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| CHAPTER 2 METAPOLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN | 第二章 元政治的转变 |
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| HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE | 历史观点 |
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| "In history as in nature, birth and death are equally balanced" -JOHAN HUIZINGA3 | "在历史上和在自然界中，出生和死亡是同样平衡的" - JOHAN HUIZINGA3 |
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| THE WANING OF THE MODERN WORLD | 现代世界的衰落 |
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| In our view, you are witnessing nothing less than the waning of the Modern Age. | 在我们看来，你们正在见证的是现代时代的消亡。 |
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| It is a development driven by a ruthless but hidden logic. More than we commonly understand, more than CNN and the newspapers tell us, the next millennium will no longer be "modern." We say this not to imply that you face a savage or backward future, although that is possible, but to emphasize that the stage of history now opening will be qualitatively different from that into which you were born. | 这是一个由无情但隐藏的逻辑驱动的发展。比我们通常理解的更多，比CNN和报纸告诉我们的更多，下一个千年将不再是 "现代"。我们这样说并不是要暗示你面临一个野蛮或落后的未来，尽管那是可能的，而是要强调，现在开启的历史阶段将与你出生的阶段有质的不同。 |
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| Something new is coming. Just as farming societies differed in kind from hunting-and-gathering bands, and industrial societies differed radically from feudal or yeoman agricultural systems, so the New World to come will mark a radical departure from anything seen before. | 新的东西正在到来。正如农耕社会与狩猎和采集的群体有很大的不同，工业社会与封建或贵族农业系统有很大的不同一样，即将到来的新世界也将标志着与以往任何事物的彻底不同。 |
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| In the new millennium, economic and political life will no longer be organized on a gigantic scale under the domination of the nationstate as it was during the modern centuries. The civilization that brought you world war, the assembly line, social security, income tax, deodorant, and the toaster oven is dying. Deodorant and the toaster oven may survive. The others won't. Like an ancient and once mighty man, the nationstate has a future numbered in years and days, and no longer in centuries and decades. | 在新的千年里，经济和政治生活将不再像现代几个世纪那样，在民族国家的支配下以巨大的规模进行组织。给你带来世界大战、流水线、社会保险、所得税、除臭剂和烤面包机的文明正在消亡。除臭剂和烤面包机可能幸存下来。其他的就不行了。就像一个古老的、曾经强大的人一样，民族国家的未来是以年和日计算的，而不再是以世纪和十年计算的。 |
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| Governments have already lost much of their power to regulate and compel. The collapse of Communism marked the end of a long cycle of five centuries during which magnitude of power overwhelmed efficiency in the organization of government. It was a time when the returns to violence were high and rising. They no longer are. A phase transition of world-historic dimensions has already begun. Indeed, the future Gibbon who chronicles the decline and fall of the once-Modern Age in the next millennium may declare that it had already ended by the time you read this book. Looking back, he may say, as we do, that it ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Or with the death of the Soviet Union in 1991. Either date could come to stand as a defining event in the evolution of civilization, the end of what we now know as the Modern Age. | 政府已经失去了很多监管和强制的权力。共产主义的崩溃标志着一个长达五个世纪的周期的结束，在此期间，权力的大小压倒了政府组织的效率。那时候，暴力的回报率很高，而且还在上升。现在已经不是这样了。一个具有世界历史意义的阶段性转变已经开始。事实上，未来的吉本在下一个千年里记录了曾经的现代时代的衰落和堕落，他可能会宣布，当你读到这本书时，它已经结束了。回顾过去，他可能会说，就像我们一样，它随着1989年柏林墙的倒塌而结束。或者随着1991年苏联的死亡。无论是哪一个日期，都可以作为文明演变中的一个决定性事件，即我们现在所知道的现代时代的结束。 |
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| The fourth stage of human development is coming, and perhaps its least predictable feature is the new name under which it will be known. Call it "PostModern." | 人类发展的第四个阶段即将到来，也许它最不可预测的特征是它将被称为的新名字。称之为 "后现代"。 |
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| Call it the "Cyber Society" or the "Information Age." Or make up your own name. No one knows what conceptual glue will stick a nickname to the next phase of history. | 称其为 "网络社会 "或 "信息时代"。或者自己编造一个名字。没有人知道什么概念性的胶水会给历史的下一个阶段粘上一个绰号。 |
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| We do not even know that the five-hundred-year stretch of history just ending will continue to be thought of as "modem." If future historians know anything about word derivations, it will not be. A more descriptive title might be "The Age of the State" or "The Age of Violence." But such a name would fall outside the temporal spectrum that currently defines the epochs of history. "Modern," according to the 0xford English Dictionary means pertaining to the present and recent times, as distinguished from the remote past.... In historical use commonly applied (in contradiction to ancient and medieval) to the time subsequent to the MIDDLE AGES."4 | 我们甚至不知道刚刚结束的五百年的历史将继续被认为是 "现代"。如果未来的历史学家知道什么是词的衍生，它就不会是。一个更具描述性的标题可能是 "国家的时代 "或 "暴力的时代"。但这样的名称会超出目前定义历史时代的时间范围。根据《0xford英语词典》，"现代 "是指与现在和最近的时代有关，与遥远的过去相区别....。在历史使用中，通常适用于（与古代和中世纪相反）中世纪之后的时间。"4 |
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| Western people consciously thought of themselves as "modern" only when they came to understand that the medieval period was over. Before 1500, no one had ever thought of the feudal centuries as a middle" period in Western civilization. The reason is obvious upon reflection: before an age can reasonably be seen as sandwiched in the "middle" of two other historic epochs, it must have already come to an end. Those living during the feudal centuries could not have imagined themselves as living in a halfway house between antiquity and modem civilization until it dawned on them not just that the medieval period was over, but also that medieval civilization differed dramatically from that of the Dark Ages or antiquity.5 | 西方人只有在认识到中世纪时期已经结束时，才会有意识地认为自己是 "现代 "的。在1500年之前，从来没有人认为封建世纪是西方文明的一个中间 "时期。反思一下，原因是显而易见的：在一个时代可以合理地被视为夹在其他两个历史时代的 "中间 "之前，它必须已经结束了。那些生活在封建世纪的人不可能想象自己生活在古代和现代文明的中间地带，直到他们意识到，不仅中世纪已经结束，而且中世纪的文明与黑暗时代或古代的文明有很大的不同。 |
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| Human cultures have blind spots. We have no vocabulary to describe paradigm changes in the largest boundaries of life, especially those happening around us. | 人类文化有盲点。我们没有词汇来描述生活中最大界限的范式变化，尤其是发生在我们身边的变化。 |
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| Notwithstanding the many dramatic changes that have unfolded since the time of Moses, only a few heretics have bothered to think about how the transitions from one phase of civilization to another actually unfold, How are they triggered? What do they have in common? What patterns can help you tell when they begin and know when they are over? When will Great Britain or the United States come to an end? These are questions for which you would be hard-pressed to find conventional answers. | 尽管自摩西时代以来发生了许多戏剧性的变化，但只有少数异端分子愿意思考从一个文明阶段到另一个文明阶段的过渡究竟是如何展开的，它们是如何触发的？它们有什么共同点？什么模式可以帮助你判断它们何时开始并知道它们何时结束？大不列颠或美国何时会结束？这些问题，你很难找到常规的答案。 |
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| The Taboo on Foresight | 对预见性的禁忌 |
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| To see "outside" an existing system is like being a stagehand trying to force a dialogue with a character in a play. It breaches a convention that helps keep the system functioning. Every social order incorporates among its key taboos the notion that people living in it should not think about how it will end and what rules may prevail in the new system that takes its place. Implicitly, whatever system exists is the last or the only system that will ever exist. Not that this is so baldly stated. Few who have ever read a history book would find such an assumption realistic if it was articulated. Nonetheless, that is the convention that rules the world. Every social system, however strongly or weakly it clings to power, pretends that its rules will never be superseded. They are the last word. Or perhaps the only word. Primitives assume that theirs is the only possible way of organizing life. More economically complicated systems that incorporate a sense of history usually place themselves at its apex. Whether they are Chinese mandarins in the court of the emperor, the Marxist nomenklatura in Stalin's Kremlin, or members of 4 The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 1828. | 在一个现有系统之外看问题，就像一个舞台工作人员试图强行与剧中人物对话一样。它违反了有助于维持系统运作的惯例。每一个社会秩序都包含了一个重要的禁忌，那就是生活在其中的人们不应该考虑它将如何结束，以及在取代它的新系统中可能存在的规则。隐含的是，无论什么系统存在，都是最后的或唯一的系统，将永远存在。并不是说这句话说得很直白。很少有读过历史书的人会认为这样的假设是现实的，如果它被阐明的话。然而，这就是统治世界的惯例。每一个社会体系，无论其对权力的依附有多强或多弱，都假装其规则永远不会被取代。它们是最后一句话。或者说是唯一的说法。原始人认为他们的规则是组织生活的唯一可能方式。在经济上更复杂的系统，包含了历史感，通常将自己置于其顶点。无论他们是皇帝宫廷里的中国吏员，还是斯大林克里姆林宫里的马克思主义名流，或者是4《牛津英语词典》精简版，第一卷（牛津：牛津大学出版社，1971年），第1828页。 |
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| This is true for almost unavoidable reasons. The more apparent it is that a system is nearing an end, the more reluctant people will be to adhere to its laws. Any social organization will therefore tend to discourage or play down analyses that anticipate its demise. This alone helps ensure that history's great transitions are seldom spotted as they happen. If you know nothing else about the future, you can rest assured that dramatic changes will be neither welcomed nor advertised by conventional thinkers. | 这是真的，几乎是不可避免的原因。一个系统越是明显地接近终结，人们就越不愿意遵守它的规律。因此，任何社会组织都会倾向于阻止或淡化那些预计其灭亡的分析。仅仅这一点就有助于确保历史上的重大转变很少在发生时被发现。如果你对未来一无所知，你可以放心，戏剧性的变化既不会受到传统思想家的欢迎，也不会被宣传。 |
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| You cannot depend upon conventional information sources to give you an objective and timely warning about how the world is changing and why. If you wish to understand the great transition now under way, you have little choice but to figure it out for yourself. | 你不能依靠传统的信息来源来给你一个客观和及时的警告，告诉你世界是如何变化的，以及为什么变化。如果你想了解现在正在进行的巨大转变，你几乎没有选择，只能自己去弄清楚。 |
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| Beyond the Obvious | 超越显而易见 |
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| This means looking beyond the obvious. The record shows that even transitions that are undeniably real in retrospect may not be acknowledged for decades or even centuries after they happen. Consider the fall of Rome. It was probably the most important historic development in the first millennium of the Christian era. Yet long after Rome's demise, the fiction that it survived was held out to public view, like Lenin's embalmed corpse. No one who depended upon the pretenses of officials for his understanding of the "news" would have learned that Rome had fallen until long after that information ceased to matter. | 这意味着要超越明显的事实。记录显示，即使是回想起来无可否认是真实的过渡，也可能在发生后的几十年甚至几个世纪内不被承认。考虑一下罗马的衰落。这可能是基督教时代第一个千年中最重要的历史发展。然而，在罗马灭亡后的很长一段时间里，它幸存下来的虚构就像列宁的尸体被防腐处理一样，被公之于众。没有人依靠官员的伪装来了解 "新闻"，直到这些信息不再重要之后，他才会知道罗马已经灭亡。 |
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| The reason was not merely the inadequacy of communications in the ancient world. The outcome would have been much the same had CNN miraculously been in business, running its videotape in September 476. That is when the last Roman emperor in the West, Romulus Augustulus, was captured in Ravenna and forcibly retired to a villa in Campania on a pension. Even if Wolfe Blitzer had been there with minicams recording the news in 476, it is unlikely that he or anyone else would have dared to characterize those events as marking the end of the Roman Empire. That, of course, is exactly what latter historians said happened. CNN editors probably would not have approved a headline story saying "Rome fell this evening." The powers-that-be denied that Rome had fallen. Peddlers of "news" seldom are partisans of controversy in ways that would undermine their own profits. They may be partisan. They may even be outrageously so. But they seldom report conclusions that would convince subscribers to cancel their subscriptions and head for the hills. Which is why few would have reported the fall of Rome even if it had been technologically possible. Experts would have come forth to say that it was ridiculous to speak of Rome falling. To have said otherwise would have been bad for business and, perhaps, bad for the health of those doing the reporting. The powers in late-fifth-century Rome were barbarians, and they denied that Rome had fallen. | 其原因不仅仅是古代世界的通讯不发达。如果CNN奇迹般地开展业务，在476年9月运行其录像带，结果也会差不多。那时候，西方最后一位罗马皇帝罗慕路斯-奥古斯都鲁斯在拉文纳被俘，被迫退居到坎帕尼亚的一栋别墅里领取退休金。即使沃尔夫-布利策在476年用微型摄像机记录了新闻，他或其他人也不可能敢把这些事件定性为标志着罗马帝国的结束。当然，这正是后世历史学家所说的情况。美国有线电视新闻网（CNN）的编辑可能不会批准一个标题故事，说 "罗马今天晚上灭亡"。当权者否认罗马已经灭亡。兜售 "新闻 "的人很少会以破坏自己利益的方式参与争论。他们可能是党派人士。他们甚至可能是离谱的。但他们很少报道会说服订户取消订阅并前往山头的结论。这就是为什么即使在技术上有可能，也很少有人会报道罗马的灭亡。专家们会站出来说，谈论罗马的衰落是荒谬的。如果不这样说，就会对生意不利，也许对报道者的健康不利。五世纪末的罗马的势力是野蛮人，他们否认罗马已经灭亡。 |
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| But it was not merely a case of authorities' saying, "Don't report this or we will kill you." Part of the problem was that Rome was already so degenerate by the later decades of the fifth century that its "fall" genuinely eluded the notice of most people who lived through it. In fact, it was a generation later before Count Marcellinus first suggested that "The Western Roman Empire perished with this Augustulus."6 Many more decades passed, perhaps centuries, before there was a common acknowledgment that the Roman Empire in the West no longer existed. Certainly Charlemagne believed that he was a legitimate Roman emperor in the year 800. | 但这不仅仅是当局说："不要报告这个，否则我们会杀了你 "的情况。部分问题是，罗马在五世纪后期已经如此堕落，以至于它的 "衰落 "真正躲过了大多数人的注意。事实上，在一代人之后，马凯利努斯伯爵才第一次提出 "西罗马帝国与这个奥古斯都鲁斯一起灭亡 "6。 又过了几十年，也许是几个世纪，人们才普遍承认西方的罗马帝国已经不复存在。当然，查理曼认为他是800年的合法罗马皇帝。 |
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| The point is not that Charlemagne and all who thought in conventional terms about the Roman Empire after 476 were fools. To the contrary. The characterization of social developments is frequently ambiguous. When the power of predominant institutions is brought into the bargain to reinforce a convenient conclusion, even one based largely on pretense, only someone of strong character and strong opinions would dare contradict it. If you try to put yourself in the position of a Roman of the late fifth century, it is easy to imagine how tempting it would have been to conclude that nothing had changed. That certainty was the optimistic conclusion. To have thought otherwise might have been frightening. And why come to a frightening conclusion when a reassuring one was at hand? | 重点不是说查理曼大帝和所有在476年后以传统方式思考罗马帝国的人都是傻瓜。恰恰相反。社会发展的特征经常是模糊不清的。当占主导地位的机构的力量被带入交易，以加强一个方便的结论，甚至是一个主要基于伪装的结论时，只有性格坚强和意见强烈的人才敢于反驳它。如果你试着把自己放在五世纪末的罗马人的位置上，很容易想象得出什么都没有改变的结论会是多么诱人。这种确定性是一种乐观的结论。如果不这样想，可能会让人感到害怕。既然一个令人放心的结论就在眼前，为什么还要得出一个令人恐惧的结论呢？ |
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| After all, a case could have been made that business would continue as usual. It had in the past. The Roman army, and particularly the frontier garrisons, had been barbarized for centuries.7 By the third century, it had become regular practice for the army to proclaim a new emperor. By the fourth century, even officers were Germanized and frequently illiterate.8 There had been many violent overthrows of emperors before Romulus Augustulus was removed from the throne. His departure might have seemed no different to his contemporaries than many other upheavals in a chaotic time. And he was sent packing with a pension. The very fact that he received a pension, even for a brief period before he was murdered, was a reassurance that the system survived. To an optimist, Odoacer, who deposed Romulus Augustulus, reunified rather than destroyed the empire. A son of Attila's sidekick Edecon, Odoacer was a clever man. He did not proclaim himself emperor. Instead, he convened the Senate and prevailed upon its too-suggestible members that they offer the emperorship and thus sovereignty over the whole empire to Zeno, the Eastern emperor in faraway Byzantium. Odoacer was merely to be Zeno's patricius to govern Italy. | 毕竟，有理由认为业务将继续如常进行。过去也是如此。罗马军队，特别是边境驻军，几个世纪以来一直处于野蛮状态。7到了第三世纪，军队宣布新皇帝已经成为惯例。到了第四世纪，甚至连军官都被日耳曼化了，而且经常是文盲。8 在罗穆卢斯-奥古斯都鲁斯被赶下王位之前，已经有很多暴力推翻皇帝的事件发生。在他的同时代人看来，他的离开与混乱时期的许多其他动乱没有什么不同。他是带着养老金被送走的。他获得了养老金，甚至在他被谋杀前的短暂时期内，这一事实本身就是对该系统幸存的一种保证。对一个乐观主义者来说，废黜罗穆卢斯-奥古斯都鲁斯的奥多亚克重新统一了帝国，而不是摧毁了帝国。作为阿提拉的跟班艾德康的儿子，奥多亚克是个聪明人。他没有宣布自己为皇帝。相反，他召集元老院，说服元老院成员将皇帝职位以及整个帝国的主权提供给远在拜占庭的东方皇帝芝诺。奥多亚克只是作为芝诺的宗主国来管理意大利。 |
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| As Will Durant wrote in The Story of Civilization, these changes did not appear to be the "fall of Rome" but merely "negligible shifts on the surface of the national scene." 7 | 正如威尔-杜兰特在《文明的故事》中写道，这些变化似乎并不是 "罗马的衰落"，而只是 "在国家舞台的表面发生了可以忽略不计的变化"。7 |
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| When Rome fell, Odoacer said that Rome endured. He, along with almost everyone else, was keen to pretend that nothing had changed. They knew that "the glory that was Rome" was far better than the barbarism that was taking its place. Even the barbarians thought so. As C. W. Previte-Orton wrote in The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, 6 Ibid., p. 102. | 当罗马沦陷时，奥多亚克说，罗马经久不衰。他和几乎所有其他人一样，都热衷于假装什么都没有改变。他们知道，"罗马的荣耀 "远比取而代之的野蛮好。甚至连野蛮人也这样认为。正如C.W. Previte-Orton在《剑桥中世纪简史》中写道，6同上，第102页。 |
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| "Persistent make-believe" | "坚持不懈的虚构" |
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| This "make-believe" involved the preservation of the facade of the old system, even as its essence was "deformed by barbarism."9 The old forms of government remained the same when the last emperor was replaced by a barbarian "lieutenant." The Senate still met. "The praetorian prefecture and other high offices continued, and were held by eminent Romans." Consuls were still nominated for a year "The Roman civil administration survived intact." Indeed, in some ways it remained intact until the birth of feudalism at the end of the tenth century. On public occasions, the old imperial insignia was still employed. Christianity was still the state religion. The barbarians still pretended to owe fealty to the Eastern emperor in Constantinople, and to the traditions of Roman law. In fact, in Durant's words, "in the West the great Empire was no more." | 这种 "虚构 "包括保留旧制度的外表，即使其本质 "被野蛮所扭曲"。9 当最后一个皇帝被野蛮的 "中尉 "取代时，旧的政府形式仍然保持不变。元老院仍在开会。"大法官和其他高级职位继续存在，并由杰出的罗马人担任"。执政官仍然被提名一年，"罗马的民事管理部门完整地存活下来"。的确，在某些方面，它一直保持完整，直到十世纪末封建主义的诞生。在公共场合，旧的帝国徽章仍然被使用。基督教仍然是国家宗教。蛮族仍然假装对君士坦丁堡的东方皇帝和罗马法律的传统表示效忠。事实上，用杜兰特的话说，"在西方，伟大的帝国已经不复存在"。 |
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| So What? | 那又怎样？ |
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| The faraway example of the fall of Rome is relevant for a number of reasons as you contemplate conditions in the world today. Most books about the future are really books about the present. We have sought to remedy that defect by making this book about the future first of all a book about the past. We think that you are likely to draw a better perspective about what the future has in store if we illustrate important megapolitical points about the logic of violence with real examples from the past. | 在你思考当今世界的状况时，罗马灭亡这个遥远的例子有许多相关的原因。大多数关于未来的书实际上是关于现在的书。我们试图弥补这一缺陷，使这本关于未来的书首先成为一本关于过去的书。我们认为，如果我们用过去的真实例子来说明关于暴力逻辑的重要的大政治观点，你就有可能对未来的情况有更好的看法。 |
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| History is an amazing teacher The stories it has to tell are more interesting than any we could make up. And many of the more interesting relate to the fall of Rome. They document important lessons that could be relevant to your future in the Information Age. | 历史是一位神奇的老师，它所讲述的故事比我们所编造的任何故事都要有趣。而许多更有趣的故事都与罗马的灭亡有关。它们记录了重要的教训，可能与你在信息时代的未来有关。 |
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| First of all, the fall of Rome is one of history's more vivid examples of what happened in a major transition when the scale of government was collapsing. The transitions of the year 1000 also involved the collapse of central authority, and did so in a way that increased the complexity and scope of economic activity. The Gunpowder Revolution at the end of the fifteenth century involved major changes in institutions that tended to raise rather than shrink the scale of governance. Today, for the first time in a thousand years, megapolitical conditions in the West are undermining and destroying governments and many other institutions that operate on a large scale. | 首先，罗马的衰落是历史上更生动的例子之一，说明了在政府规模崩溃的重大转型中发生了什么。1000年的过渡也涉及中央权力的崩溃，而且是以增加经济活动的复杂性和范围的方式进行的。十五世纪末的火药革命涉及机构的重大变化，这些变化倾向于提高而不是缩小治理的规模。今天，一千年来第一次，西方的巨型政治条件正在破坏和摧毁政府和许多其他大规模运作的机构。 |
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| Of course, the collapse in the scale of governance at the end of the Roman Empire had very different causes from those existing at the advent of the Information Age. Part of the reason that Rome fell is simply that it had expanded beyond the scale at which the economies of violence could be maintained. The cost of garrisoning the empire's far- flung borders exceeded the economic advantages that an ancient agricultural economy could support. The burden of taxation and regulation required to finance the military effort rose to exceed the carrying capacity of the economy. Corruption became endemic. | 当然，罗马帝国末期治理规模的崩溃，与信息时代到来时存在的原因非常不同。罗马灭亡的部分原因是，它的扩张已经超出了暴力经济可以维持的规模。在帝国遥远的边界驻军的成本超过了古代农业经济所能支持的经济优势。为军事行动提供资金所需的税收和监管负担上升到超过经济的承载能力。腐败成为普遍现象。 |
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| A large part of the effort of military commanders, as historian Ramsay MacMullen has 30 documented, was devoted to pursuit of "illicit profits of their command." '~ This they pursued by shaking down the population, what the fourth- century observer Synesius described as "the peace-time war, one almost worse than the barbarian war and arising from the military's indiscipline and the officers' greed." 14 | 正如历史学家拉姆斯-麦克马伦（Ramsay MacMullen）所记录的那样，军事指挥官的很大一部分努力都是为了追求 "其指挥的非法利润"。'~他们通过震慑民众来追求，这就是四世纪的观察家Synesius所描述的 "和平时期的战争，一个几乎比野蛮人的战争更糟糕的战争，是由军队的不守纪律和军官的贪婪所引起的"。14 |
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| Another important contributing factor to Rome's collapse was a demographic deficit caused by the Antonine plagues. The coil apse of the Roman population in many areas obviously contributed to economic and military weakness. Nothing of that kind has happened today, at least not yet. Taking a longer view, perhaps. the scourge of new "plagues" will compound the challenges of technological devolution in the new millennium. The unprecedented bulge in human population in the twentieth century creates a tempting target for rapidly mutating microparasites. Fears about the Ebola virus, or something like it, invading metropolitan populations may be well founded. But this is not the place to consider the coevolution of humans and diseases. As interesting a topic as that is, our argument at this juncture is not about why Rome fell, or even about whether the world today is vulnerable to some of the same influences that contributed to Roman decline. It is about something different-namely, the way that history's great transformations are perceived, or rather, misperceived as they happen. | 导致罗马崩溃的另一个重要因素是安东尼时代的瘟疫所造成的人口赤字。许多地区的罗马人口的线圈apse显然促成了经济和军事的衰弱。这种情况在今天没有发生，至少还没有。从更长远的角度来看，也许。新 "瘟疫 "的祸害将加剧新千年的技术演进的挑战。二十世纪人类人口的空前激增为快速变异的微型寄生虫创造了一个诱人的目标。对埃博拉病毒或类似病毒入侵大都市人口的担忧可能是有道理的。但这里不是考虑人类和疾病的共同进化的地方。尽管这是个有趣的话题，但我们在这个时刻的争论不是关于罗马为什么会衰落，甚至不是关于今天的世界是否容易受到一些导致罗马衰落的相同影响。它是关于一些不同的东西--即，历史上的伟大变革被感知的方式，或者说，在它们发生时被误解的方式。 |
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| People are always and everywhere to some degree conservative, with a small "C." | 人们在某种程度上总是和在任何地方都是保守的，有一个小 "C"。 |
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| That implies a reluctance to think in terms of dissolving venerable social conventions, overturning the accepted institutions, and defying the laws and values from which they drew their bearings. Few are inclined to imagine that apparently minor changes in climate or technology or some other variable can somehow be responsible for severing connections to the world of their fathers. The Romans were reluctant to acknowledge the changes unfolding around them. So are we. | 这意味着他们不愿意从解散可敬的社会习俗、推翻公认的制度、违抗他们赖以生存的法律和价值观的角度来思考问题。很少有人倾向于想象，气候、技术或其他一些变量的明显细微变化会以某种方式切断与他们父辈世界的联系。罗马人不愿意承认他们周围正在发生的变化。我们也是如此。 |
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| Yet recognize it or not, we are living through a change of historical season, a transformation in the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves that is so profound that it will inevitably transform the whole of society. The change will be so profound, in fact, that to understand it will require taking almost nothing for granted. | 然而，不管你承认与否，我们正在经历一场历史性的变革，一场人们组织生计和保护自己的方式的变革，这种变革是如此深刻，以至于它将不可避免地改变整个社会。事实上，这种变化将是如此深刻，以至于要理解它，就必须几乎不把任何事情视为理所当然。 |
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| You will be invited at almost every turn to believe that the coming Information Societies will be very like the industrial society you grew tip in. We doubt it. Microprocessing will dissolve the mortar in the bricks. It will so profoundly alter the logic of violence that it will dramatically change the way people organize their livelihoods and defend themselves, Yet the tendency will be to downplay the inevitability of these changes, or to argue about their desirability as if it were within the fiat of industrial institutions to determine how history evolves. | 你几乎每次都会被邀请去相信，即将到来的信息社会将非常像你成长的工业社会。我们对此表示怀疑。微处理将使砖块中的灰泥溶解。它将如此深刻地改变暴力的逻辑，以至于它将极大地改变人们组织他们的生计和保护自己的方式。然而，人们倾向于淡化这些变化的必然性，或者争论它们的可取性，好像决定历史如何演变的是工业机构的命令。 |
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| The Grand Illusion | 大幻象 |
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| Authors who are in many ways better informed than we are will nevertheless lead you astray in thinking about the future because they are far too superficial in examining how societies work. For example, David Kline and Daniel Burstein have written a well-researched volume entitled Road Warriors: Dreams and Nightmares Along the Information highway It is full of admirable detail, but much of this detail is marshaled in 31 | 在许多方面比我们更了解情况的作者，却会在思考未来时将你引入歧途，因为他们在研究社会如何运作时过于肤浅。例如，大卫-克莱恩和丹尼尔-伯斯汀写了一本经过充分研究的书，名为《公路勇士》。这本书充满了令人钦佩的细节，但其中大部分细节都被归纳为31条。 |
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| highway It is full of admirable detail, but much of this detail is marshaled in 31 arguing an illusion, the idea "that citizens can act together, consciously, to shape the spontaneous economic and natural processes going on around them." Although it may not be obvious, this is equivalent to saying that feudalism might have survived if everyone had rededicated himself to chivalry. No one in a court of the late fifteenth century would have objected to such a sentiment. Indeed, it would have been heresy to do so. But it also would have been entirely misleading, an example of the snake trying to fit the future into its old skin. | 公路 它充满了令人钦佩的细节，但这些细节大部分是在31日论证一种幻觉，即 "公民可以有意识地一起行动，塑造他们周围自发的经济和自然进程 "的想法。虽然这可能不是很明显，但这相当于说，如果每个人都重新致力于骑士精神，封建主义可能会生存下去。在15世纪末的法庭上，没有人会反对这种观点。事实上，这样做是异端邪说。但这也完全是一种误导，是蛇试图把未来装进它的旧皮囊的一个例子。 |
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| The most profound causes of change are precisely those that are not subject to conscious control. They are the factors that alter the conditions under which violence pays. Indeed, they are so remote from any obvious means of manipulation that they are not even subjects of political maneuvering in a world saturated with politics. No one ever marched in a demonstration shouting, "Increase scale economies in the production process." No banner has ever demanded, "Invent a weapons system that increases the importance of the infantry." No candidate ever promised to "alter the balance between efficiency and magnitude in protection against violence." Such slogans would be ridiculous, precisely because their goals are beyond the capacity of anyone to consciously affect. Yet as we will explore, these variables determine how the world works to a far greater degree than any political platform. | 变化的最深刻的原因正是那些不受意识控制的原因。它们是改变暴力发生条件的因素。事实上，它们与任何明显的操纵手段相距甚远，在一个充满政治的世界里，它们甚至不是政治操纵的对象。从来没有人在游行中高喊："提高生产过程中的规模经济"。从来没有人打着横幅要求："发明一种武器系统，提高步兵的重要性"。从未有候选人承诺 "改变保护暴力的效率和规模之间的平衡"。这样的口号将是荒谬的，正是因为它们的目标是任何人都无法有意识地影响的。然而，正如我们将探讨的那样，这些变量决定了世界如何运作，其程度远远超过任何政治纲领。 |
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| If you think about it carefully, it should be obvious that important transitions in history seldom are driven primarily by human wishes. They do not happen because people get fed up with one way of life and suddenly prefer another A moment's reflection suggests why. If what people think and desire were the only determinants of what happens, then all the abrupt changes in history would have to be explained by wild mood swings unconnected to any change in the actual conditions of life. in fact, this never happens. Only in cases of medical problems affecting a few people do we see arbitrary fluctuations in mood that appear entirely divorced from any objective cause. | 如果你仔细想一想，应该很明显，历史上的重要转变很少主要由人类的愿望驱动。它们的发生并不是因为人们厌倦了一种生活方式而突然喜欢另一种生活方式。如果人们的想法和愿望是所发生事情的唯一决定因素，那么历史上所有的突然变化都将不得不被解释为与实际生活条件的任何变化毫无关系的情绪波动。只有在影响少数人的医疗问题的情况下，我们才会看到情绪的任意波动，似乎完全脱离了任何客观原因。 |
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| As a rule, large numbers of people do not suddenly and all at once decide to abandon their way of life simply because they find it amusing to do so. No forager ever said, "I am tired of living in prehistoric times, I would prefer the life of a peasant in a farming village." Any decisive swing in patterns of behavior and values is invariably a response to an actual change in the conditions of life. In this sense, at least, people are always realistic. If their views do change abruptly, it probably indicates that they have been confronted by some departure from familiar conditions: an invasion, a plague, a sudden climatic shift, or a technological revolution that alters their livelihoods or their ability to defend themselves. | 一般来说，大量的人不会突然一下子决定放弃他们的生活方式，仅仅是因为他们觉得这样做很有趣。从来没有一个觅食者说："我已经厌倦了生活在史前时代，我更愿意过农耕村的农民生活。"行为模式和价值观念的任何决定性摇摆无一例外地是对生活条件的实际变化的反应。至少在这个意义上，人们总是现实的。如果他们的观点确实发生了突然的变化，那可能表明他们遇到了一些偏离熟悉条件的情况：入侵、瘟疫、气候的突然变化，或者改变他们生计或自我保护能力的技术革命。 |
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| Far from being the product of human desire, decisive historic changes more often than not confound the wish of most people for stability. When change occurs, it typically causes widespread disorientation, especially among those who lose income or social status. You will look in vain at public opinion polls or other measures of mood for an understanding of how the coming megapolitical transition is likely to unfold. | 决定性的历史变革远不是人类欲望的产物，它往往会混淆大多数人对稳定的愿望。当变化发生时，它通常会引起广泛的迷失，特别是在那些失去收入或社会地位的人中。你会徒劳地从民意调查或其他衡量情绪的方法中了解即将到来的大政治过渡可能会如何展开。 |
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| L1FE WITHOUT FORESIGHT | 无先见之明的l1fe |
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| If we fail to perceive the great transition going on around us, it is partly because we do not desire to see. Our foraging forebears may have been just as obdurate, but they had a better excuse. No one ten thousand years ago could have foreseen the consequences of the Agricultural Revolution. In-deed, no one could have foreseen much of anything beyond where to find the next meal. When farming began, there was no record of past events from which to draw perspective on the future. There was not even a Western sense of time divided into orderly units, like seconds, minutes, hours, days, and so on, to measure out the years. Foragers lived in the "eternal present," without calendars, and indeed, without written records at all. They had no science, and no other intellectual apparatus for understanding cause and effect beyond their own intuitions. | 如果我们未能察觉到我们周围正在发生的巨大转变，部分原因是我们不希望看到。我们觅食的祖先可能同样顽固不化，但他们有更好的借口。一万年前，没有人能够预见到农业革命的后果。事实上，除了在哪里找到下一顿饭之外，没有人能够预见到任何东西。当农耕开始时，没有任何关于过去事件的记录可以用来透视未来。甚至没有西方的时间观念，将时间分为有序的单位，如秒、分、小时、日等等，来衡量年限。觅食者生活在 "永恒的现在"，没有日历，实际上，根本没有书面记录。他们没有科学，除了他们自己的直觉之外，没有其他智力设备来理解因果关系。 |
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| When it came to looking ahead, our primeval ancestors were blind. To cite the biblical metaphor, they had not yet eaten of the fruit of knowledge. | 当谈到展望未来时，我们的原始祖先是盲目的。引用《圣经》中的比喻，他们还没有吃过知识的果实。 |
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| Learning from the Past | 向过去学习 |
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| Luckily, we have a better vantage point. The past five hundred generations have given us analytic capabilities that our forebears lacked. Science and mathematics have helped unlock many of nature's secrets, giving us an understanding of cause and effect that approaches the magical when compared to that of the early foragers. Computational algorithms developed as a result of high-speed computers have shed new insights on the workings of complex, dynamic systems like the human economy. The painstaking development of political economy itself{ although it falls well short of perfection, has honed understanding of the factors informing human action. Important among these is the recognition that people at all times and places tend to respond to incentives. Not always as mechanically as economists imagine, but they do respond. Costs and rewards matter. Changes in external conditions that raise the rewards or lower the costs of certain behavior will lead to more of that behavior, other things being equal. | 幸运的是，我们有一个更好的有利条件。过去500代人给了我们祖先所缺乏的分析能力。科学和数学帮助我们解开了自然界的许多秘密，使我们对因果关系的理解与早期觅食者的理解相比，接近神奇。由于高速计算机的发展，计算算法对人类经济等复杂动态系统的运作有了新的认识。政治经济学本身的艰辛发展{尽管它远未达到完美的程度，但却磨练了对人类行动的因素的理解。其中很重要的一点是，人们在任何时候和任何地方都倾向于对激励作出反应。虽然并不总是像经济学家想象的那样机械，但他们确实做出了反应。成本和回报很重要。在其他条件相同的情况下，提高奖励或降低某些行为的成本的外部条件的变化将导致更多的这种行为。 |
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| Incentives Matter | 激励措施很重要 |
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| The fact that people tend to respond to costs and rewards is an essential element of forecasting. You can say with a high degree of confidence that if you drop a hundred-dollar bill on the street, someone will soon pick it up, whether you are in New York, Mexico City, or Moscow. This is not as trivial as it seems. It shows why the clever people who say that forecasting is impossible are wrong. Any forecast that accurately anticipates the impact of incentives on behavior is likely to be broadly correct. And the greater the anticipated change in costs and rewards, the less trivial the implied forecast is likely to be. | 人们倾向于对成本和回报做出反应这一事实是预测的一个基本要素。你可以很有把握地说，如果你在街上扔下一张百元大钞，不管你是在纽约、墨西哥城还是莫斯科，很快就会有人捡到它。这并不像它看起来那样微不足道。它说明了为什么那些说预测是不可能的聪明人是错误的。任何准确预测激励措施对行为的影响的预测都可能是广泛正确的。而且，预期的成本和回报的变化越大，隐含的预测就越不琐碎。 |
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| The most far-reaching forecasts of all are likely to arise from recognizing the implications of shifting megapolitical variables. Violence is the ultimate boundary force on behavior; thus, if you can understand how the logic of violence will change, you can usefully predict where people will be dropping or picking up the equivalent of one-hundred-dollar bills in the future. | 最具深远意义的预测可能来自于对大政治变量变化的影响的认识。暴力是行为的最终边界力量；因此，如果你能理解暴力的逻辑将如何变化，你就可以有效地预测人们在未来将在哪里丢弃或捡起相当于一百美元的钞票。 |
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| We do not mean by this that you can know the unknowable. We cannot tell you how to forecast winning lottery numbers or any truly random event. We have no way of knowing when or whether a terrorist will detonate an atomic blast in Manhattan. Or if an asteroid will strike Saudi Arabia. We cannot predict the coming of a new Ice Age, a sudden volcanic eruption, or the emergence of a new disease. The number of unknowable events that could alter the course of history is large. But knowing the unknowable is very different from drawing out the implications of what is already known. If you see a flash of lightning far away, you can forecast with a high degree of confidence that a thunderclap is due. Forecasting the consequences of megapolitical transitions involves much longer time frames, and less certain connections, but it is a similar kind of exercise. | 我们这样说并不是说你可以知道不可知的东西。我们不能告诉你如何预测彩票中奖号码或任何真正的随机事件。我们没有办法知道恐怖分子何时或是否会在曼哈顿引爆原子弹爆炸。或者，如果一颗小行星会袭击沙特阿拉伯。我们无法预测一个新的冰河时期的到来，一个突然的火山爆发，或一种新疾病的出现。可能改变历史进程的不可知事件的数量是很大的。但是，了解不可知的事情与引出已经知道的事情的影响是非常不同的。如果你在很远的地方看到一道闪电，你可以很有把握地预测到雷声即将到来。预测大政治过渡的后果涉及更长的时间框架，以及不那么确定的联系，但这是一种类似的工作。 |
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| Megapolitical catalysts for change usually appear well before their consequences manifest themselves. It took five thousand years for the full implications of the Agricultural Revolution to come to the surface. The transition from an agricultural society to an industrial society based on manufacturing and chemical power unfolded more quickly. It took centuries. The transition to the Information Society will happen more rapidly still, probably within a lifetime. Yet even allowing for the foreshortening of history, you can expect decades to pass before the full megapolitical impact of existing information technology is realized. | 大规模政治变革的催化剂通常在其后果表现出来之前就已经出现。农业革命的全部影响花了五千年的时间才浮出水面。从农业社会向基于制造业和化学力量的工业社会的过渡发展得更快。它花了几个世纪。向信息社会的过渡将更加迅速，可能在一生中就会发生。然而，即使考虑到历史的缩短，你也可以预期在现有的信息技术的全部巨大政治影响被实现之前，还有几十年时间。 |
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| Major and Minor Megapolitical Transitions | 主要和次要的大政治过渡 |
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| This chapter analyzes some of the common features of megapolitical transitions. | 本章分析了巨型政治过渡的一些共同特征。 |
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| In following chapters we look more closely at the Agricultural Revolution, and the transition from farm to factory, the second of the previous great phase changes. Within the agricultural stage of civilization there were many minor megapolitical transitions such as the fall of Rome and the feudal revolution of the year I 0OO~ These marked the waxing and waning of the power equation as governments rose and fell and the spoils of farming passed from one set of hands to another. The owners of sprawling estates under the Roman Empire, yeoman farmers in the European Dark Ages, and the lords and serfs of the feudal period all ate grain from the same fields. They lived under very different governments because of the cumulative impact of different technologies, fluctuations in climate, and the disruptive influences of disease. | 在接下来的章节中，我们将更仔细地研究农业革命，以及从农场到工厂的过渡，这是前几个大阶段变化中的第二个。在文明的农业阶段，有许多小规模的政治过渡，如罗马的衰落和I 0OO年的封建革命~这些标志着权力等式的消长，因为政府的兴衰和农业的战利品从一伙人手中转移到另一伙人手中。罗马帝国时期庞大的庄园主，欧洲黑暗时代的贵族农民，以及封建时期的领主和农奴，都吃着同样田地里的粮食。由于不同技术的累积影响、气候的波动和疾病的破坏性影响，他们生活在非常不同的政府之下。 |
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| Our purpose is not to thoroughly explain all of these changes. We do not pretend to do so, although we have sketched out some illustrations of the way that changing megapolitical variables have altered the way that power was exercised in the past. | 我们的目的不是要彻底解释所有这些变化。我们并不打算这样做，尽管我们已经勾勒出一些例子，说明不断变化的大政治变量是如何改变过去行使权力的方式的。 |
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| Governments have grown and shrunk as megapolitical fluctuations have lowered and raised the costs of projecting power. | 随着巨大的政治波动降低和提高了投射权力的成本，政府也在增长和缩小。 |
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| Here are some summary points that you should keep in mind as you seek to understand the Information Revolution: 34 1. | 以下是你在寻求了解信息革命时应该牢记的一些摘要要点。34 1. |
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| A shift in the megapolitical foundations of power normally unfolds far in advance of the actual revolutions in the use of power. | 权力的大政治基础的转变通常在权力使用的实际革命之前就已经展开了。 |
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| Incomes are usually falling when a major transition begins, often because a society has rendered itself crisis-prone by marginalizing resources due to population pressures. | 当一个重大的转型开始时，收入通常会下降，这通常是因为一个社会由于人口的压力而使资源边缘化，从而使自己容易出现危机。 |
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| Seeing "outside" of a system is usually taboo. People are frequently blind to the logic of violence in the existing society; therefore, they are almost always blind to changes in that logic, latent or overt. Megapolitical transitions are seldom recognized before they happen. | 看到一个系统的 "外部 "通常是禁忌。人们经常对现有社会的暴力逻辑视而不见；因此，他们几乎总是对这种逻辑的变化视而不见，无论是潜在的还是公开的。大规模的政治转型在发生之前很少被认识到。 |
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| Major transitions always involve a cultural revolution, and usually entail clashes between adherents of the old and new values. | 重大的转型总是涉及到文化革命，而且通常会引起新旧价值观的信徒之间的冲突。 |
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| Megapolitical transitions are never popular, because they antiquate painstakingly acquired intellectual capital and confound established moral imperatives. They are not undertaken by popular demand, but in response to changes in the external conditions that alter the logic of violence in the local setting. | 大规模的政治转型从来都不受欢迎，因为它们使辛苦获得的知识资本过时，并使既定的道德要求变得混乱。它们不是由民众要求进行的，而是对改变当地环境中暴力逻辑的外部条件变化的回应。 |
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| Transitions to new ways of organizing livelihoods or new types of government are initially confined to those areas where the megapolitical catalysts are at work. | 向新的生计组织方式或新的政府类型的过渡，最初只限于那些大政治催化剂发挥作用的地区。 |
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| With the possible exception of the early stages of farming, past transitions have always involved periods of social chaos and heightened violence due to disorientation and breakdown of the old system. | 除了农业的早期阶段可能是个例外，过去的过渡期总是涉及到社会混乱和暴力加剧的时期，原因是旧制度的混乱和崩溃。 |
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| Corruption, moral decline, and inefficiency appear to be signal features of the final stages of a system. | 腐败、道德滑坡和效率低下似乎是一个系统最后阶段的信号特征。 |
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| The growing importance of technology in shaping the logic of violence has led to an acceleration of history, leaving each successive transition with less adaptive time than ever before. | 技术在塑造暴力逻辑方面越来越重要，这导致了历史的加速，使每一个连续的过渡期的适应时间都比以前少。 |
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| History Speeds Up | 历史的步伐加快了 |
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| With events unfolding many times faster than during previous transformations, early understanding of how the world will change could turn out to be far more useful to you than it would have been to your ancestors at an equivalent juncture in the past. Even if the first farmers had miraculously understood the full megapolitical implications of tilling the earth, this information would have been practically useless because thousands of years were to pass before the transition to the new phase of society was complete. | 随着事件的发展比以前的转变快了许多倍，对世界将如何变化的早期理解对你来说可能会比在过去的同等时刻对你的祖先更有用。即使第一批农民奇迹般地理解了耕种地球的全部巨大政治影响，这些信息实际上也是无用的，因为在完成向社会新阶段的过渡之前，还需要数千年的时间。 |
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| Not so today. History has sped up. Forecasts that correctly anticipate the megapolitical implications of new technology are likely to be far more useful today. If we can develop the implications of the current transition to the Information Society to the same extent that someone with current knowledge could have grasped the implications of past transitions to farm and factory, that information should be many times more valuable now. Put simply, the action horizon for megapolitical forecasts has shrunk to its most useful range, within the span of a single lifetime. | 今天却不是这样。历史已经加速了。正确预测新技术的巨大政治影响的预测，在今天可能要有用得多。如果我们能把目前向信息社会转型的影响发展到与拥有目前知识的人能够掌握过去向农场和工厂转型的影响一样的程度，那么这些信息现在的价值应该会高很多倍。简单地说，巨型政治预测的行动范围已经缩减到最有用的范围，即在一个人的一生中。 |
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| "Looking back over the centuries, or even f looking only at the present, we can clearly observe that many men have made their living, Often a very good living, from their special skill in 35 applying weapons of violence, and that their activities have had a very large part in determining what uses were made of scarce resources." FREDERIC C. LANE | "回顾几个世纪以来，或者甚至只看现在，我们可以清楚地看到，许多人靠他们在35种暴力武器方面的特殊技能谋生，而且他们的活动在决定如何利用稀缺资源方面发挥了非常大的作用。"弗雷德里克-C-莱恩 |
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| Our study of megapolitics is an attempt to do just that-to draw out the implications of the changing factors that alter the boundaries where violence is exercised. | 我们对大政治的研究就是试图做到这一点--引出改变行使暴力的边界的变化因素的影响。 |
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| These megapolitical factors largely determine when and where violence pays. They also help inform the market distribution of income. As economic historian Frederic Lane so clearly put it, how violence is organized and controlled plays a large role in determining "what uses are made of scarce resources. | 这些大政治因素在很大程度上决定了暴力何时何地发生。它们也有助于为收入的市场分配提供信息。正如经济史学家弗雷德里克-莱恩（Frederic Lane）明确指出的那样，如何组织和控制暴力在决定 "如何利用稀缺资源 "方面起着很大作用。 |
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| A CRASH COURSE IN MEGAPOLITICS | 大政治的速成课程 |
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| The concept of megapolitics is a powerful one. It helps illuminate some of the major mysteries of history: how governments rise and fall and what types of institutions they become; the timing and outcome of wars; patterns of economic prosperity and decline. By raising or lowering the costs and rewards of projecting power, megapolitics governs the ability of people to impose their will on others. This has been true from the earliest human societies onward. It still is. We explored many of the important hidden megapolitical factors that determine the evolution of history in Blood in the Streets and The Great Reckoning. The key to unlocking the implications of megapolitical change is understanding the factors that precipitate revolutions in the use of violence. These variables can be somewhat arbitrarily grouped into four categories: topography, climate, microbes, and technology. | 大政治的概念是一个强有力的概念。它有助于阐明历史上的一些主要谜团：政府如何兴衰以及它们成为何种类型的机构；战争的时间和结果；经济繁荣和衰退的模式。通过提高或降低投射权力的成本和回报，巨型政治学控制着人们将自己的意志强加于人的能力。从最早的人类社会开始，这就是事实。现在也是如此。我们在《血流成河》和《大清算》中探讨了许多决定历史演变的重要隐藏的大政治因素。解开大政治变化的含义的关键是理解那些在使用暴力方面催生革命的因素。这些变量在某种程度上可以被任意地归为四类：地形、气候、微生物和技术。 |
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| Topography, in conjunction with climate, had a major role to play in early history. | 地形与气候相结合，在早期历史中发挥了重要作用。 |
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| The first states emerged on floodplains, surrounded by desert, such as in Mesopotamia and Egypt, where water for irrigation was plentiful but surrounding regions were too dry to support yeoman farming. Under such conditions, individual farmers faced a very high cost for failing to cooperate in maintaining the political structure. Without irrigation, which could be provided only on a large scale, crops would not grow. No crops meant starvation. The conditions that placed those who controlled the water in a desert in a position of strength made for despotic and rich government. | 第一个国家出现在被沙漠包围的洪泛区，如美索不达米亚和埃及，那里有丰富的灌溉用水，但周围地区过于干燥，无法支持贵族耕作。在这种情况下，单个农民如果不合作维持政治结构，就会面临非常高的成本。没有灌溉，只有大规模的灌溉，作物就不会生长。没有农作物就意味着饥饿。在沙漠中控制水的人处于强势地位，这种条件使政府成为专制和富有的政府。 |
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| As we analyzed in The Great Reckoning, topographic conditions also played a major role in the prosperity of yeoman farmers in ancient | 正如我们在《大清算》中分析的那样，地形条件在古代贵族农民的繁荣中也起到了重要作用。 |
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| Greece, enabling that region to become the cradle of Western democracy. Given the primitive transportation conditions prevailing in the Mediterranean region three thousand years ago, it was all but impossible for persons living more than a few miles from the sea to compete in the production of high-value crops of the ancient world, olives and grapes. If the oil and the wine had to be transported any distance overland, the portage costs were so great that they could not be 36 sold at a profit. The elaborate shoreline of the Greek littoral meant that most areas of Greece were no more than twenty miles from the sea. This gave a decisive advantage to Greek farmers over their potential competitors in landlocked areas. | 希腊，使该地区成为西方民主的摇篮。鉴于三千年前地中海地区普遍存在的原始交通条件，生活在离海几英里以外的人几乎不可能在古代世界的高价值作物--橄榄和葡萄的生产中竞争。如果石油和葡萄酒必须通过陆路运输，搬运费用是如此之大，以至于它们无法以利润出售。希腊沿岸精心设计的海岸线意味着希腊的大部分地区离海不超过20英里。这给希腊农民带来了决定性的优势，使他们比内陆地区的潜在竞争对手更有优势。 |
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| Because of this advantage in trading high-value products, Greek farmers earned high incomes from control of only small parcels of land. These high incomes enabled them to purchase costly armor. The famous hoplites of ancient Greece were farmers or landlords who armed themselves at their own expense. Both well armed and well motivated, the Greek hoplites were militarily formidable and could not be ignored. | 由于在高价值产品交易方面的这种优势，希腊农民只需控制小块土地就能获得高收入。这些高收入使他们能够购买昂贵的盔甲。古希腊著名的跳伞兵是自费武装自己的农民或地主。希腊的跳伞兵武器精良，斗志昂扬，在军事上非常强大，不容忽视。 |
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| Topographic conditions were the foundation of Greek democracy, just as those of a different kind gave rise to the Oriental despotisms of Egypt and elsewhere. | 地形条件是希腊民主的基础，就像那些不同类型的条件产生了埃及和其他地方的东方专制制度一样。 |
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| Climate also helps set the boundaries within which brute force can be exercised. | 气候也有助于设定可以行使蛮力的界限。 |
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| A climatic change was the catalyst for the first major transition from foraging to farming. | 气候的变化是第一次从觅食到耕作的重大转变的催化剂。 |
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| The end of the last Ice Age, about thirteen thousand years ago, led to a radical alteration in vegetation. Beginning in the Near East, where the Ice Age retreated first, a gradual rise in temperature and rainfall spread forests into areas that had previously been grasslands. In particular, the rapid spread of beech forests seriously curtailed the human diet. As Susan Alling Gregg put it in Foragers and Farmers: The establishment of beech forests must have had serious consequences for local human, plant and animal populations. The canopy of an oak forest is relatively open and allows large amounts of sunlight to reach the forest floor. An exuberant undergrowth of mixed shrubs, forbs, and grasses develops, and the diversity of plants supports a variety of wildlife. In contrast, the canopy of a beech forest is closed and the forest floor is heavily shaded. Other than a flush of spring annuals prior to the emergence of the leaves, only shade-tolerant sedges, ferns, and a few grasses are found." | 大约一万三千年前最后一个冰河时代的结束，导致了植被的彻底改变。从冰河时代首先退去的近东开始，温度和降雨量的逐渐上升使森林蔓延到以前是草原的地区。特别是，山毛榉森林的迅速蔓延严重限制了人类的饮食。正如苏珊-阿林-格雷格在《觅食者与农民》中所说的那样。榉树林的建立肯定对当地的人类、植物和动物种群产生了严重的影响。橡树林的树冠是相对开放的，允许大量的阳光照射到林地。由混合灌木、草本植物和草组成的茂盛的灌木丛发展起来，植物的多样性支持各种野生动物。与此相反，山毛榉森林的树冠是封闭的，森林底部被严重遮蔽。除了在叶子出现之前的春季一年生植物，只发现耐阴的沉香、蕨类和一些草。 |
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| Over time, dense forests encroached on the open plains, spreading throughout Europe into the Eastern steppes. The forests reduced the grazing area available to support large animals, making it increasingly difficult for the population of human foragers to support themselves. | 随着时间的推移，茂密的森林侵占了开阔的平原，在整个欧洲蔓延到东部大草原。森林减少了可用于支持大型动物的放牧区，使人类觅食者的人口越来越难以养活自己。 |
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| The population of hunter-gatherers had swollen too greatly during the Ice Age prosperity to support itself on the dwindling herds of large mammals, many species of which were hunted to extinction. The transition to agriculture was not a choice of preference, but an improvisation adopted under duress to make up for shortfalls in the diet. Foraging continued to predominate in those areas farther north, where the warming trend had not adversely affected the habitats of large mammals, and in tropical rainforests, where the global warming trend did not have the perverse effect of reducing food supplies. Since the advent of farming, it has been far more common for changes to be precipitated by the cooling rather than the warming of the climate. | 狩猎采集者的人口在冰河时代的繁荣中膨胀得太厉害了，无法靠日益减少的大型哺乳动物群来支持自己，其中许多物种被猎杀到灭绝。向农业的过渡并不是一种选择，而是在被迫的情况下为弥补饮食的不足而采取的一种临时措施。在那些较远的北方地区和热带雨林中，觅食仍然占主导地位，因为那里的变暖趋势没有对大型哺乳动物的栖息地产生不利影响，而且全球变暖趋势也没有产生减少食物供应的反作用。自农业出现以来，由气候变冷而不是变暖引发的变化更为普遍。 |
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| A modest understanding of the dynamics of climatic change in past societies could well prove useful in the event that climates continue to fluctuate. If you know that a drop of one degree Centigrade on average reduces the growing season by three to four weeks and shaves five hundred feet off the maximum elevation at which crops can be grown, then you know something about the boundary conditions that will confine people's action in the future. You can use this knowledge to forecast changes in 37 everything from grain prices to land values. You may even be able to draw informed conclusions about the likely impact of falling temperatures on real incomes and political stability. In the past, governments have been overthrown when crop failures extending over several years raised food prices and shrank disposable incomes. | 在过去的社会中，对气候变化的动态有一个适度的了解，在气候继续波动的情况下，很可能证明是有用的。如果你知道平均下降一摄氏度会使生长季节减少三到四个星期，并使可种植农作物的最高海拔减少500英尺，那么你就知道一些限制人们在未来行动的边界条件。你可以利用这些知识来预测从谷物价格到土地价值的37种变化。你甚至可以就气温下降对实际收入和政治稳定的可能影响得出明智的结论。在过去，当持续数年的农作物歉收导致食品价格上涨和可支配收入缩水时，政府就会被推翻。 |
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| For example, it is no coincidence that the seventeenth century, the coldest in the modern period, was also a period of revolution worldwide. A hidden megapolitical cause of this unhappiness was sharply colder weather. It was so cold, in fact, that wine froze on the "Sun King's" table at Versailles. Shortened growing seasons produced crop failures and undermined real income. Because of the colder weather, prosperity began to wind down into a long global depression that began around 1620. It proved drastically destabilizing. The economic crisis of the seventeenth century led to the world being overwhelmed by rebellions, many clustering in 1648, exactly two hundred years before another and more famous cycle of rebellions. Between 1640 and 1650, there were rebellions in Ireland, Scotland, England, Portugal, Catalonia, France, Moscow, Naples, Sicily, Brazil, Bohemia, Ukraine, Austria, Poland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Turkey. | 例如，近代以来最冷的十七世纪也是全世界革命的时期，这不是巧合。造成这种不愉快的一个隐藏的巨大政治原因是天气急剧变冷。事实上，天气是如此寒冷，以至于凡尔赛的 "太阳王 "桌上的酒都冻住了。生长季节的缩短导致作物歉收，并破坏了实际收入。由于天气变冷，繁荣开始进入漫长的全球大萧条，大约从1620年开始。事实证明，它极大地破坏了稳定。十七世纪的经济危机导致世界被叛乱所淹没，许多叛乱集中在1648年，正好在另一个更著名的叛乱周期的两百年前。1640年至1650年间，爱尔兰、苏格兰、英格兰、葡萄牙、加泰罗尼亚、法国、莫斯科、那不勒斯、西西里、巴西、波西米亚、乌克兰、奥地利、波兰、瑞典、荷兰和土耳其都发生了叛乱。 |
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| Even China and Japan were swept with unrest. | 甚至中国和日本也被动乱所席卷。 |
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| It may also be no coincidence that mercantilism predominated in the seventeenth century during a period of shrinking trade. Economic closure was perhaps most pronounced at the end of the century, "when a terrible famine occurred." By the eighteenth century, especially after 1750, warmer temperatures and higher crop yields had begun to raise real incomes in Western Europe sufficiently to expand demand for manufactured goods. More free-market policies were adopted. This led to a self-reinforcing burst of economic growth as industry expanded to a larger scale in what is commonly described as the Industrial Revolution. The growing importance of technology and manufactured output reduced the impact of the weather on economic cycles. | 重商主义在十七世纪贸易萎缩时期占主导地位，这可能也不是巧合。经济封闭也许在该世纪末最为明显，"当时发生了可怕的饥荒"。到了十八世纪，特别是1750年以后，气温升高，作物产量提高，西欧的实际收入开始提高，足以扩大对制成品的需求。更多的自由市场政策被采纳。这导致了经济增长的自我强化，因为工业扩展到更大的规模，这就是通常所说的工业革命。技术和制成品产出的重要性不断增加，减少了天气对经济周期的影响。 |
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| Even today, however, you should not underestimate the impact of suddenly colder weather in lowering real incomes-even in wealthy regions such as North America. There is a strong tendency for societies to render themselves crisis-prone when the existing configuration of institutions has exhausted its potential. In the past, this tendency has often been manifested by population increases that stretched the carrying capacity of land to the limit. This happened both before the transition of the year 1000 and again at the end of the fifteenth century. The plunge in real income caused by crop failures and lower yields played a significant role in both instances in destroying the predominant institutions. Today the marginalization is manifested in the consumer credit markets. If sharply colder weather reduced crop yields and lowered disposable incomes, this would lead to debt default as well as tax rebellions. If the past is a guide, both economic closure and political instability could result. | 然而，即使在今天，你也不应该低估突然变冷的天气对降低实际收入的影响--即使在北美这样的富裕地区。当现有的机构配置耗尽其潜力时，社会有一种强烈的趋势，使自己容易出现危机。在过去，这种趋势往往表现为人口增长，使土地的承载能力达到极限。这种情况在1000年的转型之前和15世纪末都发生过。在这两种情况下，作物歉收和低产造成的实际收入暴跌在摧毁主导机构方面发挥了重要作用。今天，这种边缘化表现在消费信贷市场上。如果急剧变冷的天气降低了作物产量，降低了可支配收入，这将导致债务违约以及税收反叛。如果以过去为鉴，经济关闭和政治不稳定都可能导致。 |
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| Microbes convey power to harm or immunity from harm in ways that have often determined how power was exercised. This was certainly the case in the European conquest of the New World, as we explored in The Great Reckoning. European settlers, arriving from settled agricultural societies riddled with disease, brought with them relative immunity from childhood infections like measles. The Indians they encountered lived largely in thinly populated foraging bands. They possessed no such immunity and 38 were decimated. Often, the greatest mortality occurred before white people even arrived, as Indians who first encountered Europeans on the coasts traveled inland with infections. | 微生物传递伤害的力量或免于伤害的能力，其方式往往决定了权力的行使方式。正如我们在《大清算》中所探讨的那样，欧洲对新世界的征服肯定是这样的。欧洲定居者从充满疾病的农业社会来到这里，他们带来了对麻疹等儿童传染病的相对豁免权。他们遇到的印第安人主要生活在人口稀少的觅食队伍中。他们没有这种免疫力，38人被消灭了。通常情况下，最大的死亡率发生在白人到达之前，因为在沿海地区首次遇到欧洲人的印第安人带着感染物进入内陆。 |
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| There are also microbiological barriers to the exercise of power. In Blood in the Streets, we discussed the role that potent strains of malaria served in making tropical Africa impervious to invasion by white men for many centuries. Before the discovery of quinine in the mid-nineteenth century, white armies could not survive in malarial regions, however superior their weapons might have been. | 在行使权力方面也有微生物方面的障碍。在《血流成河》中，我们讨论了强烈的疟疾菌株在使热带非洲在许多个世纪里不被白人入侵方面所起的作用。在19世纪中期发现奎宁之前，白人军队无法在疟疾地区生存，无论他们的武器有多么优越。 |
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| The interaction between humans and microbes has also produced important demographic effects that altered the costs and rewards of violence. When fluctuations in mortality are high due to epidemic disease, famine, or other causes, the relative risk of mortality in warfare falls. The declining frequency of eruptions in death rates from the sixteenth century onward helps explain smaller family size and, ultimately, the far lower tolerance of sudden death in war today as compared to the past. This has had the effect of lowering the tolerance for imperialism and raising the costs of projecting power in societies with low birthrates. | 人类和微生物之间的互动也产生了重要的人口效应，改变了暴力的成本和回报。当死亡率的波动由于流行病、饥荒或其他原因而变得很高时，战争中的相对死亡风险就会下降。从16世纪开始，死亡率爆发的频率不断下降，这有助于解释较小的家庭规模，并最终解释今天与过去相比，对战争中突然死亡的容忍度要低得多。这产生了降低对帝国主义的容忍度和提高在低出生率社会投射权力的成本的效果。 |
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| Contemporary societies, comprising small families, tend to find even small numbers of battle deaths intolerable. By contrast, early modern societies were much more tolerant of the mortality costs associated with imperialism. Before this century, most parents gave birth to many children, some of whom were expected to die randomly and suddenly from disease. In an era when early death was commonplace, would-be soldiers and their families faced the dangers of the battlefield with less resistance. | 由小家庭组成的当代社会，往往会发现即使是少量的战死也是无法容忍的。相比之下，早期现代社会对与帝国主义有关的死亡成本的容忍度要高得多。在本世纪之前，大多数父母都生了很多孩子，其中一些孩子预计会随机地突然死于疾病。在一个早期死亡司空见惯的时代，未来的士兵和他们的家人面对战场上的危险时阻力较小。 |
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| Technology has played by far the largest role in determining the costs and rewards of projecting power during the modern centuries. The argument of this book presumes it will continue to do so. Technology has several crucial dimensions: A. | 到目前为止，技术在决定现代几个世纪中投射权力的成本和回报方面发挥了最大的作用。本书的论点是假定它将继续这样做。技术有几个关键层面。A. |
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| Balance between offense and defense. The balance between the offense and the defense implied by prevailing weapons technology helps determine the scale of political organization. When offensive capabilities are rising, the ability to project power at a distance predominates, jurisdictions tend to consolidate, and governments form on a larger scale. At other times, like now, defensive capabilities are rising. This makes it more costly to project power outside of core areas. Jurisdictions tend to devolve, and big governments break down into smaller ones. | 进攻与防御之间的平衡。盛行的武器技术所隐含的进攻和防御之间的平衡有助于决定政治组织的规模。当进攻能力上升时，远距离投射力量的能力占主导地位，管辖区趋于巩固，政府形成更大的规模。在其他时候，比如现在，防御能力正在上升。这使得在核心区域之外投射力量的成本更高。管辖权倾向于下放，大政府会分解成小政府。 |
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| B. | B. |
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| Equality and the predominance of the infantry. A key feature determining the degree of equality among citizens is the nature of weapons technology. Weapons that are relatively cheap, can be employed by nonprofessionals, and enhance the military importance of infantry tend to equalize power. When Thomas Jefferson wrote that "all men are created equal," he was saying something that was much more true than a similar statement would have seemed centuries earlier. A farmer with his hunting rifle was not only as well armed as the typical British soldier with his Brown Bess, he was better armed. The farmer with the rifle could shoot at the soldier from a greater distance, and with greater accuracy than the soldier could return fire. This was a distinctly different circumstance from the Middle Ages, when a farmer with a pitchfork-he could not have afforded more-could 39 | 平等和步兵的主导地位。决定公民之间平等程度的一个关键特征是武器技术的性质。相对便宜、非专业人员也能使用的武器，以及提高步兵的军事重要性的武器，往往会使权力平等。当托马斯-杰斐逊写下 "人人生而平等 "时，他说的东西比几个世纪前的类似声明似乎要真实得多。一个拿着猎枪的农民不仅和拿着布朗-贝斯的典型英国士兵一样装备齐全，而且装备得更好。拿着步枪的农民可以从更远的地方向士兵射击，而且比士兵的还击更准确。这与中世纪的情况截然不同，当时一个农民拿着干草叉，他不可能买得起更多的东西，他可以39 |
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| circumstance from the Middle Ages, when a farmer with a pitchfork-he could not have afforded more-could 39 scarcely have hoped to stand against a heavily armed knight on horseback. No one was writing in 1276 that "all men are created equal." At that time, in the most manifestly important sense, men were not equal. A single knight exercised far more brute force than dozens of peasants put together. | 在中世纪的情况下，一个拿着草叉的农民--他不可能有更多的钱--几乎不可能希望对抗一个全副武装的马背上的骑士。在1276年，没有人写过 "人人生而平等"。在当时，从最明显的意义上讲，人是不平等的。一个骑士行使的蛮力远远超过几十个农民加起来的力量。 |
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| C. | C. |
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| Advantages and disadvantages of scale in violence. Another variable that helps determine whether there are a few large governments or many small ones is the scale of organization required to deploy the prevailing weapons. When there are increasing returns to violence, it is more rewarding to operate governments at a large scale, and they tend to get bigger. When a small group can command effective means of resisting an assault by a large group, which was the case during the Middle Ages, sovereignty tends to fragment. Small, independent authorities exercise many of the functions of government. As we explore in a latter chapter, we believe that the Information Age will bring the dawn of cybersoldiers, who will be heralds of devolution. Cybersoldiers could be deployed not merely by nationstates but by very small organizations, and even by individuals. Wars of the next millennium will include some almost bloodless battles fought with computers. | 暴力中规模的优势和劣势。另一个有助于决定是有几个大政府还是有许多小政府的变量是部署盛行的武器所需的组织规模。当暴力的回报越来越高时，以大规模运作政府会有更多的回报，它们往往会变得更大。当一个小团体可以指挥有效的手段来抵抗大团体的攻击时，中世纪的情况就是这样，主权就会趋于分裂。小型的、独立的当局行使政府的许多职能。正如我们在后一章中所探讨的，我们相信信息时代将带来网络士兵的曙光，他们将是权力下放的预言者。网络士兵不仅可以由民族国家部署，还可以由非常小的组织，甚至是个人部署。下一个千年的战争将包括一些用计算机进行的几乎不流血的战斗。 |
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| D. | D. |
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| Economies of scale in production. Another important factor that weighs in the balance in determining whether ultimate power is exercised locally or from a distance is the scale of the predominant enterprises in which people gain their livelihoods. When crucial enterprises can function optimally only when they are organized on a large scale in an encompassing trading area, governments that expand to provide such a setting for enterprises under their protection may rake off enough additional wealth to pay the costs of maintaining a large political system. Under such conditions, the entire world economy usually functions more effectively where one supreme world power dominates all others, as the British Empire did in the nineteenth century. But sometimes megapolitical variables combine to produce falling economies of scale. If the economic benefits of maintaining a large trading area dwindle, larger governments that previously prospered from exploiting the benefits of larger trading areas may begin to break apart-even if the balance of weaponry between offense and defense otherwise remains much as it had been. | 生产中的规模经济。在决定最终权力是在当地行使还是从远方行使时，另一个重要因素是人们获得生计的主要企业的规模。当关键的企业只有在大规模的贸易区内组织起来才能发挥最佳的作用时，那些为其保护下的企业提供这种环境的政府可能会攫取足够的额外财富来支付维持一个大型政治体系的费用。在这样的条件下，整个世界经济通常在一个最高的世界大国主导所有其他国家的地方更有效地运作，就像大英帝国在19世纪那样。但有时巨型政治变量结合起来，会产生规模经济的下降。如果维持一个大型贸易区的经济利益减少，以前因利用大型贸易区的利益而繁荣的大型政府可能开始分裂--即使在其他方面，进攻和防御之间的武器平衡仍然与以前一样。 |
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| E. | E. |
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| Dispersal of technology. Still another factor that contributes to the power equation is the degree of dispersal of key technologies. When weapons or tools of production can be effectively hoarded or monopolized, they tend to centralize power. Even technologies that are essentially defensive in character, like the machine gun, proved to be potent offensive weapons, that contributed to a rising scale of governance during the period when they were not widely dispersed. | 技术的分散性。有助于权力平衡的另一个因素是关键技术的分散程度。当武器或生产工具可以有效地被囤积或垄断时，它们往往会使权力集中。即使是本质上属于防御性的技术，如机枪，也被证明是强有力的进攻性武器，在它们没有广泛散布的时期，有助于提高治理规模。 |
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| When the European powers enjoyed a monopoly on machine guns late in the nineteenth century, they were able to use those weapons against peoples at the periphery to dramatically expand colonial empires. Later, in the twentieth century, when machine guns became widely available, especially in the wake of World War II, they were deployed to help destroy the power of empires. Other things being equal, the more widely dispersed key technologies are, the more 40 widely dispersed power will tend to be, and the smaller the optimum scale of government. | 当欧洲列强在19世纪末享有对机枪的垄断权时，他们能够使用这些武器来对付边缘地区的人民，从而极大地扩张殖民帝国。后来，在二十世纪，当机枪变得广泛可用时，特别是在第二次世界大战之后，它们被用来帮助摧毁帝国的力量。在其他条件相同的情况下，关键技术越是广泛分散，权力就越是广泛分散，政府的最佳规模也就越小。 |
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| THE SPEED OF MEGAPOLITICAL CHANGE | 大政治变革的速度 |
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| While technology is by far the most important factor today, and apparently growing more so, all four major megapolitical factors have played a role in determining the scale at which power could be exercised in the past. | 虽然技术是今天最重要的因素，而且显然越来越重要，但所有四个主要的大政治因素在过去都发挥了决定权力行使规模的作用。 |
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| Together, these factors determine whether the returns to violence continue to rise as violence is employed on a larger scale. This determines the importance of magnitude of firepower versus efficiency in employing resources. It also strongly influences the market distribution of income. The question is, What role will they command in the future? A key to estimating an answer lies in recognizing that these megapolitical variables mutate at dramatically different speeds. | 这些因素共同决定了暴力的回报是否会随着暴力的大规模使用而继续上升。这决定了火力的大小与资源使用效率的重要性。它也强烈地影响着收入的市场分配。问题是，他们在未来将扮演什么角色？估算答案的关键在于认识到这些巨大的政治变量会以极大的不同速度发生变化。 |
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| Topography has been almost fixed through the whole of recorded history. Except for minor local effects involving the silting of harbors, landfills, or erosion, the topography of the earth is almost the same today as it was when Adam and Eve straggled out of Eden. And it is likely to remain so until another Ice Age recarves the landscapes of continents or some other drastic event disturbs the surface of the earth. At a more profound scale, geological ages seem to shift, perhaps in response to large meteorite strikes, over a period of 10 to 40 million years. Someday, there may again be geological upheavals that will alter significantly the topography of our planet. If that happens, you can safely assume that both the baseball and cricket seasons will be canceled. | 在整个有记载的历史中，地形几乎是固定的。除了涉及港口淤塞、垃圾填埋或侵蚀的轻微局部影响外，今天地球的地形几乎与亚当和夏娃蹒跚走出伊甸园时一样。而且，在另一个冰河时期重新塑造各大洲的地貌或其他一些剧烈的事件扰乱地球表面之前，它很可能会保持不变。在更深远的范围内，地质年代似乎在转变，也许是对大型陨石撞击的反应，时间为1000万至4000万年。有一天，可能会再次发生地质动荡，大大改变我们星球的地形。如果发生这种情况，你可以有把握地认为，棒球和板球赛季都将被取消。 |
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| Climate fluctuates much more actively than topography. In the last million years, climatic change has been responsible for most of the known variation in the features of the earth's surface. During Ice Ages, glaciers gouged new valleys, altered the course of rivers, severed islands from continents or joined them together by lowering the sea level. | 气候的波动比地形的波动要活跃得多。在过去的一百万年里，气候变化是造成地球表面特征的大部分已知变化的原因。在冰河时代，冰川开凿了新的山谷，改变了河流的走向，将岛屿从大陆上分割开来，或通过降低海平面将它们连接在一起。 |
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| Fluctuations in climate have played a significant role in history, first in precipitating the Agricultural Revolution after the close of the last Ice Age, and later in destablizing regimes during periods of colder temperatures and drought. | 气候的波动在历史上发挥了重要作用，首先是在上个冰河时期结束后催生了农业革命，后来又在温度较低和干旱时期破坏了制度的稳定。 |
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| Lately, there have been concerns over the possible impact of "global warming." | 最近，人们对 "全球变暖 "可能产生的影响感到担忧。 |
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| These concerns cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet, taking a longer perspective, the more likely risk appears to be a shift toward a colder, not a warmer climate. Study of temperature fluctuations based upon analysis of oxygen isotopes in core samples taken from the ocean floor show that the current period is the second warmest in more than 2 million years.22 If temperatures were to turn colder, as they did in the seventeenth century, that might prove megapolitically destabilizing. Current alarms about global warming may in that sense be reassuring. To the extent that they are true, that assures that temperatures will continue to fluctuate within the abnormally warm and relatively benign range experienced for the past three centuries. | 这些担忧不能被轻易地否定。然而，从更长远的角度来看，更可能的风险似乎是向更冷而不是更暖的气候转变。根据从海底采集的核心样本中的氧同位素分析，对温度波动的研究表明，目前是200多万年来第二温暖的时期。从这个意义上说，目前关于全球变暖的警报可能是令人欣慰的。如果它们是真实的，这就保证了气温将继续在过去三个世纪经历的异常温暖和相对良好的范围内波动。 |
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| The rate of change in the influence of microbes on the exercise of power is more of a puzzle. Microbes can mutate very rapidly. This is especially true of viruses. The 22 common cold, for example, mutates in an almost kaleidoscopic way. Yet although these mutations proceed apace, their impact in shifting the boundaries where power is exercised have been far less abrupt than technological change. Why? Part of the reason is that the normal balance of nature tends to make it beneficial for microbes to infect but not destroy host populations. Virulent infections that kill their hosts too readily tend to eradicate themselves in the process. The survival of microparasites depends upon their not being too rapidly or uniformly fatal to the hosts they invade. | 微生物对权力行使的影响的变化速度更让人困惑。微生物可以非常迅速地变异。这一点在病毒中尤为明显。例如，22种普通感冒以一种几乎万花筒般的方式变异。然而，尽管这些变异进行得很快，但它们在改变行使权力的边界方面的影响却远没有技术变革那么突然。为什么呢？部分原因是，自然界的正常平衡倾向于使微生物感染但不破坏宿主种群，这对它们有利。太容易杀死宿主的病毒性感染往往会在这个过程中消灭自己。微量寄生虫的生存取决于它们对它们所入侵的宿主不会过于迅速或一致地致命。 |
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| That is not to say, of course, that there cannot be deadly eruptions of disease that alter the balance of power. Such episodes have figured prominently in history. The Black Death wiped out large fractions of the population of Eurasia and dealt a crushing blow to the fourteenth-century version of the international economy. | 当然，这并不是说不可能有改变权力平衡的致命的疾病爆发。这类事件在历史上占有突出的地位。黑死病消灭了欧亚大陆的大部分人口，并对14世纪的国际经济造成了毁灭性的打击。 |
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| What Might Have Been | 可能发生的事情 |
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| History can be understood in terms of what might have been as well as what was. | 可以从可能发生的事情和已经发生的事情来理解历史。 |
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| We know of no reason that microparasites could not have continued to play havoc with human society during the modern period. For example, it is possible that microbiological barriers to the exercise of power, equivalent to malaria but more virulent, could have halted the Western invasion of the periphery in its tracks. The first intrepid Portuguese adventurers who sailed into African waters could have contracted a deadly retrovirus, a more communicable version of AIDS, that would have stopped the opening of the new trade route to Asia before it even began. Columbus, too, and the first waves of settlers in the New World might have encountered diseases that decimated them in the same way that indigenous local populations were affected by measles and other Western childhood diseases. Yet nothing of the kind happened, a coincidence that underlines the intuition that history has a destiny. | 我们不知道有什么理由，微寄生虫不能在现代时期继续对人类社会造成破坏。例如，有可能是行使权力的微生物障碍，相当于疟疾，但毒性更强，可能使西方对周边地区的入侵停滞不前。第一批无畏的葡萄牙冒险家驶入非洲水域时，可能感染了致命的逆转录病毒，即更具传染性的艾滋病版本，这将在新的亚洲贸易路线开始之前就阻止它的开辟。哥伦布和新大陆的第一波定居者也可能遇到疾病，像当地居民受到麻疹和其他西方儿童疾病的影响一样，使他们遭受灭顶之灾。然而，这种情况并没有发生，这种巧合强调了历史是有命运的这一直觉。 |
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| Microbes did far less to impede the consolidation of power in the' modern period than to facilitate it. Western troops and colonists at the periphery often found that the technological advantages that allowed them to project power were underscored by microbiological ones. Westerners were armed with unseen biological weapons, their relative immunity to childhood diseases that frequently devastated native peoples. This gave voyagers from the West a distinct advantage that their antagonists from less densely settled regions lacked. As events unfolded, the disease transfer was almost entirely in one direction-from Europe outward. There was no equivalent transfer of disease in the other direction, from the periphery to the core. | 在现代时期，微生物对巩固权力的阻碍远远小于对其的促进。处于边缘地带的西方军队和殖民者经常发现，使他们能够投射力量的技术优势被微生物优势所强调了。西方人用看不见的生物武器武装起来，他们对经常毁坏原住民的儿童疾病有相对的免疫力。这使来自西方的航海者具有明显的优势，而他们来自定居密度较低地区的对手则缺乏这种优势。随着事件的发展，疾病的转移几乎完全是单向的--从欧洲向外。在另一个方向，即从周边地区到核心地区，并没有相应的疾病转移。 |
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| As a possible counterexample, some have claimed that Western explorers imported syphilis from the New World to Europe. This is arguable. If true, however, it did not prove to be a significant barrier to the exercise of power. The major impact of syphilis was to shift sexual mores in the West. | 作为一个可能的反例，有些人声称西方探险家将梅毒从新世界传入欧洲。这一点是可以争论的。然而，如果是真的，它并没有被证明是行使权力的一个重要障碍。梅毒的主要影响是改变了西方的性道德。 |
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| From the end of the fifteenth century to the last quarter of the twentieth, the impact of microbes on industrial society was ever more benign. Notwithstanding the personal tragedies and unhappiness caused by outbreaks of tuberculosis, polio, and flu, no new diseases emerged in the modern period that even approached the megapolitical impact of the Antonine plagues or the Black Death. Improving public health, and the 42 | 从15世纪末到20世纪最后25年，微生物对工业社会的影响是越来越良性的。尽管肺结核、小儿麻痹症和流感的爆发造成了个人悲剧和不愉快，但在现代时期，没有出现任何新的疾病，甚至接近安东瘟疫或黑死病的巨大政治影响。改善公共卫生，以及42 |
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| modern period that even approached the megapolitical impact of the Antonine plagues or the Black Death. Improving public health, and the 42 advent of vaccinations and antidotes, generally reduced the importance of infectious microbes during the modern period, thereby increasing the relative importance of technology in setting the boundaries where power was exercised. | 近代时期的传染病，甚至接近于安东瘟疫或黑死病的巨大政治影响。公共卫生的改善，以及42种疫苗和解毒剂的出现，总体上降低了现代时期传染性微生物的重要性，从而提高了技术在设定权力行使边界方面的相对重要性。 |
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| The recent emergence of AIDS and alarms over the potential spread of exotic viruses are hints that the role of microbes may not be altogether as megapolitically benign in the future as it has been over the past five hundred years. But when or whether a new plague will infect the world is unknowable. An eruption of microparasites, such as a viral pandemic, rather than drastic changes in climate or topography, would more likely disrupt the megapolitical predominance of technology. | 最近出现的艾滋病和对外来病毒可能传播的警告都暗示，微生物的作用在未来可能不会像过去五百年那样完全是大政方针的良性发展。但何时或是否会有新的瘟疫感染世界是不可知的。微量寄生虫的爆发，如病毒大流行，而不是气候或地形的剧烈变化，将更有可能扰乱技术的大政治主导地位。 |
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| We have no way of monitoring or anticipating drastic departures from the nature of life on earth as we have known it. We cross our fingers and assume that the major megapolitical variables in the next millennium will be technological rather than microbiological. If luck continues to side with humanity, technology will continue to grow in prominence as the leading megapolitical variable. It was not always such, however, as a review of the first great megapolitical transformation, the Agricultural Revolution, clearly shows. | 我们没有办法监测或预测地球上的生命性质与我们已知的生命性质的巨大差异。我们掰着手指，假设下一个千年的主要大政治变量将是技术而不是微生物。如果运气继续站在人类一边，技术将继续作为主要的大政治变量而日益突出。然而，情况并非总是如此，正如对第一个伟大的大政治变革，即农业革命的回顾所清楚表明的那样。 |
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