



33rd International Conference on VLSI Design  
19th International Conference on Embedded Design  
Bangalore, Jan. 5. 2020.

# Side-Channel Attack Analysis and Simulation Techniques

Tutorial


**Makoto Nagata**

Graduate School of Science, Technology and Innovation,  
Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

# Advent of adversary among IC chips



Crypto attacks



H/W Trojans


# Outline

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## Background


- ▶ Side-channel attacks
- ▶ Power noise analysis technique
- ▶ Side-channel attack simulation
- ▶ Conclusions

# Passive attack – power analysis



## Analysis models (Attacker)

- Simple power analysis (SPA)
- Differential power analysis (DPA)
- Correlation power analysis (CPA)
- Local EM analysis (LEMA)




# Cryptographic engines

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
- ▶ Public key crypto
  - ✓ Asymmetric key usage for encryption and decryption – a pair of keys for public and private domains
  - ✓ Power side channel leakage analysis: SPA
  - ✓ ECC, ECDSA, RSA
  
- ▶ Private key crypto
  - ✓ Symmetric key usage – a single private key for both encryption and decryption (there is no public domain)
  - ✓ Power side channel leakage analysis: DPA, CPA
  - ✓ AES, DES (obsolete)

# Power side channel leakage analysis

## Simple Power Analysis (SPA)




## Correlation Power Analysis (CPA)



- ▶ Analysis (or attacks in a malicious case) to extract a secret key from power-noise waveforms
- ▶ Simulation technique to evaluate security risks in design against diversified leakage models


# SPA demonstration





# AES\* cryptographic architecture


\*Advanced Encryption Standard



- ▶ A single key byte (8 bit) is used in byte-wise crypto computation.
- ▶ For AES with 128-bit key, 16 computations running in parallel.
- ▶ Source of correlation:  
PS current and internal activity measured as Hamming distance



# Silicon test vehicle




Chip summary*	
Process	65 nm CMOS
Metal	9 layer Cu metal
Cores	AES engines with different S-box implementation (example: Composite)

## \*SPACES explorer chip




(Security evaluation of Physically Attacked Cryptoprocessors in Embedded Systems)

# SC leakage measurement system




- ▶ Exploration of physical mechanisms of SC information leakage
- ▶ A test chip directly mounted on an interposer, in the measurement system built on FPGA board called "SASEBO-R2"

# SC leakage measurement examples





- ▶ SC leakage comes from the correlation of S-box internal switching activity and logic operation using secret key bytes.
- ▶ It is difficult to achieve complete elimination while possible to mitigate the level of correlation – a design challenge.

# Active attack -- laser fault injection (LFI)




- ▶ High resolution fault injection both in time and space, 1-bit fault potentially reduces key space to 28@AES-128.


# LFI physical mechanism



# Physical attacks in dimensions




# Physical attack isolation walls at chip level





# Attack measures and packaging structures



## Physical media

Passive attacks	Side channel attack (SCA)	EM, Photon, Volt., Current
Active attacks	Fault attack (FA)	EM, Laser, ESD, Glitch

## Assembly structure

ASIC	Wire bonding, Flip chip	Plastic mold, CoB, etc.
FPGA	3D stacking, Fan out	Si interposer, MCM, etc.

# Reported countermeasure techniques

- Countermeasure design styles against SCA (e.g.)
  - ✓ Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [1]
  - ✓ Masked And Operation (MAO) [2]
  - ✓ Masked Dual-Rail Pre-charge Logic (MDPL) [3]
  - ✓ Threshold Implementation (TI) [4]

[1] K. Tiri, *et al.*, "A Logic Level Design Methodology for a Secure DPA Resistant ASIC or FPGA Implementation," DATE'04, vol.1, pp.10246-10251, 2004.

[2] E. Trichina, "Combinational Logic Design for AES SubByte Transformation On Masked Data," Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2003/236, 2003.

[3] T. Pop, *et al.*, "Masked Dual-Rail Precharge Logic : DPA-Resistance Without Routing Constrains," CHES2005, LNCS3659, pp.172-186, Springer-Verlag, 2005.

[4] S. Nikova, *et al.*, "Threshold Implementations Against Side-Channel Attacks and Glitches," The 8<sup>th</sup> International Conference on Information and Communications Security (ICICS 2006), LNCS4307, pp. 529-545, Springer-Verlag, Dec. 2006.

- Simulation methodology of SCA (e.g.)
  - ✓ Power consumption model [5]
  - ✓ Capacitor charging model [6]
  - ✓ Computational platforms / Gate and transistor-level simulation [7]

[5] K. Tiri, *et al.*, "Simulation Models for Side-Channel Information Leaks," The proceedings of DAC 05, pp. 228-233, San Diego, CA, USA, June. 2005.

[6] D. Fujimoto, *et al.*, "A Fast Power Current Simulation of Cryptographic VLSI Circuits for Side Channel Attack Evaluation," IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals, Vol.E96-A, No.12, pp.2533-2541, Dec. 2013.

[7] A. Kumar, *et al.*, "Efficient simulation of em side-channel attack resilience," IEEE/ACM Int. Conf. Comp. Aided Design (ICCAD), pp. 123-130, Nov. 2017.

# Outline

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Background

Side-channel attacks

- ▶ Power noise analysis technique
- ▶ Side-channel attack simulation
- ▶ Conclusions

# Power SC leakage from EMC viewpoint

EMI


- ▶ Electromagnetic emission → Side channel leakage (passive information leakage)
- ▶ EMI analysis → SCA analysis

EMS

- ▶ Electromagnetic immunity → Fault injection (active information leakage)
- ▶ EMS analysis → Fault analysis


➡ **In-depth understandings of IC-chip level EMC, toward the quality design of IC chips for hardware security**

# EMI simulation framework



Passive part of EMI models	Active part of EMI models	Challenges
S-parameters or equivalent circuits of PCB, package and IC chip	Power current models of active circuits with multiple power domains (PDs)	Scenarios to properly activate crypto circuits for EMI simulation toward HWS


# EMS simulation framework



External part of EMS	Internal part of EMS	Challenge
Limited to the direct and associated RF paths of the most significance	On-die paths of ESD I/O rings and Si substrate, in addition to PDN of circuits	Specification of the most sensitive part of circuits to RF disturbance

# C-P-S\* model for power noise analysis


\*Chip-Package-System board




- Full-system level simulation of power-noise generation and interference





# General flow of C-P-S modeling



# General flow of C-P-S modeling





# PDN impedance model




- C-P-B integrated passive model, capturing AC impedance seen from power source side (VDD)

# Power noise: C-P-S active interaction




- ▶ Power current ( $I_{DD}$ , active part of IC) interacts with PDN AC impedance.
- ▶ C-P-S integrated models for power noise in IC chips and PCB

# General flow of C-P-S modeling




# Chip power model



Chip power model  
(CPM)  
of either  
"digital circuit block"  
or  
"whole chip"

- CPM -- A power delivery network involving multiple power current models

# Liner network model (passive part)




- Liner network model (Passive CPM) -- Reduced and distributed RC network among explicit ports




# Power current model (active part)

## Standard cell library (LEF/DEF)




- SPICE simulation:  $I(t)$   
LUT for in/out condition, load caps
- Post-layout extraction  
logic cell level:  $C_{esc}$ ,  $R_{esr}$




- Cell based -- Logic cells are characterized in power current model.

# Full chip level model



- Active current models and passive network models are represented in respective sub circuits and then unified in a single netlist (SPICE compatible).

# Analysis and diagnosis of SC leakage




- ▶ Full-system level simulation of power side-channel (SC) leakage using C-P-S models<sup>1</sup>
- ▶ On-die diagnosis of physical attacks using OCM<sup>2</sup>




<sup>1</sup>Chip-Package-System board

<sup>2</sup>On-Chip Monitor

# On-chip power noise monitor (OCM)




# On-chip waveforms during crypto operation



D. Fujimoto *et al.*, "Side-Channel Leakage on Silicon Substrate of CMOS Cryptographic Chip," HOST 2014.

- SC leakage is observable everywhere on a die – even in the backside.

# Simulation versus measurements



# Outline

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Background

Side-channel attacks


Power noise analysis technique

- ▶ Side-channel attack simulation
- ▶ Conclusions




# AES\* cryptographic architecture

\*Advanced Encryption Standard




- ▶ A single key byte (8 bit) is used in byte-wise crypto computation.
- ▶ For AES with 128-bit key, 16 computations running in parallel
- ▶ Source of correlation:  
PS current and internal activity measured as Hamming distance

# SC leakage simulation flow



- ▶ Time-domain simulation for a set of plain texts to be encrypted with a private key

# PS current waveforms for CPA (sim.)




## Cost of simulation for 10,000 plain texts

Model	cost
Full transistor (pre-layout)	115 days
Full transistor (post-layout)	Unlikely
Active PS current model	10 hours



280 times acceleration demonstrated

# PS current breakdown (sim.)





- Sub (SubBytes) exhibits clear correlation with bits in plain texts, on the other hand, Sub (MixColumn) is shown to be random.

# CPA simulation and measurements





► Correlation between Hamming distance and PS waveforms

# SC leakage of AES in 130 nm CMOS



Key:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F

# SC leakage of AES in 65 nm CMOS



Key:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F

# Conclusion

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- ▶ **C-P-S power noise simulation accelerates CPA and clarifies vulnerability of AES cores against attacks in design phase.**

It will play a key role in the co-design of cryptographic circuits and PDNs for suppressing SC information leakage through PS as well as electromagnetic (EM) channels.

- ▶ **There are relevant disciplines between EMC and HWS fields.**

The knowledge (both for emission and immunity) is to be wisely integrated for HW and SW design toward secure and safe society.

*Acknowledgements: This work was in part based on results obtained from a project commissioned by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO). The authors would like to deeply thank K. Matsuda, A. Tsukioka, and Prof. N. Miura for their valuable help and valuable scientific discussions.*