

Public Key Cryptography and RSA

CS70: Discrete Mathematics and Probability Theory

UC Berkeley – Summer 2025

Lecture 9

Ref: Note 7

Today

Today is light on new math...

But very cool (and important) application of what we've been studying

- ➊ Cryptography: Basic Concepts
- ➋ Public Key Cryptography Idea
- ➌ The RSA cryptosystem
 - ➊ What it is
 - ➋ Proof that it works
 - ➌ How to efficiently implement
- ➍ Digital Signatures
 - ➊ The basic idea
 - ➋ RSA for signatures
 - ➌ Signatures for integrity on the web
 - ➍ Signatures for authentication

Quick Review Check!

Setup: $x \equiv 5 \pmod{7}$ and $x \equiv 5 \pmod{11}$
 $y \equiv 3 \pmod{7}$ and $y \equiv 9 \pmod{11}$

Fill in the blank (all mod m values in the range $0, 1, \dots, m-1$):

$$x + y \pmod{7} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$x + y \pmod{11} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$xy \pmod{7} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$\text{True/False: } x \cdot x \cdot x \cdot x \pmod{77} = (((x \cdot x \pmod{77}) \cdot x \pmod{77}) \cdot x \pmod{77}) \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$x \pmod{77} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$y \pmod{77} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$


Number of solutions for z in $z \equiv y \pmod{77}$? $\underline{\hspace{2cm}}$ (in-range!)

$$x^{61} \pmod{7} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$x^{61} \pmod{11} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

$$x^{61} \pmod{77} = \underline{\hspace{2cm}}$$

Cryptography



Terminology:

Alice: Sender

Bob: Receiver

Eve: Eavesdropper

M : Plaintext

C : Ciphertext

E : Encryption function

K_E : Encryption key

D : Decryption function

K_D : Decryption key

Exclusive Or

Bits for truth values: 0 = False 1 = True

In C programming, True is any non-zero value

Recall: In logic “OR” means “one or more of the inputs is true.”

Inclusive OR

Can also define *exclusive* OR: “one and only one input is true”

A	B	$A \vee B$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	1

A	B	$A \oplus B$
0	0	0
0	1	1
1	0	1
1	1	0

Alternate view: Mod 2 addition ($1 + 1 = 2 \equiv 0 \pmod{2}$)


Regular addition properties (associative, commutative, ...) plus:

0 is additive identity: For any x , we have $x \oplus 0 = x$

Self-inverse: For any x , we have $x \oplus x = 0$ (so also: $(x \oplus y) \oplus y = x$)

Uniform: If y is uniform (prob $\frac{1}{2}$ being 0 or 1) then $x \oplus y$ is uniform

Cryptography



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Traditional Cryptography

$$K_E = K_D$$

sometimes called “symmetric cryptography”

Example:

M is an n -bit string

K is a string of n random, independent bits


C is bitwise XOR of M and K

M: 011101001 ... 110

K: 101011011 ... 010

C: 110110010 ... 100

Cryptography



M: 011101001 ... 110

K: 101110010 ... 010

C: 110011011 ... 100

Bit i : $C_i = M_i \oplus K_i$

Important:

K_i is random (uniform, independent)

$\Rightarrow C_i$ is random/uniform

Strong points:

Ciphertext is random (100% secure!)

Extremely fast

Problems:

Alice and Bob must share a secret K

Key can only be used once!


(this scheme is a “one-time pad”)

For modern technology:

Do you share a secret with Amazon?

... a new secret for each purchase?

Cryptography: A Different Way...



What if K_E and K_D aren't the same?

What really *needs* to be secret?

Algorithms should never be secret!

K_D ? Yes! If not secret, Eve could decrypt.

K_E ? Why?

No problem if *others* can encrypt

K_D shouldn't be computable from K_E

Otherwise K_E can be public

This idea: Public key cryptography

Strong points:

Communicate securely with strangers!

No need to pre-arrange shared secret

Bob can send public key to Alice

Problems:

Algorithms not (initially!) obvious

Known algorithms are slow

Basic idea: Diffie and Hellman (1975)

First real algorithm: RSA (1976)

Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman

Adelman: Berkeley connection!

The RSA Algorithm

Three algorithms:

- Key Generation
- Encryption
- Decryption

Key Generation:

Pick two large primes p and q

Compute $N = pq$

Messages are from $\{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$

Encryption/decryption work mod N

Pick e relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$

Compute $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Now $K_E = (e, N)$

And $K_D = (d, N)$

Encryption:

$$E(K_E, M) = M^e \pmod N$$

Decryption:

$$E(K_D, C) = C^d \pmod N$$

Does this work?

Need $D(K_D, E(K_E, M)) = M$ for all M
I hope so! (We'll see....)

How are K_E and K_D related?

Compute K_D from just K_E ?

No! Need knowledge of p and q

Are p and q part of public info?

No! Just publish the product

Can you compute p and q from K_E ?

Well.... we don't think so.

Possible to factor efficiently?

No known polynomial time algorithms

Millennia of attempts...

New wrinkle: Quantum computing

Is factoring the only way to break RSA?

Probably – but unknown!

Concept Check!

Question: Which of the following is not true?

Notation: Alice is sending to Bob. Key parts ($N = pq, e, d$). Eve is evil.

- (A) Eve knows e and N
- (B) Alice knows e and N
- (C) $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{N-1}$
- (D) Bob forgot p and q but can still decode
- (E) Bob knows d
- (F) $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Encryption/Decryption Example

Values:

$$p = 7, q = 11, N = 77$$

$$\text{So } (p-1)(q-1) = 60$$

$$\gcd(7, 60) = 1 \text{ and mult inverse of } 7 \pmod{60} \text{ is } 43$$

This was the hand-calculated example from last lecture!

So:

$$K_E = (e, N) = (7, 77)$$

$$K_D = (d, N) = (43, 77)$$

For example: $M = 2$:

$$C = E(K_E, M) = M^e \pmod{N} = 2^7 \pmod{77} = 128 \pmod{77} = 51.$$

$$D(K_D, C) = C^d \pmod{N} = 51^{43} \pmod{77} \dots$$

How are we going to do this????

Cheat – Python: `pow(51, 43, 77)` gives 2 – yay!

But how did *Python* do it? 43 multiplications?

No – we can do better. (And we *must* do better when d is 2048 bits!)

Correctness: Does RSA Always Decode Correctly?

Need $D(K_D, E(K_E, M)) = M \implies (M^e)^d \equiv M^{ed} \stackrel{?}{=} M \pmod{N}$?

$$d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)} \implies ed = 1 + k(p-1)(q-1)$$

$N = pq$ with $\gcd(p, q) = 1$ – so we can use CRT and look at power mod p

$$M^{ed} \equiv M^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv M \cdot M^{k(p-1)(q-1)} \equiv M \cdot (M^{p-1})^{k(q-1)} \pmod{p}$$

Fermat's Little Theorem!

$$\text{When } M \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}, M^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p} \implies M^{ed} \equiv M \pmod{p}$$

$$\text{When } M \equiv 0 \pmod{p}? \text{ Then } M^{ed} \equiv 0 \equiv M \pmod{p}$$

Mod q works exactly the same, so $M^{ed} \equiv M \pmod{q}$

Chinese Remainder Theorem!

$$M^{ed} \pmod{pq} \text{ is the unique } z \text{ with } z \equiv M^{ed} \pmod{p} \text{ and } z \equiv M^{ed} \pmod{q}$$

\Rightarrow That's M

Theorem: Let values $N = pq$, e , and d be computed as in the RSA key generation step. Then for all $M \in \{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$, $M^{ed} \equiv M \pmod{N}$ (or equivalently, $D(K_D, E(K_E, M)) = M$).

Repeated Squaring

How can we compute large powers fast?

$$51^2 \bmod 77 = 2601 \bmod 77 = 60$$

1 modular multiplication

$$51^4 \bmod 77 = (51^2)^2 \bmod 77 = 60^2 \bmod 77 = 58$$

2 modular multiplications

$$51^8 \bmod 77 = (51^4)^2 \bmod 77 = 58^2 \bmod 77 = 53$$

3 modular multiplications

$$51^{16} \bmod 77 = (51^8)^2 \bmod 77 = 53^2 \bmod 77 = 37$$

4 modular multiplications

$$51^{32} \bmod 77 = (37)^2 \bmod 77 = 37^2 \bmod 77 = 60$$

5 modular multiplications

Cool: Computed 51^{32} in 5 multiplications (instead of 32)... but we want 51^{43}

Notice: 43 is 101011 in binary:

$$\text{Binary: } 1 \cdot 2^5 + 0 \cdot 2^4 + 1 \cdot 2^3 + 0 \cdot 2^2 + 1 \cdot 2^1 + 1 \cdot 2^0 = 32 + 8 + 2 + 1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{So } 51^{43} = 51^{32} \cdot 51^8 \cdot 51^2 \cdot 51^1$$

$$\Rightarrow \text{We have those! } 51^{43} = 60 \cdot 53 \cdot 60 \cdot 51$$

Remember to reduce mod 77 each step:

$$60 \cdot 53 = 3180 \rightarrow 3180 \bmod 77 = 23$$

$$23 \cdot 60 \bmod 77 = 71$$

$$71 \cdot 51 \bmod 77 = 2$$

Cost: 5 mod multiplications for squarings, 3 mod multiplication to put together
Computed $51^{43} \bmod 77$ in just 8 modular multiplications!

Powering By Repeated Squaring

In general: for computing x^y

Write out y in binary ($\lfloor \log_2 y \rfloor + 1$ bits)

Calculate necessary power-of-two exponents: $\lfloor \log_2 y \rfloor$ squarings

Multiply together the “1 bits”: No more than $\lfloor \log_2 y \rfloor$ multiplications

Total: At most $2\lfloor \log_2 y \rfloor$ multiplications

If n is the number of bits in y , this is $O(n)$ – *Fast(-ish)!*

How much time does it take to do modular multiplication?

$O(n^2)$ per mult is easy – Powering time: $O(n^3)$

$O(n^{1.59})$ per mult isn't much harder – Powering time: $O(n^{2.59})$

Can multiply even faster asymptotically, but only better for *large* numbers
 \Rightarrow *large* numbers means tens of thousands of bits (or more)

Elegant Recursive Implementation!

```
def modpow(x, y, n):  
    if y == 0:  
        return 1  
  
    otherbits = modpow(x, y//2, n)      # Higher bits  
    if y % 2 == 0:  
        return (otherbits*otherbits) % n  # last bit is 0  
    else:  
        return (otherbits*otherbits*x) % n # last bit is 1
```

```
modpow(51, 43, 77)  
  modpow(51, 21, 77)  
    modpow(51, 10, 77)  
      modpow(51, 5, 77)  
        modpow(51, 2, 77)  
          modpow(51, 1, 77)  
            modpow(51, 0, 77) → Returns 1 ( $51^0 \bmod 77$ )  
              → Last bit 1 → Returns  $1 \cdot 1 \cdot 51 = 51 \bmod 77 = 51$  (i.e.,  $51^1 \bmod 77$ )  
                → Last bit 0 → Returns  $51 \cdot 51 = 2601 \bmod 77 = 60$  (i.e.,  $51^2 \bmod 77$ )  
                  ...  
                    → Last bit 1 → Returns  $23 \cdot 23 \cdot 51 = 26979 \bmod 77 = 29$  (i.e.,  $51^{21} \bmod 77$ )  
                      → Last bit 1 → Returns  $29 \cdot 29 \cdot 51 = 42891 \bmod 77 = 2$  (i.e.,  $51^{43} \bmod 77$ )
```

Speed of RSA

Fast... ish

Modular Exponentiation: $x^y \bmod N$.

N has n bits: $O(n^3)$ time, or faster if clever (and n is large)

Real-world times (this laptop - Intel Core Ultra 7 155U):

0.431 msec for a 2048-bit powering (optimized!)

$\Rightarrow (1/.000431) * 2048 \approx 4.7$ million bits/sec throughput

That's good – not great though... Full HD streaming: 5-8 Mbps

For comparison: Strong symmetric encryption (AES-256): 13.6 billion bits/sec

Real-world solution – I have 100 MB I want to send:

Step 1: Create a random 256-bit (32 byte) key for symmetric cryptography
Called the “session key”

Step 2: Encrypt those 256 bits using public-key cryptography (like RSA)
Send to the receiver - now you share a secret with a stranger!

Step 3: Encrypt the 100 MB of data using symmetric cryptography
Fast, fast, fast!

Some Efficiency Tricks

Trick 1: So use a small e – does need to be random or unguessable

Example 1: $e = 3$

Only 3 modular multiplications to encrypt!

Need $\gcd(3, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$

Example 2: $e = 65,537 = 2^{16} + 1$

Encryption in 17 modular multiplications

$\gcd(65537, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$ more common

This is widely used in practice

So... fast encryption (real world: $\approx 160\text{MBps}$)

But still need to decrypt (d is large!)

Trick 2: Use Chinese Remainder Theorem to decrypt

Decryption knows private key, so can know p and q

Do powering mod p and mod q

Combine results with CRT to get result mod $pq = N$

Key Generation

Important first step: Find large primes p and q . How?

```
def getprime(bits):  
    while True:  
        x = random.randint(2**(bits-1), 2**bits-1)  
        if isprime(x): return x
```

What is `isprime`? Miller-Rabin primality test!

How long does this take?

Prime Number Theorem: $\pi(N)$ number of primes less than N . For all $N \geq 17$,

$$\pi(N) \geq N / \ln N.$$

So: Choosing randomly gives approximately $1/(\ln N)$ chance of number being a prime. Expected number of iterations: $\ln N$ (probability? expected? later!)

With p and q the rest is easy!

Used (extended GCD) to find e with $\gcd(e, (p-1)(q-1)) = 1$

`extgcd` also gives mult inverse mod $(p-1)(q-1)$ – this is d

Speed of *Breaking* RSA

“Can factor efficiently” \implies “Can break RSA efficiently”

How? Factor N to get p and q – can compute d from e

Converse?

In other words: Is breaking RSA as hard as factoring?

We don't know – interesting (and feasibly solvable) open problem

Easy? No - people have been trying to solve for > 40 years

How fast can we factor?

No polynomial-time algorithm known (for a classical computer)

People have been trying for millennia – remember Euclid was 300BC!

But ... no polytime deterministic primality testing until 2002!

GNFS is faster than exponential... slower than polynomial...

Record largest “RSA number” ever factored: 829 bits (completed in 2020)

Or at least... the largest publicly announced

829 bits took 2700 core-years of computing power


Possible game-changer:

Shor's algorithm: Polynomial-time algorithm on a quantum computer


Real-world danger? Maybe... maybe not... post-quantum crypto...

How Does Alice Get Bob's Key?

What you want to happen:




What you might actually happen:



This is called a “Man in the Middle” (MitM) attack

The core question: How can you trust that key really came from Bob?

Asymmetric Power




Asymmetric – only Bob can do what the receiver needs to do.

What if... the *sender* had a unique power?

Could verify that a message came from the sender (only they could...)

This is a **digital signature**



Signatures using RSA.

Key Generation:

Pick two large primes p and q

Compute $N = pq$

Messages are from $\{0, 1, \dots, N-1\}$

Encryption/decryption work mod N

Pick s relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$

Compute $v = s^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

Now $K_S = (s, N)$ (private)

And $K_V = (v, N)$ (public)

Signing:

$$\sigma = S(K_S, M) = M^s \pmod N$$

Verification:

$$V(K_V, M, \sigma) = \text{Test if } M \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \sigma^v \pmod N$$


Idea: Only signer (with knowledge of s) could produce σ that works

Note: RSA signing is same as RSA decryption – peculiar to RSA

Not actually true in practice (signed message padded...)

Other signature schemes (DSS, ECC, ...) don't work like this

Certificate Authorities




Problem: Alice needs a reliable copy of PU_{CA} – chicken and egg?

Browsers ship with trusted CA verification keys

You need to trust your browser (but you need to trust the browser anyway!)

Note: Certificate authorities have been fooled!

Another Use of Digital Signatures



Advantages over passwords:


- Server never has sensitive info
- Can't accidentally tell someone pw

Disadvantages:

- Must have software support
- Must store private keys securely

Real world uses:

- SSH with public key auth
- Passkeys for web logins



Browsers didn't implement for a while
Now decent uptake

Secure private key storage:

Unlocked with biometric

Note: Not using bio to log in!

Elegant Idea – Not Used Exactly...

Beautiful math, but....

What we're describing isn't (quite) what is used in practice

Sometimes called "Textbook RSA"

NOT secure in the real world!

What was described: deterministic encryption/cryptography

Same ciphertext for same plaintext every time

This is very bad – can recognize repeats, can replay ciphertexts, ...

So in the real world:

Random padding and checks included

For encryption: OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)

For signing: PSS (Probabilistic Signature Scheme)

More real-world issues? Take CS 161!

Summary

Public-Key Cryptography

Basic idea: Asymmetric power of parties and keys (public vs private)

Used for confidentiality (encryption) and integrity (signatures)

Cool and historically important public-key scheme: RSA

Works due to all the things we have been discussing!

Modular arithmetic, Fermat's Little Theorem, Chinese Remainder Theorem, ...

Efficiency: Repeated squaring, small e , CRT for decryption

Some warnings/caveats:

Understanding this math doesn't make you a cryptography expert

Many real-world problems – modifications made

Always use a robust, well-tested cryptographic library

Modern threats to RSA (and related algorithms)

Quantum computing