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FINAL ANALYTICAL REPORT
Chronicles Project, 15th Wave
September-October 2025

Contents

METHODOLOGICAL AND TECHNICAL REPORT

a. Method: **CATI**
b. Fieldwork period: **September 26 – October 21, 2025**
c. Total number of interviewers and person-hours **91 interviewers, 2,551 hours**
d. Interview duration: **16 min. 50 sec.**
e. Number of contact attempts per number in the initial sample: **3**

Numbers in the initial sample	**3,000,067**
No response	675935
Rejected	529079
Soft refusal - "no time," "driving," "at work," etc.	7696
Firm refusal - "I won't talk for anything," "I don't participate in surveys on principle," "I don't talk to strangers," etc.	23811
Connection error	19
Busy	151239
Answering machine, incorrect number, organization	1159126
Non-existent number	314051
No operators	21567
Call error	5170
Under 18	1626
Organization/Office	3168
Language problems	617
Physical or mental unfitness to respond	977
AGREEMENT	251
Interrupted	883
Marriage	26
COMPLETE	**1630**

f. Assessment of tools (questionnaires). Poorly functioning indicators. Unreliable data. Recommendations for change. ***None***
g. Understanding of possible systematic errors, socially acceptable responses. ***Support for intrusion is significantly related to the interviewer's assessment of the respondent's wariness****. The more wary the respondent, the less they support intrusion*

Technical report.

1. Sampling methodology. ***RDD based on Rossvyaz data, stratified by federal districts and two cities of federal significance.***
2. Estimated sampling error: **2.44% at a 95% confidence interval**
3. Full explanation of the weighting scheme, including details of how the weighting coefficients were developed and applied, as well as the demographic data on which the weighting coefficients were based (i.e., age, gender, and territorial distribution of the population).

Array reweighting coefficients

Two sets of coefficients were used. The first was for the array of successful questionnaires only (N=1604). The second was for the array of questionnaires in which at least one field was filled in (N=2513)

a. The array was reweighted by gender, age, and federal district categories. The resampling coefficients were calculated based on Rosstat data on the socio-demographic and territorial composition of the Russian population as of January 1, 2024. The weights by gender were calculated based on the gender composition of the adult population of Russia as a whole, without taking into account the gender distribution of the population by federal district. Weights by federal district are calculated based on the adult population of all federal districts. Weight coefficients in the calculations are rounded to millionths. Weight coefficients are calculated using the following formula:

$$\frac{\beta}{\alpha} = \mathrm{X}$$

Where X is the weight coefficient, α is the share of respondents in the sample population (in %, calculated in SPSS: frequency distributions of the variables "gender" and "federal district"), β is the share of respondents in the general population (in %, according to Rosstat data).

First set of coefficients

The calculation of weighting coefficients by federal district is presented in the table:

Federal district	*share of adult population in the district, Rosstat (β)*	*share of respondents from this district in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
Central Federal District	28.2	27.4	0.996350
NWFD	9.8	9.5	1.010526
Southern Federal District	11.4	11.2%	1.00000
North Caucasus Federal District	6.5	6.0	1.050000
PFO	19.6	19.8	0.989899
UFO	8.2	9.5	1.010526
SFD	11.1	11.1	1.000000
Far Eastern Federal District	5.2	5.5	0.963636

The calculation of weight coefficients by gender is presented in the table:

Gender	*share of the adult population of a given gender, Rosstat (β)*	*share of respondents of this gender in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
Male	45.2	58.6	0.771195
Female	54.8	41.4	1.323864

The calculation of weight coefficients by age group is presented in the table:

Age groups	*Share of adult population of this age, Rosstat (β)*	*Share of respondents of this age in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
18-29	15.3	10.8	1.420787
30-39	19.7	20.8	0.947490
40-49	19.1	24.3	0.787235
50-59	15.6	17.0	0.915842
60	30.2	27.2	1.112080

Second set of coefficients

The calculation of weighting coefficients by federal district is presented in the table:

Federal district	*Share of adult population in the district, Rosstat (β)*	*Share of respondents from this district in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
Central Federal District	28.2	26.6	1.026316
NWFD	9.8	9.5	1.010526
Southern Federal District	11.4	11.7	0.957265
North Caucasus Federal District	6.5	6.8	0.926471
PFO	19.6	19.5	1.005128
UFO	8.2	8.5	1.129412
SFD	11.1	11.1	1.000000
Far Eastern Federal District	5.2	6.4	0.828125

The calculation of weight coefficients by gender is presented in the table:

Gender	*share of the adult population of a given gender, Rosstat (β)*	*share of respondents of this gender in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
Male	45.2	58.8	0.768572
Female	54.8%	41.2	1.330291

The calculation of weight coefficients by age group is presented in the table:

Age groups	*Share of adult population of this age, Rosstat (β)*	*Share of respondents of this age in the sample (α)*	*Weighting coefficient (X)*
18-29	15.3	12.7	1.208228
30-39	19.7	20.7	0.952068
40-49	19.1	22.8	0.839026

50-59	15.6	16.8	0.926745
60	30.2	27.1	1.116184

KEY INDICATORS AND THEIR DYNAMICS

Over the course of 15 waves of the Chronicles project survey, public opinion on the "special operation" has entered a phase of stagnation. In the first waves, the share of those who directly said "yes, I support it" confidently exceeded 60% and significantly dominated the share of all other responses. Then, starting around the fifth or sixth wave, this share slowly declined and stabilized around 48-50% by the 13th-15th waves. At the same time, the share of "other" responses that do not directly support the war—direct disagreement, uncertainty, evasion of the question—grew from about 35–40% at the beginning to almost mirroring 48–50% in the last waves. As a result, we do not see a sharp decline in support, but a steady increase in the proportion of those who are not ready to directly express support for the war.

This picture suggests that public opinion on the war is in a kind of equilibrium: there has been no mass growth in support for a long time, and so far there are no events in sight that could sharply push the rating of direct support up. On the other hand, there is clearly room for further growth in the proportion of those who do not express direct support. Any stressful events—serious setbacks on the front lines, an escalation of the domestic political situation, problems on the diplomatic front—are much more likely to push people not toward stronger declarative support, but toward doubt, discontent, or silent distancing from the war.

Over several waves, attitudes toward the hypothetical withdrawal of troops and negotiations on a truce by Vladimir Putin's decision have remained relatively stable: 51% of respondents in October 2024 and 41% of respondents in January 2025 were ready to support such a decision by Putin, and 31% in October 2024 and 46% in January 2025 were not ready to support it. However, in the 15th wave, the structure of responses changed significantly, not so much due to a sharp increase in supporters or opponents, but rather due to those who remained undecided. The share of supporters remains within the range of the last waves (40–42%), the share of those who "do not support" decreases from almost 46% to 35% (and approaches the level of the 11th wave), while the share of those who find it difficult to answer jumps from 12% to 21% over the last six months. This looks like a manifestation of the phase of stagnation and confusion that is evident in the overall dynamics of the war. The expectation of an end to the conflict is noticeable—just under half of the population is already ready to support the decision to withdraw troops without achieving the initial goals. Against the backdrop of a protracted war and disappointment with diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities, respondents probably prefer not to take a clear position. In other words, there is a demand for an end to the war, but it is increasingly manifested in the form of a growing zone of doubt and unspoken expectations, rather than in the form of an open demand for peace or the continuation of the war.

Throughout the observation period, the budget priority in favor of the army fluctuated, reaching 31% in September 2025 (15th wave). Previously, the share of those who would choose the armed forces in the context of a budget deficit ranged from 25% to 42%: after a drop in the 11th wave (25%), it rose to 42% in the 13th, then fell again to 36% and has now fallen even lower. At the same time, the preference for social spending remains consistently higher: around 44-48% in all recent waves (47% in the 15th). At the same time, in the 15th wave, there has been a noticeable increase in the proportion of those who find it difficult to answer or give a different answer (22% versus 16–19% in most previous measurements). Overall, this means that against the backdrop of the protracted war, society is less and less willing to consider the army an unconditional budget priority and is increasingly leaning towards civilian spending or an uncertain position.

Over the last three waves of the survey, the picture of respondents' financial situation has remained generally unfavorable and rather stagnant. The proportion of those who say that their lives have improved over the past year is small and even declining: from 15% in the 13th wave to 19% in the 14th, and then to 12% in the 15th. More than half of those surveyed in the latest wave (52%) say that their financial situation has not changed, and this share is growing again after falling to 43% in the 14th wave. At the same time, the group of those who feel that their situation has worsened is large: 27% in the 13th wave, 36% in the 14th, and 35% in the 15th. This means that even against the backdrop of some adaptation (an increase in the number of responses stating that "nothing has changed"), about a third of the population continues to subjectively feel a decline in their financial situation. Taken together, these data do not indicate any noticeable recovery, but rather a transition to a "protracted crisis" mode: almost no one has seen any improvement, a significant portion of people still see a deterioration, and the majority report stagnation at the current level, which is far from prosperous.

The share of VPN users has been growing steadily over the last few waves, but remains a minority. In waves 6–12, it fluctuated between 18% and 23%, with slight dips (20% in wave 10, 18% in wave 11) and a rise to 22% in wave 12. Starting with wave 13 (October 2024), the share of those who "use VPN" reaches a new, higher level: about 26% in wave 13 and already a stable 27%+ in waves 14–15. In other words, approximately one in four to three respondents uses a workaround to bypass blocks, and over the past year, there has been a gradual increase in this practice.

At the same time, the majority still say they do not use VPNs: from 55% to almost 66% in different waves, and in the 15th wave – about 58%. Only the group of those who do not know what a VPN is has decreased significantly: while more than 21% responded this way in the 6th wave and 36% in the 10th wave, by the 14th–15th waves this share had fallen to 13–16%. In other words, awareness of the technology is growing, and some people are becoming active users, but VPNs have not yet become the norm.

According to respondents, support for the special operation still dominates in their immediate circle, but this majority is weakening. The share of those who say that most of their acquaintances support the special operation decreased from 48–50% in the 13th–14th waves to 44% in the 15th wave. The category "roughly equal – some support it, some don't" remains more stable, but also shows a decline (29–27–26%), while the share of those whose circle does not support the operation has remained at 12–13% throughout. On the other hand, the share of those who find it difficult to describe the mood of their circle has almost doubled: from 9–10% to 18%. This can be interpreted as a weakening of confidence that "everyone around is in favor" and as an increase in uncertainty and diversity of opinions in the immediate social environment.

THE WAR SPILLING INTO EVERYDAY LIFE

In the 15th wave, we asked a series of questions about what had happened to the respondent personally or in their city/district over the past six months. We asked about the consequences in the respondent's locality over the past six months: *"Which of the following has happened in your city or district in the last six months?"*

1) Disruptions to rail and airport services (32% of respondents)
2) Shelling, drone attacks (47% of respondents)
3) Mobile internet outages (72% of respondents)
4) Power and water outages (31% of respondents)
5) Gasoline shortages at gas stations (21% of respondents)
6) Shortages of medicines in pharmacies or medical facilities (13% of respondents)

If we construct an index of each respondent's town's vulnerability to war as the sum of binary variables for each of the six characteristics, we find that

- 13% of respondents did not experience any consequences in their locality.
- 47% experienced 1 or 2 consequences;
- 34% experienced 3 or 4 consequences;
- 6% experienced 5 or 6 consequences.

We asked the following questions about personal consequences:

1) "*Over the past year, has your financial situation improved, worsened, or remained unchanged?*" (35% responded that it had worsened, 12% that it had improved). It is worth noting that in February 2025, 19% of respondents reported an improvement. The number of respondents reporting a deterioration in their financial situation has remained stable since February 2025.
2) "*Have you or any members of your family changed or lost their jobs in the last year? If so, were you able to find a job with better, the same, or worse conditions?*" (10% responded that they lost or changed jobs and did not find the same or a better position, while 16% responded that they changed jobs and found a position that was not worse).

We also asked about savings: "*Have you lost any savings since the start of the special operation, for example, due to sanctions, asset freezes, or the stock market crash?*" 12% of respondents said they had lost savings, 38% said they had not lost savings, and 50% said they had no savings.

At the end of this section, we also asked about the overall impact of the special military operation: "*Has the special military operation affected your daily life? If so, has it been more positive or more negative?*" 7% of respondents answered (9% in February 2025) that the special military operation had a positive impact, while 42.4% answered that it had a negative impact (54% in February 2025).

If we construct an index of the personal positive/negative impact of the war for each respondent as the sum of binary variables for each of the three characteristics (change in financial situation, changes at work, impact of the special military operation on daily life), we find that, in terms of the personal negative consequences of the special military operation

- 40% of respondents did not experience any personal negative consequences.
- 35% experienced one element of personal negative consequences;
- 20% experienced two elements of personal negative consequences;
- 4% experienced three elements of personal negative consequences.

Regarding the personal positive effects of the SVO

- 71% of respondents did not experience any personal positive consequences.
- 24% experienced one element of personal positive consequences;
- 5% experienced two elements of personal positive consequences;
- 0.3% experienced three elements of personal positive consequences;

Overall, it can be concluded that the war affected 87% of the population through its negative impact on their settlements and 60% of the population through its negative impact on them personally. At the same time, about 29% of respondents experienced some positive consequences of the SVO.

Next, we analyze how the negative impact on settlements and the personal lives of respondents is related to their attitude toward the war and their readiness for a truce. Table 2 in the Appendix shows that, in general, the index of a settlement's exposure to war is not related to attitudes toward the SVO. However, a more detailed analysis shows that different impacts on a settlement have different effects. For example, disruptions to rail service and drone attacks/shelling increase support for the SVO and reduce willingness to accept a ceasefire. At the same time, mobile internet outages or power cuts tend to reduce support for the SVO and willingness to accept a ceasefire. Gasoline shortages and medicine shortages are not related to attitudes toward the SVO. Thus, it can be concluded that the direct impact of hostilities on Russian cities (through shelling and sabotage) is more likely to cause a "rally around the flag" (support increases by 5-7 percentage points, unwillingness to accept a ceasefire increases by 4-4.5 percentage points). However, the indirect impact on cities, through the Russian authorities' response to the attacks (cutting off mobile internet and electricity), causes disappointment in the SVO (support decreases by 7-11 p.p., unwillingness to accept a ceasefire decreases by 4 p.p.). Furthermore, if the impact of the war on cities is highly indirect (through interruptions in gasoline supplies or shortages of medicines), this does not affect attitudes toward the war.

The index of the personal negative effect of the SVO significantly reduces support for the SVO (by 13 p.p. for each element of the index) and reduces unwillingness to accept a truce without achieving the objectives by 4.7 p.p. (for each element of the index). Overall, the magnitude of the effect of the personal negative impact of the SVO is comparable to the effects of mobile internet and electricity outages. At the same time, although the index of personal positive experience of the SVO increases support for the SVO by 4.6-4.9 p.p., it does not affect unwillingness to accept a truce. Thus, people are sensitive to the personal negative consequences of the SVO, and this shapes their attitude towards the war. At the same time, they hardly transfer the positive consequences of the SVO to their attitude towards the war.

Table 1. Impact on the community and personal life in relation to the SVO

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Support for SVO		No truce without achieving goals		(Support for SVO) AND (No truce without achieving goals)		(Support for the SVO) AND (No truce without achieving the goals) AND (Budget for the war)	
Settlement exposure index	-0.012		0.0023		0.0059		-0.0097	
	(0.0099)		(0.0094)		(0.0087)		(0.0066)	
Railway disruptions		0.074		0.039		0.072		0.047
		(0.031)		(0.030)		(0.028)		(0.023)
Shelling, drone attacks		0.051		0.045		0.051		0.008
		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.025)		(0.020)
Mobile Internet disconnection		-0.072		-0.051		-0.052		-
		(0.030)		(0.029)		(0.028)		(0.023)
Power outages		-0.11***		-0.049		-0.069		-0.034
		(0.028)		(0.027)		(0.024)		(0.018)
Gasoline shortages		0.023		0.036		0.028		-0.023
		(0.032)		(0.031)		(0.028)		(0.020)
Drug shortages		-0.070		-0.0085		0.0028		-
		(0.038)		(0.037)		(0.034)		(0.022)
Negative personal impact index	-0.13	-0.13	-0.047	-0.048	-0.070	-0.072	-0.033	-0.033
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Positive personal impact index	0.046	0.049	-0.0019	-0.00014	0.007	0.010	0.015	0.016
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Financial position: below average	0.031	0.028	0.034	0.033	0.025	0.023	-0.010	-0.011
	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Mat. position: average	0.079	0.067	0.080	0.076	0.070	0.063	0.060	0.055
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Financial position: above average	0.055	0.044	0.053	0.048	0.054	0.046	0.037	0.032
	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Material position: Failure	0.047	0.035	0.0099	0.00011	0.045	0.033	0.068	0.064
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Age: 35-54	0.18	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.15	0.15	0.081	0.082
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Age: 55	0.20	0.19	0.30	0.29	0.28	0.27	0.17	0.16
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Female	-0.13***	-0.12	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	-0.15	-0.080***	-0.080
	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Higher education	0.040	0.030	0.037	0.032	0.051	0.042	0.031	0.025
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.018)
In training	-0.077	-0.072	-0.11	-0.11	-0.065	-0.057	-0.047	-0.044
	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.037)	(0.036)

Employment: Public sector	-0.013	-0.027	-0.092	-0.10	-0.057	-0.066	-0.049	-0.051**
	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Employment: Private sector	-0.065	-0.082	-0.027	-	-0.00088	-0.012	-0.0034	-0.0089
	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)
MSK-SPB	-0.0043	-0.044	0.037	0.016	0.0078	-0.026	0.00093	-0.023
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.031)	(0.032)
City 100-500K	-0.0016	0.0043	-0.022	-0.021	-0.0093	-0.0058	-0.013	-0.0091
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.024)	(0.024)
City less than 100K	0.033	0.049	0.014	0.019	0.0019	0.011	-0.00055	0.0089
	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.029)	(0.030)
PGT	-0.051	-0.025	0.026	0.036	-0.0089	0.0062	0.023	0.033
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Village	-0.060	-0.039	-0.023	-0.016	-0.033	-0.018	-0.011	0.0022
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.031)	(0.031)
unknown	-0.073	-0.071	-0.17***	-0.17	-0.12	-0.13	-0.074	-0.073
	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Border region	0.096	0.067	0.021	0.0023	0.05	0.032	0.082	0.072
	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Constant	0.51	0.55	0.25	0.29	0.18	0.22	0.093	0.11
	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.056)	(0.040)	(0.042)
Observations	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604
R-squared	0.127	0.148	0.103	0.111	0.109	0.124	0.080	0.088

READINESS TO GO TO THE FRONT

In any military action, casualties and injuries are inevitable, so a fighting army, especially in large-scale military operations, needs regular replenishment of personnel with trained and motivated recruits. As a result, when military operations drag on for years, a significant portion of the population of the warring country goes through them, and the proportion of those who have combatants in their immediate circle grows. Thus, in January 2024, one in four (25%) Russians had relatives who were participants in the military confrontation with Ukraine. Nine months later, this proportion had risen to 28%, and a year later to 35%. As we can see, the longer the special operation lasts, the wider the circle of those who are personally acquainted with combatants.

In 2023, following the success of the Wagner military group in recruiting Russians for military service in exchange for money, the Russian authorities replicated a similar campaign across the country, actively inviting citizens to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense and go to the front. Since this invitation is addressed to men between the ages of 18 and 60 (older front-line soldiers are the exception), the researchers asked this particular segment of the sample the question: *"If the opportunity arises, would you be willing to participate in the special operation in Ukraine? And if so, would you do so voluntarily or under a mobilization order?*"

Most likely, the answers to this question reflect not so much the respondents' real willingness to go to the front, but rather their social group's ideas about the normative response to it. The man who expressed his willingness to sign a contract was unlikely to be ready to go to the trenches, but he felt it necessary to express such willingness in communication with an unfamiliar interviewer, since this was the behavior approved by his social circle. In order to get a more accurate picture, the pollsters asked a follow-up question to those who expressed their intention to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense: had they made any attempts to do so? Of course, the answer to this question largely reflects disposition rather than actual behavior, but a positive answer to it allows for a much more accurate measurement of the audience of the Russian Ministry of Defense's advertising campaign.

In September 2022, a partial mobilization was announced in Russia. Some of those called up arrived at military registration and enlistment offices with varying degrees of enthusiasm, while others crossed the Russian border in an attempt to avoid being caught up in the fighting. Still others went to the front with a sense of doom, simply because of the legal requirements of the state authorities ("if you've been called up, you have to go!"). In February 2023, the Chronicles project asked Russian men aged 18 to 60 for the first time how they would feel about participating in the SVO. At that time, the Russian Armed Forces were recruited on the basis of conscription, i.e., without a commercial component. Therefore, respondents mainly answered the question about a possible second wave of mobilization. Four to five months after the start of mobilization, 15% expressed their willingness to become volunteers, and 40% said they would go to the front only if ordered to do so. Eight percent said they were not subject to mobilization due to health, work, or family reasons, 15% refused to answer this question, and 21% said they were not ready to go to war. As we can see, more than half (55%) of Russian men expressed their willingness to go to the combat zone voluntarily or by order. Again, we emphasize that this indicator reflects not a disposition to act, but the extent to which the male population of the country shares the social norm of supporting the special operation.



Figure 1. Dynamics of verbal willingness to participate in special military operations among men of different ages (Russian Federation, men aged 18-60, Chronicles, 2023-2025).

In September of the same year, the Russian army had already switched to a commercial recruitment model, but the number of "volunteers" did not change significantly (17%). However, the proportion of those willing to be mobilized decreased significantly (to 31%), while the proportion of those who were not willing to serve in any capacity increased to 29%. This trend probably reflects a decline in the socially recognized value of military service. In the early days after mobilization, willingness to be mobilized reflected solidarity with those who had already been mobilized. But such solidarity is no longer so characteristic of the period of the commercial army. By this time, the willingness to volunteer reflected the intention to achieve commercial success, albeit in exchange for participation in risky forms of social behavior, while the willingness to be mobilized by order reflected the receding prospect of being called up for service in conditions of retreat and military failure. This situation persisted until October 2025, when the proportion of "volunteers" fell to 9% and those "unwilling" to participate in any form of combat operations rose to 38%. As we can see, attitudes toward contract service within the framework of the SVO have changed significantly, although it is still difficult to assess the sustainability of this trend.

Starting in September 2023, pollsters became interested in whether "volunteers" had made any efforts to realize their intention to go to the front. At that time, 8% of Russian men between the ages of 18 and 60 reported that they had at least tried to find out about the possibility of signing a contract. But by September, at the peak of contract recruitment for the army, this share had fallen to 4% and then remained at roughly the same level, without significant variation (3% in October 2025). In other words, less than half of those who expressed a willingness to volunteer for military service actually made a real attempt to do so.

But even this 3% should not be considered a basis for replenishing combat units. We asked those who said they had tried to specify what prevented them from doing so, and almost all of them cited age, health, the influence of family, employer (including job security), and refusal by the military registration and enlistment office. Only one respondent reported that he was in the process of signing a contract (in the previous three waves, there were between 2 and 5). As we can see, a relatively large group (9% of Russian men aged 18-60) who declared their willingness to sign a contract turns into approximately 0.25% who, at least verbally, did not cite obstacles to participating in the SVO. If we translate this into absolute figures, it turns out that out of the nearly 3 million who verbally expressed their willingness to join the active army, about 1 million tried to do so, and approximately 80-90 thousand were either waiting to sign a contract or in the process of doing so at the time of the survey.

According to D. Medvedev, in the first nine and a half months of 2025, more than 336,000 people signed contracts[1] , or about 35,000 per month. According to independent estimates,[2] in the second quarter of 2025, 35-40 thousand Russians signed contracts. Assuming that the contract signing process takes one to two months, it follows that a mass representative survey should yield 65,000-80,000 in absolute terms, which is obviously the limit for samples of this size. In other words, it is not even theoretically possible to measure even an approximate number of contract soldiers in this way, let alone describe their socio-demographic profile. For this reason, our analysis will focus on assessing those who have expressed verbal reactive willingness to go to the SVO zone and describing their socio-demographic characteristics.
According to data from Mediazona and the BBC[3] , the most common age of Russians killed in the SVO is between 30 and 40, and over time it is shifting to older ages. According to survey data, people in older age groups are more likely to express a desire to go to war, while young people of draft age (under 30) are less likely than others to be willing to go to the front. At the same time, the decline in the number of potential volunteers is also occurring primarily among younger age groups, where it was already relatively small (over the past year, it has decreased almost threefold, from 11% to 4%). In other words, the reserve of volunteers is shifting to an increasingly older age group, and conversely, the proportion of those willing to fight at the most suitable age for this is gradually declining.



1 Medvedev: 336,000 contract soldiers have joined the army since the beginning of the year **https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8137318?ysclid=mic4ajzkhd235691426**

2 The influx of volunteers into the Russian army has decreased significantly, even though the pay for signing a contract has doubled. https://meduza.io/feature/2024/12/04/pritok-dobrovoltsev-v-rossiyskuyu-armiyu-zametno-sokratilsya-hotya-za-zaklyuchenie-kontrakta-stali-platit-vdvoe-bolshe

3 https://zona.media/casualties



Figure 2. Verbal willingness to participate in the SVO among men of different ages (Russian Federation, men aged 18-60, Chronicles, October 2025).

As can be seen from Figure 3, there are no significant differences in the intention to go to the trenches between metropolitan Russia and the Russian hinterland: among Muscovites, the figure is 7%, among residents of the rest of Russia (excluding border regions) – 9%. Men living in regions adjacent to the front line expressed almost the same willingness to sign a contract – 12%. But in 2024, they differed significantly in their unwillingness to take up arms (19% versus 35% among Muscovites), as well as in the number of those who considered themselves exempt from mobilization (15% versus 5% among Muscovites). It can be assumed that residents of frontline territories, under the pressure of social norms, may express their unwillingness to fight as impossible due to poor health, job security, or having many children. Overall, no significant differences in willingness to sign a contract were found between residents of different regions.

Russians with higher education are significantly less likely to express their intention to sign a contract than those without it (5% and 14%, respectively). At the same time, there were no differences in 2023 and 2024. It is likely that the reality of the past year has allowed university graduates to find more attractive places to apply their knowledge and skills in the rear, while those without higher education continue to consider being sent to the front as the best way to use their skills.



Figure 3. Verbal willingness to participate in military operations among men in different regions and with different levels of education (Russian Federation, men aged 18-60, Chronicles, October 2025).

Advertisements for participation in combat operations emphasize the high level of pay for contract soldiers, so it is natural to expect that the lowest-income groups will be more likely to respond to such calls. However, no statistically significant differences in willingness to sign a contract between Russians with higher incomes and low-income groups were found in 2025. Nor were any differences found between those who assess the changes in their financial situation in recent months positively and those who assess them negatively. Only Russians whose well-being has deteriorated are more likely to express unwillingness to participate in special operations (49%) than those whose well-being has improved or remained the same (30% and 35%, respectively). It is likely that contract service attracts Russians of different income levels.

It should be noted that Russians who do not pay any taxes, i.e., who formally do not own real estate or a car and have no income or earnings, are significantly more likely to express their willingness to sign a contract (18%). They represent a group that is relatively deprived and isolated from the rest of society, and in order to compensate for and possibly overcome this isolation, they are willing to engage in risky forms of social behavior. For them, SW is a tool for gaining a place in a society to which, for various reasons, they have been unable to adapt.



Figure 4. Verbal willingness to participate in SVO among men in different income groups and personal financial situations (Russian Federation, men aged 18-60, Chronicles, October 2025).

Another factor that strengthens Russian men's intention to fight is considered to be their "indebtedness." However, data collected in 2024 did not reveal a clear connection between these indicators. There is no significant correlation between the desire to voluntarily participate in special operations and the existence of loans: men who owe money to banks are more likely to say that they are willing to obey mobilization orders, but this may be due to their lack of resources to avoid being forcibly sent to the front. Thus, the stated intention to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense has no significant connection with credit history, although this connection may exist for a small number of Russian men and/or their families, which cannot be covered by the sample of the mass survey[4] .

Of course, there is a direct link between attitudes toward the special operation and the desire to participate in it. Almost three-quarters (73%) of those who do not support the special operation are not willing to participate in it, while among men aged 18-60 who support it, approximately one in seven (14%) say they are willing to volunteer for the front.

No less important is the environment in which a potential volunteer finds himself, because it is this environment that creates social pressure that either supports potential volunteers in their desire to sign a contract or counteracts it (some respondents directly stated that their wives would not let them go to the front as the reason for refusing to enlist). While 14% of those living among supporters of the special operation are willing to volunteer to fight, among those living among opponents of the intervention, this share is three and a half times lower – 4%. As we can see, the environment and its attitude towards the special operation significantly determines whether a person wants to go to the front or not. At the same time, the proportion of "volunteers" among supporters of the special operation has significantly decreased over two years from 25% to 14%, which probably reflects a weakening of the conversion of support for the operation into a willingness to participate in it.

[4] Other studies have revealed a correlation between the participation of residents of various regions in special operations and the growth of mortgage and consumer lending in those regions, indicating an inverse relationship: people go to the front in order to take out loans later—see Vladimir Zvonovsky, Alexander Khodykin, "A Military Operation That Pays" https://www.russiapost.info/society/military_operation



Figure 5. Verbal willingness to participate in the special military operation among men in different groups with different attitudes toward the special military operation (Russian Federation, men aged 18-50, Chronicles, September 2024).

Personal willingness to go to the front is influenced by the presence of such participants in one's immediate circle. Among those who do not have relatives fighting in the war, the proportion of potential volunteers drops to 7%, while the presence of such a relative increases the likelihood of expressing willingness to participate in the intervention to 13%. As we can see, the personal example of one's immediate circle has a significant impact on the respondent's own intentions, but there is probably also a reverse effect here—those who are not ready to participate in a special operation somehow discourage their close circle from participating as well.

If the special military operation has had a positive impact on the respondent's daily life, the willingness to sign a contract jumps to a record 26%. As we can see, the assessment of the material side of the special operation is significantly related to the verbal willingness to join it. On the contrary, more than half (56%) of Russian men who negatively assess the SVO told researchers that they are not ready to participate in it.



Figure 6. Verbal willingness to participate in the special military operation among those who have and have not participated in it and assessments of its impact on everyday life (Russian Federation, men aged 18-60, Chronicles, October 2025).

Thus, despite the high level of verbal readiness to go to the front, which is sufficient to mobilize a large number of Russian men, it reflects rather (1) high support for the special operation, (2) confidence in imminent victory, conveyed by current front-line soldiers in their immediate circle, (3) material benefits already received from three years of combat operations, and (4) the expectation that the SVO will become a tool for significantly improving their material and social status. Although researchers and observers often say that Russians' high levels of debt motivate them to obtain the resources necessary to repay their loans by participating in the SVO, survey data neither confirm nor refute this hypothesis.

WAR PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR RELATIVES

We analyzed waves of Chronicles surveys from wave 9 (February 2023) to wave 15 (October 2025) in terms of the attitudes toward the war of war participants and their relatives in comparison with other respondents. We will refer to respondents who do not have relatives in the SVO and are not participating themselves as respondents from *the control group*. It is with the control group that we will compare SVO participants and their relatives. Historical data show that, compared to the control group, relatives of SVO participants have always been more pro-war, while the participants themselves have been even more belligerent (Table 2 and Table 3). It is worth noting that nominal support for the SVO among SVO participants (68%) and relatives (52%) in October 2025 is at its lowest since October 2023 (wave 11). In October 2025, unwillingness to accept a truce without achieving the goals is at a historic low among SVO participants (40%) and their relatives (35%). Also in October 2025, broad core support for[5] among SVO participants (30%) and relatives (27%) is at its lowest, and the share for this indicator is statistically indistinguishable from the control group.

When it comes to consistent supporters of the war[6] and consistent supporters of peace[7] , in October 2025, the relatives of SVO participants are statistically indistinguishable from the control group in terms of these indicators: 14% of consistent supporters of the war and 18% of consistent supporters of peace among relatives of SVO participants, while in the control group these shares are 13% and 21%, respectively. For relatives of SVO participants, in October 2025, we observe a minimum of consistent supporters of the war and a maximum of consistent supporters of peace compared to previous periods for this group. Among SVO participants, the proportion of consistent supporters of peace has been at its highest since October 2023 (wave 11), but is still lower than in the control group. *In general, we can say that even those groups of the population who are themselves participating in the special operation or whose relatives are participating, in October 2025 became much closer to those who are not directly involved in the war in their position on ending the war and a truce.*

Next, we examined the perception of the material situation of war participants and their relatives. Compared to the control group in February 2023, SVO participants rated their material situation 19% better, while their relatives rated it only 2% better. At the same time, over the past year (since February 2025), participants in the special military operation have come to perceive their situation as 26% better than the control group, while their relatives' perception of their financial situation has become indistinguishable from that of the control group.

Regarding changes in their financial situation over the past year since February 2023, 24% of SWO participants reported a deterioration, 32% of their relatives reported a deterioration, and 34% of the control group reported a deterioration. Similarly, since February 2023, 32% of SWO participants reported an improvement in their financial situation, compared to 17% of their relatives and respondents in the control group.

However, the difference in the change in financial situation over the past year (since February 2025) has become less pronounced. Since February 2025, 30% of respondents among SVO participants reported a deterioration, 35% among relatives, and 36% in the control group reported a deterioration in their financial situation over the past year. Similarly, since February

[5] Defined as "Support for the SVO" AND "Not ready for a truce without achieving the goals"
[6] Defined as "Support for the SVO" AND "Not ready for a truce without achieving the goals" AND "Need to spend the deficit budget on the army"
[7] Defined as "did not express support for the SVO" AND "ready for a truce without achieving goals" AND "need to spend the deficit budget on social needs"

2025, 20% of SWO participants reported an improvement in their financial situation, compared to 17% of their relatives and 15% of respondents in the control group.

Overall, analysis of perceptions of financial situation and its dynamics shows that SVO participants feel better off financially than their relatives or other people. What stands out in particular is the fact that the financial benefits of participating in the war have had virtually no spillover effect on relatives. At the same time, over the past year, war participants have begun to experience greater financial difficulties and, according to their assessment of the dynamics of their financial situation, have begun to catch up with those who are not participating in the war.

Next, we studied media consumption among SVO participants and their relatives. Since February 2023, 44-45% of SVO participants have cited TV as their source of news, compared to 67-68% of relatives and 65% of the control group. Since February 2023, 53% of respondents among SVO participants cited Telegram channels as a source of news, compared to 44% among relatives and 40% in the control group. Since February 2025, Telegram channel consumption among SVO participants has not changed, but has increased significantly among relatives and control group respondents to 48-49%. Since February 2025, SVO participants and their relatives use YouTube 4% less often than the control group (22% vs. 26%). War participants use VPNs slightly more often (33%) than their relatives (27%) and the control group (28%). *In summary, SVO participants differ significantly from their relatives and control group respondents in their media consumption, while the latter two groups are similar in this regard. SVO participants consume Telegram significantly more often and watch TV significantly less often.*

Despite the small proportion of those who identified themselves as war participants in the sample, we can relatively clearly outline the socio-demographic profile of these respondents. Most often, these are relatively young people: in the 13th wave, most participants were in the 18-29 age cohort, and a year later, most participants were in the 30-39 age group. By sector of employment: war participants are represented in industry, the military-industrial complex, and construction (about 30%), about 60% in the private service sector, which includes trade, services, and finance, and 10% in transport and logistics. Thus, "frontline" experience is concentrated in the working-age population and in sectors directly related to economic development.

We also find that the closer the respondent is to the front line, the more loyal their answers become. When asked about the prospect of a new mobilization, respondents who participated personally in waves 13 and 15 are significantly more likely to choose "to carry out mobilization" if necessary, rather than to make peace, while among those whose families did not have anyone fighting in the war, the position "to make peace" dominates. Relatives of participants occupy an intermediate position: there are more of them who support a new mobilization than among those who do not have acquaintances in the war, but in the group of relatives of participants, the majority (about 60% in wave 15) are in favor of making peace.

The same can be seen in the question about blocking calls on WhatsApp and Telegram. Those who participated in the war themselves mostly interpret the block as a tool to combat fraudsters and terrorists, rather than a restriction on freedom of speech. Relatives of participants also predominantly view it as a mechanism to combat terrorists and fraudsters. Among those who do not have relatives participating in the SVO, opinions are roughly divided, with a slight majority leaning toward "restriction of freedom of speech." In other words, direct experience of war increases the willingness to accept repressive measures as "normal" and justified.

Table 2. Attitudes toward the SVO among SVO participants and their relatives, compared with others (percentage share for each wave and category of participation)

	Support for the SVO		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives	Personally
9	58.2	61.2	55.3
11	49.5	58.0	81.9
12	54.4	58.6	70.0
13	46.4	54.0	74.7
14	50.2	52.9	73.4
15	48.3	52.3	67.6

	For a truce without achieving goals		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives.	Personal
9	38.9	39.0	41.6
11	40.7	36.3	29.5
12	39.6	44.1	34.8
13	50.3	46.3	43.8
14	42.4	37.2	25.8
15	41.3	43.6	40.5

	No truce without achieving goals		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives.	Personal
9	47.9	47.7	58.4
11	30.9	38.1	60.8
12	37.9	41.2	40.6
13	32.3	41.4	56.2
14	43.4	50.0	70.9
15	33.8	34.6	40.2

Table 3. Share of consistent supporters of war and peace (in %) by wave and participation category

	(Support for SVO) AND (No truce without achieving goals)		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives	Personally
9	39.7	38.6	40.2
11	24.9	33.2	48.7
12	32.0	33.6	31.3
13	26.5	31.1	48.7
14	32.6	35.7	59.2
15	27.2	27.1	30.2

	Consistent supporters of war		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives.	Personal
9	22.6	23.0	24.5
11	10.2	19.4	3.0
12	16.5	18.8	17.4
13	18.1	23.5	37.8
14	16.0	20.7	33.6
15	13.4	14.4	20.3

	Consistent supporters of peace		
	Participation in the SVO		
Wave	Nobody	Relatives.	Personal
9	21.3	15.3	26.5
11	19.5	15.7	6.0
12	20.2	15.1	10.4
13	25.6	14.5	5.6
14	22.8	16.2	8.1
15	21.3	18.5	12.7

EXPECTATIONS FROM THE WAR AND DEMAND FOR CHANGE

In the 15th wave of the Chronicles, we also repeated the experiment conducted earlier in the 13th wave (September 2024). We asked a randomly selected half of the respondents the question, *"Which of the following events do you think will happen in the coming year?*" and the other half, *"Which of the following events would you like to see happen in the coming year*?" Table 1 shows the percentage of respondents for each item and each wave.

Table 4. Respondents' expectations and desires regarding the SVO, sanctions, and relations with the West

	Wave 13 (October 2024)		Wave 15 (October 2025)	
	Expect	Want	Expect	Want
Mobilization of men to participate in the SVO	42	22	35	16
End of the special military operation after its objectives have been achieved	50	86	47	88
Resolution of internal social and economic problems	51	85	48	88
Peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions	36	63	36	64
Increase in budget spending on the army	78	54	78	49
Lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia	23	65	22	63
Restoration of relations with Western countries	33	50	28	58

Over the course of a year, expectations of a new mobilization fell from 42% to 35%, and demand (desire) for mobilization fell from 22% to 16% of respondents. At the same time, expectations of increased military spending remained stable at 78%, while demand by October 2025 fell from 54% to 49%. In October 2025, 3 percentage points fewer people expect the special military operation to end after its goals are achieved than a year ago (47% in 2025 versus 50% in 2024), while 2 percentage points more people want this to happen (88% in 2025 versus 86% in 2024), i.e., the gap between demand and expectations on this issue has grown by 5 p.p. over the year. The situation is similar with regard to the resolution of internal social and economic problems: demand for their resolution has grown from 85% to 88%, while expectations that they will be resolved have fallen from 51% to 48%. Demand and expectations for a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions have remained virtually unchanged over the year (36% expect it, 63-64% want it). Demand and expectations for the lifting of sanctions are similar and fairly stable: 22-23% expect sanctions to be lifted, 63-65% want this. Regarding the restoration of relations with the West, there has been an increase in the gap between demand and expectations over the year: demand for the restoration of relations has grown from 50% to 58%, while expectations of such a restoration have fallen from 33% to 28%. *Overall, it can be concluded that people's expectations of the SVO have remained virtually unchanged or have become more pessimistic (end of the SVO, peace treaty, increased military spending), with the exception of expectations of mobilization. At the* *same time, demand for the resolution of internal problems and the restoration of relations with the West is growing, while expectations that these problems will be resolved are declining.*

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS' POLITICAL AWARENESS

We asked three questions to determine the political awareness and interest of respondents: "Can you remember the names of the current 1) Prime Minister of Russia, 2) Minister of Defense of Russia, and 3) head of your region (governor)?" By summing up the binary correct answers to each of these questions, we obtained a political awareness index ranging from 0 (did not name anyone correctly) to 3 (named all politicians correctly). About 20% of respondents named all politicians correctly or none at all, while about 30% of respondents named 1 or 2 politicians correctly. The average number of correctly named politicians was 1.46. Next, we analyzed which demographic indicators are associated with political awareness.

Respondents of middle age (35-54) and older age (55+) named 19% and 38% more politicians correctly than younger respondents (34 and younger). Women named 11% fewer politicians correctly, while people with higher education or currently studying named 24-26% more. Residents of border regions named 16% more politicians correctly.

Next, we analyzed how political awareness is related to sources of information. Using a VPN increases political awareness by 6%, TV consumption by 8%, online news by 11%, and Telegram by 20%. At the same time, VK consumption reduces political awareness by 11%.

Next, we analyzed how political awareness is related to attitudes toward the war. Using regression analysis while controlling for demographics and sources of information, we observe a consistent positive relationship between greater awareness and support for the war, unwillingness to accept a truce without achieving goals, and broad and narrow cores of support. This relationship is increasing in nature, including when moving from an awareness index of 3 to 4.

Table 5. Political awareness and attitudes toward the SVO.

VARIABLES	(1) Support for SVO	(2) No truce without achieving goals	(3) (Support for SVO) AND (No truce without achieving goals)	(4) (Support for the SVO) AND (No truce without achieving the goals) AND (Budget for the war)
1 politician	0.047	0.051	0.053	0.040
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.020)
2	0.12	0.076	0.080	0.080
	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.023)
3	0.23	0.13	0.14	0.10
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.030)
Source: TV	0.22	0.15	0.14	0.061
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Source: VK-OK	-0.029	-0.014	-0.038	-0.035
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.018)
Source: TGM	-0.018	-0.012	-0.0038	-0.015
	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.019)
Source: Inter.	-0.0100	0.0030	0.013	0.032
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Financial position: below average	0.050	0.037	0.032	-0.0065
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.027)
Mat. position: average	0.14	0.091	0.094	0.075
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.028)
Financial position: above average	0.15	0.070	0.091	0.064
	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.029)
Mat. position: Refusal	0.12	0.027	0.079	0.098
	(0.057)	(0.056)	(0.054)	(0.046)
Age: 35-54	0.11	0.14	0.11	0.058
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.020)
Age: 55	0.089	0.22	0.21	0.13
	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Female	-0.13***	-0.17	-0.15	-0.079
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.017)
Higher education	0.011	0.032	0.036	0.013
	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.019)
In training	-0.053	-0.089	-0.049	-0.049
	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.036)
Employment: Public sector	-0.0085	-0.089	-0.053	-0.051
	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.033)	(0.026)
Employment: Private sector	-0.066	-0.018	0.003	-0.0061
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.023)
MSK-SPB	0.0016	0.045	0.012	-0.0049
	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.031)

City 100-500K	0.0076	-0.016	-0.0043	-0.011
	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.024)
City less than 100K	0.05	0.013	0.0075	0.011
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.029)
PGT	-0.017	0.042	0.015	0.038
	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.032)
Village	-0.045	-0.019	-0.022	-0.0012
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.031)
unknown	-0.070	-0.17	-0.12	-0.073
	(0.068)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.043)
Border region	0.048	0.0056	0.034	0.057
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Constant	0.21	0.100	0.015	-0.027
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.051)	(0.038)
Observations	1,604	1,604	1,604	1,604
R-squared	0.137	0.125	0.123	0.089

CHARACTERISTICS OF RESPONDENTS' FINANCIAL PLANNING

Respondents' financial plans for the next two years largely depend on their current and recent financial situation. Almost 40% of respondents do not have any clear financial goals, while the presence of plans is characteristic primarily of more affluent groups. In general, a strategy of cautious savings prevails, often without a specific goal.

In the 15th wave, we asked respondents about their personal financial plans and goals for the next two years.

Do you plan to do any of the following in the next two years?

1. Buy an apartment
2. Buy land/build a house
3. Buy a car
4. Invest money in securities (stocks, bonds, mutual funds)
5. Buy currency
6. Save money for other purposes
7. Save money just in case, without any specific goals
8. None of the above
9. Difficult to say/refusal

Respondents could choose several answers, for example, buy an apartment and save money "just in case."

Fig. 7. Respondents' financial plans for the next two years (RF, Chronicles, 2025)

About 40% of respondents do not have clearly defined financial plans for the next two years (options "None of the above" and "Difficult to say/Refusal"), i.e., in essence, there is no possibility or need for any savings. The rest indicated specific goals or simply an intention to save money for something undefined. At the same time, 20% of respondents plan to save "just in case," without any other specific goals.

Nine percent of respondents plan to buy an apartment in the next two years, 10% plan to buy land or build a house, and 13% plan to buy a car. Four percent of respondents plan to invest in securities, and 3% plan to buy foreign currency.

However, the respondents' financial plans are not limited to large purchases: 17% chose the answer "Save money for other purposes." Almost one in five who chose this option indicated that they intend to save for the purchase of housing in the next two years (i.e., they are not planning the purchase itself, as was suggested in the answer options, but rather saving for it).

One in seven who chose "other savings goals" said they plan to save for a funeral. The share of such responses exceeds other responses, including the share of "vacation" savings or savings for repairs, home improvements, education, or health.



Fig. 8 Respondents' savings goals for the next two years (Russian Federation, Chronicles, 2025)

Financial plans and goals for the next two years correlate with respondents' current assessment of their financial situation. Thus, the purchase of an apartment, land plot, or construction of a house, the purchase of securities and currency, as well as savings without specific goals are mainly planned by respondents with an above-average assessment of their financial situation ("We have enough money for everything except buying a new apartment or house," "We do not experience financial difficulties and could buy a new apartment").. Respondents with an average assessment of their financial situation ("We cannot buy a new car") are more likely to plan to buy a car or save for various purposes or without specific goals. Respondents with a low assessment of their financial situation ("We don't even have enough money for food," "We don't have enough money to buy clothes and shoes") and below-average assessment ("We don't have enough money to buy large household appliances") are more likely to have no plans.

In the same wave, The Chronicle asked whether respondents had lost any savings after the start of the special operation, for example, due to the introduction of sanctions, the freezing of assets, or the fall of the securities market. Fifty percent of respondents did not have such savings, 38% did not lose anything, and 12% said they had lost something. Comparing the answers to the question about past experience and future financial plans reveals a consistent pattern. Those who lost their savings after the start of the war still plan to invest in securities and buy currency, as well as land plots. Obviously, this group has no need to buy new housing or a car. Respondents who did not lose their savings after the start of the war are more likely to plan to save without specific goals. Those who had no savings at the start of the war have no plans for the next two years.

At the same time, if we compare future financial plans with changes in respondents' financial situation over the past year, we see that respondents whose financial situation has improved are more likely to plan to buy an apartment, a car, securities, and save "just in case." In particular, respondents who participated in the war or whose relatives are participating in it are more likely to say that their financial situation has improved over the past year and that they plan to buy an apartment in the next two years. Those whose financial situation has deteriorated over the past year have no plans.

Thus, for a significant portion of respondents, the horizon for financial planning remains limited and uncertain: almost half either do not plan to save at all or find it difficult to answer. Specific goals—purchasing a home, a car, investing in securities or currency—are mainly accessible to respondents with above-average financial situations or those whose financial situation has improved over the past year (e.g., war veterans or their relatives). At the same time, the experience of losing savings does not reduce the willingness of wealthy groups to invest, while the lack of savings and the deterioration of financial circumstances lead to the abandonment of any financial plans. Overall, the data obtained reflect a high level of economic uncertainty and social stratification, which determine financial behavior strategies in the short term.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE CONSEQUENCES OF TAX INCREASES

Respondents were randomly divided into three groups:

- the first was asked what goals the respondent would be willing to support tax increases for (without specifying what price increases the tax increases would lead to)
- the second group was asked about a tax increase that would lead to a 5% increase in prices
- the third group was asked about a tax increase that would lead to a 15% increase in prices.

The answer options were universal for all three groups:

1. for the army and the military-industrial complex
2. for the sake of rebuilding new regions
3. for the social sphere
4. for the improvement of roads and housing construction
5. do not agree to tax increases for any purpose
6. for something else
7. I can't choose, everything is necessary
8. difficult to say / refusal

Overall, the distribution of responses across the three groups is as follows. The differences between the groups in terms of the price increases caused by tax increases are minimal. In all three groups, the majority are against tax increases in general. In second place in all groups is the willingness to accept increases for social purposes such as salaries and pensions. In third place is the army and the military-industrial complex.



Fig. 9. Distribution of respondents by tax increase objectives (RF, Chronicles, 2025)

For further analysis, we grouped the categories of tax increase goals into four groups:

- the army and the restoration of "new regions" (categories 1-2)
- civilian purposes (3-4)
- against tax increases (5)
- other / difficult to say / everything is needed (6-8)

In all three scenarios—without specifying the amount, with a 5% and 15% increase in prices caused by tax increases—the same pattern repeats itself. Those who are willing to raise taxes for the army and "new regions" turn out to be a staunchly pro-war segment: support for the war among them remains at over 70%. In contrast, respondents who prefer to allocate additional taxes to civilian purposes or who oppose the increase in principle are significantly more anti-war: about 60% of them do not declare their support for the war. The category "other/everything is necessary/I don't know" is in the middle—it is almost evenly divided on the war. The size of the proposed increase does not change this structure significantly.

Age confirms these differences. With an unspecified or moderate increase (tax-induced price growth of 5%), young people aged 18–29 are significantly more likely to choose civilian purposes; among all those who prioritize social services, roads, etc., about a third are young people. In the group of opponents of tax increases, on the contrary, the proportion of young people is minimal. Older people aged 60+ are more likely to be either in the "army and new regions" group, among opponents of the increase, or in the large gray area of "everything is needed/I'm not sure" — approximately one-third of older respondents are in each of these groups. In other words, with a moderate tax increase, we see a generational divide: young people gravitate toward civic priorities, while older people gravitate toward military priorities or resistance to tax increases. However, in a scenario where the tax increase leads to a 15% rise in prices, the age differences blur: the distribution by purpose becomes almost the same across all ages, and the very fact of the large price increase overshadows the generational effects.

The assessment of how the special operation has affected everyday life is also closely linked to tax priorities. On average, only about 8% of the sample say that the war has improved their lives, almost half see no change, and 45–46% assess the consequences as rather negative. Against this backdrop, the "army and new regions" group stands out sharply: it is the only category where the share of "rather positive" responses is above average (up to 18–19% in the scenario with a 15% price increase) and where the fewest people report negative consequences. In contrast, supporters of civilian goals and opponents of tax increases are much more likely to report that their daily lives have deteriorated; the share of negative assessments among them reaches 50% and above, while positive experiences virtually disappear. In all three formulations of the question, statistical tests show a consistent link between attitudes toward the goals for which taxes are being raised and assessments of the impact of the war on their lives.

Economic assessments are also built into this configuration. Looking at the dynamics of the material situation over the past year, on average 11–12% of respondents report an improvement, about half report stability, and about a third report a deterioration. But among those who are willing to raise taxes for the army and the "new regions," the share of those who say their situation has improved is significantly higher (up to 20% with a 15% increase in prices caused by tax increases), and the share of those who say their situation has worsened is below average. Opponents of tax increases, on the contrary, concentrate the maximum number of those whose situation has worsened and the minimum number of those whose situation has improved; supporters of civilian goals and the "everything is needed" category occupy intermediate positions. In sum, this means that the feeling of economic well-being is clearly linked to the willingness to finance the war through taxes: those who are better off, or at least no worse off, are more likely to agree to military spending, while those who report a deterioration are more likely to oppose any increases.

If we move from dynamics to static material status, the picture becomes even sharper. Supporters of the "army" and "new regions" are the most affluent group: there are significantly fewer poor people among them than the sample average, while the proportion of respondents with a "good material situation" is significantly higher. At the other end of the spectrum are opponents of tax increases, who are the most economically vulnerable category: poverty is significantly more common among them, and high wealth is less common than the average. Those who choose civic goals appear to be a "middle-income" group in the baseline scenario, but in the scenario of a 15% price increase caused by tax increases, they, together with supporters of tax increases for the army and occupied territories, shift toward the more affluent.

The same line runs through the answers to the question of what to do if a new mobilization is needed to continue the war. On average, about 37% of respondents believe that it is worth "conducting another mobilization," while approximately 63% would prefer to "stop military operations and conclude a peace agreement." But within tax groups, the breakdown is highly polarized. Among supporters of the "army" and "new regions," the majority—more than 60%—choose further mobilization, and this is the only group where the mobilization scenario prevails. In the "civilian goals" and "against tax increases" camps, the picture is mirrored: 75-80% there are in favor of ending the war and a peace agreement, while only one in five or four supports mobilization. Regardless of whether we are talking about an abstract tax increase or specific scenarios with a 5% and 15% increase in prices caused by tax increases, supporters of tax increases for the army and "new regions" form the core of supporters of new mobilization, while supporters of civilian goals and opponents of tax increases form the core of supporters of ending the war.

Finally, attitudes toward the blocking of Telegram and other restrictions in the digital sphere continue along the same axis of conflict. Looking at the entire sample, 38% of respondents call the blocking a "fight against fraudsters, extremists, and terrorists," 35% call it "restrictions on freedom of speech and citizen activity," and about a quarter either know nothing about the blocking or find it difficult to assess. If we limit ourselves to those who have a definite opinion, society is almost evenly divided between those who see blocking as a "fight against threats" (about 52%) and those who regard it as a "restriction of freedoms" (about 48%). Among supporters of the "army" and "new regions," the bias is clear: about 70% call blocking a fight, and the higher the proposed tax increase, the stronger this bias. Opponents of tax increases, on the contrary, form the core of those who see political reasons for the blockade: between 60 and almost 70% of them consider the blockade primarily a restriction of civil liberties. Statistically, this correlation is as stable as all the previous ones.

When taken together, a coherent picture emerges. The tax issue turns out to be a kind of marker of political and socio-economic divisions. People who are willing to raise taxes for the sake of the army and new territories are often wealthier, less likely to feel that their lives have deteriorated, support the war, advocate for its continuation and new mobilization, and are more willing to accept restrictions such as blocking messengers. At the other end of the spectrum are more economically vulnerable respondents who do not want tax increases, are more likely to choose civilian priorities, report a deterioration in their situation, oppose mobilization, and are more likely to see digital blocking as a restriction of freedoms.