

**STATE OF MICHIGAN
IN THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT**

Daniel Patru,
Petitioner / Appellant,

vs

City of Wayne,
Respondent / Appellee.

Supreme Court No. _____
Court of Appeals No. 346894
Lower Court No. 16-001828-TT

Application for Leave to Appeal

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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

Checklist

- ☐ Drafts
 - ☐ structure
 - ☐ language flow
 - ☐ word choice
 - ☐ references
 - ☐ technical form
 - ☐ proof
- ☐ Continue from the Motion for reconsideration filed with COA. Address the arguments made in the answer.

Re the MCL 211.27(2) exception for repairs done in the year of sale, contrast uncapping under MCL 211.27a with nonconsideration under MCL 211.27(2). MCL 211.27a uncapping involves the AV and TV. But MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration involves determining before-repair and after-repair appraisals, tracking the value of normal repairs in the assessment roll, and adding the value back in the TCV after the owner who made the repairs sells the property. The two statutes are in different statutes. They protect different taxpayers. MCL 211.27a protects all property owners from rapid increases in property taxes due to market appreciation after the purchase a property. MCL 211.27(2) protects only residential property owners, homeowners, from increased property taxes due to their own normal repairs. They function differently. MCL 211.27a uses AV and capped or uncapped TV while MCL 211.27(2) uses the definition of TCV and tracks the value added by normal repairs on the assessment roll, not “considering” it for assessment purposes until the property is sold.

This Court should take this case in part because it is important that tax law be clear. As it is, the STC and the plain language of the statute appear to be in conflict with the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals in Detroit which covers Wayne County.

Appellant has five cases before the Tax Tribunal which are being held in abeyance pending the resolution of this case.

Every year in Michigan thousands of homes sell significantly below their expected market value, as indicated by their assessed TCV.¹ Many of these homes sell below their market value because they need the kind of “normal repairs” which are protected by MCL 211.27(2). Under the COA’s ruling, buyers of such homes would get the significant benefit of the statute only if they delay making the repairs until the year after purchase.

Re law of the case, note that *Bennett v Bennett*, 197 Mich. App. 497; 496 N.W.2d 353 (1992), teaches that arguments which could have been brought in the earlier proceeding cannot be used in a later proceeding. Here the issue of a MCL 211.27(2) exception (whether there is an unwritten exception to MCL 211.27(2) which allows consideration of normal repairs as long as they are done in the same year as the purchase) could have been brought in the earlier proceeding and would have obviated consideration of repairs. In other words, the legal rule relied on by the Tribunal and the COA in the second appeal solve the case without requiring any of the analysis in the first COA’s decision. *Bennett*, clearly covers a case such as this.

Re the assertion that the repairs had no bearing on Respondent’s assessment, this is wrong in several ways:

¹Assessors use computer-driven mass appraisal which computes the TCV based on an average sale price of similar homes. I assume here that the TCV thus computed is generally close to the market value, *if the home is in average condition*. When a home sells for significantly less than its TCV, either the home’s features were not accurately determined by the assessor, or, the home is in disrepair and not in average condition.

1. It ignores the clear teaching of *Patru 1* that by valuing the considering the repaired value of the if the repairs are normal, their value cannot be included in the TCV for assessment purposes.
2. The statute's words that the "assessor must not consider" is characterized by the STC as "nonconsideration treatment". Nonconsideration treatment requires an accounting of the effect of the repairs on the market value. The STC requires that the assessor make a before-repair appraisal and an after-repair appraisal. The before-repair value is used as the true cash value while the difference between the before-repair value and the after-repair value is noted in the assessment roll.²
3. In contrast, the COA in *Patru v City of Wayne*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 18, 2020 (Docket No. 346894), and the Tribunal equate the statute's words "not consider" with "ignore" or "take no notice or account of". (In its Answer to the motion for reconsideration, Appellee says that "the Tribunal – and, subsequently, *this* Court – made it a point to explain that Petitioner's repairs had no bearing, whatsoever, on Respondent's 2016 assessment." *Answer* at 5.) So, because the property had been overvalued by the assessor in 2015,³ an assessment which simply increased the value by inflation without regard to any repairs was deemed to satisfy the statute.
4. In relying on the 2015 computer-derived assessment set the before-repair value, the Tribunal and the COA violated the principle of *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation v City of Warren*, 193 Mich App 348; 483 NW2d 416 (1992) that the Tribunal must make its own independent determination of TCV. This is an error of law. The Tribunal may not start with the assumption that the prior year's computer-derived TCV calculation is correct and then simply adjust for inflation. Cite.
5. To the extent that the Tribunal relied on MLS pictures and the prior year's TCV to determine the value of the repairs, this is an error of fact.

☐ Follow the example of

- ☐ Morningside Community
- ☐ Mackinac Center Legal Foundation Application for Leave to Appeal and
- ☐ Pro Se Application.

☐ (6) A statement of facts that must be a clear, concise, and chronological narrative. All material facts, both favorable and unfavorable, must be fairly stated without argument or bias. The statement must contain, with specific page references

²The Tribunal recognized that its interpretation was contrary to the STC, but asserted that the STC's interpretation was not binding on the Tribunal. Quote. In contrast, the COA misquoted the STC to make it appear that there was no conflict.

³The assessor had valued the subject property in 2015 using mass appraisal computer software which assumed that the property was in average condition, despite the fact that another department in the City had deemed the property uninhabitable until numerous repairs had been made.

to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial court,

- ☐ (a) the nature of the action;
- ☐ (b) the character of pleadings and proceedings;
- ☐ (c) the substance of proof in sufficient detail to make it intelligible, indicating the facts that are in controversy and those that are not;
- ☐ (d) the dates of important instruments and events;
- ☐ (e) the rulings and orders of the trial court;
- ☐ (f) the verdict and judgment; and
- ☐ (g) any other matters necessary to an understanding of the controversy and the questions involved;
- ☐ (7) The arguments, each portion of which must be prefaced by the principal point stated in capital letters or boldface type. As to each issue, the argument must include a statement of the applicable standard or standards of review and supporting authorities, and must comply with the provisions of MCR 7.215(C) regarding citation of unpublished Court of Appeals opinions. Facts stated must be supported by specific page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial court. Page references to the transcript, the pleadings, or other document or paper filed with the trial court must also be given to show whether the issue was preserved for appeal by appropriate objection or by other means. If determination of the issues presented requires the study of a constitution, statute, ordinance, administrative rule, court rule, rule of evidence, judgment, order, written instrument, or document, or relevant part thereof, this material must be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum to the brief. If an argument is presented concerning the sentence imposed in a criminal case, the appellant's attorney must send a copy of the presentence report to the court at the time the brief is filed;
- ☐ fix appendix references
- ☐ Make sure to show how each issue was preserved.

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Order Appealed From and Basis of Jurisdiction

Appellant seeks leave to appeal the order by the Michigan Court of Appeals, issued March 31, 2020, denying a timely filed motion for reconsideration. Per MCR 7.305(A)(2), a copy of the order denying reconsideration as well as opinion are attached.

This filing is timely because it is filed within 42 days an order denying a timely filed motion for reconsideration per MCL 7.305(C)(2)(c). Under this Court's Administrative Orders 2020-4 and 2020-8, the time period for filing did not begin to run until June 8, 2020.

Questions Presented for Review

- I. On remand, did the Tax Tribunal violate the law of the case when it found that a property was in average condition and that MCL 211.27(2) did not cover repairs done by a buyer in the year of sale, when it a a property Absent new evidence or new law, may the trial court and the Court of Appeals change findings of fact and application of law which were settled in a previous appeal?**

Appellant answers “No.” Appellee answers “Yes.” The Court of Appeals answered “Yes.”

- II. Does MCL 211.27(2) cover normal repairs performed by a buyer in the year of sale?**

Appellant answers “Yes.” Appellee answers “No.” The Court of Appeals answered “No.”

- III. May the Tax Tribunal reject a sale of the subject property as evidence of its value based only on speculation that the seller, as government entity, may not have been motivated to receive market value for the property?**

Appellant answers “No.” Appellee answers “Yes.” The Court of Appeals answered “Yes.”

- IV. If it finds that normal repairs were done under MCL 211.27(2), may the Tax Tribunal refuse to independently determine the before-repair value?**

Appellant answers “No.” Appellee answers “Yes.” The Court of Appeals answered “Yes.”

- V. Was the Tax Tribunal’s finding that \$10,000 in normal repairs had no effect on the subject’s value supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record when the tribunal relied solely on MLS pictures and the prior year’s assessed value (which assumed the property was in average condition) and ignored the MLS pricing information and the fact that the city required the repairs before it would issue a certificate of occupancy?**

Appellant answers “No.” Appellee answers “Yes.” The Court of Appeals answered “Yes.”

Introduction

This appeal comes as a result of the Appellant trying to take advantage of Mathieu-Gast⁴ for repairs that he made to a house that he bought in 2015. A Tribunal referee first refused in a Proposed Opinion and Judgment to apply the statute because the house had been in substandard condition before the repairs. Appellant filed Exceptions, pointing out that the statute did not depend on the house's condition. Along with the Exceptions, Appellant submitted a spreadsheet showing that statutory category of each repair. In his Final Opinion, the Tribunal Judge recognized that the referee had erred, but upheld the referee's conclusion because the written evidence submitted before the case and the referee's Proposed Opinion did not show that Appellant had proved that he had performed normal repairs. The Tribunal Judge refused to consider Appellant's spreadsheet.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed. The Court agreed with the Tribunal that the referee had erred. But the Court disagreed with the Tribunal that Appellant had not proved his case. The Court found that the spreadsheet

⁴The Mathieu-Gast Act, MCL 211.27(2), was meant "to encourage both owners of homes in which they reside and owners of homes which they rent to others to maintain and improve their properties with no resulting property tax increase." *Kohn v. Twp of Columbus*, Final Opinion and Judgment (MTT No. 315243, 2009), p 12. Former Tribunal Judge Susan Grimes Width reached this conclusion after examining the bill's legislative history:

The Analysis of House Bill 628131 [House Legislative Analysis Section, Second Analysis, House Bill 6281 (as enrolled) 12-23-76] lists as one of the "Arguments For" the bill a section titled "Urban blight," which states:

. . . the spreading deterioration of residential and business property – contributes heavily to the decay of contemporary cities. People are reluctant to remain in neighborhoods full of ugly, run-down houses, and they dislike doing business in areas where commercial property is not kept attractive. If the bill becomes law, homeowners and landlords would know exactly what they could do to their properties without running the risk of higher taxes, and they would be encouraged to maintain and beautify them. Eventually, people would not feel it is necessary to move out of the cities to find attractive places to live.

In defining the problem the same analysis states "[m]any contend that if the law contained specific instructions concerning what assessors should not consider when setting cash value, property owners would be encouraged to beautify their homes and perform regular maintenance." *[Id.]*

had listed repairs that qualified for nonconsideration. If Appellant's testimony at the hearing had reflected the information in the spreadsheet, then Appellant had proved his case at the hearing. The Court reasoned that because the referee had misapprehended how to properly apply the statute, she did not fully evaluate the evidence at the hearing. So the Court remanded for a new hearing to determine whether the repairs were normal under that statute.

On remand, the Tribunal ruled that the repairs were normal repairs but found other reasons, not based on the normality of the repairs, to refuse to apply the statute. "Respondent's 2016 assessment was not based on Petitioner's 'normal' repairs to the subject property." Order Denying Reconsideration (MTT Docket Line 51), at 1. nonconsideration treatment. still refused to apply nonconsideration for several reasons:

1. The Tribunal ruled that it was not violating the Court of Appeals remanding decision because, although the repairs were normal repairs,
2. The Tribunal ruled that the statute did not cover repair which were done by a buyer in the year of purchase because of the property's uncapping. *Id.* at 1-2.
3. The Tribunal ruled that because the assessor's true cash valuation of the property in the prior year (2015) reflected in average condition, the assessor did not consider the repairs when determining the true cash value in the year at issue (2016). In other words, the 2016 true cash value was simply the 2015 valuation adjusted for inflation. The assessor did not have to consider the repairs to arrive at the 2016 valuation.
4. The Tribunal ruled that alternatively, even if the repairs were considered, their value was zero because the 2015 true cash value (before the repairs) was essentially the same, adjusting for inflation, as the 2016 true cash value. The Tribunal also relied on the MLS pictures, which showed the property was in good condition, to find that the value of the repairs were zero.
5. The Tribunal ruled that the sale price of the property was not good evidence of

its value because the property was sold by the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), an entity whose “motivation may not have been to receive market value for the property.” *Id.* at 2.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals the second time. This time the Court affirmed.

drop the "law of the case" issue. It's not clear if you're right. A trial judge should be able to revisit facts.

How to formulate the remaining issues?

Uncapping exception to Mathieu-Gast? No. Because:

1. The plain language of the statute does not allow repairs to be considered until a subsequent sale.

2. The Mathieu Gast Act of 1976, MCL 211.27(2), and Proposal A, MCL 211.27a, are distinct.

- implemented at different times, see MTT decision for MG and *Nathan Klooster v City of Charlevoix*, 488 Mich. 289; 795 N.W.2d 578 (2011)

Id

Id

- implemented by different sections in the tax code

- different purposes: MG encourages property upkeep, while Proposal A shields homeowners from rising property values.

- different statutory terminology and operation:

Proposal A: taxable value vs assessed value, uncapping

MG: Value added by normal repairs is indicated on the tax roll but not considered in the true cash value.

- different chain of causation:

Proposal A does not affect MG. The TCV is an input for taxable value, not an output. Uncapping never affects TCV. TCV affects TV on uncapping.

MG determines TCV. The value added by a repair is not included in the TCV. Since AV is based on TCV, MC affects AV, and to that extent affects TV.

3. COA's error lay in failing to note the distinction between MC and PA. Specifically, an uncapping event, per that MCL 211.27a(3)(?), when TV is set to the TCV or AV, does not nullify MG. The TCV still may not include the value added by normal repairs.

Note that the fact that both MG and AV are operate on Tax Day does mean that they are doing the same thing.

On the tax day after a sale, the value added by the normal repairs of the seller, which has not been counted in the TCV but simply separately indicated on the assessment roll, is "considered" or added back to the TCV. The buyer, going forward, will now have to pay tax on the repairs made by the seller.

With respect to Proposal A, on the tax day after a transfer, the TV is set equal to the AV (ignore equalization). If the property during the seller's ownership had appreciated rapidly, the seller had been shielded from this by the capped TV. On the tax day after the sale, this shielding ends, and the TV is reset or uncapped to the TCV and then capped again until the next transfer. The amount the TV changes because of uncapping represents the appreciation experienced by property from the first tax day after its purchase by the seller to the first tax day after its sale by the seller.

Does MG require a factual determination of the before-repair and after-repair value by the tribunal? Yes. The plain language of the statute says that the amount attributable to the repairs must be indicated on the assessment roll. Since the amount attributable to the repairs directly affects the TCV, it must be independently determined by the Tribunal. Cite Jones & Laughlin, and others. This independent determination is a factual determination. Cite MCL 211.27(6). Cite decision saying that the Tribunal may choose one or the other.

In contrast, the Tribunal essentially made a ruling of law. Under the Tribunal's

interpretation, the fact that the assessor could have determined the TCV at issue simply by adjusting for inflation the previous year's TCV, meant that she did not have to consider the value added by repairs. The years-long the first appeal to the Court of Appeals was unnecessary. Furthermore, the Tribunal's interpretation of the word "consider" makes the role of pr

May the Tribunal use the prior year's TCV to determine if the assessor "considered" the value added by the repairs? No. Using the prior year's TCV to determine if the assessor "considered" the value added by repairs is a misunderstanding of the way the word "considered" is used in the statute.

As noted by the COA in Patru 1, the assessor considers the value added by the repairs when it does not account for the value added by the repairs. The only way to not consider the value added by the repairs is to determine the value of the property before the repairs.

If the prior year's TCV can be used by the Tribunal to prove the value of a property on the preceding tax year, then every case where the TCV is in dispute, not just MG cases, could be decided this way. The judge may merely start with the prior year's TCV and adjust it for inflation to arrive at the disputed TCV.

While the prior year's TCV cannot be used directly, if an assessor personally inspected the property to determine the prior year's TCV she may testify to this.

Is the TCV always factual determination? May the Tribunal use the prior year's TCV to determine, as a matter of law, the TCV at issue? No. In this case, the prior year's TCV reflected the value of the property in good or average condition. This was not a result of the assessor's personal inspection. On the contrary, the assessor testified that mass appraisal assumes the property was in normal condition. Nevertheless, the Tribunal used the prior year's TCV in two ways: First, the Tribunal found that the assessor did not consider the value added by the repairs because she simply adjusted the previous year's TCV for inflation without regard to repairs. Second and

alternatively, the Tribunal determined that the value of the repairs was zero because the prior TCV, when the property was unrepaired, is, adjusted for inflation, the same as the current TCV, when the property is repaired.

The amount in controversy in this case is around \$1,000 per year – small in relation to the amounts in play normally seen by this Court.

But the issues here potentially involve a lot of taxpayers. Appellant himself has five cases being held in abeyance at the Tax Tribunal pending resolution of this case. Appellant has identified more than 3000 properties in michigan that sold in 2019 for significantly less than their assessed (true cash) value. Many of these properties may be in the same situation as Apellant, so this decision will likely have larger application than the instant case.

Facts and Material Proceedings

I. Background

Before it was bought by Appellant, the subject house was owned by HUD. MLS Listing (MTT Docket Line 32) (Appendix at 9). The house had been listed on the MLS on and off since April 2013; its initial asking price was \$29,900, but by the time Appellant bought the house, the asking price was \$32,000. MLS History (MTT Docket Line 33) (Appendix at 8).

Appellant bought the house for the asking price in August 2015.

The City of Wayne (Respondent/Appellee) required repairs before it allowed occupancy. List of Repairs (MTT Docket Line 36) (Appendix at 10).

Appellee assessed the subject property for 2016 at a true cash value of \$50,400. Appellant appealed, arguing that Appellee's assessment was the after-repair value as of December 31, 2015. Appellant believed that the before-repair value should be used. "Petitioner claims that under MCL 211.27(2) we should not increase the subject's true cash value for normal repairs and maintenance until the subject is sold." *Patru v*

City of Wayne, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 8, 2018 (Docket No. 337547), p 2 (Appendix at 38), quoting the tribunal’s POJ in the first appeal.

Appellant appealed to the Board of Review and then to the Tax Tribunal.

II. The First Appeal to the Tax Tribunal

The Tax Tribunal’s Referee ruled that MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration did not apply because the property was in substandard condition. In Exceptions and a Motion for Reconsideration, Appellant objected to the Tribunal’s ruling that MCL 211.27(2) did not apply to houses in substandard condition. In addition to his argument, Appellant submitted a spreadsheet clearly showing that his repairs fit under the explicit terms of the statute.⁵ List of Repairs (Appendix at 10). The Tribunal’s Judges refused to consider the spreadsheet and affirmed the Referee’s decision in their final opinion and in the order denying reconsideration.

Appellant appealed for the first time to the Court of Appeals.

III. The First Appeal to the Court of Appeals

In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals Court reversed. The Court recognized that the house had been in substandard condition. “It is undisputed that, when he purchased the property, [the house] was in substandard condition and required numerous repairs to make it livable. Patru completed the required repairs on the property as of December 31, 2015.” *Patru 1*, p 1 (Appendix at 37).

The Court further noted that the repairs as listed in the spreadsheet were normal repairs under the Statute: “Patru submitted a spreadsheet detailing the repairs he completed, which . . . included repairs that, under MCL 211.27(2), constitute normal

⁵MCL 211.27(2) had fifteen specific categories (a-o) of repairs that were normal repairs under the statute.

repairs . . .” *Patru 1*, p 4 (Appendix at 40).

The Court ruled that the tribunal referee had erred in failing to apply MCL 211.27(2) to a house in substandard condition.

The hearing referee incorrectly interpreted MCL 211.27(2) by concluding that because repairs were done to a property in substandard condition, they did not constitute normal repairs. . . . This was improper . . . Nothing in MCL 211.27(2) provides that the repairs . . . are not normal repairs in the event that they are performed on a substandard property. Thus by reading a requirement into the statute that was not stated by the legislature, the trial erred . . . See *Mich Ed Ass’n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing)*, 489 Mich 194, 218; 801 NW2d 35 (2011) (stating that nothing will be read into a clear statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself). [*Patru 1*, p 5 (Appendix at 41).]

The Court went on to rule that in light of the referee’s error of law, the Tribunal erred in not allowing additional proof.

In its final opinion and judgement, the Tribunal recognized that the referee erred in its interpretation of MCL 211.27(2); however, it nevertheless upheld the determination of TCV. The Tribunal reasoned that because the spreadsheet detailing the repairs completed on the property had not been submitted before the hearing, it had no obligation to consider that evidence, so it concluded that Patru failed to establish that the repairs constituted normal repairs. However, as stated above, Patru did present evidence at the hearing in support of his claim that MCL 211.27(2) applied. The referee did not fully evaluate that evidence—which included testimony—because it misapprehended how to properly apply MCL 211.27(2). [*Id.*]

The Court explained that had the testimony at the hearing matched the contents of the spreadsheet, then the value added by the repairs should not be considered in the TCV:

If the testimony provided was an oral recitation of the information included on the spreadsheet, then Patru presented testimony sufficient to establish that at least some of the repairs constituted normal repairs under MCL 211.27(2), and so the increase in TCV attributed to those repairs should not be considered in the property’s TCV for assessment purposes until such time as Patru sells the property. However, if Patru merely testified that he did some carpentry, electrical, and masonry repairs and no further

explanation of the work that was provided, then he would have arguably failed to support his claim. *[Id]*

Because the spreadsheet itself had not been admitted and because the actual evidence presented at the hearing was not in the record, the Court remanded for a rehearing where additional proofs could be submitted to determine if the repairs were normal under the statute. *Id.*

IV. The Second Appeal to the Tax Tribunal

On remand, the tribunal ruled that the repairs were normal, but it again refused to apply MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration, this time because the repairs were done in a year of a transfer. *Patru 2*, p 1.

Also, the tribunal changed its previously undisputed finding that the property's before-repair condition was substandard. It now ruled that the repairs "did not affect the assessed [true cash value] of the property" *Id.*

Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, but the tribunal affirmed.

Appellant appealed for the second time to the Court of Appeals.

V. The Second Appeal to the Court of Appeals

In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing with the Tax Tribunal on all the issues in dispute. (The details of the Court's ruling will be discussed in the Argument section below.) Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which was answered by Appellee, but the Court denied the motion without comment on March 31, 2020.

Appellant now asks this Court to review the case.

Argument: Grounds for Granting the Application

I. Introduction

MCL 211.27(2) exempts from the true cash value the value added by normal repairs until the property is sold. The Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals in this case attack this tax exemption in two ways. First, they exclude from the statute repairs done by a purchaser in the same year of the purchase. The statute requires nonconsideration treatment⁶ for normal repairs “until the property is sold.” The word “until” means that there must be a sale *after* the repairs to cause nonconsideration treatment to end. But the Tribunal and the Court of Appeals ignore the word “until” and refuse to require nonconsideration treatment because of a sale that occurs *before* the repairs but in the same year. This violates the plain language of the statute and makes it inconsistent and illogical.

The second way that the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals attack the tax exemption is by using the assessor’s true cash value for the prior year. The prior year’s assessment was based on the assumption⁷ that the property was in average condition and did not need extensive repairs. In other words, the prior year’s assessment was based on the assumption that the repairs were not needed or had already been made. Of course this was not actually true because after the sale the Appellee itself required the repairs before it would grant a certificate of occupancy.

Despite the fact that the prior year’s true cash value was based on untrue assumption, the Tribunal and the Court of Appeals used it to deny the exemption on two alternative grounds. First, the courts argued that the assessor had not considered the repairs in determining the true cash value: the assessor had simply adjusted on

⁶The term “nonconsideration treatment” is not in the statute itself, but is used to explain the statute in Michigan State Tax Commission (STC) Bulletin No. 7 of 2014 (Mathieu Gast Act) (Appendix at 43). The term is a shorthand for the statute’s requirement that the value added by normal repairs be “indicated on the assessment roll” but not considered “in determining the true cash value of the property for assessment purposes until the property is sold.”

⁷The assessor testified at the hearing that mass appraisal does not account for properties one-by-one. In other words, properties are assessed uniformly and *Respondent assumes properties are in “average” condition*. Second Final Opinion and Judgment (MTT Docket Line 48) (FOJ), p 4 (Appendix at 21).

the prior year's assessment for inflation. Alternatively, the courts argued that the value added by the repairs was zero, because, adjusting for inflation, the property's true cash value was the same in the years before and after the repairs. The first ground misinterprets the statute's "not consider" as "to ignore" rather than indicating nonconsideration treatment.⁶ The second ground is an error of fact and also violates the requirement that the Tribunal must make an independent determination of true cash value.

esthis fact in two ways to deny the exemption. First, they said that provides that "the assessor shall not consider Second, they exclude from the statute properties that were over-assessed in the preceding year, either by saying that the assessor did not need to consider the repairs because the property's TCV was derived from the previous year's TCV, or by setting the before-repair value to the previous-year's TCV and thus determining that the repairs did not add to the TCV.

already . Third, they repeat the second attack in a different way by using the alternatively int

create an unwritten exception for repairs by a purchaser done in the same year as the purchase. Second, they create another unwritten exception for properties that have been over-valued by the assessor in the previous year.⁸ The stakes of this case amount to on the order of a thousand dollars a year.

In terms of the dollars directly at issue, this case is one of the smallest cases this Court will see. The tax liability at issue is on the order of a thousand dollars a year. But the principles deciding the issues in this case have wide applicability.

1. Mathieu Gast nonconsideration:

- (a) Is there an unwritten exception for repairs completed by a buyer in the year of purchase?

⁸In this case, the second exception is not only an error of law, but can also be viewed as an error of fact. The Tribunal and Court of Appeals found that the before-repair value was the previous year's assessed TCV. This error is addressed in the third Question Presented.

- (b) Can the taxpayer rely on the plain text of the tax code? Can the taxpayer rely on published STC bulletins? Or will the taxpayer be surprised by intricate and difficult interpretations of the law by the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals?
- 2. the law of the case:
 - (a) Can the taxpayer rely on the fact that after he wins at the Court of Appeals, that on remand the case will move forward? Or can findings of fact and legal questions established during the first appeal be revisited so as to give the taxing authority another chance to win?
 - (b) Or will legal issues that could have been brought up during the first proceeding be barred in the second proceeding?

II. Granting question one (re. the law of the case) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the first issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the view of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the public is whether taxing authorities and tribunal judges⁹ should be permitted to try again with a different theory after they have lost a dispute with a taxpayer at the Court of Appeals.

In this case, the Tax Tribunal first ruled that the house was in such *poor* condition before the repairs that the repairs were not normal repairs under the statute. Then, after the Court of Appeals rejected this theory, the Tax Tribunal tried a couple more theories. This time, on the exact same evidence, the Tribunal ruled that the house

⁹The City, appellant, has not advanced any written legal arguments at the tribunal level. Throughout this case, the conflict has been primarily between the taxpayer and the Tribunal Judges. All of the issues presented before this Court originate from the tribunal judges. This does not mean that the tribunal judges are biased or acting improperly, because they have a duty to make their own decisions, independent of positions put forth by the parties.

was in such *good* condition before the repairs that that the repairs, worth \$10,000, did not affect the value at all. In addition, the Tribunal ruled that because the repairs were done in the year when the property was purchased, that MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration did not apply at all, a theory that could have been brought up in the first appeal. This necessitated another appeal to the Court of Appeals. The process so far has lasted more four years since the initial appeal at the 2016 March Board of Review. The process has required Appellant to file numerous lengthy documents. The only way Appellant could afford to do these appeals is because he did the appeals himself for “free.” Appellant could not have afforded to pay a lawyer to do it for him.

Especially in cases like this, where the lone taxpayer is up against the unlimited resources of the government, the ordinary tax-paying public has an interest in the efficiency promoted by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The best arguments should be brought on the first appeal and arguments that are not brought, but could have been brought, should be barred. Likewise, facts determined in the first appeal should not be changed. The taxing authority should not be allowed to keep trying new theories until it succeeds either on the merits or by exhausting the taxpayer.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the first issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state’s jurisprudence. The law-of-the-case doctrine has been around for a long time and serves an important interest not only

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals’ handling of the first issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals.

III. Granting question two (whether there is a first-year exception to MCL 211.27(2)) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the second issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

There are two big-picture issues of this case from the point of MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration and the public. Will industrious buyers of distressed homes be penalized for making immediate repairs rather than waiting until the year after the sale? And, can ordinary members of the public rely on the plain language of the tax code and the guidance of the state tax commission, or must they take their chances that a Tax Tribunal Judge will make a novel interpretation of the tax code at odds with both the code's plain language and the STC?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the second issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, plain language interpretation of statutes.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the second issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals.

IV. Granting question three (rejecting a sale based on speculation) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the third issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question three and the public. Will all relevant evidence be considered fairly or will some evidence be excluded out of hand based on arbitrary per-se rules? Here the subject's actual sale was replaced with mls marketing pictures taken out of context and the previous year's assessed value which by the city's own admission assumed the point at issue.¹⁰

¹⁰The Tribunal Judge himself in his final opinion says that the Appellant's representative testified

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the third issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, a correct determination of the true cash value of properties.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the third issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. Violates *Jones & Laughlin* and prevent Appellant from receiving a fair hearing.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. *Jones & Laughlin*.

V. Granting question four (determination of before-repair value) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the fourth issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question four and the public. Will STC's guidance be followed, or can assessors and tribunal judges just do their own thing?

Is this just another way to create a first-year exception? If the previous year's assessed value is used for the before-repair value, then in many cases in which the city has not noted the below-average condition of the property, the result will be indistinguishable from an explicit first-year exception.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the fourth issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, independent determination by tax tribunal judges. tk where does this requirement come from?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the fourth issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. Violates *Jones & Laughlin* and is a back-door way to implement an year-of-sale exception.

that properties are assessed under the assumption that they are in average condition. Thus the assessed value cannot be used to prove the actual condition of the property.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. *Jones & Laughlin. Id.*

VI. Granting question five (no basis for finding no effect of repairs on value) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the fifth issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question five and the public: must Judges be disciplined in their factual findings or can they cherry-pick evidence, use "evidence" that begs the question, ignore evidence they don't like, etc?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the fifth issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, correct even-handed evaluation of the evidence. No case will have exactly this evidence, but the manner in which evidence is handled can be the same. The Court needs to correct the Tribunal before this becomes a habit.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the fourth issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. This is clearly wrong here and results in higher taxes.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. Violates the rule for evidence which is cited in many appellate cases.

VII. The fact that this case is not published should not cause the Court to think that its bad practices and teaching won't spread if unchecked now

A. This is a case of first impression regarding the first year's exception to MCL 211.27(2), the per-se rule against bank sales or sales by government institutions, the obligation to independently determine the before-repair value, and the improper use of MLS pictures and previous-year assessed value. It is a precedent even if nonbinding.

Other cases will follow. The tendency will be follow the lead of this case, especially if the Supreme Court has refused to correct it. Why pay a lawyer to craft an appeal, when someone has already tried and been shot down?

Appellant himself is counsel for five pending cases which are on hold pending the resolution of the issues in this case.

For cases involving residential fixer-uppers, it unlikely that an owner will have the resources, know-how, and willingness to appeal even to the Court of Appeals. It is likely that many more abuses like in the present case before this Court has an opportunity to correct.

Argument

1. The issue raises a serious question about the legality of a law passed by the legislature. 2. The issue raises a legal principle that is very important to Michigan law. MCL 7.305(B)(3) 3. The Court of Appeals decision is clearly wrong and will cause material injustice to me. MCL 7.305(B)(5)(a) 4. The decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. MCL 7.305(B)(5)(b)

Issue 1, concerning the law of the case, is important because in this case both the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals ignored the doctrine of the law of the case. , the law of the case was ignored, by both the Tax Tribunal and the Court of Appeals. S

I. Standard of Review

II. This Court should grant leave to appeal on question one under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

standard of review and preservation

A. Enforcing the doctrine of the law of the case serves a significant public interest in reducing the cost and length of tax appeals

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the first issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the view of the law-of-the-case doctrine and the public is whether taxing authorities and tribunal judges¹¹ should be permitted to try again with a different theory after they have lost a dispute with a taxpayer at the Court of Appeals.

In this case, the Tax Tribunal first ruled that the house was in such *poor* condition before the repairs that the repairs were not normal repairs under the statute. Then, after the Court of Appeals rejected this theory, the Tax Tribunal tried a couple more theories. This time, on exact same evidence, the Tribunal ruled that the house was in such *good* condition before the repairs that that the repairs, worth \$10,000, did not affect the value at all. In addition, the Tribunal ruled that because the repairs were done in the year when the property was purchased, that MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration did not apply at all, a theory that could have been brought up in the first appeal. This necessitated another appeal to the Court of Appeals. The process so far has lasted more four years since the initial appeal at the 2016 March Board of Review. The process has required Appellant to file numerous lengthy documents.

¹¹The City, appellant, has not advanced any written legal arguments at the tribunal level. Throughout this case, the conflict has been primarily between the taxpayer and the Tribunal Judges. All of the issues presented before this Court originate from the tribunal judges. This does not mean that the tribunal judges are biased or acting improperly, because they have a duty to make their own decisions, independent of positions put forth by the parties.

The only way Appellant could afford to do these appeals is because he did the appeals himself for “free.” Appellant could not have afforded to pay a lawyer to do it for him.

Especially in cases like this, where the lone taxpayer is up against the unlimited resources of the government, the ordinary tax-paying public has an interest in the efficiency promoted by the law-of-the-case doctrine. The best arguments should be brought on the first appeal and arguments that are not brought, but could have been brought, should be barred. Likewise, facts determined in the first appeal should not be changed. The taxing authority should not be allowed to keep trying new theories until it succeeds either on the merits or by exhausting the taxpayer.

B. The doctrine of the law of the case is a legal principle with major significance to the state’s jurisprudence because it helps make sure that the state’s limited judicial resources are used efficiently.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the first issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state’s jurisprudence. tk the law-of-the-case doctrine has been around for a long time and serves an important interest.

C. The Court of Appeals’ decision clearly contradicts Michigan caselaw and has already caused material injustice

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals’ handling of the first issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals.

III. This Court should grant leave to appeal on question two under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

standard of review and preservation

A. The public has a significant interest in the plain language application of MCL 211.27(2) in particular and the tax law generally.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the second issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

There are two big-picture issues of this case from the point of MCL 211.27(2) nonconsideration and the public. Will industrious buyers of distressed homes be penalized for making immediate repairs rather than waiting until the year after the sale? And, can ordinary members of the public rely on the plain language of the tax code and the guidance of the state tax commission, or must they take their chances that a Tax Tribunal Judge will make a novel interpretation of the tax code at odds with both the code's plain language and the STC?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the second issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, plain language interpretation of statutes.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the second issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals.

B. The exception to MCL 211.27(2) is unsupported

This court reviews the Tax Tribunal's statutory interpretation de novo. *Briggs Tax Service, LLC v Detroit Pub. Schools*, 485 Mich 69, 75; 780 NW2d 753 (2010).

This Court previously faulted the Tax Tribunal for violating the rule that "nothing will be read into a clear statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself." *Patru 1*, p 5 (Appendix at 41), quoting *Mich Ed*, 489 Mich at 218. But this Court now makes the same error by reading into MCL 211.27(2) an exception for repairs done in the year of a transfer.

The statute requires nonconsideration "until the property is sold." The word

until means that there must be a sale after the repairs for nonconsideration to end. This Court’s refusal to apply nonconsideration where there is no sale after the repairs is a violation of the plain words of the statute.

This Court also frustrates the intent of the statute which is to promote repairs. In direct violation of the statute’s plain language, this Court uses the interaction of at least two other statutes to exempt from nonconsideration the repairs of diligent buyers who start repairs right away. Under the Court’s view, they should wait until the year after the purchase so that the before-repair value can be determined on tax day.

Where did this Court err? This Court is correct up to the proposition that the uncapped taxable value is based on the true cash value of the property in the year after the transfer.¹² But it errs in equating true cash value with fair market value “regardless of any “normal repairs” made by petitioner in [the year of purchase].” Opinion at 5.

True cash value is defined in MCL 211.27¹³, which has eight subsections, which if reproduced here would span five pages. Courts have summarized true cash value as “fair market value,” based on the term “usual selling price” in subsection one. But this shorthand is used only in cases where a more complex definition is not needed. There is no case, except this Court’s opinion here, that holds that the caselaw-derived term “fair market value” overrides or invalidates an applicable subsection of MCL 211.27.

MCL 211.27(2), as part of the definition of true cash value, is not dependent on the capped or uncapped status of the taxable value defined in the next section, MCL

¹²The uncapped taxable value is the equalized assessed value (state equalized value). MCL 211.27a(3). The assessed value is one half of the true cash value. MCL 211.27a(1). The true cash value is always calculated as of tax day. “true cash value” means the usual selling price . . . at the time of assessment,” MCL 211.27(1). “The taxable status of . . . real . . . property for a tax year shall be determined as of each December 31 of the immediately preceding year, which is considered the tax day,” MCL 211.2(2).

¹³Internally MCL 211.27 may define true cash value in terms of itself. For example, MCL 211.27(2) uses “true cash value for assessment purposes” to distinguish from the “true cash value” that increased due to normal repairs. But outside of MCL 211.27, in the rest of the tax act, there is only one “true cash value” which incorporates all of MCL 211.27. For example, assessed value is defined in MCL 211.27a(1) as 50% of the true cash value. Obviously with respect to MCL 211.27(2) this means the “true cash value for assessment purposes.” But, as it is outside of MCL 211.27, MCL 211.27a(1) uses the term “true cash value.”

211.27a. Rather, the dependency goes the other way. MCL 211.27(2) always operates to exclude the value of normal repairs no matter if true cash value is used to establish the assessed value of MCL 211.27a(1) or the additions of MCL 211.27a(2)(b).

This Court's interpretation of Mathieu Gast is unsupported by the State Tax Commission. Its opinion on page 6 cites, with its own emphasis, STC Bulletin, at 3 (Appendix at 45)):

The exemption for normal repairs, replacements and maintenance ends in the year after the owner who made the repairs, replacements and maintenance sells the property. *In the year following a sale, the assessed value shall be based on the true cash value of the entire property.* The amount of assessment increase attributable to the value of formerly exempt property returning to the assessment roll is new for equalization purposes.

This Court reads just the second, emphasized, sentence out of its context. The first sentence of the paragraph gives the topic: "The exemption . . . ends in the year after *the owner who made the repairs* . . . sells the property." In this context, the second sentence's "entire property" means the property with the seller's repairs considered. The buyer's repairs are not in the paragraph's scope.¹⁴

C. The law of the case requires reversal

Under the doctrine of the law of the case, if an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal question will not be differently determined in a subsequent appeal in the same case were the facts remain materially the same. The primary purpose of the law-of-the-case doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. . . . [T]he doctrine is discretionary, rather than mandatory.

Bennett, 197 Mich. App. at 499-500.

The opinion at 5 gives two reasons why the law of the case does not apply. First, this Court had not resolved whether "the repairs were normal repairs within the

¹⁴The opinion at 6 uses this out-of-context quote to justify its holding that before-repair and after-repairs appraisals were not required. As this passage does not say what this Court thinks it says, this Court's holding on this point is without support.

meaning of MCL 211.27(2).” This was not resolved because the existing record was insufficient. *Patru 1*, p 5 (Appendix at 41). But the opinion specified that if the Tribunal found that the repairs listed on the spreadsheet had been performed, these would constitute normal repairs and should not be considered as part of the true cash value:

If the testimony provided was an oral recitation of the information included on the spreadsheet, then Patru presented testimony sufficient to establish that at least some of the repairs constituted normal repairs under MCL 211.27(2), and so the increase in TCV attributed to those repairs should not be considered in the property’s TCV for assessment purposes until such time as Patru sells the property.

Id. So on remand, the tribunal should have applied nonconsideration after it found that the repairs as listed on the spreadsheet were normal repairs.

Instead, despite finding that the repairs were normal, the tribunal did not apply nonconsideration because of the second reason: it now thought that the transfer of ownership and uncapping created an exception. Opinion at 5.

In *Bennett*, this Court was asked to reverse its earlier ruling based on a law which it had not explicitly considered the first time. This Court refused, reasoning that even though its first decision was wrong, by substituting its judgment for the prior appeals court panel, it would be doing “the very activity the law-of-the-case doctrine is designed to discourage.” *Bennett*, 197 Mich. App. at 501. If the prior panel was not aware of the new law, the parties were at fault because “ultimately it is the responsibility of the parties to bring to this Court’s attention that case law and those statutes that the parties wish the Court to consider in deciding the matter.” *Id.*

Thus *Bennett* teaches that the law of the case precludes even correct arguments if they could have been brought up in the first appeal. This is so here. Thus even if this Court agrees with the tribunal’s latest decision, it should still reverse and affirm its earlier ruling.

Logically, the tribunal’s decision rests on two independent grounds:

1. MCL 211.27(2) does not apply in transfer years and the tribunal is not prohibited

from considering this exception by the law of the case.

2. Even if nonconsideration is applied, the repairs did not affect value. Considering inflation, the before-repair value was essentially equal to the after-repair value. In particular, the subject's purchase price was not the before-repair value.

All of these propositions are proven false below. There is no exception to nonconsideration for transfer years. And even if there were such an exception, the law of the case requires that this should have been brought up on the first appeal. Second, the "fact" that the repairs did not affect value is not supported by the required evidence. And in particular, the tribunal did not properly consider the subject's purchase price.

IV. Granting question three (rejecting a sale based on speculation) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

standard of review and preservation

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the third issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question three and the public. Will all relevant evidence be considered fairly or will some evidence be excluded out of hand based on arbitrary per-se rules? Here the subject's actual sale was replaced with mls marketing pictures taken out of context and the previous year's assessed value which by the city's own admission assumed the point at issue.¹⁵

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the third issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, a correct determination of the true cash value of properties.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the third issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. Violates *Jones & Laughlin* and prevent

¹⁵The Tribunal Judge himself in his final opinion says that the Appellant's representative testified that properties are assessed under the assumption that they are in average condition. Thus the assessed value cannot be used to prove the actual condition of the property.

Appellant from receiving a fair hearing.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. *Jones & Laughlin*.

A. This Court wrongly affirms the tribunal's rejection of the purchase price

When reviewing Tax Tribunal cases, this Court looks for misapplication of the law or adoption of a wrong principle. Factual findings must be supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Statutory interpretation is reviewed de novo. *Briggs*, 485 Mich at 75; 780 NW2d at 757-758.

Contrary to this Court characterization, Appellant is not complaining that "the tribunal erred by rejecting his 2015 purchase price of the property as determinative of its TCV." Opinion at 6. Rather, Appellant's brief at 18-19 complains that the tribunal gave the sale price "no weight or credibility," Order Denying Reconsideration, at 2, contrary to the teaching of *Jones & Laughlin*, 193 Mich App at 353-354:

[T]he price at which an item of property actually sold is most certainly relevant evidence . . . the tribunal's opinion that the evidence "has little or *no* bearing" on the property's earlier value suggests that the evidence was rejected out of hand. Such cursory rejection would be erroneous.

Emphasis in original. Appellant just wants the tribunal to consider the sale price and not reject it out of hand.

The opinion at 7 asserts that the tribunal "considered petitioner's evidence of the 2015 purchase price" and also "considered the nature of the sale," but there is no record of such consideration *involving the particular facts of this case*.¹⁶ The Tribunal gave

¹⁶In this case the tribunal could have considered, but did not, that the subject house (1) had been listed by an independent, licensed real estate broker on the MLS, (2) had sold more than two years after it was first listed, (3) had had several offers on it, (4) was not reduced in price to make it sell faster, (5) sold at a price consistent with the repairs that were required.

the sale price “no weight or credibility” because the seller was HUD.¹⁷ This amounts to a per se rule which excludes from consideration the sale price of all HUD-owned homes. This is the kind of cursory rejection that *Jones & Laughlin* forbids. Especially troubling is that the tribunal justifies this per se rule with bare speculation: “Because the subject was being sold by a government entity, that entity’s motivation may not have been to receive market value for the property.” Order Denying Reconsideration, at 2.

V. Granting question four (necessity of determinating the before-repair value) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

standard of review and preservation

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the fourth issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state’s subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question four and the public. Will STC’s guidance be followed, or can assessors and tribunal judges just do their own thing?

Is this just another way to create a first-year exception? If the previous year’s assessed value is used for the before-repair value, then in many cases in which the city has not noted the below-average condition of the property, the result will be indistinguishable from an explicit first-year exception.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the fourth issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state’s jurisprudence, namely, independent determination by tax tribunal judges. tk where does this requirement come from?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals’ handling of the fourth issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. Violates *Jones & Laughlin* and is a

¹⁷In support of its rejection of the sale price, the tribunal also cites MCL 211.27(6), prohibiting assessors from presuming that the selling price is the true cash value. But *Jones & Laughlin*, 193 Mich App at 354, specifically considered and rejected this as justifying a cursory rejection.

back-door way to implement an year-of-sale exception.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. *Jones & Laughlin. Id.*

A. If the Tribunal finds that normal repairs were made, it must determine the before-repair value.

The STC requires it.

The Court of Appeals misread the STC Bulletin

VI. Granting question five (no basis for finding no effect of repairs on value) is proper under MCR 7.305(B)(2, 3, 5a, and 5b)

standard of review and preservation

Per MCR 7.305(B)(2) the fifth issue has significant public interest and the case is against one of the state's subdivisions.

The big-picture issue of this case from the point of view of question five and the public: must Judges be disciplined in their factual findings or can they cherry-pick evidence, use "evidence" that begs the question, ignore evidence they don't like, etc?

Per MCR 7.305(B)(3) the fifth issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence, namely, correct even-handed evaluation of the evidence. No case will have exactly this evidence, but the manner in which evidence is handled can be the same. The Court needs to correct the Tribunal before this becomes a habit.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5a) the Court of Appeals' handling of the fourth issue is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice. This is clearly wrong here and results in higher taxes.

Per MCR 7.305(B)(5b) the Court of Appeals' decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals. Violates the rule for evidence which is cited in many appellate cases.

A. The ruling that the repairs did not affect the value is unsupported

The tribunal's factual findings must be supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." *Pontiac Country Club v Waterford Twp*, 299 Mich App 427, 434; 830 NW2d 785 (2013). "Substantial evidence supports the Tribunal's findings if a reasonable person would accept the evidence as sufficient to support the conclusion." *Id.*

Besides ruling that MCL 211.27(2) did not apply, the tribunal also ruled that the repairs did not affect the property's true cash value, or equivalently, that the before-repair value was the same as the after-repair value. The opinion says at 5: "The tribunal did not credit petitioner's argument that the property was in substandard condition when he purchased it."

But the property's substandard condition is not merely Appellant's argument. Throughout the first trip to this Court until the tribunal's last Final Opinion, all the actors in this case, the parties, the tribunal and this Court relied on the well-established fact that the subject property was in substandard condition before the repairs.

It is undisputed that, when he purchased the property, it was in substandard condition and required numerous repairs to make it livable.

Patru 1, p 1 (Appendix at 37). This case was first appealed to this Court because:

[t]he hearing referee incorrectly interpreted MCL 211.27(2) by concluding that because the repairs were done to a property in substandard condition, they did not constitute normal repairs.

Patru 1, p 5 (Appendix at 41). The tribunal's reversal of a fact which was foundational to its first ruling was not based on new evidence: neither party argued that the house was not in substandard condition before repairs. Therefore this Court should take a careful look at the tribunal's reasoning for this drastic reinterpretation of the evidence.

The tribunal relied on MLS photographs and the prior year's assessed value:

The tribunal found that petitioner's MLS listing for the subject property showed a property in "average" condition, and that petitioner's photographs of the property, before any repairs, showed "a property that is livable and habitable with reasonable marketability and appeal." . . . It is undisputed that the assessed TCV of the property for the 2015 tax year was \$48,000.

Opinion at 5. The tribunal misused the MLS evidence. While an MLS sale may be used to support or contest a valuation, no principle of appraisal allows what the tribunal does here: reject an MLS sale as evidence of value, but then use the MLS sale for its pictures to argue that the sale price should have been higher. The MLS sale on its face supports a value \$32,000, but the tribunal says it supports a value of \$48,000. Thus, as used by the tribunal, the MLS photographs are not competent, material, and substantial evidence.

Here, there is direct, uncontested evidence that contradicts the tribunal's opinion of the MLS photographs. After having actually examined the house, the city's inspectors did not think that the house was livable and habitable, but instead, they required repairs before they would allow occupancy.

Regarding the prior year's assessed value, Respondent/Appellee testified:

[M]ass appraisal does not account for properties one-by-one. In other words, properties are assessed uniformly and *Respondent assumes properties are in "average" condition.*

Second Final Opinion and Judgment (MTT Docket Line 48) (FOJ), p 4 (Appendix at 21), emphasis added. The assessed value here is just the output of a mass appraisal computer program that assumes average condition. It is not evidence that the house was in average condition.

Also, by presuming that the assessed value was correct, the tribunal violates the teaching of *Pontiac Country Club*, 299 Mich App at 435-36: "The Tribunal may adopt the assessed valuation on the tax rolls as its independent finding of true cash value when competent and substantial evidence supports doing so, *as long as it does not afford the original assessment presumptive validity.*" Emphasis added.

VII. The fact that this case is not published should not cause the Court to think that its bad practices and teaching won't spread if unchecked now

A. This is a case of first impression regarding the first year's exception to MCL 211.27(2), the per-se rule against bank sales or sales by government institutions, the obligation to independently determine the before-repair value, and the improper use of MLS pictures and previous-year assessed value. It is a precedent even if nonbinding.

Other cases will follow. The tendency will be follow the lead of this case, especially if the Supreme Court has refused to correct it. Why pay a lawyer to craft an appeal, when someone has already tried and been shot down?

Appellant himself is counsel for five pending cases which are on hold pending the resolution of the issues in this case.

For cases involving residential fixer-uppers, it unlikely that an owner will have the resources, know-how, and willingness to appeal even to the Court of Appeals. It is likely that many more abuses like in the present case before this Court has an opportunity to correct.

Appellant in this case is perhaps unusual in being able to sustain an appellate review about a relatively small matter. There are many cases where the amount in controversy in terms of annual tax is too small to justify the cost of an effective advocate.

A long time may pass before this Court sees again the issues raised in this case. In the interim, the abuses represented by the issues raised here (assuming Appellant is correct on the issues) will continue and many injustices will be finalized before an appellate court, much less this Court has a chance to correct them. Therefore Appellant respectfully urges this Court to correct the issues in this case.

VIII. Question

A. Ground for Application

Rule 7.305

(B) Grounds. The application must show that

(1) the issue involves a substantial question about the validity of a legislative act;

(2) the issue has significant public interest and the case is one by or against the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions or by or against an officer of the state or one of its agencies or subdivisions in the officer's official capacity;

(3) the issue involves a legal principle of major significance to the state's jurisprudence;

(4) in an appeal before a decision of the Court of Appeals,

(a) delay in final adjudication is likely to cause substantial harm, or

(b) the appeal is from a ruling that a provision of the Michigan Constitution, a Michigan statute, a rule or regulation included in the Michigan Administrative Code, or any other action of the legislative or executive branches of state government is invalid;

(5) in an appeal of a decision of the Court of Appeals,

(a) the decision is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice, or

(b) the decision conflicts with a Supreme Court decision or another decision of the Court of Appeals; or

(6) in an appeal from the Attorney Discipline Board, the decision is clearly erroneous and will cause material injustice.

Standard of Review

A motion for reconsideration "must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion

must result from correction of the error.” MCL 2.119(F)(3). A palpable error is a clear error “easily perceptible, plain, obvious, readily visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest.” *Luckow Estate v Luckow*, 291 Mich App 417, 426; 805 NW2d 453, 453 (2011) (cleaned up). MCL 2.119(F)(3) “does not categorically prevent a trial court from revisiting an issue even when the motion for reconsideration presents the same issue already ruled upon; in fact, it allows considerable discretion to correct mistakes.” *Macomb County Department of Human Services v Anderson*, 304 Mich App 750, 754; 849 NW2d 408 (2014).

A. Legal Argument

Relief

Therefore because this Court’s opinion contains palpable errors which completely undermine its logic, Appellant respectfully asks this Court to reconsider this case.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Daniel Patru, P74387

July 17, 2020

Copy of Order Appealed From

Court of Appeals, State of Michigan

ORDER

Daniel Patru v City of Wayne

Docket No. 346894


LC No. 16-001828-TT

Karen M. Fort Hood
Presiding Judge

Jane M. Beckering

Mark T. Boonstra
Judges

The Court orders that the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.


Presiding Judge



A true copy entered and certified by Jerome W. Zimmer Jr., Chief Clerk, on

MAR 31 2020

Date


Chief Clerk

If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL PATRU,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v

CITY OF WAYNE,

Respondent-Appellee.

UNPUBLISHED

February 18, 2020

No. 346894

Tax Tribunal

LC No. 16-001828-TT

Before: FORT HOOD, P.J., and BECKERING and BOONSTRA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner challenges respondent's assessment of residential property in the city of Wayne for the 2016 tax year. Petitioner purchased the property in August 2015 for \$32,000 and thereafter made approximately \$10,000 worth of repairs to the property. For the 2016 tax year, respondent assessed the property as having a true cash value (TCV) of \$50,400, and a taxable value of \$25,200. Petitioner appealed these assessments to the Michigan Tax Tribunal, which issued a decision in January 2017 upholding the assessments. In a prior appeal, this Court noted that under MCL 211.27(2), an increase in TCV attributable to normal repairs cannot be considered by an assessor until property is sold, and because the record was insufficient to determine whether the repairs performed by petitioner qualified as normal repairs, this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings "to determine whether the repairs were normal repairs within the meaning of MCL 211.27(2)." *Patru v City of Wayne*, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued May 8, 2018 (Docket No. 337547) ("*Patru I*"), p 5. On remand, the tribunal agreed that petitioner's repairs qualified as "normal repairs," but determined that respondent's assessment of the property's TCV was proper because of the 2015 change in ownership. The tribunal further found, however, that petitioner's repairs, which were intended primarily to ready the property as rental property, did not affect the assessed TCV value of the property in any event. Accordingly, the tribunal again established the TCV of petitioner's property at \$50,400, and the taxable value at \$25,200, for the 2016 tax year. Petitioner again appeals as of right, and we now affirm.

In *Briggs Tax Serv, LLC v Detroit Pub Sch*, 485 Mich 69, 75; 780 NW2d 753 (2010), our Supreme Court explained:

The standard of review of Tax Tribunal cases is multifaceted. If fraud is not claimed, this Court reviews the Tax Tribunal's decision for misapplication of the law or adoption of a wrong principle. We deem the Tax Tribunal's factual findings conclusive if they are supported by "competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record." But when statutory interpretation is involved, this Court reviews the Tax Tribunal's decision de novo. [Footnotes omitted.]

A tax exemption statute must generally be narrowly construed in favor of the taxing authority, and this Court generally defers to the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute it is charged with administering and enforcing, but these rules do "not permit a strained construction adverse to the Legislature's intent." *Moshier v Whitewater Twp*, 277 Mich App 403, 409; 745 NW2d 523 (2007).

Petitioner argues that under MCL 211.27(2), the tribunal should have determined the TCV of his property without regard to any "normal repairs" he made to the property after he purchased it in August 2015. At the time relevant to this appeal, MCL 211.27(2) provided:¹

(2) The assessor shall not consider the increase in true cash value that is a result of expenditures for normal repairs, replacement, and maintenance in determining the true cash value of property for assessment purposes until the property is sold. For the purpose of implementing this subsection, the assessor shall not increase the construction quality classification or reduce the effective age for depreciation purposes, except if the appraisal of the property was erroneous before nonconsideration of the normal repair, replacement, or maintenance, and shall not assign an economic condition factor to the property that differs from the economic condition factor assigned to similar properties as defined by appraisal procedures applied in the jurisdiction. The increase in value attributable to the items included in subdivisions (a) to (o) that is known to the assessor and excluded from true cash value shall be indicated on the assessment roll. This subsection applies only to residential property. The following repairs are considered normal maintenance if they are not part of a structural addition or completion:

- (a) Outside painting.
- (b) Repairing or replacing siding, roof, porches, steps, sidewalks, or drives.
- (c) Repainting, repairing, or replacing existing masonry.
- (d) Replacing awnings.
- (e) Adding or replacing gutters and downspouts.
- (f) Replacing storm windows or doors.

¹ MCL 211.27(2) was amended by 2019 PA 116, effective November 15, 2019, to add subsection (p), which addresses the installation, replacement, or repair of an alternative energy system.

- (g) Insulating or weatherstripping.
- (h) Complete rewiring.
- (i) Replacing plumbing and light fixtures.
- (j) Replacing a furnace with a new furnace of the same type or replacing an oil or gas burner.
- (k) Repairing plaster, inside painting, or other redecorating.
- (l) New ceiling, wall, or floor surfacing.
- (m) Removing partitions to enlarge rooms.
- (n) Replacing an automatic hot water heater.
- (o) Replacing dated interior woodwork. [Emphasis added.]

Initially, we agree with the Tax Tribunal that because there was a transfer of ownership of the subject property in 2015, MCL 211.27(2) did not prohibit the assessor from considering the impact of any “normal repairs” on the property’s TCV for purposes of the 2016 tax year.

The taxable status of real property for a given tax year is “determined as of each December 31 of the immediately preceding year.” MCL 211.2(2). Generally, property is assessed at 50% of its true cash value[.]” MCL 211.27a(1). However, the “taxable value” of property is subject to “capping,” meaning it is limited to the property’s taxable value in the immediately preceding year, subject to certain allowable adjustments. MCL 211.27a(2)(a); Const 1963, art 9, § 3.² However, upon a transfer of ownership of property, the taxable value is “uncapped,” meaning “the property’s taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized valuation for the calendar year following the transfer.” MCL 211.27a(3). The taxable value does not become capped again until the end of the calendar year following the transfer of ownership. MCL 211.27a(4); *Michigan Props, LLC v Meridian Twp*, 491 Mich 518, 530; 817 NW2d 548 (2012). Thus, because petitioner purchased the property in 2015 (i.e., there was a transfer of ownership), the property’s taxable value for the 2016 tax year was to be determined by its actual assessed value as of December 31, 2015, without regard to any capping limitations.

While MCL 211.27(2) does not expressly provide that it does not apply to “normal repairs” performed during a year when ownership of property is transferred (i.e., the taxable value becomes uncapped), the statute must be read in conjunction with other provisions of the General Property

² “[B]efore ownership of property is transferred, its taxable value may increase no more than the lesser of the rate of inflation or five percent.” *Lyle Schmidt Farms, LLC v Mendon Twp*, 315 Mich App 824, 831; 891 NW2d 43 (2016). Once ownership of the property is transferred, its taxable value is “uncapped,” see *id.*, and its taxable value for the year following the transfer is determined by the property’s actual value, MCL 211.27a(3).

Tax Act, MCL 211.1 *et seq.*, and Const 1963, art 9, § 3. See *Bloomfield Twp v Kane*, 302 Mich App 170, 176; 839 NW2d 505 (2013) (statutes that relate to the same matter are considered to be *in pari materia* and must be read together as a whole). It is apparent that MCL 211.27(2) was adopted to distinguish “normal repairs” or property maintenance from other improvements (e.g., “additions”) that increase the value of property as long as the property is owned by the same party. In *Toll Northville LTD v Twp of Northville*, 480 Mich 6, 12; 743 NW2d 902 (2008), our Supreme Court, quoting *WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy*, 466 Mich 117, 121-122; 643 NW2d 692 (2001), observed that the purpose of Const 1963, art 9, § 3, as amended in 1994 by Proposal A, is

to generally limit increases in property taxes on a parcel of property, as long as it remains owned by the same party, by capping the amount that the “taxable value” of the property may increase each year, even if the “true cash value,” that is, the actual market value, of the property rises at a greater rate. However, a qualification is made to allow adjustments for “additions.”

As indicated, however, when property is sold, it becomes “uncapped” and the property’s value for the following tax year is determined by its value as of December 31 of the preceding year. In other words, the property’s TCV for the tax year following a transfer of ownership is determined by its value as of December 31 of the calendar year in which the transfer of ownership occurred. Accordingly, the restriction on consideration of “normal repairs” for purposes of calculating increases in TCV is intended to apply only while property is owned by the same party, and thus would not apply to repairs performed during a year in which ownership of the property is transferred. Rather, the taxable value of property for the tax year following a transfer of ownership would be 50% of the property’s TCV as of December 31 of the immediately preceding year (i.e., the year there was a transfer of ownership). MCL 211.2(2); MCL 211.27a(1) and (3).

TCV “means the usual selling price at the place where the property to which the term is applied is at the time of assessment, being the price that could be obtained for the property at a private sale, and not at auction sale except as otherwise provided in this section, or at forced sale.” MCL 211.27(1). TCV is synonymous with fair market value. *Pontiac Country Club v Waterford Twp*, 299 Mich App 427, 434-435; 830 NW2d 785 (2013).

Because petitioner purchased the subject property in August 2015, the taxable value of the property became uncapped between August 2015 and December 31, 2015, and, for the 2016 tax year, the assessor was required to determine the property’s TCV as of December 31, 2015. Petitioner argues that under MCL 211.27(2), respondent can consider the value added by “normal repairs” only when *petitioner* sells the property, because the statute states that “[t]he assessor shall not consider the increase in true cash value that is a result of expenditures for normal repairs, replacement, and maintenance in determining the true cash value of property for assessment purposes until the property is sold.” While this interpretation may be correct with respect to repairs made during a tax year in which there is no transfer of ownership, it cannot apply to repairs made during a year in which there was a transfer of ownership because “the property’s taxable value for the calendar year following the year of the transfer is the property’s state equalized valuation for the calendar year following the transfer,” MCL 211.27a(3), which in turn is “determined as of each December 31 of the immediately preceding year,” MCL 211.2(2). Thus, the tribunal correctly held that it was required to determine the TCV of the subject property on the basis of its fair market

value as of December 31, 2015, regardless of any “normal repairs” made by petitioner in 2015 after he purchased the property.

Petitioner seems to rely on the law-of-the-case doctrine to argue that under *Patru I*, the tribunal was required to determine whether petitioner’s repairs qualified as “normal repairs” and was further prohibited from considering the impact of any “normal repairs” in determining the property’s TCV for purposes of the 2016 tax year. In *Lenawee Co v Wagley*, 301 Mich App 134, 149-150; 836 NW2d 193 (2013), this Court explained:

“The law of the case doctrine holds that a ruling by an appellate court on a particular issue binds the appellate court and all lower tribunals with respect to that issue.” *New Props, Inc v George D Newpower, Jr, Inc*, 282 Mich App 120, 132; 762 NW2d 178 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[I]f an appellate court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). The doctrine is applicable “only to issues actually decided, either implicitly or explicitly, in the prior appeal.” *Grievance Administrator v Lopatin*, 462 Mich 235, 260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000). “The primary purpose of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided during the course of a single continuing lawsuit.” *Ashker v Ford Motor Co*, 245 Mich App 9, 13; 627 NW2d 1 (2001).

In *Patru I*, this Court did not resolve whether petitioner’s 2015 repairs to the property could or could not be considered in determining the property’s TCV for the 2016 tax year, but instead determined that “further proceedings are necessary to determine whether the repairs were normal repairs within the meaning of MCL 211.27(2).” *Id.*, unpub op at 5. More significantly, this Court did not address the effect of the property’s transfer of ownership in 2015 on the tribunal’s consideration of “normal repairs” under MCL 211.27(2) for purposes of the 2016 tax year. Because this issue was not actually addressed and decided in the prior appeal, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply.

Petitioner further argues that the tribunal erred by also finding that, regardless of the proper construction of MCL 211.27(2), petitioner’s repairs did not have any bearing on the property’s TCV, which was determined to be \$50,400 as of December 31, 2015. We again disagree. The tribunal did not credit petitioner’s argument that the property was in substandard condition when he purchased it. The tribunal reviewed petitioner’s Multiple Listing Service (MLS) printouts and photographs for both the subject property and comparable properties. The tribunal found that petitioner’s MLS listing for the subject property showed a property in “average” condition, and that petitioner’s photographs of the property, before any repairs, showed “a property that is livable and habitable with reasonable marketability and appeal.” The tribunal noted that the purpose of petitioner’s repairs was “to ready the property as a tenant rental.” It is undisputed that the assessed TCV of the property for the 2015 tax year was \$48,000. Given this evidence, it was appropriate for the tribunal to draw conclusions about the value of the property before and after petitioner’s purchase, specifically, that the prior year’s assessment of \$48,000 was reflective of the property’s TCV before petitioner purchased it, that an increase of \$2,400 could be attributed to inflation and

increases in the market, and that petitioner's "normal repairs" were not attributable to the property's substandard condition, but rather were intended primarily to prepare the property as rental property. The tribunal concluded that the "evidence supports the property's assessment as a property in average condition both at the time Petitioner acquired it and after he completed the normal repairs," and that "the assessment did not consider the increase in true cash value that was the result of normal repairs."

We reject petitioner's argument that the tribunal was required to calculate the property's TCV using a "before repairs" appraisal and an "after repairs" appraisal. Petitioner's reliance on the State Tax Commission's 2014 Bulletin No. 7 in support of this argument is misplaced. Indeed, page 3 of the Bulletin states:

The exemption for normal repairs, replacements and maintenance ends in the year after the owner who made the repairs, replacements and maintenance sells the property. *In the year following a sale, the assessed value shall be based on the true cash value of the entire property.* The amount of assessment increase attributable to the value of formerly exempt property returning to the assessment roll is new for equalization purposes. [Emphasis added.]

As already explained, because the taxable value of the subject property was uncapped due to the transfer of ownership in 2015, and respondent was permitted to assess the property on the basis of its actual TCV as of December 31, 2015, there was no need to determine the property's values before and after petitioner's "normal repairs" in 2015.

Petitioner also argues that the tribunal erred by failing to make its own independent determination of the property's TCV. See *Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp v City of Warren*, 193 Mich App 348, 354-356; 483 NW2d 416 (1992). The record does not support this argument. The tribunal evaluated the evidence and proposed valuation methods offered by both parties. The tribunal found that "[r]espondent's sales comparison approach is the most reliable and credible valuation evidence which also supports the assessment and 2016 uncapping of the subject property." The tribunal did not just automatically accept respondent's valuation. Rather, it analyzed respondent's sales-comparison data and found that "a reasoned and reconciled determination of market value is obtainable from Respondent's sales," which it concluded "supports the assessment and 2016 uncapping of the subject property."

Petitioner further argues that the tribunal erred by rejecting his 2015 purchase price of the property as determinative of its TCV. MCL 211.27(6) provides:

Except as otherwise provided in subsection (7), the purchase price paid in a transfer of property is not the presumptive true cash value of the property transferred. In determining the true cash value of transferred property, an assessing officer shall assess that property using the same valuation method used to value all other property of that same classification in the assessing jurisdiction. As used in this subsection and subsection (7), "purchase price" means the total consideration agreed to in an arms-length transaction and not at a forced sale paid by the purchaser of the property, stated in dollars, whether or not paid in dollars.

In this case, the tribunal considered petitioner's evidence of the 2015 purchase price for the property, but it also considered the nature of the sale, which involved a bank sale in which the grantor was the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development. The tribunal found that the seller was not necessarily motivated to receive market value for the property and that the property's purchase price was not presumptive of its TCV. The tribunal instead gave greater weight to the evidence submitted by respondent in support of its sales-comparison approach to valuation, which was based on sales of five properties similar in age and with comparable square footage, style, siding, and condition. The tribunal found that respondent's evidence provided "the most reliable and credible valuation evidence" and supported respondent's assessment of the subject property.

In sum, petitioner has not shown that the Tax Tribunal committed an error of law or that its decision is not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record. Accordingly, we affirm its decision.

Affirmed.

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra

STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS

DANIEL PATRU,

Petitioner-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED
May 8, 2018

v

CITY OF WAYNE,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 337547
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 16-001828-TT

Before: SHAPIRO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and O'BRIEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Daniel Patru, appeals by right the Tax Tribunal's order that established the true cash value (TCV) at \$50,400 for the 2016 tax year on a certain residential property owned by Patru in Wayne County. For the reasons stated below, we reverse and remand for rehearing.

I. BASIC FACTS

In August 2015, Patru purchased a residential property in Wayne County for \$32,000 in a bank sale. It is undisputed that, when he purchased the property, it was in substandard condition and required numerous repairs to make it livable. Patru completed the required repairs on the property as of December 31, 2015. Thereafter, respondent, the City of Wayne, determined that the TCV for his property was \$50,400, rather than the \$32,000 purchase price. Patru appealed the decision, first to the Board of Review, and then to the Tax Tribunal. Patru contended that under MCL 211.27(2), the City could not consider "the increase in true cash value that is a result of expenditures for normal repairs, replacement, and maintenance." In response, the City appears to have maintained that the TCV of the property reflected its value as a fully repaired property, and it presented a sales-comparison analysis that included no adjustments for the substandard condition of the property at the time of sale.

In October 2016, a hearing referee heard the parties' arguments and evidence in support of their respective positions. Relevant to this appeal, the referee found that the purchase price of \$32,000 was not the presumptive true cash value, and it found that the seller *may* have been under financial duress, causing the property to sell for less than market value. The referee also recognized that the property was in need of repair when it was purchased. The referee concluded that:

[T]he subject's purchase price reflected the condition of the subject property prior to the repairs and the repairs were completed by tax day. Petitioner claims that under MCL 211.27(2) we should not increase the subject's true cash value for normal repairs and maintenance until the subject property is sold. However, Petitioner even admitted that the subject was in substandard condition at the time of purchase and the city required that the repairs be made. Therefore, the Tribunal does not find that the repairs completed by Petitioner were normal repairs and maintenance as noted by the statute. Instead, the subject was in substandard condition at the time.

Thus, the referee determined that if a property is purchased in substandard condition, any repairs done on the property to bring it into good repair do not constitute normal repairs, maintenance, or replacement within the meaning of MCL 211.27(2), so the increase in TCV resulting from those repairs can be immediately considered in determining the TCV for assessment purposes. The referee then determined that the TCV for the property was \$50,400.

Patru filed exceptions, arguing that the repairs he conducted were normal repairs and directing the Tribunal to the plain language of MCL 211.27(2). Patru also submitted a spreadsheet that detailed every repair he had performed on the property and the approximate cost of each. In reviewing the exceptions, however, the Tribunal focused on the fact that the spreadsheet was "new evidence" that had not been previously submitted to the Tribunal, refused to consider the new evidence, and concluded that, although the referee's statement of law was not necessarily correct, Patru had nevertheless failed to establish that the repairs he conducted were normal repairs within the meaning of the statute. Accordingly, the Tribunal upheld the referee's determination.

Patru moved for reconsideration, contending that he had presented sworn testimony and additional documentary evidence at the hearing in support of his argument that the repairs were "normal" repairs under MCL 211.27(2). The Tribunal denied the motion. In doing so, the Tribunal did not consider that Patru had offered evidence at the hearing in support of his argument that MCL 211.27(2) applied. Instead, the Tribunal stated that Patru had failed to establish the TCV for the property before repairs. The Tribunal reasoned that, as a result, it was "unable to conclude that the valuation adopted by the Hearing Referee in the Proposed Opinion and Judgment and the Tribunal in the Final Opinion and Judgment improperly includes value for normal maintenance and repairs."

This appeal follows.

II. MCL 211.27(2)

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Patru argues that the Tribunal erred by determining the TCV for his property to be \$50,400 for the 2016 tax year. “Absent fraud, this Court’s review of a Tax Tribunal decision is limited to determining whether the tribunal made an error of law or adopted a wrong legal principle.” *Meijer, Inc v Midland*, 240 Mich App 1, 5; 610 NW2d 242 (2000). We review de novo the proper interpretation and application of a statute. *Brecht v Hendry*, 297 Mich App 732, 736; 825 NW2d 110 (2012). When construing a statute containing a tax exemption, we must construe it narrowly and in favor of the taxing authority. *Moshier v Whitewater Twp*, 277 Mich App 403, 409; 745 NW2d 523 (2007). At the same time, we will not allow a “strained construction adverse to the Legislature’s intent.” *Id.* (quotation marks and citation omitted).

B. ANALYSIS

Under MCL 211.27(2), an assessor cannot consider “the increase in true cash value that is a result of expenditures for normal repairs, replacement, and maintenance in determining the true cash value of property for assessment purposes until the property is sold.” To aid the assessor in determining what constitutes a normal repair, the Legislature set forth a list of repairs that are “considered normal maintenance if they are not part of a structural addition or completion.” See MCL 211.27(2).¹

¹ In relevant part, MCL 211.27(2) provides:

The following repairs are considered normal maintenance if they are not part of a structural addition or completion:

- (a) Outside painting.
- (b) Repairing or replacing siding, roof, porches, steps, sidewalks, or drives.
- (c) Repainting, repairing, or replacing existing masonry.
- (d) Replacing awnings.
- (e) Adding or replacing gutters and downspouts.
- (f) Replacing storm windows or doors.
- (g) Insulating or weatherstripping.
- (h) Complete rewiring.
- (i) Replacing plumbing and light fixtures.

In this case, when Patru purchased the house it was in substandard condition and required numerous repairs to bring it into a livable condition. Moreover, it is undisputed that the repairs were actually completed. However, there is a question as to whether the repairs that were completed were normal repairs within the meaning of MCL 211.27(2). The record reflects that Patru provided evidence in support of his claim at the hearing before the referee, in support of his exceptions to the referee's proposed opinion and judgment, and in support of his motion for reconsideration. In particular, the referee's proposed opinion and judgment reflects that:

At the hearing, [Patru] presented two pages of repairs that the city required to be completed. [Patru] claimed that the subject's purchase price reflected the fact that the subject needed repairs. [Patru] stated that he put approximately \$10,000 into the subject property and did most of the work himself. The work involved carpentry, electrical, and cement. The repairs were completed and the property had a certificate of occupancy by December 31, 2015.

* * *

[Patru] stated that under MCL 211.27(2) the assessor shall not consider the normal repairs or maintenance until the property is sold. [Patru] presented two pages of repairs that the city required to be repaired on the subject property before allowing occupancy. [Patru] stated that about two weeks after moving in, the subject's basement flooded. [Patru] concluded by stating that the city cannot assess the repairs to the subject property until the property is sold pursuant to the statute.

Additionally, with his exceptions to the referee's proposed opinion and judgment, Patru submitted a spreadsheet detailing the repairs he completed, which, we note, included repairs that, under MCL 211.27(2), constitute normal repairs so long as they are not part of a structural addition or completion.²

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- (j) Replacing a furnace with a new furnace of the same type or replacing an oil or gas burner.
 - (k) Repairing plaster, inside painting, or other redecorating.
 - (l) New ceiling, wall, or floor surfacing.
 - (m) Removing partitions to enlarge rooms.
 - (n) Replacing an automatic hot water heater.
 - (o) Replacing dated interior woodwork.

² For example, Patru repaired the roof, which is a normal repair under MCL 211.27(2)(b), repaired chimney masonry, which is a normal repair under MCL 211.27(2)(c), repaired a service

The hearing referee incorrectly interpreted MCL 211.27(2) by concluding that because the repairs were done to a property in substandard condition, they did not constitute normal repairs. As a result, contrary to MCL 211.27(2), the referee *considered* the increase in value attributed to the repairs when determining the property's TCV. Stated differently, the referee's finding that the property's TCV was \$50,400 was based on its assessment of the property's value after it had been repaired. This was improper because MCL 211.27(2) expressly provides that certain repairs constitute normal repairs so long as they are not part of a structural addition or completion. Nothing in MCL 211.27(2) provides that the repairs listed in subdivisions (a) through (o) are not normal repairs in the event that they are performed on a substandard property. Thus, by reading a requirement into the statute that was not stated by the legislature, the trial court erred by interpreting and applying MCL 211.27(2). See *Mich Ed Ass'n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing)*, 489 Mich 194, 218; 801 NW2d 35 (2011) (stating that nothing will be read into a clear statute that is not within the manifest intention of the Legislature as derived from the language of the statute itself).

In its final opinion and judgment, the Tribunal recognized that the referee erred in its interpretation of MCL 211.27(2); however, it nevertheless upheld the determination of TCV. The Tribunal reasoned that because the spreadsheet detailing the repairs completed on the property had not been submitted before the hearing, it had no obligation to consider that evidence, so it concluded that Patru failed to establish that the repairs constituted normal repairs. However, as stated above, Patru did present evidence at the hearing in support of his claim that MCL 211.27(2) applied. The referee did not fully evaluate that evidence—which included testimony—because it misapprehended how to properly apply MCL 211.27(2).

Further, because the hearing was not transcribed, we cannot determine whether the evidence Patru provided at the hearing was reflective of the information on the spreadsheet submitted with his exceptions. If the testimony provided was an oral recitation of the information included on the spreadsheet, then Patru presented testimony sufficient to establish that at least some of the repairs constituted normal repairs under MCL 211.27(2), and so the increase in TCV attributed to those repairs should not be considered in the property's TCV for assessment purposes until such time as Patru sells the property. However, if Patru merely testified that he did some carpentry, electrical, and masonry repairs and no further explanation of the work that was provided, then he would have arguably failed to support his claim. Either way, on the record before this Court, we cannot evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the hearing. Thus, we conclude that further proceedings are necessary in order to determine whether the repairs were normal repairs within the meaning of MCL 211.27(2). Accordingly, we remand to the Tax Tribunal for a rehearing. Further, because the existing record is insufficient to resolve whether the repairs are normal repairs within the meaning of the statute, the parties shall be afforded further opportunity to submit additional proofs. See *Fisher v Sunfield Township*, 163

walk and broken treads on front steps, which is a normal repair under MCL 211.27(2)(b), and repainted the interior, which is a normal repair under MCL 211.27(2)(k).

Mich App 735, 743; 415 n 297 (1987) (requiring rehearing when it was not clear whether the proofs submitted were sufficient to establish that repair expenditures were normal repairs).³

Reversed and remanded for rehearing consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Colleen A. O'Brien

³ We note that, on reconsideration, the Tribunal faulted Patru for failing to establish a pre-repair TCV. However, as the Tribunal must make its own, independent determination of TCV, *Great Lakes Div of Nat'l Steel Corp v City of Ecorse*, 227 Mich App 379, 389; 576 NW2d 667 (1998), we conclude that Patru's failure to persuade the Tribunal that the property's purchase price reflected the pre-repair TCV is irrelevant. The Tribunal independently had to evaluate all the evidence presented and, properly applying MCL 211.27(2), arrive at the property's TCV.