Automated Repair of Neural Networks

Author: Dor Cohen Advisor: Prof. Ofer Strichman

 $\begin{array}{c} \mbox{Industrial Engineering \& Management, Information Management Engineering} \\ \mbox{Technion $--$ Israel Institute of Technology} \end{array}$

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Introduction

- Artificial Neural Networks (NNs) have been widely used recently
- NNs excel at solving image and natural language processing tasks
- However, they were also found to be susceptible to Adversarial Attacks
- This drawback limits the usage of NNs in safety-critical systems




Figure: Depicts the effect of adding noise to an input example - this slight modification shifted the network prediction. Image is borrowed from [goodfellow2015explaining]

Verification of Neural Networks

- As a result, tools for verifying the safety of NNs were developed (e.g., [katz2017reluplex])
- Such tools provide a safety certificate given NN and desired properties
- Or, a counter-example in case the NN does not satisfy the specification

Verification of Neural Networks




Figure: Taken from [julian2016policy] - depicted at left are the decision boundaries derived from the original $ACAS\ Xu$ hash table. At the right figure, we can observe the trained NN boundaries. Each color depicts a different action that the aircraft should carry, with respect to the intruder position. It can be seen how the NN imposes unsafe regions, in contrast to the original table.

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Repair of Neural Networks

Problem definition: Consider a NN model denoted by $f_{w_A}(x)$ (model A). Assume that $f_{w_A}(x)$ is not safe w.r.t. a required specification φ . In the task of provably repairing a NN, we search for a new model $f_{w_B}(x)$ (model B) which satisfies φ and its decision boundaries are similar as possible to model A.

- Can be achieved naively via verification and re-training, until convergence
- In this work, we attempt to mitigate the repair process by utilizing tools from the field of formal verification

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Preliminaries - Linear classification for visual recognition

- Class score as a weighted sum of all of its pixel values
- E.g., we'd expect a ship classifier to have positive values in its blue channel weights




Figure: Taken from CS231N - Stanford's course for Visual Recognition with NNs - This is an example of mapping an image to class scores by using a linear classifier.

Preliminaries - Neural Network (NN) definition

- A mapping: $f_w: X \to Y$
 - $X \in \mathbb{R}^n$, $Y \in \mathbb{R}^m$, $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ and w denotes the set of function parameters.
- Usually a composition of k functions: $f_w(x) = f^k(...(f^2(f^1(x)))),$
 - where k is referred to as the **number of layers**
- Typically, each layer performs a linear transformation followed by non-linear: $f^i(x) \equiv g_i(W_i x + b_i)$,
 - g_i denotes the non-linear operation (ReLU is a common one: g(x) = max(0, x))
 - The shapes of W_i , b_i indicate the number of neurons for specific layer i

Preliminaries - Neural Network (NN) example


• For example, a two-layer NN with d ReLU neurons, an input $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and output $y \in \mathbb{R}^m$ will have the following form:

$$f_w(x) = W_2 * max(0, W_1x + b_1) + b_2$$
 (1)

• where $W_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times n}$, $b_1 \in \mathbb{R}^d$, $W_2 \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}$, $b_2 \in \mathbb{R}^m$

SAT Problem

- A Boolean formula φ is said to be in *CNF* if it's a **logical conjunction** of a set of clauses $C_1, ..., C_n$, where each clause C is a **logical disjunction** of a set of literals
- ullet SAT: deciding if there exists an **assignment** that satisfies arphi
- Example: $\varphi = (x_1 \lor x_2) \land (\neg x_1 \lor x_3)$
- Satisfying assignment: $\{x_1 = 1, x_2 = 1, x_3 = 1\}$, $\rightarrow \varphi$ is SATISFIABLE
- Solved by DPLL in practice (a backtracking based search algorithm)



Satisfiability modulo theories (SMT)

- Extends the SAT problem by supporting more theories (e.g., linear real arithmetic)
- Fundamentally solved with DPLL (similar to SAT) and a corresponding theory solver
- For instance, consider the real variables x, y in this formula: $\varphi = (y > 3x) \land (x >= 3)$
- Can re-write as: $\varphi = A \wedge B$
- At first, let's try to assign B = True
- A theory solver is invoked and assigns x = 3, which satisfies B = True
- After simplification, we get y > 9
- Finally, a possible solution is: x = 3, y = 10

(NN) Verification

- Verification methods allow to prove whether functions fulfill a certain specification
- Let f_w be such a function, with a given parameter set w
- A general specification can be formulated in first-order logic as follows:

$$\forall x \ C_{in}(x) \implies C_{out}(f_w, x) \tag{2}$$

where C_{in} and C_{out} denote input and output constraints functions respectively.


NN Repair

- Consider the case where f_w has an **unsafe** property
- We can slightly modify Eq. 2 to search for a new model $f_{\hat{w}}$
- The new model shall satisfy the specification, assuming such model exists
- That is by adding an existential quantifier:

$$\exists \hat{w} \ \forall x \ C_{in}(x) \implies C_{out}(f_{\hat{w}}, x) \tag{3}$$

Example - SMT formula to repair an NN

Consider the following NN, it has two inputs (in1, in2), a hidden layer with one **ReLU** neuron (n11), two outputs (out1, out2) and 6 weights (w11, w12, w21, w22, bias11, bias21, bias22):



Assume that this NN violates a required **specification**: $\forall in_1 \in [0, 0.5]$.out₁ > out₂. We then search for a repaired NN, by choosing to free two weights (while the rest remain constant):

```
 \exists w_{21}, bias_{21} \ ( \\ \forall in_1, in_2 \ ( \\ n_{11} = \text{if-then-else}(in_1 * w_{11} + in_2 * w_{12} + bias_{11} > 0, in_1 * w_{11} + in_2 * w_{12} + bias_{11}, 0) \land \\ out_1 = w_{21} * n_{11} + bias_{21} \land \\ out_2 = w_{22} * n_{11} + bias_{22} \land \\ (in_1 >= 0) \land (in_1 <= 0.5) \implies (out_1 > out_2) \\ ) \ )
```

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Adversarial Robustness property

Adversarial robustness defines **invariance to noise** in a δ neighborhood of x_0 as follows:

$$\forall x. \ \|x - x_0\| \le \delta \implies D(f_w(x)) = D(f_w(x_0)), \tag{4}$$

where D denotes the decision function, usually $D(f(x)) = \underset{j}{\operatorname{argmax}}(f(x))$ where j denotes the model predicted category.

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Repair w.r.t. Adversarial Robustness property

To generate a repaired network f_{w_B} which satisfies the safety properties, we search for a **subset** of weights $w_{B_{free}} \subseteq w_B$, and corresponding values, such that

$$\forall x. \ \|x - x_0\| \le \delta \implies D(f_{w_B}(x)) = D(x_0), \tag{5}$$

holds, where f_{w_B} is a NN in which the weights in $w_{B_{free}}$ are set to those values, and the rest are set to the values of the corresponding weights in the original NN.


Notice: we have many options for choosing $w_{B_{free}}$

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Initial Experiments

At first, we attempt to repair the following network (depicted on leftmost figure) to satisfy the **Adversarial Robustness** property w.r.t. point (-10, -10):



This experiment demonstrates that we should also preserve similarity

Experimental Setup

For the main part, we experiment with the following **neural networks** and their corresponding **data sets**:


Model Name	Hidden Layers Sizes	Parameters	Train Set Size	Train Set Accuracy	Test Set Size	Test Set Accuracy	Sampled Set Size	Sampled Set Accuracy
XOR-B	[4]	22	1562	0.99743	1600	0.99125	500	1.0
Blobs	[10, 10]	162	6000	1.00000	4000	1.00000	1000	1.0

Further, we require these **properties** to hold:

Model Name	Property	Coordinate	Delta	Class	Norm	Violated
XOR-B	Property 1	[50, -15]	5	Blue (1)	L1	Yes
XOR-B	Property 2	[7, -15]	5	Blue (1)	L1	Yes
Blobs	Property 1	[30, 6]	5	Red (0)	L1	Yes
Blobs	Property 2	[-7.5, -30]	5	Red (0)	L1	Yes

Experimental Setup

Depicted below are the **decision boundaries** and **data sets** for each model, along with the required **specification**:



Experimental Setup - Technical Details

- Z3 SMT solver and its Python wrapper to search for new weights assignments
- **PyTorch** with *Adam* optimizer to train the networks
- Experiments were performed on a computer with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8250U CPU @ 1.60GHz, using 8Gb of RAM, running Linux Ubuntu version 16.04.1
- Each repair trial was given a timeout of 600 seconds

Experiments - Similarity Heuristics

- As our initial experiments demonstrate, we shall employ **similarity-preserving** heuristics to keep the repaired NN decision boundaries as close as possible to the originals
- For this purpose we use three different heuristics which are illustrated below




Figure: **Samples** - Enforce the model prediction on certain input coordinates




Figure: **Grid** - Divide the decision boundary into cells and enforce the same prediction for each cell.





Figure: **Voronoi** - Build the cells according to Voronoi decomposition.

Experiments - Similarity Heuristics

- We perform extensive experiments to compare our proposed **similarity heuristics**.
- ullet Following are visualizations for the repair of model XOR-B's $1^{\rm st}$ property via each heuristic



Each similarity-preserving heuristic yields n additional constraints, in our experiments we require that at least $m \le n$ constraints hold (we later use **threshold** to denote m).

Experiments - Similarity Heuristics

Attempts to repair each of **XOR-B** properties via each of our proposed heuristics:

Heuristic S	oft Constraint	s Thresholds Ac	curacy Before Rep	air Max. Accuracy	Min. Accuracy A	verage Accura	cy Trials SAT UNSAT 1	imeout	Total Solver Time (sec.)		
	Weight selection tactic: Individual weights										
	1st Property										
GRID SAMPLES VORONOI	[100] [450] [153]	[1, 2] [1, 250, 400] [1, 2]	99.5085% 99.5085% 99.5085%	85.9640% 86.9470% 85.9640%	37.5205% 37.5205% 37.5205%	60.1614% 71.8988% 55.9803%	44 9 26 66 15 51 44 9 13	9 0 22	6397 32 13994		
2nd Property											
GRID SAMPLES VORONOI	[100] [450] [153]	[1, 2] [1, 250, 400] [1, 2]	99.5085% 99.5085% 99.5085%	98.9896% 98.9896% 96.3681%	37.5205% 37.5205% 37.5205%	65.5980% 83.6997% 60.6827%	44 10 24 66 24 42 44 10 12	10 0 22	6234 32 13843		
			Weight selection	tactic: Arbitrary o	ombinations of w	eights, neuron	s or layers				
1st Property											
GRID SAMPLES VORONOI [:	[100, 400] [450] 268, 250, 153]	[1, 2, 10] [1, 250, 400] [1, 2, 10]	99.5085% 99.5085% 99.5085%	85.9640% 98.6073% 86.2370%	37.5205% 37.5205% 37.5205%	60.9448% 84.4578% 60.9030%	38 15 0 36 32 4 39 15 0	23 0 24	13812 171 14424		

The *Samples* similarity heuristic proves to be the most effective and efficient, as noticed by average accuracy and total solving time.

Experiments - Repair with Samples Similarity Heuristic

Aggregated search results for the repair of **XOR-B** network, with **Samples** similarity heuristics, results are grouped by soft constraints threshold value:

Threshold / Soft Constra	ints Accuracy Before Repair Max.	Accuracy Min. Accuracy	Average Accuracy	Trials SAT UI	ISAT T	imeout Ski	pped Tota	l Solver Time (sec.)	
		1st Prop	perty					1	
	V	eight selection: Combin	ations of two weig	hts					
1/1562 325/1562 750/1562 1000/1562 1500/1562	99.50847% 99.1: 99.50847% 99.20 99.50847% 98.60	0808% 33.72474% 0616% 37.73894% 0270% 48.90770% 0732% 61.22338% 0270% 93.11851%	68.05714% 71.35950% 80.55633%	231 156 231 103 231 92 230 74 230 18	61 0 0 11 51	11 1	0 75 28 39 56	9127 42027 18004 13321 9529	
		2nd Proj	perty						
	Weight selection: Individual weights								
1/1562 325/1562 750/1562 1000/1562 1500/1562 1561/1562	99.50847% 97.99 99.50847% 97.99 99.50847% 97.99 99.50847% 99.31	38.09394% 37.52048% 37.52048% 49.80885% 6194% 64.09066% 731% 96.36810% NA	74.23539% 74.13435% 77.06475% 89.54806% 97.50137% NA	22 10 22 10 22 9 22 8 22 4 22 0	12 12 13 14 18 22	0 0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0	141 75 63 68 64 27	
		1st And 2nd	Property						
	v	eight selection: Combin	ations of two weig	hts					
1/1562 325/1562 750/1562 1000/1562 1500/1562	99.50847% 90.4 99.50847% 97.3 99.50847% 90.4	464% 20.04369% 1238% 36.15511% 117% 48.90770% 1238% 63.62643% 1079% 96.28618%	63.79459% 68.24854% 80.96122%	231 119 231 76 231 65 231 40 231 2	95 0 0 16 37	11 1 9 1	0 12 55 66 91	8933 34731 11555 11202 3676	

Produce safe networks by freeing up to two weights, with only a mild loss of accuracy

Experiments - Repair with Samples Similarity Heuristic

Aggregated search results for the repair of the **Blobs** network, with the **Samples** similarity heuristic, results are grouped by soft constraints threshold value:

Threshold / Soft Constraint	s Accuracy Before Repair Max.	Accuracy Min. Accuracy	Average Accuracy	Trials SAT U	INSAT Ti	meout Skipped	Total Solver Time (sec.)
		1st Property (indi	ividual weights)				
1/6000 500/6000 1000/6000 2000/6000 5500/6000	100.00000% 99.4 100.00000% 99.5 100.00000% 99.4	43636% 64.10000% 41818% 86.50909% 50000% 86.50909% 43636% 86.47273% 34545% 90.49091%	89.52500% 95.03438% 94.11420% 94.44403% 95.55016%	107 48 107 32 107 32 107 32 107 29	44 0 0 0 3	15 0 16 59 0 75 0 75 0 75	18968 11723 2046 2330 3518
		2nd Property (ind	lividual weights)				
1/6000 500/6000 1000/6000 2000/6000 5500/6000	100.00000% 99.1 100.00000% 99.1 100.00000% 99.1	72727% 51.12727% 72727% 86.15455% 72727% 86.30909% 75455% 64.67273% 53636% 90.47273%	86.66129% 92.72323% 93.59798% 90.52121% 94.50160%	143 31 143 18 143 18 143 18 143 17	95 0 0 0 1	17 0 13 112 0 125 0 125 0 125	23884 9573 1406 1789 2580
		1st And 2nd	Property				
	Combinations of	size 2, assembled from to	op-5 repair setups o	f individual v	veights		
1/6000 500/6000 1000/6000 2000/6000 5500/6000	100.00000% 99.5 100.00000% 99.5 100.00000% 86.6	49091% 62.45455% 10909% 74.16364% 66364% 86.30909% 89091% 86.30909% 81818% 97.35455%	89.15565% 93.26263% 93.08636% 86.55455% 98.23636%	45 33 45 9 45 4 45 3 45 3	12 0 0 0 0	0 0 24 12 5 36 1 41 0 42	5137 15823 3477 747 638

Information from repairing single properties might be useful to further attempts of repairing multiple properties simultaneously. **Blobs** network has 162 parameters, and 13041 options to choose 2 parameters.

Experiments - Comparison to baseline

- We compare the results of repairing **XOR-B** and **Blobs** to a naive baseline
- Baseline: a repair loop which alternates between verification and re-training

Depicted are the accuracy measures for each of the networks and their repaired properties:

Model		XOR-B		Blobs			
Property	1st	2nd	Both	1st	2nd	Both	
Our method	99.2627%	99.3173%	97.3511%	99.5000%	99.7545%	99.5636%	
Naive method	97.2678%	96.4469%	94.5724%	97.3533%	97.8333%	96.0733%	

Our method outperforms the naive method in terms of accuracy across all configurations

Automated Repair of Neural Networks

- Challenge in enumerating all possible weight combinations (n choose k)
- We suggest to perform the search in a greedy manner
- Provide a heuristic which attempts to minimize the UNSAT formulas we tackle

Thesis includes an algorithm to automatically repair NNs, a brief description:

Greedy repair (sketch)

- 1. Traverse a **search tree** where its nodes are combinations of free weights, and the tree level indicates the number of free weights.
- 2. Each **node** traversed corresponds to a **trial** which attempts to repair the network by freeing the given subset of weights.
- 3. Stop traversing according to timeout, return the most similar network as measured by accuracy.

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Contributions

- Demonstrate how off-the-shelf SMT solvers can be utilized to repair NNs
- Propose and experiment with similarity-preserving heuristics
- Perform additional experiments with the winning heuristic (Samples), and compare it to a naive baseline
- Suggest a greedy search algorithm to automatically repair NNs, and further strategies to improve its efficiency

Future work

- Perform additional experiments with larger benchmarks such as *Acas XU* networks, compare the results to related techniques
- Suggest further improvements to the algorithm
- Experiment with additional SMT solvers, attempt to fine-tune solvers to this specific task

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The End