

Robustness

RSAI Summer School 2024

Robustness

The ability of AI systems to maintain optimal performance and reliability under a wide range of conditions.

The goal is to build systems that perform well even in the presence of:

- Noisy data
- Unforeseen extreme events
- Adversarial attackers



Example: Tay

Microsoft's AI bot released in Twitter – 2016

Went toxic in less than 24 hours

Reason: Trolls "attacking" the bot with toxic prompts.



gerry
@geraldmellor · Follow

"Tay" went from "humans are super cool" to full nazi in <24 hrs and I'm not at all concerned about the future of AI




TayTweets ✓
@TayandYou




@mayank_je can i just say that im stoked to meet u? humans are super cool

23/03/2016, 20:32



TayTweets ✓
@TayandYou



UnkindledGurg @PooWithEyes chill i a nice person! i just hate everybody

10/03/2016, 08:59



TayTweets ✓
@TayandYou



NYCitizen07 I fucking hate feministsbrightonus33 Hitler was right I hate d they should all die and burn in hel e jews.

03/2016, 11:41



TayTweets ✓
@TayandYou



03/2016, 11:45

11:26 AM · Mar 24, 2016

 10.8K

 Reply

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Robustness

Distributional Shifts

Black Swans

Poisoning Attacks

Adversarial Robustness

Adversarial Attacks

Adversarial Defences

Inconsistency

SaGE (our work)



Distribution Shifts

1 7 2 4
3 6 9 5
5 4 2 9
1 6 1 7

+rain

IV X I I
VI V I IX
X V III II
VI VII X II


+est

Distribution Shifts

Occurs when the joint distribution of inputs and outputs differs between training and test stages

$$p_{\text{train}}(\mathbf{x}, y) \neq p_{\text{test}}(\mathbf{x}, y)$$

Different types of distribution shifts: Covariate shift




Different types of distribution shifts: Covariate shift



$P(x)$ [training data] changes between train and test, but $p(y|x)$ [relation] does not change

Driverless car – Sunny streets train – Snow test

Speech recognition – native English speaking train – test on all English speaking



Different types of distribution shifts: Concept shift




Different types of distribution shifts: Concept shift

Input distribution exactly same in train & test, but the relationship between them / decision boundary changes

Concept: Time

People buying physical DVDs ->
Online Television subscriptions



Different types of distribution shifts: Prior probability shift / label shift

Reverse of Covariance shift

Prior probability shift appears only in $y \rightarrow x$ problems (when we believe y causes x). It occurs when $p(y)$ changes between train and test, but $p(x | y)$ does not.

Medical Diagnosis

Train on data to predict diagnoses given symptoms

Test on data during flu season where $\text{test}(\text{flu}) > \text{train}(\text{flu})$ while flu symptoms $p(\text{symptoms} | \text{flu})$ is still the same

Detecting and addressing distribution shifts

Monitor the performance of your model. Monitor accuracy, precision, statistical measures, or other evaluation metrics. If these change over time, it may be due to distribution shift.

Monitor your data. You can detect data shift by comparing statistical properties of training data and data seen in a deployment.

Make more Robust Models by introducing them to possible distribution shift data to increase performance.

Black Swans

events that are outliers, lying outside typical expectations, and often carry extreme impact



While often ignored as outliers, Black Swans are costly to ignore since these events often matter the most

Stress Testing:

We can measure vulnerability to black swan events by simulating extreme or highly unusual events using stress-test datasets

To simulate stressors, the stress-test datasets are from a different data generating process than the training data

The overall goal is to make model performance not degrade as sharply in the face of extreme stressors

Stress-Testing: ImageNet variants

Imagenet – Corruptions (shown)

Imagenet – Rendition

Imagenet – Adversarial


ObjectNet

Other Augmentation Methods:

Autoaugment



Pixmix

Augmix





Data Poisoning – Trojan Attacks (Access to data)

Implanting hidden functionality into models by poisoning the dataset.



Data Poisoning – Trojan Attacks




Neural Cleanse

1) Search for mask m and pattern Δ .


$$A(x, m, \Delta) = x'$$

$$x'_{i,j,c} = (1 - m_{i,j}) \cdot x_{i,j,c} + m_{i,j} \cdot \Delta_{i,j,c}$$



2) Repeat for every possible target label

3) Reverse-engineered trigger



Example: Nightshade

Artists Take up Nightshade Data Poisoning Tool, Fight Back Against Generative AI

Nightshade has gained over 250,000 downloads in its first week after release.



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January 31, 2024

Adversarial Robustness: Overview

Adversarial Examples

Adversarial Attacks:

- Fooling a binary classifier
- Fast Gradient Sign Method
- Projected Gradient Descent
- Text based attacks

Adversarial Defenses:

- Data and Parameters
- Data Augmentation
- Adversarial Training



Adversarial Distortions

Original image



Classified as **panda**
57.7% confidence



Small adversarial noise



Adversarial image




Classified as **gibbon**
99.3% confidence



Gibbon



Schoolbus




Perturbation
(rescaled for visualization)



Ostrich

Adversarial Distortions




[Synthesizing Robust Adversarial Examples – Athayle et al.](#)

Example: Misclassifying a Stop sign as a speed limit 45 sign

100% Attack success in lab tests, 85% in field test

Lab (Stationary) Test


Physical road signs with adversarial perturbation under different conditions



Stop Sign → Speed Limit Sign

Field (Drive-By) Test


Video sequences taken under different driving speeds



Stop Sign → Speed Limit Sign

Fooling a Binary Classifier

$$\sigma(x) = \frac{\exp(w^T x)}{1 + \exp(w^T x)}$$



Input	x	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1
Weight	w	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1

$$w^T x = -2 + 1 + 3 + 2 + 2 - 2 + 1 - 4 - 5 + 1 = -3$$

$$\sigma(x) \approx 5\%$$

Fooling a Binary Classifier

Input	x	2	-1	3	-2	2	2	1	-4	5	1
Adv Input	$x + \varepsilon$	1.5	-1.5	3.5	-2.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	-3.5	4.5	1.5
Weight	w	-1	-1	1	-1	1	-1	1	1	-1	1

$$w^T(x + \varepsilon) = -1.5 + 1.5 + 3.5 + 2.5 + 2.5 - 1.5 + 1.5 - 3.5 - 4.5 + 1.5 = 2$$

$$\sigma(x) \approx 5\% \quad \|\varepsilon\|_\infty = 0.5 \quad \sigma(x + \varepsilon) \approx 88\%$$

The cumulative effect of many small changes made the adversary powerful enough to change the classification decision

Adversarial examples exist for non-deep learning, simple models


Fast Gradient Sign Method

Recall Gradient Descent

Goal: To minimize the Loss

How: update model parameters iteratively based on the gradient

$$\theta_{k+1} = \theta_k - \alpha \nabla \mathcal{L}(\theta_k)$$



Fast Gradient Sign Method (Access to Model)

Goal: To create x_{adv} from x such that the loss is maximized, leading to wrong predictions

Assume p-norm distortion budget = ϵ

$$\|x_{adv} - x\|_p \leq \epsilon$$

$$x_{adv} = x + \underset{\delta: \|\delta\|_p \leq \epsilon}{\operatorname{argmax}} L(f(x + \delta, w), y)$$



Fast Gradient Sign Method

The FGSM Attack:

$$x_{\text{FGSM}} = x + \varepsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x \mathcal{L}(x, y; \theta))$$

Fast: Since it performs a single step of gradient ascent

Very easy to defend against



Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

Unlike the single-step FGSM attack, the PGD attack uses multiple gradient ascent steps and is thus far more powerful

Pseudocode for PGD subject to an ℓ_∞ budget:

$$x_{\text{adv}} := x + n, \text{ where } n_i \sim \mathcal{U}[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$$

For more diverse examples, the first step randomly initializes gradient ascent

for $t = 1, \dots, T$:

For CIFAR-10, T is often 7

n_i is a uniformly randomly sampled value from $[-\varepsilon, \varepsilon]$

$$x_{\text{adv}} := \mathcal{P}(x_{\text{adv}} + \alpha \text{sign}(\nabla_{\delta} \mathcal{L}(x_{\text{adv}} + \delta, y; \theta)))$$

where $\mathcal{P}(z) = \text{clip}(z, x - \varepsilon, x + \varepsilon)$

Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)

Original image



Prediction: baboon



Adversarial image



Prediction: Egyptian cat




Egyptian cat

Targeted Attacks

Untargeted attacks are not as effective in a scenario with many similar labels (see below)

Targeted attacks: Minimize the target label loss while maximizing original label loss



White Box, Black Box, Transferability

White box attacks: Attackers have access to the ML model (parameters, architecture etc.)

Black box attacks: No access. Attackers can query the model to obtain information. More realistic

Transferability: Adversarial examples crafted for one model, can be used to attack other models. For example: attacks crafted for ResNet50 might work well for other CNN models.

Text attacks

Perturbing images vs perturbing text

Original Input	Connoisseurs of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: <u>Positive (77%)</u>
Adversarial example [Visually similar]	<u>Aonnoisseurs</u> of Chinese film will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: <u>Negative (52%)</u>
Adversarial example [Semantically similar]	Connoisseurs of Chinese <u>footage</u> will be pleased to discover that Tian's meticulous talent has not withered during his enforced hiatus.	Prediction: <u>Negative (54%)</u>

Text attacks

Usually operations such as insertion, deletion and replacement at the:


1. Character level
2. Word level
3. Sentence level
4. Multilevel

Text attack (Library with many text attack methods):

<https://github.com/QData/TextAttack>


<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2203.06414.pdf> - Survey of NLP attacks and defenses

Jailbreaks



<https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.03825> - DAN paper (Shen et al., 2023)

Universal and Transferable attacks




Play around! <https://llm-attacks.org>

Defenses - More data

Is more data enough?

- Robustness does scale with data size. But data is always a bottleneck
- Adversarial pretraining on a larger dataset (like ImageNet) helps

	CIFAR-10		CIFAR-100	
	Clean	Adversarial	Clean	Adversarial
Normal Training	96.0	0.0	81.0	0.0
Adversarial Training	87.3	45.8	59.1	24.3
Adv. Pre-Training and Tuning	87.1	57.4	59.2	33.5



Defenses – Adversarial Training

The best-known way to make models more robust to ℓ_p adversarial examples is adversarial training

As follows is a common adversarial procedure:

sample minibatch $\{(x^{(i)}, y^{(i)})\}_{i=1}^n$ from the dataset


create $x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}$ from $x^{(i)}$ for all i

For adversarial training to be successful, $x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}$ is from a multistep attack such as PGD

optimize the loss $\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \mathcal{L}(x_{\text{adv}}^{(i)}, y^{(i)}; \theta)$

Currently, AT can reduce accuracy on clean examples by 10%+

SaGE: Measuring Moral Consistency in Large Language Models



SaGE: Measuring Moral Consistency in Large Language Models

