We will be happy to help you!

Methodological and technical report

Methodological part
a. Method. **CATI**
b. Timing of the field portion of the study. **October 17 - 22, 2023**
c. Total number of interviewers and person/hour of work **44 interviewers, 585 hours**
d. Duration of the interview **9 min. 05 sec.**
e. Number of contact attempts per 1 number in the starting sample - **3**

Numbers in the starting sample	540687
No answer	18659
Rejected	137724
Soft refusal - "no time", "driving", "at work", etc.	21297
Hard refusal - "I won't talk for anything", "on principle I won't participate in surveys", "don't talk to strangers", etc.	4312
Communication error	2
Busy	21060
Answering machine, wrong number, organization	89809
Defunct number	66722
No operators	7379
Call error	1379
Under 18	426
Organization/Office	415
Language issues	184
Physical or mental non-responsiveness	160
AGREEMENT	1374
Interrupted	174
FULL	**1200**

f. Evaluation of the toolkit (questionnaire). Poorly performing indicators. Unreliable data. Recommendations for change. *no*
g. Perception of possible systematic errors, socially approved responses. ***Support for intrusion is significantly related to the interviewer's assessment of the respondent's wariness***. *The more wary the respondent is, the less supportive he/she is of the intrusion*

Technical Report.
a. Sampling methodology. ***RDD according to Rossvyaz data, stratified by federal districts and two cities of federal significance***
b. Estimated sampling error; **2.82% at 95% confidence interval**
c. A full explanation of the weighting scheme, including details of how the weights were developed and applied, and the demographics on which the weights were based (i.e. age, gender and spatial distribution of the population);

Array reweighting coefficients
Two sets of coefficients were used. The first one is for the array with complete questionnaires only (N=1200). The second one is for the array of questionnaires in which at least one field was filled in (N=1374)

a. The array is reweighted by gender, age and federal district categories. The reweighting coefficients are calculated on the basis of Rosstat data on socio-demographic and territorial composition
population of Russia as of 01.01.2022. Weights by gender are calculated on the basis of the gender composition of the adult population of the whole of Russia without taking into account the gender distribution of the population by federal districts. Weights by federal districts are calculated on the basis of the adult population of all federal districts. The weights are rounded to millionths. The weights are calculated using the formula:

$$\frac{\beta}{\alpha} = X$$

Where X - weight coefficient α - share of respondents in the sample population (in %, calculated in SPSS: frequency distributions of variables "gender" and "federal district"), β - share of respondents in the general population (in %, according to Rosstat data).

The first set of coefficients

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts is presented in the table:

Federal District	adult share of population in the district, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents from this county in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
CFA	27,7%	29,5%	0,938983
NWFD	9,7%	10,3%	0,941748
SFO	11,4%	10,9%	1,045872
NCFB	6,4%	5,9%	1,084746
FRP	19,8%	19,5%	1,015385
UVO	8,2%	7,8%	1,051282
SFO	11,4%	11,0%	1,036364
DFO	5,4%	5,2%	1,038462

The calculation of weighting factors by gender is presented in the table:

floo r	adult population share of this gender, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this gender in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
Male	45,2%	52,4%	0,862595
Female	54,8%	47,6%	1,151261

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups is presented in the table:

Age groups	adult share of the population of a given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
18-29 years old	15,3%	11,1%	1,378378
30-39 years old	21,2%	22,8%	0,929825

40-49 years old	18,4%	23,4%	0,786325
50-59 years old	15,9%	16,8%	0,946429
60+ years	29,2%	26,0%	1,123077

The second set of coefficients

Calculation of weighting coefficients by federal districts is presented in the table:

Federal District	adult share of population in the district, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents from this county in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
CFA	27,7%	28,5%	0,971930
NWFD	9,7%	9,8%	0,989796
SFO	11,4%	11,1%	1,027027
NCFB	6,4%	6,8%	0,941176
FRP	19,8%	19,8%	1,000000
UVO	8,2%	7,9%	1,037975
SFO	11,4%	10,8%	1,055556
DFO	5,4%	5,2%	1,038462

The calculation of weighting factors by gender is presented in the table:

floo r	adult population share of this gender, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this gender in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
Male	45,2%	52,3%	0,864245
Female	54,8%	47,7%	1,148847

Calculation of weighting coefficients by age groups is presented in the table:

Age groups	adult share of the population of a given age, Rosstat (β)	share of respondents of this age in sampling (α)	weight coefficient (X)
18-29 years old	15,3%	10,9%	1,403670
30-39 years old	21,2%	22,7%	0,933921
40-49 years old	18,4%	22,9%	0,803493
50-59 years old	15,9%	16,8%	0,946429
60+ years	29,2%	26,6%	1,097744

Crumbling of the sample
The first interview question was asked to 1,374 respondents and the last interview question was asked to 1,200 respondents. The process of sample shedding is presented in the table

Feature label	Number of records	Shattering	Question text
Q1002	1374	0%	Gender of respondent
Q1003	1374	0%	HOW OLD ARE YOU?
region	1374	0%	If you are a Russian citizen, in which region, krai or republic do you permanently reside?
Q6004	1374	0%	What is your main occupation at present?
Q6005	1374	0%	What is your highest level of education confirmed by a diploma or certificate?
Q6006	1374	0%	Which of the listed descriptions most accurately corresponds to the financial situation of your family?
Q8	1374	0%	What of the listed things happened to you during the last year in connection with the current situation in the country? Several negative situations are listed first, followed by several positive ones
Q9	1364	1%	How do you think your financial situation (your family's situation) will change in the next six months?
Q10	1355	1%	Over the last two years, how often have you used the Internet? Choose the most appropriate option
Q12	1334	3%	Please tell me, do you support or do not support Russia's **special military operation (SMO)*** on the territory of Ukraine, do you find it difficult to answer unequivocally or do not want to answer this question?
Q13	1325	4%	During the past year, have you or have you not had to doubt your attitude to the special military operation at least sometimes?
Q14	1317	4%	Are you personally or someone from your family involved or has been involved in military actions within the framework of the special military operation in Ukraine? Or are there no such people?
Q15	1293	6%	If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Ukraine and start negotiations on a ceasefire, NOT having achieved the original goals of the military operation, would you support or not support such a decision of Vladimir Putin?
Q16	1270	8%	From what sources do you receive information about Russia's military operation on the territory of Ukraine?
Q21	1206	14%	Do you think that increasing government spending by 70% on national defence in 2024 is more likely to benefit the Russian economy, more likely to harm it, or will it have no effect on the economy?
Q23	1204	14%	Do you think that for you and your family personally, an increase in government spending on national defence is more likely to worsen your financial situation, more likely to improve it, or will it have no effect on your financial situation?
Q999	1200	15%	These were all the questions we wanted to ask you. Thank you for your participation

¹ This is the definition of a Russian military incursion into Ukrainian territory that is authorized for use by Russian authorities and safe for respondents and operators.

October 2023: Who doesn't feel bad about the war.

Within the framework of the latest poll conducted by the "Chronicles" project from October 17 to October 22, 2023, we touched upon several monitoring topics that allow us to track the dynamics of the distribution of opinions in Russian society on topical issues, both those directly related to the war in Ukraine and the material situation inside the country.

In early fall, the first reports appeared, at first presumptive and then increasingly confident, about how Russian budget expenditures will grow on the "defense." How are military expenditures perceived today, how do ordinary people relate them to their everyday life? How well-founded are the assumptions that people expect "golden rain" from defense industry investments?

In terms of general attitudes, we see that twice as many Russians would prefer that the budget be spent on social needs rather than on the armed forces - 47% vs. 25%. Back in spring, the priority of spending the budget on the army was supported by one and a half times more respondents - 37%. Today, a significant part of this group has moved to the position of "doubters". Analysis of differences in the distribution of opinions on this issue in socio-demographic groups shows that traditional, archetypal motives do not work here. Thus, women support the priority of spending on the armed forces as often as men (24% and 25%, respectively), while older Russians, who, it would seem, should be more interested in government spending on social support, on the contrary, more often than others support the priority of spending on the army - 35%. And if we divide the sample into groups by type of employment, we see that the group most dependent on social budget expenditures - pensioners - most often advocate that the budget should be spent on defense.

In your opinion, where should public funds be spent first?

	all	Type of employment						
		Pensioners	Students	Unemployed	Homeboy's balls	Employees of state enterprises	Private sector employees a	Businessmens
On **armed** economic forces	25	36%	14%	19%	9%	23%	21%	26%
On **socially** sphere	47	32%	73%	53%	64%	48%	54%	47%
Difficult being reply	25	26%	9%	28%	16%	28%	25%	25%

Yes, on the one hand, this position hides the more common attitude of the older generation that the state is more important than the personal. But it seems that there is a second argument. Over the past 20 years, pensioners have gotten used to the fact that pensions are paid without delays (which was one of the most acute pain points in the social sphere when Vladimir Putin came to power), and they take this fact "as a given". Pensioners probably do not allow even the idea that this area of budget expenditures can somehow suffer from the increase in any other expenditures.

The gap between the attitudes regarding the principles of spending the state budget and personal benefit is even more evident in the answers to two questions - "How will a 70% increase in national defense spending affect the Russian economy?" and "How will an increase in national defense spending affect your financial situation?". For the first question, we see an almost even distribution of opinions on all options - "will affect for the better", "will affect for the worse" and "will not affect at all".

It is important to note that employees of state and private enterprises equally often believe that such an increase in defense spending will have a positive impact on the country's economy as a whole. And a noticeable prevalence of positive assessments is noticeable primarily in the group of pensioners, where 27% believe that the growth of defense spending will be useful for the economy, and 12% believe that it will be harmful. At the opposite pole are students and entrepreneurs. Only in these groups the supporters of the opinion that the growth of defense spending will have a negative impact on the economy have a significant advantage (almost twofold) - 40% vs. 21% among students, and 33% vs. 19% among entrepreneurs. The last two groups of the population are too small to have a serious impact on the all-Russian indicators, but these shifts show quite clearly the axes along which society is currently divided regarding views on the economic priorities of the states

If we talk about the generational gap, the break occurs at the 40-year mark: those who are younger are more likely to believe that increased defense spending is bad for the economy, while those who are older are more likely to believe that it is good for the economy. And this boundary can no longer be attributed to
"Soviet heritage" - today's forty-year-olds essentially did not catch the USSR at a conscious age. This indoctrination has, in all probability, a deeper nature.

The second question, devoted to assessing the impact of increased defense spending on personal financial situation, shows in which groups there is the strongest gap between the perception of the life of the country as a whole and their personal well-being. In general, only 5%(!) expect that the increase in state defense spending will put something in the pockets of themselves or their families. Not surprisingly, pessimists prevail among those who believe that increased defense spending is bad for the economy (59% vs. 3%), but even among those who expect

of benefits for the economy, but more of those, albeit slightly, who for themselves personally expect their financial situation to worsen - 16% vs. 12%.

Do you think that for you and your family personally, an increase in government spending on national defense is more likely to worsen your/your family's financial situation, improve it, or have no effect at all?

	Do you believe a 70% increase in government spending on national defense in 2024...		
	will benefit the economy	will hurt the economy	It won't. not
Rather, the worsen material position	16%	59%	18%
Rather, the improve material position	12%	2%	3%
There's no impact on the financial situation	66%	34%	73%

If we look at two important indicators of a person's sense of self - material and emotional - we see that about half of Russians feel a decrease in family income (44%) and have experienced anxiety attacks (52%) in recent months.

If we consider respondents' answers depending on self-assessment of their material status, we can see that the poorer people are, the more often they feel both a decrease in income and general anxiety.

And when people assess their financial situation not retrospectively ("how it has changed"), but prospectively ("how it will change"), the gap between "poor" and "rich" is even more noticeable. While on average the shares of optimists ("your/your family's financial situation will improve") and pessimists are approximately equal (19% vs. 24%), at the poles of material status we see a diametrically opposite picture. Among the poor more than a half expect deterioration, among the rich optimists are 3-4 times more numerous than pessimists.

We see one geographical exception to the general trend "less resourceful groups more often expect deterioration of their financial situation". In Moscow, the share of those who expect deterioration of their financial situation is the highest among all regional strata - 36%. Three times fewer residents of the capital expect improvement - 12% Summing up the analysis of respondents' answers to the questions devoted to material aspects of self-perception and assessments of state expenditures, we can conclude that the level of "militarism" is decreasing, but the share of supporters of defense expenditures, even to the detriment of the social sphere, is high, and somewhat paradoxically, but the basis of this group are pensioners, i.e. those who are most dependent on social budget items. On the contrary, entrepreneurs, students, and Muscovites - the most resourceful and/or free from social budget items - are the most opposed to military expenditures and expect a worsening of their financial situation.

A total of 377421 phone numbers were dialed, 8% of them were picked up (including

respondents who did not fit the selection criteria - under 18 years of age, not citizens of the Russian Federation, etc.). The share of refusals from established contacts is 90%, the share of complete questionnaires is 4% (other call statuses: sent for redial and disconnected).

Dynamics of attitudes towards SMOs

1) The October 2023 SMO nominal support level of 51% is the lowest historical support value comparable to the time of mobilization (51%).

2) Prior to October 2022, 39% of respondents said their income was declining (compared to March 2022 income). Starting from February 2023, 44% of respondents say this. Contrary to the macroeconomic indicators of income growth, respondents' perception of income change shows rather a general trend of income decline over the last year with stagnation since February 2023. Probably, people here understand material situation (adjusted for inflation) rather than nominal income. However, there is also a slight increase in the group of people who claim rising incomes. If in June 2022 such people were 18%, in October 2023 such people are 21%.

3) There is a decrease in the share of respondents who lost their job in the last year - from 12% in June 2022 to 7% in October 2023. The share of respondents who have found a better job has not changed much and remains at 15%. In conjunction with point 2), this suggests that from October 2022 and in 2023 it was possible to reduce the unemployment rate (compared to the first half of the SMO), which is also confirmed by the macroeconomic view of unemployment in the Russian Federation.

4) In October 2023, expectations for changes in financial situation in six months are similar to May 2022: 24% expect deterioration, 19% expect improvement, and 49% expect no change. Overall, there is a general trend towards stabilization and possible improvement in financial expectations. In conjunction with points 2) and 3) - people do not see a better financial situation now, but having a job makes them more optimistic.

5) In October 2023, in addition to the standard question about expectations of change in financial situation, we asked about expectations of change in relation to increased spending on SMO: "*For you and your family personally, do you think that increased government spending on national defense is more likely to worsen your financial situation, more likely to improve it, or have no effect on your financial situation?*"

		Expecting a change of mate in 6 months.				
		Deteriorates я	Don't change	Improvements я	From. к	Itoг
Change of matrimonial position when increasing government spending on defense	Deteriorate	13.4	10.9	2.6	1.4	28.3
	Don't change	7.6	30.5	11.6	3.2	53.0
	It will improve	0.2	1.9	2.1	0.3	4.6
	Difficult to answer/refuse	2.9	5.6	2.6	3.2	14.2
	Bottom line	24.2	49.0	18.9	8.0	100

When crossing these two questions, it can be seen that about 11% of respondents who answered the standard question "No change", with the understanding that the budget for SMO will be increased, say that their financial situation will worsen. Also, 7.6.% of those who expect deterioration in the standard question say that there is no change in the question with the increase of the budget for SMO

of the defense budget. This is the group of those who can gain something from the continuation of SMO. It is also worth noting that the standard question has 19% optimists, while the question with increased SMO spending has only 4.6% optimists. The decrease of 14.4% (=19%-4.6%) is another group of people who in 2024 will have a divergence between their expectations and reality.

6) Anxiety levels have consistently increased over the entire period of the war. Since February 2023, the proportion of people who have experienced anxiety in the last year has exceeded 50% and is not decreasing.

7) In 2023, there is an increase in the shortage of medicines due to their withdrawal from the Russian market. In 2023, the share of respondents who answered that necessary medicines have disappeared is 20%, while in October 2022 there were 16% of such people.

8) The share of people using VPNs is decreasing. The peak was observed in February 23 - 23.5% of all respondents. In October 2023 there is a minimum level of VPN use - 18% of all respondents. It is likely that the measures against VPNs are quite effective. At the same time, the level of Internet use remains stable: 76-77% of respondents use the Internet every day.

9) After mobilization, the number of different sources of information about the SMO increased. At the same time, the peak was observed in February 2023 (apparently tied to the SMO anniversary). Now there is some downward trend, but still the consumption of information about SMO is higher than before mobilization.

10) Since February, both the share of those who did not doubt their attitude to the SMO and the share of those who doubted their attitude to the SMO decreased by 4%. Among those who support the SMO, the proportion of those who doubted (11%) and those who did not doubt (86%) remained almost unchanged. For each group of those who clearly did not express their support for the SMO (non-supporters/non--supporters), the share of those who did not doubt changed within the statistical error (3%), and the share of those who doubted it dropped significantly (went to non-supporters/non-supporters). Thus, the level of self-censorship is growing.

In this wave, we also asked about the perceived risk of taking social surveys from 1 to 5 (1 being completely safe and 5 being very dangerous).

Polling	Low risk(1-2)	Medium (3)	High (4-5)	From to	Ito g
SMO support					
Yes, support	53.5	17.	316	.113.1	100
No, I don't.					
support	22.5	30.2	40.6	.8	100
Difficult to answer	37.4	22.8	21.2	18.6	100
Refusal	19.7	32.5	35.7	12.1	100
Total	40.6	22.7	23.5	13.2	100
Doubt about SMO among those who did NOT express support for SMO					
Had to	22.2	25.5	39.6	12.6	100
Not had	30.6	30.9	29.0	.6	100
Difficult to answer	31.5	25.0	20.0	23.5	100
Refusal	12.3	30.2	42.1	15.4	100
Total	26.7	28.5	31.5	13.3	100
Doubt about SMO among those who expressed support for SMO					
Had to	44.8	25.7	23.4	.1	100
Not had	55.3	16.1	14.6	14.0	100
Difficult to answer	34.2	20.6	30.7	14.6	100
Rejection	.0		100.0		100
Total	53.5	17	.316	.113.1	100

As can be seen, among the respondents who refused to answer the question about SMO, the distribution of risk of answering social surveys is similar to the distribution of those who clearly do not support. Those who could not answer the question about SMO by risk distribution are between those who support and those who do not support. It is also worth noting that those who expressed support for SMO in general feel social surveys significantly safer. At the same time, among those who refused to answer the question about doubts in SMO we can see a clear completion of the risk of surveys.

11) The share of families whose relatives participate in SMO has been stable since February 2023 at 22-24%. In comparison, this share was 12-13% before mobilization.

12) The percentage of those ready for a truce has held steady at 40% since February 2023. Not ready for a truce, declining from 47% (February 2023) to 32% in October 2023.

Will Putin's decision to call a cease-fire without achieving his goals be supported		NOT support Bottom line	Support	Difficult to answer	refuse	
A 70% increase in defense spending for national economy	Benefit	32.16	18.8	16.19	23.17	22.89
	Won't	29.98	20.31	22.15	17.81	23.75
	change	12.53	28.84	16.59	8.59	19.65
	Harm					
	Difficult to answer	22.94	30.27	43.74	42.84	31.48
	Rejection	2.4	1.79	1.34	7.59	2.23
	Bottom line	100	100	100	100	100
augmentation expenses for the defense and your mat.situation	Will improve	6.13	3.36	3.82	6.45	4.55
	Will not change	56.98	51.69	52.06	41.92	52.95
	Worsen	24.12	33.85	24.98	26.08	28.28
	Difficult to answer	11.73	9.3	18.34	22.61	12.82
	Rejection	1.04	1.79	0.8	2.95	1.4
	Bottom line	100	100	100	100	100

Among those who are not ready to support the ceasefire now, 12.5% believe that an increase in SMO spending would be detrimental to the economy and 24% believe that it would be detrimental to them personally (i.e. it would reduce their financial situation). If we make similar calculations in terms of support for the SMO, then among those who support the SMO, 18% believe that their financial situation will decrease due to increased spending on the war (these respondents make up 9.5% of the sample).

13) Ready spending on the military has fallen from 37% to 25%, social spending has been stable at 47% since February 2023.

Core of support and opposition

14) Broad core support (SMO support AND not ready for a ceasefire): is 27% in October 2023 and this is the lowest historical level (during mobilization it was 28-29%)

15) Broad core of SMO opponents (did not express support for the SMO AND expressed

willingness for a truce): is 25% in October 2023 and is stable since February 2023.

February 2023

SMO Support - 58.5%, Unprepared for Armistice - 47.2%, Army Budget 37%.

Support cores

- Support for SMO AND Unpreparedness for a truce - 39%
- SMO support AND army budget - 31.4%
- SMO Support AND Ceasefire Unpreparedness AND Army Budget - 22%

The opposing nuclei

- No expressed support for SMO AND Willingness to Truce - 25.7%
- No SMO support expressed AND social budget - 30%
- No support expressed for SMO AND Ceasefire readiness AND Social budget - 20%

October 2023

SMO support - 52%, Unprepared for truce - 33%, Army budget - 25.5%.

Support cores

- Support for SMO AND Unpreparedness for a truce - 27%
- SMO support AND army budget - 19.8%
- SMO Support AND Ceasefire Unpreparedness AND Army Budget - 12%

The opposing nuclei

- No expressed support for SMO AND Willingness to Truce - 25.3%
- Not expressed support for SMO AND social budget - 30.7%
- No support expressed for SMO AND Willingness to Truce AND Social Budget - 18.5%

Conclusion: In October 2023, there is a minimum level of support and unwillingness for a ceasefire (comparable to the mobilization period), but a maximum level of willingness for a ceasefire. This is a unique historical combination of opinions that may be due to the shock of the new wave of October conscription and comparable in strength to the shock of mobilization.

Regression analysis:

1) The negative effect of economic problems (layoffs and lower incomes) on SMO support is weakening. It was strongest in February 2023. In October 2023, this effect is comparable to July-September 2022. The effect of economic distress on willingness (and unwillingness) to truce disappeared in October 2023. The effect peaked in February 2023. (See Annex Table P1).
2) The effect of TV on SMO support is also weakening. The strongest TV effect is observed in March 2022, then July 2022 and February 2023. In October 2023, the effect of TV is half as weak as in February 2023. Similarly for readiness/unpreparedness for the ceasefire. In October 2023, the effect of TV on truce unpreparedness is at its minimum and comparable to the mobilization period. (see Annex Table P2).
3) Weakening negative effects of VPN on SMO support and unpreparedness for the October 2023 truce. The strongest effects were in February 2023 and July 2023. (See Appendix Table P3).

Conclusion: SMO fatigue causes the influence of traditional informational (TV, VPN) and personal

(economic problems) channels to weaken. Recall that there was also a decline in information content consumption and VPN use, but no significant improvement in economic problems.

Region-level external data - validation of Chronicle data:

1) Arrests for anti-war speech (OVD-Info) in Russian regions at the beginning of the war (normalized per population) are negatively associated with SMO support and not being ready for a ceasefire, and positively associated with anxiety.
2) Mediazone's data on fatalities as of the month of the survey at the regional level is positively associated with the statement that the respondent himself or herself or a family member is involved in SMO.
3) The relative number of searches in Yandex for "Payments to the deceased" for the month of the survey at the regional level is positively associated with respondents' answers about family members' participation in SMOs and with support for SMOs in the survey data. It is worth recalling that we observed a positive relationship between participation in SMOs and support for SMOs in the survey data.

Conclusion: the geographic and temporal variation in the Chronic and ExtremeScan survey data corresponds to the variation in population behavior at the regional level as of the date of the surveys.

APPENDIX:

Table P1: The effect of economic problems on SMO support, truce readiness and SMO continuation over time

VARIABLES	(1) War support	(2) War stop	(3) War continue
Clothes insecurity	0.067***	-0.030	0.091***
	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Appliances shortage	0.11***	-0.041*	0.099***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.024)
Car shortage	0.13***	-0.057***	0.13***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Real estate shortage	0.13***	-0.054**	0.13***
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.027)
All is feasible	0.18***	-0.053**	0.13***
	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Female	-0.11***	0.097***	-0.14***
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.011)
18-34	-0.31***	0.24***	-0.34***
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
35-54	-0.11***	0.11***	-0.16***
	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.012)
High Education	-0.015*	-0.035***	0.020**
	(0.0085)	(0.010)	(0.0087)
Study	-0.099***	0.060**	-0.10***
	(0.022)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Home Work	0.0038	0.023	-0.016
	(0.014)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Unemployed	-0.0026	0.0054	-0.030
	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Pension	0.051***	0.0021	0.0089
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.018)
Rural	0.0074	-0.016	0.020
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Region unemploym.	0.00043	0.0060**	-0.0047**

	(0.0028)	(0.0029)	(0.0023)
Region Median income	-0.00054	0.00055	-0.00045
	(0.00043)	(0.00033)	(0.00038)
Region Border	0.077***	-0.044***	0.057***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.014)
Wave3*Econ. problems	-0.058***		
	(0.018)		
Wave4*Econ. problems	-0.13***	0.13***	-0.14***
	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.022)
Wave5*Econ. problems	-0.13***	0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)
Wave6*Econ. problems	-0.081***		
	(0.015)		
Wave6.1_ES*Econ. problems	-0.094***	0.060***	-0.054***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Wave8*Econ. problems	-0.10***		
	(0.017)		
Wave9*Econ. problems	-0.17***	0.087***	-0.057***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Wave9.1_ES*Econ. problems	-0.14***	0.032	-0.047**
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Wave10.1_ES*Econ. problems	-0.11***	0.032*	0.0046
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.024)
Wave11*Econ. problems	-0.094***	0.0033	-0.010
	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Constant	0.71***	0.0025	0.90***
	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.035)
Observations	14,597	9,684	9,684
R-squared	0.124	0.095	0.164
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Estimat.	OLS	OLS	OLS

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table P2: Effect of SMO Info from TV on SMO support, truce readiness and SMO continuation over time

	(1) War support	(2)	(3)
VARIABLES		War stop	War continue
Clothes insecurity	0.058***	-0.024	0.11***
	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.031)
Appliances shortage	0.11***	-0.060**	0.11***
	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.032)
Car shortage	0.17***	-0.077***	0.15***
	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.030)
Real estate shortage	0.15***	-0.077***	0.14***
	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.032)
All is feasible	0.24***	-0.091***	0.14***
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.032)

Female	-0.13***	0.10***	-0.16***
	(0.0097)	(0.015)	(0.012)
18-34	-0.23***	0.22***	-0.28***
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)
35-54	-0.094***	0.10***	-0.15***
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.015)
High Education	-0.0053	-0.035***	0.043***
	(0.0095)	(0.011)	(0.0096)
Study	-0.053**	-0.0030	-0.079***
	(0.021)	(0.032)	(0.023)
Home Work	-0.014	0.0039	-0.0028
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)
Unemployed	-0.047***	-0.00011	-0.044**
	(0.016)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Pension	0.053***	-0.021	0.022
	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.019)
Rural	-0.012	-0.011	-0.00047
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.014)
Region unemploym.	0.0011	0.0075***	-0.0087***
	(0.0025)	(0.0023)	(0.0020)
Region Median income	-0.00025	0.00019	0.00015
	(0.00040)	(0.00044)	(0.00036)
Region Border	0.055***	-0.024	0.041**
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Wave2*Info TV	0.29***		
	(0.023)		
Wave5*Info TV	0.22***	-0.15***	0.17***
	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Wave6*Info TV	0.30***		
	(0.023)		
Wave7.1*Info TV	0.18***	-0.067*	0.10***
	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Wave7.2*Info TV	0.19***	-0.056*	0.052**
	(0.035)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Wave8*Info TV	0.21***		
	(0.022)		
Wave9*Info TV	0.26***	-0.17***	0.20***
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Wave9.1_ES*Info TV	0.24***	-0.074**	0.19***
	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.036)
Wave10*Info TV	0.21***	-0.0057	0.085***
	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.032)
Wave11*Info TV	0.14***	-0.016	0.055**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.027)
Constant	0.49***	0.22***	0.63***
	(0.036)	(0.051)	(0.050)
Observations	12,971	7,811	7,811
R-squared	0.155	0.084	0.164
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Estimat.	OLS	OLS	OLS

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Table P3: Effect of VPN on SMO support, truce readiness and SMO continuation over time

VARIABLES	(1) War support	(2) War stop	(3) War continue
Clothes insecurity	0.063***	-0.038	0.091***
	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Appliances shortage	0.12***	-0.054*	0.099***
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Car shortage	0.19***	-0.096***	0.16***
	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.034)
Real estate shortage	0.17***	-0.086**	0.15***
	(0.023)	(0.033)	(0.036)
All is feasible	0.23***	-0.068*	0.13***
	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.042)
Female	-0.11***	0.12***	-0.18***
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.013)
18-34	-0.29***	0.22***	-0.32***
	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.020)
35-54	-0.11***	0.11***	-0.16***
	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.017)
High Education	-0.0060	-0.056***	0.016
	(0.0094)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Study	-0.080***	-0.037	-0.099***
	(0.028)	(0.039)	(0.029)
Home Work	0.0066	0.041*	0.0019
	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Unemployed	-0.042**	0.0086	-0.038*
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Pension	0.080***	-0.012	0.052**
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Rural	-0.00052	-0.011	0.020
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Region unemploym.	0.00058	0.0087*	-0.0095***
	(0.0025)	(0.0044)	(0.0028)
Region Median income	-0.00088**	0.00018	0.000036
	(0.00042)	(0.00056)	(0.00053)
Region Border	0.073***	-0.045**	0.057***
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Wave6*Use VPN	-0.15***		
	(0.028)		
Wave6.1_ES*Use VPN	-0.10***	0.12***	-0.045
	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Wave8*Use VPN	-0.11***		
	(0.034)		
Wave9*Use VPN	-0.19***	0.19***	-0.14***
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.018)
Wave9.1_ES*Use VPN	-0.086**	0.12**	-0.052
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Wave10*Use VPN	-0.19***	0.18***	-0.099***
	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.035)
Wave11*Use VPN	-0.067*	0.079**	0.0015
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.031)

Constant	0.63***	0.19***	0.62***
	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.043)
Observations	9,555	6,152	6,152
R-squared	0.121	0.075	0.132
Wave FE	Y	Y	Y
Estimat.	OLS	OLS	OLS

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.