

# **Global Classification of Health Information Systems as Critical, Protected, or High-Security Infrastructure**

A comparative study  
(updated through January 2026)

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Comparative analysis of **17 jurisdictions** with detailed chapter coverage,  
plus **20+ countries** surveyed across Latin America, ASEAN, Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia

# Executive Summary

This comparative study analyzes how **17 jurisdictions** classify health-related information systems and operators as critical infrastructure, plus an additional **20+ countries** surveyed across Latin America, ASEAN, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Whether framed as *critical information infrastructure*, *critical entities*, *essential services*, or equivalent constructs, this report identifies global patterns and actionable insights for policymakers.

## Scope of Analysis

Coverage	Count	Regions
<b>Deep-dive chapters</b>	17	North America, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Middle East
<b>Multi-region survey</b>	20+	Latin America, ASEAN, Africa, Central Asia, Eastern Europe

## Key Findings

- Universal prioritization of life-and-safety digital functions.** Across all 17 jurisdictions, consistent prioritization emerges for: emergency dispatch systems, major hospital clinical platforms (EMR/EHR, ICU monitoring), blood and organ allocation services, disease surveillance systems, and national health information exchanges.
- Multiple designation models, converging on hybrids.** Approaches include:
  - Sector-based** (USA, Canada): broad coverage, lower precision
  - Entity-based** (UK, EU, France): clear accountability, scalable
  - System-based** (Singapore): precise, but complex to administer
  - Asset-based** (Australia, Germany): explicit thresholds, easy to verify
  - Hybrid models** increasingly common: combining quantitative thresholds with qualitative “safety net” criteria
- Criteria public; lists often confidential.** Most regimes publish designation *criteria* (enabling self-assessment) while keeping specific entity lists confidential to avoid creating target lists.  
**Exception:** South Korea publishes designations in the Official Gazette.
- Tiering structures vary.** From binary (designated/not) to multi-tier:
  - Two-tier:** EU NIS2 (Essential/Important), Hong Kong (Category 1/2/3 obligations)
  - Three-tier:** Israel (Basic/Medium/High database security)
  - Single-tier + enhanced:** Australia (Critical Hospital → SoNS)
- 2025–2026: A regulatory inflection point.** Eleven major regulatory milestones across eight jurisdictions are entering force, with convergence toward 24-hour early warning and 72-hour detailed incident reporting.

## Key Regulatory Milestones (2025–2026)

Date	Jurisdiction	Milestone	Health Sector Impact
1 Apr 2025	Switzerland	Cybersecurity Ordinance (CSV) in force	24h reporting for hospitals, labs
30 May 2025	Australia	Ransomware payment reporting mandatory	Applies to critical hospitals
14 Aug 2025	Israel	Privacy Protection Law Amendment 13	3-tier database security levels
24 Sept 2025	Taiwan	Revised Cyber Security Management Act	MoDA as competent authority
1 Oct 2025	Norway	Digital Security Act in force	Health as “socially important service”
Nov 2025	UK	Cyber Security Bill introduced	Expands to MSPs, 24h reporting
6 Dec 2025	Germany	NIS2 implementation law in force	30,000-case hospital threshold
1 Jan 2026	Hong Kong	CI Ordinance in force	12h/48h/14d incident reporting
1 Jan 2026	Australia	Strict enforcement posture begins	Enhanced supervision of ICU hospitals
May 2026	USA	CIRCIA final rule expected	72h incident/24h ransom reporting
17 July 2026	EU	CER Directive deadline	All-hazard resilience for health

## Incident Reporting: Global Convergence

Reporting Stage	Emerging Standard	Jurisdictions
Early warning	12–24 hours	Hong Kong (12h), Norway (24h), Switzerland (24h), EU NIS2 (24h), UK (24h)
Detailed notification	48–72 hours	Hong Kong (48h), Norway (72h), EU NIS2 (72h), USA CIRCIA (72h)
Final report	14–30 days	Hong Kong (14d), Norway (1 month), EU NIS2 (1 month)
Ransom payment	24 hours	USA CIRCIA, Australia

## Designation Models (Taxonomy)

Model	Description	Examples
<b>System-based</b>	Specific systems designated	Singapore (CII)
<b>Entity-based</b>	Operators/providers designated	UK (OES), EU (NIS2), France (OIV)
<b>Asset-based</b>	Specific facilities designated	Australia (ICU hospitals), Germany (30k cases)
<b>Sector-based</b>	Obligations apply to classes	USA (HPH sector), Canada (10 CI sectors)
<b>Hybrid</b>	Combined approaches	Germany (KRITIS + NIS2), Hong Kong

## Health Entities Most Commonly Designated

Near-universal inclusion (80%+ of frameworks):

- Hospitals with ICU/emergency capability
- National/regional health information exchanges
- Blood and organ allocation services
- Disease surveillance systems
- Emergency ambulance dispatch (CAD)

Frequently included (50–80%):

- Medical laboratories (reference/diagnostic)
- Pharmaceutical manufacturers/distributors
- Medical device manufacturers

## Evidence Labels

Where this report lists systems “most likely” to be treated as critical:

- (A) **Explicit** — directly stated in law/regulation
- (B) **Guidance** — stated in official policy documents
- (C) **Criteria inference** — inferred from published thresholds
- (D) **Expert judgement** — reasoned where sources are incomplete

## Methodology

This analysis synthesizes:

- Official legislation and regulations (updated through January 2026)
- Competent-authority guidance documents and consultation papers
- Primary source verification for all 17 deep-dive jurisdictions
- Multi-region survey based on official government and agency sources

All substantive claims are supported by numbered references. Where lists are confidential, the report distinguishes between what is directly evidenced and what is inferred.

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# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA)

## Final category

**Healthcare and Public Health (HPH) Sector** — one of the U.S. **Critical Infrastructure Sectors**.

In the U.S. model, this is primarily a **sector-level classification** (not a single public “designated list” of health information systems).

## What is “classified” or “designated” in practice?

### 1) Sector classification (public)

CISA describes U.S. Critical Infrastructure as organized into multiple sectors; **Healthcare and Public Health** is one of them.

### 2) Entity/asset scoping for incident reporting (developing, rule-based)

Under **CIRCIA**, reporting obligations apply to “covered entities” in critical infrastructure (as further defined by rulemaking). The law sets **reporting timelines** (e.g., covered cyber incidents and ransomware payments) but the exact boundary of “covered entity” is operationalized through regulation.

## Exact criteria used (as expressed in the cited U.S. materials)

### A) Sector boundary (HPH scope)

The HPH sector includes both **public health** and **healthcare** functions/services (sector overview framing).

### B) Criticality logic that drives “what systems matter most” (functional dependence)

The HPH Sector-Specific Plan notes that the sector **depends on vast, complex information technology systems** and the **rapid, secure transmission and storage of large amounts of data**—a direct rationale for treating key health information systems as high-impact from a resilience/security perspective.

### C) CIRCIA reporting thresholds (obligation trigger)

CIRCIA sets statutory reporting clocks: **covered cyber incidents** must be reported **within 72 hours**, and **ransomware payments** **within 24 hours** (as summarized in the fact sheet).

## **Is there grading / tiering of “criticality” for health information systems?**

The U.S. approach is expressed more as:

- a **sector construct** (HPH as a CI sector), and
- **reporting/obligation scoping** via CIRCIA’s “covered entity / covered incident” framework,

rather than an explicit **public tiering scheme** that assigns every health information system to a graded level.

However, CISA operational publications do show **risk-impact thinking** (e.g., protection goals like availability/integrity for “critical HPH systems, functions, and data”).

## **What is public vs confidential?**

**Public** \* The fact that HPH is a **Critical Infrastructure Sector** is public. \* High-level reporting obligations and timelines under CIRCIA are public (as summarized by CISA).

**Potentially non-public / organization-specific** \* Exact lists of which specific hospitals/entities/systems are most critical in a given locality or network are typically handled through **risk management and coordination**, rather than a single universal public register in the materials provided. \* RVA-type findings are published in anonymized form; the advisory describes the engagement and outcomes without naming the organization.

## **Which *health information systems* are most likely to be treated as “highest criticality” in the U.S. framing?**

CISA sector documents and advisories emphasize **mission-essential functions, data dependence, and operational disruption patterns**. Consequently, the “highest criticality” systems in the health sector typically cluster into these categories:

### **1) Care-delivery operational systems (availability-critical)**

Systems whose loss disrupts direct patient care delivery and continuity: \* Core clinical workflow platforms and associated identity/access dependencies (because HPH depends on large, complex IT and rapid/secure data flows).

CISA’s mitigation guide is explicit that threats can affect **critical HPH systems, functions, and data** and highlights patient-focused service impacts as a central concern.

### **2) Public-health coordination and information flows (societal-impact critical)**

Systems enabling public health operations and situational awareness—because the sector’s planning and operations depend on **information sharing and data**. The SSP explicitly frames dependency on secure transmission/storage at scale.

### **3) Enterprise IAM / domain services and internal network controls (blast-radius critical)**

CISA's RVA advisory shows that once an attacker is “inside,” **misconfigurations/weak passwords** can enable **domain compromise**, and it highlights actions like **phishing-resistant MFA for administrative access**, removing default credentials, and **network segregation**—all pointing to IAM/domain control planes as high criticality in health enterprises.

### **4) Vulnerability/patch posture for legacy and exposed systems (exploitability critical)**

The same RVA advisory documents issues such as weak password policy and stresses the importance of stronger credential hygiene (e.g., longer passwords), patching, and segregation when patching is not possible—patterns highly relevant to clinical environments with legacy platforms and constrained devices.

### **5) Ransomware resilience dependencies (operational continuity critical)**

The ransomware advisory for HPH explicitly frames ransomware as an operational disruption problem for the sector—driving prioritization of systems needed for continuity of care and contingency operations.

## **Practical “tests” (derived from the U.S. documents)**

A health information system in the U.S. context is most plausibly “high criticality / highest security priority” if it satisfies one or more of these document-grounded tests:

1. **IT-dependence test:** It is part of the “vast, complex” IT environment required for healthcare delivery and for rapid, secure data movement/storage at scale.
2. **Service disruption test:** Its compromise materially affects “critical HPH systems, functions, and data,” especially patient-focused service continuity.
3. **Enterprise blast-radius test:** Its compromise enables broad takeover (e.g., domain compromise) or bypass of administrative control—highlighted by CISA’s RVA outcomes and recommended mitigations (phishing-resistant admin MFA, default credential removal, segregation).
4. **Regulatory reporting relevance test (CIRCIA):** Incidents affecting it are more likely to be “covered cyber incidents” (depending on final covered-entity definitions) and therefore time-bound reporting obligations (72h/24h) become operationally relevant for the owning organization.

## **References (USA)**

1. CISA — Critical Infrastructure Sectors (includes Healthcare and Public Health as a sector). ([CISA](#))
2. CISA — Healthcare and Public Health Sector (sector overview framing). ([CISA](#))
3. NIPP Sector-Specific Plan: Healthcare and Public Health (2015) — dependency on complex IT and rapid/secure data flows. ([CISA](#))

4. **CISA — CIRCIA Fact Sheet (2022)** — 72-hour covered incident reporting and 24-hour ransomware payment reporting timelines. ([CISA](#))
5. **CISA — AA23-349A: HPH Sector Risk & Vulnerability Assessment** — internal weaknesses leading to domain compromise; recommended mitigations. ([CISA](#))
6. **CISA — AA20-302A: Ransomware Activity Targeting the HPH Sector** — operational disruption framing for HPH ransomware. ([CISA](#))

# AUSTRALIA

## Final categories (what the law actually classifies)

1. Critical infrastructure asset (health care and medical sector): “critical hospital” — a hospital that has a “general intensive care unit”. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
2. CIRMP in-scope subset: “designated hospital” — a critical hospital mentioned in Schedule 1 of the Critical infrastructure risk management program Rules (LIN 23/006); Part 2A (CIRMP) applies to a designated hospital. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
3. Higher-tier classification: “system of national significance (SoNS)” — the Act creates Enhanced cyber security obligations (Part 2C) that operate in relation to systems of national significance, including statutory incident response planning obligations and related requirements. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### A) “Critical hospital” (health CI asset trigger)

- Definition (Act): “critical hospital means a hospital that has a general intensive care unit.” ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- “General intensive care unit” definition (Act): the Act defines what qualifies as a “general ICU” (capable of mechanical ventilation for several days and invasive cardiovascular monitoring, with specified specialist support). ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- Sector mapping (Act): “a critical hospital is taken to relate to the health care and medical sector.” ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- Critical infrastructure asset listing (Act): “critical hospital” is included in the Act’s definition/listing of critical infrastructure assets. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

### B) “Designated hospital” (CIRMP / Part 2A trigger)

- Definition (Rules): “designated hospital means a critical hospital mentioned in Schedule 1.” ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- Part 2A application (Rules): for the Act’s Part 2A application provision, the Rules specify that Part 2A applies to... (g) a designated hospital. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

### C) SoNS (Enhanced cyber security obligations trigger)

- Enhanced cyber security obligations exist in the Act (Part 2C), and are expressly framed as relating to systems of national significance. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- Example of SoNS-linked obligation (Act): the Act sets out SoNS-related requirements around incident response plans (including compliance, review, update, and provision to the Secretary), and specifies that an incident response plan for a SoNS must relate to cyber security incidents and plan for responding to incidents with relevant impact. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

## Grading / tiering schemes (what is explicit vs not)

What is explicit in instruments (evidentiary):

- **Binary at the asset layer:** “critical hospital” is the health-sector CI asset class in the Act. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- **CIRMP step-up:** “designated hospital” is a defined subset, and the Rules explicitly apply Part 2A (CIRMP) to it. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- **Further step-up exists for SoNS:** the Act explicitly provides an additional layer of obligations under Part 2C for systems of national significance. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

What is not explicit (and should not be asserted as fact):

- The law does **not** publish a universal “Tier 1/2/3” label scheme for hospitals; any “tiering” language is a **presentation convenience** rather than a statutory classification.

## Health information systems most likely treated as “high criticality” in practice

**Interpretation (not a direct statutory list):** The SOCI framework designates **assets (hospitals / SoNS systems)** rather than enumerating specific hospital IT systems. However, the CIRMP Rules define **“cyber and information security hazard”** in terms of improper access/misuse of information or computer systems related to the CI asset, or use of computer systems to obtain unauthorised control/access that might impair functioning. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

**Interpretation (supported by the obligation scope above):** for **critical hospitals / designated hospitals**, systems that are tightly coupled to delivering the hospital’s critical functions (and whose compromise would plausibly “impair its proper functioning”) are the ones most likely to be operationally prioritised under CIRMP cyber/information security hazards (e.g., core clinical and operational platforms). ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

**Additional evidentiary hook (Rules):** the Rules explicitly note that a **data storage system** meeting requirements under **subsection 9(7) of the Act** for an in-scope CI asset is **taken to be part of the CI asset**, and include “material risk” examples referencing impacts to ICT/OT and to **data storage systems holding business critical data**. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

## Public vs confidential (what is public, what is not)

- **Public (criteria/instruments):** the Act and the CIRMP Rules (including the definition of “designated hospital” and the fact Schedule 1 exists) are published. ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))
- **Register / lists not public (Act):** the Act provides that the Secretary must keep a Register and “must ensure that the Register is not made public.” ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

## References (Australia)

1. **Australian Government — Federal Register of Legislation.** *Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018* (Compilation incl. definitions of “critical hospital” and “general intensive care unit”; health-sector mapping; register confidentiality; Part 2B/2C structure; SoNS-related obligations). ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

2. **Australian Government — Federal Register of Legislation.** *Security of Critical Infrastructure (Critical infrastructure risk management program) Rules (LIN 23/006) 2023* (Compilation 04 Apr 2025: definition of “designated hospital”; Part 2A application to designated hospitals; definition of cyber/information security hazard; data storage system note; material risk examples). ([Federal Register of Legislation](#))

# EUROPEAN UNION (NIS2)

## Legal basis

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (“NIS2”). ([EUR-Lex](#))

## Final Categories (what the Directive actually creates)

### 1) Essential entities

NIS2 defines “essential entities” in Article 3(1) (including Annex I entities above the “medium-sized” ceiling, plus several additional categories). ([EUR-Lex](#))

### 2) Important entities

Entities in scope that are not essential are “important entities” under Article 3(2). ([EUR-Lex](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria

### Step 1 – Is the entity in an Annex I or Annex II type?

NIS2 applies to public or private entities of a type referred to in Annex I or II (subject to the scope rules below). ([EUR-Lex](#))

### Step 2 – Size-based scope rule (default rule)

By default, NIS2 applies to Annex I / Annex II entities that qualify as medium-sized enterprises (per EU SME Recommendation) or exceed the medium-sized ceilings, and that provide services/carry out activities in the Union. ([EUR-Lex](#))

### Step 3 – “Regardless of size” triggers (explicit in Article 2(2)–(4))

Even if below the medium-sized threshold, the Directive also applies regardless of size to Annex I/II entities where (among others):

- the entity is the **sole provider** in a Member State of an essential service, **or**
- disruption could have a **significant impact** on **public safety / public security / public health**, **or**
- disruption could induce a **significant systemic risk** (including cross-border impact), **or**
- the entity is critical due to **specific importance at national/regional level** for a sector/service or interdependent sectors. ([EUR-Lex](#))

Also: entities identified as critical entities under Directive (EU) 2022/2557 fall within scope regardless of size (Article 2(3)). ([EUR-Lex](#))

## Step 4 – Essential vs Important classification (Article 3)

- **Essential** includes (a) Annex I entities that exceed the medium-size ceilings, plus other listed categories (and Member State identifications under Article 2(2)(b)–(e)). ([EUR-Lex](#))
- **Important** = Annex I/II entities that are in scope but **do not qualify as essential**. ([EUR-Lex](#))

## Health sector coverage

### Annex I (Essential-sector types) – Health

Annex I includes a **Health** sector with: \* **Health care providers**, and \* **EU reference laboratories**. ([EUR-Lex](#))

### Annex II (Important-sector types) – Health-adjacent manufacturing

Annex II includes manufacturing categories that cover (among others):

- medical devices,
- in vitro diagnostic medical devices, and
- medicinal products. ([EUR-Lex](#))

**Interpretation (explicitly marked):** NIS2's legal "final categories" are **entity categories** (essential/important). It does **not** itself publish a list of "critical systems" in healthcare; instead it places obligations on the **in-scope entity**, and those obligations practically attach to the network & information systems used to provide the covered services.

## Grading / tiering schemes

NIS2's formal structure is a **two-tier classification**: **Essential** vs **Important**. ([EUR-Lex](#)) It also contains **explicit "regardless of size" inclusion tests** (sole provider / public health impact / systemic risk / special national or regional importance), which function as legal "criticality overrides" for inclusion in scope. ([EUR-Lex](#))

## Incident reporting (exact timings in the Directive)

For **significant incidents**, Member States must ensure entities submit:

- **Early warning:** within **24 hours** of becoming aware. ([EUR-Lex](#))
- **Incident notification:** within **72 hours** of becoming aware. ([EUR-Lex](#))
- **Final report:** **no later than one month** after the incident notification (with additional progress/final timing for ongoing incidents). ([EUR-Lex](#))

NIS2 also contains a clause allowing authorities, after consulting the entity, to **inform the public** or require the entity to do so where public awareness is necessary / in the public interest. ([EUR-Lex](#))

## **Lists and transparency (what is mandated vs not mandated)**

### **List requirement (mandated)**

By **17 April 2025**, Member States must **establish a list** of essential and important entities (and review/update at least every two years). ([EUR-Lex](#)) Entities must submit minimum identifying information (name, address/contact, sector/subsector, Member States where services are provided). ([EUR-Lex](#))

### **Publication of the list (not mandated in the text shown)**

In the provisions cited above, NIS2 **requires a list to exist** and prescribes information flows (including statistical reporting to the Commission), but it does **not** state that Member States must publish a public registry. ([EUR-Lex](#)) It also explicitly addresses confidentiality constraints on information exchange (confidential business information, etc.). ([EUR-Lex](#))

### **Interpretation: mapping to “health information systems most likely classified”**

*(These are examples to help operationalize the entity-scoped law; they are **not** lists from NIS2 itself.)* If a **hospital / clinic / health care provider** is in-scope as an essential/important entity, then systems typically implicated will include (as an operational matter): EHR/EMR platforms, PAS, ED/ICU/OR systems, LIS, RIS/PACS, pharmacy/medication systems, blood bank/transfusion systems, identity/access, and supporting infrastructure used to deliver the service. If **EU reference laboratories** are in-scope, then their surveillance/diagnostic IT (e.g., LIMS and associated data flows) are the most obvious in-scope systems. If **medical device / IVD / medicinal product manufacturers** are in-scope (Annex II), then manufacturing/quality systems and supporting enterprise IT used to produce/release products are the most obvious in-scope systems.

## **References (European Union)**

1. Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2 Directive) — Official Journal of the European Union (EUR-Lex PDF). ([EUR-Lex](#))

# CANADA

## Final category

Canada's top-level framing for "critical / protected" health systems is **sector-based**:

1. **Critical Infrastructure (CI)** — "Health" sector (one of 10 CI sectors in Canada's National Strategy / Public Safety Canada CI framework). ([Public Safety Canada](#))
2. **Federally regulated "critical cyber systems"** (designation-based obligations) — via Bill C-8 / proposed CCSPA framework for designated operators of certain vital services/systems within Parliament's jurisdiction (not a "health CI designation list," but relevant to cross-cutting dependencies such as telecom, energy/pipelines, transport, banking/clearing). ([Ministère de la Justice](#))

## Exact legal / policy criteria used

### A) National Critical Infrastructure (Public Safety Canada) – public definition + sector model

**CI definition (public):** CI refers to "processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services" essential to Canadians' health/safety/security/economic well-being and the effective functioning of government. ([Public Safety Canada](#))

**Sector list (public):** The National Strategy enumerates **ten CI sectors**, explicitly including **Health**. ([Public Safety Canada](#))

**How inclusion works (important):** This is a **resilience / partnership framework**, not a single national law that publishes a universal, named list of "designated health information systems." The Strategy emphasizes:

- **shared responsibilities** across federal/provincial/territorial governments, local authorities, and owners/operators, with owners/operators bearing primary responsibility for protecting assets/services; ([Public Safety Canada](#))
- **an all-hazards risk management approach** and improved **information sharing/protection** among partners. ([Public Safety Canada](#))

### B) Federal designation-based cyber obligations (Bill C-8 / CCSPA concept)

What CCSPA would do (as described by Justice Canada):

- **Part 2** would enact the **Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA)** to protect "critical cyber systems" supporting **vital services/systems** within Parliament's jurisdiction that are vital to national security or public safety. ([Ministère de la Justice](#))
- It would authorize designation of **classes of operators ("designated operators")** who own/control/operate critical cyber systems; these operators would have specified obligations. ([Ministère de la Justice](#))
- "Vital" systems/services initially include sectors such as **telecommunications, pipelines/power lines, nuclear energy, transportation, banking and clearing/settlement**, with potential additions by Governor in Council. ([Ministère de la Justice](#))

**Bill text purpose clause (primary text):** the purpose is to protect critical cyber systems to support continuity/security of vital services/systems, including managing cyber risks (incl. supply chain/third-party), protecting systems from compromise, detecting incidents, and minimizing impacts. ([Parliament of Canada](#))

## Grading / tiering scheme

Canada's CI model is primarily **sector-in-scope** (e.g., "Health" as a CI sector) rather than a published graded tiering of all health information systems. ([Public Safety Canada](#))

Under the CCSPA approach (if enacted), the main "tier" is **designation status**:

- **designated operator** vs **non-designated operator** (federally regulated vital service/system operators). ([Ministère de la Justice](#))

## "Higher security" triggers relevant to health (what becomes critical in practice)

Because Canada's national CI approach is sector + consequence + interdependency (rather than a single national list), the most "critical / higher-security" health systems are typically those whose disruption plausibly causes:

- **loss of vital services or harm / loss of life**, which Cyber Centre CI guidance highlights as potential CI impacts; ([Canadian Centre for Cyber Security](#))
- **hospital operational disruption / compromised medical devices** (explicitly called out as a CI cyber-impact risk). ([Canadian Centre for Cyber Security](#))

This supports prioritizing, in practice (examples, not an official list): core hospital operational platforms, emergency workflows, key diagnostic and medication systems, public health coordination platforms, and enterprise identity/network controls that have wide "blast radius."

## Public vs confidential

### Public

- CI definition and the **10-sector list including Health** are explicitly public. ([Public Safety Canada](#))
- Federal legislative instruments (Bill text, Charter Statement, legislative summaries) are public. ([Parliament of Canada](#))

### Typically not public (operational practice)

Specific, organization-level inventories of "most critical" systems (within hospitals/provinces/health authorities) are generally managed via risk management and operational security processes implied by the partnership/owner-operator responsibility model, rather than published as a single universal national register in the cited framework. ([Public Safety Canada](#))

## Latest updates (strictly sourced)

- Public Safety Canada CI overview page shows update metadata (Jan 2025) and reiterates CI definition + the 10 sectors including Health. ([Public Safety Canada](#))
- Cyber Centre CI guidance page shows update metadata (Jul 2025) and reiterates CI definition, sector list, and CI cyber impacts. ([Canadian Centre for Cyber Security](#))
- Bill C-8 (45th Parliament, 1st session): LEGISinfo lists the bill and links to the bill text and Charter Statement. ([Parliament of Canada](#))
- Library of Parliament legislative summary (PDF) notes CCSPA incident reporting requirements for designated operators, including a reporting period that “cannot exceed 72 hours” for reporting certain incidents to CSE. ([Parliamentary Library of Canada](#))

## References (Canada)

1. Public Safety Canada — *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure* (sector list, CI definition, partnership/all-hazards/info sharing model). ([Public Safety Canada](#))
2. Public Safety Canada — *Canada's Critical Infrastructure (CI)* (CI definition; 10 sectors including Health). ([Public Safety Canada](#))
3. RCMP — *Safeguarding critical infrastructure* (10 sectors list including Health). ([RCMP](#))
4. Canadian Centre for Cyber Security — *Security considerations for critical infrastructure (ITSAP.10.100)* web page (CI definition; sector list; CI impacts and mitigations context). ([Canadian Centre for Cyber Security](#))
5. Canadian Centre for Cyber Security — *ITSAP.10.100 PDF* (threats, impacts including hospital operations/medical devices; CI definition). ([Canadian Centre for Cyber Security](#))
6. Parliament of Canada — *LEGISinfo: Bill C-8* (bill listing, links to text + Charter Statement + legislative summary). ([Parliament of Canada](#))
7. Parliament of Canada — *Bill C-8 (First Reading text)* (purpose clause for protecting critical cyber systems). ([Parliament of Canada](#))
8. Justice Canada — *Charter Statement: Bill C-8* (Part 2 enacts CCSPA; designated operators; initial vital services list). ([Ministère de la Justice](#))
9. Library of Parliament — *Legislative Summary of Bill C-8 (PDF)* (incident reporting requirement summary, including period not exceeding 72 hours). ([Parliamentary Library of Canada](#))

# UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected” in this regime)

1. Operator of Essential Services (OES) — Health (England)
  - The DHSC health-sector guide states that “Healthcare services are an essential service under the NIS Regulations” and that “NHS trusts and foundation trusts, integrated care boards (ICBs) and certain independent providers [are] currently designated OESs for healthcare services.” ([GOV.UK](#))
  - The same guide states that the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, acting through DHSC, is responsible for overseeing the NIS Regulations for OESs within the health sector in England (i.e., DHSC is the competent authority for the England health sector). ([GOV.UK](#))
2. Relevant Digital Service Provider (RDSP) — cross-sector category (often relevant to health supply chains)
  - The ICO’s Guide to NIS is explicitly for organisations providing digital services such as online marketplaces, online search engines and cloud services, and it explains RDSP obligations and the ICO’s role as the UK competent authority for RDSPs. ([ICO](#))
  - The NIS Regulations 2018 define “digital service” as including (a) online marketplace, (b) online search engine, (c) cloud computing service, and define “cloud computing service.” ([Legislation.gov.uk](#))
3. Proposed expansion (Bill introduced 12 Nov 2025 — Bill 329)
  - The Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill explanatory notes (within the Parliament PDF) describe new/expanded regulated roles including relevant managed service providers (RMSPs) and critical suppliers. ([UK Parliament](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### A) OES (Health sector, England)

- The DHSC guide states the health-sector OES landscape in England (NHS trusts/foundation trusts, ICBs, and certain independent providers are currently designated as OESs for healthcare services). ([GOV.UK](#))
- The DHSC guide states it is published under regulation 3 guidance duties, and that OESs must have regard to it when carrying out security and incident reporting duties under the NIS Regulations. ([GOV.UK](#))

### B) RDSP (ICO-regulated)

- The DHSC guide lists criteria for being an RDSP (all must apply), including providing an online search engine/online marketplace/cloud computing service in the UK; UK head office or nominated UK representative; and not being a micro/small enterprise (staff/turnover thresholds). ([GOV.UK](#))

- The ICO states its guide summarises obligations for **RDSPs** and explains the ICO's role as competent authority for RDSPs. ([ICO](#))

## **Incident reporting tests and thresholds (evidence only)**

### **OES (Health, England) – “significant impact” + DHSC Table 1 thresholds**

- The DHSC guide states that OES reports must be submitted via the Data Security and Protection Toolkit (DSPT) without undue delay and, in any event, no later than 72 hours after the OES became aware that an NIS incident has occurred. ([GOV.UK](#))
- The DHSC guide states OESs must assess significance having regard to (i) number of users affected, (ii) duration, (iii) geographical area, and provides Table 1 thresholds for the health sector definition of significant impact. ([GOV.UK](#))

Examples of explicit Table 1 thresholds (DHSC):

- Excess fatalities: > 0; Potential clinical harm: > 50 patients at risk. ([GOV.UK](#))
- ED closure/diversion: > 3 hours (major trauma centre); > 24 hours (all other organisations). ([GOV.UK](#))
- Outpatient appointments cancelled: 1,500; Inpatient episodes cancelled: 250. ([GOV.UK](#))
- NHS111 services unavailable: > 3 hours. ([GOV.UK](#))

### **RDSP (ICO) – 72-hour reporting requirement**

- The ICO states: notify the ICO without undue delay and not later than 72 hours of becoming aware of any incident (where feasible). ([ICO](#))
- The ICO also states: only RDSPs notify the ICO; OESs notify their sector competent authority. ([ICO](#))

## **Grading / tiering scheme (as published)**

- The regime is categorical by role (e.g., OES vs RDSP) with different competent authorities and obligations, as reflected in the DHSC guide (OES) and ICO guidance (RDSP), and in the NIS Regulations' definitions/structure. ([GOV.UK](#))

## **Latest updates (2025–2026) – Bill introduced 12 Nov 2025 (Bill 329) (evidence only)**

From the Bill's explanatory notes:

- A two-stage reporting structure is described: initial notification within 24 hours of becoming aware, and full notification within 72 hours (described for OES incidents and similarly for RDSP incidents). ([UK Parliament](#))
- The notes also state that regulated entities must send a copy of notifications to the CSIRT (NCSC in its CSIRT capacity) at the same time as notifying the regulator. ([UK Parliament](#))
- The explanatory notes describe managed services / RMSPs and critical suppliers as added/expanded regulated categories. ([UK Parliament](#))

## References (United Kingdom)

1. **DHSC (GOV.UK):** *The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018: guide for the health sector in England* (OES scope statement; DHSC oversight; DSPT reporting route; 72 hours; Table 1 thresholds). ([GOV.UK](#))
2. **UK Legislation:** *The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (S.I. 2018/506) — PDF* (definitions of digital service / cloud computing service; RDSP references). ([Legislation.gov.uk](#))
3. **ICO:** *The Guide to NIS* (scope: online marketplace/search/cloud services; ICO role as competent authority for RDSPs). ([ICO](#))
4. **ICO:** *Incident reporting (Guide to NIS)* (RDSP-only notification to ICO; “without undue delay and not later than 72 hours”; NCSC notification suggestion). ([ICO](#))
5. **UK Parliament Publications:** *Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill — Explanatory Notes (Bill 329; introduced 12 Nov 2025)* (24h/72h staged reporting; CSIRT copy; RMSPs/managed services; critical suppliers). ([UK Parliament](#))

# GERMANY

## Final categories

Germany applies **two distinct, formal classification layers** that can bring health-sector entities/systems into heightened cybersecurity obligations:

1. KRITIS (Critical Infrastructure) — “Kritische Anlagen” / critical installations (anlagen-bezogen)
  - Instrument: **BSI-Kritisverordnung (BSI-KritisV)** (Verordnung zur Bestimmung kritischer Anlagen nach dem BSI-Gesetz). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
  - Health sector thresholds are in **Anhang 5 (Sektor Gesundheit)**. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
2. NIS2 implementation (entity-based) — “Besonders wichtige Einrichtungen” and “Wichtige Einrichtungen”
  - Instrument: **BSI-Gesetz (BSIG)** (2025 consolidated version on Gesetze-im-Internet), including sector lists in **Anlage 1** and **Anlage 2**. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
  - Official statements indicate the **NIS-2 implementation law entered into force on 6 Dec 2025**. ([Bundesregierung](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (how classification is determined)

### A) KRITIS (Health sector) — threshold test in BSI-KritisV Anhang 5

A health installation is KRITIS-relevant when it matches an Anlagenkategorie in **Anhang 5** and meets the defined **Schwellenwert**.

Examples explicitly shown in the annex include:

- Hospitals (Krankenhaus): **Vollstationäre Fallzahl/Jahr = 30,000**. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
- Labor / lab IT service constellation (diagnostics/therapy-control IT services for at least one lab): **1,500,000** (threshold shown in the Anhang 5 text snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
- Blood/plasma donation control system (**Blut- oder Plasmaspendensteuerungssystem**): **Hergestellte oder in Verkehr gebrachte Produkte/Jahr = 34,000**. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

Timing rule (when KRITIS status applies): the BSI-KritisV provides that an installation is treated as KRITIS from **1 April of the calendar year following** the year in which the threshold is first reached/ exceeded (and ceases similarly after dropping below). ([bmi.bund.de](#))

### B) NIS2 (BSIG 2025) — entity/sector test via Anlage 1 & Anlage 2

Under the BSIG consolidated 2025 version, the sector lists in **Anlage 1** and **Anlage 2** are used to classify organisations as:

- “**Besonders wichtige Einrichtungen**” (especially important) and/or
- “**Wichtige Einrichtungen**” (important),

depending on the applicable sector listing and legal framing. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

Health-relevant entries evidenced in the annexes include:

- **Anlage 1** contains health-related entries such as **pharmaceutical R&D** (in relation to medicines), and references to **medical devices for public-health emergency situations** (linked to EU emergency mechanisms). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
- **Anlage 2** includes **manufacture of in-vitro diagnostics** and related medical device manufacturing language (as shown in the Anlage 2 snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

*(The evidence above is limited to the retrieved official passages.)*

## Registration / notification (explicit requirement)

The BSIG includes a **registration obligation**: covered entities must register **no later than three months** and provide required information to the competent system/authority. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

## Grading / tiering scheme (as evidenced)

- KRITIS (BSI-KritisV): effectively **binary** at installation level (threshold met vs not met), using **numeric thresholds** in Anhang 5. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
- NIS2 (BSIG 2025): **two-tier entity categorisation** via **Anlage 1** vs **Anlage 2** structure (especially important vs important sectors/entities). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

## Public vs confidential

- **Public:** KRITIS thresholds for health are published in **Anhang 5** ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#)), and BSIG sector annexes are also published on [Gesetze-im-Internet](#). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
- **KRITIS statistics:** BSI publishes KRITIS “in figures” (aggregated reporting). ([BSI](#))

## Operational note

Germany’s hospital sector uses **B3S (branch-specific security standard) materials** in practice. The DKG’s submitted B3S document explicitly references applicability beyond only KRITIS hospitals (e.g., those exceeding **30,000** inpatient cases) and frames B3S usage as an implementation approach in context. ([dkgev.de](#))

## References (Germany)

1. BSI-KritisV ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#)) — regulation index. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
2. BSI-KritisV — **Anhang 5 (Sektor Gesundheit)** ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#)) — hospital threshold 30,000 cases/year (and health sector annex basis). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
3. BSI-KritisV — **health/lab IT threshold evidence** ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#) snippet from Anhang 5 showing 1,500,000). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
4. BSI-KritisV — **Blut-/Plasmaspendensteuerungssystem threshold 34,000** ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#) + PDF snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
5. BSI-KritisV **timing rule** (“ab dem 1. April ...”) (BMI PDF + [Gesetze snippet](#)). ([bmi.bund.de](#))
6. BSIG (2025 consolidated) ([Gesetze-im-Internet](#)) + **Anlage 1** + **Anlage 2**. ([Gesetze im Internet](#))

7. Anlage 1 health-related entries (pharma R&D; emergency medical device linkage) (Gesetze-im-Internet snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
8. Anlage 2 health supply-chain entry (in-vitro diagnostics / medical devices manufacturing snippet) (Gesetze-im-Internet snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
9. BSIG §33 registration obligation (“spätestens drei Monate ...”) (Gesetze-im-Internet snippet). ([Gesetze im Internet](#))
10. Entry into force date (6 Dec 2025) — Federal Government + BSI press release. ([Bundesregierung](#))
11. EU Regulation (EU) 2022/123 — Article 22 (“Liste kritischer Medizinprodukte ...”) (EUR-Lex PDF). ([EUR-Lex](#))
12. DKG B3S hospital security standard submission document (2025-07-25) (PDF). ([dkgev.de](#))

# SINGAPORE

## Final Categories

Cybersecurity Act (2018; amended 2024)

- Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) — a **computer or computer system** designated under section 7(1) (i.e., system-level designation, not “whole organisations/sectors”). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

CII sector coverage (policy statement):

- CSA identifies **Healthcare** as one of the critical sectors in scope for CII-protected essential services. ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

## Exact Legal/Regulatory Criteria (designation test)

Under **section 7(1)** (as described in CSA's official FAQ and the Act's Explanatory Statement), a system may be designated as CII where it is:

1. Located wholly or partly in Singapore, and
2. Necessary for the continuous delivery of an “essential service”, and
3. The system’s loss or compromise will have a debilitating effect on the availability of that essential service in Singapore. ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

“Essential service” framing (why healthcare can qualify): the Explanatory Statement describes “essential service” as a service essential to national-level interests (including **public health**) and **specified in the First Schedule**. ([Isomer User Content](#)) Designation mechanics and duration: \* Designation is by **written notice** to the system owner. ([Isomer User Content](#)) \* Designation takes effect for **5 years** unless withdrawn earlier; CSA explains this as allowing periodic re-evaluation as circumstances change. ([Isomer User Content](#))

## Grading/Tiering Schemes

- No published multi-tier grading for CII designation — the regime is essentially **designated CII vs non-CII** (with the list of designated CII itself not public). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

## Obligations once designated (high-level; from official explanatory material + CSA CII Code)

From the Cybersecurity Act Explanatory Statement, CII owners’ duties include (among others):

- comply with **Codes of Practice / Standards of Performance** and directions,
- report prescribed cybersecurity incidents,
- undergo audits at least once every 2 years,
- perform cybersecurity risk assessments at least once a year, and
- participate in cybersecurity exercises if required. ([Isomer User Content](#))

CSA publishes the **Cybersecurity Code of Practice for CII** (PDF) under its legislation resources (non-compliance is enforceable via directions under the Act, per the Explanatory Statement). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

## Healthcare information systems “most likely” designated CII

Strict evidentiary position (what can be said publicly):

- CSA states the list of CII and CII owners is secret for national security reasons, and CII refers to specific computers/systems explicitly designated (not “firms and sectors”). Therefore specific health systems (e.g., NEHR, ED systems, etc.) cannot be confirmed as CII from public sources. ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

Related but not a CII designation list (health sector cyber requirements):

- MOH has issued **Cyber and Data Security Guidelines for Healthcare Providers** in the context of safe contribution/access to NEHR (this is a healthcare-sector cyber baseline document, not a publication of CII designations). ([Health Information](#))

## Public vs Confidential

Public:

- CSA publicly describes the **CII definition** and **critical sector scope** (including healthcare) and links to CII regulatory materials and Codes of Practice. ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

Confidential:

- The list of CII and CII owners is secret (CSA's explicit statement). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

## Latest Updates (2024–2026) — what can be evidenced from official sources

- CSA states **amendments to the Cybersecurity Act were passed in Parliament in May 2024**, including updates to the CII provisions (and new regulated classes like STCC/ESCI/FDI). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))
- CSA's legislation pages show the current published **CII Code of Practice** and its last-updated date on the site. ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))

## References (Singapore)

1. **Cyber Security Agency of Singapore (CSA).** FAQs — Cybersecurity Act (CII definition; sectors; secrecy of CII list; 5-year designation rationale). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))
2. **Government of Singapore / CSA.** Cybersecurity Act — Explanatory Statement (PDF) (section-by-section explanation including section 7 test; 5-year effect; duties like audits/risk assessments). ([Isomer User Content](#))

3. **CSA. Cybersecurity Act (overview page)** (notes amendments passed May 2024; sector list including healthcare; links to official sources). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))
4. **CSA. Codes of Practice page** (official listing and link to CII Code of Practice PDF). ([Cyber Security Agency of Singapore](#))
5. **CSA. Cybersecurity Code of Practice for Critical Information Infrastructure (PDF)** (detailed CII owner requirements). ([Isomer User Content](#))
6. **Ministry of Health (Singapore). Cyber & Data Security Guidelines for Healthcare Providers (PDF)** (NEHIR-linked healthcare provider cyber requirements; not a CII designation list). ([Health Information](#))

# JAPAN

## Legal Basis

- **Basic Act on Cybersecurity (Act No. 104 of 2014)** — establishes the national cybersecurity policy framework and defines *critical social infrastructure providers* as those providing infrastructure foundational to people's lives/economic activity where failure/deterioration would have enormous impact.
- **Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection** (Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters; June 17, 2022; revised March 8, 2024) — sets the government-wide CIP framework and terminology for CI operators, CI sectors, CI services, and “critical information systems”.

## Final Categories (as used in the CIP framework)

From the Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection:

- **CI sectors:** the policy glossary enumerates CI sectors including “**medical services**” (among other sectors).
- **CI operators:** defined in the policy as “critical social infrastructure providers” (per the Basic Act) and further scoped via **ANNEX 1**.
- **Critical information systems:** information systems required to provide CI services, designated for each CI operator based on degree of impact on CI services.

## “Medical services” as a CI sector – what the policy explicitly says

ANNEX 1 (scope/examples) includes:

- Medical services — Medical facilities (excluding small scale facilities), with example critical information systems such as:
  - “medical examination record management systems”
  - “medical examination support systems”
  - “community medical care support systems”

ANNEX 2 (service explanation/outage examples) includes for medical services:

- CI service: “medical examination / examination and treatment”
- Example impacts: hindrance to medical examination support departments; malfunction of medical equipment threatening human life
- Referenced guidance: “Guideline on Safety Management of Medical Information Systems”

## Health-sector cybersecurity governance signals from MHLW (evidence from your PDFs)

- **Basic Policy for Cyber-security Measures at Medical Facilities:**
  - The policy context explicitly places healthcare cyber measures alongside:
    - \* “Basic Act on Cyber-security”

- \* “Fourth action plan on information security measures for critical infrastructure”
- \* and depicts **Healthcare CEPTOAR** within the information-sharing / reporting ecosystem.
- It also describes preparation of a **checklist** to facilitate checks at medical facilities and indicates positioning cybersecurity-measure status checks as part of **on-site inspection** framing.

#### **Guidelines on Safety Management of Healthcare Information Systems (Ver. 6.0 outline/major points)**

- The version history explicitly notes that **Version 2** was “revised from the viewpoint of health-care information systems as **critical infrastructure**.”
- It also notes that because **online qualification check** became mandatory (from April 2023), “almost all medical facilities, etc., are required to take the network-related security measures” described in the guidelines.

### **Medical devices cybersecurity (incident handling / reporting) – evidence**

From the PMDA/MHLW English reference translation you uploaded (000272598.pdf):

- It describes cybersecurity expectations across the lifecycle (pre-market resilience; post-market vulnerability correction/patching; incident handling) and provides for reporting pathways/forms to PMDA in the described framework.

### **Grading / Tiering schemes (what we can and cannot claim evidentially)**

- No public numeric thresholding for “medical CI” appears in the CI policy text (it uses the qualitative boundary “medical facilities (excluding small scale facilities)” in ANNEX 1).
- The CIP framework does define **information-sharing structures and policy measures**, but a **public hospital-tier scoring rubric (A/B/C or Tier 1/2/3)** is **not evidenced** by the sources opened above, so it is **omitted** here.

### **Health information systems most defensibly “in-scope / critical”**

Based strictly on ANNEX 1 examples for “medical services” in the CIP policy:

- Medical examination record management systems
- Medical examination support systems
- Community medical care support systems

## References (Japan)

1. Japanese Law Translation (Ministry of Justice). The Basic Act on Cybersecurity (Act No. 104 of 2014). ([link](#))
2. Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters (Japan). The Cybersecurity Policy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (revised March 8, 2024). ([pdf](#))
3. National Cybersecurity Office (Japan). Critical Infrastructure Protection Overview. ([pdf](#))
4. MHLW (Japan). Basic Policy for Cyber-security Measures at Medical Facilities. ([pdf](#))
5. MHLW (Japan). Guidelines on Safety Management of Healthcare Information Systems Ver. 6.0. ([link](#))
6. PMDA/MHLW (Japan). Cybersecurity-related medical device safety / reporting material. ([pdf](#))

# CHINA (PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA)

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

1. 关键信息基础设施 (Critical Information Infrastructure, “CII”) —重点保护 / key protection
  - The Cybersecurity Law provides that the State applies 重点保护 (“key protection”) to CII in listed sectors, **on the basis of the network security graded protection system** (网络安全等级保护制度), and delegates the specific scope and protection measures to the State Council. ([CAC](#))
2. 关键信息基础设施的运营者 (Operators of CII / “CIIOS”)
  - The Cybersecurity Law contains a dedicated section on **CII operational security** and sets additional obligations for **CII operators** in that section. ([CAC](#))
3. **□关键信息基础设施安全保护条例□** (State Council Decree No. 745; effective 1 Sept 2021)
  - These Regulations define CII, establish the supervisory structure, and set out the **industry-regulator “determination / designation” mechanism** (Protection Work Departments drafting designation rules; organizing determinations; notifying operators). ([China Law Translate](#))
4. Health-sector “highest protected” systems under MLPS (graded protection) — explicit health guidance
  - The National Health Commission (then Ministry of Health) guidance (2011) states that the **graded protection system has five levels** and lists multiple **health information systems** that should be “principally not lower than Level 3.” ([National Health Commission](#))
  - The NHC/NATCM/NCDC measures (2022) state a principle focusing on protection of **CII**, **MLPS Level 3+** networks, and **important data/personal information** in healthcare institutions. ([National Health Commission](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### A) The Definition (scope text)

Cybersecurity Law — CII (Article 33 on CAC text)

- CII sectors explicitly listed include: **public communications and information services, energy, transportation, water conservancy, finance, public services, e-government, and “other” CII** whose destruction/loss of function/data leakage may seriously endanger national security / people's livelihood / public interest.
- The provision states this protection is “**on the basis of**” the graded protection system, and that the **specific scope and protection measures** are to be formulated by the State Council. ([CAC](#))

CII Security Protection Regulations (Decree No. 745) — CII definition (Article 2)

- Defines CII by (i) listed sectors (includes **public services, e-government**, etc., and also **national defense technology industry**) and (ii) a harm test (destruction/loss of function/data leakage may seriously endanger national security / people's livelihood / public interest). ([China Law Translate](#))

## B) The Thresholds (tests stated in the instruments)

### Cybersecurity Law (graded protection baseline)

- The Cybersecurity Law states the State implements the **network security graded protection system** and requires network operators to fulfill specified security protection obligations under that system. ([CAC](#))

### Decree No. 745 designation mechanism — criteria for designation rules (Article 9)

- Protection Work Departments must draft **designation rules** and file them with the State Council public security department.
- In drafting designation standards, Article 9 lists three factors:
  1. importance of the network facilities/information systems to core operations in the sector;
  2. degree of harm if destroyed / loses function / data leakage;
  3. impact on other industries/sectors. ([China Law Translate](#))

No numeric thresholds in the designation factors \* Article 9 provides factors (importance/harm/impact) and does **not** state numeric thresholds. ([China Law Translate](#))

## Grading / tiering scheme

1. **Network security graded protection system** (网络安全等级保护制度)
  - The Cybersecurity Law states that China implements the graded protection system and lists operator obligations under that system. ([CAC](#))
2. **CII protection is explicitly stated as being “on the basis of” graded protection**
  - The Cybersecurity Law provision on CII states 重点保护 for CII **on the basis of** graded protection. ([CAC](#))
3. **Five levels (explicitly stated in the 2011 health-sector guidance)**
  - The 2011 health-sector guidance states: “**等级…分为五级**” and names each level from Level 1 to Level 5. ([National Health Commission](#))

## Incident reporting tests and thresholds

### Cybersecurity Law (general incident reporting duty)

- The Cybersecurity Law requires network operators to have incident response plans and to report incidents to competent authorities “according to provisions”. ([CAC](#))

### Decree No. 745 (Article 18) — CIO reporting trigger

- CIOs must report when **major cybersecurity incidents occur** in CII or **major cybersecurity threats are discovered**, to Protection Work Departments and public security organs. ([China Law Translate](#))

### Examples of “especially serious” incidents/threats (Decree No. 745, Article 18)

- Article 18 gives examples such as **overall interruption of operations / primary function failures, leaks of basic state information and other important data, large-scale personal information leaks, large economic losses, or illegal transmission of a larger scope of information**, triggering onward reporting by Protection Work Departments after receipt. ([China Law Translate](#))

## Deadlines

- Article 18 uses “promptly” for onward reporting by Protection Work Departments after receiving a report; no hour/day deadline is specified in the cited Article 18 text. ([China Law Translate](#))

## Health-sector clauses / guidance (primary, health-specific)

### A) Health systems explicitly “≥ Level 3” in 2011 guidance (NHC/Ministry of Health)

The 2011 guidance states the graded protection system has five levels and then states the following “important health information systems” are **principally not lower than Level 3**:

- **Cross-province national networked systems:**
  - health statistics network direct reporting, infectious disease reporting, health supervision reporting, public health emergency command information systems, etc. ([National Health Commission](#))
- **National/provincial/municipal health information platforms**, and national-level data centers including (examples listed): new rural cooperative medical scheme, health supervision, maternal & child health, etc. ([National Health Commission](#))
- **Core business information systems of Class III Grade A hospitals** (三级甲等医院核心业务信息系统). ([National Health Commission](#))
- **Ministry of Health website system.** ([National Health Commission](#))
- “Other” systems assessed by the technical expert committee as Level 3+. ([National Health Commission](#))

It also states:

- **Annual level evaluation** (等级测评) for Level 3+ health information systems. ([National Health Commission](#))

### B) Healthcare institution cybersecurity measures (2022)

The 2022 measures state they are made with reference to multiple laws/regulations including the Cybersecurity Law and the **CII Security Protection Regulations**, and include a principle: \* “重点保障关键信息基础设施网络安全等级保护第三级及以上网络以及重要数据和个人信息安全” (focus protection on CII, MLPS Level 3+ networks, important data and personal information). ([National Health Commission](#))

## Health information systems “most likely” designated

**Not determinable from the cited CII national instruments alone.** \* The CII Security Protection Regulations assign designation to sector Protection Work Departments and require sector designation rules (Articles 9–11). The Regulations do not, in the cited text, list healthcare systems by name as “CII.” ([China Law Translate](#))

**What is explicitly stated for health (separate from CII designation)** \* The 2011 and 2022 health-sector instruments explicitly identify multiple health systems as **MLPS Level 3+ targets** and identify protection of **CII** and **MLPS Level 3+ networks** as priorities in healthcare institutions. ([National Health Commission](#))

## Public vs confidential

- **Public (instruments):** the Cybersecurity Law text (including the CII chapter) and Decree No. 745 text are publicly available (official Chinese; translations exist). ([CAC](#))
- **Designation outcomes:** Decree No. 745 states operators are **notified** of designation results and that determinations are **reported** to the State Council public security department. ([China Law Translate](#))
- A **public national list of CIIOs is not present in these instruments' text** (i.e., the cited law/regulation text does not contain a list). ([CAC](#))

## Latest updates (2025–2026) — primary confirmation

- Xinhua reports the NPCSC passed the decision amending the Cybersecurity Law on **28 Oct 2025** and that it **takes effect 1 Jan 2026**. ([Xinhua News](#))
- The CAC page for the Cybersecurity Law states the law is **revised according to the 2025-10-28 NPCSC decision** (as shown in the header). ([CAC](#))

## References (China)

1. **Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC)** — “中华人民共和国网络安全法” (official Chinese text; header shows 2025 revision basis; includes CII chapter). ([CAC](#))
2. **China Law Translate** — “Regulations on Critical Information Infrastructure Security Protections” (State Council Decree No. 745) (translation; Articles 2, 9–11, 18 etc used). ([China Law Translate](#))
3. **National Health Commission (NHC)** — 2011 “卫生行业信息安全等级保护工作的指导意见” (卫办发〔2011〕85号) (five levels; ≥ Level 3 system list; annual evaluation). ([National Health Commission](#))
4. **NHC / NATCM / NCDC** — 2022 “医疗卫生机构网络安全管理办法” (国卫规划发〔2022〕29号) (focus on CII and MLPS Level 3+ networks, etc.). ([National Health Commission](#))
5. **Xinhua** (新华网) — report that amendments were passed 2025-10-28 and effective 2026-01-01. ([Xinhua News](#))
6. **English.gov.cn** — State Council release summarizing Decree No. 745 effective date (Sept 1, 2021). ([State Council of China](#))

# SOUTH KOREA

## Final categories

Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure (정보통신망 보호법) establishes a designation-based “critical infrastructure” regime for information and communications infrastructure:

1. **Information and Communications Infrastructure** (정보통신망) — defined term. ([E-Law](#))
2. **Critical Information and Communications Infrastructure** (중관련 정보통신망) — **information and communications infrastructure designated** as “critical” by the head of a central administrative agency (or, for certain local-government-supervised organizations, by the competent Minister in consultation). ([E-Law](#))
3. **Management Organization** — an organization that manages critical information and communications infrastructure, with statutory duties to formulate and implement protection measures and related submissions/roles. ([E-Law](#))

The Enforcement Decree prescribes **procedures and required contents** for designation, publication/notification, vulnerability analysis timing, protection-measures submission, and incident notification contents. ([E-Law](#))

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (primary texts)

### A) What may be designated as “critical”

A central administrative agency head may designate infrastructure under their jurisdiction as **critical information and communications infrastructure** by taking into account the **five factors** below:

1. national/social importance of duties performed by the managing organization
2. dependence of those duties on the infrastructure
3. inter-connection with other infrastructure
4. areas/extent of damage to national security, economy, society if an intrusion incident occurs
5. probability of intrusion incidents and ease of restoration ([E-Law](#))

Additional legal points in the Act on designation:

- The agency head **may request data** necessary to decide designation. ([E-Law](#))
- The agency head **may revoke** designation when the relevant affairs are abolished/suspended/changed. ([E-Law](#))
- The agency head must **submit designation/revocation for deliberation** by the Committee (with authority for the Committee to hear opinions). ([E-Law](#))
- The agency head must **publicly announce** designation/revocation **unless** the Committee deliberates that non-announcement is necessary for national security. ([E-Law](#))

### B) Decree: how “designation” is operationalized

The Decree specifies a stepwise process around a “**designation unit**” and evaluation:

- **Selection of designation units** (Decree Art. 13): central administrative agency head requires the organization to select a “designation unit,” and may examine/adjust reasonableness. ([E-Law](#))
- **Self-evaluation for designation** (Decree Art. 14): agency head may issue evaluation guidelines; organization evaluates and submits results. ([E-Law](#))
- **Review of evaluation** (Decree Art. 15): agency head reviews whether self-evaluation is objective/appropriate with reference to Act Art. 8(1) factors; may require re-evaluation in specified circumstances. ([E-Law](#))
- **Recommended designation decision timeline** (Decree Art. 16-2(3)): where designation is recommended under Act Art. 8-2(1), the agency head must decide whether to designate after designation-unit selection, self-evaluation, and review **within 60 days**. ([E-Law](#))

## C) Public notice / publication requirements (Act + Decree)

- Act: designation/revocation must be **publicly announced**, with a national-security exception after Committee deliberation. ([E-Law](#))
- Decree Art. 16: when designating or revoking designation, the agency head must notify the management organization “without delay” and publish specific fields in the **Official Gazette**:
  1. designation number
  2. name of critical information and communications infrastructure
  3. name of management organization
  4. performing duties
  5. grounds for designation/revocation ([E-Law](#))

## Obligations tied to “critical” designation (Act + Decree)

### A) Protection measures and submission

- Act Art. 5(1): management organization must formulate and implement **physical and technological** protection measures, linked to vulnerability analysis results. ([E-Law](#))
- Act Art. 5(2): management organization submits details of measures to the competent central administrative agency (with stated exception). ([E-Law](#))
- Decree Art. 8: measures for the following year must be submitted **by every August 31**. ([E-Law](#))

### B) Vulnerability analysis and timing

- Act Art. 9(1): management organization analyzes and evaluates vulnerabilities “on a regular basis as prescribed by Presidential Decree.” ([E-Law](#))
- Decree Art. 17(1)–(3):
  - first analysis within **6 months** of designation (extendable to **9 months** with approval, per stated condition)
  - thereafter **each year** (with an exception allowing earlier analysis if serious changes occur or deemed necessary)
  - if ordered under Act Art. 9(2), analysis within **6 months** of receiving the order ([E-Law](#))

## C) Roles (CISO concept)

- Act Art. 5(4): management organization designates a **chief information security officer** (with stated exception). ([E-Law](#))
- Decree Art. 9: specifies who may be designated and enumerates supervisory responsibilities (including measures, technical support requests, vulnerability analysis, compliance with guideline/measure orders, incident notification, and recovery measures). ([E-Law](#))

## D) Protection guidelines

- Act Art. 10: central administrative agencies may establish protection guidelines and recommend management organizations follow them; guidelines must be revised/supplemented regularly considering technological advancements. ([E-Law](#))
- Decree Art. 20(1)–(2): protection guidelines include (i) management/operation of an information protection system, (ii) vulnerability analysis & incident prevention, (iii) incident response & recovery; and must be notified to management organizations when formulated/revised/supplemented. ([E-Law](#))

## E) Cyber security incident notification content (Decree)

- Decree Art. 21(1): notification includes (1) date/time and facility, (2) details of damage, (3) other matters necessary for swift response and recovery. ([E-Law](#))

## Grading / tiering scheme

In the Act + Enforcement Decree texts cited above, **designation is a binary status** (designated or not designated as “critical information and communications infrastructure”); **no numeric or multi-tier classification scale** appears in these provisions. ([E-Law](#))

## What is public vs confidential

- **Public:** the Act requires public announcement of designation/revocation (subject to the national-security exception). ([E-Law](#))
- **Public:** the Decree requires Official Gazette publication of specific designation fields. ([E-Law](#))
- **May be withheld (national security):** the Act permits non-public announcement after Committee deliberation when necessary for guaranteeing national security. ([E-Law](#))

## References (South Korea)

1. Korea Legislation Research Institute (KLRI). **Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure** (English translation page; includes Arts. 2, 5–13, etc.). ([E-Law](#))
2. Korea Legislation Research Institute (KLRI). **Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure** (English translation page; includes Arts. 8–9, 13–18, 20–22, etc.). ([E-Law](#))

3. Korea Law Information Center ([law.go.kr](http://law.go.kr)). Act on the Protection of Information and Communications Infrastructure (English statute page). ([Korea Law Information Center](#))

# FRANCE

**Translation note:** English translations below are **unofficial** glosses of the cited French legal terms/phrases, provided for readability. All legal terms remain as defined in the cited French primary texts.

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

1. **Opérateur d'importance vitale (OIV)** — (*English: “Operator of Vital Importance”*) — category defined in **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-1**.
2. **Secteur d'activités d'importance vitale (SAIV)** — (*English: “Sector of Vital-Importance Activities”*) — criteria in **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-2**; SAIV list fixed by **Arrêté du 2 juin 2006 modifié**.
3. **Systèmes d'information d'importance vitale (SIIV)** — (*English: “Vital-Importance Information Systems”*) — definition + secrecy of the SIIV list in **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-41-2**.
4. **Health SAIV sub-sectors with SIIV rules + incident modalities fixed by ministerial orders** (examples from 17 April 2023 JORF texts):
  - « **Établissements de santé** » — (*English: “Health establishments / healthcare facilities”*) (Arrêté du 17 avril 2023).
  - « **Veille et alerte sanitaires** » — (*English: “Health surveillance and health alerts”*) (Arrêté du 17 avril 2023).

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### A) The Definition

#### A1. OIV (operator-level designation test) — **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-1 (II)**

Key French legal phrases → English gloss:

- « **obérer gravement** » → “seriously impair / severely undermine”
- « **mettre gravement en cause la santé ou la vie de la population** » → “seriously jeopardise the health or life of the population”
- « **malveillance, sabotage, terrorisme** » → “malicious acts, sabotage, terrorism”

#### A2. SAIV (sector-level criteria) — **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-2**

Key French legal phrases → English gloss:

- « **besoins essentiels pour la vie des populations** » → “essential needs for the life of the population(s)”
- « **difficilement substituables ou remplaçables** » → “difficult to substitute or replace”
- « **danger grave pour la population** » → “serious danger for the population”

#### A3. SIIV (system-level definition) — **Code de la défense, Article R.1332-41-2**

Key French legal phrase → English gloss:

- « **couverte par le secret de la défense nationale** » → “covered by national defence secrecy”

## B) The Thresholds

B1. OIV impact threshold language (qualitative test) — uses the French qualitative terms above (e.g., « obérer gravement », « mettre gravement en cause... »). B2. SAIV substitutability + serious danger tests (qualitative tests) — uses « difficilement substituables ou remplaçables » and « danger grave pour la population ».

## Grading / tiering scheme

- Binary designation: designated OIV vs non-designated.
- OIV designation orders: « ne sont pas publiés » → “are not published”; and not communicable under the cited CRPA provisions.
- No public tiering scheme stated in the cited SAIV/OIV/SIIV provisions.

## Incident reporting tests and thresholds

General SIIV incident-information rule (no hour-based deadline stated here) — Code de la défense, Article R.1332-41-10

Key French legal phrases → English gloss:

- « dès qu'ils ont connaissance » → “as soon as they become aware”
- « au fur et à mesure de l'avancement de l'analyse » → “as the analysis progresses”
- (Arrêté not published) « n'est pas publié » / notification to persons with a need to know → “not published / notified to persons who need to know”

Health sub-sector orders (examples) — incident types specified by annexes (not published)

Key French legal phrase → English gloss:

- « ne sont pas publiées » (Annexes II–IV) → “are not published”

## Health information systems “most likely” designated

- OIV designation list: designation orders not published (« ne sont pas publiés ») and not communicable.
- SIIV lists: covered by national defence secrecy (« secret de la défense nationale »).
- Health-related SAIV sub-sectors explicitly named in cited JORF texts:
  - « Établissements de santé » (“Health establishments / healthcare facilities”)
  - « Veille et alerte sanitaires » (“Health surveillance and health alerts”)

## Public vs Confidential

### Public

- Definitions and criteria in the **Code de la défense** (OIV/SAIV/SIIV; incident information rule).
- SAIV list in **Arrêté du 2 juin 2006 modifié**, including « Santé » (“Health”).
- Health sub-sector orders stating annex publication status and rule structure.

### Confidential / not published

- OIV designation orders: **not published** / not communicable.
- SIIIV lists: covered by **national defence secrecy**.
- Annexes II–IV of cited 17 April 2023 health sub-sector orders: **not published**.

## Latest updates (2025–2026)

- EU NIS2 transposition status (France) — Commission status page entries (dates shown on the cited page).
- Assemblée nationale dossier — bill docket entries (dates shown on the cited page).

## References (France)

1. Code de la défense — Article R.1332-1 (OIV criteria). ([Legifrance](#))
2. Code de la défense — Article R.1332-2 (SAIV criteria). ([Legifrance](#))
3. Code de la défense — Article R.1332-3 (OIV designation secrecy). ([Legifrance](#))
4. Arrêté du 2 juin 2006 (SAIV list includes « Santé »). ([Legifrance](#))
5. Code de la défense — Article R.1332-41-2 (SIIIV definition). ([Legifrance](#))
6. Code de la défense — Article R.1332-41-10 (Incident notification). ([Legifrance](#))
7. Arrêté du 17 avril 2023 — « Établissements de santé ». ([Legifrance](#))
8. Arrêté du 17 avril 2023 — « Veille et alerte sanitaires ». ([Legifrance](#))
9. Assemblée nationale — Dossier législatif (Cybersécurité). ([Link](#))
10. European Commission — NIS2 Implementation (France). ([Link](#))

# NORWAY

Note: Norway's core legal framework for digital security is the **Digital Security Act (digitalsikkerhetsloven)**, with implementing **Digital Security Regulations** that entered into force **1 October 2025**.

## Final Categories

### 1) Providers of socially important services (**tilbydere av samfunnsviktige tjenester**)

- The Act applies to providers of socially important services under § 6 in the sectors: energy, transport, **health**, water supply, bank, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure.

### 2) Providers of digital services (**tilbydere av digitale tjenester**)

- The Act applies to providers of digital services under § 9.
- § 9 lists: **online marketplace**, **online search engine**, and **cloud computing service**.

### 3) Health sector code of conduct (**sector guidance**)

- Code of Conduct for Information Security and Data Protection in the Health Care Sector (Version 7.0) (the “Code”), including stated version metadata and applicability date.

## Exact Legal / Regulatory Criteria (primary texts)

### A) Statutory scope (Digital Security Act)

#### Scope: sectors include health

- The Act applies to providers of socially important services under § 6 in the sectors including **health**.

## Entry into force

- § 20 states the Act enters into force at the time determined by the King; the Lovdata rendering notes “From 1 Oct 2025 ...”.

## **B) “Provider of a socially important service” – § 6 (Act)**

A provider under § 6 is an entity that: \* delivers a service in one of the listed sectors (including health), and \* is dependent on network and information systems to deliver that service, and \* the service is important for maintaining fundamental societal functions or people's basic needs, and an incident would have significantly disruptive impact on delivery of the service.

## **C) Security requirements for providers of socially important services – § 7 (Act)**

§ 7 requires appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures and lists specific risk/assurance aims, including: preventing incidents and limiting consequences; ensuring a level of security appropriate to risk; and maintaining continuity/availability elements as described in the provision (items (a)–(g)).

## **D) Incident notification duty for providers of socially important services – § 8 (Act) + reporting timelines (Regulations)**

### **Duty to notify (Act § 8)**

- Providers must notify the supervisory authority without undue delay about incidents with significant impact on continuity of the service.
- The Act lists factors for assessing whether impact is “significant” (users affected, duration, geographic area, extent of functionality failure, and impact on economic and societal activity).

### **Reporting steps and timelines (Regulations § 20)**

The Regulations specify a staged reporting sequence for incidents with significant impact:

- Early warning: “as soon as possible and no later than 24 hours after the provider becomes aware ...”.
- Notification: “as soon as possible and no later than 72 hours after the provider becomes aware ...”.
- Final report: “no later than one month after submission of the notification ...”.

## **E) Providers of digital services – § 9, § 10, § 11 (Act)**

### **Category definition (Act § 9)**

- § 9 lists the digital services: online marketplace, online search engine, cloud computing service.

## **Security requirement (Act § 10)**

- Providers of digital services must implement **appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures** and lists areas to address (security of systems and facilities, incident handling, business continuity management, monitoring/auditing/testing, compliance with standards, etc.).

## **Incident notification duty (Act § 11)**

- Providers of digital services must **notify** the supervisory authority **without undue delay** about incidents with **substantial impact** on provision of the service, and the section lists assessment factors (users affected, duration, geographic spread, extent of disruption, impact on economic and societal activities).

## **F) Supervisory and enforcement elements (Act + Regulations)**

### **Supervisory authority appointment (Act § 13)**

- “The King appoints one or more supervisory authorities ...”.

### **Information access / inspections (Act § 14)**

- Providers must provide information required by the supervisory authority and provide access to premises and equipment; this applies “without hindrance of statutory confidentiality”.

### **Administrative reactions (Act §§ 15–17)**

- § 15: corrective orders (“pålegg om retting”) with deadline.
- § 16: coercive fine (“tvangsmulkt”).
- § 17: violation fine (“overtredelsesgebyr”) for intentional/negligent breaches of §§ 7, 8, 10, 11 or 14.

### **Maximum violation fine level (Regulations § 24)**

- Regulations § 24 describes violation fine upper limits and states: “In any case, the fine ... may not exceed **NOK 50 million**.”

### **Designation / listing mechanisms (Regulations § 1 – sector enumerations)**

The Regulations define “providers of essential services” (providers of socially important services) and list multiple categories. For the **health** sector, the list includes:

- Regional health enterprises (regional helseforetak) and the Norwegian Health Network (Norsk Helsenett SF).
- Providers responsible for pre-hospital emergency medical services under the Health and Care Services Act § 3-2(1) and the Municipal Health and Care Services Act § 3-2a.
- Providers responsible for specialist medical emergency response services under the Specialist Health Services Act § 2-2.

## **Health-specific clauses / guidance covered (only what the PDFs state)**

### **1) Health sector is explicitly in the Act's sector scope**

- “Health” is explicitly listed among the sectors for providers under § 6.

### **2) Health sector provider types are explicitly listed in the Regulations**

- The Regulations enumerate specific health-sector organisations/services as providers of essential services (examples listed above).

### **3) Health Care Sector Code of Conduct (Version 7.0) — what the Code states**

#### **Version metadata / applicability**

- The Code document states “Version 7.0” and “Applicable from 01/10/2025” (and includes approval/publishing metadata in the same section).

#### **Scope statement: “Who does the Code apply to” (section 1.3)**

- The Code includes a dedicated section “1.3 Who does the Code apply to” describing the health and care sector scope in the document itself.

#### **Relationship to legislation (section 1.4)**

- The Code includes a section “1.4 Relationship between the Code and applicable legislation” that describes how the Code relates to legal requirements.

## Minimum requirement themes (section 3.2)

- The Code includes section “3.2 Minimum requirements for information security and data protection” that enumerates minimum requirements (including core security properties and related operational expectations) in the text.

## References (Norway)

1. **Stortinget / Lovdata.** *Lov om digital sikkerhet (digitalsikkerhetsloven)* (2023-12-20-108). ([Lovdata](#))
2. **Lovdata.** *Forskrift om digital sikkerhet (digitalsikkerhetsforskriften)* (FOR-2025-06-20-1131). ([Lovdata](#))
3. **Norwegian Directorate of Health (Helsedirektoratet).** *Code of Conduct for Information Security and Data Protection in the Health Care Sector (Normen) — Version 7.0.* ([Link](#))

# SWITZERLAND

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

- Betreiberinnen von kritischen Infrastrukturen (operators of critical infrastructures) subject to the Pflicht zur Meldung von Cyberangriffen (duty to report cyberattacks). Primary basis: *Informationssicherheitsgesetz (ISG)*, Art. 74a–74i. ([Newsd](#))
- Meldepflicht (cyberattack reporting duty) implementing ordinance. Primary basis: *Cyber Sicherheitsverordnung (CSV)* (ordinance), incl. Art. 12–19.

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### Subsection A (The Definition): the specific text defining the scope

Scope by category (ISG Art. 74b “Bereiche – Die Meldepflicht gilt für”) includes, among other sectors, the following health-relevant categories:

- “Spitäler, die auf der kantonalen Spitalliste … aufgeführt sind” (hospitals listed on a canton’s hospital list). ([Newsd](#))
- “medizinische Laboratorien mit einer Bewilligung … des Epidemigesetzes” (medical laboratories with a permit under the Epidemics Act). ([Newsd](#))
- “Unternehmen … [mit Bewilligung] … von Arzneimitteln … oder Medizinprodukte … herstellen oder vertreiben” (companies authorised for medicines, and companies that manufacture or distribute medical devices as specified). ([Newsd](#))

Exclusion mechanism (ISG Art. 74c): the Federal Council must exclude categories where cyberattack-caused outages/malfunctions are unlikely (e.g., low IT dependence) or would have only minor impacts (e.g., few persons affected; absorbed by other critical infrastructures; low macroeconomic loss potential). ([Newsd](#))

Ordinance-level exclusions (CSV Art. 12):

- CSV specifies sectoral exclusion conditions for listed categories (e.g., higher education; energy; transport; post; civil aviation etc.).

### Subsection B (The Thresholds): quantitative or qualitative tests

Reportable cyberattack conditions (ISG Art. 74d): a cyberattack on a critical infrastructure must be reported if there are indications that:

- functionality is endangered (of the affected CI or another CI), or
- a foreign state executed/caused it, or
- it led to or could lead to manipulation / outflow of information, or

- it remained **undetected for more than 30 days**; and it **must always** be reported if linked to **extortion, threat, or coercion** against the operator or its employees. ([Newsd](#)) **Ordinance definitions used for applying these tests (CSV Art. 14):**
- Functionality “endangered” if **employees/third parties are affected by system interruptions** or operations can be maintained **only using emergency plans**.
- “Manipulation / outflow” exists if **business-relevant information** is viewed/changed/disclosed by unauthorized persons, or a **data security breach notification under DSG Art. 24** has been made.
- “Undetected for a longer period” is defined as **more than 90 days** since the incident.
- “Extortion/threat/coercion” link is defined by CSV.

## Grading / tiering scheme

- **Binary scheme (in-scope vs out-of-scope)**: the reporting duty applies if the entity falls within ISG Art. 74b and is not excluded under ISG Art. 74c / CSV Art. 12. ([Newsd](#))

## Incident reporting tests and thresholds

**Deadlines (primary text):**

- **24-hour reporting period**: CSV refers to a “**Meldefrist von 24 Stunden nach der Entdeckung des Cyberangriffs**” (reporting period of 24 hours after discovery).
- **Completion window (if information is missing)**: if not all required information is known within the 24-hour period, BACS grants **14 days** to supplement the report.

**Triggers (primary text):**

- **ISG Art. 74d** conditions (functionality endangered; foreign state; manipulation/outflow; undetected >30 days; always if extortion/threat/coercion). ([Newsd](#))
- **CSV Art. 14** definitions for applying “functionality endangered”, “manipulation/outflow”, “undetected”, and “extortion/threat/coercion”.

## Health information systems “most likely” designated

### Explicit in law

- The primary instruments define **entity categories** (e.g., hospitals on cantonal hospital lists; permitted medical laboratories; authorised medicines/medical-device businesses). They do **not** list specific health **information system types** (e.g., EHR, PACS) as named items. ([Newsd](#))

## Public vs Confidential

- **Public**: ISG and CSV texts (scope categories; exclusions; reportable-incident tests; deadlines; ordinance entry-into-force). ([Newsd](#))

- **Confidential / not in these primary texts:** no consolidated list of specific obligated entities is provided in ISG/CSV; certain categories reference external legal lists/permits (e.g., “kantonale Spitalliste”; Epidemics Act permits). ([Newsd](#))

## Latest updates (2025–2026)

- **CSV entry into force:** “Diese Verordnung tritt am **1. April 2025** in Kraft.” (CSV Art. 19).
- **No additional 2025–2026 amendments** are stated in the accessed primary texts beyond the above entry-into-force provision.

## References (Switzerland)

1. **Federal Council (Bund).** *Informationssicherheitsgesetz (ISG)*. ([pdf](#))
2. **Federal Council (Bund).** *Cybersicherheitsverordnung (CSV)*. ([Fedlex](#))

# TAIWAN

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

### 1. Critical infrastructure providers

**Primary basis:** Cyber Security Management Act (CSMA) — Chapter III, Article 20 (designation + obligations for “critical infrastructure providers”). ([Law Moda](#))

### 2. Specific non-government agencies (regulated non-government entities, including CI providers and others covered by the Act)

**Primary basis:** CSMA — Chapter III (e.g., Articles 21–24 set obligations for “specific non-government agencies,” including incident notification/reporting mechanisms). ([Law Moda](#))

### 3. Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) (defined within Taiwan’s national CI protection guidance)

**Primary basis:** Executive Yuan Office of Homeland Security (OHS) — *Guidelines for National Critical Infrastructure Protection* (definition of CII as systems/SCADA supporting continuous operation of national critical infrastructures).

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### A) The Definition (scope text)

- National Critical Infrastructure (CI) definition (OHS Guidelines): assets/systems/networks (public/private; physical/virtual) whose disruption may negatively impact government/society, cause casualties, losses, economic downturn, environmental changes, or damage national security/interests.
- Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) definition (OHS Guidelines): “vital information and communication systems or SCADA” dealing with core task functions and supporting continuous operation of national CI; managed under a single authority according to the CI sector it belongs to.
- Critical infrastructure providers designation construct (CSMA Article 20): the central competent authority for the relevant sector designates critical infrastructure providers, submits the designation for approval by the Executive Yuan, and notifies approved entities in writing. ([Law Moda](#))

### B) The Thresholds (quantitative / qualitative tests)

- No numeric thresholds are stated in the cited legal text for when an entity becomes a “critical infrastructure provider.” The designation mechanism is described as an administrative designation/approval process (CSMA Article 20). ([Law Moda](#))

## Grading / tiering scheme

- Cyber security responsibility levels (A–E) (classified from high to low): Level-A, Level-B, Level-C, Level-D, Level-E.

**Primary basis:** *Regulations on Classification of Cyber Security Responsibility Levels, Article 2* (as published in MODA's CSMA-related regulations compilation). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))

- Incident severity levels (Level-1 to Level-4) used for response requirements:

The *Regulations on the Notification and Response of Cyber Security Incident* define level-1, level-2, level-3, level-4 cyber security incidents (including distinctions involving **core business information**, **core information and communication systems**, scope of service interruption, and geographic/scale impact). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))

## Incident reporting tests and thresholds

### Deadlines

From the *Regulations on the Notification and Response of Cyber Security Incident*:

- Government agencies:
  - Must **complete verification** within **8 hours** for **level-1/2** incidents and within **2 hours** for **level-3/4** incidents (Article 5). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))
  - Must **complete damage control or recovery** within **72 hours** for **level-1/2** and within **36 hours** for **level-3/4** (Article 6). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))
- Specific non-government agencies (including those designated):
  - When aware of a cyber security incident, must **notify** the central competent authority for the relevant sector; for **level-3/4**, notification must be **within 1 hour** (Regulations, Article 11). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))
  - After completing damage control or recovery, must submit an **investigation/handling report**, and then submit a **corrective action report** (Articles 11–12). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))

## Triggers (what counts as reportable)

- The same regulation defines incident levels 1–4; the level definitions reference (among other factors) whether the event affects **core business information** and/or a **core information and communication system**, and the scope/duration/extent of disruption (Article 2). ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))

## Health information systems “most likely” designated

- Not stated in cited primary texts.

The OHS Guidelines classify national CI into **eight sectors**, one of which is “**emergency rescue and hospitals**”. The Guidelines also define **CII** as the vital ICT/SCADA supporting continuous CI operations. However, the cited sources do **not** publish a system-by-system list for healthcare.

## Public vs Confidential

### Public (in cited sources):

- CSMA (legal obligations and the designation mechanism for “critical infrastructure providers,” incident notification duty, etc.). ([Law Moda](#))
- OHS Guidelines (definitions of CI/CII; sector classification including hospitals).

### Confidential (not evidenced here):

- Not stated in cited primary texts whether the specific lists of designated providers/assets are public or confidential.
- The OHS Guidelines’ table of contents includes a section titled “**Classified and sensitive information/Confidentiality requirement**” (Chapter 4, Section 1), but this chapter does not claim what specific lists are or are not disclosed beyond what is explicitly shown.

## Latest updates (2025–2026)

### Cyber Security Management Act revised and promulgated:

- Taiwan’s official MODA law database shows the CSMA “Date: 2025.09.24” and notes it was “Revised and promulgated a total of 35 articles... on September 24, 2025,” with “date of enforcement... determined by the Executive Yuan.” ([Law Moda](#))

### Competent authority (as reflected in the revised CSMA text):

- The same official text states “The competent authority... is the Ministry of Digital Affairs” (Article 2). ([Law Moda](#))

## References (Taiwan)

1. Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA). Cyber Security Management Act (English law database; revision dated 2025-09-24). ([Law Moda](#))
2. Ministry of Digital Affairs (MODA). Consolidated PDF of CSMA + related regulations. ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))
3. Executive Yuan Office of Homeland Security. Guidelines for National Critical Infrastructure Protection (2018 revision).
4. MODA / Administration for Cyber Security. Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIIP) overview. ([Ministry of Digital Affairs](#))

# THAILAND

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

- “Critical Information Infrastructure” (CII) — defined term in the **Cybersecurity Act, B.E. 2562 (2019)** (unofficial English translation in Government Gazette format).
- “Organization of Critical Information Infrastructure” (CII Organization) — defined term in the **Cybersecurity Act, B.E. 2562 (2019)**.
- Cyber Threat levels — non-critical / critical / crisis levels defined in the **Cybersecurity Act, B.E. 2562 (2019)**.

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### Subsection A (The Definition): the specific text defining the scope

- “Critical Information Infrastructure”: “the computer or computer system” used by a Government Agency or private organization in operations relating to **maintaining national security, public security, national economic security, or infrastructures in the public interest**.
- “Organization of Critical Information Infrastructure”: a Government Agency or private organization that **has a mission of or provides a CII service**.
- Committee designation power (Section 49): the Committee prescribes (by notification) characteristics of organizations with missions/services in specified aspects, including “**public health**”.

### Subsection B (The Thresholds): quantitative or qualitative tests

- Aspect-based trigger (qualitative): Section 49 lists aspects for which organizations may be prescribed as CII Organizations; “**public health**” is one listed aspect.
- Case-by-case review (qualitative): Section 49 states the Committee “shall consider and review... on a case-by-case basis.”
- No numeric outage/time thresholds for CII designation appear in the provided Act text.

## Grading / tiering scheme

- Three-level Cyber Threat classification (Section 60): non-critical level / critical level / crisis level.
- Public health referenced in threat effects (Section 60(2)): “critical level” includes effects on “...economy, **public health**, public safety, or the public order...” such that the CII operation could not operate or provide service.

# **Incident reporting tests and thresholds**

## **Deadlines**

- **Section 57 (CII incident reporting):** where a Cyber Threat is “significantly occurring” to a CII Organization’s system, it “shall report” to the Office and the Supervising/Regulating Organization; the CRC “may prescribe criteria and method” of reporting. **No fixed hour/day deadline is stated in Section 57 in the provided Act text.**
- **Section 58 (“without delay”):** if examination shows there is or may be a Cyber Threat to an information system under a Government Agency or CII Organization, the organization shall notify the Office and its Supervising/Regulating Organization **“without delay.”**
- **Section 54 (annual assessment + 30-day submission):** a CII Organization must conduct risk assessment / cybersecurity examination **at least once per year** and submit a summary report to the Office **within 30 days** after completion.

## **Triggers (what counts as a reportable incident)**

- **Section 57 trigger:** “Cyber Threat significantly occurring” to the system of a CII Organization.
- **Section 58 trigger:** examination results show there “is or may be” a Cyber Threat to the relevant information system.
- **Penalty for non-reporting (Section 73):** failure by a CII Organization to report a Cyber Threat incident under Section 57 (without reasonable cause) — **fine not exceeding Baht 200,000.**

## **Health information systems “most likely” designated**

- **Explicit in the provided primary text:** Section 49 includes “public health” as an aspect for which the Committee may prescribe organizations as CII Organizations.
- **Not specified in the provided primary text:** the Cybersecurity Act text provided does **not** enumerate specific **health information system types** (e.g., EHR, LIS, radiology PACS) as CII, and does **not** provide a published list of designated health entities within the provided documents.
- **Process stated in the Act:** designation occurs via **Committee notification** prescribing characteristics of organizations in the listed aspects (including public health), with consideration rules published in the Government Gazette and case-by-case review.

## **Public vs Confidential**

### **Public (in provided primary text)**

- The Act states that Committee rules for consideration under Section 49 “shall be published in the Government Gazette.”

**Confidentiality obligations in provided health-sector primary text (separate statute):**

- **National Health Act, B.E. 2550 (2007), Section 7:** “Personal health information shall be kept confidential,” and disclosure is restricted except by the person’s will or where required

by specific law.

## Latest updates (2025–2026)

### CII List Revision (September 2025):

- On 16 September 2025, the NCSC published a notification in the Royal Gazette revising the official list of Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) organizations, specifically covering seven key sectors including **public health**. This update modernizes the 2023 classifications and clarifies regulatory oversight for both public and private essential service providers.

### Website Security Standard (September 2025):

- A new Website Security Standard was issued on 16 September 2025 under the Cybersecurity Act, establishing mandatory technical protocols (encryption, incident management, etc.) for CII operators and government agencies.

## References (Thailand)

1. Office of the National Cyber Security Committee (NCSC). Cybersecurity Act, B.E. 2562 (2019). ([link](#))
2. National Health Commission Office. National Health Act, B.E. 2550 (2007). ([link](#))
3. Royal Thai Government Gazette. NCSC Notification Re: List of Critical Information Infrastructure Organizations (2025). ([link](#))
4. NCSC Thailand. Notification Re: Website Security Standard for Government and CII Organizations (2025).

# HONG KONG (HKSAR)

## Final Categories

Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Computer Systems) Ordinance (Ord. No. 4 of 2025; Cap. 653) creates the following legal categories:

1. **Critical infrastructure** (definition linked to **Schedule 1 sectors**, including **Healthcare services**) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
2. **Specified critical infrastructure** (a “critical infrastructure” that is **specified for** a particular regulating authority) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
3. **Regulating authorities**
  - **Commissioner of Critical Infrastructure (Computer-system Security)** (as regulating authority) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
  - **Designated authorities in Schedule 2** (Monetary Authority; Communications Authority) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
4. **CI operator** (organization **designated** under section 12) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
5. **Critical computer system** (computer system **designated** under section 13) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
6. **Category 1 / Category 2 / Category 3 obligations** (defined by reference to **Part 4** divisions) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Commencement:** a Government notice states the Ordinance **comes into operation on 1 January 2026** (with commencement notice published in the Gazette on 27 June 2025). ([Communications Authority](#))

## Exact Legal / Regulatory Criteria (primary text)

### A) “Critical infrastructure” – definition + sectors

Definition (section 2): “critical infrastructure” means an infrastructure that is:

- related to a sector specified in **Schedule 1**, and
- provides an essential service in Hong Kong, and
- the disruption/compromise described in the definition would hinder or substantially affect maintenance of **critical societal and economic activities in Hong Kong**. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Schedule 1 sectors** (for the definition of “critical infrastructure”) include: Energy; Information technology; Banking and financial services; Air transport; Land transport; Maritime transport; Healthcare services; Telecommunications and broadcasting services. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

### B) “Specified critical infrastructure” – which regulator applies

For a **critical infrastructure** to be a **specified critical infrastructure** (section 2(3)):

- it must be **related to** a sector in **Schedule 1**, and
- it is specified **for a designated authority** if it is related to a sector in **Schedule 2** and is operated by a **regulated organization** in Schedule 2; otherwise it is specified **for the Commissioner**. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

Designated authorities in Schedule 2:

- **Monetary Authority** (for **Banking and financial services**)
- **Communications Authority** (for **Telecommunications and broadcasting services**) ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Regulating authority rule (section 5):** the **Commissioner** is the regulating authority for CI operators **unless** the operator operates a specified critical infrastructure specified for a **designated authority**, in which case the **designated authority** regulates that operator. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## C) CI operator — designation test (section 12)

A regulating authority may **designate an organization** as a **CI operator** if the authority determines the organization has **ownership or control** in relation to the **operation** of the whole or part of a specified critical infrastructure, including (examples listed in section 12(2)):

- ownership/control of the whole/part of the infrastructure;
- operation of the whole/part;
- ability to **direct or influence** the operation. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

In deciding whether to designate, section 12(3) lists factors including:

- **degree of ownership or control** in relation to operation;
- whether the organization can **direct or influence** the operation;
- any other factor the authority considers relevant. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## D) Critical computer system — designation test (section 13)

A regulating authority may **designate a computer system** as a **critical computer system** of a specified critical infrastructure if (section 13(1)):

- it is a computer system **operated by** the CI operator or another person;
- it is **accessible by the CI operator in or from Hong Kong**; and
- it is **essential to the core function** of the infrastructure. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

In designating, section 13(2) lists factors including:

- extent to which the system is essential to the core function;
- whether it can be substituted;
- effect of compromise on operation/provision of essential service;
- connectivity/exposure;
- other factor the authority considers relevant. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

# Obligations on CI operators (Part 4)

## Category structure (definitions)

- Category 1 obligation: an obligation in Division 1 of Part 4 ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
- Category 2 obligation: an obligation in Division 2 of Part 4 ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
- Category 3 obligation: an obligation in Division 3 of Part 4 ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## Category 1 obligations (examples)

**Section 19 — Office in Hong Kong / contact means:** CI operator must **maintain an office in Hong Kong** and **provide the regulating authority** with (among other items) the **address**, and the **means** by which the operator may be contacted. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 21 — Computer-system security management unit:** CI operator must **establish a unit** (however described) responsible for computer-system security of critical computer systems and must provide specified particulars to the regulating authority. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## Category 2 obligations (management plan + change notification + risk assessment + audit)

**Section 22 — Notify certain events within 1 month:** if events listed in section 22(2) occur (including material change to design/configuration/security/operation of a critical computer system; removal of a critical computer system; adding an accessible system essential to core function; or change making an existing accessible system essential to core function), the CI operator must **notify** the regulating authority **within 1 month** of the event. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 23 — Submit & implement a computer-system security management plan (3 months):** CI operator must submit the plan **within 3 months after the operator's designation date** (extendable on application), and implement it; the plan must cover all matters in **Schedule 3**; revisions must be submitted **within 1 month** of revision. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 24 — Risk assessments (first within 12 months; then annually):**

- first risk assessment: **within 12 months** after designation date;
- subsequent: **at least once every 12 months** after expiry of the first period;
- report to regulator: **within 3 months** after expiry of the period for conducting the assessment (extendable on application). ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 25 — Audits (first within 24 months; then every 24 months):**

- first audit: **within 24 months** after designation date;
- subsequent: **at least once every 24 months** after expiry of the first period;
- report to regulator: **within 3 months** after expiry of the period for carrying out the audit (extendable on application). ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## **Category 3 obligations (drills + emergency response plan + incident reporting)**

**Section 26 — Participation in drills:** Commissioner may require a CI operator to participate in a computer-system security drill (after reasonable notice). ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 27 — Emergency response plan (3 months):** CI operator must submit an emergency response plan to the Commissioner **within 3 months** after designation date (extendable on application), revisions within **1 month**, and must implement the plan; the plan must cover matters in **Part 2 of Schedule 3**. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Section 28 — Notify incidents + follow-on written report (Schedule 6 times):**

- notification must be made “as soon as practicable” and **within the specified time**;
- if initial notice not in specified form/way, a written record must be submitted;
- CI operator must further submit a written report within the specified time. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

**Schedule 6 — specified times (examples shown in the schedule table):**

- **within 12 hours** in the circumstances set out in item 1(a);
- **within 48 hours** in item 1(b);
- **within 14 days** for the written report in item 2. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## **HEALTH**

There is **one explicit health-specific element** in the Ordinance, and the rest is written in **sector-neutral** terms.

1. Healthcare is explicitly a “sector” for CIs
  - Schedule 1 lists “Healthcare services” as a sector specified for the definition of “critical infrastructure.” ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
2. No health-specific “designated authority” is listed
  - Schedule 2 specifies designated authorities for only:
    - Monetary Authority — sector: Banking and financial services
    - Communications Authority — sector: Telecommunications and broadcasting services ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))
3. Obligations are framed for “CI operators” generally (not a health-only sub-regime)
  - The Ordinance structures compliance as “**Part 4 — Obligations of CI Operator**” (with Divisions for organization, prevention, and incident reporting/response). ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

So, the **health-specific hook** is the inclusion of “Healthcare services” in Schedule 1; the remaining designation/obligation machinery is expressed at the **CI operator / critical computer system** level. ([Legislative Council of Hong Kong](#))

## **References (Hong Kong)**

1. Legislative Council of Hong Kong. Protection of Critical Infrastructures (Computer Systems) Ordinance (Ord. No. 4 of 2025). ([LegCo](#))

2. Communications Authority. Hong Kong Government: PCICSO Commencement Notice.  
[\(link\)](#)

# ISRAEL

## Final categories (what is “highest critical / protected”)

1. **הגבוהה האבטחה רמת עליהם שחלת מאגרים** (“databases to which the **high security level applies**”) — Protection of Privacy Regulations (Data Security), 5777–2017 (הנתן תקנות (ט-2017)).
2. **חמור אבטחה אירוע** (“**severe security incident**”) — defined in Protection of Privacy Regulations (Data Security), 5777–2017.
3. (Additional legal category used for public bodies’ security duties): **”בטחה פעולות אבטחה** (“**security actions**”), explicitly including **information-security-related activity** — Law for Regulating Security in Public Bodies, 5758–1998 (התקן ציבוריים בגופים הביטחון להסדרת חוק).

## Exact legal / regulatory criteria (what triggers inclusion)

### Subsection A (The Definition): the specific text defining the scope

1) Database security levels (basic / medium / high) — definitions (Data Security Regulations, 2017):

- **”הבסיסית האבטחה רמת עליהם שחלת מאגרים**” — databases **not** listed in the First or Second Schedule and not managed by an individual.
- **”הבינונית האבטחה רמת עליהם שחלת מאגרים**” — databases of the types listed in the **First Schedule** (and not managed by an individual).
- **”הגבוהה האבטחה רמת עליהם שחלת מאגרים**” — databases of the types listed in the **Second Schedule**.

2) Severe security incident (“**חמור אבטחה אירוע**”) — definition (Data Security Regulations, 2017):

- For a **high-security-level database**: “**המاجر מן במידע שימוש בו שנעשה אירוע**” (unauthorized use / use beyond authorization, or integrity impairment).
- For a **medium-security-level database**: “**...המاجر מן מהותי בחלק שימוש בו שנעשה אירוע**” (unauthorized use / beyond authorization, or integrity impairment **regarding a substantial part of the database**).

3) Public-body security actions include information-security actions (Security in Public Bodies Law, 1998):

- “**המדינה בבטיחן לפגוע עלולה שחשיפתו מידע לאבטחת פעולות אבטחה פעולות**” (activity to secure information whose exposure may harm state security).

### Subsection B (The Thresholds): quantitative or qualitative tests

Severe security incident thresholds are explicitly differentiated by the database’s security level:

- **High level:** unauthorized use (or beyond authorization) of **information from the database**, or **integrity impairment** (no “substantial part” qualifier).
- **Medium level:** unauthorized use (or beyond authorization) of a “**מהותי חלק**” (“substantial part”) of the database, or integrity impairment regarding a substantial part.

## **Grading / tiering scheme**

Tiered scheme (3 levels) under the Data Security Regulations:

- **Basic / Medium / High security level** categorization for databases, defined via inclusion in the First / Second Schedules (and exclusions for individually managed databases).

## **Incident reporting tests and thresholds**

### **Deadlines: 24-hour / 72-hour rules**

No 24h/72h deadline text located in the accessible primary regulatory text used below (Data Security Regulations). The regulation uses “**מידי באופן**” (“immediately”) for notification to the Registrar in the severe-incident case.

## **Triggers: what counts as a reportable incident**

Trigger + duty (Data Security Regulations, Regulation 11(ד)(ב)):

- “...מידי באופן לרשם המאגר בעל כך על ידיע (1) – חמור אבטחה אירע.”  
(If a severe security incident occurred — (1) the database owner shall notify the Registrar immediately....).

Registrar-directed notification to data subjects (Data Security Regulations, Regulation 11(ד)(ב)(ב)):

- The Registrar may instruct the database owner (with certain statutory exceptions) — **after consulting** the head of the national cyber authority (“הסיבר להגנת הלגומית הרשות ראש”) — to notify affected data subjects (“**מידע נושא**”).

## **Health information systems “most likely” designated**

### **What is explicit in accessible primary sources**

Healthcare entities referenced as part of “health organizations” (State Comptroller report):

- The State Comptroller report cites a Ministry of Health definition of “**בריאות ארגן**” (“health organization”) including: the Ministry of Health, health funds (HMOs), medical institutions (including hospitals), pharmacies, evacuation and rescue organizations, clinics, and other organizations licensed by the Ministry of Health.

Databases that include information subject to professional confidentiality are explicitly carved out from the “individually managed database” category (Data Security Regulations):

- אתיקה של עקרונות לפי או דין לפי מקצועית סודיות לחובת בשלו כפוף המאגר שבעל מידע הכלל מידע מאגר “מקצועית” (a database including information subject to professional confidentiality by law or professional ethics).

## Evidence-based inference

Based on (a) the explicit scope of “health organizations” above and (b) the Data Security Regulations’ database-security-level framework, examples of **health-sector information systems that commonly operate as “databases” containing professionally confidential health information** include: **EHR/EMR databases, hospital information systems, laboratory information systems, radiology/PACS archives, pharmacy systems, appointment & admissions systems, emergency dispatch/ambulance care records, and national/regional registries.**

This list is **not** a designation list from Israeli law; it is an inference about typical systems that store the regulated classes of information described above.

## Public vs Confidential

**Public (located and cited):**

- **Security in Public Bodies Law (1998)** — statutory definitions including “security actions” that explicitly include securing sensitive information whose exposure may harm state security.
- **Protection of Privacy Regulations (Data Security) (2017)** — definitions of security levels; definition of “severe security incident”; immediate notification duty to the Registrar; possible Registrar-directed notification to data subjects after consultation with the national cyber authority.

**Confidential (not contained in the accessible legal texts above):**

- The cited laws/regulations above **do not themselves publish a list** of specific designated entities or systems as “critical infrastructure.” (No such list appears within the cited sections of the statutes/regulations.)

## Latest updates (2025–2026)

- **Privacy Protection Law (Amendment No. 13), 2024** (**הprtiot hgnth chok**) was published in Israel’s Book of Laws (“**hhchokim sfr**”) on **14 Aug 2024** and is identified as Amendment No. 13 in that publication.
- Accessible sources discussing commencement state that **Amendment 13 enters into force on 14 Aug 2025** (one year after publication).

## References (Israel)

1. The Knesset. Regulation of Security in Public Bodies Law, 5758–1998 (**hbvthcn ln hsdrth chok**). (ציבוררים בગופים). ([link](#))
2. Israel Privacy Protection Authority. Protection of Privacy Regulations (Data Security), 5777–2017. ([English translation](#))
3. State Comptroller of Israel. Annual Report: Healthcare Cybersecurity. ([link](#))

4. The Knesset. Privacy Protection Law (Amendment No. 13), 2024. ([link](#))

# Part 2: Comparative Synthesis & Framework Design Recommendations

## Comparative Framework Overview

This study provides deep-dive analysis of **17 jurisdictions** with detailed chapter coverage, plus an additional **20+ countries** surveyed in the multi-region overview table.

### Deep-Dive Jurisdictions (17 Countries)

Country/Region	Designation Model	Transparency	Explicit Thresholds	2025-2026 Updates
<b>USA</b>	Sector-level (HPH sector)	Frameworks public, priorities confidential	No (voluntary, qualitative)	<b>CIRCIA final rule expected (May 2026), 72-hr incident/24-hr ransom reporting</b>
<b>Australia</b>	Asset-level (ICU hospitals)	Criteria fully public, SoNS confidential	<b>Yes (ICU presence)</b>	<b>Ransomware payment reporting (May 2025), strict enforcement (Jan 2026)</b>
<b>EU (NIS2)</b>	Entity-level (Essential/Important)	Criteria fully public, lists vary by state	<b>Yes (&lt;50 employees, €10M)</b>	<b>CER Directive (July 2026 deadline), all-hazard resilience</b>
<b>Canada</b>	Sector-based (10 CI sectors)	CI definition public	No (qualitative)	<b>Bill C-8/CCSPA proposed (72-hr reporting)</b>
<b>UK</b>	Entity-level (OES)	Criteria public, lists confidential	<b>Yes (incident thresholds most explicit globally)</b>	<b>Cyber Security Bill (Nov 2025), expands to MSPs/suppliers, 24-hr reporting</b>
<b>Germany</b>	System/entity (KRITIS + NIS2)	<b>High thresholds public</b>	<b>Yes (30,000 inpatient cases/year)</b>	<b>NIS2 implementation law in force (6 Dec 2025)</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	System-level (individual CII)	Criteria public, lists confidential	No (qualitative “debilitating”)	No major updates

Country/Region	Designation Model	Transparency	Explicit Thresholds	2025-2026 Updates
<b>New Zealand</b>	Risk-based (HISO segmentation)	Partially public	No (qualitative, developing)	<b>PSR GOV framework (1 Oct 2025)</b>
<b>Japan</b>	Entity-level (discretionary)	Medium (hospital categories public)	No (qualitative “excluding small scale”)	No major updates
<b>China</b>	System/entity (CII + MLPS)	Low (general criteria only)	No (party-state discretion)	No major updates
<b>South Korea</b>	Designation-based (CIIC)	<b>High (Official Gazette publication)</b>	No (5-factor qualitative test)	No major updates
<b>France</b>	Entity-level (OIV/SAIV)	Criteria public, lists confidential	No (qualitative)	No major updates
<b>Norway</b>	Entity-level (socially important services)	Criteria public	No (qualitative “significantly disruptive”)	<b>Digital Security Act in force (1 Oct 2025), 24h/72h reporting</b>
<b>Switzerland</b>	Entity-level (CI operators)	Criteria public, entities via permits	No (qualitative, category-based)	<b>Cybersecurity Ordinance (CSV) in force (1 Apr 2025), 24h reporting</b>
<b>Taiwan</b>	Designation-based (CI providers)	Criteria public	No (administrative designation)	<b>CSMA revised (24 Sept 2025), MoDA as authority</b>
<b>Thailand</b>	Designation-based (CII orgs)	Criteria public (Gazette)	No (Committee notification)	No major updates cited
<b>Hong Kong</b>	Designation-based (CI operators)	<b>High (criteria + obligations public)</b>	No (qualitative “essential to core function”)	<b>CI Ordinance in force (1 Jan 2026), 12h/48h/14d reporting</b>
<b>Israel</b>	Database security levels	Criteria public	<b>Yes (3-tier: Basic/Medium/High)</b>	<b>Privacy Law Amendment 13 effective (14 Aug 2025)</b>

# **Universal Health Information Systems Prioritized Globally**

**Across all 17 deep-dive jurisdictions, consistent prioritization emerges for:**

1. **Emergency call-taking and ambulance dispatch** (111/112/119/911/999 + Computer Aided Dispatch)
2. **Major hospital core clinical systems** (EMR/EHR, EDIS, ICU monitoring)
3. **Intensive care unit systems** (explicitly: Australia, UK, Germany; implicitly: all others)
4. **Blood bank and transfusion services** (national/regional level)
5. **National/regional infectious disease surveillance**
6. **National health information infrastructure** (where exists: electronic prescription, national EHR)

**High but variable priority:**

7. Ambulance electronic patient care records (ePCR/ePRF)
8. Operating theatre management and anesthesia systems
9. Hospital laboratory information systems (LIMS)
10. Pharmacy management and ePrescribing (hospital-based)
11. Medical imaging systems (PACS/RIS in acute settings)
12. National immunization registries
13. Organ and tissue transplant allocation systems

**Lower priority (but still important):**

- Community hospital systems (if alternatives exist)
- Primary care / GP systems (unless sole provider)
- Outpatient specialty clinics
- Health research systems (non-pandemic)
- Administrative/billing systems

# Emerging Global Trends (2025-2026)

## Key Regulatory Milestones (2025-2026)

Date	Jurisdiction	Milestone
1 Apr 2025	Switzerland	Cybersecurity Ordinance (CSV) enters into force; 24-hour reporting
30 May 2025	Australia	Mandatory ransomware payment reporting in effect
14 Aug 2025	Israel	Privacy Protection Law Amendment 13 enters into force
24 Sept 2025	Taiwan	Revised Cyber Security Management Act promulgated
1 Oct 2025	Norway	Digital Security Act and Regulations enter into force
1 Oct 2025	New Zealand	PSR GOV Policy Framework implemented
Nov 2025	UK	Cyber Security and Resilience Bill introduced
6 Dec 2025	Germany	NIS2 implementation law (NIS2UmsuCG) enters into force
1 Jan 2026	Australia	Strict enforcement posture begins
1 Jan 2026	Hong Kong	Protection of Critical Infrastructures Ordinance enters into force
May 2026	USA	CIRCIA final rule expected
17 July 2026	EU	CER Directive deadline for identifying critical entities

## 1. Supply Chain Regulation Expansion

- UK: New Bill explicitly targets **Managed Service Providers (MSPs)** and **critical suppliers**
- EU: NIS2 includes manufacturers of medical devices and pharmaceuticals
- **Implication:** Future frameworks must include criteria for assessing and mandating security standards for third and fourth-party vendors

## 2. All-Hazard Resilience Integration

- **EU CER Directive:** Mandates resilience plans for physical, environmental, natural disaster, and supply chain disruptions

- **Shift:** Moving beyond pure cybersecurity to require planning for broader disruptions that could impact digital services
- **Implication:** Critical infrastructure frameworks should integrate business continuity planning for multi-hazard scenarios

### 3. Stricter & Harmonized Incident Reporting

Global convergence towards standardized reporting timelines: | Reporting Stage | Common Standard | Examples | | :-----|:-----|:-----| | **Early warning** | 12-24 hours | Hong Kong (12h), Norway (24h), Switzerland (24h), EU NIS2 (24h) | | **Detailed notification** | 48-72 hours | Hong Kong (48h), Norway (72h), EU NIS2 (72h), USA CIRCIA (72h) | | **Final report** | 14-30 days | Hong Kong (14d), Norway (1 month), EU NIS2 (1 month) | | **Ransom payment** | 24 hours | USA CIRCIA, Australia |

### 4. Enhanced Enforcement Postures

- **Australia:** Shift to “stricter enforcement-oriented posture” from January 2026
- **EU:** Significant penalties (up to €10M or 2% global turnover)
- **Hong Kong:** Fines up to HK\$5M for non-compliance with CI operator obligations
- **Implication:** Compliance moving from voluntary guidance to mandatory requirement with serious consequences for non-compliance

# Key Policy Design Insights for New Jurisdictions

This section synthesizes lessons learned from the 17 jurisdictions analyzed, organized as actionable decision points for policymakers.

## Designation Model Trade-offs

Model	Advantages	Disadvantages	Best For	Examples
<b>Sector-based (no designation)</b>	Low administrative burden; covers all entities in sector	Lacks precision; may burden small providers unnecessarily	Countries with limited regulatory capacity	USA, Canada
<b>Entity-based designation</b>	Clear accountability; scales with organization	May miss critical small providers	Developed regulatory systems	UK (OES), EU (NIS2), France (OIV)
<b>System-based designation</b>	Precise; focuses on actual critical systems	Complex to administer; requires technical assessment	High IT maturity jurisdictions	Singapore (CII)
<b>Asset-based designation</b>	Clear thresholds; easy to verify	May be too rigid; misses critical functions at smaller sites	Jurisdictions wanting explicit rules	Australia (ICU hospitals), Germany (30k cases)
<b>Hybrid</b>	Flexible; covers edge cases	More complex to implement	Most jurisdictions moving this direction	Germany (KRITIS + NIS2), Hong Kong

**Recommendation for new countries:** Start with **sector + entity-based** for broad coverage, then add **system/asset thresholds** as regulatory capacity matures.

## Which Health Entities to Include (Global Consensus)

Based on analysis across all 17 jurisdictions, the following entities appear most frequently in CI/CII frameworks:

## Tier 1: Near-Universal Inclusion (explicitly included in 80%+ of frameworks)

Entity Type	Notes	Example Jurisdictions
<b>Hospitals with ICU/emergency capability</b>	Often defined by bed count or case volume	Australia, Germany, UK, EU, Hong Kong
<b>National/regional health information exchanges</b>	EHR platforms, health data networks	Singapore, Japan, Taiwan
<b>Blood and organ allocation services</b>	Often at national level	Germany, France, UK
<b>Disease surveillance systems</b>	Epidemic response capability	All jurisdictions (explicitly or implicitly)
<b>Emergency ambulance dispatch (CAD)</b>	Often in “emergency services” sector	UK, EU, Australia

## Tier 2: Frequently Included (50-80% of frameworks)

Entity Type	Notes	Example Jurisdictions
<b>Medical laboratories (reference/diagnostic)</b>	Often linked to epidemic response	Switzerland, EU, Germany
<b>Pharmaceutical manufacturers/distributors</b>	Supply chain criticality	EU (NIS2), Germany
<b>Medical device manufacturers</b>	Especially IVD and implantables	EU (NIS2 Annex II), Germany
<b>National immunization registries</b>	Pandemic preparedness	Japan, Taiwan

## Tier 3: Variable Inclusion (depends on national context)

Entity Type	Notes	Jurisdictions with Explicit Inclusion
<b>Private hospital chains</b>	Based on market share or regional importance	Singapore, Hong Kong

Entity Type	Notes	Jurisdictions with Explicit Inclusion
Telehealth platforms	Emerging; few explicit designations yet	None explicitly (emerging area)
Health insurance claims systems	Administrative criticality	USA (implicit), Germany

## Governance Structure Options

Structure	Description	Pros	Cons	Examples
Centralized cyber agency	Single agency designates and supervises all CI	Consistency; clear accountability	May lack health sector expertise	Singapore (CSA), Israel (INCD)
Sector-specific regulator	Health ministry/agency handles health CI	Domain expertise; existing relationships	May lack cyber expertise; fragmentation	Japan (MHLW), France (health ministry)
Hybrid with sector leads	Central cyber coordination; sector authorities designate	Balances expertise; coordination	Complexity; inter-agency friction	UK, Germany, Hong Kong
Federated (federal countries)	Shared federal/state responsibility	Respects local context	Coordination challenges; gaps	Canada, Australia, Germany

**Recommendation for new countries:** Hybrid model with a central cybersecurity coordination body and sector-specific designation authority in the health ministry tends to balance expertise best.

## Threshold Design: Quantitative vs Qualitative

Approach	Description	When to Use	Examples
Explicit quantitative	Numeric thresholds (beds, cases, employees)	High data availability; desire for predictability	Germany (30,000 cases/yr), EU ( $\leq 50$ employees), Australia (ICU presence)

Approach	Description	When to Use	Examples
<b>Qualitative + factors</b>	Multi-factor assessment; committee review	Lower data availability; diverse health system	South Korea (5-factor test), Singapore (“debilitating effect”)
<b>Functional designation</b>	Based on services provided, not size	Small but critical providers (e.g., sole provider in region)	EU (“regardless of size” exceptions), UK, NZ
<b>Registration-based</b>	Entities self-assess and register; spot-check enforcement	Resource-constrained regulators	Germany (NIS2 registration), Hong Kong

**Key insight from global analysis: Pure quantitative thresholds miss edge cases.**  
 Best practice combines a quantitative baseline with qualitative “safety net” criteria (e.g., “sole provider,” “unique capability,” “cross-border impact”).

## Common Implementation Pitfalls (Lessons from Established Frameworks)

Pitfall	Lesson Learned	Countries with This Issue
<b>Confidential lists become stale</b>	Build in mandatory periodic review (e.g., every 2 years)	EU (mandates 2-year review), UK
<b>Small critical providers overlooked</b>	Include “regardless of size” exceptions for unique/sole providers	EU NIS2, UK
<b>Supply chain not covered</b>	Explicitly include MSPs, cloud providers, medical device vendors	UK (new Bill), EU
<b>No escalation path for evolving threats</b>	Build in mechanism for emergency temporary designation	Taiwan, South Korea
<b>Reporting burden on small providers</b>	Tiered reporting obligations proportionate to size/criticality	EU (Essential vs Important), Israel (3-tier)
<b>Siloed from other CI sectors</b>	Map and address interdependencies (power, telecom, water)	Most mature frameworks address this

## What to Make Public vs Confidential

Element	Global Consensus	Rationale
<b>Designation criteria</b>	<b>PUBLIC</b>	Enables self-assessment; transparency; predictability
<b>Reporting thresholds</b>	<b>PUBLIC</b>	Clear compliance expectations
<b>List of designated entities</b>	<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>	Avoid creating target list for attackers
<b>Aggregate statistics</b>	<b>PUBLIC (anonymized)</b>	Sector learning; accountability
<b>Incident reports</b>	<b>CONFIDENTIAL (individual); PUBLIC (aggregated/anonymized)</b>	Balance learning vs security

**South Korea exception:** Official Gazette publication of designated CII is required by law, demonstrating that transparency models can work with appropriate security measures.

# Updated Recommendations for Framework Design (2025-2026)

Based on comprehensive analysis and latest global developments:

## 1. Adopt Hybrid Criticality Criteria

- **Combine Approaches:** Use explicit thresholds (like Germany's 30,000 cases, Australia's ICU presence) for objectivity, supplemented by qualitative assessment for unique critical providers.
- **Include Supply Chain:** Explicitly incorporate MSPs and critical suppliers in scope (following UK model).
- **Functional + Size-Based:** Combine functional designations (emergency services, blood/organ systems) with size-based thresholds (EU's  $\geq 50$  employees).

## 2. Implement Proportional Three-Tier System

- **Tier 1 (Essential/Critical):** Highest obligations, ex-ante supervision, 24/7 monitoring requirements
- **Tier 2 (Important):** Moderate obligations, ex-post supervision, regular assessments
- **Tier 3 (Baseline):** Basic cyber hygiene, voluntary reporting
- **Align Penalties:** Proportionate penalties based on tier and organizational size

## 3. Establish Clear Incident Reporting Thresholds

- **Adopt UK-Style Metrics:** Implement explicit, quantitative incident thresholds (patient counts, service disruption durations)
- **Harmonize Timelines:** Align with emerging global standards (24-hour initial, 72-hour detailed)
- **Special Ransomware Reporting:** Consider mandatory ransom payment reporting within 24 hours

## 4. Ensure Strategic Transparency

- **Public Criteria:** Publish clear designation criteria enabling self-assessment
- **Confidential Lists:** Maintain confidential entity lists to avoid creating target lists
- **Aggregate Reporting:** Publish anonymized sector statistics and case studies for learning

## 5. Integrate All-Hazard Resilience

- **Beyond Cybersecurity:** Require business continuity and disaster recovery planning for physical, environmental, and supply chain disruptions
- **Regular Testing:** Mandate annual or biennial testing of resilience plans
- **Cross-Sector Dependencies:** Map and address interdependencies with other critical infrastructure sectors


## 6. Future-Proof for Emerging Technologies

- **Telehealth Platforms:** Explicitly include national/regional telehealth systems
- **AI/ML Systems:** Consider criticality of AI-driven diagnostic and treatment systems
- **IoT Medical Devices:** Address security of connected medical device ecosystems

# Implementation Roadmap for New Jurisdictions

## Quick-Start Decision Tree

START: Is health explicitly listed as a CI sector in existing national law?



## Model Legislation Elements (Based on Global Best Practices)

Element	Recommended Approach	Reference Models
Definition of "health CI"	Entity-based + functional criteria	EU NIS2 (healthcare providers), Australia (ICU hospitals)
Designation authority	Health ministry with cybersecurity agency coordination	Hong Kong, Germany, UK
Scope criteria	Quantitative baseline + qualitative exceptions	Germany + EU hybrid
Obligations structure	Tiered (Essential/Important or Tier 1/2/3)	EU NIS2, Israel
Incident reporting	24h early warning / 72h detailed / 30d final	EU NIS2, Norway, Hong Kong
Penalties	Proportionate to size; administrative fines + compliance orders	EU, Hong Kong
Review cycle	Mandatory 2-year review of designated list	EU NIS2

## Phase 1: Foundation (Months 1-6)

### 1.1 Legal Authority Assessment

- Review existing cybersecurity/CI laws for health sector applicability
- Identify gaps requiring new legislation vs ministerial regulation
- Map existing health sector regulatory bodies and their powers

## **1.2 Sector Risk Assessment**

- Inventory major health information systems in the country
- Identify single points of failure (sole providers, national systems)
- Assess current incident reporting and cyber hygiene baseline

## **1.3 Stakeholder Mapping**

- Identify designated authority (cybersecurity agency, health ministry, or hybrid)
- Map hospitals, labs, insurers, technology vendors in health sector
- Establish working group with sector representatives

# **Phase 2: Design & Consultation (Months 7-12)**

## **2.1 Develop Designation Criteria**

- Define quantitative thresholds (e.g., bed count, case volume, employee count)
- Add qualitative safety-net criteria (sole provider, unique capability)
- Draft “regardless of size” exception triggers

## **2.2 Draft Obligations Framework**

- Tier 1 (Essential): Risk management plan, security officer, 24h reporting, annual audit
- Tier 2 (Important): Risk management, 72h reporting, biennial assessment
- Tier 3 (Baseline): Basic cyber hygiene, voluntary reporting

## **2.3 Stakeholder Consultation**

- Publish draft framework for public comment
- Conduct workshops with hospital associations, health IT vendors
- Align with telecom, energy, finance CI frameworks on cross-sector issues

# **Phase 3: Pilot Implementation (Months 13-18)**

## **3.1 Pilot Designation**

- Designate 5-10 largest/most critical entities for pilot
- Test designation process and notification procedures
- Refine criteria based on pilot feedback

## **3.2 Develop Operational Guidance**

- Create sector-specific security controls guidance (reference: Germany B3S, UK CAF)
- Develop incident reporting forms and submission system
- Establish information-sharing mechanisms (CERT, sectoral ISAC)

### **3.3 Capacity Building**

- Train designated entities on compliance requirements
- Train regulatory staff on supervision and enforcement
- Establish help desk for compliance questions

## **Phase 4: Full Implementation (Months 19-24)**

### **4.1 Full Rollout**

- Designate all in-scope entities based on final criteria
- Activate mandatory incident reporting
- Begin compliance monitoring

### **4.2 Enforcement Framework**

- Establish graduated enforcement (warning → compliance order → fine)
- Publish anonymized enforcement statistics for sector learning
- Create appeals/review mechanism

### **4.3 Cross-Sector Integration**

- Map interdependencies with power, telecom, water CI
- Establish joint incident response protocols
- Participate in national/regional CI coordination mechanisms

## **Phase 5: Maturity & Evolution (Ongoing)**

### **5.1 Continuous Improvement**

- Conduct annual review of designation criteria effectiveness
- Update thresholds based on sector evolution (e.g., telehealth growth)
- Incorporate lessons from incident response

### **5.2 International Alignment**

- Monitor and align with regional frameworks (EU NIS2, ASEAN, etc.)
- Participate in international information-sharing networks
- Consider mutual recognition agreements for cross-border operators

### **5.3 Emerging Technology Integration**

- Add AI/ML diagnostic systems to scope consideration
- Address IoT medical device security
- Update for cloud and SaaS health platforms

# Conclusion

This comprehensive analysis of **17 jurisdictions** with detailed chapter coverage, plus an additional **20+ countries** surveyed across Latin America, ASEAN, Africa, Middle East, and Central Asia, reveals a global landscape undergoing significant transformation in 2025-2026. **Five key trends dominate:**

1. **Expanded Scope:** Regulations now explicitly encompass supply chains, with MSPs and critical suppliers facing direct obligations (UK, EU).
2. **Holistic Resilience:** The shift from pure cybersecurity to all-hazard resilience planning (EU CER Directive) reflects recognition that health systems face multifaceted threats.
3. **Stricter Reporting:** Convergence towards 12-24 hour early warning and 48-72 hour detailed notification, with specific ransomware payment reporting (24 hours in USA, Australia).
4. **Enhanced Enforcement:** Moving from voluntary guidance to mandatory requirements with significant penalties (EU up to €10M, Hong Kong up to HK\$5M).
5. **New Jurisdictions Entering the Framework:** 2025-2026 sees major new entrants including Hong Kong (CI Ordinance), Switzerland (CSV), Norway (Digital Security Act), and Taiwan (revised CSMA).

Despite diverse legal traditions and cultural contexts, remarkable consensus exists on which health systems merit highest protection: emergency services, major hospital clinical systems, blood/organ services, and disease surveillance platforms. The most effective frameworks emerging from this global analysis combine **transparent, objective criteria** (enabling self-assessment) with **proportionate, risk-based obligations** (ensuring appropriate resource allocation), while maintaining necessary **confidentiality over specific asset lists** (preserving security). For jurisdictions developing or updating their health critical infrastructure frameworks, the 2025-2026 updates from the UK, EU, US, Australia, Hong Kong, Switzerland, and Norway provide a clear roadmap emphasizing supply chain security, all-hazard resilience, and harmonized incident reporting. These developments, coupled with the foundational principles from established frameworks like Germany's precise thresholds, Singapore's system-level approach, and South Korea's transparent designation process, create a comprehensive model for protecting the digital foundations of healthcare in an increasingly interconnected and threatened world.

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# Health as a Critical Information / Critical Infrastructure Sector

Region	Country	Status (health as CI/CII sector)	Ref(s)
Latin America	Chile	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> “prestación institucional de servicios de salud” listed as an <b>essential service</b> under the national cybersecurity/critical infrastructure framework	<a href="#">1</a>
	Mexico	<b>Not confirmed (primary not found in accessible sources):</b> I did not find a government text explicitly listing “health/healthcare” as a CI/CII sector in the sources retrieved for this run	—
ASEAN	Singapore	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> CSA lists <b>Healthcare</b> among CII sectors under the Cybersecurity Act	<a href="#">2</a>
	Malaysia	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> NACSA lists <b>Healthcare Services</b> as an NCII sector	<a href="#">3</a>
	Indonesia	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> official summary of <b>Perpres 82/2022</b> lists <b>Sektor kesehatan</b> as a strategic sector for Vital Information Infrastructure protection	<a href="#">4</a>
	Thailand	<b>Explicit (secondary):</b> “Public Health” presented as a CII sector under Thailand’s Cybersecurity Act (source is not a government statute page)	<a href="#">5</a>
Africa	Ghana	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> CSA directive lists <b>Health</b> as a Critical Information Infrastructure sector	<a href="#">6</a>
	Kenya	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> national coordination body list includes <b>health</b> among CII sectors	<a href="#">7</a>
	Nigeria	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> national cybersecurity policy/strategy text includes <b>Public Health and Healthcare Sector</b>	<a href="#">8</a>
	Egypt	<b>Not confirmed (primary not found in accessible sources):</b> a strategy launch page was found, but the <b>sector list including health</b> was not located in an accessible primary document in this run	<a href="#">9</a>
Middle East	Bahrain	<b>Explicit (primary/official):</b> National Cybersecurity Center lists <b>Health Services</b> as a CNI sector	<a href="#">10</a>
	Qatar	<b>Not confirmed (primary not found in accessible sources):</b> I only retrieved a news report about the strategy launch (no official sector list including health found in this run)	<a href="#">11</a>
	United Arab Emirates (UAE)	<b>Explicit (official portal copy):</b> lists <b>Health services</b> among protected critical asset sectors	<a href="#">12</a>
Central Asia	Kazakhstan	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> definition/rules for “critical information and communication infrastructure” explicitly include <b>healthcare</b>	<a href="#">13</a>
	Kyrgyz Republic	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> definition of “critical information infrastructure” includes the field of <b>healthcare</b>	<a href="#">14</a>
Southern Africa	Zambia	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> Cyber Security Act defines “critical sector” and explicitly includes <b>health</b>	<a href="#">15</a>
	Botswana	<b>Explicit (primary):</b> national cybersecurity strategy lists critical infrastructure sectors including <b>health</b>	<a href="#">16</a>

Region	Country	Status (health as CI/CII sector)	Ref(s)
Eastern Europe	Russia	Explicit (secondary compilation of legal text): law scope statement includes systems functioning in the sphere of healthcare (здравоохранения)	17
	Ukraine	Not confirmed (primary not found in accessible sources): I retrieved official legal portals for “critical infrastructure” concepts, but not an accessible sector list explicitly naming health in this run	18

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