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**ANALYTICAL REPORT
BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THE 13TH WAVE OF POLLS
OF THE "CHRONICLES" PROJECT**

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**Hereinafter - the definition of a Russian military invasion of the territory of Ukraine, which is authorized for use by the Russian authorities and is safe for respondents and operators.*

1. Methodology

- Time of the field part of the study: September 10-27, 2024
- Method: CATI
- Sampling methodology: RDD according to Rossvyaz data, stratified by federal districts and two cities of federal significance
- Total number of interviewers and person/hour of work 73 interviewers, 2336 hours
- Average interview duration: 16 min. 20 sec.
- Number of contact attempts per number in the starting sample: 4
- The data set consists of four samples (see details in the Data Structure section), the aggregate number of respondents: 1848
- Maximum error sampling by total array: 2,3% at 95% confidence interval

2. Data structure

The data array of the 13th wave of the Chronicles project consists of several elements that we want to emphasize.

Samples

The data consists of four groups of samples.

Group	Table of Contents	Characteristics	Commentary
Sample A	<p>Representative sample of the adult population of Russia (18+ years).</p> <p>Respondents are those who have not participated in Chronicle surveys before.</p> <p>N= 831</p>	<p>The sample is random (RDD), stratified by federal districts and two federal cities.</p> <p>Maximum sampling error A: 4% at 95% confidence interval.</p> <p>For more information on sampling: https://chronicles.report/method</p>	<p>We recommend using this particular group to analyze the dynamics of responses to repeated survey questions from previous waves of the Chronicles.</p> <p>In the report itself, unless otherwise specified, we use sample A as the basis.</p>
Sample B	<p>Panel of respondents based on the adult population of Russia (18+ years).</p> <p>Respondents are those with whom were successfully interviewed in waves of "Chronicle" interviews Nos. 10, 11, 12, as well as in the RusScan-7 and ExtremeScan-5 surveys (sample of surveys ExtremeScan and RuScan are formed according to the same criteria as the Chronicles sample).</p> <p>N= 608</p>	<p>Maximum sampling error B: 4% at 95% confidence interval.</p> <p>For more information on sampling: https://chronicles.report/method</p>	<p>The point of this panel is to re-survey respondents who have already participated in the Chronicle and ExtremeScan surveys. In the future, we will publish a panel data structure based on this sample.</p>
Sample B	<p>A sample of hard-to-reach respondents based on the adult population of Russia (18+ years old).</p>	<p>Maximum sampling error B: 5% at 95% confidence interval.</p> <p>More</p>	<p>The point of this group is to try to reach, through the survey, those respondents who are less</p>

	<p>Respondents are those with whom there were interview attempts, but which were not successful in Chronicle waves #10, 11, 12, as well as in the RusScan-7 and ExtremeScan-5 surveys (sample ExtremeScan and RuScan is formed according to the same criteria as the Chronicles sample).</p> <p>N= 409</p>	<p>information on sampling frame: https://chronicles.report/method</p>	<p>interested in communicating with survey projects and/or that are guaranteed to have never been surveyed by the Chronicle before.</p>
ABB sampling	<p>Represents the combined array of the three previous groups: Sample A+ Sample B + Sample C.</p> <p>N= 1848</p>	<p>Maximum sampling error on the total array (ABB sample): 2% at 95% confidence interval.</p>	

Primes

As part of the Chronicles Wave 13 survey, we conducted a priming experiment (see details in Section 8). The experiment consisted of asking different respondents the same survey questions in a different order. There were 4 variations in the order of the blocks of questions. The experiment was based on the hypothesis that the order of politically sensitive questions (blocks of questions) would influence respondents' answers.

At the beginning of all interviews, irrespective of the priming, were the questionnaire questions numbered Q1003 (about respondent's age), Q60 (about region of residence), Q3 (about problems of concern), Q4 (about financial situation), Q5 (about work) and Q6 (about savings). The alternating priming blocks were followed in the same order by all remaining questions of the questionnaire.

The questionnaire, which is available on the [Chronicles github](#), is presented in the priming- 1 version.

Characteristics / Priming Groups	Order of blocks of questions	Number of respondents
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Priming-1	1) Question about participating in the presidential vote 2) Questions about Vladimir Putin 3) Questions about attitudes towards SWO and mobilization 4) Everything else	In Sample A N= 200 In the ABB Sample N= 441
Priming-2	1) Questions about attitudes towards SWO and mobilization 2) Question about participating in the presidential vote 3) Questions about Vladimir Putin 4) Everything else	In Sample A N= 205 In the ABB Sample N= 449
Priming-3	1) Questions about Vladimir Putin 2) Question about participating in the presidential vote 3) Questions about attitudes towards SWO and mobilization 4) Everything else	In Sample A N= 204 In the ABB Sample N= 450
Priming-4	1) Questions about attitudes towards SWO and mobilization 2) Questions about Vladimir Putin 3) Question about participating in the presidential vote 4) Everything else	In Sample A N= 217 In the ABB Sample N= 471

Questions in alternating wording

Several questions of the questionnaire were asked in wording that alternated for different respondents. These questions are presented in the table below.

When analyzing the dynamics in comparison with previous waves of "Chronicles" on the question about Vladimir Putin's support for withdrawal of troops (Q1004), we recommend paying attention to the specific wording of this question in previous questionnaires.

Question code	Formulation 1	Formulation 2
Q1004	If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and start negotiations on a ceasefire, NOT having achieved the original goals of the military operation, would you support or not support such a decision?	If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and start negotiations on a ceasefire, will you support or not support such a decision?

	In Sample A N= 414	In the ABB Sample N= 910	In Sample A N= 412	In the ABB Sample N= 901
Q1005	Which of the following events would you like to see happen in the coming year?		Which of the following events do you think will happen in the coming year?	
	In Sample A N= 420	In the ABB Sample N= 910	In Sample A N= 406	In the ABB Sample N= 901

3a. Dynamics of respondents' attitudes towards SWO

Compared to the results of the last, 12th wave of the Chronicle poll from January 2024, there was a +10% increase in the share of respondents who are ready to support the withdrawal of troops and peace talks with Ukraine without achieving the goals of the Strategic Defense Forces. According to the 13th wave in September 2024, about 50% of respondents are ready to support such a decision of Vladimir Putin. This figure is a historical maximum for all waves of the Chronicles project. At the same time, there is a decrease in the share of those who are not ready to support the decision to withdraw troops. In September 2024, there were 31% of such respondents, while in January this group amounted to 39%.

	Chronicles February 23	Chronicles June 23	Chronicles October 23	Chronicles January 24	Estimate Score August 24	Chronicles September 24
I will support	40 %	39 %	40 %	40 %	48 %	49 %
I won't support	47 %	39 %	33 %	39 %	32 %	33 %
Difficult to answer	13 %	22 %	27 %	21 %	20 %	18 %

According to our data, the share of respondents who declare direct support for the SWO has reached a historical minimum - 48% in September 2024. Previously, we recorded the share of such respondents at the level of 56%, and the previous minimum was in September 2022 against the background of "partial mobilization" and was 51%. At the same time, it should be noted that there was no significant increase in those who do not directly support the SWO. The share of these respondents according to the data of the 13th wave is 13%, in the "mobilization" wave we recorded an identical result, in January 2024 there were 9% of such respondents.

An obvious growth is observed in the number of those respondents who refuse to answer a direct question about support or non-support for SWO. Thus, "those who found it difficult to answer" in wave 13 is 24% and it is +5 p.p. to the previous result, as well as the largest share for all waves of "Chronicles". The share of those who refused to answer this question is 15%, which is roughly in line with all previous observations, in January 2024 the share of those who refused was 16%. The topic of the SWO evokes a wide range of feelings among respondents, from fatigue and irritation to danger, and it is likely that some respondents who are not ready to express direct support for the SWO find it comfortable to express their opinion through "difficult to answer".

	February 2023	July 2023	October 2023	January 2024	September 2024
Yes, I support it	59	55	52	56	50
No, I don't support it	11	12	10	9	14
I find it difficult to answer	18	16	18	19	22
don't want to answer this question	13	17	20	16	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100

We

noticed a contradictory dynamic in the question about the priorities of public spending in case of a budget deficit - on the armed forces or the social sphere (pensions, health care, education). "Chronicles" asks this question starting from February 2023 (wave 9). And until September 2024, respondents predominantly chose the social sphere as budget priorities with a difference of 10-20%. In the 13th wave we recorded a change of priorities: 39% of respondents named the social sphere and 42% - the armed forces. At the same time, the share of those who "found it difficult" gradually decreased from 28% in the 11th wave (October 2023) to 18% in the 13th wave. A likely explanation for the change of priorities may be the activation of a kind of defense mechanism against the background of the operation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kursk region. Respondents may assess the actions of the AFU as a failure of the RF Armed Forces and, therefore, see the need to strengthen their country's army.

	January 2023	October 2023	January 2024	September 2024
to the armed forces	37	26	33	45
on the social sphere including health care and "education")	47	46	44	38
I find it difficult to answer, another answer	16	28	23	17
Total	100	100	100	100


Starting with wave 9 and based on respondents' answers to the three questions above, we distinguish between groups of consistent supporters of war and consistent supporters of peace. To **consistent supporters** of war we refer those who simultaneously expressed support for war, who would not support the decision to withdraw troops from the territory of Ukraine without achieving the goals of the Strategic Defense Forces, and who believe that the priority of the budget should be spending on the army. In February 2023 there were 23% of such people, in October 2023 - 12%, in January 2024 - 17%. In September 2024 there were 16% of such people.

To **consistent supporters of peace** we include those who at the same time did not express direct support for the war, would support the decision to withdraw troops from the territory of Ukraine without achieving the goals of the NWO and who believe that the priority of the budget should be spending on the social sphere. In February 2023 there were 20% of such people, in October 2023 - 18%, in January 2024 - 19%. According to the data of "Chronicles" from September 2024, there are 21% of such people.

The graph below shows that the dynamics between the groups of consistent supporters of war and peace is actually minimal. This suggests that no external events have affected the expansion or contraction of the groups of consistent supporters over the past year and a half. The intragroup dynamics in the context of various characteristics of respondents is also minimal. Consistent supporters of war traditionally include more men than women, more respondents from older groups, especially the oldest (60+), and generally more respondents with higher incomes. Among consistent peace supporters, there are slightly more women than men (although in the last three waves of surveys the gender groups have almost equalized), noticeably more respondents from younger age groups, especially the youngest (18-29), and more respondents with lower incomes.

36. Attitudes towards mobilization and willingness to participate in CoHE


In the 13th wave of Chronicles for the anniversary of "partial mobilization" in Russia, we asked respondents about their attitude to mobilization. Half of the respondents, given a choice between mobilization and a peace agreement with Ukraine, would choose peace, and only a third of respondents would choose another mobilization.



When asked what, in the respondents' opinion, should be done to liberate Kursk Oblast from the AFU, the majority of respondents (27%) found it difficult to answer, with roughly equal proportions (17-18%) of those who believe that a new mobilization should be carried out and those who believe that a mutual exchange of territories should be carried out. Another 16% believe that it is necessary to transfer troops from other parts of the front to Kursk Oblast. The consensus unacceptable for respondents is the sending of conscript soldiers, with about 7% choosing this option.

When asked what respondents would like to see happen in the next year, 22% of respondents chose the mobilization of men to participate in the SWE. The majority (85% each) of respondents would like to see the end of the SWO in the coming year to achieve all goals and for the main efforts of the authorities to be focused on domestic social and economic problems. 65% of respondents each would like a peace agreement with Ukraine with mutual concessions, as well as the removal of sanctions imposed on Russia. Half of the respondents want to restore relations with Western countries and about the same number want to increase spending on the army.

Which of the following events would you like to see happen in the next year? (multiple answers)



In addition, in wave 13 we record that the number of those declaring willingness to participate in the NWO by order of the Ministry of Defense fell significantly (from 42% to 33%), while the number of those explicitly declaring unwillingness to participate in the NWO rose from 21% to 30%.

If such an opportunity arises, are you ready to participate in a special operation in Ukraine? And if you are ready, then voluntarily or by order of mobilization?

	February 2023	September 2024
not ready	21	30
ready to volunteer	15	15
ready as ordered	42	32
not subject to mobilization	8	9
I find it difficult to answer	7	5
I don't want to answer this question	8	9

3B. Segmentation of respondents in relation to SWO (cluster analysis)

Russian and foreign sociologists have repeatedly made attempts to segment Russians in their attitude to the war in Ukraine. The significant contradictory nature of SWO supporters indicates their heterogeneity and the presence of various subgroups in this segment. On the contrary, the pressure of state propaganda and the criminalization of the anti-war stance in Russia may noticeably

reduce the share of opponents of SWO. One of the tools for such segmentation is **cluster analysis**. It analyzes respondents' answers to a number of questions and, depending on this, groups respondents without using any a priori hypotheses about the groups themselves and their content. We conducted such an analysis on the data set of the 13th wave of Chronicles. For more details on cluster analysis, see Appendix 1.

We use the 6-cluster structure because in the case of 7 clusters, small clusters where the smallest cluster is less than 4% were split. Also, when going from 5 to 6 clusters, the largest cluster was split. The clustering results are shown in Figure 1.

To clarify the names and interpretation of the segments, Table 1 shows the distribution of answers to each of the three questions (on support for Putin's decision to withdraw troops, on support for the SVO and on mobilization).

	Peace Supporters	War supporters	Hidden Peace Supporters	Opponents of escalation	Supporters of another SVO	Consonants c CBO
TOTAL	13%	29	30	13	4	11
Support troop withdrawal	23%		56		0	21
neutral answer	3%	39		49	9	
do not support troop withdrawal		74		19	7	
support CBO		60	14	6		20
neutral answer			62	28	7	4
do not support CBO	90%			1	9	
for carrying out the mobilization		68			11	21
neutral answer	2%	39	15	21	2	21
for the cessation of hostilities	26%		55	19		

The results of the cluster analysis allow us to draw the following conclusions.

1. The majority of Russians support the NWO, but this support is heterogeneous. Only 29% support it as it is being conducted, are ready to mobilize, and do not agree with the withdrawal of troops without achieving military objectives, even if Putin decides to do so. Another 4% do not support military intervention in words, but only because it is not being carried out in the way they would like and with the wrong results. We can call them "**supporters of the other SWO**", as they critically assess its present and past,

but strongly believe in the need for escalation and rejection of the prospect of an early peace. In total, **33%** more or less definitely **support the SWO**.

2. In addition, 13% pay lip service to the SWO but prefer to refrain from escalating the conflict by avoiding mobilization, while 11% support Putin's decision to launch military action but would accept his decision to withdraw troops. They are closer to supporters of war, but their position is more loose and inconsistent. They can be called **inconsistent supporters of the war** and **24%** of Russians belong to them.

3. Supporters of peace are represented by two segments and differ only in whether they are ready to speak out against the SWO in a direct question or not. First, these are **its clear and consistent opponents** - 13%. They, answering in different forms to the question about their attitude to the SWO, every time confirm their anti-war position. Secondly, these are those who are **ready to support Putin's hypothetical decision to withdraw troops** and those who do not support new mobilization, but evaded the assessment of the NWO when asked directly 30%. In total, **peace supporters make up 43%**.




Figure 1: Segments of Russians in their attitude to SWO (RF, September 2024, Chronicles, 13th wave, N=1800)

4. As we can see, there are currently more supporters of war in Russia, but given the marginalization of the anti-war point of view in the media and its legislative criminalization, it is obvious that a part of peace-loving Russians shy away from openly expressing their point of view, and, on the contrary, verbally agree with the current policy. Therefore, it is reasonable to classify those who avoided expressing disagreement with the SWO as supporters of peace, while inconsistent supporters of the war

should continue be considered inconsistent
 proponents as this position is not socially and normatively
 condemned.

5. **Consistent supporters of the SWO** are most often men, older generations of Russians, who are better educated, do not have low incomes, live in small cities, are employed in the private sector and have not changed their place of work in the last year. They are influenced by television and YouTube channels. They are more numerous among the relatives of front-line workers who are ready to actively discuss the SWO and support Putin. They are less likely to have mortgages, but more likely to have consumer loans. They can be attributed to social groups that have settled in and adapted to the current, wartime Russian society.

6. Among the **hidden supporters of peace**, the share of women, young people without higher education is high. This share is high in low-income groups and decreases in high-income groups; their share decreases in big cities and reaches a maximum in the TST, among those employed in the public sector of the economy, where the pressure of social norms is intensified by direct coercion. They are also numerous in the mixed information environment, where they are influenced by both supporters and opponents of the SWO, so they prefer not to express disapproval of military actions. On the contrary, the influence of YouTube and Telegram feeds is shrinking this segment in favor of the outspoken opposition to the SWO. They preferred to stay home for the presidential election in March 2024 and shy away from unambiguous assessment of Putin's performance. Unlike explicit peace supporters, they fear that the prospect of a peace agreement with Ukraine will lead to concessions unacceptable to them. This is a group of people who are not fully settled in the current society; they support a peaceful solution to the conflict, rather, based on their own ideas of good and evil (this allows them to oppose the majority opinion), avoiding political participation whenever possible.

7. **Supporters of peace** are equally represented among men and women. Their share decreases from younger to older generations of Russians and from low-income to high-income groups. Among university graduates, they are almost one and a half times more numerous than among those without higher education, and in metropolitan cities they are four times(!) more numerous than in rural areas. Those employed in the private economy - both wage earners and entrepreneurs - are more often consistently opposed to SWEs. Those who have noted the deterioration of their financial situation in the last year are also more likely to speak out against the war. In other words, these are relatively status-oriented groups of the population, but they note the threat or deterioration of their status, not necessarily expressed in monetary terms. They prefer YouTube and partly Telegram, and among them there are both those who are willing to participate in discussions about the situation at the front and those who would prefer to shy away from it. There are few frontline workers in their midst and they are practically

are absent among those who are ready to go to the front themselves, either voluntarily or by mobilization. They make up more than half of those who voted for other candidates in the presidential election and about the same number among those who negatively assess Putin's performance.

8. **"Escalation avoiders"** did not express unequivocal support for the NWO, but they do not want to leave occupied territories and withdraw troops, and they do not approve of re-mobilization. They would not want to turn the SWO into a war with total mobilization of all resources. They are more numerous among young people and few in older generations and in cities, except in capital cities, among those who have not found work in the last year or have found work worse than the previous one, and in environments where supporters and opponents of the SWO are found with about equal frequency. They prefer to shy away from discussing the military topic, they are more frequently indebted than other Russians, and perhaps this is the reason for their inconsistent stance on intervention: their apolitical nature is linked to the greater relevance of personal difficulties for them. They feel "outside politics" and prefer to leave this sphere to other groups, fearing, nevertheless, to involve themselves in undesirable activities.

9. Another peripheral group is those **who agree with the SWO**. They support the intervention and are ready to re-mobilize, but on the other hand, they also support the withdrawal of troops if Putin decided to do so. They agreed with the authorities' decision to start hostilities and fully accepted the official version of events, but they are equally ready to accept Putin's opposite decision to withdraw troops even without achieving the goals of the NWO. This segment does not have any dependence on demographic factors, but they are very numerous among the supporters of the Strategic Defense Forces (17% vs. 11% in the entire sample). In other words, this group is formed where support for the NWO is expressed to the maximum extent and the presence of the anti-war point of view is minimal. They are almost absent among the SWO opponents. Nevertheless, these people do not become consistent supporters of intervention. On the other hand, among those who are ready to go to the front, the share of this group is 19%, which also indicates the contradictory political position of its members. This group is made up of consistent supporters of Putin, supporting him in any, the most opposite, decisions. Their attitude to the NWO is secondary for them.

10. Thus, there are two segments of SWO supporters (29%+4%=33%) for two segments of its opponents (13%+30%=43%). There are also two peripheral groups that differ from each other. The first one is probably focused on solving their everyday problems and tries to avoid questions about war and peace, while the second one is under significant influence of state propaganda. I would like to emphasize, this

segmentation was made only on the basis of grouping the most typical answers of respondents, without any a priori assumptions about such groupings. This should have been avoided, because verbal and direct attitudes towards the SWO and its consequences, on the one hand, are extremely contradictory, on the other hand, are influenced by state propaganda and criminalization of the anti-war position. Nevertheless, the cluster analysis shows both quite clear and consistent support for the SWO and opposition to it, expressed both explicitly and implicitly.

11. Separately, we should mention the influence of state propaganda, broadcast not only through TV channels, but also through controlled network resources (VK, Odnoklassniki, Rutube). Here the share of supporters of war is higher, but the share of hidden supporters of peace is also higher. State propaganda partly convinces Russians of its rightness, and partly achieves their silence. Peace supporters are best represented in the audience of YouTube and Telegram. It should be said that Telegram represents the audience of both supporters and opponents of the SWO, but the transitional groups there are less than average, that is, today it is in this resource that the information battlefield is located.

If we divide the obtained segments not in relation to the SWO, but in relation to how openly and consistently both positions are defended, we find the highest concentration of such consistent pro et contra among men, older generations and the most affluent groups of Russians, as well as among residents of capital cities and small towns, and in the audiences of Telegram and both video hosting sites (YouTube and Rutube)

Intermediate groups unite not quite consistent supporters of SWE. They are most often found among women, young people without higher education, low-income groups and residents of villages and settlements, among those who have changed jobs in the last year, who have all types of credit except cash loans and microcredits, who did not go to the presidential elections and believe that the president cannot be wrong.

As we can see, those who have a firm and consistent position, mostly belong to the social center. The inconsistent position is characteristic, rather, of the social periphery, for those whose status is unstable and dependent.

Detailed socio-demographic and information-consumer characteristics of the segments are presented in Appendix 2.

4. Respondents' attitude towards Vladimir Putin

For a quarter of a century Russian polsters have been creating a stable picture of high and stable popular support for Vladimir Putin's performance as president of Russia. The experience of ExtremeScan research and the Chronicles project on attitudes toward the war has shown the dangerous superficiality of information obtained from direct answers to standardized questions about support for the president.

The problem of measuring the attitude of the Russian population to Vladimir Putin is the irrational unconnectedness of the declared support with the assessment of the effectiveness of his activity as the president of the country. Putin is perceived by the masses not as a person or a politician, but as a non-alternative and irreplaceable symbol of state power in Russia outside the feedback zone. People are experiencing a crisis of lack of representation of their interests at the top. Feedback is not just absent, the very intention to establish it is punishable. In domestic and non-public communications, it is acceptable to express functional dissatisfaction if it is not attributed directly to Putin.

In September 2024, we re-asked the traditional Polster questions about approval of Putin's performance and voting in the presidential election.

In response to the question: "Do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin's performance as President of Russia?" - we received a figure close to that of the top three polsters: 77% answered in the affirmative.

But what does that endorsement mean? All 2.5 years of the war we measured its support and showed that a direct answer "I support the SWO" does not mean readiness and willingness to continue this war, to spend a huge share of the budget on the army, to lose people, to conquer and hold occupied territories and to isolate from the West. Similarly, approval of Putin's "performance" does not mean that his decisions and actions are in line with the desires of his supporters.

Probably a more reliable indicator of support for an incumbent president is voting for him or her in an election, i.e. a physical action. In September, we repeated our March 2024 polling days survey question, "Who did you vote for in the 2024 presidential election?" In the September survey, 54% of all voters said they voted for Putin. This [share](#) does not differ from the one obtained, VTsIOM, FOM and ExtremeScan immediately after the elections.

It is worth noting that almost no one believes in elections as a democratic instrument of positive influence on the future of the country. Even Putin's supporters do not connect their ritual actions of socially approved voting for Putin with real consequences for the life of the country. We

We realize that some voters are in solidarity with his actions and decisions, but for many of his nominal supporters, elections have long since become an empty, formal and controlled act. For many voters, taking part in the administrative ritual of voting is easier than explaining their refusal.

We proceeded from the simple logic that approval of the president's activities, much less voting, must mean support for his actual actions and decisions. To "decipher" Putin's rating, we constructed several target groups of the president's supporters - from the widest possible to the most radically narrow.

77% approve

The first, broadest group: 77% of the sample - all respondents who answered the direct question about approval of Putin's performance in the affirmative. In this group we found the following features:

- 75% of those who approve of Putin do not want mobilization,
- 83% of the approvers would like t h e authorities to prioritize internal social and economic problems,
- 51% (with 17% against) believe that it is more important to liberate the Kursk region rather than launch an offensive in Donbass.

But Putin, whom this group approves of, is not mobilizing only because he fears obvious protests, sabotage and falling ratings. For him, domestic problems have always been less of a priority than external ones, and even less so in a war. And it was his decision to develop primarily an offensive on Ukrainian territory, not to liberate the Kursk region.

Loyalists - 25%

A second, more focused group of "loyalists," there are 25% of them, and they:

- approve of Putin's performance,
- voted for him in the presidential election,
- believe that Putin's mistakes in governing the country are ^{unlikely}¹.

¹Question wording: "Do you admit that Vladimir Putin may make mistakes in governing the country or is this unlikely?"

Loyalists are uncritical followers of Putin, but:

- Almost half of Loyalists would like to see peace with Ukraine "with mutual concessions" next year,
- 76% would like the authorities to prioritize internal social and economic problems,
- 43% are more likely to be willing to stop the war than to mobilize again,
- In hypothetical peace talks, 47% of respondents would be satisfied with Ukraine's refusal to join NATO, and only 32% would insist on maintaining control over the conquered territories.

Pragmatists - 20%

This is the segment of informed and critical supporters who:

- approve of Putin's performance,
- voted for him in the election,
- but also believe he may make ^{mistakes}² in running the country,
- and uses YouTube or Telegram as a source of information.

They have a higher share than uncritical loyalists of those who would like more focus on internal problems (89%), who would like peace with Ukraine with mutual concessions (57%); among them there are more opponents of mobilization (82%), but at the same time a higher share of awareness of its necessity (48%).

Pragmatists are slightly more likely than loyalists to choose an offensive in Donbas to the detriment of the defense of their territories (21% vs. 16-17%), but 44% still choose the liberation of the Kursk region. Among them there is a higher share of those who have relatives fighting at the front (36% vs. 29% among other Putin supporters), which adds materiality to the perception of the war.

Among them, the share of private enterprise owners is twice as high, which also qualifies to a certain extent the degree of their awareness and consciousness.

Putin's "foot soldiers" - 20%.

²Similar question.

To find people close to Putin's aspirations, his real supporters, let's take a radical group of people who:

- approve of Putin's performance,
- prefer to mobilize rather than move to peace talks in order to continue the SWO,
- prioritize budget spending on war over social spending.

That is, the aspirations of these people are essentially in line with Putin's main strategy and actual program of action, the goal of which is military success in Ukraine.

91% of "foot soldiers" support SWO. At 83% of SWO support the closest entourage (in the entire sample 50%). 75% would not support Putin's hypothetical decision to withdraw troops from Ukraine and move to peace talks - despite the unachieved goals. 44% would consider fair amnesty for criminal offenses in exchange for participation in military actions, and 99% would consider benefits for participants in military actions.

In this group, men make up 67%. 33% have someone in their family involved in military operations (vs. 27% in the general population), and 5% claim to be veterans of the NWO themselves (vs. 2% for the whole sample).

They look like real militarist Putinists. In terms of profile, they correspond to the very [new middle class](#), "the basis of which was formed by participants in the fighting in Ukraine and workers in the areas of active import substitution.

But even they, through the prism of personal expectations, often look pacifist. What events would they like to see happen in the coming year?

- 73% would like the authorities to prioritize domestic social and economic problems.
- 33% of them would like a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions,
- 53% would like to see Western sanctions lifted,
- and 42% want to restore relations with the West.


What is more important for them - to develop the offensive in Ukraine or to liberate the Kursk region? 42% vs. 29% say: native land is more important than new ones

territories. Obviously, these aspirations do not correspond to Putin's actions. Kursk region, domestic problems are not a priority for him, and he has given up on relations with the West. It turns out that if the loyal group of those who support Putin is purged of dissenters, its ranks will be noticeably thinned.

On most parameters we see 30%, 40% and even 80% of Putin's "supporters" disagreeing with his policies regarding these parameters.

On the one hand, this is normal: there cannot be complete coincidence between the views of the leader and his approvers. On the other hand, there are the most important decisions for the country and the common man: the most important for the leader and at the same time fateful for the man. In Putin's case, these are the decisions to start and end the war.

The beginning of the war was an absolute shock to the whole country, and its end was the request of an increasing part (now 80%) of the population.



Picture 1.

One third of Putinists are not ready to support the SWO, despite the obvious social approval of such a position in their eyes. And when we ask about stopping the war, the readiness to "support the decision to withdraw troops and move to peace talks, (even) **despite the unachieved goals of the special operation**" is even higher.

And this is happening in spite of the goals that [Putin formulates](#): "The outcome must be in Russia's favor, I say directly, without any embarrassment, and must be based on the realities that are emerging on the battlefield. Without any doubt, we are not going to make any concessions here, there will be no swaps."

Between 48% and 59% of Putin's supporters in all of our named groups are ready for a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions. It is important to note that these very numbers among supporters are not radically different from the entire sample, where 63% want peace with mutual concessions.

The same abstraction as support for the special operation looks like attitude to Putin. Relying on standardized formulations of questions, pollsters get big but empty numbers. Projective techniques work better. For example, the formula: "Does this politician reflect the interests (expectations) of people like you?"

— allows you to model a leader's actual relevance to his or her audience.

In our surveys, the pre-election survey in late January 2024 and the September survey, we asked two questions about significant events:

1. *Which of the following events would you like to see happen in the coming year? (Same question in both surveys);*
2. *Versions of the second question before and after the election:*
 - a. *If Vladimir Putin wins the Russian presidential election, which of the following events do you think will happen in the next year? (end of January 2024 version);*
 - b. *Which of the following events do you think will happen in the next year? (September 2024 version, since the elections have already taken place).*

Among Putin's voters, the discrepancy between the desired events and the actions they expect from their "chosen one" is striking. People quite guess that Putin's presidency will lead to negative consequences and undesirable events. But in doing so, people are taken out of the rational field. Their choice is determined not by preferences, but by nonalternativity and learned disbelief in the possibility of a change of power.

For example, the desire for mobilization (or rather, the recognition of its necessity) has increased in 8 months from 17% to 27% - and the expectation (prediction) that it will happen has grown proportionately.

In terms of positive events, we see an inverse dependence. The desire of events significantly exceeds the forecast: a peace treaty with Ukraine with reciprocal

concessions - 55% and 35%, focus on internal problems - 82% and 60%.


Events	Intending to vote for Putin (February 2024)		Those who voted for Putin (September 2024)	
	wish	Waiting	wish	Waiting
Mobilization of men to participate in the SVO	17%	32%	27%	43%
Termination of the SVO after achieving its goals	87%	68%	92%	57%
The main efforts will be focused on solving internal social and economic problems.	81%	72%	82%	60%
Peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions	53%	34%	55%	35%
Increase in budget expenditures for the army	59%	71%	67%	80%
Lifting sanctions imposed on Russia	50%	22%	59%	22%
Restoring relations with Western countries	45%	34%	43%	35%

Picture 2. Source Project Chronicles, February, September 2024

Such a significant discrepancy begs the question: how can you vote for a candidate who will not realize your desires? The answer, apparently, is that wishes are one reality and actual policy is another. Vladimir Putin's own voters probably do not see him as a leader who solves people's problems.

5. Economic health and attitudes towards SWO

While until December 2023, the share of respondents saying that their financial situation has decreased over the last year ranged between 30-45% of the total number of respondents, in 2024 this figure decreased to 20-25%. However, by the end of 2024, there is an increase in the number of respondents claiming a decrease in financial situation from 20% in April 2024 to 26% in September 2024. This increase can be explained by both seasonality and accelerating inflation. The share of respondents saying that their financial situation has improved over the last year has fluctuated quite steadily between 13-20% since the beginning of the war.



The dynamics of self-assessment of financial situation shows a decreasing trend of the poorest groups of the population for 2024. There is also some increase in the share of people with average income.

Self-assessment of financial situation among the participants of SWE and their family members is higher by 5% compared to the families of respondents who do not participate in SWE. Also, families of participants of SWE are 8% less likely to talk about deterioration of their financial situation. It is worth noting that this difference between the families of SWO participants and other families became statistically significant only in 2024 and became particularly strong in September 2024. At the same time, it cannot be said that the families of the participants of the SWO say more often about the improvement of their financial situation. From this we can conclude that military money began to reach military families precisely in 2024. This money maintains the usual level of well-being, but it cannot be said that the families of the participants of the NWO began to feel financially better. At the same time, it should be noted that the participants of the SWO themselves always spoke about the improvement of their financial situation, but their number in the survey sample is only about 2-2.5% of the number of respondents starting from the fall of 2023.

Chronicle Wave 13 results also show that families of SWO participants did not save more or less than families of non-SWO respondents. The families of SWO participants are typically 50% more likely to borrow money from friends and relatives, 8% more likely to have taken out loans at some point in their lives, and 13% more likely to have taken out loans in 2022-2024 compared to the families of non-SWO respondents. We also observe that families of SWO participants are nearly 41% more likely to take out auto loans compared to families of non-SWO respondents, while taking out mortgages is statistically indistinguishable for these families. Among those families who took out loans in 2022 and 2023-2024, families of SWO participants are 24% more likely to say it became more difficult to repay loans in 2023-2024.

Thus, despite the improving financial situation of SWE participants and their families, which was especially evident in 2024, these families did not save more often. These families are generally characterized by more frequent use of borrowed funds, especially loans from relatives and acquaintances. Families of SWO participants were more likely to take out car loans, but not mortgages. However, among respondents who resorted to credit both in 2022 and 2023-2024, families of SWO participants are more likely to say that loans have become more difficult to pay. The latter may be related to rising loan rates and the higher borrowing capacity of the families of SWO participants.

When it comes to the public sector, civil servants (officials and employees of state-owned companies) rate their financial situation 3% lower than employees in the private sector. This result has been quite stable since 2022. However, at the same time, civil servants are 10% less likely to say that their financial situation has worsened over the past year, but it cannot be said that they are more likely to say that their financial situation has improved - the financial situation of civil servants is more stable. The results of Wave 13 also show that civil servants are less likely to take out loans: they are 55% less likely to take out car loans and 40% less likely to take out mortgages compared to employees in the private sector. Among those respondents who resorted to credit in both 2022 and 2023-2024, government workers are twice as likely to say that loans have become easier to repay. This may be due to preferential loans for them.

Overall, households that experienced a decline in wealth in the last year were 27% more likely to have taken out cash loans, microcredits, and loans from relatives or friends in 2023-2024 compared to those that did not experience a decline in wealth. At the same time, if respondents took out loans in 2022 and 2023-2024, they are almost three times more likely to say that loans became more difficult to repay if they experienced a decline in wealth (77%) compared to those who did not experience a decline in wealth (27%).

In all waves, deteriorating material situation reduces support for SWO. In the 13th wave of "Chronicles", the contribution of deteriorating material situation to the decrease in support for SWO amounted to 9% (the minimum for the whole history of "Chronicles" observation), with the total share of SWO support of 49%, i.e. deterioration of material situation reduces support for SWO by 18.3%. This effect is lower than the reverse contribution of TV to the support for SWO - 12.5 p.p. (i.e. 25.5%).

According to our observations before the 13th wave of Chronicles, civil servants were more loyal to the SWE than private sector employees. At the same time, a decrease in material status had the same effect in magnitude, reducing support for the SWO for both civil servants and private sector workers. However, in wave 13

we see a changed trend. Civil servants are no longer more loyal to the SWO in general, but the decline in their financial situation does not become a further driver of their declining support for the SWO.

The situation with willingness to vote for Putin is similar. Civil servants were almost 6% more ready to vote for Putin (with the total share of those ready to vote for him at 56%), but the decline in financial situation for both civil servants and private sector workers reduced the willingness to vote for Putin by 20-22% (i.e. by 38%). However, the analysis of the actual voting according to the data of the 13th wave of "Chronicles" showed that with the total share of respondents who voted for Putin equal to 57%, civil servants were 11% more likely to vote for him. This is almost twice as many civil servants ready to vote for Putin. At the same time, a decrease in the financial situation of civil servants reduced the real vote by only 7%, while for private sector employees this reduction amounted to 15%. Similar patterns of connections were observed in the 13th wave of "Chronicles" regarding support for Putin's activity and confidence in the error-free nature of his activity. In general, the comparison of pre-election results on willingness to vote and actual voting may indicate significant administrative pressure on civil servants during the election week.

If we consider not just nominal support for the SWO as a measure of loyalty, but more consistent support for the war (declared support for the SWO and not being prepared for a ceasefire), then according to our data from past waves, civil servants were not more loyal supporters of the war. However, at the same time, economic shocks through the reduction of their financial situation did not affect their position, unlike private sector employees. However, in the 13th wave of Chronicles we see a changed trend. Civil servants in general have become less consistent supporters of the war than private sector workers, but economic shocks make civil servants more consistent supporters of the war.

Analyzing views on the purposes of volunteer participation in CVOs:

- Respondents who experienced a decrease in their financial situation are more pragmatic than those who did not experience a decrease in their financial situation. They are more likely to say that they volunteer for material benefits.
- Families of SWO participants are more ideological than respondents who do not have relatives in the SWO. Families of SWO participants are more likely to say that they volunteer for civic duty.
- The position of civil servants is more centrist on this issue than that of private sector employees. Civil servants are less likely to say that volunteers go only for money, but they do not say more often that they go for civic duty.

6. Issues of concern to respondents

In Wave 13 of the Chronicles, we asked about the problems that concern respondents most today. This was an open-ended question, respondents could specify three problems, which were then coded into groups.

38% - the largest group of respondents who said that they are concerned about the financial and economic sphere of life - prices, including tariffs for housing and utilities, rates on loans and mortgages, salaries, payments, allowances, etc.

31% are concerned about the war and everything that is connected with it: loss of life and loss of people, mobilization and impossibility to return a relative home, security problems in border regions, difficulties in receiving payments, etc.

18% - the problem of medicine in the country as a whole and personal health of the respondent and his/her relatives.

Then come the problems of transportation, roads, infrastructure - 10%. And another 6% are concerned with housing problems (except for the problem of tariffs, they belong to the economic block) - lack of own housing, the need for major repairs, poor communications, lack of gas, wood heating and others.

Respondents also point out problems related to politics - the internal situation in the country as a whole and Russia's foreign policy, corruption, poor work of the authorities (mainly local authorities), lack of elections, lawlessness, unfair trial, arbitrariness of law enforcers. A small proportion of respondents speak about the problem of censorship, blocking of channels, lack of freedoms in the country.

Personal problems related to family, studies and employment are also mentioned. The problem of employment includes not only difficulties in finding a job, but also unsatisfactory working conditions, poor relations at work, and raising the retirement age (low wages belong to the economic block of problems).

Other problems include the lack of specialists in various fields and population loss from the regions, problems of access to and quality of education, environmental problems (pollution, garbage, climate change, stray animals), issues related to migration (respondents often did not specify whether they were talking about migrants who came to Russia or about Russians who left), security and law and order problems, tense international situation in general, instability of life, uncertainty, inability to plan.

A small proportion of respondents also noted problems in the cultural sphere, including the low quality of TV programs and the dominance of propaganda. A few

people said about travel restrictions due to sanctions. Only 1% of respondents said they had no problems, and 21% found it difficult to answer the question.

Some problems are correlated with the respondents' position on the SWO. For example, respondents who openly support the "special operation" less often mention financial and economic problems (33%) than respondents who openly do not support it (47%) or refused to answer this question (45%). The same applies to the whole block of problems related to the SWO: if among those who support the SWO the problem of war and everything related to it was mentioned by 30%, then among those who openly do not support the SWO this problem was mentioned by 41%.

In addition, among the respondents who openly do not support the SWE, there are more often those who talk about political problems of the country, corruption, poor work of the authorities, etc. They, as well as those who could not answer about their attitude to the SWE, are concerned about the problems of education in the country. They, as well as those who found it difficult to answer about their attitude to the SWO, are concerned about the problems of education in the country. Among those who found it difficult to answer about "special operation" there are more of those who are concerned about personal family affairs, problems of their own or their children's education. Among those who refused to answer about attitude to SWO there are more of those who are concerned about employment problems.

7. Reasons for respondents' participation in the survey

Why do respondents participate in telephone surveys, including on political topics, despite censorship and increased repression? At the end of the questionnaire 13 waves of the Chronicles, we asked what reason respondents had for agreeing to participate in the survey. The same question was asked in two other telephone surveys conducted in June and October 2024 ([PROPA project](#)). Mostly participants answer that they were interested in listening to the questions, some specify that for them the survey is a kind of a source of information about what is happening.

From a quarter to a third of respondents take part in the survey because they want to express their opinion, to be useful. They consider it their civic duty to help "collect statistics" or hope that their answers will change the situation in the country for the better.

About a quarter of respondents participate in the survey because they say they just had some free time.

To improve the quality of our research, tell us the reason why did you agree to take the survey?			
	PROPA (June 2024)	Chronicles 13 (Sept. 2024)	PROPA (Oct. 2024)
It was interesting listen questions	54	38	43
Wanted to make a point	31	30	25
Just had some free time	8	25	25
Another reason	7	6	7
Difficult to answer/refuse	1	1	1
Total	100	100	100

Presumably, respondents in the three subsamples of wave 13 of Chronicles (see Data Structure section) must have different motivations for participating in the survey. Indeed, those who agree to be re-interviewed are more likely than others to answer that they want to express their opinion - 36% vs. 23-28% in the other two groups.

To improve the quality of our research, tell us the reason why you agreed to participate in the survey?	Sample A	Sample B	Sample B
It was interesting to hear the questions	40	35	39
Wanted to make a point	28	36	23
Just had some free time	27	22	27
Another reason	5	7	9

Difficult to answer/refuse	0	1	2
Total	100	100	100

We also find a statistically significant relationship between the desire to express one's opinion in the survey and answers to some substantive questions. For example, this reason is most often given among those whose financial situation has worsened over the last year - 37% versus 26%-27% among those whose financial situation has improved or has not changed. A similar correlation is found with the question about changes in life in general over the past year - among those whose life has worsened, 40% participate in the survey to express their opinion, compared to 25%-27% among those whose life has improved or has not changed noticeably.

The desire to speak out in the survey correlates not only with deterioration in personal life, but also with disapproval of the government and its decisions. Thus, 40% of respondents who disapprove of Putin's activities gave this reason for participating in the survey, while 27% of respondents who approve of Putin's activities gave this reason. This reason was also chosen by 46% of respondents who openly do not support the NWO. At the same time, in the groups with open support for the NWO or those who did not give an unambiguous answer

- desire to express in the survey was chosen by about a quarter of respondents.

However, the strongest correlation is found with the question about who respondents voted for in the presidential election in 2024. Among those who voted for Vladislav Davankov, as well as among those who spoiled the ballot, about 55% of respondents said that they participate in the survey to express their opinion. Among other respondents, including those who did not vote at all, this reason for participating in the survey ranges from 26% to 37%. Thus, we believe that the survey is a way of political expression to a greater extent for respondents who disagree with the authorities. In addition, this same category of respondents more often repeatedly participate in surveys.

8. Results of the priming experiment

In the sample as a whole, priming about war (primes 2 and 4) does not statistically significantly affect the attitude towards Putin (support or error-free question) or the approval of voting for him. But among those who have NOT felt a decrease in their financial situation, priming about war increases the likelihood that a respondent will declare a vote for Putin.

Also among those who felt a decrease in their financial situation, priming about war increases the likelihood that the respondent answered that Putin can make mistakes. And also among those who are ready for a truce priming about war increases the probability of saying that Putin can make mistakes. It is worth noting that none of the primings affect NOT the statement about support for Putin's activities.

In the sample as a whole, the pro-Putin priming (priming 3) increases the willingness to support Putin's decision to withdraw troops and stop the war. This effect appears at the expense of those who have not experienced a decrease in their financial situation, as well as those who did not vote for Putin and those who do not think that Putin can make mistakes.

In the sample as a whole, priming about participation in presidential voting (priming 1) increases the probability that a respondent believes that Putin may make mistakes, but it does not affect support for Putin's performance. The effect appears only for those who voted for Putin. This effect is stronger for those who have not previously received priming about the war. This effect is also stronger for those who have improved their financial situation over the past year.

All this allows us to say that the "classical" measure of presidential support (the question about Putin's support for the presidency of the Russian Federation) is not sensitive to any priming, and, probably, it should be considered not the best measuring tool. At the same time, even the statement of the fact of voting for Putin is sensitive to the primings on some subgroups.

We also believe that support for the ceasefire is support from respondents who are not interested in the information agenda, a kind of measure of "justification of the system", acceptance and support of power decisions by default. Also the respondents' statement about voting for Putin in the presidential election causes some disappointment in him as an infallible leader. Among those who have felt a decline in their financial situation over the past year, memories of the war are painful and this leads to a higher probability that respondents answered that Putin can make mistakes.

9. Technical report

Type of sample	A	B	B
Numbers in the starting sample	998685	10026	263886
No answer	109645	530	10630
Rejected	332634	318	12288
Soft refusal - "no time," "driving," "on the work," etc.	30567	459	3587
The hard refusal is "I won't talk." "I don't participate in polls on principle," "I don't talking to strangers," etc.	10704	931	7983
Communication error	14	1	0
Busy	61796	174	12896
Answering machine, wrong number, organization	157787	862	21433
Defunct number	165142	64	10417
No operators	11776	826	988
Call error	6393	9	502
Under 18	1195	23	347
Organization/Office	971	23	331
Language issues	327	7	136
Physical or mental non-responsiveness	430	27	286
AGREEMENT	1415	744	727
Interrupted	588	135	318
FULL	827	609	409

Array reweighting coefficients

Two sets of coefficients each were used for sample A (for interrupted and successful interviews) and two more sets of coefficients for the array as a whole.

a. The arrays are reweighted by gender, age and federal district. In addition to socio-demographic parameters, the total array is also reweighted by sample volumes in order to equalize samples A, B and C in the total array by weighting coefficients. The reweighting coefficients are calculated on the basis of Rosstat data on the socio-demographic and territorial composition of the Russian population as of 01.01.2023. Weights by gender are calculated on the basis of the gender composition of the adult population of the whole Russia without taking into account the gender distribution of the population by federal districts. Weights by federal districts are calculated on the basis of the adult population of all federal districts. The weights are rounded to millionths. The weights are calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{\beta}{\alpha} = X$$

Where X is the weighting factor α is the proportion of respondents in the sample population (in %, calculated in SPSS: frequency distributions)

variables "gender" and "federal district"), θ - share of respondents in the general population (in %, according to Rosstat data).

The first set of coefficients is for the array of successful interviews for sample A (N=804)

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts

Federal District	proportion of the adult population in the county, Rosstat (β)	the share of respondents from this district in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
CFA	28,2%	28,0%	1,007143
NWFD	9,8%	10,4%	0,942308
SFO	11,4%	11,1%	1,028682
NCFB	6,5%	6,1%	1,059080
FRP	19,6%	20,5%	0,957620
UVO	8,2%	8,1%	1,006448
SFO	11,1%	10,8%	1,027964
DFO	5,3%	5,0%	1,060000

Calculation of weighting factors by gender

floor	the proportion of the adult population of a given sex, Rosstat (β)	the proportion of respondents of a given gender in the sample (α)	weighting factor (X)
Male	45,2%	54,6%	0,828145
Female	54,8%	45,4%	1,206681

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups

Age groups	the share of the adult population of the given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
18-29 years old	15,4%	14,4%	1,067273
30-39 years old	20,5%	21,5%	0,955244
40-49 years old	18,7%	23,5%	0,795848
50-59 years old	15,7%	13,9%	1,132202
60+ years	29,7%	26,6%	1,114793

The second set of coefficients is for the array with interrupted interviews for sample A (N=1415)

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts

Federal District	proportion of the adult population in the county, Rosstat (β)	the share of respondents from this district in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
CFA	28,2%	26,9%	1,048327
NWFD	9,8%	10,4%	0,942308
SFO	11,4%	10,9%	1,047557
NCFB	6,5%	8,6%	0,751208
FRP	19,6%	18,0%	1,090623
UVO	8,2%	8,4%	0,970504
SFO	11,1%	12,4%	0,895323
DFO	5,3%	4,5%	1,177778

Calculation of weighting factors by gender

floor	the proportion of the adult population of a given sex, Rosstat (β)	the proportion of respondents of a given gender in the sample (α)	weighting factor (X)
Male	45,2%	56,9%	0,794670
Female	54,8%	43,1%	1,271074

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups

Age groups	the share of the adult population of the given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
18-29 years old	15,4%	13,5%	1,138424
30-39 years old	20,5%	24,1%	0,852188
40-49 years old	18,7%	21,6%	0,865854
50-59 years old	15,7%	14,7%	1,070585
60+ years	29,7%	26,1%	1,136149

The third set of coefficients is for the total set of successful interviews across all samples (N=1812)

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts

Federal District	proportion of the adult population in the county, Rosstat (β)	the share of respondents from this district in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
CFA	28,2%	25,7%	1,097276
NWFD	9,8%	14,0%	0,700000
SFO	11,4%	10,4%	1,097920
NCFB	6,5%	5,8%	1,113860
FRP	19,6%	18,0%	1,090623
UVO	8,2%	9,9%	0,823458
SFO	11,1%	11,2%	0,991251

DFO	5,3%	4,9%	1,081633
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Calculation of weighting factors by gender

floor	the proportion of the adult population of a given sex, Rosstat (β)	the proportion of respondents of a given gender in the sample (α)	weighting factor (X)
Male	45,2%	54,4%	0,831189
Female	54,8%	45,6%	1,201388

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups

Age groups	the share of the adult population of the given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
18-29 years old	15,4%	11,7%	1,313567
30-39 years old	20,5%	19,8%	1,037260
40-49 years old	18,7%	23,1%	0,809629
50-59 years old	15,7%	15,5%	1,015329
60+ years	29,7%	29,9%	0,991755

Calculation of weighting coefficients by sample type

Sampling	Required sampling fraction of the total array (β)	Actual proportion of the sample in the total array (α)	weighting factor (X)
A	33,3%	44,4%	0,750000
B	33,3%	33,3%	1,000000
B	33,3%	22,3%	1,493274

The fourth set of coefficients is for the total set of successful interviews across all samples with interrupted interviews (N=2886)

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts

Federal District	adult share of population in the district, Rosstat (β)	response rate of a given district in the sample (α)	weighting factor (X)
CFA	28,2%	24,9%	1,132530
NWFD	9,8%	12,7%	0,771654
SFO	11,4%	10,5%	1,087464
NCFB	6,5%	7,4%	0,873026
FRP	19,6%	17,2%	1,141350
UVO	8,2%	9,9%	0,823458
SFO	11,1%	12,6%	0,881112
DFO	5,3%	4,9%	1,081633

Calculation of weighting factors by gender

floor	the proportion of the adult population of a given sex, Rosstat (β)	the proportion of respondents of a given gender in the sample (α)	weighting factor (X)
Male	45,2%	55,4%	0,816186
Female	54,8%	44,6%	1,228325

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups

Age groups	the share of the adult population of the given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weighting factor (X)
18-29 years old	15,4%	11,6%	1,324890
30-39 years old	20,5%	21,4%	0,959707
40-49 years old	18,7%	22,0%	0,850111
50-59 years old	15,7%	15,7%	1,002395
60+ years	29,7%	29,3%	1,012064

Calculation of weighting coefficients by sample type

Sampling	Required sampling fraction of the total array (β)	Actual proportion of the sample in the total array (α)	weighting factor (X)
A	33,3%	49,0%	0,679592
Б	33,3%	25,8%	1,290698
B	33,3%	25,2%	1,321429

Crumbling of the sample

The first interview question was asked to 2,886 respondents and the last interview question was asked to 1,846 respondents to respondents. The process of sample shedding is summarized in the following table.

Code issue	Packs records	Shattering	Question text
Q6001	2886	0%	In which Federal District do you reside?
Q3	2886	0%	WRITE DOWN THE FIRST NAMED PROBLEM HERE
Q4	2813	3%	Over the past year, has your financial situation improved, worsened or remained generally unchanged?
Q5	2750	5%	Have you or members of your family changed or lost jobs in the last year? If yes, were you able to find a job in better, the same or worse conditions
Q6	2720	6%	In general, over the past year, the amount of your cash did savings increase, decrease, or remain the same?

Q7	2414	16%	Tell me, did you manage to vote in the Russian presidential election in March 24th? If yes, for whom did you vote?
Q8	2418	16%	Are you suggesting that Vladimir Putin may be committing mistakes in running the country, or is that unlikely?
Q9	2390	17%	Do you generally approve or disapprove of the activities of the Vladimir Putin as president of Russia?
Q39	2494	14%	What do you think, if a new mobilization is needed to continue the special operation - what is the right way to proceed? to do: another mobilization
Q10	2408	17%	What do you think is a more important goal for the Russian army today: to dislodge the Ukrainian army from Kursk region or promotion in
Q11	2334	19%	In your opinion, what of the following should be done to liberate the territories of Kursk region from the of the Ukrainian armed forces?
Q12	2161	25%	What do you think Russia should achieve in peace negotiations first and foremost - holding the new territories or Ukraine's renunciation of the
Q14	2120	27%	Please tell us whether you support or do not support Russia's military operation on the territory of the of Ukraine, you find it difficult to give a definite answer
Q16	2212	23%	From what sources do you get information on the progress of of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine?
Q17	2015	30%	Do you or do you not use a vi-pi en (VPN)?
Q18	2006	30%	Participants and veterans of special operations and their families are entitled to a variety of benefits (housing and utilities, housing and utilities, housing and utilities allowances, housing and utilities allowances, and housing and utilities allowances).
Q21	1995	31%	loans, enrollment in universities). How do you Do you think it is fair or unfair that participants and veterans of a military operation are exempted from from criminal liability h
Q22	1982	31%	How do you think the majority of those who go to the front today to volunteer are PREFERRED, solving their MATERIAL PROBLEMS or fulfilling the
Q23	1972	32%	In your opinion, in case of a budget deficit, where should public funds be spent first? - on the armed forces or on
Q24	1965	32%	You personally or someone in your family is or has been involved in military action as part of a special operation in Ukraine? Or are there no such people?
Q25/250	1965	32%	Which of the following events would you like to see happen in the coming year? of the listed events will take place in the coming year?
Q26	1922	33%	Would you like to talk more or less with acquaintances, relatives, or coworkers about what going on at the front, in a special ops zone?
Q27	1906	34%	Do you think that among your close acquaintances, relatives, coworkers, most of the Supports or does not support the military opera
Q2	1903	34%	Have you or a family member who lives in the community ever take out a loan with you?

Q6004	1873	35%	What is your current primary occupation?
Q37	1867	35%	Over the past year, your life has changed in a whole lot of ways. for better, for worse, or no noticeable change?
A5	1860	36%	A5. What is your highest level of education, verified by a diploma, a GED?
Q6006	1857	36%	Which of the following descriptions is most accurate corresponds to your family's financial situation?
Q305	1856	36%	Please indicate, at least approximately, what is the average monthly income for each person? a member of your family?
Q38	1847	36%	To improve the quality of our research, tell us, by what reason did you agree to participate in the survey?
Q1002	1847	36%	A1. Gender of the respondent
Q999	1846	36%	THOSE WERE ALL THE QUESTIONS WE WANTED TO ASK YOU REQUEST. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!

10. Appendices

ANNEX 1. Cluster analysis

Technically, **cluster analysis** is the grouping of individual units/respondents as many as homogeneous groups/clusters/segments. The higher the homogeneity of such a group, the deeper the differences between the selected segments, i.e. units/respondents grouped by one set of attributes into a segment are likely to give homogeneous values for another set of attributes as well. ("If we ask the same question to respondents from one cluster, the probability of getting the same answer is significantly higher than when interviewing people from different clusters", A.V. Churikov, "Fundamentals of sampling design for sociological research", 2020).

Advantages of cluster analysis. It itself (in a divisional or agglomeration way) will divide the array into clusters depending on the similarity/homogeneity (in the mathematical sense - closeness) of respondents' answers to different questions. This allows taking into account more complex combinations of respondents' answers than crosstabulations, especially in cases when there is no unambiguous logical dependence in these answers ("muddle in the head"). Cluster analysis itself is heuristic in nature, i.e. we do not test any hypothesis arising from our theoretical assumptions, but have to interpret the result ad hoc, assuming that in further measurements such segmentation will be preserved and it will be possible to track the dynamics of individual segments.

Disadvantages of cluster analysis. In addition to its heuristic nature (which is both a disadvantage and an advantage), it is extremely sensitive to the number of attributes used, as well as the length and nature of the scales. Since the distance parameter between respondents' answers is used for clustering, the inclusion of traits with nominal scales does not make sense. Metric scales also have their limitations, especially if they are highly elongated and heterogeneous, which often results in segments that are small in size but meaningful in the sense of being different from others. Ordinal variables with a minimum, i.e. three-member scale seem to be ideal.

Involving a large number of attributes reflecting attitudes towards the same phenomenon, such as SWO, in a cluster analysis can only exacerbate the "mush". It is necessary to attract exactly those that reflect different sides of such an attitude, for example, to the phenomenon as such, as well as possible variants of its development. Three attributes of the 13th wave of the Chronicles project were chosen as signs for clustering the attitude of Russians to the SWO:

Tell me, please, do you support or do not support Russia's military operation on the territory of Ukraine, do you find it difficult to answer unequivocally or do not want to answer this question?

If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and start negotiations on a ceasefire, (NOT having achieved the original goals of the military operation)³, would you support or not support such a decision?

What do you think, if a new mobilization is required to continue the special operation - what is the right thing to do: to conduct another mobilization or to stop military operations and conclude a peace agreement with Ukraine?


The scales for all three questions were reduced to a three-measure ordinal scale, where the mean value was neutral (uncertain answers, refusals to answer, difficulties, etc.). The first question assessed an event that had taken place and was ongoing, while the other two questions assessed hypothetical and, most likely, opposite events in terms of meaning and consequences.

The divisional K-means analysis was chosen. Its main advantage is the simplicity of the algorithm. Disadvantages - it is necessary to determine the number of clusters in advance and the result depends on the sequence of cases, i.e. the location of questionnaires in the array.

APPENDIX 2. Socio-demographic and information-consumer characteristics of clustering segments


While supporters of peace, i.e. those who openly and consistently advocate an anti-war position, are represented in the same proportion (13% each) among men and women, supporters of war dominate among men (38%), and among women - hidden supporters of peace (36%). The share of supporters of peace increases as one moves from older to younger generations of Russians, while the share of supporters of war increases in the opposite direction. Among young people there are also more hidden supporters of peace, opponents of escalation, and fewer who agree with the SWO. That is, support for military action grows with age.

³Half of the respondents were not asked the bracketed part of the question. The analysis was conducted for the entire sample. Specially conducted analysis did not reveal any significant differences between the two parts of the sample.




Among those who do not have higher education there are more supporters of war (32%), and hidden supporters of peace (36%), among those who have it - supporters of peace (16%). As we can see, higher education contributes to the formation of a more consistent position on the issues of war and peace.

Capital cities have the highest share of open supporters of peace (21%) and the lowest share of hidden supporters (24%). At the same time, the share of strong supporters of war is somewhat smaller there (26%) than in the country as a whole (30%). Residents of urban centers differ from urban residents by a greater share of hidden supporters of peace (39%). In villages, however, support for military action is most pronounced: the share of strong supporters of peace (5%) is half as high as in cities, while the share of opponents of escalation (17%) who support the current vector of conflict development is higher.



In the private economy, explicit supporters of both war and peace are better represented than in other employment groups. Hidden supporters of peace are more numerous among budgetary employees. Availability and change of a place of work has a significant impact on the attitude to SWO. If a person has not changed his/her job in the last year, the probability that he/she supports SWO is higher than average. But if he had to change his job for a better one (it is quite likely that this job is connected with the military-industrial complex, which has grown over the last year and a half) or an equivalent one, he is most likely to oppose the SWO, either explicitly or implicitly. And if the job turned out to be worse than the previous one or there was no job at all, the worker is more likely to be in favor of the SWO, but will try not to encourage the escalation of the conflict.

Among those whose financial situation has improved in the last year, there are more of those who either support or agree with the SWO. Among those who faced deterioration of personal well-being, disagreement with the military confrontation is significantly higher. Thus, assessments of the dynamics of one's own financial situation are directly related to the support for military actions: the more positive they are, the stronger is the approval of military confrontation.




INFORMATIONAL IMPACT ON SEGMENTS

The information environment obviously affects attitudes towards the NWO. Where the point of view of the Russian authorities is best represented (TV, VK, OK and Rutube), the share of supporters of war is higher, but the share of hidden supporters of peace is also higher there. In other words, no matter how hard the state propaganda tries, it is not possible to convince Russians of its rightness to the end, but it is possible to achieve their restrained silence. Supporters of peace are best represented in the audience of YouTube and Telegram. Telegram today among Russians is an audience of both supporters and opponents of the NWO, but the transition groups there are smaller than average.

Strong supporters of both war and peace are more likely to be surrounded by like-minded people. In the mixed environment, however, it is more likely to be a group of hidden


in favor of peace and against escalation. On the other hand, the largest share of supporters "the other SWO" among supporters of military confrontation indicates that their acquiescence is largely shaped by the pressures of their everyday environment, whose anti-war views they encounter, and perhaps influenced by which they avoid verbal support for the SWO.




Obviously, the presence of some family members at the front influences the attitude towards the NWO. Among those who have front-line soldiers in their family, the share of supporters of the war is significantly higher than among those who do not have them (32% vs. 28%). Conversely, if a person does not support the SWO, it is more difficult to find a frontline soldier among his/her relatives.

Supporters of the war are more numerous among those who are ready to go to the front voluntarily (56%), or by order (47%), as well as among those who consider themselves not subject to mobilization (49%).

There are also more supporters of war among those who are ready to discuss it more than it turns out in reality or among those who are satisfied with the volume and quality of such discussion (39% and 49%, respectively). But among those who would like to talk about war less or not at all, the share of supporters of peace - explicit and implicit - is increasing. Nevertheless, explicit opponents of war are also willing to discuss the problems of war and peace more actively, rather than avoiding discussion on this topic. That is, the firmness of a position increases the readiness to discuss it.



It is often heard that those who have loans and find it difficult to pay them are sent to the front. Consequently, the support of SWOs should be significantly dependent on whether a person has an outstanding loan or not. Such a dependence has indeed been revealed, but it concerns only car loans and cash loans, including microcredits. In these groups, the share of supporters of the war is significantly higher than among those who took out mortgages or consumer loans, or borrowed from their immediate environment. The presence of a mortgage - a long-term financial solution - is more characteristic of anti-war Russians than of SWO supporters. Pro-war supporters, on the other hand, more often prefer car loans and cash loans. Perhaps this explains their greater optimism in assessing changes in their financial situation: they manage to maintain it with the help of loans.



Attitudes toward President Putin, who started the NWO, are linked to attitudes toward the NWO itself. Among those who voted for Putin in the elections, the share of supporters of the war increases to 40%. Among those who approve of his work as president of Russia, they are 36%. In contrast, the share of peace supporters is highest among those who voted for his election rivals and among those who disapprove of his work (53% and 56%, respectively). The share of hidden peace supporters is highest among those who voted for his rivals in the election and among those who disapprove of his work.

among those who ignored the election or avoided assessing Putin's performance. Those who agree with the SWO are more numerous among those who approve of Putin's performance and rule out the possibility of his mistakes. This group's support for Putin determines their support for the SWO: those who support mobilization if it is needed for military purposes are also willing to support withdrawal from Ukraine without achieving the SWO goals, if Putin so decides.

