

Android : Static Analysis Using Similarity Distance

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Abstract—

As Android applications become increasingly ubiquitous, we need algorithms and tools to protect applications from product tampering and piracy, while facilitating valid product updates. Since it is easy to derive Java source code from Android bytecode, Android applications are particularly vulnerable to tampering. This paper presents an algorithm, based on a customized similarity distance, which returns a value between 0 and 1, which can serve as a change indicator. Potential applications of the algorithm include 1) to determine if obfuscators, applied by developers, are protecting their code from piracy, 2) to determine if an Android application is infected with malware, facilitating the automatic extraction of the injected malware, and 3) to identify valid code updates and releases as part of the code release cycle.

I. INTRODUCTION

According to [13], Android consumers in the U.S spend an average of 56 minutes per day on their phones, with two-thirds of this time spent with Android applications. Moreover, Andy Rubin, Senior Vice President of Mobile at Google [27] stated that they have over 500.000 Android devices activated every day. So it is easy to understand [22] why this platform is an increasingly interesting target for misuse.

Many tools have been released to interact with Android applications. Assemblers and disassemblers, like smali/baksmali [16] are useful to reverse engineer Android applications. Advanced tools such as apktool [7] are very useful to modify an application and repackage it. Decompilers [26] [24] transform Android bytecode to Java bytecode to enable use of classical Java decompilers [19] [14] [23], although they have some issues [4] during the decompilation.

In this paper, we introduce new algorithms for static analysis of Android applications, in order to address some problems that users and developers are encountering. All of the algorithms are based on the similarity distance using real world compressors [10]. The first problem that we discuss is how it is possible to create a rip-off indicator to identify whether an application is similar to another one or not, i.e., to determine if someone pirated an application or parts of an application. We can extend this problem to extract automatically malware that has been injected into an application. In addition, if we can find similarities between two applications, the algorithm can be applied to evaluate the efficiency of an obfuscator on the application. A secondary issue that we address, is how it is possible to obtain and visualize the differences between two valid versions of an application. We have used our algorithms to identify small dissimilarities in methods and in basic blocks

(without using graphs) in order to use the longest common subsequence algorithm [1] to extract exact differences.

In the first section, we define the similarity distance, and describe how we have choose our compressors in order to have the maximum performance with the best distance similarity. Next, we describe our main algorithm to compare applications in order to find similarities. We then extend this algorithm to identify dissimilarities and perform difference analysis between two applications. In the conclusion, we discuss future work and some open problems to encourage further research in this area.

II. SIMILARITY

The similarity distance based on real world compressors is called the Normalized Compression Distance (NCD) [10]. The NCD of two elements A and B is defined as $d_{NCD}(A, B)$. We can compute

- $C(A)$ and $L_A = L(C(A))$;
- $C(B)$ and $L_B = L(C(B))$;
- $C(A|B)$ and $L_{A|B} = L(C(A|B))$;

where $A|B$ is the concatenation of A and B , C is the compressor, and L is the length of a string. Then $d_{NCD}(A, B)$ is defined by

$$d_{NCD}(A, B) = \frac{L_{A|B} - \min(L_A, L_B)}{\max(L_A, L_B)}. \quad (1)$$

The NCD is based on the similarity [10] of elements. A compressor C is normal if the following four axioms are satisfied up to an additive $O(\log n)$, where n is the maximal binary length of the elements involved in the inequalities:

- 1) Idempotency: $C(xx) = C(x)$, and $C(\varepsilon) = 0$, where ε is the empty string.
- 2) Monotonicity: $C(xy) \geq C(x)$.
- 3) Symmetry: $C(xy) = C(yx)$.
- 4) Distributivity: $C(xy) + C(z) \leq C(xz) + C(yz)$.

The idea demonstrated in the following simple example. If you take three elements

- X ("HELLO WORLD") and the length of the compression $Y = C(X) = 6$,
- X' ("HELLO WOORLD") and the length of the compression of $Y' = C(X') = 7$,
- X'' ("HI !!!") and the length of the compression of $Y'' = C(X'') = 3$.

the compression of $C(XX')$ will be similar to $C(X)$ whereas the compression of $C(XX'')$ will not be similar to $C(X)$.

In addition to these four inequalities being respected by a given compressor, in a real context we must have timing constraints for execution of the algorithm. The compression rate is not a determining factor for the choice of the compressor if it complies with the following rules:

- 1) C respects the four inequalities,
- 2) C(x) is calculated within an acceptable amount of time.

We studied 5 implementations of different algorithms to choose the one that respects the most inequalities:

- zlib [21], bz2 [3], LZMA [2], XZ [11], Snappy [17].

We chose to test all compressors with random text data sets [12] (the test sets are text data, because we will not submit binary data to our compressor) on the four inequalities. The following tables show the resulting number of matches, the total length of compression, and the execution time of each compressor:

| | Idempotency |
|--------|-----------------------|
| LZMA | 0/9, 900, 1.45565796 |
| XZ | 0/9, 1824, 0.72005010 |
| zlib | 0/9, 894, 0.00037599 |
| bz2 | 0/9, 1294, 0.00088286 |
| Snappy | 1/9, 1208, 0.00010705 |

| | Monotonicity |
|--------|--------------------------|
| LZMA | 72/72, 9645, 11.65594506 |
| XZ | 72/72, 17108, 5.70679307 |
| zlib | 72/72, 9177, 0.00256300 |
| bz2 | 72/72, 11334, 0.00596595 |
| Snappy | 72/72, 13354, 0.00065804 |

| | Symmetry |
|--------|---------------------------|
| LZMA | 26/72, 12266, 11.68412399 |
| XZ | 54/72, 20008, 5.68789411 |
| zlib | 26/72, 11474, 0.00305796 |
| bz2 | 72/72, 12972, 0.00746584 |
| Snappy | 14/72, 17476, 0.00071502 |

| | Distributivity |
|--------|-------------------------------|
| LZMA | 504/504, 153377, 163.45748401 |
| XZ | 504/504, 259812, 79.99475789 |
| zlib | 504/504, 144557, 0.03746986 |
| bz2 | 504/504, 170142, 0.09060693 |
| Snappy | 504/504, 215810, 0.00880289 |

After these tests (more in [12]) Snappy was selected because speed of compression is far superior and this compressor respects the inequalities.

A. Similarity Algorithm

We propose an algorithm to find efficiently and quickly the similarities (and differences) of methods between two applications (without debugging information). In our case, we have tested and implemented it with bytecode (Java [25] or Dalvik [18]) files but it is possible to extend this algorithm to classical binaries. This algorithm is an improvement in the field of executable comparison as it applies new techniques with very efficient, precise, and timely results in many domains.

This algorithm is composed of the following steps:

- Generate signatures for each method.
- Identify all methods which are identical.
- Identify all methods which are partially identical by using NCD (with Snappy compressor).

So the global idea is to associate each method of the first application with others of the second application (unless the method match directly) by using NCD with an appropriate compressor.

The algorithm produces and detects the following elements:

- identical methods,
- similar methods,
- new methods,
- deleted methods.

1) *Initialization of methods*: The algorithm (1) must initialize each method, so we can associate several attributes to a method as shown in figure 1:

- the entropy, based on the raw binary data,
- a buffer which represents the sequence of instructions, with useless information removed from it,
- a unique checksum (or hash) based on the previous buffer,
- a signature.

In order to create the checksum of a method, we must remove and retain some information associated with an instruction. It is a very important to remove false positives easily. Thus we need to remove information which is a direct result of the compilation and information which can be changed by a simple modification:

- registers, offset of a jump instruction.

And we need to retain:

- the original name of the instruction (group in a single name the jump instructions), strings, integers and floats, constants, etc.

Algorithm 1 Algorithm for filtering names and operands of an Android instruction

Require: *Instruction*

```

buffer ← ""
// goto instructions
if Instruction.opvalue ≥ 0x28 and Instruction.opvalue ≤ 0x2a then
    buffer ← "goto"
else
    buffer ← Instruction.opname
end if
// an integer is present in the instruction
if integer in Instruction.operands then
    buffer ← buffer + getIntegers( Instruction )
end if
// a string is present in the instruction
if Instruction.opvalue == 0x1a then
    buffer ← buffer + getString( Instruction )
end if
return buffer

```




Figure 1. Attributes associated with a method

So if we use a unique checksum for each method, it is possible to quickly remove from the comparison, methods which are exactly identical as show in figure 2.




Figure 2. Remove identical methods by using hash

2) *Generating signatures of methods:* We used a normal grammar presented by Silvio Cesare [9] to generate different types of signatures as needed including the following:

- Control Flow Graph,
- API (current application, Android, Java),
- Strings,

- Exceptions.

We considered this signature as an interesting input for the distance similarity because this signature does not include information about instructions. The information in the signature is more general, (e.g., the presence of a basic block, if a specific package is called, etc). Of course it is possible to modify the grammar in order to have a controlled output.

The following is an example of the grammar signature for a method:

```

Procedure ::= StatementList
StatementList ::= Statement | Statement StatementList
Statement ::= BasicBlock | Return | Goto | If | Field |
    Package | String | Exception
Return ::= 'R'
Goto ::= 'G'
If ::= 'I'
BasicBlock ::= 'B'
Field ::= 'F'0 | 'F'1
Package ::= 'P' PackageNew | 'P' PackageCall
PackageNew ::= 'C'
PackageCall ::= 'M'
PackageName ::= ε | Id
String ::= 'S' Number | 'S' Id
Exception ::= Id
Number ::= \d+
Id ::= [a-zA-Z]\w+

```

Thus we can generate a particular signature for a method based on selected features. We must create the best signature to identify methods, in order to identify highly identical methods. Moreover we have not used particular dependencies like strings, names of classes/methods/fields, etc. We have used only the following elements:

- Control Flow Graph,
- External API used (Android + Java),
- Exceptions.

For example, we can generate different signatures for one method, with more or less detail:

```

Lorg/t0t0/androguard/TC/TCD; equal (I Ljava/lang/
String;) Ljava/lang/String;
-> : B[P1F0P0P1P1SP1P1SP1P1P1S]B[S]B[RS]B[SG]
-> : B[P1F0P0P1P1S1P1P1S6P1P1P1S4]B[S4]B[RS4]B
[S4G]
-> : B[F0SSIS]B[S]B[RS]B[SG]
-> : B[P1{Ljava/lang/Integer;toString(I)Ljava/
lang/String;}F0P0{Ljava/lang/StringBuilder
;}[...]P1{Ljava/lang/String;equals(Ljava/lang/
Object;)Z}IS]B[S]B[RS]B[SG]

```

3) *Identification of methods:* If we need to ensure a better match between methods, it is possible to add the following elements to calculate the similarity distance by using a filtering algorithm [5]:

- the entropy,
- the buffer which represents the sequence of instructions.

With the NCD (Algorithm 2, the signature function returns the previous described signature, and the clean function removes useless information of each instruction of the method), we use the Snappy compressor to accelerate the comparison between all methods, to detect exactly the same methods (algorithm 3, figure 3), partially the same methods (algorithm

3), new methods (algorithm 4, figure 4) or deleted methods (algorithm 5).

Algorithm 2 Algorithm of similarity to calculate the distance between two methods

Require: $a1, a2$

```

n1  $\leftarrow$  NCD( signature( a1 ), signature( a2 ) )
n2  $\leftarrow$  NCD( clean( a1 ), clean( a2 ) )
return (n1 + n2) / 2

```

Algorithm 3 Algorithm for finding identical or similar methods between two applications

Require: $apps1, apps2$

```

exact  $\leftarrow$  {}
diff  $\leftarrow$  {}

for a1  $\leftarrow$  apps1.methods() do
  if a1.hash not in apps2.hash then
    for a2  $\leftarrow$  apps2.methods() do
      if a2.hash not in apps1.hash then
        Append( diff[ a1 ], similarity( a1, a2 ) )
      end if
    end for
  else
    Append( exact, a1 )
  end if
end for
for a1  $\leftarrow$  diff.methods() do
  a1.sort()
end for

```

Algorithm 4 Algorithm for identifying new methods

Require: $apps1, apps2, diff$

```

new  $\leftarrow$  []
for a2  $\leftarrow$  apps2.methods() do
  if a2.hash not in apps1.hash then
    state  $\leftarrow$  true
    for a1  $\leftarrow$  diff.methods() do
      if a1.checksort( a2 ) then
        state  $\leftarrow$  false
        break
      end if
    end for
    if state == true then
      Append( new, a2 )
    end if
  end if
end for

```




Figure 3. Find exact/similar methods between two applications




Figure 4. Identify new methods between two applications

Algorithm 5 Algorithm for identifying deleted methods

Require: $apps1, apps2, diff$

```

delete  $\leftarrow$  []
for a1  $\leftarrow$  diff.methods() do
  if a1.getsort() == 0 then
    Append( delete, a1 )
  end if
end for

```

The signature of each method helps to compare all methods more quickly, but an algorithm based on clustering can filter identical methods before our algorithm in order to accelerate the comparison, and can be very interesting in the case of comparing one element against N elements.

It is possible to detect all different or identical methods, but we do not care about the entire application. This is a problem as we need to take into account other information associated with an Android application in order to extend the ratio of similarity to a entire application.

We can add the following information from an application:

- strings, constants (integers, floats), various internal data like "fill array data".

B. Detecting pirated applications aka rip-off indicator

A major problem in the Android market is the theft of applications, because it is very easy to download an application and to crack/re-package it with smali/baksmali/apk-tool to push it in different markets. While it is possible to compare an application with reverse engineering tool manually using a tool such as baksmali [16], IDA [15] or Androguard [12], it is very time consuming and inefficient. Automated approaches are better to compare other applications with the original when piracy is suspected.

With the previous algorithms, we have all the required information to calculate an indicator (between 0.0 to 100.0) to indicate whether the application has been stolen.

To do that (Algorithm 6), we apply a designation (between 0.0 (identical) to 1.0 (different)) to each attribute:

- 0.0 to a perfect identical method,
- value of the NCD for a partial identical method,
- value of the NCD for the general information of the application (strings, constants, etc.).

Moreover we exchange the compressor (Snappy) at the end of the algorithm with the XZ compressor in order to have a more comprehensible value for the final user.

Algorithm 6 Algorithm to calculate the similarity between two applications

Require: *diff, exact*

```

marks ← []
for a1 ← diff.methods() do
    Append( marks, GetFirstSortValue( a1 ) )
end for
for a1 ← exact.methods() do
    Append( marks, 0.0 )
end for
finalmark ← 0.0
for i ← marks.get() do
    finalmark ← (finalmark + (1.0 - i))
end for
finalmark ← (finalmark / Len( marks )) * 100

```

We have tested the algorithm 6 in multiple cases. The cases include two different applications (Listing 1), two identical

applications (Listing 2), two "quite" identical applications (Listing 3), and with a known stolen and repackaged application (Listing 4).

Listing 1. Similarity of two different applications

```

desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i
examples/obfu/classes_tc.dex apks/classes.dex
DIFF METHODS : 3
NEW METHODS : 199
MATCH METHODS : 0
DELETE METHODS : 4
[0.99816107749938965, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0]
0.0459730625153

```

Listing 2. Similarity of identical applications

```

DIFF METHODS : 0
NEW METHODS : 0
MATCH METHODS : 14
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.08235294371843338, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
99.4509803752

```

Listing 3. Similarity of quite identical applications

```

DIFF METHODS : 1
NEW METHODS : 0
MATCH METHODS : 12
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.14427860081195831, 0.095238097012042999, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0]
98.2891664441

```

Listing 4. Similarity of a stolen application

```

desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i apks/
HolyFuckingBiblev11-market-militia-.apk apks/
holyfuckingbible.apk
DIFF METHODS : 1
NEW METHODS : 81
MATCH METHODS : 72
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.8460613489151001, 0.091269843280315399, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
98.7333362268

```

We can see that the final mark is very useful for a developer to determine whether his application has been stolen or not, partially or totally, because he can inspect each method which matches with another.

C. Evaluation of Android obfuscators

Another problem with Java or Android applications is the transformation of the source code in bytecode. This transformation can be easily reversed by using a classical decompiler like jad, jd-gui or dava, with varying degrees of reliability. Moreover virtual machines do not allow code modification on the fly (polymorphic) and it is a real problem for classical packers. Nevertheless, Android

developers use obfuscators frequently such as proguard [20] or dasho [29] to prevent the reverse engineering of their software.

This leads to an interesting problem. "How is it possible to evaluate an obfuscator?". We can answer this question by using similarity distance as described previously. If two applications have a high number of equal functions (or almost equal functions), we can say that there is a problem with the obfuscation process.

The obfuscator can use several techniques to protect a Java/Android application:

- 1) change names of classes, methods, fields,
- 2) modify the control flow,
- 3) code optimization,
- 4) change instructions with metamorphic technique.

The first option is not efficient with our similarity distance because we do not use debugging information. The second option can be a problem with a classical distance, but the similarity distance is not sensible to this point due to the real compressor. The third can be detected as removal instructions. The final option is an issue and it is not covered by our algorithm. (We have not yet seen any tool which uses this technique.) Even if this technique will be used we will have to do a normalisation of each method before applying our algorithm.

We can protect an application with an obfuscator and we can calculate the distance by using a blackbox technique (our similarity algorithm). If this distance is close to 100 then the obfuscator did a poor job by using the first three techniques (or other equivalent techniques) as shown in listing 5.

Listing 5. Similarity of application protected by proguard and dasho

```
desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i
examples/obfu/classes_tc.dex examples/obfu/
classes_tc_proguard.dex
DIFF METHODS : 7
NEW METHODS : 4
MATCH METHODS : 0
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.47394958138465881, 0.040816325694322586,
0.059999998658895493, 0.040816325694322586,
0.059999998658895493, 0.13333334028720856,
0.040816325694322586, 0.095238097012042999]
88.1878750864
desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i
examples/obfu/classes_tc.dex examples/obfu/
classes_tc_dasho.dex
DIFF METHODS : 2
NEW METHODS : 0
MATCH METHODS : 10
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.50084036588668823, 0.13114753365516663,
0.1428571492433548, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,
0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0]
94.0396534709
```

D. Malware

In our algorithm, we can extract automatically new methods (methods that are not present in the first application but in the second one). Typically, the case of an injected malware (Listing 6) in the Android official or unofficial markets, a

classical application is taken from a market, and the malware writer injects his "evil" code in the application and propagates the new application in different markets.

Listing 6. Similarity of application with injected malware

```
desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i apks/
com.swampy.sexpos_162.apk apks/com.swampy.sexpos
.apk-GEINIMI-INFECTED.apk
DIFF METHODS : 0
NEW METHODS : 51
MATCH METHODS : 218
DELETE METHODS : 0
[1.0, 0.0, [...]]
99.5433789954
desnos@destiny:~/androguard$ ./androsim.py -i apks/
TAT-LWP-Mod-Dandelion-orig.apk apks/TAT-LWP-Mod-
Dandelion.apk
DIFF METHODS : 0
NEW METHODS : 31
MATCH METHODS : 18
DELETE METHODS : 0
[0.68480598926544189, 0.0, [...]]
96.3957579512
```

It is possible to isolate the malware quickly if we know the original application, which is an easy task because the malware writer does not generally modify it, (i.e., all original code is intact). Further, it is also possible to use this technique with multiple (but different) samples, in order to extract identical methods, because these methods will be the methods of the malware.

Moreover we can isolate new injected methods, but it is possible to extend our algorithm by using diffing techniques to determine whether someone has modified an original method to inject a hook or not.

III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN APPLICATIONS

It is interesting to calculate the differences between two versions of an application (for reverse engineering) to identify modifications in order to find a security bugfix, or after the injection of malware. The idea is to detect classical modifications in a method including:

- modification of codes in a basic block,
- addition of new basic blocks.

We can use the algorithm of similarity in the previous section to find identical/similar methods in order to extract modifications of instructions from basic blocks. We can add the following steps:

- Identification of identical basic blocks by using NCD,
- Extraction of added/removed instructions by using the longest common subsequence algorithm (LCS)[1].

Futhermore it is possible to change the signature of a method to have a small one to accelerate operations by removing exceptions and API because it is not an important point in this algorithm.

A. Identification of basic blocks

We have used the same algorithm 2 to compare basic blocks (algorithms 7, 8, 9, figures 5, 6), because it is just a different level of granularity. So we use the NCD (also with Snappy compressor) to compare basic blocks and checksums/hashes to quickly eliminate identical basic blocks.

Algorithm 7 Algorithm of matching exactly or partially basic blocks between two methods

Require: *bb1, bb2*

```

diffbb ← {}
for b1 ← bb1.basicblocks() do
  if b1.hash not in bb2.hash then
    for b2 ← bb2.basicblocks() do
      if b2.hash not in bb1.hash then
        Append( diffbb[ b1 ], similarity(b1, b2) )
      end if
    end for
  end if
end for
for b1 ← diffbb.basicblocks() do
  b1.sort()
end for

```

Algorithm 8 Algorithm of similarity between two basic blocks

Require: *a1, a2*

```

n1 ← NCD( checksum( a1 ), checksum( a2 ) )
return n1

```




Figure 5. Find exactly/partially the same basic blocks between two methods

1) *Identification of added or removed instructions:* After the identification of basic blocks we can use a classical algorithm like the longest common subsequence problem (LCS) [1] to extract new and old instructions (algorithm 10).

So we must modify our sequence of instructions into a string to use the LCS algorithm. We can also use a filtered algorithm on each single instruction to convert it to a value between 0 to 255.

For instance, the following basic blocks:

Algorithm 9 Algorithm of matching exactly or partially basic blocks between two methods

Require: *bb1, bb2*

```

newbb ← []
for b2 ← bb2.basicblocks() do
  if b2.hash not in bb2.hash then
    state ← true
    for b1 ← diffbb.basicblocks() do
      if b1.checksort( b2 ) then
        state ← false
        break
      end if
    end for
    if state == true then
      Append( newbb, b2 )
    end if
  end if
end for

```




Figure 6. Find new basic blocks between two methods

Algorithm 10 Algorithm to extract added/removed instructions from a basic block

Require: *b1, b2, toString*

```

addins ← []
delins ← []
X ← toString( b1 )
Y ← toString( b2 )
addins, delins ← LCS( X, Y )

```

```

ADD 3
ADD 1
SUB 2
IGET
ADD 3
GOTO

```

```

ADD 3
ADD 3
SUB 2
IGET
MUL 4
GOTO

```

are transformed in the following strings :

```

"\x00\x01\x02\x03\x00\x04"
"\x00\x00\x02\x03\x05\x04"

```

By using the LCS algorithm, we can get the instructions that we must add or remove, as shown in figure 7, in the first string (our first basic block) in order to find the differences between two basic blocks. If we get the previous strings, it is possible to apply the LCS algorithm:

```

In : a = "\x00\x01\x02\x03\x00\x04"
In : b = "\x00\x00\x02\x03\x05\x04"
In : z = LCS( a, b )

In : z
[[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
 [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
 [0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1],
 [0, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2],
 [0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3],
 [0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3],
 [0, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4]]

```

We have a matrix with the different LCS, where the longest LCS has a length of four:

```

"\x00\x02\x03\x04"

```

This matrix is applied to the elements to add or to remove:

```

In : l_a = [] l_r = []
In : getDiff( z, a, b, len(a), len(b), l_a, l_r )

00
- 01
+ 00
02
03
- 00
+ 05
04

In [11]: l_a
Out[11]: [(1, '\x00'), (4, '\x05')]

In [12]: l_r
Out[12]: [(1, '\x01'), (4, '\x00')]

```

In this example, we must do the following actions in the first basic block to get the second one :

- add : ADD 3 (position 1), MUL 4 (position 4)
- remove : ADD 1 (position 1), ADD 3 (position 4)

B. Visualization

The visualization is an important element during the analysis of differences between two applications, because it is with this tool that the information is recovered. Current tools display differences with two CFGs (see figure 8), but it is possible to merge [8] two CFGs to have only one as shown in figure 9.




Figure 7. Find added/removed instructions from a basic block




Figure 8. Visualization of differences by using two CFGs




Figure 9. Visualization of differences by using one CFG

We can improve the visualization by using a simple graphical chart:

- green for added instructions,
- red for deleted instructions.

Jump instructions are a major problem when we use only one CFG to display differences, for example : "IF X, Y [B-0x90,

B-0x60]” which is a jump to 0x90 or 0x60 offsets (after the evaluation of the instruction) can be changed to : ”IF X, Z [B-0x80, B-0x50]” with a jump to old or new basic blocks. If the block 0x50 is the same as 0x60 but the block 0x80 is new, we need to change the display with correct differences :

- IF X, Y [B-0x90, B-0x60]
- IF X, Z [B-0x80, B-0x60]

We need to resolve identical or new basic blocks at different offsets (our algorithm is not dependent of the position of the basic block). We obtain the algorithm 11 which is the new CFG (with original, new and different basic blocks) as shown in figure 10.

Algorithm 11 Algorithm of matching exactly or partially basic blocks between two methods

Require: *origbb, diffbb, newbb*
finalcfg \leftarrow []
for b1 \leftarrow origbb.basicblocks() **do**
 if b1.name not in diffbb **then**
 b1.tag \leftarrow ORIG
 Append(finalcfg, b1)
 else
 b1.tag \leftarrow DIFF
 Append(finalcfg, diffbb[b1.name])
 end if
end for
for b1 \leftarrow newbb.basicblocks() **do**
 b1.tag \leftarrow NEW
 Append(finalcfg, b1)
end for
finalcfg.sort()




Figure 10. Differences and visualization between 2 basic blocks

C. Practical tests

a) *Skype*: The 15th April 2011, AndroidPolice [6] released a new security vulnerability in Skype (version 1.0.0.831) for Android. This vulnerability exposes the users' name, phone number, and chat logs to all installed applications. The security bug is very simple, it is an incorrect usage of permissions to open files [6].

So, it is possible for another application to access to all information of your skype account, like account balance, full name, date of birth, city/state/country, home phone, office phone, cell phone, email addresses, your webpage, your bio, instant messages. A few days after this vulnerability, Skype [28] release a new version (1.0.0.983) which fixed this security bug. It is a good example to test our algorithm in a real case like Skype because this application is not small and it is an interesting case of reverse engineering. We can identify how many functions are :

- exactly identical : 8038,
- partially identical : 165,
- new : 14,
- delete : 7.

We analyzed the 165 methods, by searching methods related to file permissions, by using the Java API or directly with chmod program. Inside the 165 methods, most of them are related to simple constant modification but we can identify a method really close to another one (with the same name)

which manipulate files :

```
Lcom/skype/ipc/SkypeKitRunner; run ()V with Lcom/skype/ipc/SkypeKitRunner; run ()V 0.269383959472
```

This method has four modified basic blocks, but only three basic blocks merit further investigation.

An integer value (it is the operating mode) of the method *openFileOutput* has been changed from 3 to 0 (listing 7) :

```
public abstract FileOutputStream openFileOutput (String name, int mode)
```

where 3 and 0 are respectively :

- **MODE_WORLD_READABLE** (allow all other applications to have read access to the created file) and **MODE_WORLD_WRITEABLE** (allow all other applications to have write access to the created file),
- **MODE_PRIVATE** (the default mode, where the created file can only be accessed by the calling application (or all applications sharing the same user ID)).

Listing 7. *SkypeKitRunner* class, run method: change mode of *openFileOutput*

```
DIFF run-BB@0x316 :
[...]
```

```
220(324) const-string v7 , [string@ 2998 'csf']
221(328) + const/4 v8 , [#+ 0] , {0}
222(328) - const/4 v8 , [#+ 3] , {3}
223(328) invoke-virtual v5 , v7 , v8 , [meth@ 120
    Landroid/content/Context; (Ljava/lang/String; I)
    Ljava/io/FileOutputStream; openFileOutput]
[...]
```

In another basic block, the first argument of `chmod` has been changed (listing 8) from 777 to 750 :

- RWX, RWX, RWX
- RWX, R-X, —

Listing 8. `SkyperKitRunner` class, `run` method: change argument of `chmod`

```
DIFF run-BB@0x348 :
229(346) invoke-static [meth@ 5805 Ljava/lang/
Runtime; () Ljava/lang/Runtime; getRuntime]
230(34c) move-result-object v2
231(34e) new-instance v4 , [type@ 899 Ljava/lang/
StringBuilder;]
232(352) invoke-direct v4 , [meth@ 5848 Ljava/lang/
StringBuilder; () V<init>]
233(358) const-string v5 , [string@ 2921 'chmod 750
']
234(358) const-string v5 , [string@ 2904 'chmod 777
']
235(358) invoke-virtual v4 , v5 , [meth@ 5855 Ljava/
lang/StringBuilder; (Ljava/lang/String;) Ljava/
lang/StringBuilder; append]
236(35e) move-result-object v4
237(360) invoke-virtual v3 , [meth@ 5719 Ljava/io/
File; () Ljava/lang/String; getCanonicalPath]
```

And in the last modified basic block, there is a new call (listing 9) to a new method which fixes all files in the context directory of the application :

```
Lcom/skype/ipc/SkyperKitRunner; ([Ljava/io/File;) V
fixPermissions]
```

which fixes all permissions (patch permissions from the previous version) to :

- RWX — — for a directory,
- RW- — — for a file.

Listing 9. `SkyperKitRunner` class, `run` method : call new method on files

```
417(5c8) + move-object/from16 v0 , v19
418(5c8) invoke-virtual v4 , v3 , v2 , v5 , [meth@
5804 Ljava/lang/Runtime; (Ljava/lang/String; [
Ljava/lang/String; Ljava/io/File;) Ljava/lang/
Process; exec]
419(5ce) + move-object v1 , v4
420(5ce) move-result-object v2
421(5d0) + invoke-direct v0 , v1 , [meth@ 1923 Lcom
/skype/ipc/SkyperKitRunner; ([Ljava/io/File;) V
fixPermissions]
```

IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In the first part of the paper we presented several algorithms to compare applications to identify their similarities or differences. To do that we applied an original selected compressor (Snappy) obtain a real usable tool to improve the time of comparison with good results. With this similarity distance, we created a tool to determine whether a version of application has potentially been pirated. Next we applied this technique to design a tool to measure the efficiency of an obfuscator, and we demonstrated that there is a lack of proven tools in this domain. In the final part we described a new algorithm to find and visualize dissimilarities between versions of an application. The tools and the framework are open source and can be downloaded on the website [12].

While this paper demonstrate progress in this area, we need to continue investigating this domain to compare one application against multiple applications by using clustering. An additional area which merits additional research relates to the possible use of similarity distance to create a database of applications [12] to check whether an identified application is present in a large set of applications. While preliminary findings are promising, there remains much work to be done in this important area.

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