

The Evolution of the U.S. Airlines Industry: Networks, Competition, and Consumer Welfare

Nate H. Miller¹ Nicholas G. Rupp² Drew Van Kuiken³ Jon Williams⁴

¹Georgetown University

²East Carolina University ³UNC - Chapel Hill

November 20, 2024



THE UNIVERSITY
of NORTH CAROLINA
at CHAPEL HILL

Concentration Is Increasing

	2000	2010	2019
American	11%	12%	21%
Continental	7%	5%	-
Delta	16%	19%	20%
Southwest	16%	23%	21%
United	12%	11%	15%
U.S. Airways	11%	10%	-
Total	73%	71%	77%

Rise of Market Power?

- Or network growth ⇒ more competitive markets, higher quality for consumers

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
Rise of Market Power?

- Or network growth ⇒ more competitive markets, higher quality for consumers
- How have consolidation, LCC-entry, and changing airline networks shifted the level and allocation of consumer surplus?

Data

Main dataset: DB1B, 1998-2022

- 10% sample of all domestic origin and destination passenger tickets
- Aggregated at month-market/ticket/coupon level
- We **do** know the price of the entire ticket, route flown, distance in miles
 - We **do not** know fees paid, cabin-type, or the date of purchase
- For demand model: 26,000 one-way markets, 12 airlines, **only estimated on 2015-2019**
- Markets and airlines qualify if they have at least 10 passengers/quarter in all quarters for a given year
- Smallest airlines: Virgin America, Sun Country, Hawaiian Airlines



Two-Level NL Demand

Log(Share Nonstop/Connect. Nest)	0.62*** (0.01)
Log(Share Air Travel/Outside Nest)	0.32*** (0.01)
Price (1000s)	-23.66*** (0.48)
Nonstop	1.34*** (0.02)
Route Miles (in 1000s)	0.35*** (0.02)
Nonstop x Average Frequency (100s)	0.17*** (0.01)
Nonstop Network Size (100s)	0.71*** (0.02)
Connecting Network Size (100s)	0.50*** (0.01)
Carrier Type	Yes
Origin-Year-Quarter	Yes
Destination-Year-Quarter	Yes
N	2,789,463

Implied:

	Mean
Elasticity	-3.96
Marginal Cost	\$66
Lerner Index	.35

**The actual
presentation
is below**

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Rise of Market Power?


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
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


Nonstop Network Size




- Consolidation ⇒ network changes
- Availability of direct flights broadly increasing
- Southwest has tons of direct flights

Connecting Network Size



- Consolidation ⇒ network changes
- Size of one-stop network increasing but more slowly
- Southwest has tons of direct flights, few connecting flights
- Different business models?



This Paper:

1. Estimate demand, back out marginal costs, project marginal costs for 2015-2019
2. Fix product quality, demand/cost shocks in 2019. Project demand and marginal costs backward to 1998
3. Calculate counterfactual prices and welfare

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Estimate a two-level nested logit model of demand:

$$u_{irt} = x_{rt}\beta - \alpha p_{rt} + \xi_{rt} + \nu_{it} + (1 - \sigma_2)\nu_{igt} + (1 - \sigma_1)(1 - \sigma_2)\varepsilon_{irt} \quad (1)$$

- ν_{it} =Air Travel/Outside Good, ν_{igt} =Nonstop/Connecting
- σ close to 1 \Rightarrow substitutes, close to 0 \Rightarrow MNL, nest doesn't matter. Require $1 \geq \sigma_1 \geq \sigma_2 \geq 0$
- $x = \{\text{Nonstop Flag, Distance, Nonstop} \times \text{Average Frequency, Nonstop Network Size, Connecting Network Size}\}$
- Instruments = {BLP Own-Product Averages, BLP Rival-Product Averages, Tax Shifters, Capacity Instruments}
- Specifications not shown = {Various FEs, Bag Fees, BLP Own/Rival Sums, Product Differentiation IVs}


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Model Fit with Different FEs



Estimating Marginal Costs

To project marginal costs backwards, need a model of structural determinants of marginal cost:

$$mc_{jrt} = \sum_{c=1}^{\mathcal{C}} \mathbb{1}_{j \in c} (\gamma_{c1} \text{Distance}_r + \gamma_{c2} \text{Nonstop}_r) + \lambda_t + \lambda_{act} + \omega_{jrt} \quad (2)$$

where:

- j is a carrier, r is a route, and t is year-quarter fixed effects
- $|\mathcal{C}| = 3$: Legacy carriers, Southwest, and Other
- λ_{act} includes fixed effects for all airports that touch route r irrespective of place in route

Carrier Type	\times Distance	\times Nonstop
Legacy	0.034	-13.294
Southwest	0.024	-22.623
LCC/Other	0.019	-27.500
Fixed Effects		
Year-Quarter		Yes
Airport-Carrier Type		Yes
R ²		0.36
Observations	2,789,499	

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- Congestion captured by airport-carrier type-time fixed effects
- Fit is solid, but unclear how structural these structural parameters are
- When projecting backwards, time-invariant

Projecting Backwards

- Use time fixed effects from 2019q1
- Time-varying elements of demand: networks, prices. Set prices = 0, calculate later
- Time-varying elements of marginal cost: none

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Iteratively solve:


- Prices + demand estimates imply market shares
- \Rightarrow Use Nash-Bertrand assumption to find counterfactual prices based on marginal costs and share derivatives:

$$mc = p + \Delta^{-1} \cdot s/\alpha$$


Fit Assessment

Counterfactual vs. Actual Prices, Based on Inputs


Demand and Cost Residual




No Demand, Yes Cost Residual




Yes Demand, No Cost Residual



No Demand or Cost Residual



Counterfactual Price Estimation



Carrier Type	\times Distance	\times Nonstop
Legacy	0.007	4.24
Southwest	-0.002	1.31
LCC/Other	-0.02	-4.7
Fixed Effects		
Year-Quarter-Route		Yes
R ²		0.46
Observations		2,789,499


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- Slightly better fit
- RMSE 1/3 the size of prior model
- Harder to project backwards - even more time varying


Fit Assessment

Counterfactual vs. Actual Prices, Based on Inputs


Demand and Cost Residual




No Demand, Yes Cost Residual



Yes Demand, No Cost Residual



No Demand or Cost Residual




Next Steps


- Keep thinking about MC specifications
- Decompose changes in welfare: how much of increase in welfare is due to improved networks, increased competition, or population growth?
- Retrospective: more merger analysis, e.g., what would welfare look like if we shut down the American-US Airways merger?

Appendix

Fares: Dropping Across the Distribution




Distribution: Number of Available Nonstop Destinations




Slightly decreasing, but effect is small

Nonstop vs Connection Shares: 8 Point Jump in Nonstop Share



Passenger Volume by Airline Type: Volumes Are Way Up




LCC + ULCC Share Increased from 20% to 40%

One-Level NL Demand

Log(Share Within)	0.51*** (0.00)
Price (1000s)	-18.64*** (0.40)
Nonstop	1.48*** (0.02)
Route Miles (in 1000s)	0.01 (0.01)
Nonstop x Average Frequency (100s)	0.13*** (0.01)
Origin Nonstop Service (100s)	0.52*** (0.02)
One-Stop Network Size (100s)	0.41*** (0.01)
Carrier-Year-Quarter	Yes
Origin-Year-Quarter	Yes
Destination-Year-Quarter	Yes
N	2,743,978

Implied:

	Mean
Elasticity	-2.69
Marginal Cost	\$94
Lerner Index	.30



Berry and Jia (2010) report average lerner index of 0.60