UNITED STATES
ARMY WAR COLLEGE
PRESS
Carlisle Barracks, PA
STRENGTH and WISDOM

PAY ME NOW OR PAY ME LATER: TRADEOFFS IN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT VERSUS "LETTING THEM FIGHT"

Duu Renn
Paul F. Diehl

PKSOI

PKSOI PAPER

PAY ME NOW OR PAY ME LATER: TRADEOFFS IN PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENT VERSUS "LETTING THEM FIGHT"

Duu Renn
Paul F. Diehl

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 22 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5054.

*****

All Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) publications are available on the PKSOI homepage for electronic dissemination. Hard copies of this report also may be ordered while copies last from our homepage. PKSOI's homepage address is: *https://pksoi.army.mil*

*****

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute publishes a quarterly journal to update the peace and stability operations community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications and upcoming conferences sponsored by PKSOI. Each quarterly journal has a specific theme related to peace and stability operations and a commentary by the Director of PKSOI entitled *The Director's Corner*. If you are interested in receiving this journal, please subscribe on our homepage at *http://pksoi.army.mil/subscription.cfm*.

ISBN: 978-0-9861865-4-7

FOREWORD

Are peacekeeping operations always the "right" answer to intra and inter-state conflicts? Do peacekeeping operations actually artificially increase the length complexity of conflicts? In some circumstances do they actually increase casualty levels and prevent reconciliation and conflict termination? Do many peacekeeping missions end up doing more harm than good? Authors Renn and Diehl tackle these challenging and emotional questions and come away from their examination with decidedly mixed answers. The authors provide a tough, thorough examination of a difficult set of issues in hopes of enabling the best possible senior leader decision making in future conflicts.

Daniel A. Pinnell
COL, U.S. Army
Director
Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DUU (Jason) RENN duurenn2@illinois.edu. Duu (Jason) Renn is a Ph.D Candidate in Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His research interests focus on civil wars.

PAUL F. DIEHL pdiehl@utdallas.edu. Paul F. Diehl serves as President of the International Studies Association for the 2015-2016 term. He is Associate Provost and Ashbel Smith Professor of Political Science at the University of Texas-Dallas. His research interests concern peacekeeping, enduring rivalries, and international law.

Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Tradeoffs in Peacekeeping Deployment versus "Letting Them Fight"

Duu Renn and Paul F. Diehl

Introduction

Imagine that a civil war breaks out in an African country, a too frequent occurrence in the post-cold war era. Would that country and the international community at large benefit from deploying a peacekeeping operation to facilitate a peace agreement and then assist in the implementation of such an agreement? The assumption is often made that peacekeeping is inherently good, or at least superior to taking no action in the face of a civil war and its accompanying costs. Yet, is this really correct? In this study we examine the tradeoffs in deciding to deploy a peace operation into a given conflict versus the alternative of letting the conflict continue until a victor emerges or a peace agreement is reached and ultimately the fighting stops. Such tradeoffs raise some ethical dilemmas about if and when to send international forces in the face of civil conflict.

Scholars and policymakers often look to peace operations as panaceas to threats to international peace and security. Largely, this has evolved out of the lack of viable alternatives in terms of collective security as well as the time consuming and often ineffective alternatives presented by economic sanctions and legal processes respectively. Accordingly, the number of peace operations has exploded since the end of the cold war, numbering just under 200 since 1948 according to some counts;[1] these are conducted by an increas-

ing variety of international and regional organizations as well as multinational coalitions. In addition, the range of missions now performed by such operations has also dramatically increased, going beyond cease-fire monitoring to include many peacebuilding activities such as DDR (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration), election supervision, and promoting the rule of law among others.

The dramatic increase in peace operations, especially in civil war contexts, implies that they are effective options in dealing with violent strife. Yet there are several voices that question the wisdom of encouraging cease-fires and associated peace agreements to end civil wars. They argue that it is better in the long run to allow such wars to "run their course" and permit one side or the other to emerge victorious or allow the parties themselves to reach a peace agreement based on outcomes on the battlefield.[2] These scholars claim that the countries involved will be more stable and less likely to revert back to warfare when one side consolidates power. Similarly, rational choice approaches to decision-making[3] caution against brokered peace agreements that do not reflect the prevailing power balance between disputants; such agreements are said to be more likely to fall apart than those whose implementation reflects the strengths of the parties involved.

This study examines the merits of deploying a peace operation versus letting armed conflict continue. Throughout, we compare wars that received peacekeeping and wars that did not, recognizing that the decision to send in a peacekeeping force is not random.[4] Looking at Doyle and Sambanis' list of civil wars from 1945-1999 (see Table 1), approximately 61 percent of cases involve no peacekeeping force and

almost three-fourths of those end with a military victory by one side or the other. Thus, the peacekeeping option is still a minority choice in dealing with civil wars.

Comparisons are made across a number of different goals, focusing on four in particular: promoting a negotiated settlement, keeping the peace after the fighting stops, reducing battlefield and civilian casualties, and promoting democratization respectively. All or several of these are often the core goals of the international community and peace operations in general in the face of civil conflict. In addition, we briefly note some other consequences that follow from the choice to send a peacekeeping force as opposed to choosing to wait for a decisive outcome to the fighting.

In making our evaluations, we rely on the normative standard reflected in utilitarianism, which focuses on the outcomes or consequences of actions, specifically the amount of harm that accrues from the choices made.[5] That is, rather than making an *a priori* normative judgment, an assessment is made based on whether the option chosen (peace operation or do nothing) achieves the desired goals as weighed against any negative consequences that might accrue.

Tradeoffs in Peace Operations

Promoting Conflict Resolution

In the context of an ongoing civil war, the first choice for the United Nations, regional organizations, and leading states is whether to authorize a peacekeeping operation in advance of some type of formal peace agreement to halt the fighting; ideally this would also facilitate a diplomatic settlement to the conflict.

The traditional perspective, reflecting public perceptions and those of sponsoring organizations, re-

gards the deployment of peacekeepers as enhancing peacemaking efforts.[6] This line of thinking draws heavily upon the idea that intense conflict makes the prospects for diplomacy more difficult.[7] According to this rationale, as a conflict continues over time and the warring sides experience intense fighting, peacemaking becomes more difficult because the parties grow more psychologically committed to the conflict.[8] As this commitment deepens, each seeks to punish the other side and achieve a return on their own sunk costs from the conflict. In turn, even when conflicting parties might consider moving toward a peace settlement as the costs of fighting grow unbearable, severe violence serves to heighten the "the bargainer's dilemma" in which disputants fear that a willingness to make concessions toward a peace agreement will be interpreted as a signal of weakness and exploited by their adversaries.

By establishing and maintaining a cease-fire among the warring sides, peacekeepers supposedly create an environment in which the psychological barriers to settlement begin to diminish and the bargainer's dilemma can be attenuated. A cooling off period can lessen hostilities and build some trust between the protagonists. In addition, according to this view, intense conflict puts domestic political constraints on leaders who might otherwise be inclined to sign a peace agreement. Consistent with these arguments, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argues that peacekeeping "expands the possibilities for … the making of peace."[9]

An alternative view sees the roots of violent conflict as an "informational" problem. When two contending sides seek to impose their own preferred solution in a dispute, there is uncertainty about the

outcomes of a potential war between them. Not only are the two sides uncertain about the actual distribution of capabilities between them, but the level of resolve their opponent has in pressing its claim is also unclear. War provides a mechanism for the two sides to gather information about one another's capabilities and resolve, with war ending when the two sides can determine the likely outcome of the confrontation. By stopping fighting, however, peacekeeping interrupts this flow of information, leaving uncertainty about who would win were the conflict to continue and what the terms of settlement might be.

Peacekeeping can also undermine the conflict resolution process in a second fashion. Negotiation and mediation expert I. William Zartman points to the important role of what he terms as a "hurting stalemate," a condition in which conflicting sides reach a point in which neither can defeat the other militarily and impose its own terms of settlement, and each continues to bear unsustainable costs.[10] Intense conflict can provide the means by which these costs are imposed upon the warring sides as each continues to experience casualties and the loss of resources devoted to the conflict. In turn, as a hurting stalemate develops, the pain produced by it can create incentives for the belligerents to look for a way out of their conflict, making them more amenable toward peace settlements. The deployment of peacekeepers to a conflict, while potentially serving to help manage the conflict, also lessens the "ripeness" of a conflict for a peace agreement. In dampening the level of conflict between the belligerents, peacekeepers also reduce the conflict costs faced by the two sides. At the same time, the presence of peacekeepers can reduce the time pressure placed on the combatants to reach a settlement.[11] From this

perspective, allowing the fighting to continue is more likely to produce a permanent end to the fighting and a stable settlement in the long run.

What do we know from empirical findings that could shed light on these competing perspectives? Michael Greig and Paul Diehl lend support for the pessimistic view of the peacekeeping-peacemaking relationship.[12] In general, peacekeeping actually *reduces* the occurrence of diplomatic efforts aimed at settling conflicts. Among both interstate and civil conflicts, when peacekeepers are deployed, the likelihood that conflicting parties will attempt direct negotiations or accept offers of mediation to help settle their conflict was sharply reduced. Some of the most prominent mediation successes, such as the Vatican-mediated settlement of the Beagle Channel Dispute and the U.S.-brokered Camp David Accords took place in the absence of peacekeepers, with renewed peacekeeping deployment between Israel and Egypt taking place only *after* a peace settlement was in place.

Not only does the presence of peacekeepers reduce the likelihood that mediation and negotiation efforts will take place, but the on-the-ground performance of peacekeepers in managing conflict also strongly influences the occurrence of diplomatic initiatives to settle the conflict. When violence subsequently flares up, even after peacekeepers are deployed, mediation and negotiation become even less likely.[13] For example, failed peacekeeping efforts in Somalia only dampened expectations among the warring parties, and indeed within the international community as a whole, that a diplomatic settlement of differences was possible. Finally, Greig and Diehl report that even when diplomatic efforts do occur, the likelihood that mediation and negotiation will lead to a settlement agreement

(as opposed to a simple cease-fire) is reduced in the presence of peacekeepers.[14] Thus, empirically, peacekeeping limits diplomatic initiatives and undermines their effectiveness when they do occur.

Table 1: Peacekeeping and the Likelihood of Negotiation and Mediation Success		
	No Peacekeeping	*Peacekeeping*
Successful Negotiation	43% (0.13)	31% (0.04)
Successful Mediation	41% (0.06)	22% (0.03)

Using data from Grieg and Diehl, we generate the predicted probabilities that negotiation or mediation will lead to an agreement based on the presence of peacekeeping.[15] In a set of civil wars[16] between 1946 and 1999, the probability of successful negotiation or mediation is always higher when peacekeepers are not involved (see Table 1). A civil war includes a successful negotiation in 43 percent of the cases when there is no peacekeeping presence, but drops to 31 percent when peacekeepers are involved. High variability in the estimate for negotiation success, however, means that we are uncertain about the negative effect of peacekeeping in this situation, but are confident that peacekeeping does not increase the prospects for negotiation success. Mediation is about half as likely to succeed when peacekeepers are present (22 percent) compared to when they are not (41 percent); this difference is statistically significant supporting the idea that peacekeeping hinders successful mediation.

Overall, the net effect appears to be that peacekeeping actually diminishes the likelihood of diplomacy

and successful mediation and negotiation, at least relative to not deploying such an operation. Available data do not permit a direct comparison with letting the parties fight on, an option that is embedded within the broad category of "no peacekeeping."[17]

Keeping the Peace: Stability and Peace Duration

Whether peacekeeping or other processes produce a halt in fighting, wars eventually do end, but there remains the concern of preventing a renewal of that violent conflict. Thus, there has been substantial attention to "peace duration," or the time lapse until fighting is renewed as a barometer used to assess the success or "stability" of a given option.[18] Clearly, peace operations likely supervise different post-conflict scenarios than ones occasioned by their absence. The former usually derive from peace agreements agreed to by the participants. Post-conflict situations in which one side was victorious or was able to compel its enemy into stopping the fighting might result in a peace agreement, but this is not necessarily the case; the conditions might be imposed by the dominant side. Nevertheless, how long peace lasts can be compared across these different outcomes.

Most studies of peacekeeping operations find that they are effective at reducing conflict and preventing future violence. Countries that receive peacekeepers, on average, are more likely to remain stable compared to those without such operations. Peacekeeping's positive effect on stability relies on the ability of such operations to convey information between belligerents, reduce the chance of accidental skirmishes, and provide detection and accountability for any violations of the cease-fire. Compared to civil wars that experience no

peacekeeping, V. Page Fortna finds that peacekeepers reduce the risk of subsequent fighting between former belligerents from 50 percent to 75 percent, noting that the effect may even be stronger as peacekeepers often deploy to difficult conflicts where stability is harder to obtain.[19] Other studies reach similar conclusions. After adjusting for the non-random deployment of peacekeepers through matching, Michael Gilligan and E.J. Sergenti show that UN peacekeeping operations reduce the risk of conflict recurrence by 85 percent if deployed at the end of the conflict.[20] Another study finds that peacekeepers reduce the risk of any new civil conflict—either between the former belligerents or new opponents—by approximately 70 percent.[21]

Conclusions about the effectiveness of peacekeeping in lengthening peace duration are based on comparison with the polyglot category of "no peacekeeping." Most often, this does not include what may have occurred if the conflict continued or at best lumps such a scenario together with all others that do not involve peacekeeping, thereby obscuring individual effects. More specific analyses of non-intervention are required to compare the outcomes with those involving peace operations. In her studies on peacekeeping, Fortna also notes that decisive military outcomes tend to improve stability. Compared to a cease-fire or truce, having a clear winner reduces the risk of renewed violence by at least 85 percent while ending a war with a peace agreement has a smaller effect (a reduction of about 60 percent).[22]

A closer examination of war outcomes presents some additional, more nuanced findings, suggesting that the impact of letting the fighting continue is conditional on the final victor in the conflict. Michael Quinn, David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses stress a

distinction between the identity of victors and post-war stability. In civil wars in which the government prevails, peace is far from guaranteed. Compared to government victories, when rebels win, a recurrence of war is 90 percent less likely. Significantly for our purposes, a government victory is also less likely to be stable than a war that ends with an agreement supported by peacekeeping operations. These outcomes are 25 percent less likely to return to war than government victories.[23]

Why are these rebel victories more stable? One reason may be that rebels are more likely to "clean house" following a victory and create conditions that are less favorable to opponents who might compete for the right to govern. This is especially the case in revolutions in which the successful group adopts repressive policies and makes an effort to eliminate all political opposition. At the end of the Costa Rican Civil War in 1948, the victorious rebels forced many of the defeated government officials into exile, avoiding renewed conflict. In contrast, following Guatemala's various civil conflicts in the post-WWII era, the government often won but did not quash rebel organizations, so they regrouped and reengaged the government with violence. This effect is not consistent throughout time, though, as rebel victories are initially more unstable than government victories. In the first year following the end of a war, victorious rebels are twice as likely to return to the battlefield as victorious governments. By the third year, however, the relationship reverses and a government victory becomes less stable than a rebel victory.[24]

Table 2: The Risk of War		
	Risk of Recurrence	
Peacekeeping Compared to Government Victory	-71%	
Settlement Compared to a Government Victory	-43%	
	Risk at 1-Year	*Risk at 3-Years*
Rebel Victory Compared to Government Victory	+200%	-67%

Table 2 provides a summary of the findings based on Mason, Quinn and Gurses's data.[25] As we have seen above, the pacific effect of peacekeeping remains robust. In their model, peacekeeping reduces the risk of conflict by 71 percent compared to a government victory. Although many have argued that a decisive military outcome is more stable, this is only the case initially. After fourteen years, the risk of recurrence in a settlement is actually 43 percent less than in conflicts where the government wins. Finally, we see variation in the effect of rebel victories over time. They are initially much more dangerous—twice as likely to return to violent conflict than wars that end in a government victory—but become less risky if peace continues. By the third year after the conflict, however, a recurrence of war is 67 percent less for rebel victors than wars with government victors.

Are decisive victories a better alternative to peacekeeping? It depends, as not all victories are the same and these outcomes carry their own tradeoffs. Rebel

victories may be more stable than government victories and even agreements backed by peacekeepers in the long-run, but there is also the risk that they fail in the short-term. In addition, the purges, repression and other unsavory means of consolidating power that often accompany rebel victories represent violations of international human rights standards.

Reducing Battlefield and Civilian Casualties

Deciding whether or not to deploy peacekeepers should also include a consideration of the human costs associated with intervention. Most obviously, these involve casualties that take place on the battlefield, but wars also kill and displace civilian populations and continue to do so long after a conflict ends.[26] Do peacekeepers reduce the number of casualties inflicted by war and does this protection come with any tradeoffs?

In the more specific case of UN peacekeeping, a reduction in battlefield deaths occurs when peacekeepers are armed and deployed in a sizable number to intervene in a civil war. In the set of civil wars that occurred in Africa from 1992 to 2011, Lisa Hultman and her colleagues report that armed UN troops reduced battlefield violence to a dramatic degree.[27] The average number of battle deaths in conflicts without UN troops was 22 per month; according to their model, a deployment of 10,000 troops would drop that average to 6 per month, or a 70 percent reduction in battlefield deaths.[28] There is no such reduction in battle deaths, however, when peacekeepers serve a policing or monitoring role. Thus, the ability of troops to separate belligerents forcefully and suppress violence is crucial in reducing the human cost of conflict. Admittedly, large

deployments can be politically and materially costly, but the benefit of these actions not only manifests in a reduction of deaths on the battlefield, but a lessening of tensions between combatants in a period when the risk of war renewal is great.

Additional evidence suggests that peacekeepers are even better at preventing civilian casualties in civil wars. Hultman and colleagues also find that peacekeepers have a larger impact in preventing the loss of civilian lives.[29] With no armed UN troops, the average monthly number of civilian casualties is 106. A smaller increase to 8000 troops drops the average to less than 2, holding other relevant factors constant. Police forces are perhaps even more effective. With no UN policing, the average number of civilian casualties in a civil war is 96 per month. In their model, with a police force of only 200, the average number of civilian casualties decreases to only 14. A police force of 500 reduces casualties to nearly zero.[30] Although mandates for armed troops and police are well-suited to protect civilians, monitors are less capable and are actually associated with an increase in civilian deaths. Perhaps this occurs when perpetrators are not deterred and even spurred on by monitoring missions to attack civilians before a "stronger" peacekeeping force arrives.

Although these results are encouraging from a humanitarian perspective, actual patterns in the deployment of peacekeepers may hinder their ability to prevent casualties. Jacob Kathman's data on UN peacekeeping deployments suggest that most missions involve suboptimal deployments and therefore might be too small to prevent casualties.[31] Recall that a deployment of 10,000 armed troops can reduce battlefield casualties by 70 percent, but the average de-

ployment size for armed troops is just under 3000 and much smaller in the majority of cases.[32] Although 400 police might eliminate civilian casualties altogether, in practice the average size of such forces is slightly below that number, and the median size is only six. The high degree of variability in the size of deployments indicates that the UN tailors missions based not only on humanitarian need, but logistical and political concerns as well. Thus, whereas peacekeeping deployment can save many lives, the full potential for this is often not actualized.

Many recent studies identify international intervention as an effective means of preventing casualties, both on and off the battlefield, but these benefits may have other effects and also depend on the form of intervention. Peacekeeping operations are found to help contain conflict within a geographic region.[33] Thus, even if peacekeepers cannot prevent the violence in their theater of operation, they can prevent conflict from spilling over into neighboring regions. Some studies find that outside intervention, however, may initially increase the danger of genocide or unilateral violence. In anticipation of foreign involvement, combatants ramp up violence to solidify gains before intervention forces arrive. Once they do arrive, violence against protected civilian groups may also serve as a denouncement of intervention and an indirect attack on the resolve of these outside parties.

As noted above, contemplating what would have occurred in a civil war had peacekeepers stayed out is inherently difficult (i.e., it is impossible to prove a negative). Had the conflicts ended in decisive outcomes—that is, if peacekeepers stayed out—we might expect fewer casualties in the short run, as Toft finds that fewer people die per year in these conflicts. In the

long-run, conflicts that end in settlements are much longer than those that end decisively, and thus *ceteris paribus* might involve more deaths.[34] Roughly 50 percent more people die per capita over the entire duration of wars that terminated in settlements than wars with clear victors. Add to this consideration that if a war recurs (which is more common in settlements than in decisive victories), it tends to be increasingly violent, killing combatants and civilians at a higher rate.[35]

Despite these findings, the more detailed evidence suggests that peacekeeping is not an outright worse decision in terms of preventing deaths. Instead, much depends on the mandate and composition of peacekeeping forces. With a proper mandate and sufficient strength, peacekeepers may prevent the loss of life at a relatively low cost, but whether these results extend beyond the post-cold war experience of African civil wars remains to be seen. Similarly, a relatively low material cost[36] may not always translate into the political will necessary for robust peacekeeping.

Democratization/Political Reform

A common feature in peacekeeping since the end of the cold war has been the push for democratization. Indeed, the majority of post-civil war agreements contain provisions for elections.[37] In addition to a normative desire, often from a neoliberal perspective, for these political reforms, studies suggest that democracy should help create room for cooperation and the peaceful resolution of disagreements, even in the contentious political arena of post-war countries.[38] Having a political alternative to violence is also linked to a lower chance of conflict recurrence,[39] but the record of

reform following peacekeeping operations is less than encouraging. Roland Paris criticizes the peacekeeping operations of the 1990s for their narrow focus on elections and economic liberalization, which lacked the necessary commitment to institution building to make reform "stick."[40] Studies on the effect of peacekeeping on democratization are somewhat sparse. Some evidence suggests that outright victory, specifically rebel victory, improves the prospect for democracy, but these results are heavily disputed and any positive impact might be many years in coming.

Does peacekeeping lead to a more democratic future for post-war societies? Given that most peacekeeping operations are designed with democratic reform in mind, it is surprising that there is little evidence that peacekeeping interventions have any effect on democracy. Most authors who examine the effect of peacekeeping on democratization find no strong or consistent effect in the short- or long-term.[41] Fortna finds that when compared to cases where wars end without outside involvement, peacekeeping has no significant effect on the quality of democracy in the year following the war, three years out, or five years after the conflict ends.[42] Similarly, at the ten-[43] and twenty-[44]year mark, countries that received peacekeeping operations are no more democratic than those countries that did not receive peacekeeping operations.[45] Madhav Joshi finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between peacekeeping and democratization and his measure of democracy is different—relying on a three-point shift in subcomponents of an index on institutional openness to represent a democratic transition.[46] The balance of the evidence, however, suggests that there is no clear relationship between peacekeeping and democratization.

The lack of association between peacekeeping and democratization might have little to do with the former and more with the specific barriers in promoting democratic processes and institutions. Peacekeeping cannot rectify problems with flawed constitutions and institutions nor the provision of basic security and economic well-being in the long run.

Monica Toft argues for the benefits of a decisive military victory, specifically one in which a rebel group succeeds in wresting power from the government. In this situation, she argues, victorious rebels take the organizational skills and any popularity that allowed them to win the war, and implement effective political reforms that set the country on a path to democracy. In her analysis, countries that end wars with settlements (most peacekeeping operations would fit in this category) have a temporary increase in the level of democracy, but then reverse course and repress dissidents so much so that within a generation, political institutions are actually less democratic than when the war ended. Nevertheless, the other authors cited above are unable to reproduce Toft's findings about a rebel victory controlling a country's level of democracy.[47] Instead, they find no relationship between rebel victory and the before "level" of democracy,[48] or even a negative one.[49] The idea that a war that ends in a victory for the rebels will produce a more democratic regime, even in the short term, is therefore doubtful.



Figure 1 displays the democracy scores after civil wars, based on data from Fortna and Huang,[50] and arrayed along the commonly used Polity scale of regime types; that scale ranges from -10 to +10 with end points representing extreme values of authoritarianism and democracy respectively.[51] Scores are examined at 2, 5, 10, and 20 years following civil war under several different treatments, including comparing peacekeeping versus no peacekeeping, and whether there was a decisive victory in the war, with consideration also given to the identity of the winner (rebel or government).[52]

Overall, the prospect for democracy in countries that experience civil wars is bleak. Most predicted values are near or below zero, more indicating more authoritarian characteristics than democratic ones; conventionally, scholars consider a state to be a democracy only when its score exceeds +6 or +7 on the scale. On average, the level of democracy in a post-war state that receives peacekeeping is about three

points *lower* than a similar country that receives no peacekeeping and this holds for two decades. Wars that end in decisive victories fair no better, on average. Although rebel victories are slightly more democratic, the difference between these values is neither substantively or statistically significant.

What is the best means to ensure political reform in a country recovering from war—is it through peacekeepers or by waiting for a decisive military outcome? Scholarly analyses suggest that neither has a significant effect on democratization. Yet political reform is much more involved than policing a cease-fire line, registering voters, or defeating an enemy. A temporary presence by a foreign organization should not be expected to sustain a long-lasting democratic transition. Additionally, the locals who participate in the politics of post-war societies may not be too concerned about the democratic process, but just with the political outcomes.[53]

Other Consequences

Our juxtaposition of peacekeeping versus non-intervention was analyzed above on four key dimensions. Yet there are other consequences that flow from these choices. A full consideration of these additional consequences is beyond the scope of this piece. The exact effects allowing fighting to continue will vary tremendously according to how intense and how long the fighting is prior to a cease-fire of, as well as a series of contextual factors. Nevertheless, in making an assessment of the relative utility of the two options, these other consequences need to be part of the calculation.

In addition to their more official activities as peacekeepers, staff members and troops stationed within a conflict zone interact with the community. The impact of these daily interactions between peacekeeping forces and local populations can range from a temporary boost in the local economy, to rare but damaging instances where peacekeepers participate in crime, including sexual violence and human trafficking.

Criminal activity is a common occurrence in states stricken by war. Wars erode the ability of governments to enforce the law and as citizens witness violence and instability, it becomes easier for them to accept and even participate in illicit or illegal behavior.[54] Respect for the rule-of-law in post-conflict societies does not suddenly improve when conflict stops.[55] In the new wave of peacekeeping missions that followed the end of the cold war, the UN often implemented policing as well as peacekeeping[56] and previous sections speak to their effectiveness in protecting civilians. A problem arises, though, when peacekeepers are the ones in need of policing.

With the breakdown of law and order during war, atrocities are more likely to occur, and the longer a war lasts, the more numerous these incidents will be. A cease-fire supervised by peacekeepers and associated local security operations diminishes criminal activity if the operation is at all successful. This provides a clear relative advantage for peacekeeping versus war continuation, but peacekeeping soldiers can also create problems with the local community. Peacekeepers have fathered children with local women and abandoned them at the end of their time in the host country.[57] Peacekeepers have also been implicated in rape and human trafficking.[58] In an attempt to prevent these outcomes, the United Nations has

been recruiting more female peacekeepers, in a hope that having women in the peacekeeping unit will help police the actions of the male peacekeepers.[59] There are also attempts to train peacekeepers and establish oversight, punishing those that harm the local population.[60] Peacekeepers might commit fewer atrocities than they prevent, but the record of the former is far from spotless.

Peace operations also have a number of other outcomes, many of which are unintended and undesirable.[61] These come in a variety of forms. Some are gender-based, as peacekeeping soldiers commit rapes against the local population, spread HIV/AIDS, and may perpetuate discriminatory hiring practices when employing the local population. For example, in 2007, UN peacekeepers (in the UNOCI mission in Côte d'Ivoire) were accused of rape and sexual abuse. Economic distortions include the creation of dual public-sector economies (that of the peacebuilding operation and that of the national government) and the undermining of local markets for services and products because of the displacement of the same by the peace operation.[62] Economic benefits have also been found to benefit urban areas disproportionately and are relatively short-lived, exacerbating issues of inequality and distorting markets.[63] Political corruption, black market activity, and other effects are also possible; these might be committed by peacekeepers or facilitated by their presence as was the case in Bosnia.[64] Presumably, most of the deleterious side effects of peacekeeping would be worse under conditions of continued warfare, but hard and systematic cross-conflict evidence is not available to render this judgment for sure.

Conclusion

When the United Nations was slow to act in Somalia and the Congo, critics were appalled that its member states could allow the civil conflicts to continue without taking concerted action. Although individual cases might vary, we explored whether sending a peacekeeping force versus letting the fighting continue is a superior strategy in general. We use the normative standard provided by utilitarianism, namely judging the relative benefits of each strategy weighed against the harms, focusing on four main goals of the international community in addressing ongoing wars. The results of our analysis reveal something of a mixed bag in terms of the merits of each approach:

- During an ongoing conflict, obtaining a ceasefire and deploying a peace operation makes diplomatic efforts less likely to occur and less successful when they do occur.
- Once an end to the fighting is reached, the relative advantage of each approach varies by time and the identity of the victor in an unconstrained war. Peacekeeping is clearly superior to government victories in civil wars with respect to preventing or delaying the renewal of violent conflict. Rebel victories poses the greatest risk to the return of war in the short-run, but are actually more stable, superior to peacekeeping and government victories, in the long run.
- Peacekeeping can reduce both battlefield and civilian deaths, but only if troop size is large enough; the average operation size, however, is sub-optimal on average and therefore the conflict management is less than could be achieved. Letting the fighting continue results

in more intense fighting and more deaths, but such wars end more quickly and therefore in some circumstances fewer overall deaths might occur.

- Neither peacekeeping nor non-intervention has much impact on the democratization of the target state in either the short or long term.
- The presumption is that more human rights abuses (e.g., rape, genocidal acts) and other negative consequences (corruption, economic distortions) will occur in unconstrained war. Peacekeeping is not immune from such effects, albeit at much lower levels, and sometimes is directly responsible for such occurrences.

The bottom line is that the choice of sending a peace operation to a conflict, as opposed to taking a "hands-off" approach is not clear-cut on utilitarian grounds. Policy makers might be faced with what Greig and Diehl (2005) have referred to as the "peacekeeping-peacemaking" dilemma. Stopping the fighting and sending in a peace force could save combatant and civilian lives as well as prevent the most heinous human rights violations. It also might make the renewal of violence less likely, especially in the short run. Yet all this comes at the expense of promoting a full settlement to the conflict, and in the long run the peacekeeping advantages might dissipate or be reversed under some scenarios.

Endnotes

1. Paul F. Diehl and Alexandru Balas, *Peace Operations*, 2nd editon, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014).

2. Edward Luttwak. "Give War a Chance", *Foreign Affairs,* July/August 1999.; "In Syria, America Loses if Either Side Wins", *New York Times*, 24 August 2013.**,** Monica Duffy Toft. *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).

3. Suzanne Werner and Amy Yuen. "Making and Keeping Peace", *International Organization*, vol. 59, no. 02, 2005, pp. 261-292.

4. We recognize that contexts and the peace missions performed vary dramatically across conflicts and these might affect the kinds of outcomes that can be expected.

5. See Jeremy Bentham, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, (Gloucestershire: Clarendon Press, 1879) and John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government*. (Rockville, MD: Wildside Press LLC, 2007) for a discussion of classical utilitarianism.

6. The description of this perspective is taken from J. Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, "Peacekeeping: A Barrier to Durable Peace?" *The Yale Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 7, no. 1, 2012, pp. 46-53.

7. For example, see Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A Review of Practice", In *Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques*, edited by I. William Zartman and J .Lewis Rasmussen, (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2007).

8. Chester Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall. *Taming Intractable Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

9. Boutros Boutros-Ghali. *An Agenda for Peace*. 2nd edition. (New York: United Nations, 1995), p. 45

10. I. William Zartman, "Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond", In *International Conflict Resolution After the Cold War*, edited by Paul. Stern and Daniel. Druckman, (Washington: National Academy Press, 2000).

11. Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping*. Revised edition. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.

12. J Michael Greig and Paul F. Diehl, "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma", *International Studies Quarterly,* vol. 49, no. 4, 2005, pp. 621-646.

13. *Ibid*.

14. *Ibid*.

15. The statistical models are based on Table 4 from Greg and Diehl, "The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma," pp. 640. We fit a probit model for both negotiation and mediation success, using the presence of peacekeeping as a predictor and controlling for the length of the conflict, the issues at stake, the composition of negotiators/mediators, previous agreements, and a number of other variables. See Greig and Diehl for additional details. Predicted probabilities are based on the change in likelihood when peacekeeping does and does not occur, with all other variables held at their means. We report standard errors in parenthesis.

16. The definition of a civil war differs slightly in these cases. The data source sets a more inclusive threshold of only 200 battle deaths, not the typical one thousand. For more detail about case selection, see Patrick Regan, "Third Party Intervention and the Duration of Intrastate Conflict", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 46, no. 1, 2002, pp. 55-73.

17. Sanctions and other non-intervention options by the international community could be included in this category as well as inaction.

18. Indeed, this is the most commonly used indicator of peace operation success; see Paul F. Diehl and Daniel Druckman, *Evaluating Peace Operations*. (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.)

19. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices after Civil War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

20. Michael Gilligan and E.J. Sergenti. 2007. "Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science,* vol 3, no. 2, 2008, pp. 89-122. Note that the authors find that the UN peacekeepers have no consistent effect when deploy in the midst of a conflict.

21. T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick T. Brandt and Jason Michael Quinn. "When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars", *International Studies Perspectives*, vol. 12, no. 2, 2011, pp. 171-189.

22. Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?* Cf. Toft, *Securing the Peace*. Her statistical model suggests that military victories reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict by twenty-four percent compared to other outcomes.

23. J. Michael Quinn , T. David Mason, and Mehmet Gurses. "Sustaining the Peace: Determinants of civil war recurrence", *International Interactions* vol. 33, no.2, 2007, pp.167-193. Cf. Toft, *Securing the Peace*. Here, rebel victories reduce the likelihood of recurrence by a more modest eleven percent while government victories have no significant effect. Note that Toft does not account for the effects of peacekeeping.

24. T. David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick T. Brandt and Jason Michael Quinn. "Sustaining the Peace."

25. Ibid. Mason and his co-authors use a Cox proportional hazard model to estimate the risk that peace may fail. They account for the effects of war outcomes, peacekeeping, national attributes such as ethnic composition and political institutions, and characteristics of the war like its duration, lethality, and the aims of rebel groups. Their analysis uses a set of civil wars between 1945 and 1999 – the same time period as the previous section – but drawn from Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 48, no. 6, 2004, pp. 814–858. Note that the definition of a civil war in this dataset is defined as a violent domestic dispute involving the government that kills at least 500 deaths in the first year of the conflict. Their complete model appears on pp. 184, Table 1 or their study.

26. Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. "Civil Wars Kill and Maim People – long after the shooting stops", *American Political Science Review,* vol. 97, no. 02, 2003, pp. 189-202, 2003.

27. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman and Megan Shannon. "Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting", *American Political Science Review.* Vol. 108, no. 4, 2014, pp. 737-753.

28. *Ibid*.

29. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War", *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 57, no. 4, 2013, pp. 875-891.

30. *Ibid*.

31. Jacob Kathman, "United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990-2011", *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, vol. 30, no. 5, 2013, pp.532-549.

32. *Ibid*.

33. Kyle Beardsley, "Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict", *The Journal of Politics,* Vol. 3, no. 4, 2011, pp. 1051-1064. Peacekeepers help prevent the geographic spread of conflict to neighboring regions by policing those that cross borders. See also Eric Melander, "Selected to Go Where Murderers Lurk? The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians", *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* Vol 26, no. 4, 2009, pp. 389-154 who finds evidence of this containment effect and evidence that peacekeepers help protect civilians.

34. Monica Duffy Toft. *Securing the Peace*.

35. Ibid. One example of this danger occurred in Angola following the failed Bicesse Accords and a series of verification missions by the United Nations. In the year and a half that followed the failed 1992 elections was the most bloody of the entire conflict with as many as 120,000 died in renewed fighting. A total of

500,000 died in twenty-seven years of war. See Hayward R. Alker, Ted Robert Gurr, and Kumar Rupesinghe. *Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons*, 2001, pp. 181.

36. Hultman et al. "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War", The authors estimate that the cost of increasing the number of UN troops to the level necessary to drop civilian deaths from 106 to 2 per month would be $1.2 million over the course of an average peace keeping operation, while global defense spending tops $1.6 trillion.

37. Anna K, Jarstad, "The Prevalence of Power-Sharing: Exploring the Patterns of Post-Election Peace", *Africa Spectrum*, vol. 44, no. 3, 2009, pp. 41-62.

38. Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis. "Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations," (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

39. Barbara Walter, "Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol 41, no. 3, 2004, pp. 371-388. See also Charles Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence*, (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2012).

40. Roland Paris, At War's End.

41. Virginia Page Fortna. "Peacekeeping and Democratization," in Anna Jarstad and Timothy Sisk (eds) *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of* Peacebuilding, (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 39-79; Mehmet Gurses and T. David Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy: The Prospects for Post-Civil War Democracy", *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 89, no. 2, 2008, pp. 315-336, Monica Duffy Toft, 'Securing the Peace', and Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, "Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 56, no. 4, 2012, pp. 801-808.

42. Virginia Fortna, "Peacekeeping and Democratization." The author looks at changes in Polity Scores, a measure of institutional openness, and the Freedom House index, a measure of political freedoms.

43. Gurses and Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy."

44. Fortna and Huang, "Democratization after Civil War."

45. Joshi is an exception to this general finding, but his analysis relies on a limited shift toward democracy rather than the achievement of full democracy. See Madhav Joshi, "Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005," *Democratization*, vol. 17, no. 5, 2010, pp. 826-855. Similarly, Steinert and Grimm also find some support for a positive and significant relationship between specific "democracy-support" forms of peacekeeping and future levels of democracy. Unlike most of the studies reviewed here, however, Steinert and Grimm rely on Freedom House's assessment of individual freedoms and civil liberties instead of Polity's measure of institutional openness. Their methodological procedure predicts changes in the outcome (more or less democratic) and does not account for the magnitude of these changes. See Janina Steinert and Sonja Grimm, "Too Good to Be True?: United Nations Peacebuilding and the Democratization of War-Torn States," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (published online, 19 December 2004 at *http://cmp.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/12/19/0738894214559671?papetoc*)

46. Joshi, Madhav. "Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005." *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 826-855.

47. This includes the level of democracy at the end of the war and economic development.

48. Fortna, Peacekeeping and Democratization"; Fortna and Huang, "Democratization after Civil War."

49. Gurses and Mason, "Democracy Out of Anarchy."

50. The Polity score is a 21-point index that measures institutional openness. Higher, positive values are typically associated with democratic governance, while negative values correspond to more authoritarian rule. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers. "Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2002", 2002. Fortna and Huang predict Polity using

OLS regression, with clustered-robust standard errors and control variables to account for the effects of war outcomes, characteristics of the war such as the length, cost, and size of the military. For more information on their model, see their paper. Predicted values of Polity come from the linear model and vary depending on the presence of absence of the denoted variables. For the prediction procedure, we hold control variables at their mean.

51. Marshall, M.G., Jaggers, K. "Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002," Polity IV Project, (College Park: University of Maryland 2004).

52. Peacekeeping and war outcomes rarely produce statistically significant results, meaning that in most cases these estimates are not distinguishable from one another despite some changes in values over time.

53. Christopher Clapham, "Peacekeeping and the Peacekept: Developing Mandates for Potential Intervenors," in Robert Rotberg, *Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention, (*Washington: Brookings Institute Press, 2000), pp. 34-56.

54. Carolyn Nordstrom, *Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering in the Twenty-First Century*. vol. 10. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

55. Stephan Haggard and Lydia Tiede, "The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record", *International Studies Quarterly,* vol 58, no. 2, 2014, pp. 405-417.

56. Rama Mani. "Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post Conflict Peacebuilding", *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 6, no. 4, 1999, pp. 9-26.

57. Muna Ndulo, "The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers during Peacekeeping Missions", *Berkeley Journal of International Law,* vol. 27, no. 1, 2009.

58. Charles Anthony Smith and Heather M. Smith. "Human Trafficking: The Unintended Effects of United Nations Interven-

tion", *International Political Science Review* vol. 32, no.2, 2011, pp. 125-145.

59. Olivera Simić, "Does the Presence of Women Really Matter? Towards Combating Male Sexual Violence in Peacekeeping Operations", *International Peacekeeping,* vol. 17, no.2, 2010, pp. 188-199.

60. Nudulo, "The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers during Peacekeeping Missions". The inability to punish peacekeepers is unlikely to change as home countries retain the right to prosecute their peacekeepers and few follow through with disciplinary action.

61. Chiyuki Aoi, Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Cedric De Coning, eds. *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations*. (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007).

62. *Ibid*.

63. Michael Carnahan, William Durch and Scott Gilmore, "The Economic impact of Peacekeeping", (Peace Dividend Trust, 2006).

64. Peter Andreas, Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).



FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/

This Publication

PSKOI Website

USAWC Website

ISBN: 978-0-9861865-4-7