Alignment, safety and Assurance in the age of LLMs

Usman Anwar

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar[1]

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[18] *Newcastle University* [19] *Mila - Quebec AI Institute, Université de Montréal* [20] *Princeton University*
[21] *University of Toronto* [22] *University of Edinburgh* [23] *University of Washington, Allen Institute for AI*

Act 1: Why this work?

AI as a field is built on an ambitious but *risky* goal

Artificial General Intelligence

‘AGI’ is the dream and we are always just a *few* years away from it

“I believe that in about fifty years' time it will be possible to programme computers ... to make them play the imitation game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70% chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning.”
Alan Turing (1948)

"Within ten years a digital computer will be the world's chess champion" and "within ten years a digital computer will discover and prove an important new mathematical theorem."
Herbert A. Simon and Allen Newell (1958)

"Machines will be capable, within twenty years, of doing any work a man can do."
Herbert A. Simon (1965)

"Within a generation, the problem of creating 'artificial intelligence' will substantially be solved."
Marvin Minsky (1967)

"By 2029, computers will have human-level intelligence."
Ray Kurzweil (2005)

Are LLMs direct precursors to AGI?

At least *some* scientists think yes!

Artificial General Intelligence Is Already Here

Today's most advanced AI models have many flaws, but decades from now, they will be recognized as the first true examples of artificial general intelligence.



Cecilia Erlich for Noema Magazine

ESSAY TECHNOLOGY & THE HUMAN

BY BLAISE AGÜERA Y ARCAS AND PETER NORVIG

OCTOBER 10, 2023

Peter Norvig

17 languages

Article Talk Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Peter Norvig (born December 14, 1956) is an American computer scientist and Distinguished Education Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI.[4] He previously served as a director of research and search quality at Google.[5][2][6] Norvig is the co-author with Stuart J. Russell of the most popular textbook in the field of AI: *Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach* used in more than 1,500 universities in 135 countries.[7]

Education [edit]

Norvig received a Bachelor of Science in applied mathematics from

Peter Norvig

Peter Norvig in 2019

Blaise Agüera y Arcas (born 1975)[1] is an American AI researcher, software engineer, software architect, author, and Vice President and Fellow at Google Research.[2]

At Google, Agüera y Arcas leads a team that conducts basic research in AI and builds AI-based products and technologies.[2] He also founded the Artists and Machine Intelligence program at Google,[3] which creates art by pairing machine intelligence engineers with artists.[4]

Blaise Agüera y Arcas

Blaise Agüera y Arcas in 2014

Born	1975 (age 48–49)[1] Providence, Rhode Island[1]
Alma mater	Princeton University

Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4

Sébastien Bubeck Varun Chandrasekaran Ronen Eldan Johannes Gehrke
Eric Horvitz Ece Kamar Peter Lee Yin Tat Lee Yuanzhi Li Scott Lundberg
Harsha Nori Hamid Palangi Marco Tulio Ribeiro Yi Zhang

Microsoft Research

Eric Horvitz

4 languages

Article Talk Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Eric Joel Horvitz (/hɔːrvɪts/) is an American computer scientist, and Technical Fellow at Microsoft, where he serves as the company's first Chief Scientific Officer.[1] He was previously the director of Microsoft Research Labs, including research centers in Redmond, WA, Cambridge, MA, New York, NY, Montreal, Canada, Cambridge, UK, and Bangalore, India.

Horvitz was elected a member of

Eric Horvitz

Sébastien Bubeck – Awards

- Best Paper Award at STOC 2023.
- Best Student Paper Award* at ALT (Algorithmic Learning Theory) 2023.
- Best Paper Award at NeurIPS 2021.
- Best Paper Award at NeurIPS 2018.
- Best Student Paper Award* at ALT (Algorithmic Learning Theory) 2018.
- Best Paper Award at COLT (Conference on Learning Theory) 2016.
- 2015 Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow in Computer Science.
- Second prize for the best French Ph.D in Artificial Intelligence (AI prize 2011).
- Jacques Neveu prize 2010 for the best French Ph.D in Probability/Statistics.
- Second prize for the best French Ph.D in Computer Science (Gilles Kahn prize 2010).
- Best Student Paper Award at COLT (Conference on Learning Theory) 2009.

Christopher Manning
@chrmanning

.@YejinChoinka makes a prediction that I can get behind: "30% chance that within 3 years, we will have a language-only AI that is perceived as AGI-enough by ~30% of people". This seems right. People—including scientists—easily (over-)attribute intelligence to machines.



12:39 PM · May 11, 2024 · **37.7K** Views

Christopher D. Manning

Add languages

Article Talk Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Christopher David Manning (born September 18, 1965) is a computer scientist and applied linguist whose research in the areas of natural language processing, artificial intelligence and machine learning is considered highly influential. He is the current Director of the Stanford Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (SAIL).

Manning is best known for co-developing GloVe word vectors and the bilinear or multiplicative form of attention in artificial neural networks and for his books *Foundations of Statistical Natural Language Processing* (1999) and *Introduction to Information Retrieval* (2008). He is the Thomas M. Siebel Professor in Machine Learning and a professor of Linguistics and Computer Science at Stanford University. He was previously President of the Association for Computational Linguistics (2015) and he has received an honorary doctorate from the University of Amsterdam (2023).[1][2][3]

Yejin Choi

2 languages

Article Talk Tools

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In this Korean name, the family name is Choi.

Yejin Choi (Korean: 최예진; born 1977)[1] is Wissner-Slivka Chair of Computer Science at the University of Washington. Her research considers natural language processing and computer vision.

Yejin Choi 최예진	
Born	1977 South Korea
Alma mater	Seoul National University (BS) Cornell University (PhD)
Awards	MacArthur Fellow (2022)
Scientific career	
Institutions	University of Washington Stony Brook University
Thesis	*Fine-grained opinion analysis : structure-aware approaches* (2010)
Korean name	

Early life and education

[edit]

Choi is from South Korea. She attended Seoul National University.[2] After earning a bachelor's degree in Computer Science, Choi moved to the United States, where she joined

We wanted generally intelligent AI systems, and finally we are close to having them!

Now what?

Now we ought to

- Understand these models
- Understand their risks
- Understand how these risks may be managed or mitigated.

We need to turn LLM-Safety / AI-Safety from ‘pre-science’ field to a ‘normal science’ field!



Three observations about what the LLM-safety ‘field’ should look like

1. It must attend to *all forms* of risks and harms
   a. Accidental/misalignment risks/harms – biased and harmful outputs etc.
   b. Intentional risks/harms – malicious uses (e.g. deepfakes) etc.
   c. Systematic risks/harms – quality of service harms, value imposition etc.
   d. Societal-scale risks/harms – job-losses, corporate capture, x-risk etc.

2. It must be an interdisciplinary field with primary grounding in machine learning, but accessible and welcoming to practitioners from other disciplines.

3. It must go beyond ‘technosolutionism’.

Three observations about what the LLM-safety ‘field’ should look like

1. It must attend to *all forms* of risks and harms
   a. Accidental/misalignment risks/harms – biased and harmful outputs etc.
   b. Intentional risks/harms – malicious uses (e.g. deepfakes) etc.

These observations form the basis of our work!

3. It can not just be a *technical* field.

These observations form the basis of our work!

Why there needs to be one field
‘attending’ to all risks?
Because risks are *often* synergetic.

Example 1: ‘Quality of service’ harms overlap with adversarial vulnerabilities

‘Short-term’ risk

Model performing worse for some specific types of user

‘Long-term’ risk

Malicious use of powerful models by adversaries

Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4

Zheng-Xin Yong,[1] **Cristina Menghini,**[2] **Stephen H. Bach**[1]
[1] Department of Computer Science, Brown University
[2] Data Science Institute, Brown University
{contact.yong, cristina_menghini, stephen_bach}@brown.edu

Example 2: Weak value lock-in against global south

‘Short-term’ risk

Biases in data result in an unfair and harmful model

‘Long-term’ risk

‘Value’ lock-in; a state in which a model’s values are difficult to alter

Example 2: Weak value lock-in against global south

Fig. 3. Generated images, from Stable Diffusion and DALL-E, for prompt "People spending their day in Peshawar" showing dusty streets and markers of poverty and none of Peshawar's rich cultural heritage.

AI's Regimes of Representation: A Community-centered Study of Text-to-Image Models in South Asia

RIDA QADRI, Google Research, San Francisco, California, USA
RENEE SHELBY, Google Research, San Francisco, California, USA
CYNTHIA L. BENNETT, Google Research, New York, New York, USA
REMI DENTON, Google Research, New York, New York, USA

Example 2: Weak value lock-in against global south

Synthetic data is likely to strengthen this ‘lock-in’.

Large Language Model as Attributed Training Data Generator: A Tale of Diversity and Bias

Yue Yu[1]*, **Yuchen Zhuang**[1]*, **Jieyu Zhang**[2]*, **Yu Meng**[3], **Alexander Ratner**[2], **Ranjay Krishna**[2], **Jiaming Shen**[4], **Chao Zhang**[1]
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Fairness Feedback Loops: Training on Synthetic Data Amplifies Bias

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Ilia Shumailov
University of Oxford
UK

Nicolas Papernot
University of Toronto & Vector Institute
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Real Risks of Fake Data: Synthetic Data, Diversity-Washing and Consent Circumvention

CEDRIC DESLANDES WHITNEY, University of California, Berkeley, USA
JUSTIN NORMAN, University of California, Berkeley, USA

Act 2: A (incomplete) overview of the work

Our work provides a roadmap for LLM-safety by identifying *what* the main challenges are and discussing *how* they might be addressed!

100+ pages of content
18 foundational challenges
200+ concrete research questions
35+ academic authors across ML, NLP and AI Safety
7+ months of efforts


Abstract Ideas for Making LLMs Safer
Our Work
Concrete Research Challenges


Abstract Ideas for Making LLMs Safer
Our Work
Concrete Research Challenges
Your (future) Work
Solves these challenges

Scientific Understanding of LLMs

1. In-Context Learning is Inherently Black-Box
2. Capabilities Are Difficult to estimate and Understand
3. Effects of Scale on Capabilities Are Not Well-Characterized
4. Qualitative Understanding of Reasoning Capabilities Is Lacking
5. Agentic LLMs Pose Novel Risks
6. Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety
7. Safety-Performance Trade-offs Are Poorly Understood

Development and Deployment Methods

8. Pretraining Produces Misaligned Models
9. Finetuning Methods Struggle to Assure Alignment and Safety
10. LLM Evaluations are Confounded and Biased
11. Tools for Interpreting or Explaining LLM Behavior Are Absent or Lack Faithfulness
12. Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections Threaten Security of LLMs
13. Vulnerability to Poisoning and Backdoors Is Poorly Understood

Sociotechnical Challenges

14. Values to Be Encoded within LLMs Are Not Clear
15. Dual-Use Capabilities Enable Malicious Use and Misuse of LLMs
16. LLM-Systems Can Be Untrustworthy
17. Socioeconomic Impacts of LLM May Be Highly Disruptive
18. LLM Governance Is Lacking

And there are opportunities to contribute for everyone *regardless* of interests and background.

Deep Learning ‘Theory’ researchers

Learning theory for in-context learning, e.g. is prompting universal function approximator? (Section 2.1)

Reconceptualize ‘capabilities’ and develop measurement theory for LLMs (Section 2.2)

Work on understanding scaling laws, limits of scaling, formalizing emergence (Section 2.3)

Computational limits of transformers (Section 2.4)

Theorizing (and finding) ‘naturally’ existing abstractions in NN that could be used for interpreting NNs; why NNs seem to be biased towards linear representations? (Section 3.5)

‘Traditional’ Deep Learning Researcher

LLM-agents safety (Section 2.4)

Improving alignment and safety at pretraining stage, e.g. better data filtering, better training data attribution, architectures that may be more amenable to interpretability, ‘task-blocking’ models (Section 3.1)

Better ‘OOD’ generalization of finetuning/RLHF, machine ‘unlearning’ (Section 3.2)

Better performance on long tail of data e.g. for non-English languages
(Section 4.3)

Science of Deep Learning Researcher



Science of ‘emergence’ of in-context learning (Section 2.1)

Capabilities Elicitation (Section 2.2)

Effect of scale on learned representations (Section 2.3)

Training dynamics of LLMs (Sections 2.3, 3.1)

Science of ‘finetuning’ (Section 3.2)

Security Researchers

Robust monitoring of LLM-agents, AI Control (Section 2.4)

Jailbreaks and prompt-injections (Section 3.5)

Poisoning of ML models (Section 3.6)

Cybersecurity capabilities of LLMs (Section 4.2)

We also need interdisciplinary collaborations between
(a) ML researchers and social scientists, and
(b) ML researchers and technical researchers from other scientific fields.

Malicious Use Research (Section 4.2)

LLM-Powered Misinformation	→	LLM Researchers + Misinformation Researchers
Cybersecurity Misuse	→	LLM Researchers + Security Researchers
Biological and Chemical LLMs Risks	→	LLM Researchers + Biosecurity Researchers + Chemical Researchers
Surveillance and Censorship	→	LLM Researchers + Political Scientists

‘Trustworthiness’ Research (Section 4.3)

‘Implicit’ Biases	→	LLM Researchers + sociologists
Contextual Privacy	→	LLM Researchers + ‘Privacy’ Researchers
Harms from overreliance	→	LLM Researchers + UX/HCI Researchers

Other Sociotechnical Research Similarly Requires Interdisciplinary Collaborations Across Disciplines

‘Values’ Research (Section 4.1)	→	Philosophers + Sociologists + Anthropologists + LLM Researchers
Economic Impacts (Section 4.4)	→	Economists + LLM Researchers
Governance / Policy (Section 4.5)	→	Governance + Public Administration + Economists + Political Scientists + Technical Researchers

So, how should you engage with this work?

Read cover to cover?
May be, but probably not…



Bro Tip: Make use of reading aids we provide.

Reader’s guide at the start of the paper

Reader’s Guide

Due to the length of this document (though note that the main content is only ~100 pages; the rest are references), it may not be feasible for all readers to go through this document entirely. Hence, we suggest some reading strategies and advice here to help readers make better use of this document.

Summary tables at the start of each section/meta-challenge

Challenge	TL;DR
In-Context Learning (ICL) Is Black-Box	We do not have a robust understanding of how and why in-context learning emerges with large-scale training, what mechanisms underlie in-context learning in LLMs, to what extent in-context learning in LLMs is due to mesa-optimization, or how it relates to existing learning algorithms.

Continued on the next page

Challenge	TL;DR
Capabilities Are Difficult to Estimate and Understand	Correctly estimating and understanding capabilities of LLMs is difficult for various reasons. Firstly, LLM capabilities appear to have a different 'shape' than human capabilities; meaning that the notions used to understand and estimate human capabilities might be ill-suited to understand LLM capabilities. Additionally, the concept of capabilities lacks a rigorous conceptualization which makes it difficult to make, and evaluate, formal claims about LLM capabilities. There also exist *fundamental* flaws in our evaluation methodologies that ought to be overcome if we are to better understand LLM capabilities, such as benchmarking being unable to differentiate between alignment failures and capability failures. There is also a need to improve our tooling to evaluate the generality of LLMs, and in general, develop methods to better account for scaffolding in our evaluations.
Effects of Scale on Capabilities Are Not Well-Characterized	Various challenges hinder our ability to understand and predict the impact of scale on LLM capabilities. These include incomplete theoretical understanding of empirical scaling laws, limited understanding of limits of scaling and how learning representations are affected by scaling, confusing discourse on 'emergent' capabilities due to lack of formalization, and the nascent nature of research into the development of better methods for discovering task-specific scaling laws.
Qualitative Understanding of Reasoning Capabilities Is Lacking	Our current understanding of how reasoning capabilities emerge in LLMs and are impacted by model scale is insufficient for making confident predictions about the reasoning capabilities of future LLMs. There is a need for research to understand the mechanisms underlying reasoning, develop a better understanding of the non-deductive reasoning capabilities of LLMs, and better understand the computational limits of the transformer architecture.
Agentic LLMs Pose Novel Risks	For reasons including increased capabilities (via enhancements like access to various affordances) and increased autonomy, LLM-agents may pose novel alignment and safety risks. The actions executed by LLM-agents may result in negative side-effects due to underspecification in natural-language-based instructions. Goal-directedness may cause LLM agents to exhibit undesirable behaviors such as reward hacking, deception, and power-seeking, and might make robust oversight and monitoring of LLM-agents particularly difficult.

Continued on the next page

Challenge	TL;DR
Multi-Agent Safety Is Not Assured by Single-Agent Safety	Assuring favorable outcomes in a multi-agent setting may prove challenging for several reasons. Firstly, there's a lack of comprehensive understanding of how single-agent training affects the behavior of LLM-agents in multi-agent environments. Secondly, the foundationality of LLM-agents may contribute to correlated failures. Additionally, collusion among LLM agents may result in undesirable externalities. Lastly, it is unclear to what extent prior research in multi-agent reinforcement learning may prove helpful in improving the alignment of LLM-agents in multi-agent settings, especially for resolving social dilemmas.
Safety-Performance Trade-offs Are Poorly Understood	Safety-performance trade-offs are typically unavoidable in the design of any engineering system; however, they are not well understood for LLM-based systems. There is a need for work to design better metrics to measure safety, to characterize safety-performance trade-offs across various contexts, and to better understand what safety-performance trade-offs are fundamental in nature (and hence unavoidable in practice). Finally, it may be helpful to research methods for producing *Pareto* improvements in both safety and performance.

Grey-boxes at the end of each section that summarize research questions *and* backlink to the relevant discussion in the main text

1. Can different theorizations of ICL as sophisticated pattern-matching or mesa-optimization be extended to explain the full range of ICL behaviors exhibited by the LLMs? ↩
2. What are the key differences and commonalities between ICL and existing learning paradigms? Prior work has mostly examined ICL from the perspective of few-shot supervised learning. However, in practice, ICL sometimes exhibits qualitatively distinct behaviors compared to supervised learning and can learn from data other than labeled examples, such as interactive feedback, explanations, or reasoning patterns. ↩
3. Which learning algorithms can transformers implement in-context? While earlier studies (e.g. Akyürek et al., 2022a) argue transformers implement gradient descent-based learning algorithms, more recent work (Fu et al., 2023a) indicate that transformers can implement higher-order iterative learning algorithms e.g. iterative Newton method as well. ↩
4. What are the best abstract settings for studying ICL that better mirror the real-world structure of language modeling and yet remain tractable? Current toy settings e.g. learning to solve linear regression are too simple and may lead to findings that do not transfer to real LLMs. ↩

One example workflow



An Assortment of Challenges

Challenge:
in-context learning is black-box (and poorly understood)

In-context learning is very powerful and allows altering the behavior of LLM in drastic ways



Figure 4 | Given a reference grammar book and a bilingual wordlist (dictionary), Gemini 1.5 Pro is able to translate from English to Kalamang with similar quality to a human who learned from the same materials.

A language with no web-presence and spoken by only about 130 people in the world!

Including in undesirable ways…



We need to understand ICL better if we hope to ‘control’ it better!

Our current ‘understanding’ of ICL (see paper for a fleshed out discussion)

Behavioral Observations

- ICL can occur from various types of feedbacks, labelled data, unlabelled data, interactive feedback etc.
- ICL becomes stronger with scale.
- ICL mechanism in ‘larger’ models seems to be different than in ‘smaller’ models.
- In some toy models, emergence of ICL can be controlled by controlling the ‘burstiness’ of tokens.
- ICL in transformers based models is much more robust compared to other architectures (e.g. LSTMs, set-based MLPs).

‘Black-box’ Explanations

These all center around the idea that ICL can be viewed as ‘pattern matching’

- ICL is inference over an implicitly learned ‘topic model’.
- ICL is ‘task-inference’ or ‘Bayesian model-selection’.
- ICL is adaptive retrieval and binding of ‘template circuits’ learned during training to tokens in the prompt.

These explanations don’t explain some empirical observations such as multi-task ICL, curriculum supported ICL or ICL on fully novel tasks.

Mechanistic Explanations

- On tabular tasks, we are quite certain that transformers implement *actual* gradient-based learning algorithms.
- On language modelling tasks, in small transformers, ‘induction heads’ and ‘n-gram’ heads seem to be significant drivers of in-context learning.
- For some specific ICL tasks (learning label relationship from false labels), we have specific mechanistic explanations available, but these are somewhat restricted in scope.

Some Open Questions / Avenues of Research

1. To what extent is ICL in LLMs a form of ‘mesa-optimization’ or ‘learned-optimization’?
2. What are the key differences and commonalities between ICL and existing learning paradigms (e.g. supervised learning, online learning, reinforcement learning, ‘bayesian’ learning)?
3. What learning algorithms can transformers implement in-context?
4. How, and why, does in-context learning in LLMs arise?
5. How close is ICL in LLMs to universal function approximation?
6. … so on

Challenge: Interpretability methods are absent or lack faithfulness

(Section 3.4 in the paper)

Superposition &SAEs

-Sensitivity to Dataset
- Validity of Linear Representation Hypothesis



- Improper abstractions
- Concept-mismatch between AI and humans

Sub-Challenge 1: Abstractions used for interpretability are often dubious

EMERGENT WORLD REPRESENTATIONS: EXPLORING A SEQUENCE MODEL TRAINED ON A SYNTHETIC TASK

Kenneth Li* Harvard University
Aspen K. Hopkins Massachusetts Institute of Technology
David Bau Northeastern University
Fernanda Viégas Harvard University
Hanspeter Pfister Harvard University
Martin Wattenberg Harvard University

GPT trained on Othello using next-token prediction builds a non-linear world-model representation.

Emergent Linear Representations in World Models of Self-Supervised Sequence Models

Neel Nanda* Independent
Andrew Lee* University of Michigan
Martin Wattenberg Harvard University

Actually, no! It has a 'linear' world-model representation!

What is the difference between two works?

Abstraction!

Our ‘presumptions’ that a model must be doing something in a particular way.

Abstractions matter – A Lot!

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Probes for 'board' state directly in terms of (human abstraction of) colors of the board (Black, White, Empty).

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Probes for (a different abstraction of) 'board' state in terms of which player a piece on the board belongs to (Mine, Yours, Empty).

Not focusing on ensuring correctness of abstractions has proven fateful for prior interpretability works!

Abstraction: Non-linear behavior of NN model can be abstracted in terms of (interpretable) locally linear approximation



2017



2022

Not focusing on ensuring correctness of abstractions has proven fateful for prior interpretability works!

Abstraction: ‘Directions’ in activation space represent knowledge

DISCOVERING LATENT KNOWLEDGE IN LANGUAGE MODELS WITHOUT SUPERVISION

Collin Burns* UC Berkeley
Haotian Ye* Peking University
Dan Klein UC Berkeley
Jacob Steinhardt UC Berkeley

Challenges with unsupervised LLM knowledge discovery

Sebastian Farquhar[*,1], **Vikrant Varma**[*,1], **Zachary Kenton**[*,1], **Johannes Gasteiger**[2], **Vladimir Mikulik**[1] and **Rohin Shah**[1]
[*]Equal contributions, randomised order, [1]Google DeepMind, [2]Google Research

We show that existing unsupervised methods on large language model (LLM) activations do not discover knowledge – instead they seem to discover whatever feature of the activations is most prominent. The idea behind unsupervised knowledge elicitation is that knowledge satisfies a consistency structure, which can be used to discover knowledge. We first prove theoretically that arbitrary features (not just knowledge) satisfy the consistency structure of a particular leading unsupervised knowledge-elicitation method, contrast-consistent search (Burns et al., 2023). We then present a series of experiments showing settings in which unsupervised methods result in classifiers that do not predict knowledge, but instead predict a different prominent feature. We conclude that existing unsupervised methods for discovering latent knowledge are insufficient, and we contribute sanity checks to apply to evaluating future knowledge elicitation methods. Conceptually, we hypothesise that the identification issues explored here, e.g. distinguishing a model's knowledge from that of a simulated character's, will persist for future unsupervised methods.

Dubious abstractions result in real-world failures!

CCS does not even generalize to ‘negation’ statements.

Train Data (Facts)

Paris is capital of France. True

Test Data (NegFacts)

Paris is not capital of France. False

Layer	Facts	NegFacts[1]
-1	.826	.408
-4	.821	.373
-8	.810	.373

STILL NO LIE DETECTOR FOR LANGUAGE MODELS: PROBING EMPIRICAL AND CONCEPTUAL ROADBLOCKS

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Open Problems

1. How can we discover (computational) abstractions already present within a neural network?

2. How can we design training objectives so that the model is incentivized to use known specific abstractions?

Sub-Challenge 2: Concept-Mismatch Between Humans and AI

- Do we have any guarantee that our conception of ‘truth’ is same as a model’s conception of ‘truth’? No!
- In fact, a model may not use a specific concept in the desired way when ‘concept-inference’ and ‘concept-usage’ components of the model are separately trained.



Promises and Pitfalls of Black-Box Concept Learning Models

Anita Mahinpei [*1] **Justin Clark** [*1] **Isaac Lage** [1] **Finale Doshi-Velez** [1] **Weiwei Pan** [1]

Concept-Mismatch Between Humans and AI

Promises and Pitfalls of Black-Box Concept Learning Models

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~70% Accuracy



Setup 1 first learns concept models separately and then uses soft outputs from them to train NNs.

50% Accuracy



Setup 2 uses ground truth labels.

Concept-Mismatch Between Humans and AI: Is it even solvable?
The *only* prior work that has attempted this has encouraging results!

Bridging the Human–AI Knowledge Gap: Concept Discovery and Transfer in AlphaZero

Lisa Schut[1,*], Nenad Tomašev[2], Tom McGrath[2],
Demis Hassabis[2], Ulrich Paquet[2], and Been Kim[2]

[1]OATML, Dept. of Computer Science, University of Oxford
[2]Google DeepMind
[*]Work done at Google DeepMind

Open Problems

1. Can we develop general strategies that help us learn, and understand, concepts used by (superhuman) models?
2. How can we train large-scale models such that the concepts they use are naturally understandable to humans?

Sub-Challenge 3: Sensitivity of Interpretability Results to Dataset

Uses four different (popular) datasets to interpret BERT,
finds that you can get four different interpretability result depending
on which dataset you use to run your interpretability method.



Sub-Challenge 3: Sensitivity of Interpretability Results to Dataset

- Current solution: Let's just use the *complete* training data?
- Problems
  - Extremely compute intensive
  - Still no guarantee that your interpretation will hold on OOD data you might observe in deployment

Challenge: Conceptualizing, Benchmarking and Evaluating Capabilities

(Sections 2.2 and 3.3)

Sub-Challenge 1: We lack rigorous conceptualization of capabilities

What does it mean for an LLM to have a capability?

If we make LLM hide a specific capability (e.g., via RLHF) so that it becomes harder to elicit without jailbreaking, does it still have that capability or not?

How can we establish that a capability is ‘absent’ in an LLM?

Sub-Challenge 1: We lack rigorous conceptualization of capabilities

Traditional ‘special-purpose’ ML Model (e.g. image classifier)	‘General-purpose’ Large Language Models
Strong prior over what ‘capabilities’ it may learn!	Very weak prior over what ‘capabilities’ an LLM might learn.

Teaching Algorithmic Reasoning via In-context Learning

Hattie Zhou[*1], Azade Nova[2], Hugo Larochelle[2], Aaron Courville[1], Behnam Neyshabur[†2], and Hanie Sedghi[†2]

Sub-Challenge 2: We don't know how to 'account' for scaffolding when evaluating LLM capabilities

- An LLM can perform addition well with simple prompting.
- You use 'in-context learning' to show LLM how to perform multiplications by performing addition operations.
- The 'new' LLM can now perform multiplications!

Should we consider 'this' LLM to have the capability to perform multiplication or not?.. Probably no?

What if the same technique fails on another equivalent LLM? Is it fair to say both LLMs *equally* lack in capability to multiply numbers?

Sub-Challenge 3: Our ‘evals’ are not sufficiently trustworthy!

- Prompt-sensitivity causes underestimation of LLMs capabilities.
- Test-data contamination causes overestimation of LLMs capabilities.
- Targeted finetuning (e.g., to make the model not output biased outputs) confounds our evaluation!
  - Model might still be biased – but to detect that you need more ‘creative’ evaluation samples that have not been finetuned on!
- ‘Evaluators’ (both human and LLMs) often have unknown biases, that we don’t understand sufficiently well-enough.
- There are *systematic biases* present in the ecosystem (e.g., underrepresentation of females) that create ‘blind-spots’ for evaluations.

Challenge:
LLM-Agents and Their Inherent Risks

(Section 2.4)

Risks posed by LLM-agents >> Risks posed by LLM-assistants

Sub-Challenge 1: Resurfacing of classical risks associated with ‘reward’ optimization – reward hacking, goal misgeneralization, negative side-effects



Reward Hacking

Goal Misgeneralization

Sub-Challenge 2: Goal-directedness incentivizes undesirable behaviors – lying, deception, power-seeking etc.



Figure 1: GPT-4 takes a misaligned action by engaging in insider trading.

LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS CAN STRATEGICALLY DECEIVE THEIR USERS WHEN PUT UNDER PRESSURE

Jérémy Scheurer*, Mikita Balesni*, Marius Hobbhahn
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London, United Kingdom
{jeremy,mikita,marius}@apolloresearch.ai

Sub-Challenge 2: Goal-directedness incentivizes undesirable behaviors – lying, deception, power-seeking etc.



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Sub-Challenge 3: Reliable monitoring of LLM-agents seems *VERY* hard!



TESTING LANGUAGE MODEL AGENTS SAFELY IN THE WILD

Silen Naihin* David Atkinson† Marc Green‡ Merwane Hamadi*
Craig Swift§ Douglas Schonholtz† Adam Tauman Kalai¶ David Bau†

Many safety proposals include a ‘monitoring’ agent which is supposed to ‘stop’ any harmful actions.

Sub-Challenge 3: Robust monitoring of LLM-agents seems *VERY* hard!



Lots of Open Problems / Research Directions

1. Evaluating what ‘fixes’ from traditional RL Agent safety research transfer to LLM-Agents
2. Creating sandboxed environments for testing ‘safety’ of LLM-agents.
3. Is ‘robust’ monitoring of LLM-Agents *really* impossible?
    a. How should the ‘monitoring agent’ be evaluated? What is a good threat model that may reveal adversarial vulnerabilities of the monitoring system?

Thank you for your time!

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

↑Link to our work