

*BU CS591 S1*  
*NEU CS 7880*

*Foundations of Private Data Analysis*  
*Spring 2021*

*Lecture 01: Introduction*

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# *Today*

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- Course Intro
- A taste of the syllabus
  - Attacks on information computed from private data
  - A first private algorithm: randomized response

# *This Course*

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- Intro to research on privacy in ML and statistics
  - Mathematical models
    - How do we formulate nebulous concepts?
    - How do we assess and critique these formulations?
  - Algorithmic techniques
- Skill sets you will work on
  - Theoretical analysis
  - Critical reading of research literature in CS and beyond
  - Programming
- Prerequisites
  - Comfort writing **proofs about probability**, linear algebra, algorithms
  - Undergrads: discuss your background with instructor.

# *Administrivia*

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- Web page: <https://dpcourse.github.io>
  - Communication via Piazza
  - Lectures on Gather
  - Course work on Gradescope
- Your jobs
  - Lecture preparation, attendance, participation
  - Homework
  - Project

# *Every lecture*

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- Ahead of time
  - Watch video
    - Engage actively and take notes by hand as you watch
  - Read lecture notes
  - Answer Gradescope pre-class questions
- In class
  - Be present with camera on
    - Let us know on Piazza if that is an issue in general or for specific lectures. Default is attendance at every class
  - Actively participate in problem-solving
    - Problems will be posted ahead of time
  - Take notes on your work
- After class
  - Submit your notes (photo or electronic) on Gradescope

# *Coursework*

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- Lecture prep and in-class work
- Homework
  - Due **Fridays every 2 weeks**
  - Limited collaboration is permitted
    - Groups of size  $\leq 4$
  - Academic honesty: You must
    - Acknowledge collaborators (or write “collaborators: none”)
    - Write your solutions yourself, and be ready to explain them orally
      - Rule of thumb: walk away from collaboration meetings with no notes.
    - Use only course materials (except for reading general background, e.g., on probability, calculus, etc)
- Project (details TBA)
  - Read and summarize a set of 2-3 related papers
  - Identify open questions
  - Develop new material (application of a technique to a new data set, work on open question, show some assumption is necessary, ...)
  - Presentation in last week of class

# *To do list for this week*

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- Make sure you have access to Piazza, Gradescope
- Read the syllabus
- Fill Gradescope background survey
  - By Thursday
- Watch videos, read notes, answer questions for Lecture 2
  - By next lecture (Thu/Fri)

# *Today*


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- Course Intro
- A taste of the syllabus
  - Attacks on information computed from private data
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# *Data are everywhere*

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- Decisions increasingly **automated** using rules based on personal data



- Census data used to apportion congressional seats
  - Think about citizenship question
- Also enforce Voting Rights Act, allocate Title I funds, design state districts, ...

# *Machine learning on your devices*


- Statistical models trained using data from your phones
  - auto complete
  - voice recognition / "passing"
  - face recognition (photos)
  - ad targeting / timing ...
  - app usage / correlated w/ location
  - location data.
  - select
  - news
  - social media
  - ads ...
- Statistical models trained from other personal data
  - credit scoring
  - criminal justice *parole* *recidivism* *predictive policing*.
  - health *risk factors* *how long patients stay in ICU*
  - captchas.
  -

# *Machine learning on your devices*

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- Statistical models trained using data from your phones
  - Offer sentence completion
  - Convert voice to speech
  - Select, for you and others to see,
    - Content (e.g. FB newsfeed)
    - Ads
    - Recommendations for products (“You might also like...”)
- Statistical models trained from other personal data
  - Advise judges’ bail decisions
  - Allocate police resources
  - Advise doctors on diagnosis/treatment

# *Privacy in Statistical Databases*



Large collections of personal information

- census data
- medical/public health
- social networks
- education


Statistical analysis  
benefits society

Valuable because  
they reveal so much  
about our lives

# *Two conflicting goals*

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- **Utility**: release aggregate statistics
- **Privacy**: individual information stays hidden




## How do we define “**privacy**”?

- Studied since 1960's in
  - Statistics
  - Databases & data mining
  - Cryptography
- This course section: **Rigorous foundations and analysis**


# *First attempt: Remove obvious identifiers*



“AI recognizes blurred faces”  
[McPherson Shokri Shmatikov ’16]




[Gymrek McGuire Golan  
Halperin Erlich ’13]



[Pandurangan ’14]

- Everything is an identifier
- Attacker has external information
- “Anonymization” schemes are regularly broken




[Ganta Kasiviswanathan S ’08]

# *Reidentification attack example*

[Narayanan, Shmatikov 2008]

+	-	+	-	+
+	-			
+	-	+	+	+
+		-		
+	-	-	-	
	-	+		

Anonymized  
NetFlix data



+	-		+	+
+		-		+
+	-	+	+	
+		-		
+	-	-	-	
	-		-	-

Public, incomplete  
**IMDB** data



+	-	+	+	
+	-			
+	-	+	+	+
+	-		-	
+	-	-	-	
	-	+		

Alice  
Bob  
Charlie  
Danielle  
Erica  
Frank

**Identified** NetFlix Data


On average,  
four movies  
uniquely  
identify user

# *Is the problem granularity?*

What if we only release **aggregate** information?

Problem I: Models leak information

- Support vector machine output reveals individual data points
- Deep learning models reveal even more



# *Models Leak Information*

Somali	↔	English
ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag ag	↔	And its length was one hundred cubits at one end
ag	↔	And they came to be at the gates of the valley by the valley by the valley

Models can leak information about training data  
in unexpected ways

- Example: Smart Compose in Gmail
  - Haven't seen you in a while.  
Hope you are doing well
  - John Doe's SSN is 920-24-1930  
[Carlini et al. 2018]
- Modern deep learning algorithms often “memorize” inputs

# *Is the problem granularity?*

What if we only release **aggregate** information?

Problem 1: Models leak information

Problem 2: Statistics together may encode data

- Example: Average salary before/after resignation
- More generally:

**Too many, “too accurate” statistics  
reveal individual information**

- Reconstruction attacks
  - Reconstruct all or part of data
- Membership attacks
  - Determine if a target individual is in (part of) the data set


Cannot release everything  
everyone would want to know

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# *Differential privacy*

# Differential Privacy


- Robust notion of “privacy” for algorithmic outputs
  - Meaningful in the presence of arbitrary side information
- Several current deployments



Apple




Google



US Census


- Burgeoning field of research



Algorithms

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{2}(x+1) = \frac{1}{2}(x+1) + \frac{1}{2}(x+1) = \frac{1}{2}(x+1) \\ & \frac{1}{2}(x+1) = \frac{(x+1)(x+2)}{2} = \frac{1}{2}(x+1)(x+2) \end{aligned}$$


Crypto,  
security



Statistics,  
learning



Game theory,  
economics




Databases,  
programming  
languages




Law,  
policy

# Differential Privacy




- Data set  $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathcal{X}$ 
  - Domain  $\mathcal{X}$  can be numbers, categories, tax forms
  - Think of  $x$  as **fixed** (not random)
- $A$  = **probabilistic** procedure
  - $A(x)$  is a random variable
  - Randomness might come from adding noise, resampling, etc.

# Differential Privacy




- A thought experiment
  - Change one person's data (or add or remove them)
  - Will the **probabilities of outcomes** change?



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# *A First Algorithm: Randomized Response*

# *Randomized Response (Warner 1965)*



- Say we want to release the proportion of diabetics in a data set
  - Each person's data is 1 bit:  $x_i = 0$  or  $x_i = 1$
- Randomized response: each individual rolls a die
  - 1, 2, 3 or 4: Report true value  $x_i$
  - 5 or 6: Report opposite value  $1 - x_i$
- Output is list of reported values  $Y_1, \dots, Y_n$ 
  - It turns out that we can estimate fraction of  $x_i$ 's that are 1 when  $n$  is large



# Randomized Response

$i$	$x_i$	Die roll	$Y_i$
1	0	5	yes
2	1	1	yes
3	1	3	yes
4	1	2	yes
5	0	6	yes
6	0	4	no
7	1	2	yes
8	0	3	no
9	1	2	yes
10	1	5	no

10	0	3	no
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What sort of privacy does this provide?


- Many possible answers

One approach:  
Plausible deniability


- $x_{10}$  could have been 0
- $x_8$  could have been 1
- Suppose we fix everyone else's data  $x_1, \dots, x_9 \dots$
- What is

$$\frac{\Pr(Y_{10} = \text{no} | x_{10} = 1)}{\Pr(Y_{10} = \text{no} | x_{10} = 0)} ?$$

# Differential Privacy



- A thought experiment
  - Change one person's data (or add or remove them)
  - Will the **probabilities of outcomes** change?



# *Plausible deniability and RR*

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A bit more generally...

- Fix any data set  $\vec{x} \in \{0,1\}^n$ , and any **neighboring** data set  $\vec{x}'$ 
  - Let  $i$  be the position where  $x_i \neq x'_i$
  - (Recall  $x_j = x'_j$  for all  $j \neq i$ )
- Fix an output  $\vec{a} \in \{0,1\}^n$

$$\Pr(A(\vec{x}) = \vec{a}) = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^{\#\{j : x_j = a_j\}} \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{\#\{j : x_j \neq a_j\}}$$

(because decisions made independently)

- When we change one output, one term in the product changes (from  $\frac{2}{3}$  to  $\frac{1}{3}$  or vice versa)
- So  $\frac{\Pr(A(\vec{x})=\vec{a})}{\Pr(A(\vec{x}')=\vec{a})} \in \left\{\frac{1}{2}, 2\right\}$ .

# *Recall basic probability facts*

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- Random variables have expectations and variances

$$\mathbb{E}(X) = \sum_x x \cdot \Pr(X = x)$$

$$Var(X) = \mathbb{E}\left(\left(X - \mathbb{E}(X)\right)^2\right)$$

- Expectations are linear: For any rv's  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  and constants  $a_1, \dots, a_n$ :

$$\mathbb{E}\left(\sum_i a_i X_i\right) = \sum_i a_i \mathbb{E}(X_i)$$

- Variances add over **independent** random variables. If  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  are independent, then

$$Var\left(\sum_i a_i X_i\right) = \sum_i a_i^2 Var(X_i)$$

- The **standard deviation** is  $\sqrt{Var(X_i)}$

## *Exercise 1: sums of random variables*

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- Say  $X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n$  are independent with, for all  $i$ ,

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}(X_i) &= \mu \\ \sqrt{\text{Var}(X_i)} &= \sigma\end{aligned}$$

- Then what are the expectation and variance of the average  $\bar{X} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ ?

- a)  $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X}) = \mu n$  and  $\sqrt{\text{Var}(\bar{X})} = n\sigma$
- b)  $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X}) = \mu$  and  $\sqrt{\text{Var}(\bar{X})} = \sigma$
- c)  $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X}) = \mu$  and  $\sqrt{\text{Var}(\bar{X})} = \sigma/\sqrt{n}$
- d)  $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X}) = \mu$  and  $\sqrt{\text{Var}(\bar{X})} = \frac{\sigma}{n}$
- e)  $\mathbb{E}(\bar{X}) = \mu/n$  and  $\sqrt{\text{Var}(\bar{X})} = \frac{\sigma}{n}$

## *Exercise 2: Estimating $\sum_i x_i$ from RR*

- Show there is a procedure which, given  $Y_1, \dots, Y_n$ , produces an estimate  $A$  such that

$$\sqrt{\mathbb{E} \left( A - \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \right)^2} = O(\sqrt{n}).$$

Standard deviation  
of estimate

Equivalently,  $\sqrt{\mathbb{E} \left( \frac{A}{n} - \bar{X} \right)^2} = O\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\right)$

➤ Hint: What are the mean and variance of  $3Y_i - 1$ ?

# *Randomized response for other ratios*

- Each person has data  $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ 
  - Normally data is more complicated than bits
    - Tax records, medical records, Instagram profiles, etc
  - Use  $\mathcal{X}$  to denote the set of possible records
- Analyst wants to know sum of  $\varphi$ :  $\mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$  over  $x$ 
  - Here  $\varphi$  captures the property we want to sum
  - E.g. “what is the number of diabetics?”
    - $\varphi((Adam, 168 \text{ lbs.}, 17, \text{not diabetic})) = 0$
    - $\varphi((Ada, 142 \text{ lbs.}, 47, \text{diabetic})) = 1$
    - We want to learn  $\sum_{i=1}^n \varphi(x_i)$



- Randomization operator takes  $z \in \{0,1\}$ :

$$R(z) = \begin{cases} z & w.p. \frac{e^\epsilon}{e^\epsilon + 1} \\ 1 - z & w.p. \frac{1}{e^\epsilon + 1} \end{cases}$$

Ratio is  $e^\epsilon$  (think  $1 + \epsilon$  for small  $\epsilon$ )

For each person  $i$ ,  
 $Y_i = R(\varphi(x_i))$

# *Randomized response for other ratios*

- Each person has data  $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ 
  - Analyst wants to know sum of  $\varphi: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$  over  $x$
- Randomization operator takes  $z \in \{0,1\}$ :

$$R(z) = \begin{cases} z & w.p. \frac{e^\epsilon}{e^\epsilon + 1} \\ 1 - z & w.p. \frac{1}{e^\epsilon + 1} \end{cases}$$

- How can we estimate a proportion?

➤  $A(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ :

- For each  $i$ , let  $Y_i = R(\varphi(x_i))$
- Return  $A = \sum_i (aY_i - b)$

➤ What values for  $a, b$  make  $\mathbb{E}(A) = \sum_i \varphi(x_i)$  ?



We can do much better than this!  
Coming up ...

- **Proposition:**  $\sqrt{\mathbb{E}(A - \sum_i \varphi(x_i))^2} = \frac{e^\epsilon + 1}{e^\epsilon - 1} \sqrt{n}$ .  
 $\approx \frac{2\sqrt{n}}{\epsilon}$  when  $\epsilon$  small