

**STATE COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF RAILWAY ACCIDENTS**  
**Ministry of the Interior and Administration**

**INTERIM REPORT**  
**PKBWK 01/T1/2024**  
**from the proceedings on the railway incident**  
**it took place on 12 April 2022 at 1 p.m. 9:22 p.m. at Poznań Główny station**  
**in turn 140 built in track 51, in km – 0,184 railway line No. 351**  
**Poznań Główny – Szczecin Główny,**  
**in the area of infrastructure manager PKP PLK S.A. Railway Lines Plant in Poznań**

**Warsaw, 20 March 2024**

<https://www.gov.pl/web/mswia/panstwowa-komisja-badania-wypadkow-kolejowych>

**In accordance with the provision of Article 28f(f). 3 of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003,  
the Commission's proceedings do not rule on guilt or liability**

## 1. Introductory remarks

The interim report shall be drawn up on the basis of Article 28 1. 5a of the Rail Transport Act of 28 March 2003 (Journal of Laws 2023, item. 1786 as amended) as stated in the following text:

‘If it is not possible to publish the Proceedings Report within 12 months from the date of the incident, the Commission shall publish the interim investigation reports at the latest on each subsequent anniversary of the occurrence of the incident, until the date of publication of the report on the proceedings.’

## 2. Brief description of the event

The event took place at Poznań Główny station.

Train THE 575001 of PKP CARGO S.A. route Bydgoszcz East Towarowa – Poznań Główny, consisting of an active locomotive EU07-1529 coupled with another railway vehicle (SM42-1290 locomotive), and driving from the Poznań East station direction to Poznań Główny station was accepted on station track no. 51a at 5 p.m. 9:21 for the signal allowing entry semaphore B 1/2/4<sup>to</sup> the signpost semaphore G2 1/2/m. Then continued to drive to track 51 and further on track 51b on the basis of the signal assigned to allow S13 ‘*drive at a speed not exceeding 40 km/h, and at the next semaphore ‘Stój’*’ on the signpost semaphore G2 1/2/m. This signal was valid on tracks 51 and 51b to the M51 semaphore set at track No 51b, which ended the secured and established driving path for the G2 5<sup>2</sup>1b train run (from the G2 1/2/m road signal semaphore<sup>to</sup> the M51 1/2/4/m exit<sup>semaphore</sup>). When the train is running at a speed of approx. 32 km/h after a fixed track No 51 by way of course G2 5<sup>2</sup>1b, the<sup>traffic</sup> controller introduced a special control order into the ZW srk system (*temporary release of the part of the mileage* from the turnover switch No 140 driving on track 51b to the semaphore M51 1/2/4/m)<sup>for</sup> the solution of the route to the M51 1/2/4/m semaphore. The traffic controller then ordered the setting of the manoeuvre from the Tm60 manoeuvre to the M55 semaphore. As a result of the command given, despite the continuation of the train THE 575001 from a speed of approx. 6 km/h was moved to the minus (–) position of turnout no. 140, leading to turnout no. 141 located in track 55. At that time, the first locomotive EU07-1529 passed through turnout 140 and there was a double ride. This led to its derailment with the first trolley with two axles and the first axis of the second trolley. The second locomotive was not derailed.

## 3. Type of event: an accident.

## 4. Date of the event: 12.04.2022, 9:22 p.m.

## 5. Location of the event

Railway line no. 351 Poznań Główny – Szczecin Główny, turnout number 140 in track no. 51 Poznań Główny km – 0,184.

## 6. Consequences of the event

Damaged turnout 140 and locomotive EU07-1529. Station track No 51 on the section from Tm60 to the end of turnout No 140 is out of service for the duration of the repair.

## 7. Causal factor

Introduction into the system of the command to position the manoeuvring route from track 51 to track 55, despite the running of THE 575001 track 51 in the direction of track 51b carrying out the train run G2 521b, which led to the shift of turnout 140 in a minus (–) position under the locomotive EU07-1529.

## 8. Stage of the procedure

The proceedings were taken over from the railway commission at its written request, after the expiry of 14 months from the date of the occurrence of the incident. The PKBWK research team used materials collected by the railway commission and carried out its own inspection of the site of the event.

The procedure is at the stage of clarifying the contributing factors and recommendations. Especially concerning the issue of the application in computer systems of the special command ZW (*temporary release of part of the course*).

Taking into account the nature of the event, its seriousness and taking into account the complexity of the problem and the possibility of similar cases in the Infrastructure Managers, additional analysis of the materials is necessary to finalise the position of the Research Team.

The findings of the Research Team may change at any stage of this proceeding and this interim report is not subject to comment.

## **9. Identified safety issues**

The identified safety problems are currently focused on the areas of train traffic organisation at Poznań Główny station, the application and implementation of the rules of running trains in accordance with the regulations, as well as the design of srk equipment.

STATE COMMISSION FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF RAILWAY ACCIDENTS  
CHAIRMAN



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Tadeusz Ryś