have beset mortal human beings in most times and places. | Abracadabra这句咒语所召唤的魔法，和访问计算机的密码有着奇怪的相似之处。在某些方面，高速计算已经使模仿精灵的魔法成为可能。早期的“数字仆人”已经服从那些控制他们被封在其中的计算机的命令，就像精灵被封在魔法灯里一样。信息技术的虚拟现实将扩大人类愿望的范围，使几乎任何可以想象的东西都显得真实。遥感将赋予活着的人同样的能力，以超自然的速度跨越距离，从远处监控事件，就像希腊人认为赫尔墨斯和阿波罗享有的那样。信息时代的主权个体，就像古代和原始神话中的神一样，将在适当的时候享有一种 "外交豁免权"，不受大多数时间和地点的凡人所遭遇的政治困境的影响。（中译书注：赫尔墨斯是古希腊神话中的商业之神，也是众神的使者。阿波罗是古希腊神话中的光明之神，消灾解难之神，同时也是人类文明、迁徙和航海者的保护神。他们两位都属于奥林匹斯十二主神。） |
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| The new Sovereign Individual will operate like the gods of myth in the same physical environment as the ordinary, subject citizen, but in a separate realm politically. | 新的主权个体将像神话中的神灵一样，在与普通的臣民相同的物理环境中运作，但在政治上却有一片独立的领域。 |
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| Commanding vastly greater resources and beyond the reach of many forms of compulsion, the Sovereign Individual will redesign governments and reconfigure economies in the new millennium. The full implications of this change are all but unimaginable. | 主权个体掌握着巨大的资源，并且超越了许多形式的强制力，他们将在新的千年里重新设计政府，并且重构经济。这一变化的全部影响几乎不可想象。 |
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| Genius and Nemesis | 天才与克星 |
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| For anyone who loves human aspiration and success, the Information Age will provide a bounty. That is surely the best news in many generations. But it is bad news as well, The new organization of society implied by the triumph of individual autonomy and the true equalization of opportunity based upon merit will lead to very great rewards for merit and great individual autonomy. This will leave individuals far more responsible for themselves than they have been accustomed to being during the industrial period. It will also reduce the unearned advantage in living standards that has been enjoyed by residents of advanced industrial societies throughout the twentieth century. As we write, the top 15 percent of the world's population have an average per-capita income of $21,000 annually. The remaining 85 percent of the world have an average income of just $1,000. That huge, hoarded advantage from the past is bound to dissipate under the new conditions of the Information Age. | 对于任何热爱人类愿望和成功的人来说，信息时代将提供丰厚的回报。这肯定是许多世代以来最好的消息。但是，这也是一个坏消息。个人自主权的胜利和基于功绩的真正机会均等化所暗示的新的社会组织将导致对功绩和个人自主权的极大奖励。这将使个人对自己的责任比他们在工业时期所习惯的要大得多。它还将减少20世纪发达工业社会的居民所享有的不劳而获的优势。在我们写这篇文章的时候，世界上最高的15%的人口每年的平均人均收入为21,000美元。世界上其余85%的人的平均收入只有1,000美元。过去那种巨大的、囤积的优势在信息时代的新条件下必然会消散。 |
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| As it does, the capacity of nationstates to redistribute income on a large scale will collapse. Information technology facilitates dramatically increased competition between jurisdictions. When technology is mobile, and transactions occur in cyberspace, as they increasingly will do, governments will no longer be able to charge more for their services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. Anyone with a portable computer and a satellite link will be able to conduct almost any information business 6 anywhere, and that includes almost the whole of the world's multitrillion- dollar financial transactions. | 在这种情况下，民族国家大规模重新分配收入的能力将崩溃。信息技术促进了行政辖区之间竞争的急剧增加。当技术是可移动的，并且交易发生在网络空间，政府将不再能够为他们的服务收取超过他们对支付这些服务的人的价值，正如越来越多发生着的那样。任何拥有便携式电脑和卫星通信线路的人将能够在任何地方执行几乎任何有关信息的业务，这包括全世界价值几十亿美元的金融交易。 |
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| This means that you will no longer be obliged to live in a high-tax jurisdiction in order to earn high income. In the future, when most wealth can be earned anywhere, and even spent anywhere, governments that attempt to charge too much as the price of domicile will merely drive away their best customers. If our reasoning is correct, and we believe it is, the nationstate as we know it will not survive in anything like its present form. | 这意味着，你将不再有义务为了赚取高收入而居住在一个高税收的行政区域。在未来，当大多数财富可以在任何地方赚取，甚至可以在任何地方消费时，那些试图收取太多作为住所价格的政府，只会赶走他们最好的客户。如果我们的推理正确无误，而且我们相信它是正确的，那么我们所知道的民族国家将不会以任何类似于其目前的形式存在。 |
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| THE END OF NATIONS | **国家的末日** |
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| Changes that diminish the power of predominant institutions are both unsettling and dangerous. Just as monarchs, lords, popes, and potentates fought ruthlessly to preserve their accustomed privileges in the early stages of the modern period, so today's governments will employ violence, often of a covert and arbitrary kind, in the attempt to hold back the clock. Weakened by the challenge from technology, the state will treat increasingly autonomous individuals, its former citizens, with the same range of ruthlessness and diplomacy it has heretofore displayed in its dealing with other governments. Increasingly harsh techniques of exaction will be a logical corollary of the emergence of a new type of bargaining between governments and individuals. | 削弱主导机构权力的变化既令人不安，也很危险。正如君主、领主、教皇和权贵们在现代早期阶段为维护他们习惯的特权而进行的无情斗争一样，今天的政府也会使用暴力，往往是隐蔽和任意的暴力，以试图阻止时间的流逝。由于受到技术挑战的削弱，国家将以它在与其他政府打交道时表现出的同样的无情和外交手段来对待日益自主的个体，也就是国家以前的公民。越来越严厉的征税技术将是政府和个人之间出现的一种新的讨价还价方式的必然结果。 |
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| Technology will make individuals more nearly sovereign than ever before. And they will be treated that way. Sometimes violently, as enemies, sometimes as equal parties in negotiation, sometimes as allies. But however ruthlessly governments behave, particularly in the transition period, wedding the IRS with the CIA will avail them little. | 技术将使个人比以往任何时候都更接近主权，而且他们将会被像拥有主权那样对待。有时这些个体被当做敌人，以暴力对待；有时，这些个体被当作谈判代表，被平等地对待，也有时被当做盟友。但是，无论政府的行为多么无情，特别是在过渡时期，国家税务局与中央情报局一旦联手，对那些个体来说，并没有什么好处。 |
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| They will be increasingly required by the press of necessity to bargain with autonomous individuals whose resources will no longer be so easily controlled. | 迫于形势，他们将越来越多地被要求与自主的个人讨价还价，而这些人的资源将不再那么容易控制。 |
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| The changes implied by the Information Revolution will not only create a fiscal crisis for governments, they will tend to disintegrate all large structures. Fourteen empires have disappeared already in the twentieth century. The breakdown of empires is part of a process that will dissolve the nationstate itself. Government will have to adapt to the growing autonomy of the individual. Taxing capacity will plunge by 50~70 percent. This will tend to make smaller jurisdictions more successful. The challenge of setting competitive terms to attract able individuals and their capital will be more easily undertaken in enclaves than across continents. | 信息革命所隐含的变化不仅会给政府带来财政危机，而且会使所有大型结构解体。在二十世纪，已经有十四个帝国消失了。帝国的瓦解是民族国家本身解体过程的一部分。政府将不得不适应个人日益增长的自治权力。税收能力将骤降50-70%。这将倾向于使较小的行政区域更加成功。设定有竞争力的条件以吸引有能力的个体及其资本的挑战，在飞地中比在各大洲更容易进行。（中译书注：飞地，是一种特殊的人文地理现象，指虽然隶属于某一行政区域管辖、但不与本区相连的土地。如果某一行政主体拥有一块飞地，那么它无法直接经过自己的行政区域到达该地，只能飞过其他行政主体的属地，才能到达那片地盘，所以那片地盘叫“飞地”。） |
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| We believe that as the modern nationstate decomposes, latter-day barbarians will increasingly come to exercise power behind the scenes. | 我们相信，随着现代民族国家的解体，后世的野蛮人将越来越多地在幕后行使权力。 |
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| Groups like the Russian mafiya, which picks the bones of the former Soviet Union, other ethnic criminal gangs, nomenklaturas\*, drug lords, and renegade covert agencies will be laws unto themselves. | 像俄罗斯黑手党那样脱胎于苏联的团体、其他民族犯罪团伙、名流、毒枭以及秘密机构都最终将束缚他们自己。 |
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| They already are. Far more than is widely understood, the modem barbarians have already infiltrated the forms of the nationstate without greatly changing its appearances. | 他们已经是这样了。远远超过人们的广泛理解，现代的野蛮人已经渗透到民族国家的形式中，而没有极大地改变其外观。 |
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| They are microparasites feeding on a dying system. As violent and unscrupulous as a state at war, these groups employ the techniques of the state on a smaller scale. Their growing influence and power are part of the downsizing of politics. Microprocessing reduces the size that groups must attain in order to be effective in the use and control of 7 violence. As this technological revolution unfolds, predatory violence will be organized more and more outside of central control. Efforts to contain violence will also devolve in ways that depend more upon efficiency than magnitude of power. | 他们是以垂死的系统为食的微型寄生虫。与战争中的国家一样暴力和不择手段，这些团体在较小的范围内使用国家的技术。他们日益增长的影响力和权力是政治缩减的一部分。微信息处理（microprocessing）减少了团体必须达到的规模，以便有效地使用和控制暴力。随着信息技术革命的展开，掠夺性暴力将越来越多地在中央控制之外被组织起来。遏制暴力的努力也将以新的方式进行转移，这种新的方式更多地取决于效率，而不是权力的大小。 |
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| History in Reverse | **历史的倒退** |
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| The process by which the nationstate grew over the past five centuries will be put into reverse by the new logic of the Information Age. Local centers of power will reassert themselves as the state devolves into fragmented, overlapping sovereignties.5 | 民族国家在过去五个世纪中的发展过程将被信息时代的新逻辑所逆转。地方权力中心将重新确立自己的地位，因为国家将演变为零散的、重叠的主权国家。 |
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| The growing power of organized crime is merely one reflection of this tendency. | 有组织犯罪的力量不断增强，只是这种趋势的一个反映。 |
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| Multinational companies are already having to subcontract all but essential work. Some conglomerates, such as AT&T, Unisys, and ITT, have split themselves into several firms in order to function more profitably. The nationstate will devolve like an unwieldy conglomerate. | 跨国公司已经不得不将所有的工作分包出去，除了必要的工作。一些企业集团，如AT&T、Unisys和ITT，已经将自己拆分成几个公司，以便更有利地运作。民族国家将像一个笨重的企业集团一样逐渐消失。 |
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| Not only is power in the world changing, but the work of the world is changing as well. Microprocessing has created entirely new horizons of economic activity that transcend territorial boundaries. This transcendence of frontiers and territories is perhaps the most revolutionary development since Adam and Eve straggled out of paradise under the sentence of their Maker: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread. "As technology revolutionizes the tools we use, it also antiquates our laws, reshapes our morals, and alters our perceptions. This book explains how. | 不仅世界上的权力在变化，而且世界的工作也在变化。微处理创造了全新的经济活动领域，超越了领土的界限。这种对边界和领土的超越也许是自亚当和夏娃在造物主的判决下大摇大摆地离开天堂以来最具革命性的发展。"你在脸上流汗，也要吃面包。"随着技术使我们使用的工具发生革命性变化，它也使我们的法律过时，重塑我们的道德，并改变了我们的观念。这本书解释了如何。 |
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| Microprocessing and rapidly improving communications already make it possible for the individual to choose where to work. Transactions on the Internet or the World Wide Web can be encrypted and will soon be almost impossible for tax collectors to capture. Tax-free money already compounds far faster offshore than onshore funds still subject to the high tax burden imposed by the twentiethcentury nationstate. After the turn of the millennium, much of the world's commerce will migrate into the new realm of cyberspace, a region where governments will have no more dominion than they exercise over the bottom of the sea or the outer planets. In cyberspace. the threats of physical violence that have been the alpha and omega of politics since time immemorial will vanish. In cyberspace, the meek and the mighty will meet on equal terms. Cyberspace is the ultimate offshore jurisdiction. An economy with no taxes. Bermuda in the sky with diamonds. | 微处理和迅速改进的通信已经使个人选择工作地点成为可能。在互联网或万维网上的交易可以被加密，并且很快就会被征税人捕捉到，几乎不可能。免税资金在海外的复利速度已经远远超过了仍受制于20世纪民族国家所施加的高额税负的在岸资金。千禧年之后，世界上的大部分商业将迁移到网络空间的新领域，在这个区域，政府的统治权将不比他们对海底或外星球的统治权多。在网络空间中，自古以来一直是政治的首要和次要因素的身体暴力威胁将消失。在网络空间，温和的人和强大的人将在平等的条件下相遇。网络空间是最终的离岸管辖权。一个没有税收的经济体。天空中的百慕大与钻石。 |
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| When this greatest tax haven of them all is fully open for business, all funds will essentially be offshore funds at the discretion of their owner. This will have cascading consequences. The state has grown used to treating its taxpayers as a farmer treats his cows, keeping them in a field to be milked. Soon, the cows will have wings. | 当这个最大的避税天堂完全开放时，所有的资金基本上都将成为离岸资金，由其所有者决定。这将产生一连串的后果。国家已经习惯于对待其纳税人，就像农民对待他的奶牛一样，把它们放在田里挤奶。很快，奶牛就会有翅膀。 |
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| The Revenge of Nations | 国家的复仇 |
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| Like an angry farmer, the state will no doubt take desperate measures at first to tether and hobble its escaping herd. It will employ covert and even violent means to restrict access to liberating technologies. Such expedients will work only temporarily, if at all. The twentiethcentury nationstate, with all its pretensions, will starve to death as its tax revenues decline. | 像一个愤怒的农夫一样，国家无疑会在一开始采取绝望的措施来拴住和束缚其逃跑的牛群。它将采用隐蔽的甚至是暴力的手段来限制对解放技术的使用。这种权宜之计即使有效果，也只是暂时的。二十世纪的民族国家，以其所有的自诩，将随着其税收的减少而饿死。 |
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| When the state finds itself unable to meet its committed expenditure by raising tax revenues, it will resort to other, more desperate measures. Among them is printing money. Governments have grown used to enjoying a monopoly over currency that they could depreciate at will. This arbitrary inflation has been a prominent feature of the monetary policy of all twentiethcentury states. Even the best national currency of the postwar period, the German mark, lost 71 percent of its value from January 1, 1949, through the end of June 1995. In the same period, the U.S. dollar lost 84 percent of its value.6 This inflation had the same effect as a tax on all who hold the currency. As we explore later, inflation as revenue option will be largely foreclosed by the emergence of cybermoney. New technologies will allow the holders of wealth to bypass the national monopolies that have issued and regulated money in the modern period. The state will continue to control the industrial-era printing presses, but their importance for controlling the world's wealth will be transcended by mathematical algorithms that have no physical existence. In the new millennium, cybermoney controlled by private markets will supersede flat money issued by governments. Only the poor will be victims of inflation. | 当国家发现自己无法通过提高税收来满足其承诺的支出时，它将采取其他更绝望的措施。其中之一就是印钞票。政府已经习惯于享有对货币的垄断，他们可以随意贬值。这种任意的通货膨胀一直是二十世纪所有国家货币政策的一个突出特点。即使是战后最好的国家货币--德国马克，从1949年1月1日到1995年6月底，也损失了71%的价值。在同一时期，美元的价值损失了84%。6 这种通货膨胀对所有持有货币的人产生了相同的影响。正如我们在后面所探讨的，通货膨胀作为收入的选择将在很大程度上被网络货币的出现所排除。新技术将允许财富持有者绕过在现代时期发行和管理货币的国家垄断机构。国家将继续控制工业时代的印刷机，但它们对控制世界财富的重要性将被没有物理存在的数学算法所超越。在新的千年里，由私人市场控制的电子货币将取代政府发行的平面货币。只有穷人会成为通货膨胀的受害者。 |
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| Lacking their accustomed scope to tax and inflate, governments, even in traditionally civil countries, will turn nasty. As income tax becomes uncollectable, older and more arbitrary methods of exaction will resurface. The ultimate form of withholding tax--de facto or even overt hostage-taking will be introduced by governments desperate to prevent wealth from escaping beyond their reach. Unlucky individuals will find themselves singled out and held to ransom in an almost medieval fashion. Businesses that offer services that facilitate the realization of autonomy by individuals will be subject to infiltration, sabotage, and disruption. Arbitrary forfeiture of property, already commonplace in the United States, where it occurs five thousand times a week, will become even more pervasive. Governments will violate human rights, censor the free flow of information, sabotage useful technologies, and worse. For the same reasons that the late, departed Soviet Union tried in vain to suppress access to personal computers and Xerox machines, western governments will seek to suppress the cybereconomy by totalitarian means. | 由于缺乏惯常的征税和通货膨胀的范围，政府，甚至是传统的文明国家的政府，都会变得很讨厌。随着所得税变得无法征收，更古老、更随意的征收方法将重新出现。预扣税的最终形式--事实上的甚至公开的扣押，将被政府引入，以防止财富逃出他们的视野。不幸的人将发现自己被挑出来，以一种近乎中世纪的方式被勒索。提供促进个人实现自主的服务的企业将受到渗透、破坏和干扰。任意没收财产，在美国已经很普遍，每周发生五千次，将变得更加普遍。政府将侵犯人权，审查信息的自由流动，破坏有用的技术，甚至更糟。就像已故的、离开的苏联试图压制个人电脑和施乐机的使用而徒劳无功一样，西方政府将试图通过极权主义手段压制网络经济。 |
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| RETURN OF THE LUDDITES | 忽悠人的回归 |
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| Such methods may prove popular among some population segments. The good news about individual liberation and autonomy will seem to be bad news to many who are not among the cognitive elite. The greatest resentment is likely to be centered among those of middle talent in currently rich countries. They particularly may come to feel that information technology poses a threat to their way of life. The beneficiaries of organized compulsion, including millions receiving income redistributed by governments, may 9 resent the new freedom realized by Sovereign Individuals. Their upset will illustrate the truism that "where you stand is determined by where you sit." | 事实证明，这种方法在某些人群中很受欢迎。对于许多不属于认知精英的人来说，关于个人解放和自治的好消息似乎是个坏消息。最大的怨恨可能集中在目前富裕国家的中等人才身上。他们尤其会觉得信息技术对他们的生活方式构成了威胁。有组织的强迫行为的受益者，包括数百万接受政府重新分配的收入的人，可能会对主权个体实现的新自由感到不满。他们的不满将说明这样一个道理："你的立场由你的位置决定"。 |
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| It would be misleading, however, to attribute all the bad feelings that will be generated in the coming transition crisis to the bald desire to live at someone else's expense. More will be involved. The very character of human society suggests that there is bound to be a misguided moral dimension to the coming Luddite reaction. Think of it as a bald desire fitted with a moral toupee. We explore the moral and moralistic dimensions of the transition crisis. Self-interested grasping of a conscious kind has far less power to motivate actions than does self- righteous fury. While adherence to the civic myths of the twentieth century is rapidly falling away, they are not without their true believers. Everyone who came of age in the twentieth century has been inculcated in the duties and obligations of the twentiethcentury citizen. The residual moral imperatives from industrial society will stimulate at least some neo-Luddite attacks on information technologies. | 然而，如果把在即将到来的过渡危机中产生的所有坏情绪都归结为光秃秃的以别人为代价的生活欲望，这将是一种误导。将涉及更多。人类社会的特点表明，在即将到来的卢德反应中必然有一个被误导的道德层面。可以把它看作是一个装着道德假发的秃头欲望。我们探讨转型危机的道德和道义层面。有意识的自我利益的把握远不如自我正义的愤怒来激励行动的力量。虽然对二十世纪公民神话的坚持正在迅速消失，但它们并非没有忠实的信徒。每个在二十世纪成年的人都被灌输了二十世纪公民的责任和义务。工业社会残留的道德要求至少会刺激一些对信息技术的新鲁德主义攻击。 |
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| In this sense, this violence to come will be at least partially an expression of what we call "moral anachronism," the application of moral strictures drawn from one stage of economic life to the circumstances of another. Every stage of society requires its own moral rules to help individuals overcome incentive traps peculiar to the choices they face in that particular way of life. Just as a farming society could not live by the moral rules of a migratory Eskimo band, so the Information Society cannot satisfy moral imperatives that emerged to facilitate the success of a militant twentiethcentury industrial state. We explain why. | 在这个意义上，即将到来的暴力至少部分地体现了我们所说的 "道德上的不合时宜"，即把从经济生活的一个阶段得出的道德规范应用于另一个阶段的情况。每个社会阶段都需要自己的道德规则，以帮助个人克服他们在该特定生活方式中所面临的选择所特有的激励陷阱。就像一个农业社会不能按照爱斯基摩人的道德规则生活一样，信息社会也不能满足为促进二十世纪工业国家的成功而出现的道德要求。我们解释一下原因。 |
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| In the next few years, moral anachronism will be in evidence at the core countries of the West in much the way that it has been witnessed at the periphery over the past five centuries. Western colonists and military expeditions stimulated such crises when they encountered indigenous hunting-and-gathering bands, as well as peoples whose societies were still organized for farming. The introduction of new technologies into anachronistic settings caused confusion and moral crises. The success of Christian missionaries in converting millions of indigenous peoples can be laid in large measure to the local crises caused by the sudden introduction of new power arrangements from the outside. Such encounters recurred over and over, from the sixteenth century through the early decades of the twentieth century. We expect similar clashes early in the new millennium as Information Societies supplant those organized along industrial lines. | 在未来的几年里，道德上的不合时宜将在西方的核心国家出现，就像过去五个世纪在边缘国家所看到的那样。西方殖民者和军事远征在遇到原住民的狩猎和采集队伍，以及那些社会仍然为农耕组织的民族时，激发了这种危机。将新技术引入不合时宜的环境中，造成了混乱和道德危机。基督教传教士成功地改变了数以百万计的原住民，这在很大程度上可以归功于突然从外部引入新的权力安排所造成的当地危机。从十六世纪到二十世纪初的几十年间，这种遭遇一次又一次地出现。我们预计在新千年初期，随着信息社会取代那些按照工业路线组织的社会，也会发生类似的冲突。 |
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| The Nostalgia for Compulsion | 对强迫症的怀念 |
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| The rise of the Sovereign Individual will not be wholly welcomed as promising new phase of history, even among those who benefit from it most. Everyone will feel some misgivings. And many will despise innovations that undermine the territorial nationstate. It is a fact of human nature that radical change of any kind is almost always seen as a dramatic turn for the worse. Five hundred years ago, the courtiers gathered around the duke of Burgundy would have said that unfolding innovations that undermined feudalism were evil. They thought the world was rapidly spiraling downhill 10 at the very time that later historians saw an explosion of human potential in the Renaissance. Likewise, what may someday be seen as a new Renaissance from the perspective of the next millennium will look frightening to tired twentieth century eyes. | 主权个体的崛起不会被完全视为有希望的历史新阶段而受到欢迎，即使是在那些从中受益最多的人中间。每个人都会感到一些疑虑。许多人将鄙视那些破坏领土民族国家的创新。人类本性的一个事实是，任何形式的激进变化几乎都会被看作是一个戏剧性的转折。五百年前，聚集在勃艮第公爵身边的朝臣们会说，破坏封建主义的创新的发展是邪恶的。他们认为世界正在迅速走下坡路，而后来的历史学家却在文艺复兴中看到了人类潜力的爆发。同样，有一天，从下一个千年的角度来看，可能被视为新的文艺复兴的东西，在二十世纪疲惫的眼睛看来是可怕的。 |
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| There is a high probability that some who are offended by the new ways as well as many who are disadvantaged by them, will react unpleasantly. Their nostalgia for compulsion will probably turn violent. Encounters with these new "Luddites" will make the transition to radical new forms of social organization at least a measure of bad news for everyone. | 一些被新方法冒犯的人以及许多因新方法而处于不利地位的人，很可能会做出不愉快的反应。他们对强迫的怀念可能会变成暴力。遇到这些新的 "卢德分子 "将使向激进的新的社会组织形式的过渡至少对每个人来说都是一个坏消息。 |
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| Get ready to duck | 准备躲避 |
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| With the speed of change outracing the moral and economic capacity of many in living generations to adapt, you can expect to see a fierce and indignant resistance to the Information Revolution, notwithstanding its great promise to liberate the future. | 由于变化的速度超过了许多在世的人适应的道德和经济能力，你可以期待看到对信息革命的激烈和愤慨的抵抗，尽管它有解放未来的伟大承诺。 |
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| You must understand and prepare for such unpleasantness. A transition crisis lies ahead. The new information and communication technologies are more subversive of the modern state than any political threat to its predominance since Columbus sailed. This is important because those in power have seldom reacted peacefully to developments that undermined their authority. They are not likely to now. | 你必须理解并为这种不愉快做准备。转型危机就在眼前。新的信息和通信技术对现代国家的颠覆性超过了哥伦布航海以来对其主导地位的任何政治威胁。这一点很重要，因为那些当权者很少对破坏其权威的发展作出和平反应。他们现在也不可能这样做。 |
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| The clash between the new and the old will shape the early years of the new millennium. We expect it to be a time of great danger and great reward and a time of much diminished civility in some realms and unprecedented scope in others. | 新与旧之间的冲突将塑造新千年的最初几年。我们预计这将是一个充满危险和巨大回报的时期，在某些领域，文明程度大大降低，而在另一些领域，则是前所未有的范围。 |
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| Increasingly autonomous individuals and bankrupt, desperate governments will confront one another across a new divide. We expect to see a radical restructuring of the nature of sovereignty and the virtual death of politics before the transition is over instead of state domination and control of resources, you are destined to see the privatization of almost all services governments now provide. For inescapable reasons that we explore at length in this book, information technology will, destroy the capacity of the state to charge more for its services than they are worth to the people who pay for them. | 越来越多的自主的个人和破产的、绝望的政府将在一个新的鸿沟中相互对峙。我们期待看到主权性质的彻底重组，以及在过渡期结束前政治的实际死亡，而不是国家对资源的支配和控制，你注定要看到政府现在提供的几乎所有服务的私有化。由于我们在本书中详细探讨的不可避免的原因，信息技术将破坏国家对其服务的收费能力，使之超过对支付这些服务的人的价值。 |
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| Sovereignty Through Markets | 通过市场实现主权 |
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| To an extent that few would have imagined only a decade ago, individuals will achieve increasing autonomy over territorial nationstates through market mechanisms. | 仅仅在十年前，很少有人能想象到，个人将通过市场机制实现对领土民族国家越来越多的自主权。 |
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| All nationstates face bankruptcy and the rapid erosion of their authority. Mighty as they are, the power they retain is the power to obliterate, not to command. Their intercontinental missiles and aircraft carriers are already artifacts, as imposing and useless as the last warhorse of feudalism. | 所有的民族国家都面临着破产和其权威的迅速消减。尽管他们很强大，但他们保留的权力是抹杀的权力，而不是指挥的权力。他们的洲际导弹和航空母舰已经是工艺品，就像封建主义的最后一匹战马一样威武而无用。 |
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| Information technology makes possible a dramatic extension of markets by altering the way that assets are created and protected. This is revolutionary indeed, it promises to be more revolutionary for industrial society than the advent of gunpowder proved to be for feudal agriculture. The transformation of the year 2000 implies the 11 commercialization of sovereignty and the death of politics, no less than guns implied the demise of oath-based feudalism. Citizenship will go the way of chivalry. | 信息技术通过改变资产的创造和保护方式，使市场的急剧扩展成为可能。这的确是革命性的，它对工业社会的革命性超过火药的出现对封建农业的革命性。贰零零零年的变革意味着主权的商业化和政治的死亡，就像火药意味着基于誓言的封建主义的消亡一样。公民权将走向骑士精神的道路。 |
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| We believe that the age of individual economic sovereignty is coming. Just as steel mills, telephone companies, mines, and railways that were once "nationalized" have been rapidly privatized throughout the world, you will soon see the ultimate form of privatization--the sweeping denationalization of the individual. The Sovereign Individual of the new millennium will no longer be an asset of the state, a de facto item on the treasury's balance sheet. After the transition of the year 2000, denationalized citizens will no longer be citizens at all, but customers. | 我们相信，个人经济主权的时代正在到来。正如曾经被 "国有化 "的钢铁厂、电话公司、矿山和铁路在世界各地迅速私有化一样，你们很快就会看到私有化的最终形式--个人的全面非国有化。新千年的主权个体将不再是国家的资产，不再是国库资产负债表上的一个事实上的项目。在贰零零零年的转型之后，非国有化的公民将不再是公民，而是顾客。 |
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| The commercialization of sovereignty will make the terms and conditions of citizenship in the nationstate as dated as chivalric oaths seemed after the collapse of feudalism. Instead of relating to a powerful state as citizens to be taxed, the Sovereign Individuals of the twenty-first century will be customers of governments. These governments wilt be organized along different principles than those which the world has come to expect over the past several centuries. | 主权的商业化将使民族国家的公民身份的条款和条件像封建主义崩溃后的骑士誓言一样过时。二十一世纪的主权个体将成为政府的客户，而不是作为被征税的公民与一个强大的国家发生关系。这些政府的组织原则将不同于过去几个世纪以来世界所期待的那些。 |
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| A new moral vocabulary will be required to describe the relations of Sovereign Individuals with one another and what remains of government. We suspect that as the terms of these new relations come into focus, they will offend many people who came of age as "citizens" of twentiethcentury nationstates. The end of nations and the "denationalization of the individual" will deflate some warmly held notions, such as "equal protection under the law" that presuppose power relations that are soon to be obsolete. | 将需要一个新的道德词汇来描述主权个体彼此之间的关系以及政府的剩余部分。我们猜想，当这些新关系的术语成为焦点时，它们将冒犯许多作为二十世纪民族国家 "公民 "而长大的人。国家的终结和 "个人的非国家化 "将使一些热烈持有的概念，如 "法律下的平等保护"，变得空洞无物，而这些概念的前提是很快就会被淘汰的权力关系。 |
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| Just as attempts to preserve the power of knights in armor were doomed to fail in the face of gunpowder weapons, so the modem notions of nationalism and citizenship are destined to be short-circuited by microtechnology. Indeed, they will eventually become comic in much the way that the sacred principles of fifteenth-century feudalism fell to ridicule in the sixteenth century. The cherished civic notions of the twentieth century will be comic anachronisms to new generations after the transformation of the year 2000. | 就像试图维护穿盔甲的骑士的权力在火药武器面前注定要失败一样，现代的民族主义和公民权概念也注定要被微观技术所短路。事实上，它们最终会成为滑稽的，就像15世纪封建主义的神圣原则在16世纪被嘲笑一样。二十世纪所珍视的公民概念在贰零零零年的变革之后，对新的几代人来说将是滑稽的不合时宜的。 |
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| The Don Quixote of the twenty-first century will not be a knight-errant struggling to revive the glories of feudalism but a bureaucrat in a brown suit, a tax collector yearning for a citizen to audit. | 二十一世纪的堂吉诃德将不是一个为恢复封建主义的辉煌而奋斗的骑士，而是一个穿着棕色西装的官僚，一个渴望对公民进行审计的征税人。 |
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| REVIVING LAWS OF THE MARCH | 恢复行进中的法律 |
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| We seldom think of governments as competitive entities, except in the broadest sense, so the modern intuition about the range and possibilities of sovereignty has atrophied. In the past, when the power equation made more difficult for groups to assert a stable monopoly of coercion, power was frequently fragmented, jurisdictions overlapped, and entities of many different kinds exercised one or more of the attributes of sovereignty. Not infrequently, the nominal overlord actually enjoyed scant power on the ground. Governments weaker than the nationstates are now faced with sustained competition in their ability to impose a monopoly of coercion over a local territory. This 12 competition gave rise to adaptations in controlling violence and attracting allegiance that will soon be new again. | 除了最广泛的意义之外，我们很少认为政府是竞争性的实体，所以现代人对主权的范围和可能性的直觉已经萎缩了。在过去，当权力等式使得团体更难宣称对强制力的稳定垄断时，权力经常是分散的，管辖权重叠，许多不同类型的实体行使一个或多个主权属性。名义上的霸主实际上在当地享有很少的权力，这种情况并不少见。比民族国家更弱小的政府在对当地领土实施垄断性胁迫的能力方面，现在面临着持续的竞争。这12场竞争催生了控制暴力和吸引效忠方面的适应性，这些适应性很快又会成为新的东西。 |
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| When the reach of lords and kings was weak, and the claims of one or more groups overlapped at a frontier, it frequently happened that neither could decisively dominate the other. In the Middle Ages, there were numerous frontier or "march" regions where sovereignties blended together. These violent frontiers persisted for decades or even centuries in the border areas of Europe. There were marches between areas of Celtic and English control in Ireland; between Wales and England, Scotland and England, Italy and France, France and Spain, Germany and the Slav frontiers of Central Europe and between the Christian kingdoms of Spain and the Islamic kingdom of Granada. Such march regions developed distinct institutional and legal forms of a kind that we are likely to see again in the next millennium. Because of the competitive position of the two authorities, residents of march region seldom paid tax. What is more, they usually had a choice in deciding who's laws they were to obey, a choice that was exercised through such legal concepts as "avowal" and "distraint" that have now all but vanished. We expect such concepts to become a prominent feature of the law of Information Societies. | 当领主和国王的影响力很弱，一个或多个团体的主张在边境地区重叠时，经常发生的情况是，双方都不能决定性地支配对方。在中世纪，有许多边境或 "行军 "地区的主权混杂在一起。在欧洲的边境地区，这些暴力的边境线持续了几十年甚至几个世纪。在爱尔兰的凯尔特人和英国人控制的地区之间，在威尔士和英格兰、苏格兰和英格兰、意大利和法国、法国和西班牙、德国和中欧的斯拉夫边境之间，以及在西班牙的基督教王国和格拉纳达的伊斯兰王国之间，都有游行。这样的行进区域形成了独特的制度和法律形式，我们有可能在下一个千年再次看到这种形式。由于两个当局的竞争地位，行军区的居民很少交税。更重要的是，他们通常可以选择决定服从谁的法律，这种选择是通过 "宣誓 "和 "扣押 "等法律概念来行使的，而这些概念现在几乎已经消失了。我们希望这些概念能够成为信息社会法律的一个突出特点。 |
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| Transcending Nationality | 超越国籍 |
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| Before the nationstate, it was difficult to enumerate precisely the number of sovereignties that existed in the world because they overlapped in complex ways and many varied forms of organization exercised power. They will do so again. The dividing lines between territories tended to become clearly demarcated and fixed as borders in the nationstate system. They will become hazy again in the Information Age. In the new millennium, sovereignty will be fragmented once more. New entities will emerge exercising some but not all of the characteristics we have come to associate with governments. | 在民族国家之前，很难精确地列举出世界上存在的主权国家的数量，因为它们以复杂的方式重叠，许多不同的组织形式行使着权力。他们将再次这样做。在民族国家体系中，领土之间的分界线趋于明确划定并固定为边界。在信息时代，它们将再次变得模糊不清。在新的千年里，主权将再次被分割开来。新的实体将出现，行使一些但不是所有我们已经与政府相关的特征。 |
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| Some of these new entities, like the Knights Templar and other religious military orders of the Middle Ages, may control considerable wealth and military power without controlling any fixed territory. They will be organized on principles that bear no relation to nationality at all. Members and leaders of religious corporations that exercised sovereign authority in parts of Europe in the Middle Ages in no sense derived their authority from national identity. They were of all ethnic backgrounds and professed to owe their allegiance to God, and not to any affinities that members of a nationality are supposed to share in common. | 其中一些新的实体，就像中世纪的圣殿骑士团和其他宗教军事组织一样，可能会控制相当大的财富和军事力量，而不控制任何固定的领土。他们将根据与国籍完全无关的原则组织起来。中世纪在欧洲部分地区行使主权权力的宗教团体的成员和领导人，在任何意义上都不会从民族身份中获得权力。他们具有各种民族背景，并宣称要效忠于上帝，而不是效忠于一个民族的成员所应具有的任何亲缘关系。 |
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| Merchant Republics of Cyberspace | 网络空间的商人共和国 |
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| You will also see the reemergence of associations of merchants and wealthy individuals with semisovereign powers, like the Hanse (confederation of merchants) in the Middle Ages. The Hanse that operated in the French and Flemish fairs grew to encompass the merchants of sixty cities.7 The "Hanseatie League," as it is redundantly 13 known in English (the literal translation is "Leaguely League"), was an organization of Germanic merchant guilds that provided protection to members and negotiated trade treaties. It came to exercise semisovereign powers in a number of Northern European and Baltic cities. Such entities will reemerge in place of the dying nationstate in the new millennium, providing protection and helping to enforce contracts in an unsafe world. | 你还会看到具有半主权权力的商人和富人协会的重新出现，如中世纪的汉斯（商人联盟）。在法国和弗拉芒集市上经营的Hanse发展到包括60个城市的商人。7 "Hanseatie联盟"，在英语中被多余地称为13（直译为 "Leaguely联盟"），是一个日耳曼商人行会的组织，为成员提供保护并协商贸易条约。它开始在一些北欧和波罗的海城市行使半主权的权力。在新的千年里，这种实体将重新出现，以取代垂死的民族国家，在一个不安全的世界里提供保护并帮助执行合同。 |
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| In short, the future is likely to confound the expectations of those who have absorbed the civic myths of twentiethcentury industrial society. | 简而言之，未来可能会迷惑那些吸收了二十世纪工业社会的公民神话的人的期望。 |
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| Among them are the illusions of social democracy that once thrilled and motivated the most gifted minds. | 其中有社会民主的幻想，这些幻想曾经让最有天赋的人感到兴奋和激动。 |
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| They presuppose that societies evolve in whatever way governments wish them to; preferably in response to opinion polls and scrupulously counted votes. This was never as true as it seemed fifty years ago. Now it is an anachronism, as much an artifact of industrialism as a rusting smokestack. The civic myths reflect not only a mindset that sees society's problems as susceptible to engineering solutions; they also reflect a false confidence that resources and individuals will remain as vulnerable to political compulsion in the future as they have been in the twentieth century. We doubt it. Market forces, not political majorities, will compel societies to reconfigure themselves in ways that public opinion will neither comprehend nor welcome. As they do, the naive view that history is what people wish it to be will prove wildly misleading. | 它们的前提是，社会以政府希望的任何方式发展；最好是响应民意调查和严格计算的投票。这从未像五十年前那样真实。现在，它是一个不合时宜的东西，就像一个生锈的烟囱一样，是工业主义的人工制品。公民神话不仅反映了一种心态，即认为社会问题很容易被工程解决；它们还反映了一种错误的信心，即资源和个人在未来仍会像二十世纪那样容易受到政治强迫。我们对此表示怀疑。市场力量，而不是政治多数，将迫使社会以公众舆论既不理解也不欢迎的方式重新配置自己。当他们这样做时，认为历史是人们所希望的那样的天真观点将被证明具有极大的误导性。 |
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| It will therefore be crucial that you see the world anew. That means looking from the outside in to reanalyze much that you have probably taken for granted. This will enable you to come to a new understanding. If you fail to transcend conventional thinking at a time when conventional thinking is losing touch with reality, then you will be more likely to fall prey to an epidemic of disorientation that lies ahead. Disorientation breeds mistakes that could threaten your business, your investments, and your way of life. | 因此，你重新看待这个世界将是至关重要的。这意味着从外部看，重新分析你可能已经认为理所当然的许多东西。这将使你能够获得新的理解。如果你不能在传统思维与现实脱节的时候超越传统思维，那么你将更有可能成为未来迷失方向的流行病的猎物。迷失方向会滋生错误，可能威胁到你的业务、你的投资和你的生活方式。 |
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| "The universe rewards us for understanding it and punishes us for not understanding it. When we understand the universe, our plans work and we feel good. Conversely, if we try to fly by jumping off a cliff and flapping our arms, the universe will kill us." -JACK COHEN AND IAN | "宇宙奖励我们理解它，惩罚我们不理解它。当我们理解宇宙时，我们的计划就会成功，我们就会感觉良好。相反，如果我们试图通过跳下悬崖和拍打手臂来飞行，宇宙就会杀死我们。"-杰克-科恩和伊恩 |
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| STEWART | 斯特沃特 |
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| Seeing Anew | 重新看待 |
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| To prepare yourself for the world that is coming you must understand why it will be different from what most experts tell you. That involves looking closely at the hidden causes of change. We have attempted to do this with an unorthodox analysis we call the study of megapolitics. In two previous volumes, Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning, we argued that the most important causes of change are not to be found in political manifestos or in the pronouncements of dead economists, but in the hidden factors that alter the boundaries where power is exercised. Often, subtle changes in climate, topography, microbes, and technology alter the logic of violence. They transform the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves. | 要为即将到来的世界做好准备，你必须了解为什么它将与大多数专家告诉你的不同。这涉及到仔细研究变化的隐藏原因。我们试图通过一种非正统的分析来做到这一点，我们称之为巨型政治学研究。在之前的两卷书《血流成河》和《大清算》中，我们认为变化的最重要原因不是在政治宣言中或在死去的经济学家的声明中找到，而是在改变权力行使边界的隐藏因素中。通常，气候、地形、微生物和技术的微妙变化会改变暴力的逻辑。它们改变了人们组织生计和保护自己的方式。 |
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| Notice that our approach to understanding how the world changes is very different from that of most forecasters. We are not experts in anything, in the sense that we 14 pretend to know a great deal more about certain "subjects" than those who have spent their entire careers cultivating highly specialized knowledge. To the contrary, we look from the outside in. We are knowledgeable around the subjects about which we make forecasts. Most of all, this involves seeing where the boundaries of necessity are drawn. | 请注意，我们理解世界如何变化的方法与大多数预测者的方法非常不同。我们不是什么专家，也就是说，我们假装比那些花了整个职业生涯来培养高度专业化知识的人对某些 "主题 "了解更多。恰恰相反，我们是从外面看进去的。我们是围绕着我们所预测的主题来了解的。最重要的是，这涉及到看到必要性的界限在哪里被划分。 |
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| When they change, society necessarily changes, no matter what people may wish to the contrary. | 当他们发生变化时，社会必然会发生变化，不管人们有什么相反的愿望。 |
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| In our view, the key to understanding how societies evolve is to understand factors that determine the costs and rewards of employing violence, Every human society, from the hunting band to the empire, has been informed by the interactions of megapolitical factors that set the prevailing version of the "laws of nature." Life is always and everywhere complex. The lamb and the lion keep a delicate balance, interacting at the margin. If lions were suddenly more swift, they would catch prey that now escape. If lambs suddenly grew wings, lions would starve. The capacity to utilize and defend against violence is the crucial variable that alters life at the margin. | 在我们看来，理解社会如何演变的关键是理解决定采用暴力的成本和回报的因素，每一个人类社会，从狩猎队到帝国，都是由大政治因素的相互作用所决定的，这些因素设定了 "自然法则 "的主流版本。生活始终是复杂的，无处不在。羔羊和狮子保持着微妙的平衡，在边缘互动。如果狮子突然变得更加敏捷，它们会抓住现在逃跑的猎物。如果羔羊突然长出翅膀，狮子就会饿死。利用和抵御暴力的能力是改变边缘生活的关键变量。 |
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| We put violence at the center of our theory of megapolitics for good reason. The control of violence is the most important dilemma every society faces. As we wrote in The Great Reckoning: | 我们把暴力放在我们的大政治理论的中心是有原因的。对暴力的控制是每个社会面临的最重要的困境。正如我们在《大清算》中写的那样。 |
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| The reason that people resort to violence is that it often pays. In some ways, the simplest thing a man can do if he wants money is to take it. That is no less true for an army of men seizing an oil field than it is for a single thug taking a wallet. Power, as William Playfair wrote, "has always sought the readiest road to wealth, by attacking those who were in possession of it." | 人们诉诸暴力的原因是，它往往能带来回报。在某些方面，如果一个人想要钱，他能做的最简单的事情就是拿钱。对于一支夺取油田的军队来说，这一点与单个暴徒夺取钱包的情况一样。正如威廉-普莱菲尔（William Playfair）所写的那样，"权力总是通过攻击那些拥有财富的人，来寻找通向财富的最便捷之路。" |
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| The challenge to prosperity is precisely that predatory violence does pay well in some circumstances. War does change things. It changes the rules. | 对繁荣的挑战恰恰是掠夺性的暴力在某些情况下确实报酬丰厚。战争确实改变了事情。它改变了规则。 |
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| It changes the distribution of assets and income. It even determines who lives and who dies. It is precisely the fact that violence does pay that makes it hard to control. 9 | 它改变了资产和收入的分配。它甚至决定了谁生谁死。恰恰是暴力确实能带来收益这一事实，使它难以控制。9 |
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| Thinking in these terms has helped us foresee a number of developments that better-informed experts insisted could never happen. For example, Blood in the Streets, published in early 1987, was our attempt to survey the first stages of the great megapolitical revolution now under way. We argued then that technological change was destabilizing the power equation in the world. Among our principal points: • We said that American predominance was in decline, which would lead to economic imbalances and distress, including another 1929-style stock market crash. Experts were all but unanimous in denying that such a thing could happen. Yet within six months, in October 1987, would markets were convulsed by the most violentsell-off of the century. | 在这些方面的思考帮助我们预见了一些发展，而这些发展被更多知情的专家坚持认为不可能发生。例如，1987年初出版的《血流成河》（Blood in the Streets）就是我们试图对目前正在进行的巨大政治革命的最初阶段进行调查。我们当时认为，技术变革正在破坏世界权力平衡的稳定。在我们的主要观点中。- 我们说，美国的主导地位正在下降，这将导致经济失衡和困境，包括另一次1929年式的股票市场崩溃。专家们几乎一致否认这种事情可能发生。然而，在6个月内，即1987年10月，市场就被本世纪最猛烈的抛售所震慑。 |
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| Yet 1989 brought the events that "no one could have predicted." The Berlin Wall fell, as revvolutions swept away Communist regimes from the Baltic to Bucharest. | 然而，1989年发生了 "没有人能够预料到 "的事件。柏林墙倒塌，革命席卷了从波罗的海到布加勒斯特的共产主义政权。 |
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| • We explained why the multiethnic empire that the Bolshevik nomenklatura inherited form the tsars would "inevitably crack apart." At the end of December 1991, the 15 hammer-and-cycle banner was lowered over the Kremlin for the last time as the Soviet Union ceased to exist. | - 我们解释了为什么布尔什维克贵族从沙皇那里继承的多民族帝国会 "不可避免地分裂开来"。1991年12月底，随着苏联的不复存在，克里姆林宫上空最后一次降下了15面锤子和自行车的旗帜。 |
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| Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Japanese stock market crashed, losing almost half its value. We continue to believe that its ultimate low could match or exceed the 89 percent loss that Wall Street suffered at the bottom after 1929. | 在柏林墙倒塌后不久，日本股市就崩溃了，几乎损失了一半的价值。我们仍然认为，它的最终低点可能与华尔街在1929年后的底部所遭受的89%的损失相匹配或超过。 |
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| While the main themes of Blood in the Streets have proven remarkably accurate with the benefit of hindsight, only a few years ago they were considered rank nonsense by the guardians of conventional thinking. A reviewer in Newsweek in 1987 reflected the closed mental climate of late industrial society when he dismissed our analysis as "an unthinking attack on reason." | 尽管事后证明《血流成河》的主要主题非常准确，但就在几年前，它们还被传统思维的守护者认为是一派胡言。1987年《新闻周刊》的一位评论员将我们的分析斥为 "对理性的不假思索的攻击"，这反映了晚期工业社会的封闭精神氛围。 |
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| You might imagine that Newsweek and similar publications would have recognized with the passage of time that our line of analysis had revealed something useful about the way the world was changing. Not a bit, The first edition of The Great Reckoning was greeted with the same sniggering hostility that welcomed Blood in the Streets. No less an authority than the Wall Street Journal categorically dismissed our analysis as the nattering of "your dopey aunt." | 你可以想象，随着时间的推移，《新闻周刊》和类似的出版物会认识到，我们的分析路线已经揭示了关于世界变化方式的有用信息。但事实并非如此，《大清算》的第一版受到了与欢迎《喋血街头》一样的嗤之以鼻的敌视。比《华尔街日报》更权威的媒体断然否定了我们的分析，认为我们的分析是 "你的姨妈 "的唠叨话。 |
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| This chuckling aside, the themes of The Great Reckoning proved less ludicrous than the guardians of orthodoxy pretended. | 撇开这种笑声不谈，《大清相国》的主题被证明没有正统观念的守护者所假装的那么可笑。 |
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| • We extended our forecast of the death of the Soviet Union, exploring why Russia and the other former Soviet republics faced a future of growing civil disorder4 hyperinflation, and falling living standards. | - 我们扩展了对苏联死亡的预测，探讨了为什么俄罗斯和其他前苏联共和国在未来会面临日益严重的内乱4恶性通货膨胀和生活水平下降。 |
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| • We also forecast that there would be a major redefinition of terms of income redistribution, with sharp cutbacks in the level of benefits. Hints of fiscal crisis appeared from Canada to Sweden, and American politicians began to talk of "ending welfare as we know it." • We anticipated and explained why the "new world order" would prove to be a "new world disorder." Well before the atrocities in Bosnia engrossed the headlines, we warned that Yugoslavia would collapse into civil war. | - 我们还预测，将对收入再分配的条款进行重大的重新定义，并大幅削减福利水平。从加拿大到瑞典都出现了财政危机的迹象，美国的政治家们开始谈论 "结束我们所知的福利"。- 我们预计并解释了为什么 "世界新秩序 "会被证明是 "世界新混乱"。早在波斯尼亚的暴行成为头条新闻之前，我们就警告说，南斯拉夫将崩溃，陷入内战。 |
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| The Great Reckoning also spelled out a number of controversial theses that have not yet been confirmed, or have not reached the level of development that we forecast: • We said that the Japanese stock market would follow Wall Street's path after 1929, and that this would lead to credit collapse and depression. Although unemployment rates in Spain, Finland, and a few other countries exceeded those of the 1930s, and a number of countries, including Japan, did experience local depressions, there has not yet been a systemic credit collapse of the kind that imploded economies worldwide in the 1930s. | 大算盘》还阐述了一些有争议的论点，这些论点尚未被证实，或者没有达到我们预测的发展水平。- 我们说过，日本股市将追随华尔街1929年后的道路，这将导致信贷崩溃和经济萧条。尽管西班牙、芬兰和其他一些国家的失业率超过了20世纪30年代的水平，而且包括日本在内的一些国家确实经历了局部萧条，但还没有出现像20世纪30年代内爆全球经济的那种系统性信贷崩溃。 |
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| • We explained why the "War on Drugs" was a recipe for subverting the police and judicial systems of countries where drug use is widespread, particularly the United States. With tens of billions of dollars in hidden monopoly profits piling up each year, drug dealers have the means as well as the incentive to corrupt even apparently stable countries. While the world media have carried occasional stories hinting at high-level penetration of the U.S. political system by drug money, the full story has not yet been told. | - 我们解释了为什么 "禁毒战争 "是颠覆毒品使用广泛的国家，特别是美国的警察和司法系统的秘诀。由于每年有数百亿美元的隐性垄断利润堆积在一起，毒贩子有办法也有动机去腐蚀甚至是表面上稳定的国家。虽然世界媒体偶尔会报道，暗示毒品资金对美国政治体系的高层渗透，但完整的故事还没有被讲述。 |
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| Looking Where Others Don't | 寻找别人不知道的地方 |
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| Notwithstanding the points where our forecasts were mistaken or seem mistaken in light of what is now known, the record stands to scrutiny. Much of what is likely to figure in future economic histories of the 1990s was forecast or anticipated and explained in The Great Reckoning. Many of our forecasts were not simple extrapolations or extensions of trends, but forecasts of major departures from what has been considered normal since World War II. We warned that the 1990s would be dramatically different from the previous five decades. Reading the news of 1991 through 1995, we see that the themes of The Great Reckoning were borne out almost daily. | 尽管有一些地方我们的预测是错误的，或者从现在已知的情况来看似乎是错误的，但这些记录是经得起推敲的。许多可能出现在90年代未来经济史上的东西，在《大清算》中都有预测或预期，并有解释。我们的许多预测不是对趋势的简单推断或延伸，而是对二战以来被认为是正常情况的重大背离的预测。我们警告说，20世纪90年代将与之前的50年有巨大的不同。阅读1991年至1995年的新闻，我们看到《大清算》的主题几乎每天都得到了证实。 |
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| We see these developments not as examples of isolated difficulties, trouble here, trouble there, but as shocks and tremors that run along the same fault line. The old order is being toppled by a megapolitical earthquake that will revolutionize institutions and alter the way thinking people see the world. | 我们认为这些发展不是孤立的困难的例子，这里的麻烦，那里的麻烦，而是沿着同一断层线的冲击和震荡。旧的秩序正在被一场巨大的政治地震所推翻，这场地震将彻底改变体制，改变有思想的人看待世界的方式。 |
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| In spite of the central role of violence in determining the way the world works, it attracts surprisingly little serious attention. Most political analysts and economists write as if violence were a minor irritant, like a fly buzzing around a cake, and not the chef who baked it. | 尽管暴力在决定世界运作方式方面起着核心作用，但它引起的认真关注却少得令人吃惊。大多数政治分析家和经济学家在写作时，都认为暴力是一个小的刺激物，就像一只苍蝇在蛋糕周围嗡嗡叫，而不是烤蛋糕的厨师。 |
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| Another Megapolitical Pioneer | 另一个大政治家的先锋 |
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| In fact, there has been so little clear thinking about the role of violence in history that a bibliography of megapolitical analysis could be written on a single sheet of paper. | 事实上，对于暴力在历史中的作用，人们很少有清晰的思考，以至于一张纸上就能写出一份巨型政治分析书目。 |
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| In The Great Reckoning, we drew upon and elaborated arguments of an almost entirely forgotten classic of megapolitical analysis, William Playfair's An Enquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations, published in 1805. Were one of our departure points is the work of Frederic C. Lane. Lane was a medieval historian who wrote several penetrating essays on the role of violence in history during the1940s and 1950s. Perhaps the most comprehensive of these was "Economic Consequences of Organized Violence," which appeared in the Journal of Economic History in 1958. Few people other than professional economists and historians have read it, and most of them seem not to have recognized its significance. Like Playfair, Lane wrote for an audience that did not yet exist. | 在《大清算》中，我们借鉴并阐述了一个几乎完全被遗忘的巨型政治分析经典，即威廉-普莱菲尔（William Playfair）于1805年出版的《关于强国和富国衰落的永久原因的调查》的论点。我们的出发点之一是弗雷德里克-C-莱恩的作品。莱恩是一位中世纪的历史学家，他在20世纪40年代和50年代就暴力在历史中的作用写了几篇深刻的文章。也许其中最全面的是 "有组织暴力的经济后果"，它出现在1958年的《经济史杂志》上。除了专业的经济学家和历史学家之外，很少有人读过它，而且他们中的大多数人似乎都没有认识到它的重要性。像普莱费尔一样，莱恩是为一个尚不存在的受众而写的。 |
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| Insights for the Information Age | 对信息时代的洞察力 |
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| Lane published his work on violence and the economic meaning of war well before the advent of the Information Age. He certainly was not writing in anticipation of microprocessing or the other technological revolutions now unfolding. Yet his insights into violence established a framework for understanding how society will be reconfigured in the Information Revolution. | 莱恩在信息时代到来之前就已经发表了他关于暴力和战争的经济意义的著作。他当然不是在预测微处理或其他正在展开的技术革命的情况下写作的。然而，他对暴力的洞察力为理解社会在信息革命中如何被重新配置建立了一个框架。 |
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| The window Lane opened into the future was one through which he peered into the past. He was a medieval historian, and particularly a historian of a trading City, Venice, whose fortunes surged and sagged in a violent world. In thinking about how Venice rose and fell, his attention was attracted to issues that can help you understand the future. He saw the fact that how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what uses are made of scarce resources. | 莱恩向未来打开的窗口是他窥视过去的窗口。他是一位中世纪的历史学家，尤其是一位贸易城市威尼斯的历史学家，威尼斯的财富在一个暴力的世界中起起落落。在思考威尼斯的兴衰时，他的注意力被吸引到那些可以帮助你理解未来的问题上。他看到了这样一个事实，即如何组织和控制暴力在决定 "如何利用稀缺资源 "方面起着很大作用。 |
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| We believe that Lane's analyses of the competitive uses of violence has much to tell us about how life is likely to change in the Information Age. But don't expect most people to notice, much less follow, so unfashionably abstract an argument. While the attention of the world is riveted on dishonest debates and wayward personalities, the meanderings of megapolitics continue almost unnoted. The average North American has probably lavished one hundred times more attention on 0. J. Simpson than he has on the new microtechnologies that are poised to antiquate his job and subvert the political system he depends on for unemployment compensation. | 我们相信，莱恩对暴力的竞争性使用的分析，对信息时代的生活可能发生的变化有很多启示。但是，不要指望大多数人注意到，更不要指望他们会遵循如此不合时宜的抽象论点。当全世界的注意力都集中在不诚实的辩论和不守规矩的人身上时，大政治的蜿蜒曲折几乎没有人注意。普通的北美人对0.J.辛普森的关注可能比他对新的微观技术的关注多一百倍，这些技术准备使他的工作过时并颠覆他赖以获得失业补偿的政治制度。 |
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| THE VANITY OF WISHES | 愿望的虚幻性 |
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| The tendency to overlook what is fundamentally important is not confined solely to the couch dweller watching television. Conventional thinkers of all shapes and sizes observe one of the pretenses of the nationstate-that the views people hold determine the way the world changes. Apparently sophisticated analysts lapse into explanations and forecasts that interpret major historical developments as if they were determined in a wishful way. A striking example of this type of reasoning appeared on the editorial page of the New York Times just as we were writing "Goodbye, NationState, Hello. | 忽视根本性重要事物的倾向并不仅仅局限于看电视的沙发客。形形色色的传统思想家观察到了国家的一个假象--即人们持有的观点决定了世界的变化方式。看似成熟的分析家们会陷入解释和预测，把重大的历史发展解释得好像是一厢情愿地决定。就在我们写《再见，民族国家，你好》的时候，《纽约时报》的社论版上出现了这种推理的一个突出例子。 |
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| Why? Because the nationstate is faltering and can no longer control economic forces. | 为什么？因为民族国家正在摇摇欲坠，无法再控制经济力量。 |
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| In our view, this assumption verges on the absurd. To suppose that some specific new form of governance will emerge simply because another has failed is a fallacy. By that reasoning, Haiti and Zaire would long ago have had better government simply because what they had was so luminously inadequate. | 在我们看来，这种假设近乎荒唐。假设某种新的治理形式会出现，仅仅是因为另一种形式失败了，这是一种谬误。按照这种推理，海地和扎伊尔早就有了更好的政府，只是因为他们所拥有的是如此明显的不足。 |
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| Colchester's point of view; widely shared among the few who think about such things in North America and Europe, utterly fails to take into account the larger megapolitical forces that determine what types of political systems are actually viable. | 科尔切斯特的观点在北美和欧洲少数思考这些问题的人中广为流传，但他完全没有考虑到决定哪些类型的政治制度实际上是可行的更大的大政治力量。 |
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| That is the focus of this book. When the technologies that arc shaping the new millennium are considered, it is far more likely that we will see not one world government, but microgovemment, or oven conditions approaching anarchy. | 这就是本书的重点。当考虑到弧形塑造新千年的技术时，我们更有可能看到的不是一个世界政府，而是微观经济，或接近无政府状态的烤箱条件。 |
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| For every serious analysis of the role of violence in determining the rules by which everyone operates, dozens of books have been written about the intricacies of wheat subsidies, and hundreds more about arcane aspects of monetary policy. Much of this shortfall in thinking about the crucial issues that actually determine the course of history probably reflects the relative stability of the power configuration over the past several centuries. The bird that falls asleep on the back of a hippopotamus does not think about losing its perch until the hippo actually moves. Dreams, myths, and fantasies play a much larger role in informing the supposed social sciences than we commonly think. | 对于每一次认真分析暴力在决定每个人运作规则方面的作用，都有几十本关于小麦补贴的错综复杂的书，还有几百本关于货币政策的神秘方面的书。这种对实际决定历史进程的关键问题的思考的不足，很可能反映了过去几个世纪以来权力配置的相对稳定。在河马背上睡着的鸟儿，在河马真正移动之前，不会想到会失去它的栖息地。梦想、神话和幻想在为所谓的社会科学提供信息方面发挥的作用比我们通常认为的要大得多。 |
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| This is particularly evident in the abundant literature of economic justice. | 这在经济正义的大量文献中尤其明显。 |
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| Millions of words have been uttered and written about economic justice and injustice for each page devoted to careful analysis of how violence shapes society, and thus sets the boundaries within which economies must function. Yet formulations of economic justice in the modern context presuppose that society is dominated by an instrument of compulsion so powerful that it can take away and redistribute life's good things. Such power has existed for only a few generations of the modern period. Now it is fading away. | 关于经济正义和不公正，人们已经说了几百万字，每一页都在仔细分析暴力如何塑造社会，从而设定经济必须运作的界限。然而，在现代背景下对经济正义的表述预示着社会被一种强大的强制工具所支配，以至于它可以夺走和重新分配生活中的美好事物。这种权力只在现代时期的几代人中存在过。现在它正在逐渐消失。 |
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| Big Brother on Social Security | 社会保障问题上的老大哥 |
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| Industrial technology gave governments greater instruments of control in the twentieth century than ever before. For a time, it seemed inevitable that governments would become so effective at monopolizing violence as to leave little room for individual autonomy. Nobody at midcentury was looking forward to the triumph of the Sovereign Individual. | 在二十世纪，工业技术给政府提供了比以往任何时候都更大的控制工具。一时间，政府在垄断暴力方面变得如此有效，似乎不可避免地给个人自主权留下了很小的空间。在本世纪中叶，没有人期待着主权个体的胜利。 |
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| Some of the shrewdest observers of the mid-twentieth century became convinced on the evidence of the day that the tendency of the nationstate to centralize power would lead to totalitarian domination over all aspects of life. In George Orwell's 1984 (1949), Big Brother was watching the individual vainly struggle to maintain a margin of autonomy and self- respect. It appeared to be a losing cause. Friedrich von Hayek's The Road to Serfdom (1944) took a more scholarly view in arguing that freedom was being lost to a new form of economic control that left the state as the master of everything. | 二十世纪中期一些最精明的观察家根据当时的证据确信，民族国家集中权力的趋势将导致对生活所有方面的极权主义统治。在乔治-奥威尔的《1984》（1949年）中，"老大哥 "正看着个人徒劳地挣扎，以保持自主和自尊的余地。这似乎是一个失败的事业。弗里德里希-冯-哈耶克（Friedrich von Hayek）的《通往奴役之路》（The Road to Serfdom）（1944年）以更学术化的观点认为，自由正在被一种新的经济控制形式所剥夺，这种控制形式使国家成为一切的主宰。 |
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| These works were written before the advent of microprocessing, which has incubated a whole range of technologies that enhance the capacity of small groups and even individuals to function independently of central authority. | 这些作品是在微处理技术出现之前写的，微处理技术孵化了一系列技术，增强了小团体甚至个人独立于中央权威运作的能力。 |
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| As shrewd as observers like Hayek and Orwell were, they were unduly pessimistic. History has unfolded its surprises. Totalitarian Communism barely outlasted the year 1984. A new form of serfdom may yet emerge in the next millennium if governments succeed in suppressing the liberating aspects of microtechnology. But it is far more likely that we will see unprecedented opportunity and autonomy for the individual. What our parents worried about may prove to be no problem at all. What they took for granted as fixed and permanent features of social life now seem destined to disappear. Wherever necessity sets boundaries to human choice, we adjust, and reorganize our lives accordingly. | 尽管像哈耶克和奥威尔这样的观察家很精明，但他们还是过于悲观了。历史已经展开了它的惊奇。极权主义的共产主义几乎没有延续到1984年。如果政府成功地压制了微观技术的解放方面，一种新形式的农奴制可能在下一个千年出现。但更有可能的是，我们将看到前所未有的机会和个人的自主权。我们的父母所担心的可能被证明根本就不是问题。他们认为理所当然的社会生活的固定和永久特征现在似乎注定要消失。只要必要性为人类的选择设定了界限，我们就会进行调整，并相应地重新组织我们的生活。 |
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| The Hazards of Forecasting | 预测的危险性 |
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| No doubt we put our small measure of dignity at risk in attempting to foresee and explain profound changes in the organization of life and the culture that binds it together. | 毫无疑问，在试图预见和解释生活组织和将其捆绑在一起的文化的深刻变化时，我们将我们小小的尊严置于危险之中。 |
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| Most forecasts are doomed to make silly reading in the fullness of time. And the more dramatic the change they envision, the more embarrassingly wrong they tend to be. The world doesn't end. The ozone doesn't vanish. The coming Ice Age dissolves into global warming. Notwithstanding all the alarms to the contrary, there is still oil in the tank. Mr. | 大多数预测注定要在充分的时间里做愚蠢的解读。而且他们设想的变化越大，就越是令人尴尬地错了。世界并没有结束。臭氧不会消失。即将到来的冰河时期会溶入全球变暖。尽管有所有相反的警告，油箱里仍然有油。先生。 |
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| Antrobus, the everyman of The Skin of Our Teeth, avoids freezing, survives wars and threatened economic calamities, and grows old ignoring the studied alarms of experts. | 安特罗伯斯是《我们牙齿的皮肤》中的常人，他避免了冰冻，在战争和经济灾难的威胁下幸存下来，并无视专家们的研究警报而变老。 |
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| Most attempts to "unveil" the future soon turn out to be comic. Even where self-interest provides a strong incentive to clear thinking, forward vision is often myopic. In 1903, the Mercedes company said that "there would never be as many as 1 million automobiles worldwide. The reason was that it was implausible that as many as 1 million artisans worldwide would be trainable as chauffeurs." 12 | 大多数试图 "揭开 "未来的尝试很快就变成了滑稽。即使在自我利益为清晰的思维提供了强大的动力的情况下，前瞻性的眼光也往往是近视的。1903年，梅赛德斯公司说，"全世界永远不会有多达100万辆的汽车。原因是，全世界有多达100万名工匠可以被训练成司机，这是不可能的"。12 |
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| Recognizing this should stop our mouths. It doesn't. We are not afraid to stand in line for a due share of ridicule. If we mistake matters greatly, future generations may laugh as heartily as they please, presuming anyone remembers what we said. To dare a thought is to risk being wrong. We are hardly so stiff and useless that we are afraid to err. Far from it. We would rather venture thoughts that might prove useful to you than suppress them out of apprehension that they might prove overblown or embarrassing in retrospect. | 认识到这一点应该让我们的嘴停下来。但事实并非如此。我们并不害怕站在队伍中接受应有的嘲讽。如果我们犯了很大的错误，后人可以随心所欲地嘲笑，假定有人记得我们说过的话。敢于思考就是冒着错误的风险。我们并没有僵硬和无用到害怕犯错。远非如此。我们宁可大胆提出可能对你有用的想法，也不愿因担心它们可能被夸大或在回想起来时令人尴尬而压制它们。 |
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| As Arthur C. Clarke shrewdly noted, the two overriding reasons why attempts to anticipate the future usually fall flat are "Failure of Nerve and Failure of Imagination." ' | 正如阿瑟-克拉克（Arthur C. Clarke）精明地指出的那样，试图预测未来的努力通常落空的两个首要原因是 "神经衰弱和想象力衰弱"。' |
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| Of the two, he wrote, "Failure of Nerve seems to be the more common; it occurs when even given all of the relevant facts the would-be prophet cannot see that they point to an inescapable conclusion, Some of these failures are so ludicrous as to be almost unbelievable." | 在这两种情况中，他写道："神经衰弱似乎更常见；它发生在即使给了所有相关的事实，可能的预言家也看不出它们指向一个不可避免的结论，其中一些失败是如此可笑，几乎令人难以置信。 |
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| Where our exploration of the Information Revolution falls short, as it inevitably will, the cause will be due more to a lack of imagination than to a lack of nerve. | 如果我们对信息革命的探索不尽如人意，那么原因更多的是由于缺乏想象力，而不是缺乏胆量。 |
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| Forecasting the future has always been a bold enterprise, one which properly excites skepticism. Perhaps time will prove that our deductions are wildly off the mark. Unlike Nostradamus, we do not pretend to be prophetic personalities. We do not foretell the future by stirring a wand in a bowl of water or by casting horoscopes. Nor do we write in cryptic verse. Our purpose is to provide you with a sober, detached analysis of issues that could prove to be of great importance to you. | 对未来的预测一直是一项大胆的事业，它能适当地激发人们的怀疑态度。也许时间会证明，我们的推论完全偏离目标。与诺查丹玛斯不同，我们并不假装自己是预言家。我们不通过在一碗水里搅动魔杖或投掷星座来预言未来。我们也不写神秘的诗句。我们的目的是为你提供一个清醒的、超然的分析，这些问题可能证明对你非常重要。 |
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| We feel an obligation to set out our views, even where they seem heretical, precisely because they may not otherwise be heard. In the closed mental atmosphere of late industrial society, ideas do not traffic as freely as they should through the established media. | 我们感到有义务阐明我们的观点，即使它们看起来是异端的，正是因为它们可能不会被听到。在晚期工业社会封闭的精神氛围中，思想并不像它们应该通过既定的媒体那样自由流通。 |
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| This book is written in a constructive spirit. It is the third we have written together, analyzing various stages of the great change now under way. Like Blood in the 21 | 这本书是本着建设性的精神写的。这是我们一起写的第三本书，分析了目前正在进行的巨大变革的各个阶段。就像《21世纪的血》一样 |
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| Streets and The Great Reckoning, it is a thought exercise. It explores the death of industrial society and its reconfiguration in new forms. We expect to see amazing paradoxes in the years to come. On the one hand, you will witness the realization of a new form of freedom, with the emergence of the Sovereign Individual. You can expect to see almost the complete liberation of productivity. At the same time, we expect to see the death of the modern nationstate. Many of the assurances of equality that Western people have grown to take for granted in the twentieth century are destined to die with it. | 在《街道》和《大清算》中，它是一种思想练习。它探讨了工业社会的死亡和它在新形式下的重构。我们期望在未来几年看到惊人的悖论。一方面，你将看到一种新的自由形式的实现，主权个体的出现。你可以期待看到生产力的几乎完全解放。同时，我们预计将看到现代民族国家的死亡。西方人在二十世纪逐渐认为理所当然的许多平等保证，注定要与它一起消亡。 |
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| We expect that representative democracy as it is now known will fade away, to be replaced by the new democracy of choice in the cybermarketplace. If our deductions are correct, the politics of the next century will be much more varied and less important than that to which we have become accustomed. | 我们预计，现在已知的代议制民主将逐渐消失，取而代之的是网络市场上新的选择民主。如果我们的推论是正确的，下个世纪的政治将比我们已经习惯的政治更加多样和不重要。 |
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| We are confident that our argument will be easy to follow, notwithstanding the fact that it leads through some territory that is the intellectual equivalent of the backwoods and bad neighborhoods. If our meaning is not entirely intelligible in places, that is not because we are being cute, or using the time-honored equivocation of those who pretend to foretell the future by making cryptic pronouncements. We are not equivocators. If our arguments are unclear, it is because we have failed the task of writing in a way that makes compelling ideas accessible. Unlike many forecasters, we want you to understand and even duplicate our line of thinking. It is based not upon psychic reveries or the gyrations of planets, but upon old-fashioned, ugly logic. For quite logical reasons, we believe that microprocessing will inevitably subvert and destroy the nationstate, creating new forms of social organization in the process. It is both necessary and possible for you to foresee at least some details of the new way of life that may be here sooner than you think. | 我们相信，我们的论点会很容易理解，尽管它穿过了一些相当于知识界的落后地区和坏邻居的领域。如果我们的意思在某些地方不完全明白，那并不是因为我们在耍小聪明，或者使用那些假装通过隐晦的声明来预言未来的人的历史悠久的含糊其辞。我们不是模棱两可的人。如果我们的论点不明确，那是因为我们没有完成以使令人信服的观点易于理解的方式进行写作的任务。与许多预测者不同，我们希望你能理解，甚至复制我们的思路。它不是基于精神上的遐想或行星的回旋，而是基于老式的、丑陋的逻辑。由于相当合乎逻辑的原因，我们相信微处理将不可避免地颠覆和摧毁民族国家，在这个过程中创造新的社会组织形式。对你们来说，至少预见新的生活方式的一些细节是必要的，也是可能的，这种生活方式可能比你们想象的更快到来。 |
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| Ironies of a Future Foretold | 预示未来的讽刺 |
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| For centuries, the end of this millennium has been seen as a pregnant moment in history. More than 850 years ago, St. Malachy fixed 2000 as the date of the Last Judgment. American psychic Edgar Cayce said in 1934 that the earth would shift on its axis in the year 2000, causing California to split in two and inundating New York City and Japan. A Japanese rocket scientist, Hideo Itokawa, announced in 1980 that the alignment of the planets in a "Grand Cross" on August 18, 1999, would cause widespread environmental devastation, leading to the end of human life on earth.' 15 | 几个世纪以来，这个千年期的结束一直被看作是历史上的一个怀孕时刻。850多年前，圣马拉奇将贰零零零年定为最后审判的日期。美国灵媒埃德加-凯斯（Edgar Cayce）在1934年说，地球将在贰零零零年发生地轴移动，导致加利福尼亚一分为二，淹没纽约市和日本。一位日本火箭科学家伊藤川英夫在1980年宣布，1999年8月18日行星排列成 "大十字"，将造成广泛的环境破坏，导致地球上人类生命的结束。15 |
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| Such visions of apocalypse make a plump target for ridicule, Alter all, the year 2000, while an imposing round number, is only an arbitrary artifact of the Christian calendar as adopted in the West. Other calendars and dating systems calculate centuries and millennia from different starting points. By the reckoning of the Islamic calendar, for example, A.D. 2000 will be the year 1378. As ordinary-sounding as a year can be. | 这种对世界末日的憧憬是一个丰满的嘲笑目标，毕竟，贰零零零年虽然是一个雄伟的整数，但只是西方采用的基督教日历的一个任意的人工制品。其他日历和日期系统从不同的起点计算几个世纪和几千年的时间。例如，根据伊斯兰历法的计算，公元贰零零零年将是1378年。这是个听起来很普通的年份。 |
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| According to the Chinese calendar, which repeats itself every sixty years, A.D. 2000 is just another year of the dragon. It is part of a continuous cycle that extends millennia into the past. | 根据中国的日历，每60年重复一次，公元贰零零零年只是另一个龙年。它是一个连续的周期的一部分，延伸到过去的几千年。 |
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| Professor Itokawa notwithstanding, premonitions about the new millennium seem closely tied to the Christian faith, and the predominant Western imagination of time. | 尽管有板川教授，关于新千年的预感似乎与基督教信仰和西方主流的时间想象紧密相连。 |
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| They are prophecies, not astrophysics. Most are dreams, reveries, and visions, or numerical interpretations of visions, like Newton's gloss on the prophecies of Daniel. | 它们是预言，不是天体物理学。大多数是梦境、遐想和幻觉，或对幻觉的数字解释，就像牛顿对但以理预言的解释。 |
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| These intuitive leaps begin with a perspective that takes the birth of Christ to be the central fact of history. They are compounded by the psychological power of large round numbers, which every trader will recognize as having an arresting quality. The two thousandth year of our epoch cannot help but become a focus for the imagination of intuitive people. | 这些直觉上的飞跃始于将基督的诞生视为历史中心事实的观点。它们因大整数的心理力量而变得更加复杂，每个交易者都会认识到大整数有一种引人注目的品质。我们这个时代的第两千年不能不成为有直觉的人的想象力的焦点。 |
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| A critic could easily make these premonitions seem silly, without even addressing the ambiguous and debatable theological notions of the Apocalypse and the Last Judgment that give these visions so much of their power Even within the Christian framework, the year 2000 can only seem the likely inflection point for the next stage of history if one overlooks errors of arithmetic. In strict logic, the next millennium will not begin until 2001. The year 2000 will be only the two thousandth year since Christ's birth. Or it would be had Christ been born in the first year of the Christian era. He was not. In 533, when Christ's birth replaced the founding date of Rome as the basis for calculating years according to the Western calendar, the monks who introduced the new convention miscalculated Christ's birth. It is now accepted that he was born in 4 B.C. | 批评者很容易使这些预感显得愚蠢，甚至没有涉及到模棱两可、值得商榷的天启和最后审判的神学概念，这些概念赋予了这些预感如此大的力量。即使在基督教框架内，如果忽略了算术上的错误，贰零零零年似乎才可能是下一个历史阶段的拐点。按照严格的逻辑，下一个千禧年要到2001年才会开始。贰零零零年将只是基督诞生后的第两千年。或者说，如果基督是在基督教时代的第一年出生的，那就会是这样。他没有。533年，当基督的诞生取代了罗马的建国日期，成为根据西历计算年份的基础时，引入新惯例的僧侣们把基督的诞生计算错了。现在人们接受了他生于公元前4年的说法。 |
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| On that basis, a full two thousand years since his birth will be completed sometime in 1997. Hence Carl Jung's apparently odd launch date for the start of a New Age. | 在此基础上，自他出生以来整整两千年的时间将在1997年的某个时候完成。因此，卡尔-荣格为新时代的开始设定了一个明显奇怪的启动日期。 |
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| Giggle if you will, but we do not despise or dismiss intuitive understandings of history. Although our argument is grounded in logic, not in revenues, we are awed by the prophetic power of human consciousness. Time after time, it redeems the visions of madmen, psychics, and saints. So it may be with the transformation of the year 2000. | 如果你愿意的话，不妨笑一笑，但我们并不鄙视或否定对历史的直觉理解。虽然我们的论点是以逻辑为基础，而不是以收入为基础，但我们对人类意识的预言能力感到震惊。一次又一次，它救赎了疯子、灵媒和圣人的幻觉。贰零零零年的转变也可能是如此。 |
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| The date that has long been fixed in the imagination of the West looks to be the inflection point that at least half confirms that history has a destiny. We cannot explain why this should be, but nonetheless we are convinced that it is so. | 在西方人的想象中早已固定下来的日期看起来是一个拐点，至少有一半证实了历史是有命运的。我们无法解释为什么会这样，但我们还是相信它是这样的。 |
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| Our intuition is that history has a destiny, and that free will and determinism are two versions of the same phenomenon. The human interactions that form history behave as though they were informed by a kind of destiny. lust as an electron plasma, a dense gas of electrons, behaves as a complex system, so do human beings. The freedom of individual movement by the electrons turns out to be compatible with highly organized collective behavior. As David Ohm said of an electron plasma, human history is "a highly organized system which behaves as a whole." | 我们的直觉是，历史有一种命运，而自由意志和决定论是同一现象的两个版本。形成历史的人类互动的行为就像他们被一种命运所告知。 就像电子等离子体，一种密集的电子气体，表现为一个复杂的系统，人类也是如此。电子个体运动的自由原来与高度组织化的集体行为是相容的。正如大卫-欧姆在谈到电子等离子体时所说，人类历史是 "一个高度组织化的系统，其行为是一个整体"。 |
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| Understanding the way the world works means developing a realistic intuition of the way that human society obeys the mathematics of natural processes. Reality is nonlinear But most people's expectations are not. To understand the dynamics of change, you have to recognize that human society, like other complex systems in nature, is characterized by cycles and discontinuities. That means certain features of history have a tendency to repeat themselves, and the most important changes, when they occur, may be abrupt rather than gradual. | 理解世界的运作方式意味着对人类社会服从自然过程的数学的方式形成一种现实的直觉。现实是非线性的，但大多数人的期望却不是。要理解变化的动力，你必须认识到，人类社会和自然界的其他复杂系统一样，具有周期和不连续的特点。这意味着历史的某些特征有重复的趋势，而最重要的变化，当它们发生时，可能是突然的，而不是逐渐的。 |
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| Among the cycles that permeate human life, a mysterious five-hundred- year cycle appears to mark major turning points in the history of Western civilization. As the year 23 2000 approaches, we arc haunted by the strange fact that the final decade of each century divisible by five has marked a profound transition in Western civilization, a pattern of death and rebirth that marks new phases of social organization in much the way that death and birth delineate the cycle of human generations. This has been true since at least 500 B.C., when Greek democracy emerged with the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes in 508 B.C. The following five centuries were a period of growth and intensification of the ancient economy, culminating in the birth of Christ in 4 B.C. This was also the time of the greatest prosperity of the ancient economy, when interest rates reached their lowest level prior to the modern period. | 在贯穿人类生活的各种周期中，一个神秘的五百年周期似乎标志着西方文明历史的重大转折点。随着贰零零零年的到来，我们被一个奇怪的事实所困扰，即每个世纪的最后十年都标志着西方文明的深刻转型，这种死亡和重生的模式标志着社会组织的新阶段，就像死亡和出生划定了人类世代的周期一样。至少从公元前500年开始就是如此，当时希腊民主制度随着公元前508年克利斯提尼的宪法改革而出现。随后的五个世纪是古代经济增长和强化的时期，在公元前4年基督诞生时达到高潮。 |
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| The next five centuries saw a gradual winding down of prosperity, leading to the collapse of the Roman Empire late in the fifth century A.D. William Playfair's summary is worth repeating: "When Rome was at its highest pitch of greatness. ... will be seen to be at the birth of Christ, that is, during the reign of Augustus, and by the same means it will be found declining gradually till the year 490." 16 It was then that the last legions dissolved, and the Western world sank into the Dark Ages. | 在接下来的五个世纪里，繁荣逐渐减弱，导致罗马帝国在公元五世纪末崩溃。"当罗马处于其最伟大的阶段时。......将被视为在基督诞生时，也就是在奥古斯都统治时期，通过同样的方法，将发现它逐渐衰落，直到490年"。16 就在那时，最后一个军团解散了，西方世界陷入了黑暗时代。 |
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| During the following five centuries, the economy withered, long-distance trade ground to a halt, cities were depopulated, money vanished from circulation, and art and literacy almost disappeared. The disappearance of effective law with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West led to the emergence of more primitive arrangements for settling disputes. The blood feud began to be significant at the end of the fifth century. | 在随后的五个世纪里，经济萎缩，长途贸易停滞不前，城市人口减少，货币从流通中消失，艺术和文化几乎消失。随着西方罗马帝国的崩溃，有效法律的消失导致了解决争端的更原始的安排的出现。血仇在五世纪末开始变得重要起来。 |
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| The first recorded incident of trial by ordeal occurred precisely in the year 500. | 第一个有记录的神明审判事件正好发生在500年。 |
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| Once again, a thousand years ago, the final decade of the tenth century witnessed another "tremendous upheaval in social and economic systems." Perhaps the least known of these transitions, the feudal revolution, began at a time of utter economic and political turmoil. In The Transformation of the Year One Thousand, Guy Bois, a professor of medieval history at the University of Paris, claims that this rupture at the end of the tenth century involved the complete collapse of the remnants of ancient institutions, and the emergence of something new out of the anarchy feudalism.' 17 In the words of Raoul Glaber, "It was said that the whole world, with one accord, shook off the tatters of antiquity." 'The new system that suddenly emerged accommodated the slow revival of economic growth. The five centuries now known as the Middle Ages saw a rebirth of money and international trade, along with the rediscovery of arithmetic, literacy and time awareness. | 一千年前，第十世纪的最后十年再次见证了另一场 "社会和经济体系的巨大动荡"。也许这些转型中最不为人所知的是封建革命，它开始于一个彻底的经济和政治动荡的时期。巴黎大学中世纪史教授居伊-布瓦（Guy Bois）在《千禧年的变革》中称，十世纪末的这次断裂涉及到古代制度残余的完全崩溃，以及从无政府的封建主义中出现的新事物'。17用拉乌尔-格拉博的话说，"据说整个世界一致甩掉了古代的破烂。"'突然出现的新制度适应了经济增长的缓慢复苏。现在被称为中世纪的五个世纪见证了货币和国际贸易的重生，以及算术、识字和时间意识的重新发现。 |
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| Then, in the final decade of the fifteenth century, there was yet another turning point. It was then that Europe emerged from the demographic deficit caused by the Black Death and almost immediately began to assert dominion over the rest of the globe. | 然后，在15世纪的最后十年，又出现了一个转折点。就在那时，欧洲摆脱了黑死病造成的人口赤字，几乎立即开始对全球其他地区进行统治。 |
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| The "Gunpowder Revolution," the "Renaissance," and the "Reformation" are names given to different aspects of this transition that ushered in the Modern Age. It was announced with a bang when Charles VIII invaded Italy with new bronze cannon. It involved an opening to the world, epitomized by Columbus sailing to America in 1492. | 火药革命"、"文艺复兴 "和 "宗教改革 "是对这一开创了现代时代的转型的不同方面的命名。当查理八世带着新的青铜大炮入侵意大利时，它以一声巨响宣告了这一点。它涉及到对世界的开放，1492年哥伦布航行到美洲就是一个缩影。 |
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| This opening to the New World launched a push toward the most dramatic economic growth in the experience of humanity. It involved a transformation of physics and astronomy that led to the creation of modern science. And its ideas were disseminated widely with the new technology of the printing press. | 这次对新世界的开放启动了人类经验中最引人注目的经济增长。它涉及物理学和天文学的变革，导致了现代科学的产生。它的思想通过印刷术的新技术得到了广泛传播。 |
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| Now we sit at the threshold of another millennial transformation. We expect it to utterly transform the world, in ways that this book is meant to explain. You would be perfectly within your rights to doubt this, since no cycle that repeats itself only twice in a millennium has demonstrated enough iterations to be statistically significant. Indeed, even much shorter cycles have been viewed skeptically by economists demanding more statistically satisfying proof. "Professor Dennis Robertson once wrote that we had better wait a few centuries before being sure" about the existence of four-year and the eight-to ten-year trade cycles.' 19 By that standard, Professor Robertson would have to suspend judgment for about thirty thousand years to be sure that the five-hundred-year cycle is not a statistical fluke. We are less dogmatic, or more willing to recognize that the patterns of reality are more complex than the static-and linear- equilibrium models of most economists. | 现在我们正坐在另一个千年转型的门槛上。我们期望它能彻底改变世界，而这本书就是要解释这些。你完全有权利怀疑这一点，因为没有任何一个在千年内只重复两次的周期显示出足够的反复，在统计学上是有意义的。事实上，甚至更短的周期也被要求提供更多统计学上令人满意的证据的经济学家们所怀疑。丹尼斯-罗伯逊（Dennis Robertson）教授曾经写道，我们最好等上几个世纪，然后再确定 "四年和八到十年的贸易周期的存在"。19 按照这个标准，罗伯逊教授必须暂停判断大约三万年，才能确定五百年的周期不是统计上的侥幸。我们不那么教条，或者说更愿意承认，现实的模式比大多数经济学家的静态和线性平衡模型更复杂。 |
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| We believe that the coming of the year 2000 marks more than another convenient division along an endless continuum of time. We believe it will be an inflection point between, the Old World and a New World to come. The Industrial Age is rapidly passing. Its technology of mass production has been eclipsed by a new technology of miniaturization. With the new information technology has come a new science of nonlinear dynamics, one whose startling conclusions are mere strands that have yet to be woven together into a comprehensive worldview. We live in the time of the computer, but our dreams are still spun on the loom. We continue to live by the metaphors and thoughts of industrialism. Our politics still straddles the industrial divide between right and left, as mapped by thinkers like Adam Smith and Karl Marx, who died before almost everyone now living was born.\* The industrial worldview, incorporating the operating principles of industrial science, is still the "commonsense ' intuition of educated opinion. | 我们相信，贰零零零年的到来不仅仅是沿着无尽的时间连续体的另一个方便的划分。我们相信它将是旧世界和即将到来的新世界之间的一个拐点。工业时代正在迅速过去。它的大规模生产技术已经被一种新的小型化技术所取代。随着新的信息技术的出现，出现了一门新的非线性动力学科学，其惊人的结论只是一些尚未被编织成一个全面的世界观的线索。我们生活在计算机的时代，但我们的梦想仍然在织布机上旋转。我们继续生活在工业主义的隐喻和思想中。我们的政治仍然横跨左右的工业鸿沟，正如亚当-斯密和卡尔-马克思这样的思想家所描绘的那样，他们几乎在现在活着的所有人出生之前就已经去世了。 |
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| It is our thesis that the "common sense" of the Industrial Age will no longer apply to many areas as the world is transformed. | 我们的观点是，随着世界的转变，工业时代的 "常识 "将不再适用于许多领域。 |
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| More than eighty-five years after the day in 1911 when Oswald Spengler was seized with an intuition of a coming world war and "the decline of the West," we, too, see "a historical change of phase occurring. ... at the point preordained for it hundreds of years ago."20 Like Spengler, we see the impending death of Western civilization, and with it the collapse of the world order that has predominated these past five centuries, ever since Columbus sailed west to open contact with the New World. Yet unlike Spengler we see the birth of a new stage in Western civilization in the coming millennium. | 1911年，奥斯瓦尔德-斯宾格勒对即将到来的世界大战和 "西方的衰落 "产生了直觉，85年后的今天，我们也看到了 "一个历史阶段的变化正在发生。20 与斯宾格勒一样，我们看到了西方文明的死亡迫在眉睫，以及自哥伦布向西航行与新世界建立联系以来，在过去五个世纪中占主导地位的世界秩序的崩溃。然而，与斯宾格勒不同的是，我们看到西方文明的一个新阶段将在未来的千年里诞生。 |