**Adam Smith (based on materials developed with Jonathan Ullman)**

# 1   Advanced Composition of Approximate DP

In this lecture, we show that $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differential privacy satisfies a "strong composition" theorem, in which the $\varepsilon$ parameter increases only with the *square root* of the number of stages of the composition.

Consider an algorithm $A$ that consists of the adaptive composition of $k$ algorithms, each of which is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP:



In Lecture 5, we argued that if each individual algorithm is $(\varepsilon, 0)$-DP, then the composition of all $k$ is (at worst) $(k\varepsilon, 0)$-DP. That is the best one can hope to prove for $(\varepsilon, 0)$-DP, but the relaxation to $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ gives us a different type of guarantee:

**Theorem 1.1** (Strong Composition). *For all $\varepsilon, \delta \geq 0$ and $\delta' > 0$, the* adaptive *composition of $k$ algorithms, each of which is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private, is $(\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta})$-differentially private where*

$$\tilde{\varepsilon} = \varepsilon\sqrt{2k\ln(1/\delta')} + k\varepsilon\frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{\delta} = k\delta + \delta'. \tag{1}$$

Let's get a feeling for the asymptotics here. When $\varepsilon$ is not too big (say, at most 1), the quantity $\frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1}$ is close to $\varepsilon/2$, so the final privacy parameter $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is $\Theta(\varepsilon\sqrt{k\ln(1/\delta)} + \varepsilon^2 k)$ if we take $\delta' = \delta$. Suppose we want this final privacy guarantee to be at most 1, then we need $\varepsilon^2 k < 1$. In that range, we have $\varepsilon\sqrt{k} > \varepsilon^2 k$, so

$$\tilde{\varepsilon} = \Theta\left(\varepsilon\sqrt{k\ln(1/\delta)}\right) \qquad \text{when } \varepsilon < 1/\sqrt{k}.$$

Contrast this with so-called *basic composition* (from Lecture 9), which shows that the adaptive composition of $k$ mechanisms that are $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP is $(k\varepsilon, k\delta)$-DP. When $k > \ln(1/\delta)$, strong compositon provides a much tighter bound (see Figure 1 for an example). This is crucial when we analyze iterative algorithms that have many stages, as with Lloyd's algorithm from Lecture 5 and the differentially private gradient descent methods we will see in Lecture 11.

For example, consider the task of approximating a set of $d$ count queries. Absent a special relationship between the queries, the global $\ell_1$ sensitivity of the vector of counts is $d$ and so the Laplace mechanism adds noise $\Theta(d/\varepsilon)$ to each query's answer. The Gaussian mechanism from last lecture would add noise of expected magnitude only $\Theta(\sqrt{d\ln(1/\delta)}/\varepsilon)$ because the $\ell_2$ sensitivity of the vector is $\sqrt{d}$.

However, we can alternately view the Laplace mechanism on the whole vector as the composition of $d$ separate instances of the Laplace mechanism—one for each query. If we ensure each one is $(\varepsilon', 0)$-DP,

Figure 1: Bounds on the privacy parameter obtained for the composition of $k$ mechanisms, each of which is $(\varepsilon, 0)$-DP for $\varepsilon = 0.01$. The horizontal axis represents the number $k$ of mechanisms. The blue (straight) curve shows the bound $k\varepsilon$ given by basic composition, while the red curve shows the value $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ given by Theorem 1.1 with $\delta' = 10^{-6}$.

then strong composition implies that the whole algorithm is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP for $\varepsilon = \Theta(\varepsilon' \sqrt{k \ln(1/\delta)})$. Setting $\varepsilon' = \frac{\varepsilon}{\sqrt{k \ln(1/\delta)}}$, we see that the Laplace mechanism satisfies $(\varepsilon, \delta)$differential privacy with a smaller amount of noise—the same $\Theta(\sqrt{d \ln(1/\delta)}/\varepsilon)$ bound we get from the Gaussian mechanism!

**Quantitatively Tighter Bounds**    The bound in Theorem 1.1 provides clear asymptotics, but is not always tight. First, we'll see from the proof that the dominant term in the bound on $\tilde{\varepsilon}$ is actually a generic bound on the tails of the binomial distribution; plugging in exact bounds can improve the constant terms.

There are also now many results that yield tighter bounds for the composition of specific mechanisms or classes of mechanisms. These have proven crucial for understanding algorithms with many stages of a particular form, such as stochastic gradient descent (discussed next lecture). For now, though, we will try to see how to prove the simple, general bound of Theorem 1.1.

## 2    Privacy Loss as a Random Variable

Given a randomized algorithm $A$ and two possible inputs $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{x}'$, define the privacy loss on output $y$ to be the "log-odds ratio", that is, the log of the ratio of the likelihoods of $y$ under $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{x}'$:

$$I_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'}(y) \overset{\text{def}}{=} \ln \left( \frac{\mathbb{P}\left(A(\mathbf{x}) = y\right)}{\mathbb{P}\left(A(\mathbf{x}') = y\right)} \right). \tag{2}$$

Last lecture, we showed (Lemma 1.4) that if, for every pair of neighboring data sets $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'$,

$$\underset{Y \leftarrow A(\mathbf{x})}{\mathbb{P}} \left( I_{\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'}(Y) > \varepsilon \right) \leq \delta,$$

then the mechanism $A$ is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP.

Now when $A$ consists of the adaptive composition of $k$ mechanisms, we can write the output as a sequence $y = (y_1, y_2, ..., y_k)$. We do not want to assume anything about the way that the $j$-th algorithm $A_j$ is chosen based on $y_1, y_2, ..., y_{j-1}$. Somewhat surprisingly, we don't have to! We can break up the probability of seeing the sequence $y$ as a product

$$\mathbb{P}\left(A(\mathbf{x}) = y_1, ..., y_k\right) = \mathbb{P}\left(A_1(\mathbf{x}) = y_1\right) \times \mathbb{P}\left(A_2(\mathbf{x}, y_1) = y_2\right) \times \cdots \times \mathbb{P}\left(A_k(\mathbf{x}, y_1, ..., y_{k-1}) = y_k\right),$$

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... which allows us to write the privacy loss as a sum:

$$I_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{x}'}(y_1, .., y_k) = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \ln \left( \frac{\mathbb{P}\left(A_j(\mathbf{x}, y_1, ..., y_{j-1}) = y_j\right)}{\mathbb{P}\left(A_j(\mathbf{x}', y_1, ..., y_{j-1}) = y_j\right)} \right). \tag{3}$$

The important observation is that in each term of this sum, we are conditioning on the same previous outputs $y_1, ..., y_{j-1}$ in the numerator and denominator. Regardless of how $A_j$ is chosen, we are comparing outputs of the same algorithm $A_j$ on both outputs.

Basic composition for $(\varepsilon, 0)$-DP follows from the fact that for such mechanisms each term in the sum (3) is at most $\varepsilon$, so the sum is at most $k\varepsilon$.

To prove the strong composition theorem for $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP, we want to take advantage of the fact that there is some cancelation in this sum. We know (roughly) that each term is contained in the interval $[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$ with high probability. But it turns out that their average is generally at most $\varepsilon^2$. When many of them are added, that is the behavior which dominates.

## 2.1 Privacy Loss Distributions for Some Representative Mechanisms

To get a sense of that, we can compute this privacy loss for a few example mechanisms, and how it is distributed.

**Gaussian Noise** Suppose each $A_j$ is an instance of the Gaussian mechanism from last lecture. The proof of Theorem 2.1 shows that the log-odds ratio is itself normally distributed, namely when $Y$ is the output of the algorithm under data set $\mathbf{x}$, we have $I_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{x}'}(Y) \sim N\left(\frac{\Delta^2}{2\sigma^2}, \frac{\Delta^2}{\sigma^2}\right)$. We chose $\sigma = \Delta\sqrt{2\ln(1/\delta)}/\varepsilon$, so the privacy loss for this mechanism has expectation $\varepsilon^2 \cdot \frac{1}{4\ln(1/\delta)}$.

**Randomized Response** Let's look at the example of randomized response from Lectures 1 and 4. Each input bit $x_i$ is randomized with a value

$$Y_i = \begin{cases} x_i & \text{w.p. } \frac{e^\varepsilon}{e^\varepsilon+1}, \\ 1 - x_i & \text{w.p. } \frac{1}{e^\varepsilon+1}. \end{cases}$$

For every two neighboring datasets $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'$, the privacy loss $I_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{x}'}(y)$ is therefore $\varepsilon$ with probability $\frac{e^\varepsilon}{e^\varepsilon+1}$, and $-\varepsilon$ with probability $\frac{1}{e^\varepsilon+1}$. It's expectation is $\varepsilon \cdot \frac{e^\varepsilon-1}{e^\varepsilon+1} = \Theta(\varepsilon^2)$. Again, we see the same scaling.

**Name and Shame** Recall the name and shame algorithm $NS_\delta$ from Lecture 5, which outputs each person's raw data with probability $\delta$. If data sets $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'$ differ in person $i$'s data, the privacy loss is $+\infty$ when person $i$'s data is released, and $0$ when it is not. The expectation of this privacy loss is $\infty$, but only due to the small probability event in which there is a catastrophic failure of secrecy.

We'll see below that these three behaviors are representative—every $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ differentially private algorithm has privacy loss that is roughly $\varepsilon^2$ in expectation, as long as we first set aside some event of probability at most $\delta$.

**Exercise 2.1.** What is the distribution of the privacy loss $I_{\mathbf{x},\mathbf{x}'}(Y)$ when $A$ is the Laplace mechanism in one dimension? Show that its expectation is $\Theta(\varepsilon^2)$.

# 3 Proving Strong Composition

## 3.1 The Simulation Lemma: Reducing to Leaky Randomized Response

To get a handle on the privacy loss, we'll actually show that once we fix two neighboring data sets, every $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP algorithm's behavior is captured by a very simple "leaky" variant of randomized response.

If $X$ and $Y$ are random variables taking values in the same set (and with probabilities defined for the same collection of events), we say $X \approx_{\varepsilon,\delta} Y$ if for every event $E$: $P_X(E) \leq e^\varepsilon P_Y(E) + \delta$ and $P_Y(E) \leq e^\varepsilon P_X(E) + \delta$.

We would like to characterize this relation in simpler terms. As a starting point, let's try to imagine the simplest pair of random variables that satisfies the relationship. It seems like we need one type of outcome to capture the $\delta$ additive difference in probabilities, and another type that captures the $e^\varepsilon$ multiplicative change. Consider the following two special random variables, $U$ and $V$, taking values in the set $\{0, 1, \text{"I am U"}, \text{"I am V"}\}$ with the probabilities

| Outcome | $P_U$ | $P_V$ |
|---------|-------|-------|
| 0 | $\frac{e^\varepsilon(1-\delta)}{e^\varepsilon+1}$ | $\frac{1-\delta}{e^\varepsilon+1}$ |
| 1 | $\frac{1-\delta}{e^\varepsilon+1}$ | $\frac{e^\varepsilon(1-\delta)}{e^\varepsilon+1}$ |
| "I am U" | $\delta$ | 0 |
| "I am V" | 0 | $\delta$ |

Suppose you see a realization of either $U$ or $V$, and you want to guess which one generated the value you saw. If you see the outcome "I am $U$", then you know that it must have been a realization of $U$; hence the name of that value. Similarly, seeing "I am $V$" tells you with certainty that the value was a realization of $V$. On the other hand, if you see 0 or 1—which are much more comon when $\delta$ is small—then you get only a weak signal about which random variable generated the value you saw.

The next lemma shows that *every* pair of random variables that satisfy $X \approx_{\varepsilon,\delta} Y$ are just "disguised copies" of $U$ and $V$.

**Lemma 3.1** (Simulation Lemma for $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-DP)**.** *For every pair of random variables $X, Y$ such that $X \approx_{\varepsilon,\delta} Y$, there exists a randomized map $F$ such that $F(U) \sim X$ and $F(V) \sim Y$.*

The proof of Lemma 3.1 is a bit trickly, though fairly intuitive. Murtaugh and Vadhan [MV16] provide a self-contained proof. We give a very rough sketch here at the end of these notes.

This lemma says that, once we have fixed two neighboring data sets $x$ and $x'$, we can view the output of an $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private algorithm as conveying no more information than you learn from seeing one of $U$ and $V$.

**Exercise 3.2.** Let $P = Lap(1/\varepsilon)$ and $Q = 1 + Lap(1/\varepsilon)$ (this is abuse of notation—we mean a Laplace random variable centered at 1 instead of at 0). Show how they can be generated from $U$ and $V$ by giving an explicit randomized function $F$ such that $F(U) \sim P$ and $F(V) \sim Q$.

We can use Lemma 3.1 to prove the Strong Composition (Theorem 1.1). Fix a sequence of $k$ mechanisms $A_j$, each of which takes a data set in $\mathcal{U}^n$ as well as a partial transcript $y_1, ..., y_{j-1}$ (abbreviated $\vec{y}_1^{j-1}$) such that, for every partial transcript, $A_j(\cdot; \vec{y}_1^{j-1})$ is $(\varepsilon, \delta)$-differentially private. Also, fix two data sets $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}'$ that differ in one entry.

For every partial transcript $\vec{y}_1^{j-1}$, we have $A_j(\mathbf{x}; \vec{y}_1^{j-1}) \approx_{\varepsilon,\delta} A_j(\mathbf{x}'; \vec{y}_1^{j-1})$ and so there exists a randomized map $F_{\vec{y}_1^{j-1}}$ such that $F_{\vec{y}_1^{j-1}}(U)$ and $F_{\vec{y}_1^{j-1}}(V)$ have the same distributions as $A_j(\mathbf{x}; \vec{y}_1^{j-1})$ and $A_j(\mathbf{x}'; \vec{y}_1^{j-1})$, respectively.

This allows use to show the first important claim:

**Claim 3.3.** *There is a randomized map $F^*$ such that the composed mechanism $A$ satisfies:*

$$A(\mathbf{x}) \sim F^*(U_1, ..., U_k) \text{ where } U_1, ..., U_k \sim_{i.i.d.} U \text{ and} \tag{4}$$

$$A(\mathbf{x}') \sim F^*(V_1, ..., V_k) \text{ where } V_1, ..., V_k \sim_{i.i.d.} V . \tag{5}$$

*Proof.* Consider the algorithm:

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**Algorithm 1:** $F^*(z_1, ..., z_k)$:
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1 **for** $j = 1$ *to* $k$ **do**
2 $\quad\big\lfloor\quad y_j \leftarrow F_{\vec{y}_1^{\,j-1}}(z_j)$ ;
3 **return** $(y_1, ..., y_k)$.

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Since $F_{\vec{y}_1^{\,j-1}}(U_j)$ has the same distribution as $A_j(\mathbf{x}; \vec{y}_1^{\,j-1})$ for each stage $j$, the overall distribution of $F^*(U_1, ..., U_k)$ is the same as $A(\mathbf{x})$ (and similarly for $\mathbf{x}'$ when the inputs are i.i.d. copies of $V$). $\qquad\square$

To prove that $A$ is $\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta}$-differentially private, it suffices, by closure under postprocessing, to prove that $(U_1, ..., U_k) \approx_{\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta}} (V_1, ..., V_k)$. We are almost done!

## 3.2 Strong Composition for Leaky Randomized Response

**Claim 3.4.** $(U_1, ..., U_k) \approx_{\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta}} (V_1, ..., V_k)$ *where* $\tilde{\varepsilon}, \tilde{\delta}$ *are as in Theorem 1.1.*

*Proof.* We'll consider two "bad events": $B_1$ and $B_2$. The first, $B_1$, is when we see a clear signal that the input was drawn according to $U$:

$$B_1 = \{\vec{z} : \text{at least one } z_j \text{ is "I am U"}\}. \tag{6}$$

If $\vec{z}$ is distributed as $U_1, ..., U_k$, then the probability of $B_1$ is exactly $1 - (1 - \delta)^k \le k\delta$.

If $\vec{z} \sim U_1, ..., U_k$, then conditioned on $\bar{B}_{1,u}$ not occurring, we have $\vec{z} \in \{0, 1\}^k$. The probability of $\vec{z}$ is nonzero under both $U$ and $V$, and we can compute the odds ratio by taking advantage of independence:

$$\ln\left(\frac{P_U(\vec{z})}{P_V(\vec{z})}\right) = \sum_j \ln\left(\frac{P_U(z_j)}{P_V(z_j)}\right) = \sum_j \ln\left(\frac{(1-\delta)e^{\varepsilon(1-z_j)}/(e^\varepsilon+1)}{(1-\delta)e^{\varepsilon(z_j)}/(e^\varepsilon+1)}\right) = \sum_j \varepsilon(-1)^{z_j} .$$

This log odds ratio is thus a sum of bounded, independent random variables under distribution $U$, with expectation

$$\mathbb{E}_{\vec{z} \sim (U_1, ..., U_k)}\left(\frac{P_U(\vec{z})}{P_V(\vec{z})}\bigg| \bar{B}_1\right) = k\varepsilon \cdot \mathbb{E}\left((-1)^U \bigg| U \in \{0, 1\}\right) = k\varepsilon\frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} .$$

By the Chernoff bound, for any $t > 0$ we have

$$\Pr_{\vec{z} \sim U_1, ..., U_k}\left(\underbrace{\ln\left(\frac{P_U(\vec{z})}{P_V(\vec{z})}\right) > \tilde{\varepsilon}}_{\text{event } B_2} \bigg| \bar{B}_1\right) \le e^{-t^2/2} \text{ where } \tilde{\varepsilon} \overset{\text{def}}{=} k\varepsilon\frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} + t\varepsilon\sqrt{k}.$$

Let $B_2$ be the event that $\left\{ \vec{z} \in \{0,1\}^k : \ln\left(\frac{P_U(\vec{z})}{P_V(\vec{z})}\right) > k\varepsilon\frac{e^\varepsilon - 1}{e^\varepsilon + 1} + t\varepsilon\sqrt{k} \right\}$. Note that conditioned on $\bar{B}_1 \cap \bar{B}_2$, the ratio of $P_U(\vec{z})$ to $P_V(\vec{z})$ is bounded. Hence, for any event $E$,

$$P_U(E \cap \bar{B}_1 \cap \bar{B}_2) \leq e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}} P_V(E \cap \bar{B}_1 \cap \bar{B}_2) \leq e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}} P_V(E).$$

This allows us to show the indistinguishability condition we want:

$$P_U(E) \leq P_U(E \cap \bar{B}_1 \cap \bar{B}_2) + P_U(B_1) + P_U(B_2|\bar{B}_1)P_U(\bar{B}_1)$$
$$\leq e^{\tilde{\varepsilon}} P_V(E) + k\delta + e^{-t^2/2}.$$

Setting $t = \sqrt{2\ln(1/\delta')}$ completes the proof of Claim 3.4 and also of Theorem 1.1. $\qquad\qquad\square$

**Exercise 3.5.** Use the proof strategy from the previous theorem to show that the composition of an $(\varepsilon_1, \delta_1)$-DP algorithm with a $(\varepsilon_2, \delta_2)$-DP algorithm is $(\varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2, \delta_1 + \delta_2)$-DP.

### 3.3 A Proof Sketch for Lemma 3.1

*Proof Sketch.* We assume for simplicilty that $X$ and $Y$ are discrete. The basic intuition comes from the picture in Figure 2.



Figure 2: A picture to help understand Lemma 3.1

Let's first consider the case where $\delta = 0$. We will describe $F$ by computing, for each $z$, the probabilities that $F$ outputs $z$ on inputs 0 and 1. Call these probabilities $F(z|0)$ and $F(z|1)$. What linear combinations of these two variables should equal $P_X(z)$ and $P_Y(z)$ respectively? Once we write those down, we can just solve for $F(z|0)$ and $F(z|1)$. We obtain:

$$P_X(z) \quad = \quad \frac{e^\varepsilon}{e^\varepsilon + 1}F(z|0) + \frac{1}{e^\varepsilon + 1}F(z|1) \tag{7}$$

$$P_Y(z) \quad = \quad \frac{1}{e^\varepsilon + 1}F(z|0) + \frac{e^\varepsilon}{e^\varepsilon + 1}F(z|1) \tag{8}$$

$$\tag{9}$$

(Question for the reader: How do we know the resulting numbers can be taken to be probabilities?)

To handle the case where $\delta > 0$, it helps to look at Figure 2. The area under each of the red and green curves is 1, since the probabilities in the distributions of $X$ and $Y$ each add to 1. We start by proving that the probabilities of areas $A$ and $B$ are at most $\delta$. Now proceed under the assumption that both of them have area exactly $\delta$. In that case, you can write $P_X = \delta P_A + (1 - \delta)P'_x$ and $P_Y = \delta P_B + (1 - \delta)P'_y$, where $P_A, P_B, P'_x, and P'_y$ are probability distributions and $P'_x, P'_y$ satisfy $P'_x \approx_{(\varepsilon,0)} P'_y$. You can generate $P_A$ and $P_B$ from the inputs "I am $U$" and "I am $V$", and use what you learned in the case $\delta = 0$ to generate $P'_x$ and $P'_y$ under appropriate distributions on 0 and 1.

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Finally, you can extend this solution to handle the general case with a (slightly) more complicated calculation. Specifically, let $\delta_x = P_X(A)$ and $\delta_y = P_Y(B)$. Let $P'_x$ be the unnormalized distribution $P'_x = \max\{P_X, e^\varepsilon P_Y\}$ and similarly define $P'_y = \max\{P_X, e^\varepsilon P_Y\}$. These have mass $1 - \delta_x$ and $1 - \delta_y$ respectively. Let

$$
\begin{aligned}
F(\text{``I am } U\text{''}) &= \delta_x \max\{0, P_X - e^\varepsilon P_Y\} + \frac{\delta - \delta_x}{\delta} P'_x \\
F(\text{``I am } U\text{''}) &= \delta_y \max\{0, P_Y - e^\varepsilon P_X\} + \frac{\delta - \delta_y}{\delta} P'_y \\
F(0) &= \frac{e^\varepsilon + 1}{e^{2\varepsilon} - 1}\left(e^\varepsilon P'_x - P'_y\right) \\
F(1) &= \frac{e^\varepsilon + 1}{e^{2\varepsilon} - 1}\left(e^\varepsilon P'_y - P'_x\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

The probabilities can be verified to satisfy the requirements on $F$ in the Lemma. $\qquad\square$

## Additional Reading and Watching

This presentation is from lecture notes on adaptive analysis by Aaron Roth and Adam Smith [?]. The first version of the strong composition theorem appeared in [DRV10]. Our presentation is based on Kairouz et al. [KOV15, KOV17], as well as Dwork and Roth [DR14, Sections 3.5.1–2]. The characterization of $(\varepsilon, \delta)$ indistinguishability of Lemma 3.1 is due to [KOV17]. Their proof is based on a much more general result of Blackwell (1953). A self-contained proof may be found in [MV16].

There are now quite a few techniques to get tighter analyses of the for the adpative composition of specific algorithms. Examples include concentrated DP [DR16, BS16, BDRS18], Renyi DP [Mir17], and Gaussian DP [DRS19]. That literature continues to evolve.

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