

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests*

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Abstract

Though presidents often criticize organized interests, presidents also expend considerable effort engaging them. Using original elite interviews, a survey of lobbyists, and administrative data, I consider how this engagement manifests, why presidents engage interests, and with which interests presidents engage. Unlike in other institutions, presidents exercise substantial control over engagement with interests, and they engage to mobilize interests' institutional resources in service of their goals. To optimize mobilization, presidents focus engagement on well-resourced interests and interests who share presidents' preferences. Pairing over 7 million White House visitor log entries from two administrations with lobbying and campaign finance records, I demonstrate that presidential engagement is informed by interests' electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment, though these characteristics' substantive effects are modest. My findings highlight coalition-building with interests as an under-appreciated source of presidential power and elucidate the degree to which presidents amplify the political voice of well-resourced and copartisan interests.

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Though polar opposites in most respects, both Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump routinely assailed organized interests.¹ Early in his presidency, Obama declared at a bill signing, “When I ran for President, I did so because I believed that despite... the influence of special interests, it was possible for us to bring change to Washington.”² Also early in his term, Trump proclaimed he “want[ed] to get the special interests out of politics for good.”³ Both also took action to limit the power of interests in their administrations, such as issuing executive orders restricting former lobbyists’ ability to serve in government.⁴ Scholars suggest Trump, Obama, and other presidents express antipathy towards and distance themselves from interests not because of personal inclinations, but as a consequence of the office’s isolation from the organized interest universe. Howell and Moe posit this isolation emerges from institutional design, as presidents’ “position of national leadership gives them far more freedom from special interest pressure... than their legislative counterparts” (2016, 102; see also Quirk and Nesmith 2005; Truman 1971). Further, Light suggests this isolation stems from presidents’ deliberate choices, describing “a conscious effort [by the White House] to avoid interaction with most groups” (1999, 94). Consequently, scholars afford “far less attention” to presidents’ supposedly limited interactions with interests than to legislatures’ and executive agencies’ interactions with them (Loomis 2009, 403).

However, a closer look at the White House’s day-to-day activities reveals that presidents frequently engage with organized interests.⁵ While salient instances of engagement, such as Presi-

¹I use “organized interests” rather than “interest groups” to be inclusive in terminology. Whereas “interest groups” implies membership-based groups, “organized interests” includes entities lacking members pursuing collective goals through political action, such as corporations and universities (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 9).

²Barack Obama, “Remarks on Signing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009,” June 22, 2009, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/286991>.

³Donald Trump, “Remarks at a ‘Make America Great Again’ Rally in Huntington, West Virginia,” August 3, 2017, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/330949>.

⁴Tamara Keith, “Trump’s Executive Order On Ethics Pulls Word For Word From Obama, Clinton,” *NPR*, January 28, 2017, <https://www.npr.org/2017/01/28/512201631/trumps-executive-order-on-ethics-pulls-word-for-word-from-obama-clinton>.

⁵Like Salisbury and Shepsle (1981)’s “legislative enterprise,” I consider presidents as presiding over an organization of staffers accountable to them who facilitate the performance of their duties. Formally, the staffers fulfilling this function are those in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). While managing EOP personnel presents presidents with some of the same coordination problems they encounter in the broader bureaucracy (Krause 2009), several institutional features help presidents ensure their staff works towards their priorities, particularly in engaging with organized interests. First, because a large proportion of EOP staff—particularly those in the White House Office—serve at the pleasure of the president, they are more responsive to presidents’ preferences than staff in federal agencies. Second, most modern White Houses delegate oversight of engagement with interests to the Office of Public Liaison (OPL), which serves as the White House’s primary point of contact with interests and manages and provides input on other White House units’ engagement (Pika 2009). Multiple interviewees from other White House units

dent Bill Clinton providing donors nights in the Lincoln Bedroom,⁶ often attract criticism, such anecdotes belie the White House’s commonplace engagement with interests in public and private settings. Recounting his early days as president, Barack Obama recalls “an endless flow of meetings with various constituency groups... to address their concerns and solicit their support” (Obama 2020, 285-286). Similarly, an aide to President Jimmy Carter reports the administration “tried to keep up very good relations with all the major interest group players in town... meeting with [them]... on a regular basis.”⁷ The ubiquity of such engagement is exemplified by the longevity of the White House Office of Public Liaison, a unit maintained by every president since Gerald Ford responsible for cultivating relationships with interests (Peterson 1992; Pika 2009).⁸ Though the White House may distance itself from interests in public-facing behavior, an aide to President John F. Kennedy admits, “[I]nterest groups are in the woodwork, under the floors, in the hallways, and in the rose garden” (Light 1999, 95). Highlighting this discrepancy between the prominence of interests in the White House and the “episodic and limited” attention scholars have paid to presidents’ interactions with interests, Loomis notes in the *Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency* that “such a gap is remarkable” (2009, 404-405).

This paper begins to address this gap by probing with which organized interests presidents engage. In doing so, this paper also considers two antecedent questions: to what extent do presidents or interests exercise control over engagement, and what motivations drive engagement? While these questions remain underexplored in part because scholars have deemphasized the linkage between presidents and interests, they have also been overlooked because “the requisite data are difficult to amass” (Loomis 2009, 421). These questions require data on both the dynamics by which engagement between presidents and interests manifests and the occurrence of engagement; however,

reported meetings with interests were often routed through OPL, sometimes adding frustrating levels of complexity to the process. Through OPL, presidents can better ensure engagement aligns with their preferences than if they conducted oversight themselves. This is especially true when the directors of OPL or its equivalent have clout with the president and senior staff, as was the case in the Clinton and Obama administrations (Pika 2009). Consistent with the notion of the president as head of an “executive enterprise,” I consider engagement by any EOP member with interests to constitute “presidential engagement.”

⁶Glenn Bunting and Ralph Frammolino, “Up to 900 Donors Stayed Overnight at the White House,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 9, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997-02-09/news/mn-27120_1_white-house-official.

⁷David Rubenstein, Interview with the Miller Center for Public Affairs, March 6, 1982, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/bertram-carp-oral-history-deputy-assistant-domestic>.

⁸During the Obama and Biden administrations, this office has been recast as the Office of Public Engagement.

these phenomena are seldom observable.

I investigate these questions using original interviews, survey responses, and administrative data shedding light on presidents’ engagement with organized interests. First, I consider the degree to which presidents and interests exert influence over engagement with insights from 15 interviews with former White House officials and interest representatives and a survey of over 700 lobbyists. Unlike the traditional “outside-in” lobbying model, where interests pursue access to policymakers, my interviews and survey responses demonstrate that the relative prominence of an “inside-out” model, where presidents take a leading role in providing interests access, affords presidents substantial control over engagement (Shaiko 1998; Tenpas 2005). Second, I describe presidents’ motivations for engaging with interests and provide expectations for which interests they are likely to engage. In brief, interests’ institutional resources, such as lobbying capabilities and campaign contributions, make them important targets of presidents’ coalition-building efforts; through engagement, presidents hope to mobilize interest support or discourage opposition. To maximize the interest resources they marshal, presidents focus engagement on interests offering the highest expected rates of return—well-resourced interests and those sharing presidents’ preferences. Third, I evaluate these expectations using over 7 million White House visitor log entries from the Clinton and Obama administrations and contemporary lobbying records to identify instances where presidents engaged with interests and model engagement as a function of interests’ electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment. My findings indicate presidents are more likely to engage with interests with larger resource endowments and who are copartisans, though the magnitudes of these effects are modest, as even low-resource and non-copartisan interests experience engagement at substantial rates.

My findings highlight the importance of presidents’ interactions with organized interests and contribute to key themes in the study of the presidency, organized interests, and representation. While recent studies of presidential power focus on tools presidents wield independently, such as unilateral action (Lowande and Rogowski 2020), disbursement of selective benefits (Kriner and Reeves 2015), and appointments outside the advise and consent process (Kinane 2021), this study reemphasizes that presidents’ toolkits also include their ability to build and mobilize coalitions.

Further, my findings speak to the debate concerning presidential representation by considering representational priorities presidents exhibit through engaging interests, who are both independent actors and manifestations of preferences in the mass public. By engaging more with well-resourced and copartisan interests, my results suggest presidents provide more representation to subgroups that help advance their goals (Druckman and Jacobs 2015; Kriner and Reeves 2015) rather than serving as national representatives (Howell and Moe 2016). Finally, my findings illuminate presidents' role in fostering or tempering the outsized voice upper-class interests enjoy in American politics. While presidents, contrary to their role as national representatives (Bentley 1908; Truman 1971; Quirk and Nesmith 2005), engage more often with high-resource interests aligned with the upper-class, this preference is modest, especially when compared to that of other institutions like Congress.

Presidents as Engagers-in-Chief

Presidents and organized interests interact in many well-documented ways, such as interests contributing to presidents' campaigns and altering their activities in response to presidents' priorities (Baumgartner et al. 2011). I focus on a specific type of interaction I term "presidential engagement," or reciprocal communication and coordination between presidents and interests concerning electoral or policy goals. A key distinguishing trait of presidential engagement is that it requires active participation from both actors; for instance, while interests can expend campaign resources in support of presidents unilaterally, engagement requires dialogue between presidents and interests. Though presidential engagement can take place through many mediums of direct contact, such as phone calls and emails, my theoretical exposition and empirical analysis focus on in-person White House meetings because they are a valued form of interaction for both parties and because the significant time and effort the White House expends to facilitate them provides a strong signal of its engagement priorities.⁹

⁹While I focus on White House meetings, my survey respondents indicate the frequency with which their clients experienced engagement through these meetings is correlated with the frequency with which they experienced engagement through mail, email, and phone calls ($r = 0.77$ and $r = 0.61$ for the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively) and meetings outside the White House ($r = 0.77$ and $r = 0.59$, respectively). Thus, the dynamics I describe also inform the White House's use of other engagement mediums (see Supplemental Information Section B).

Framing these interactions as *presidential* engagement presupposes presidents exert critical influence over their manifestation and conduct. This assertion diverges from the commonly understood “outside-in” lobbying dynamic characterizing other institutions, such as Congress, where interests’ motives for and strategic behavior to gain access and influence take precedence and policymakers are mere targets of interests’ pursuits (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hall and Dardorff 2006; Miller 2021*b*). However, several descriptive accounts assert presidents’ motivations and strategic choices feature prominently in interactions with interests, particularly when compared to those of other policymakers, fostering an “inside-out” lobbying dynamic where presidents exercise substantial control (Peterson 1992; Shaiko 1998; Tenpas 2005). Unfortunately, limited systematic evidence exists demonstrating presidents exert more control over interactions with interests than other political elites. Substantiating this dynamic is important for my theoretical argument because presidents must wield considerable power over engagement for their incentives to influence with which interests they engage.

In this section, I augment extant descriptive studies with original interviews and survey responses from organized interest representatives and White House officials to demonstrate presidents wield important control over engagement. My interviews, conducted with 15 interest representatives and former White House officials between 2018 and 2019, provide detailed insights on the dynamics governing engagement from actors on both sides of the relationship.¹⁰ My survey responses, collected from over 700 lobbyists in 2018, illustrate how these insights generalize to the broader population of interests.¹¹ This novel data provides a window into typically unobservable mechanisms of elite decisionmaking surrounding the White House’s interactions with interests that provide presidents important control over engagement.

¹⁰See Supplemental Information Section A for more about interview procedures and interviewee descriptions.

¹¹My sampling frame includes all points of contact on Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) reports filed between the first quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of 2018. While not all interests with whom presidents might engage file LDA reports, the low thresholds for lobbying activity requiring reporting force interests with more than a transient interest in federal policy to file; consequently, studies of interests at the federal level typically focus on the population of interests filing LDA reports (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 2011; Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002). See Supplemental Information Section A for details about LDA and survey procedures.

Conditions Empowering Presidents

Explanations for presidents’ relatively strong control over engagement fall into three categories. First, physical and logistical barriers make outside-in lobbying difficult for organized interests while providing the White House control over access (Peterson 1992). One key distinction between the White House and other policymaking venues is restrictions on physical access; whereas interests can easily enter Congress and many federal agencies to attend events or visit unannounced, White House access requires prior clearance. These barriers not only create distance between interests and the White House, but also impose transaction costs on White House staff, who must exert time and effort to collect and submit visitors’ personal information to the Secret Service in advance; thus, the White House is disinclined to provide access. As one former White House official describes, “Going to a meeting at the White House is not trivial. You have to go through security, you have to get cleared in. There’s... care given to who is coming into the building...” (Interviewee A).

Second, the White House faces stronger time and resource constraints on its ability to interact with interests than other institutions. While all policymakers shoulder important responsibilities, presidents, as head of the executive branch and the sole nationally elected official, face an unceasing flow of demands for action that exceeds their powers and capabilities (Cronin 1980). Further, the small size of the White House’s staff relative to those of the 535 members of Congress and hundreds of federal agencies leaves presidents little capacity for interacting with the thousands of organizations in the organized interest universe (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012).¹² Given a choice between fighting for a sliver of the White House’s attention or pursuing more accessible policymakers, interests tend to forsake the White House and focus outside-in lobbying on congresspersons and bureaucrats (Loomis 2009). As an aide to President Lyndon Baines Johnson explains, “There are 535 opportunities in Congress and only one in the White House. You get an hour to present your case before each representative; you get fifteen minutes once a year with the president. Where would you put your effort?” (Light 1999, 94). Because interests shift their outside-in lobbying effort

¹²In fiscal year 2016, the Executive Office of the President employed nearly 1,900 people (“Fiscal Year 2017 Congressional Budget Submission,” *Executive Office of the President*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/fy2017eopbudgetfinalelectronic.pdf>), while Congress and the broader executive branch employed 34,000 and 2.68 million civilian workers, respectively (“Analytical Perspectives Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2017,” *Office of Management and Budget*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2017/assets/spec.pdf>).

away from the White House, presidents inherit considerable discretion over initiating engagement.

Third, the White House has responded to the challenges of interacting with interests with institutional innovations that increase its authority over engagement. The most prominent such innovation is the Office of Public Liaison (OPL), a White House unit created during the Ford administration to manage presidents' relationships with interests (Pika 2009). An Obama administration staffer who worked in this unit described it as "the door to the White House... our job was to work with organized interests all the time, every day. Our role was to represent the President for these interests" (Interviewee A). Importantly, OPL functions as the White House's primary point of contact with interests, centralizing engagement and serving as a clearinghouse for information flowing to and from interests. While this helps the White House engage efficiently, it stymies interests' outside-in lobbying to reach officials beyond OPL, leading them to lobby other venues where policymakers are more reachable (Interviewee B). Through institutional innovations like OPL, the White House has accumulated control over engagement (Kumar and Grossman 1984, 308).

Evidence of Presidential Control Over Engagement

Because presidential engagement is the product of behind-closed-doors actions by myriad actors inside and outside the White House, marshaling evidence illustrating every dimension of the process is difficult. However, by collecting insights from political elites on both sides of the relationship, I can evaluate the veracity of several claims central to the argument that, relative to other institutions, the White House exercises substantial control over engagement. Specifically, I use my interviews and survey responses to show: interests focus more lobbying attention on Congress and the bureaucracy than the White House; the White House takes an active role in initiating engagement; and interests are more responsive to the White House than vice versa. While this evidence is not definitive proof of White House control over engagement, its alignment with extant descriptive accounts affirms the argument that presidents' motivations are key to engagement.

First, I assess whether organized interests allocate less lobbying attention to the White House, thereby enabling presidents to exert more influence over engagement. In Figure 1, I present the distributions of lobbyists' responses to questions asking how important direct contacts with officials




Figure 1: Importance of Direct Contacts for Organized Interests Across Institutions Bar graphs indicate how important respondents reported having direct contacts with officials in Congress (left), the federal bureaucracy (center), and the White House (right) is for their overall lobbying strategies. Responses are weighted to reflect the characteristics of the sampling frame. Responses may not sum to 100% due to rounding. *N* between 709 and 714 per question.

in Congress, the federal bureaucracy, and the White House are to their lobbying strategies. The distributions for Congress and the bureaucracy accord with traditional outside-in lobbying accounts, with most respondents indicating direct contacts are “very” or “extremely” important (91.4% and 82.4%, respectively). However, only about a third of respondents (39.3%) assigned similar importance to direct contacts with the White House. Because interests are rational actors who allocate resources given expectations of success, this disconnect implies they devote more effort to obtaining direct contacts with Congress and the bureaucracy than the White House. Consequently, presidents must exercise greater initiative to engage interests focusing their access-seeking behavior elsewhere.

Second, I explore the extent to which presidents initiate engagement with interests. My survey asked respondents who reported attending White House meetings during the Obama or Trump administrations the degree to which meetings were initiated by their organization or the White House. The distributions of responses (top row of Figure 2) indicate the White House often takes an active role in initiating meetings; the majority of respondents (52.6%) reported the Obama administration tended to take the lead or share responsibility for initiating meetings, while a smaller but still




Figure 2: Dynamics of Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests Bar graphs indicate respondents' perceptions of dynamics underlying presidential engagement during the Obama (left) and Trump (right) administrations. The top row indicates the degree to which respondents thought direct contacts arose from organizations' requests versus White House invitations, and the center and bottom rows indicate the frequency with which the White House granted organizations' requests and organizations accepted White House invitations, respectively. These questions were posed to respondents who reported attending White House meetings during each administration. Responses are weighted to reflect the characteristics of the sampling frame. Responses may not sum to 100% due to rounding. N between 231 and 248 per question.

sizable proportion of respondents (38.8%) reported similar experiences in the Trump administration.¹³ Former White House officials echoed that both presidents and interests initiate interactions, but stressed that they and their colleagues exerted significant effort to cultivate engagement; one official explained they “tried to be affirmative in engaging groups, companies, businesses, you name it... [and] it was also fairly regular for groups, voices, corporate actors, constituency groups, etc., to ask and request meetings or engagements or conversations. So it’s definitely both” (Interviewee D). However, several interest representatives indicated engagement was more commonly initiated by the White House; one lobbyist recalled, “The majority [of meetings arose from] the White House bringing people in” (Interviewee E), and another reported, “More often than not... [the White House] called stakeholders in” (Interviewee F). Further, even when interests request meetings, the White House’s unique institutional characteristics afford it ultimate discretion in disposing of requests. Together, the survey responses and interviews indicate that while some engagement emerges from interests’ outside-in lobbying, the White House plays a more active role in manifesting engagement than traditional lobbying accounts anticipate.

Third, I investigate how the White House and organized interests respond to each others’ engagement entreaties. The center and bottom rows of Figure 2 present the distributions of responses to questions concerning the frequency with which the White House acceded to interests’ requests and interests accepted White House invitations, respectively. These results demonstrate interests are more responsive to the White House than vice versa; while approximately three-quarters of respondents indicate both administrations “sometimes” or “usually” granted their organizations’ requests, over 90% replied their organizations “usually” or “always” accepted White House invitations. My interviewees unanimously agreed White House invitations are heeded more often than interest requests. One former White House official reported he rejected most requests because “I just didn’t have a whole lot of time to sit around and talk to people about whatever” (Interviewee C), while another relayed, “When the White House calls, people tend to take the call. People were generally always willing to meet” (Interviewee A). A lobbyist mirrored these sentiments, explain-

¹³Several interviewees reported the Trump administration was less active in engaging with interests than previous administrations. A former Trump administration official attributed this to the administration’s lack of preparation: “Early on, there wasn’t a whole lot of organization... we didn’t have some of the support groups [like OPL] set up yet” (Interviewee C).

ing, “I have not ever turned down a meeting. I always think of meeting as productive. In terms of getting the meetings, yes, it’s very challenging” (Interviewee F).

Taken together, this evidence illustrates that the White House’s interactions with organized interests differ fundamentally from those characterizing other institutions. While Congress and federal agencies are besieged by interests’ outside-in lobbying, presidents enjoy first- and second-mover advantages providing significant discretion over engagement. As a first-mover, the White House conducts inside-out lobbying through institutionalized structures that enable it to manage engagement with interests. As a second-mover, the White House’s physical isolation, sparse staff resources, and institutional mechanisms provide unique opportunities to exercise discretion in fielding requests. To be sure, interests’ outside-in lobbying sometimes motivate presidential engagement; however, as illustrated in the middle and bottom rows of Figure 2, the White House’s second-mover advantage allows it to fulfill these requests less regularly than interests accede to its invitations. As one lobbyist explained the relative influence of the White House and his organization in manifesting engagement, “It works both ways, and it’s predominantly us reaching out to them... [But] they’re the drivers. They determine whether they want to be responsive or not” (Interviewee G).

Presidents’ Motivations for Engagement

Because presidential engagement with organized interests is presidency-driven, presidents’ motivations for conducting engagement are key to understanding with which interests they engage. Presidents, as goal-oriented actors, pursue electoral success for themselves and their copartisans, favorable policy, and positive legacies (Light 1999). While they enjoy extensive unilateral powers to pursue their goals, the American constitutional system requires presidents to secure cooperation or assent from others to achieve many important aspirations. For example, presidents’ electoral success rests in voters’ hands. Again, policy initiatives necessitating legislation require congressional approval. Further, faced with myriad responsibilities that stretch the limits of their office (Cronin 1980), presidents often rely on other actors, like congressional leaders (Beckmann 2010) and party organizations (Galvin 2009), to provide resources to subsidize presidents’ pursuits.

Thus, presidents’ ultimate success hinges on their ability to build coalitions that can provide

support at the ballot box and in Congress and other institutions on whose consent presidents rely and can subsidize presidents' undertakings. In building coalitions, presidents not only seek to bolster support but also temper opposition, as both absolute and relative gains improve their standing (Beckmann 2010). Though previous studies of presidential coalition-building focus on Congress and the public (Edwards 2000), they largely overlook another class of actors whose support or opposition can affect presidents' success: organized interests (but see Holyoke 2004; Kumar and Grossman 1984; Milkis and Tichenor 2019; Peterson 1992, 2008). While interests lack formal powers, such as votes in elections or in Congress, they can be valuable targets of presidents' coalition-building because their institutional resources, like campaign funds and lobbying capabilities, can help or hinder presidents' aims. Through engagement, presidents can mobilize interests' resources in directions favorable to them.

Organized interests' institutional resources attract presidents' attention for two reasons. First, interest resources can subsidize presidents directly as they pursue electoral, policy, and legacy goals (Hall and Deardorff 2006). For instance, presidents can utilize interests' policy expertise and political intelligence to strengthen proposals and elucidate stakeholders' preferences on them. In the context of regulatory review, Haeder and Yackee (2015) illustrate that the president's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is particularly responsive to comments from interests with policy expertise. Relatedly, Peterson (2008) describes how the second Bush administration's energy task force relied heavily on the expertise of energy interests—in some cases utilizing the very text of their proposals in regulations. Additionally, presidents can promote their electoral success by stimulating interests to support their campaigns through contributions and voter mobilization efforts (Kumar and Grossman 1984; Peterson 1992).

Second, organized interests can indirectly aid presidents by exerting pressure on actors on whose support presidents rely. For example, because presidents' legislative success hinges largely on their party's strength in Congress (Bond and Fleisher 1990), presidents can direct interests' electoral resources to copartisan congressional candidates. Additionally, to assemble winning coalitions in Congress, presidents can leverage interests' lobbying capacity to pressure members to support their initiatives (Beckmann 2010; Peterson 1992; Sullivan 1988). Further, presidents can co-opt interests'

grassroots lobbying apparatuses to promote their initiatives among interests' memberships and the public (Cohen 2012). Accounts of several presidential legislative priorities in recent decades, including Ronald Reagan's Tax Reform Act (Milkis and Tichenor 2019, 273-274), George W. Bush's Energy Policy Act (Peterson 2008, 305), and Obama's Affordable Care Act (Jacobs and Skocpol 2012, 74-75), suggest success depended partly on presidents' mobilization of interests to lobby Congress and the public.

Sometimes, presidents' mere engagement sufficiently motivates organized interests to cooperate; when asked about his client's willingness to comply with White House requests, one lobbyist reported, "If the White House asks, then you figure out a way to make that work for you... it's very hard to say no to a White House" (Interviewee H). However, should rhetoric alone fail to secure cooperation, presidents' unilateral powers provide ways to induce compliance. For example, presidents can help interests realize desired outcomes by employing executive orders, appointing preferred officials to executive and judicial positions, and exercising influence over the bureaucracy. Again, presidents can utilize their bully pulpit to generate attention and support for interests' priorities; as Baumgartner et al. find, one of the strongest determinants for interests' success in achieving or stifling policy change is presidential support through taking "an advocacy role in a public-policy debate" (2009, 238). Presidents can also help interests perform institutional maintenance by enabling them to advertise connections with high-level officials (Brown 2014). Thus, presidents have both motivation and means to obtain interests' cooperation through engagement.

Engagement Strategy as Constrained Optimization

While presidents' limited time and resources and the vastness of the organized interest universe helps consolidate their control over engagement, these features also limit the number of interests with which presidents can engage; as one Obama administration official explains, "We wanted [to engage with] everybody, but, at the end of the day, there are a million organizations out there and every single organization isn't going to be a part of everything" (Interviewee I). Presidents face a constrained optimization problem wherein they must determine which subset of interests, if engaged, provides the highest rate of return. General models of coalition-building (Cox and McCub-

bins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996) and studies of presidential coalition-building in other contexts (Beckmann 2010; Kriner and Reeves 2015) highlight two characteristics of potential coalition members which should inform presidents' decisions: interests' resource endowments and alignment with presidents' preferences.

First, presidents focus engagement on interests with larger resource endowments to efficiently bolster their coalition's resources or diminish those of their opponents. Because the costs of engagement (e.g., staff effort required to convene meetings) are fixed, presidents can more dramatically shift the balance of interest resources arrayed for and against them by targeting well-resourced interests (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Dixit and Londregan 1996). Presidents' focus on well-resourced potential coalition members manifests in other contexts, such as Congress and the public. For instance, rather than lobbying each congressperson, presidents focus on congressional leaders who wield institutional power and can pressure members for presidents (Beckmann 2010). Again, in attracting public support, presidents tailor rhetoric and policies to appeal to citizens with more political resources, such as those in higher socioeconomic strata (Druckman and Jacobs 2015; Griffin and Newman 2016), and whose votes and voices are more valuable, such as swing state residents (Kriner and Reeves 2015). Turning to interests, Milkis and Tichenor (2019) argue presidents are more likely to collaborate with social movements and associated interests when they possess institutional resources presidents can harness to achieve policy change, and Haeder and Yackee (2015) find OMB is more responsive to comments from well-resourced interests. Thus, presidents take a similar approach by focusing engagement on well-resourced interests.

Second, presidents engage more with interests aligned with their partisan or ideological preferences. This does not mean presidents never engage with interests with divergent preferences; indeed, engagement with such interests can persuade or demobilize opponents (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Milkis and Tichenor 2019). As a former White House official expressed, presidents engage with interests to both "increase the likelihood that you... maximize a positive reaction... [and] avoid a negative reaction" (Interviewee B; see also Beckmann 2010). Indeed, accounts of the Affordable Care Act indicate Obama's engagement with interests naturally opposed to reform, like pharmaceutical companies, was key to its enactment (Jacobs and Skocpol 2012, 69-75). However,

because coalition builders' entreaties are typically better received by those with similar preferences (Cox and McCubbins 1986), presidents allocate more effort to targets sharing their preferences. For instance, presidents' rhetoric (Druckman and Jacobs 2015; Eshbaugh-Soha and Rottinghaus 2013) and policy decisions (Griffin and Newman 2016; Kriner and Reeves 2015) often appeal to partisan and ideological allies in the public. Similarly, presidents center congressional outreach on copartisans (Beckmann 2010). Likewise, presidents focus engagement on interests whose preference similarity predisposes them to react favorably.

Research Design

Presidents engage with organized interests through a variety of mediums including phone calls, emails, and White House meetings. While the same strategic considerations confront presidents across mediums, my empirical analysis focuses on White House meetings for two reasons. First, across institutions, policymakers and interests alike perceive in-person direct contacts, or access, as the most effective medium for gaining counterparts' attention, making preferences salient, and building relationships (Baumgartner et al. 2009). Second, because the White House must expend more time and effort to conduct in-person meetings relative to other mediums, presidents' strategic considerations should manifest most strongly in this context.¹⁴

While all White House meetings bestow the benefits and exact the costs of engagement on interests and the White House, the circumstances of meetings can provide additional signals about presidents' engagement priorities. One detail my interviewees highlighted as a marker of the importance the White House assigns to meetings is with whom in the White House interests meet, or the visatee. While all White House personnel's time is limited, that of the president and senior advisers is especially scarce because they oversee broader policy and managerial portfolios; thus, from an organizational perspective, engagement utilizing high-level personnel is more costly to the White House. Interests, cognizant of these disparities in power and influence, place more value on engagement with high-level personnel; as one lobbyist expressed, "Relationships that are closer to

¹⁴See Supplemental Information Section B for more on engagement mediums and why in-person meetings are well-suited to test my expectations.

the president are the most valuable” (Interviewee G). Consequently, the president or senior advisers may be more involved in engagement when the targeted interests are more central to presidents’ coalition-building efforts (Kumar and Grossman 1984, 293-294). Indeed, one staffer shared that while the White House tried to meet with all interests, it “might assign a more junior person to take the meeting or... elevate the meeting to a senior official depending on the significance of the issue and, frankly, the significance of the individual” (Interviewee A). Because presidents’ engagement priorities may be expressed not only through with which interests they meet, but also with whom in the White House those interests meet, I consider both White House meetings writ large and as classified by visitees’ ranks.

Empirical studies of direct contacts between policymakers and organized interests typically confront data inavailability (Miller 2021*a*; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012, 295-304). In most contexts, contacts take place behind closed doors and records of them are rarely disclosed. However, recent releases of over 7 million White House visitor logs records from the Clinton and Obama administrations provide a rare opportunity to observe White House meetings attended by interest representatives. By pairing these records with lobbying and campaign finance reports, we can assess how interests’ resource endowments and preferences inform presidents’ engagement decisions.

White House Visitor Logs

One of the world’s most secure workplaces, the Secret Service closely monitors all individuals entering and exiting the White House complex and records the comings and goings of individuals without permanent passes in the Worker and Visitor Entry System (WAVES)—more commonly known as the White House visitor logs. Each WAVES record contains information including the visitor’s name and the date and time of the visit.¹⁵

Until recently, no sitting president had disclosed the White House visitor logs. However, in September 2009, President Obama announced his administration would voluntarily release its visitor logs every quarter. When the Obama administration left office, it had released nearly 6 million records spanning September 15, 2009 to September 30, 2016. Additionally, in 2015, the Clinton

¹⁵See Supplemental Information Section C.1.6 for information on the visits included in WAVES.

Presidential Library began fulfilling Freedom of Information Act requests by releasing the visitor logs for the final five years of the Clinton administration. Since the Lobbying Disclosure Act data I leverage to identify organized interest representatives begins in 1998 (described below), I use the 1.3 million records from the final three years of Clinton’s presidency. In total, I utilize over 7 million records from these administrations.¹⁶

Because the only information the visitor logs provide about each visitor is her name, we cannot discern which visitors were representatives of which organized interests from the visitor logs alone. Rather, to detect instances of presidential engagement with specific interests, we need data providing the names of persons representing each interest for time periods contemporaneous with the visitor logs. I obtain this information from reports interests filed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), which requires interests to provide the names of their registered lobbyists, or those responsible for interests’ political advocacy.¹⁷ Using these rosters of interests’ representatives, I identify instances of engagement by matching the names of lobbyists provided in each interest’s semiannual (through 2007) or quarterly (2008 and after) LDA reports with the names of White House visitors in corresponding time periods.^{18,19} Then, I aggregate all instances of engagement associated with each interest for each time period in which they filed an LDA report—semiannual for the Clinton administration and quarterly for the Obama administration—to construct measures of engagement. This level of observation—the organized interest-time period—constitutes my unit of analysis.

I utilize two measures of presidential engagement. First, I create a binary indicator for whether each organized interest-time period observation experienced engagement at least once.²⁰ Second,

¹⁶See Supplemental Information Section C for details on WAVES records from the Clinton and Obama administrations and the status of records from other recent administrations.

¹⁷See Supplemental Information Section A for more on LDA reporting requirements. While interests’ representatives may include persons not designated as registered lobbyists, my survey respondents indicate interests’ contingents to White House meetings usually include at least one registered lobbyist (see Supplemental Information Section C).

¹⁸The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 changed the required filing frequency from semiannual to quarterly.

¹⁹Analyses in the main paper measure engagement using exact matches between the names of lobbyists and White House visitors. In Supplemental Information Sections C.3 and E, I describe the matching procedure and alternative approximate matching techniques and reestimate my models using engagement measures constructed through approximate matching. The substantive results from these specifications are consistent with those presented here.

²⁰Table SI.9 presents specifications utilizing counts of engagement as outcomes; the substantive results from these specifications are consistent with those presented here.

acknowledging the White House may be more likely to engage with interests central to its coalition-building efforts with high-level personnel, I use the identity of each meeting’s visatee to create binary indicators for whether each interest-time period observation experienced engagement with: 1) the president, vice-president, first lady, or an EOP staffer whose salary falls in the top quartile; and 2) any other person at the White House complex. I refer to these types of engagement as “high-quality” and “low-quality,” respectively.²¹

Organized Interests’ Resources and Preferences

I obtain measures of organized interests’ resource endowments and preferences utilizing data from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Because most interests specialize in either electoral politics or policymaking (Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002), I incorporate measures of both electoral and policy resources. First, I measure interests’ electoral resources as the aggregate amount of campaign contributions they make to candidates for federal office. I focus on aggregate contributions rather than only contributions to the president because aggregate contributions reflect interests’ electoral resource endowments, which presidents can channel in support of themselves and copartisans. Using CRP’s compilation of the Federal Election Commission’s reports for election cycles immediately preceding and including periods for which I have visitor logs—1995-1996 to 1999-2000 and 2007-2008 to 2015-2016 for the Clinton and Obama administrations, respectively—I generate for each interest-time period observation a binary indicator for whether the interest made any contributions in the preceding two years (i.e., the length of an electoral cycle) and a continuous measure of its total contributions in those two years. Second, I measure interests’ policy resource endowments using the lobbying expenditures indicated on their LDA reports in the previous time period.²² Under LDA, activities for which expenditures must be reported include not only lobbying contacts themselves, but also “any efforts in support of such contacts, including preparation or planning activities, research, and any other background work.”²³ Thus, lobbying expenditures

²¹See Supplemental Information Section C.4 for details on engagement quality measures.

²²Filers must indicate if expenditures exceed a threshold—\$10,000 for reports filed before 2008, \$5,000 for reports filed thereafter—and report a specific amount only if above that threshold. To account for left-censoring, I subtract the threshold from reported amounts; thus, the measure indicates expenditures exceeding the threshold.

²³Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. §1601) https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Lobbying/Lobby_Disclosure_Act/TOC.htm.

capture a wide range of interests’ policy resources, including staff salaries and expertise. Given the right-skewedness of both resource measures, I apply log transformations.

Measuring interests’ partisan or ideological preferences is less straightforward. Few measures of interests’ preferences exist, and those that do offer coverage for few interests filing LDA reports. For example, Bonica (2013) and Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz (2020), who estimate interests’ ideology using campaign contributions and positions on legislation, provide scores for only 1,416 (4.4%) and 1,565 (4.8%) of the 32,421 interests in my analyses, respectively. Facing this limitation, I use qualitative information from CRP to construct a trichotomous measure of the partisan alignment of each of the 92 industries into which CRP sorts interests.²⁴ For each industry, CRP provides a summary of its political activity and policy preferences, often assessing the partisan leanings of interests in the industry.²⁵ If an industry’s summary expresses a preference for the Democratic or Republican Party, I code that industry as aligned with that party. If the summary does not express clear partisan inclinations, I code it as Independent, or aligned with neither party. While this classification scheme may misattribute the preferences of some individual interests, studies using interest-level preference measures find that the distributions of preferences within industries typically exhibit clear central tendencies (Bonica 2013; Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz 2020). Thus, industry-level partisan alignment is an imperfect but informative measure of interests’ preferences providing coverage for all observations.²⁶

Estimation Strategy

The data structure poses non-trivial challenges for analysis. One set of challenges stems from inconsistencies in temporal units. While some time-varying components of the data are observed daily, such as visitor log entries, others are observed less frequently, such as interests’ lobbying expenditures. Further, because the frequency of LDA filings changed from semiannual to quarterly

²⁴Describing interests’ preferences using partisanship does not account for ideological distinctions among interests sharing partisan inclinations. However, in polarized environments like those characterizing the Clinton and Obama administrations, interests typically forge partisan ties (Grossmann, Mahmood, and Isaac 2021).

²⁵“Alphabetical Listing of Industries,” *Center for Responsive Politics*, <https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/alphalist.php>.

²⁶Table SI.10 repeats my analyses using interest-level preference measures from Bonica (2013) and Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz (2020). The results from those analyses are substantively similar to those presented here.

in 2008, the temporal units associated with information from LDA reports vary across the Clinton and Obama administrations. I address these disparities in two ways. First, to make temporal units of measurement consistent for all variables, I aggregate all data up to the temporal unit associated with contemporary LDA filing requirements—semiannual for the Clinton administration, and quarterly for the Obama administration. Second, given the changes to LDA filing requirements, I estimate separate models for each presidency.

A second set of challenges arises from the data’s time-series cross-sectional structure. Each observation corresponds to an organized interest in a given time period, with each interest nested in one of CRP’s 92 industries. Consequently, observations are non-independent, as multiple observations correspond to the same interests, industries, and time periods. In order to recover unbiased parameter estimates and uncertainty measures, the analysis requires techniques that accommodate this non-independence. Another issue associated with the data structure is that one key covariate—interests’ partisan alignment—is measured at the industry-level, and thus repeated across observations of the same interests and industries. Unfortunately, conventional modeling approaches cannot estimate parameters for interest- and industry-level effects and partisan alignment due to collinearity.

To account for non-independence and collinearity, I utilize Bayesian multilevel models. Multilevel models account for non-independence in nested data structures by allowing parameter estimates to vary for each grouping, such as repeated observations of interests, industries, and time periods (Shor et al. 2007). Additionally, multilevel models can estimate parameters for covariates measured at the group-level, such as industry-level partisan alignment. Each of my logistic multilevel models estimate a binary indicator of whether an interest-time period observation experienced presidential engagement as a function of its lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions; the partisanship of its industry; a series of interest-time period-level control variables drawn from LDA filings, such as on which issues it lobbied; and varying intercepts for each interest, industry, and time period. All models report no divergent transitions during sampling and indicate convergence with \hat{R} statistics of ≤ 1.10 for all parameters.²⁷

²⁷See Supplemental Information Section D for details on model estimation.

Results

First, I discuss my analyses that measure presidential engagement treating all White House visits equally. Interpreting multilevel models can be difficult because of the large number of parameters estimated. To ease presentation, I provide predicted probabilities of engagement using an observed-value approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013), fixing the covariate values of all observations to their observed values while independently varying each covariate of interest—lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and partisan alignment—to demonstrate its marginal effect. This illustrates how the probability of engagement changes across levels of each covariate.

The left panes of Figures 3 and 4 present the predicted probabilities of engagement for interests with the levels of resources and partisan alignment specified by the far left labels during the Clinton and Obama administrations, respectively.²⁸ Before considering how variation in resources and partisan alignment affect engagement, it is worth noting that even interests who are not primary targets of presidential coalition-building experience engagement at non-negligible rates. For instance, interests not making campaign contributions experienced engagement with a 0.50 probability every semester of the Clinton administration and a 0.30 probability every quarter of the Obama administration. With thousands of interests active in each time period, these substantively large probabilities underscore that presidential engagement is commonplace. Additionally, these probabilities reinforce that presidents do not engage *only* with well-resourced and copartisan interests, as engaging other interests can be important for coalition-building (e.g., non-copartisans to persuade or demobilize).

I use the predicted probabilities in the left panes of Figures 3 and 4 to evaluate my expectations by assessing whether the differences between them across levels of lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and partisan alignment are statistically distinguishable. Importantly, we cannot rely

²⁸For each set of covariate values in Figures 3 and 4, the probability of engagement during the Clinton administration is one and a half times to two times higher than during the Obama administration. Two contextual differences explain this. First, the temporal range for each observation during the Clinton administration is twice as large as during the Obama administration; thus, each interest-time period observation has twice as long to experience engagement. Second, the number of interests filing LDA reports during the Obama administration is two and a half times higher than during the Clinton administration. Because presidents' ability to engage with interests did not expand at the same rate, the baseline probability of engagement during the Obama administration is lower. These differences preclude direct comparisons across administrations.




Figure 3: **Relationship between Organized Interests' Resources and Partisan Alignment on Presidential Engagement (Clinton)** In the left pane, points and lines represent the means and 95% credible intervals of the distributions of predicted probabilities calculated using an observed-value approach with parameter estimates from the Clinton administration model (see Table SI.6). For each of the three interest characteristics, I calculate the probabilities of engagement for all observations for each of the specified values while fixing other covariates to each observation's observed values. In the right pane, I plot the means and 95% credible intervals for the differences between specific pairs of these distributions of predicted probabilities as indicated by the labels on the left side of the pane. For example, the three topmost points and lines in the left pane indicate the probabilities of engagement when lobbying expenditures are set to the first, second, and third quartile values. In the right pane, the two topmost points and lines indicate the differences in the distributions of probabilities when lobbying expenditures are set to their first and second and their second and third quartile values, respectively. Discrepancies between differences indicated in the right pane and differences between corresponding values in the left pane are attributable to rounding.

on visual comparisons among these probabilities, but instead must assess the differences between the distributions from which they are calculated. The right panes of these figures present the differences for specific pairs of probabilities, as indicated by the labels on the left side of those panes. I refer to differences whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero as statistically distinguishable.²⁹

Considering first the predicted probabilities for varying levels of lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions, we observe consistent increases in the probability of engagement as re-

²⁹See Supplemental Information Section E.1 for details about calculation and interpretation of predicted probabilities.

sources increase. For example, in the left pane of Figure 3, whereas the probability of the Clinton administration engaging an interest with the first quartile of lobbying expenditures ($< \$10,000$) is 0.43, this probability increases by 0.10 (23%) to 0.53 when expenditures increase to the median (\$20,000). Further increasing expenditures from the median to the third quartile (\$80,000) induces a smaller increase in this probability of 0.02 (4%) to 0.55. Similarly, in the left pane of Figure 4, while the probability of the Obama administration engaging with an interest not making campaign contributions is 0.30, this probability increases by 0.05 (17%) to 0.35 when contributions increase to the first quartile (\$28,891). Further increases in contributions to the median (\$97,088) and third quartile (\$337,000) are associated with smaller additional increases in the probability of engagement. The right panes of both figures indicate each stepwise increase in lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions is statistically distinguishable, as the 95% credible intervals for the differences between the distributions of predicted probabilities exclude zero. Therefore, while presidents engage with interests lacking resources at not-insignificant rates, they are moderately more likely to engage with interests with larger electoral and policy resource endowments.

Turning to the predicted probabilities associated with interests' partisan alignment, we see presidents are more likely to engage with interests in industries aligned with the Democratic Party—the party of both Presidents Clinton and Obama. For the Clinton administration, the probability of engagement for an interest in an industry aligned with the Democratic Party is 0.54, but shifting its industry's alignment to the Republican Party or neither party decreases this probability by 0.04 (7%) and 0.05 (9%) to 0.50 and 0.49, respectively. Similar effects manifest for the Obama administration; the probability of engagement for interests in industries aligned with the Democratic Party is 0.33, but this probability decreases by 0.03 (10%) to 0.30 when industry alignment shifts to the Republican Party or neither party. The right panes of both figures indicate the differences in probabilities for interests in Democratic versus Republican industries for both administrations, and for interests in Democratic versus Independent industries for the Clinton administration, are statistically distinguishable. Thus, while presidents engage with interests of all partisan persuasions, they engage modestly more often with copartisans.




Figure 4: **Relationship between Organized Interests' Resources and Partisan Alignment on Presidential Engagement (Obama)** In the left pane, points and lines represent the means and 95% credible intervals of the distributions of predicted probabilities calculated using an observed-value approach with parameter estimates from the Obama administration model (see Table SI.6). For each of the three interest characteristics, I calculate the probabilities of engagement for all observations for each of the specified values while fixing other covariates to each observation's observed values. In the right pane, I plot the means and 95% credible intervals for the differences between specific pairs of these distributions of predicted probabilities as indicated by the labels on the left side of the pane. For example, the three topmost points and lines in the left pane indicate the probabilities of engagement when lobbying expenditures are set to the first, second, and third quartile values. In the right pane, the two topmost points and lines indicate the differences in the distributions of probabilities when lobbying expenditures are set to their first and second and their second and third quartile values, respectively. Discrepancies between differences indicated in the right pane and differences between corresponding values in the left pane are attributable to rounding.

Engagement Quality

Next, I turn to my analyses accounting for engagement quality. Since the time and effort of presidents and senior advisers are more scarce and valuable to the White House, the effects of interests' partisan alignment and resources (as well as the qualities resources afford, such as policy expertise and lobbying capacity) should be magnified for high-quality engagement with these personnel relative to low-quality engagement with others. To explore this expectation, I fit bivariate multi-level logistic regression models for each administration with high- and low-quality engagement as




Figure 5: **Relative Effect of Organized Interests' Resources and Partisan Alignment on High- and Low-Quality Presidential Engagement** Points and lines represent the means and 95% credible intervals of differences in distributions of the coefficient estimates corresponding with interests' lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and partisan alignment for high- and low-quality presidential engagement during the Clinton and Obama administrations (see Table SI.11). For example, the two topmost points and lines represent the difference between the distribution of coefficient estimates for lobbying expenditures when the outcome measure is high-quality engagement and the corresponding distribution of estimates when the outcome measure is low-quality engagement for each administration. Credible intervals for some differences are too small to be visible.

separate outcomes and compare the coefficient estimates for lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and partisan alignment for each type of engagement.³⁰ Figure 5 presents the differences in the distributions of these estimates for high- and low-quality engagement.³¹

³⁰Bivariate models account for the non-independence of the White House's choices to provide an interest with high- and/or low-quality engagement by modeling correlations among analogous parameters in the constituent models for each type of engagement (see Supplemental Information Section D).

³¹See Supplemental Information Section E.3 for how these differences are calculated.

Considering first the relative effects of electoral and policy resources, I expect high-quality engagement coefficient estimates for lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions to be larger than those for low-quality engagement. However, the differences plotted in the two topmost pairs of Figure 5 indicate the estimates for these measures are not distinguishably different across engagement qualities; while the differences in the lobbying expenditures coefficients are nearly zero with narrow 95% credible intervals, the differences in the campaign contributions coefficients are not distinguishable and in the opposite direction as expected, since negative values indicate a larger effect for low-quality engagement. Moving to partisan alignment, where alignment with the Democratic Party is the omitted category, I expect high-quality engagement coefficient estimates for alignment with the Republican Party or neither party to be smaller than those for low-quality engagement. While the differences for both types of alignment are in the expected direction, all are substantively small with 95% credible intervals including zero. Thus, while the White House prioritizes general engagement with well-resourced and copartisan interests, there is no evidence representatives of interests with those characteristics are systematically more likely to meet with the president or his senior advisers when visiting the White House than with a lower-level staffer.³²

Conclusion

Presidents often cast organized interests as villains who exercise “undue influence”³³ and have “made a living bleeding our country dry.”³⁴ However, as presidents publicly cast interests as foils, they also cultivate cooperation through engagement. Data inavailability long concealed this inconsistency. Using original interviews, survey responses, and administrative data, this paper demonstrates not only that presidents frequently interact with interests, but that presidents do so

³²One potential explanation for these null results is that even if the White House wants to focus high-quality engagement on well-resourced and copartisan interests, presidents and their senior advisers, whose actions attract close scrutiny, face countervailing pressure to cultivate reputations for personally interacting with a wide range of the interests with which the White House engages. Future studies should consider the extent to which government officials’ decisions about with which interests to interact are informed by how they expect interests and political elites to perceive those interactions.

³³Bill Clinton, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on Administration Goals,” February 17, 1993, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-congress-administration-goals>.

³⁴Donald Trump, “Remarks Announcing Candidacy for the Republican Presidential Nomination in 2020,” June 18, 2019, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-announcing-candidacy-for-the-republican-presidential-nomination-2020>.

largely of their own volition. Like presidents build coalitions in Congress and the public, they court members of the organized interest universe to provide support or withhold opposition, with some emphasis on interests with large resource endowments and who share presidents' preferences.

These findings have several implications for our understandings of the presidency, organized interests, and representation in American politics. First, while recent discussions of the presidential toolkit focus on powers presidents exercise independently (Kinane 2021; Kriner and Reeves 2015; Lowande and Rogowski 2020), this study spotlights engagement with interests and the institutional mechanisms which facilitate it as an important instrument of power (Peterson 1992). Because presidents can benefit from mobilizing interests' institutional resources in all contexts, including campaigning, policymaking, and managing public opinion, incorporating interests into presidency studies may provide new insights on how presidents advance their aims. For instance, while some argue presidents seldom influence congressional votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990), accounting for presidents' marshaling of interests to lobby congresspersons may reveal presidential influence in Congress. Again, though presidents' ability to "go public" has waned in recent years, presidents may persuade and mobilize the public through interests' outreach (Cohen 2012). The linkage between presidents and interests offers fertile ground to explore open and contested questions about the presidency.

Second, though recent studies of presidential representation stress that presidents emphasize representation of copartisans (Kriner and Reeves 2015; Eshbaugh-Soha and Rottinghaus 2013), my finding that engagement is also informed by interests' resources suggests presidents' representational emphases may vary across contexts. Most studies of presidential representation focus on the mass public, where each person possesses roughly equal resources; while some may be more willing or able to participate politically, each can only provide presidents a single vote in an election or nod of approval in a poll. However, when interacting with elites, such as congresspersons or interests, presidents recognize some actors wield more influence and focus representational effort accordingly. For interests, my results indicate engagement is informed not only by interests' preferences, but also their resources. Similarly, in Congress, Beckmann (2010) demonstrates presidents' coalition-building focuses on leaders from both parties rather than only copartisan leaders. While copartisan

leaders are more responsive to presidents, non-copartisan leaders hold important institutional powers and sway over their members, and presidents communicate with them to bargain or demobilize opposition. Future studies of presidential representation should explore how presidents consider characteristics beyond preferences, such as resources, when allocating representational attention.

Third, this study offers a rare opportunity to assess how presidents contribute to organized interests' ability to bias political outcomes. Interests representing businesses and the upper-class, who tend to enjoy large resource endowments, pervade and exercise disproportionate influence in Congress and the federal bureaucracy (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), but some speculate presidents' impulse for national representation dampens the influence of these privileged interests and provides a friendlier venue for interests "not effectively represented in the existing government" (Bentley 1908, 345; see also Howell and Moe 2016; Truman 1971; Quirk and Nesmith 2005). My results neither fully endorse nor fully refute this conjecture. In one respect, that presidents prefer engaging with high-resource interests perpetuates disparities in political voice that benefit business and upper-class interests and marginalize other constituencies. However, presidents engage with even low-resource interests at not-insubstantial rates, and high-resource interests' odds of experiencing engagement are far from guaranteed; for instance, during the Clinton presidency, even interests making no campaign contributions have a 0.50 probability of experiencing engagement, and increasing contributions to the third quartile value ($\approx \$200,000$) only increases this probability to 0.59 (see Figure 3). Further, whereas larger resource endowments increase interests' probability of experiencing some form of engagement, I find no evidence resources exert stronger effects on access to the president and senior advisers than to lower-level staffers; thus, while higher resource levels induce modest increases in presidential engagement, they are not indicative of higher quality engagement.

An ideal assessment of how presidential engagement contributes to upper-class bias relative to policymakers' provision of access in other institutions, like Congress, requires data from those institutions comparable to the White House visitor logs. Lacking such data, comparisons to Kalla and Broockman (2016) suggest presidents privilege high-resource interests to a similar or lesser extent than congresspersons in providing access. In their field experiment, Kalla and Broockman (2016)

find interests are 5 percentage points (12%) more likely to secure a meeting with a congressperson’s office, and 13 percentage points (240%) more likely to secure a meeting with the congressperson herself or a senior staffer (i.e., high-quality access), when they reveal electoral resources by mentioning their members donate to campaigns. While my effects of contributions on the probability of engagement conducted by any member of the White House are similar to Kalla and Broockman (2016)’s,³⁵ my effects of contributions on high-quality engagement are much smaller.³⁶ Further, unlike Kalla and Broockman (2016), I find no difference in the effect of contributions on interests’ access to high- and low-quality engagement. Thus, presidents may not counterbalance the advantages resources afford interests in securing access to other institutions, but they may contribute less to upper-class bias in political voice—particularly at the highest levels of government.

This paper not only illuminates important facets of presidents’ interactions with organized interests, but also highlights lines of future inquiry. As only two recent Democratic administrations have disclosed their visitor logs, this paper cannot speak directly to how some forms of contextual variation, such as presidents’ partisanship and institutional changes affecting presidents’ engagement abilities, may condition engagement. In the former case, presidents of both parties face the same engagement incentives, but Republicans’ closer alignment with well-resourced business interests could augment the effect of resources on engagement for Republican presidents (Grossmann, Mahmood, and Isaac 2021). In the latter instance, the creation of OPL and its ability to coordinate engagement may enable modern presidents to more efficiently align interactions with interests with their goals than in previous periods. Both paths of research would benefit from additional records of engagement such as visitor logs from Republican administrations or more circumscribed information about presidents’ own engagement with interests from Presidential Daily Diaries or Oval Office tapes. Future work could also consider the interplay between presidential engagement and organized interest coalitions. While the current analysis focuses on presidents’ direct engagement with

³⁵Interests are 3 and 5 percentage points (6% and 17%) more likely to experience engagement when moving from no contributions to the first quartile value during the Clinton and Obama administrations, respectively (see Figures 3 and 4).

³⁶Using the model summarized in Table SI.11, I calculate and compare the probabilities of high-quality engagement in each administration when interests make no contributions and make the first quartile value of contributions, holding all covariates at their observed values. I find interests are 1 percentage point, or 4% and 25%, more likely to experience high-quality engagement when moving from no contributions to the first quartile value during the Clinton and Obama administrations, respectively.

interests, engagement with interests in coalitions may enable presidents to indirectly engage other coalition members. Additionally, presidents may use engagement to forge coalitions by mobilizing and coordinating the activity of interests sharing common goals. Finally, whereas this paper argues engagement mobilizes interests in service of presidents' goals, it does not explicitly test whether presidents' efforts are successful. Subsequent work should evaluate the efficacy of engagement by linking interactions between presidents and interests to interest behavior, such as congressional and grassroots lobbying on presidential initiatives.

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Supplemental Information

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A Interview and Survey Descriptions

Learning about the dynamics governing presidents’ engagement with organized interests is difficult because the process by which it occurs and most instances of engagement itself occur behind closed doors. I use novel interview and survey data from former White House officials and organized interest representatives to shed light on these dynamics to both demonstrate the important role presidents’ motivations play in manifesting engagement and check assumptions about the data-generating process underlying the White House visitor logs. In this section, I explain how I conducted these interviews and the survey and describe the characteristics of each sample.

A.1 Interviews Description

Between May 2018 and September 2019, I conducted 15 semi-structured interviews with former White House officials and organized interest representatives, seven of whom worked in the Clinton, Obama, or Trump administrations, and nearly all of whom worked in lobbying or policy advocacy when interviewed. Interviews lasted for between 30 to 60 minutes. Most were conducted in-person in the Washington, DC area, though a few were conducted via phone. Interviewees agreed to speak “on background,” such that I anonymize the information they provided. In addition to the direct quotes I present in the main paper and Supplemental Information, I draw on the full interviews to orient and contextualize my theoretical exposition and empirical analysis.

In arranging interviews, I strove to speak with individuals with different perspectives on the relationships between presidents and organized interests. The former White House officials I interviewed had experience in offices such as the Domestic Policy Council, the National Security Council, the Office of Legislative Affairs, the Office of Public Engagement, and the Office of the Press Secretary. My interviewees specialized in policy areas including chemical manufacturing, education, the environment, healthcare, reproductive rights, telecommunications, and transportation.

Below, I list the dates and relevant experience of the interviewees whom I directly reference:

Table SI.1: Details for Interviews Directly Quoted

<u>Interviewee Pseudonym</u>	<u>Interview Date</u>	<u>Interviewee Experience</u>
Interviewee A	May 3, 2018	Former White House official
Interviewee B	August 23, 2019	Former White House official
Interviewee C	September 5, 2019	Former White House official
Interviewee D	September 25, 2019	Former White House official
Interviewee E	May 11, 2018	Education lobbyist
Interviewee F	August 28, 2019	Water resources lobbyist
Interviewee G	May 3, 2018	Religious organization lobbyist
Interviewee H	September 13, 2019	Chemical industry lobbyist
Interviewee I	May 4, 2018	Former White House official
Interviewee J	May 4, 2018	Reproductive rights lobbyist
Interviewee K	August 22, 2019	Telecommunications lobbyist

Interviewee pseudonyms are based on order of appearance (i.e., the first interviewee quoted is designated as “Interviewee A”).

A.2 Survey Description

To gain insights on the relationships between presidents and organized interests from a broader population, I conducted a survey of organized interest representatives drawn from Lobbying Disclosure Act filings which asked about experiences with and perspectives on interacting with the then-current Trump White House and the recently-departed Obama White House.

A.2.1 Lobbying Disclosure Act Reports

The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 and subsequent amendments require lobbyists or the entities who employ them to file reports with the House and Senate on the lobbying activities they conduct on behalf of their client(s).^{SI.1} Under LDA, individuals are considered lobbyists if they, in working on behalf of a client, make a “lobbying contact,” or an “oral, written, or electronic communication” regarding public policy, with more than one “covered official”—which includes all members of the Executive Office of the President, high-ranking officials in the executive branch—and most members of the legislative branch, and spends 20 percent or more of her time working for the client on lobbying activities in a reporting period. As of January 2017, a lobbyist employed directly by a client spending more than \$13,000, or a lobbyist contracted by a client spending more than \$3,000, on lobbying activities in a quarter is required to file a report on behalf of their client for that quarter. Lobbyists were required to file these reports, known formally as LD-2s, on a semiannual basis until 2008, after which they have been required to file them quarterly. LD-2s record information about filers’ clients including their address and contact information, lobbying expenditures in the relevant period, the issues on which they lobbied, the government entities they lobbied, and the names of the individuals who have performed lobbying work for the client in excess of the above thresholds. Importantly, each LD-2 report designates an email address for a point of contact, which enables me to distribute an online survey to these points of contact.

Because the thresholds for lobbying activity that require lobbyists to file LDA reports on behalf of their clients are fairly low, a sampling frame defined by the filing of LDA reports should include most organized interests with more than a transient interest in federal policy. For the time period used by the sampling frame (first quarter of 2017 to third quarter of 2018), over 14,000 unique organized interests are identified as clients on LDA reports filed on their behalf. Given the breadth of organized interests identified by LDA reports, political science researchers often utilize LDA reports to define the scope of the organized interest universe at the federal level (e.g., Baumgartner and Leech 2001; Baumgartner et al. 2009, 2011; Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty 2013; Grossmann and Pyle 2013; McKay 2011; Tripathi, Ansolabehere, and Snyder 2002; You 2017).

It is important to note that a sampling frame based on LDA reports does not capture *all* interests involved in federal policymaking, as organizations whose activities do not exceed reporting thresholds as defined by LDA are not included. However, excluding these organizations from the sampling frame and, later, the empirical analysis of instances of White House engagement, should not affect the substantive inferences we draw for a few reasons. First, because organizations whose lobbying activity falls below the LDA reporting thresholds likely have few direct contacts with federal policymakers and low levels of resources, their survey responses and inclusion in the empirical analysis of White House engagement would likely reinforce the existing trends (e.g., they would be unlikely to report higher levels of emphasis on direct contacts with the White House relative to

^{SI.1}Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. §1601) https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Lobbying/Lobby_Disclosure_Act/TOC.htm.

Congress or the bureaucracy when compared to the sampling frame drawn from LDA reports; their lower levels of resources would make it unlikely for their lobbyists to appear in the White House visitor logs). Second, even if many organizations conduct advocacy activity outside of the scope of LDA (e.g., organizations who knowingly or unknowingly fail to file LDA reports, 501(c)(3) organizations whose political activity stays outside the bounds of LDA, etc.), their exclusion would only alter our substantive conclusions if the White House behaved differently towards them compared to otherwise similar organizations identified in LDA reports. Because presidential engagement decisions are premised in large part on interests' strategic value in presidents coalition-building efforts, it is unlikely that the White House treats organizations of equal value differently depending on their legal classification. Thus, were we able to incorporate these organizations who do not file LDA reports, their inclusion would likely only reinforce the inferences gleaned from the analyses.

A.2.2 Sampling Procedure

The survey sample consists of all persons listed as points of contact on LD-2 reports filed between the first quarter of 2017 and the third quarter of 2018. While these points of contact can be persons who are not registered lobbyists per LDA, nearly two-thirds of points of contact are LDA lobbyists (see Table SI.2), and individuals who are not LDA lobbyists often perform government relations or policy advocacy functions and are familiar with their employers' interactions with policymakers. For each individual, I selected his or her most recent appearance on a report to obtain the most up-to-date contact and employment information. If the same individual was identified as the point of contact for more than one client in a given quarter, I randomly sampled one report where that individual appeared. To minimize email bounces and improve response rates, the email addresses in the selected reports were screened to check for appropriate formatting and identify duplicates. Some organizations, such as large lobbying firms, provided the same generic email address for all filings; when such generic email addresses were identified, every effort was made to obtain a unique email address for that individual (searching the organization website, LinkedIn, etc.). After de-duplicating and screening email addresses, the final sample consisted of 5,938 individuals.

Initial invitations were sent to all 5,938 individuals on November 15, 2018, with reminder emails sent on November 29, 2018 and December 13, 2018. Data collection ceased on December 31, 2018. Excluding the points of contact whose email addresses were identified as invalid when invitations were sent, the overall response rate for individuals who completed the demographic and background module, which asked general questions about their experience working for their current client, is 13.2% ($\frac{719}{5458}$). The response rate for those who reached the module asking about their clients' interactions with the Obama and/or Trump White Houses is 10.2% ($\frac{557}{5458}$).^{SI.2}

The questions about the Obama and Trump administrations were identical save the identities of the presidents mentioned. These questions were asked as separate blocks for each president and presented consecutively with the block order randomized across respondents. The set of questions in each block asked respondents how frequently their client interacted with the White House during an average year during that administration 1) by phone, email, or mail, 2) through in-person meetings at the White House, and 3) through in-person meetings outside of the White House. Respondents' answers for the second question—the frequency of in-person White House meetings—determined what additional questions they were provided in each block. If respondents indicated that their

^{SI.2}106 respondents who reached this module indicated that they did not start working for their current client until 2017. Therefore, they were shown only questions for the Trump administration in this module.

client “Never” had in-person meetings at the White House, they were asked questions about not having meetings during the Obama or Trump presidencies. Respondents indicating that their client had at least one in-person White House meeting (i.e., “Fewer than 5 times”) were asked questions about those meetings with the Obama or Trump White House. Of the 433 respondents who answered this question for the Obama administration, 167 (38.6%) reported that their client never had in-person White House meetings, and 266 (61.4%) indicated that their client had at least one in-person meeting. Of the 541 respondents who answered this question for the Trump administration, 269 (49.7%) reported that their client never had in-person White House meetings, and 272 (50.3%) indicated that their client had at least one in-person meeting.

A.2.3 Evaluating Concerns about Response Bias

While this survey allows me to collect information from a large number of organized interest representatives, these self-reports, like all survey responses, are susceptible to response bias (i.e., responses may deviate from realized experiences; Miller see 2021*a,b*). For example, we might be concerned about desirability bias, with some respondents trying to appear more influential than they are by over-reporting the frequency of White House contacts.

While it is difficult to determine the degree of response bias, I can get a sense of it by comparing respondents’ self-reports of clients’ in-person White House meetings during the Obama administration with my observational measure of their clients’ in-person White House meetings during that time. If the bias present for this question is minimal, then we should have confidence that the bias in responses to other questions is also minimal. Of the 433 responses to this question, I am able to match 406 to organized interests in my observational data.^{SI.3} In order to compare my quarterly measures of engagement across 7 years of the Obama administration and the survey respondents’ reports of their clients White House meetings, I recode both data sources. For my observational data, I code an interest as “1” if my data contains any instances of it experiencing engagement in those 7 years and “0” otherwise. For the survey data, I code an interest as a “1” if the respondent reports that its client attended a White House meeting at least once (i.e., “Fewer than 5 times”) and “0” otherwise. With this coding scheme, 284 of the 406 observations (70.0%) match, such that both my observational data and the survey self-reports indicate that the interest did or did not have White House meetings during the Obama administration. Of the remaining 122 observations, in 102 of the cases (25.1%) the self-report indicates that the client did not have White House meetings but my observational data detects instances of engagement, while in the remaining 20 cases (4.9%) the self-report indicates that the client had White House meetings but my observational data does not detect instances of engagement. These results should reassure us that response bias is minimal; in addition to matching reports of meetings in both data sources for the vast majority of cases (70.0%), most of the mismatches are of the opposite character as would be expected if desirability bias is present, as mismatches arose more frequently when respondents indicated their client did not have White House meetings than when they reported that they did.

A.2.4 Descriptive Sample Characteristics

It is difficult to assess the representativeness of my survey respondents and the interests they represent to the points of contact and clients in the sampling frame because scant information

^{SI.3}Observations which do not match occur because the interest did not file LDA reports prior to 2017. These interests were likely active during the Obama administration, but did not meet LDA reporting thresholds.

Table SI.2: Comparison of Respondents with Sampling Frame

<u>Characteristic</u>	<u>% of Respondents (N)</u>	<u>% of Sampling Frame (N)</u>
<u>Lobbyist Employer</u>		
Client	60.6% (436)	53.4% (2913)
Firm	39.4% (283)	46.6% (2545)
<u>Lobbying Expenditures</u>		
First Quartile	26.6% (191)	25% (1365)
Second Quartile	30.2% (217)	25% (1364)
Third Quartile	24.1% (173)	25% (1365)
Fourth Quartile	19.2% (138)	25% (1364)
<u>CRP Category</u>		
Agribusiness	4.5% (32)	4.2% (228)
Communications and Electronics	3.9% (28)	6.6% (360)
Construction	1.4% (10)	2.1% (112)
Defense	2.2% (16)	2.1% (117)
Energy and Natural Resources	7.1% (51)	8.1% (444)
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate	8.2% (59)	9.6% (526)
Health	18.9% (136)	18.5% (1011)
Ideological and Single-Issue	13.1% (94)	9.2% (500)
Labor	1.8% (13)	2.1% (116)
Lawyers and Lobbyists	1.5% (11)	1.2% (66)
Misc Business	10.6% (76)	11.8% (645)
Other	6.1% (44)	6.2% (339)
Transportation	6.5% (47)	6.1% (331)
Unknown	14.2% (102)	12.1% (663)
<u>Registered Lobbyist</u>		
Yes	74.1% (533)	62.5% (3409)
No	25.9% (186)	37.5% (2049)

exists for those points of contact and clients. Four pieces of information can be gleaned from their LDA filings and the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), which cleans and aggregates those filings: the client's quarterly lobbying expenditures with that point of contact's employer; whether the filer is the client or a lobbying firm contracted by a client; the client's CRP sector coding; and whether the point of contact is a registered lobbyist under LDA.^{SI.4} Table SI.2 compares the distribution of these characteristics in the full sampling frame and the 719 respondents who answered at least one of the survey questions reported in the main paper. These comparisons reveal differences for all four characteristics that are substantively small but statistically distinguishable at the $p < 0.05$

^{SI.4}The first three of these pieces of information are easily observable from CRP's aggregated LDA filings, but the fourth can only be determined by comparing the names of the points of contact with the names of the lobbyists listed on the same LDA filing. To determine whether the point of contact is a registered lobbyist, I used approximate matching techniques to compare the name of the point of contact on each LDA filing to the names of the registered lobbyists also appearing on the filing, and visually inspected the best match for each LDA form to determine if the point of contact was also a registered lobbyist.

Table SI.3: Descriptive Statistics of Respondents

Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)	Characteristic	% of Respondents (N)
<u>Gender</u>		Somewhat conservative	14.2% (102)
Female	28.9% (208)	Very conservative	4.6% (33)
Male	70.4% (506)	NA	1.1% (8)
NA	0.7% (5)	<u>Party Identification</u>	
<u>Age</u>		Strong Democrat	36.4% (262)
18-29	4.0% (29)	Democrat	8.2% (59)
30-49	38.9% (280)	Lean Democrat	8.2% (59)
50-64	35.3% (254)	Independent	10.6% (76)
65 or over	21.3% (153)	Lean Republican	7.0% (50)
NA	0.4% (3)	Republican	10.3% (74)
<u>Education</u>		Strong Republican	15.0% (108)
Some college, no 4-year degree	1.9% (14)	Other	2.4% (17)
College graduate	29.9% (215)	NA	1.7% (14)
Post-graduate degree	67.7% (487)	<u>Lobbying Experience</u>	
NA	0.4% (3)	Less than 5 years	10.3% (74)
<u>Race/Ethnicity</u>		5-10 years	17.5% (126)
Asian	1.4% (10)	11-15 years	17.1% (123)
Black	3.3% (24)	16-20 years	13.2% (95)
Hispanic	1.7% (12)	More than 20 years	41.4% (298)
White	89.7% (645)	NA	0.4% (3)
Other	2.5% (18)	<u>Past Government Experience</u>	
NA	1.4% (10)	Member of Congress	4.9% (35)
<u>Income</u>		Congressional staffer	42.7% (307)
Less than \$25,000	0.3% (2)	Presidential appointee	7.9% (57)
\$25,000-\$50,000	0.7% (5)	EOP staffer	4.5% (32)
\$50,000-\$75,000	3.5% (25)	Civil servant	13.6% (98)
\$75,000-\$100,000	6.3% (45)	Other	14.5% (104)
\$100,000-\$200,000	26.3% (189)	No experience	33.9% (244)
\$200,000 or more	58.3% (419)	<u>Current Role with Client</u>	
NA	4.7% (34)	Lobbyist	57.7% (415)
<u>Ideology</u>		Executive officer responsible	30.2% (217)
Very liberal	13.2% (95)	for lobbying	
Somewhat liberal	22.0% (158)	Executive officer not responsible	4.5% (32)
Slightly liberal	14.5% (104)	for lobbying	
Neither liberal nor conservative	16.7% (120)	Other	7.4% (53)
Slightly conservative	13.8% (99)	NA	0.3% (2)

level.^{SI.5} Thus, while the sample of respondents differs from the sampling frame, it contains a sizable number of respondents with each unique level of these characteristics.

To account for these small but statistically distinguishable imbalances, I weight the survey responses I present in Figures 1, 2, and SI.1 using these four characteristics provided for all respondents in the sampling frame. For Figure 1, I weight responses among the 719 respondents who answered general questions about their experience working for their current client. For Figures 2 and SI.1, I weight responses among the 557 respondents who reached the module asking about their clients' interactions with the Obama and Trump administrations.

Table SI.3 provides information on the descriptive characteristics of the 719 respondents who answered general questions about working for their current client. Because this information was collected during the survey, it is only available for respondents. The high proportions of respondents who report education levels of "post-graduate degree" (67.7%), income levels of "\$200,000 or more"

^{SI.5}The $|t|$ and χ^2 test statistics from the difference in means and χ^2 tests are: $|t| = 4.27$ for Lobbyist Employer; $\chi^2_3 = 21.08$ for Lobbying Expenditures; $\chi^2_{13} = 33.21$ for Lobbying Expenditures; and $|t| = 7.55$ for Registered Lobbyist.

(58.3%), and experience levels of “more than 20 years” (41.4%) suggest that most respondents are political elites who play a substantive role in lobbying, rather than low-level employees who may respond to emails but lack significant lobbying experience.

A.2.5 Question Wordings

Below, I provide the questions asked of respondents about their clients’ lobbying and interactions with the Obama and Trump administrations and identify where I present its results.^{SI.6}

Because all respondents were listed as a point of contact on at least one LDA report and the email solicitation and consent sheet told them they were in the sample because they were listed a point of contact, I expected that respondents would understand terminology used in the questions as it is used in the context of LDA.^{SI.7} For instance, I expected respondents to understand “contact” in Question 1 as defined by LDA: “Any oral, written, or electronic communication to a covered official that is made on behalf of a client with regard to” federal policymaking. Thus, this question captures a broader range of activities than in-person meetings in government officials’ workplaces, including in-person interactions outside of work (e.g., fundraisers) and remote communications (e.g., emails). Additionally, because LDA’s definition of “covered executive branch official” explicitly groups together in a single clause and applies to all employees of the Executive Office of the President (EOP), but considers officials elsewhere in the executive branch across several clauses and applies only to those in high-level positions, I expected respondents to interpret “the White House” in Question 1 as encompassing all EOP personnel and “the federal bureaucracy” as encompassing all other executive branch employees.^{SI.8}

1. How important is it for [your client] to have direct contact with individuals in the following political institutions as part of its overall lobbying strategy? (*Asked separately for Congress; the White House; and the federal bureaucracy*) (Results in Figure 1)
 - Not at all important
 - Slightly important
 - Somewhat important
 - Very important
 - Extremely important

^{SI.6}As noted above, all respondents reaching the module asking about interactions with the Obama and Trump administrations saw questions about the Trump administration, but only those respondents who reported working for their client prior to 2017 saw questions about the Obama administration.

^{SI.7}Lobbying Disclosure Act (as amended), section 3(3), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Lobbying/Lobby_Disclosure_Act/3_Definitions.htm.

^{SI.8}Compliance materials produced and disseminated by the federal lobbying community emphasize these interpretations. For instance, in discussing covered executive branch officials, the American Bar Association’s lobbying manual notes that “[readers] should be aware that *every* employee in the Executive Office of the President, from the President’s Chief of Staff to the most junior intern in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), is a ‘covered executive branch official’ within the meaning of the lobbying law. This would include not only the immediate White House staff, but also employees of the Council of Economic Advisors (15 U.S.C. §1023); the National Economic Council (NEC)(Exec. Order No. 12,835, 58 Fed. Reg. 6189 (1993)); the Office of Environmental Quality (42 U.S.C. §4372); the Office of Management and Budget (31 U.S.C. §501); the Office of National Drug Control Policy (12 U.S.C. §1501); the Office of Science and Technology Policy (42 U.S.C. §6611); and the Office of the United States Trade Representative (19 U.S.C. §2171)” (emphasis original; page 218 of *The Lobbying Manual: A Complete Guide to Federal Lobbying Law and Practice*. 2016. Edited by Rebecca Gordon and Thomas Susman. ABA Book Publishing).

2. To the best of your knowledge, how frequently did lobbyists or other individuals affiliated with [your client] interact with President [Barack Obama/Donald Trump] or members of his White House staff in an average year...? (*Asked separately for via mail, email, or phone; via in-person meetings at the White House complex; via in-person meetings outside of the White House complex*) (Results in Figure SI.1)
 - Never
 - Fewer than 5 times
 - 5 to 10 times
 - 11 to 15 times
 - 16 to 20 times
 - More than 20 times
3. Which of the following types of individuals affiliated with [your client] typically attended in-person meetings at the White House complex under the [Obama/Trump] administration? Select all that apply (Results discussed in Supplemental Information Section C)
 - Executive officers
 - Registered lobbyists
 - Government affairs employees who were not registered lobbyists
 - Other [text box to specify]
4. When individuals affiliated with [your client] attended in-person meetings at the White House complex under the [Obama/Trump] administration, which side tended to initiate those meetings? (Results in Figure 2)
 - Always the White House
 - Usually the White House, but occasionally [my client]
 - Sometimes the White House, sometimes [my client]
 - Usually [my client], but occasionally the White House
 - Always [my client]
5. When [your client] was invited to an in-person meeting at the White House complex under the [Obama/Trump] administration, how frequently did they attend the meeting? (Results in Figure 2)
 - Always
 - Usually
 - Sometimes
 - Rarely
 - Never
6. When [your client] requested an in-person meeting at the White House complex under the [Obama/Trump] administration, how frequently did the White House fulfill the meeting request? (Results in Figure 2)
 - Always
 - Usually
 - Sometimes
 - Rarely
 - Never

7. Has [your client] turned down invitations from the [Obama/Trump] administration for in-person meetings at the White House complex? (Results discussed in Supplemental Information Section B)
 - Yes
 - No
 - Not sure
 8. Has the [Obama/Trump] administration turned down requests for in-person meetings at the White House complex from [your client]? (Results discussed in Supplemental Information Section B)
 - Yes
 - No
 - Not sure
-

B Mediums of White House Engagement

The communication and coordination at the core of presidential engagement can take place through a variety of mediums, including electronic and physical mail, fax, phone, text message, and in-person meetings between the White House and organized interest representatives. However, despite technological advances enabling political actors to interact remotely in real-time, policymakers across institutions and organized interests alike perceive direct contacts as the most valuable means of engagement (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Levine 2009; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). In addition, because direct contacts in the form of White House meetings are costly for the White House to provide, who presidents choose to include in meetings provides a strong signal of their engagement priorities. For these two reasons, on which I elaborate below, I focus my theoretical exposition and empirical analysis on presidential engagement in the form of White House meetings.

First, both policymakers and organized interests assign a higher value to direct contacts relative to other forms of access. In extant surveys and interviews, organized interests indicate that direct contacts with policymakers are among their most common and important lobbying tactics (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Drutman 2015; Levine 2009; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). At least three features of direct contacts make them a prized medium of access. First, access provides policymakers and organized interests with each other's attention, enabling them to better transmit resources, such as information and expertise, than they can through other means (Hall and Wayman 1990). Second, access makes each other's preferences more salient, or mentally accessible, such that policymakers and organized interests afford each other preferential treatment in future interactions and are more likely to consider their preferences in their decision-making processes (Miler 2010). Third, access encourages the cultivation of interpersonal relationships between the policymakers and organized interest representatives that can enhance cooperation and trust (Levine 2009).

While most extant work on direct contacts focuses on Congress, my interviewees suggest that these perceptions carry over to the White House. For instance, one lobbyist echoed the first and second benefits of in-person access to the White House by reporting that, relative to other modes of communication, in-person access "tends to be more effective in terms of sharing knowledge... and just sort of raising our issues" (Interviewee E). Another lobbyist indicated that in-person access

to a White House official allows her to “get a much better feeling for the person when you can read their body language and interact with them in human form” (Interviewee J). Finally, a third interviewee indicated a benefit of in-person meetings unique to the White House: the opportunity to walk through an exclusive government institution and conduct institutional maintenance by broadcasting to members that they gained access to this rarefied building (Interviewee K).

Second, in-person meetings are stronger signals of the White House’s engagement priorities because they are costlier to provide than other mediums of engagement (i.e., they require more of the White House’s scarce time and effort to conduct). While all mediums require the White House to expend some degree of time and effort, in-person meetings are uniquely costly for complex organizations such as the White House to conduct. For instance, in-person meetings are more difficult to scale than mass email campaigns, which the White House often uses to distribute information about announcements and events. In-person meetings also require more advance planning than other forms of engagement; organizers must coordinate the busy schedules of the president and/or staffers with those of interest representatives to find a mutually agreeable time to assemble in the same physical space, reserve sometimes scarce room space, and request and set up needed materials (e.g., audiovisual equipment, refreshments). Given these costs, one interviewee expressed that “the default was typically email for much of the communication” because other mediums of engagement, such as phone calls and in-person meetings, were “just too darn time-consuming” (Interviewee A).

Beyond these inherent costs of in-person meetings faced by all complex organizations (e.g., corporations, non-profits), the White House faces unique transaction costs when conducting in-person meetings stemming from its security clearance platform. While the White House’s densely layered security shields presidents and staffers from unannounced intrusions by lobbyists that members of Congress experience on Capitol Hill, they also require White House staff to exert additional effort to peel back those layers to let interest representatives in. All White House visitors must be cleared through the Worker and Visitor Entry System (WAVES), a platform administered by the Secret Service. To “clear” prospective meeting invitees, White House staff must collect each person’s date of birth and Social Security number and provide this information to the Secret Service via a WAVES request. Then, the Secret Service runs background checks on all invitees before adding them to the list of visitors approved for the date and time of the meeting. This clearance process adds additional costs for White House staff by requiring them to collect this information from invitees, file WAVES requests in advance of meetings, and following up on problematic requests. Additionally, the Secret Service has a finite capacity to process and conduct background checks, and high volumes of WAVES requests can delay visitor clearances. Two of my interviewees indicated that the White House clearance process often disincentivized in-person meetings. One interviewee noted that “[g]oing to a meeting at the White House is not trivial. You have to go through security, you have to get cleared in. There’s some, clearly, care given to who is coming into the building and not” (Interviewee A). A second interviewee remarked that “[u]nless [having a meeting is] a real priority, you’re just not. Maybe phone calls, for sure. You’re not going to set up a whole meeting. First of all they have to go through clearance. Some of these White Houses, clearances is a whole platform” (Interviewee B). These features of the White House’s clearance system, together with the traditional costs associated with in-person meetings, make these meetings a particularly costly medium of engagement. Consequently, these meetings provide strong signals of the White House’s engagement priorities because the White House anticipates a sufficiently high expected value of engagement to justify the cost of an in-person meeting rather than a cheaper engagement medium.

B.1 Comparing Mediums of White House Engagement

While qualitative evidence suggests presidential engagement through White House meetings is scarcer than other engagement mediums, scant data exists comparing these mediums. Understanding the relative frequency with which different types of engagement occur is important for substantive and empirical reasons. Substantively, knowing how often the White House engages through different mediums would enable us to investigate whether and to what degree meetings are scarcer than lower-cost alternatives, such as emails, and offer a better sense of how often the White House and organized interests interact (i.e., the full scope of engagement activities).

Empirically, knowing more about how different mediums of engagement correlate would provide insight into how well information on in-person White House meetings describes the White House's engagement with individual interests. This empirical wrinkle was spotlighted by a series of reports during the Obama administration alleging that White House staffers arranged meetings with lobbyists and other political actors at sites just outside the White House complex to keep them off of the visitor logs.^{SI.9} While the White House denied these meetings were intended to skirt ethics policies, these stories raise the concern that presidents and their staffs might sometimes conduct engagement in ways that conceal their activity (e.g., setting meetings outside the White House to keep them off the visitor logs, using phone calls instead of emails so as to not create a paper trail).

To gain insight into the relationships among different mediums of engagement, I asked respondents about the frequency with which they experienced engagement in an average year with the Obama and Trump White Houses through three mediums: remote communications (mail, phone, or email); in-person meetings at the White House; and in-person meetings outside of the White House. Figure SI.1 presents respondents' answers to these questions for the Obama (top row) and Trump (bottom row) administrations. Glancing at the distributions, we note that each is right-skewed, with most respondents indicating that they experienced each medium of engagement fewer than 5 times in an average year; this reinforces my overarching claim that engagement is rare. Further, comparing the distributions for remote communications (left panes) to those for in-person meetings at the White House (center panes) or outside of the White House (right panes), the right-skew of the distributions for in-person meetings is more pronounced than for remote communications. For instance, while 23.4% of respondents indicated that their interest experienced 11 or more remote communications with the Obama White House in an average year, only 9.8% of respondents indicated experiencing a similar number of in-person White House meetings. Together, these responses indicate that in-person engagement is more scarce than remote engagement.

To gauge how closely these engagement mediums are related, I examined the correlations among the survey responses within each administration. For the Obama administration, the correlation between the frequency of engagement through remote communications and White House meetings is 0.77, and the correlation between the frequency of engagement through meetings at the White House and meetings not at the White House is also 0.77. For the Trump administration, the magnitudes of these correlations are smaller but still substantively large (0.61 for remote communications and White House meetings, 0.59 for meetings at the White House and meetings not at the White House). These correlations indicate that the White House's engagement mediums are complements, such that interests experiencing one type of engagement often experience other types. Therefore, data on any one type of engagement—in the current case, White House meetings—provides an informative signal of the White House's overall engagement activity.

^{SI.9}Eric Lichtblau. "Across From White House, Coffee With Lobbyists." *The New York Times*, June 24, 2010, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25caribou.html>.




Figure SI.1: **Relationships Between Mediums of Presidential Engagement** Bar graphs indicate how frequently respondents indicated the Obama (left column) and Trump (right column) administrations engaged with their organized interests through remote communications (top row), in-person White House meetings (center row), and in-person meetings outside the White House (bottom row). These questions were asked only of respondents who reached the survey module asking about their interactions with the Obama and/or Trump White Houses. Responses are weighted to reflect the characteristics of the sampling frame (see Supplemental Information Section A). *N* between 433 (535) and 442 (544) per question for the Obama (Trump) administration.

B.2 When Engagement Does Not Occur

Focusing on only insights from interests who experienced White House meetings could yield inaccurate conclusions through selection bias (i.e., learning about engagement from those who experience engagement). To mitigate selection bias, I asked respondents who indicated not experiencing White House meetings about their perceptions of why they did not experience them. First, I asked respondents if their interest had turned down invitations for White House meetings. Second, I asked respondents if the White House had turned down their meeting requests.

Responses to these questions are consistent with engagement as a presidency-driven process. For the first question, only 1 of 151 respondents indicated that their interest turned down an invitation from the Obama administration, and only 2 of 256 respondents indicated that their interest turned down an invitation from the Trump administration. These responses suggest that presidents have a strong first-mover advantage; as many of my interviewees suggested, when the White House asks interests to meet, they meet. For the second question, few respondents indicated that they asked the White House for a meeting (only 9 of 151 respondents for the Obama administration and 15 of 254 respondents for the Trump administration). These responses imply that interests not experiencing engagement are not expending outside-in lobbying resources trying to obtain it, but instead turn their efforts to other venues and allow the president to choose whether to engage.

C Data Description

In this section, I provide information about the data I utilize in my empirical analyses and the string matching procedure used to identify presidential engagement.

C.1 White House Visitor Logs

My empirical analyses utilize the White House visitor logs from the presidencies of Bill Clinton and Barack Obama. In this subsection, I provide details about these visitor logs, as well as information about the disposition of comparable data from other recent presidencies.

C.1.1 Clinton

In response to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests 2007-0779-F and 2016-0727-F, the Clinton Presidential Library made available the White House visitor logs for the 1999-2001 and 1996-1998 periods, respectively.^{SI.10} These records are available as comma-separated values files and were obtained directly from the Library. Because the names of organized interests' registered lobbyists provided in Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) reports are only available starting in 1998, only the visitor log entries spanning from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2000 are used. The 1,293,975 million entries in this time period correspond to 813,535 unique appointments.^{SI.11} Be-

^{SI.10}“Worker and Visitor Entry System (WAVES), 1996-1998 - Collection Finding Aid,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/57587>; “White House Worker and Visitor Entry System (WAVES), 1999-2000 - Collection Finding Aid,” *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/44133>.

^{SI.11}Because the Clinton visitor logs do not include a unique identifier for each appointment, I use information in the logs that are ostensibly identical for all persons in the same appointment, such as the time and date of the appointment and the name of the person scheduling the appointment, to create appointment identifiers.

cause these visitor logs were disclosed pursuant to FOIA and the Presidential Records Act (PDA), some information, such as entrants' Social Security numbers and dates of birth, and some entries, such as those that would endanger national security, are withheld.

C.1.2 Bush 43

The White House visitor logs from the George W. Bush administration are the subject of a pending FOIA request.^{SI.12} To date, the George W. Bush Presidential Library has made available a handful of records from January 20, 2001, and has no timetable for the release of additional records.^{SI.13}

C.1.3 Obama

Fulfilling a campaign promise to increase transparency, the Obama administration implemented a voluntary disclosure policy in September 2009 whereby the White House visitor logs would be posted on the White House website on a monthly basis.^{SI.14} By the time President Obama left office, his administration had posted over 5,901,105 visitor log entries encompassing 1,599,210 unique appointments.^{SI.15} Because the disclosure policy only applies to entries made starting on September 15, 2009, my analysis does not include entries from the first nine months of the Obama administration. Additionally, because the Obama administration was unable to finish disclosing visitor log entries leaving office, my analysis concludes with entries from September 30, 2016.

Under the disclosure policy, the Obama administration reserved the right to withhold records related to “national security interests,” “purely personal guests of the first and second families,” and “a small group of particularly sensitive meetings,” such as the visits of Supreme Court nominees. These exemptions should not bias my analysis because few meetings with organized interest representatives fall into these categories. However, if the Obama White House used these exemptions to conceal engagement, they would likely conceal meetings with representatives from well-resourced and copartisan interests, as they would be most likely to spark public backlash. Given that I expect presidents are more likely to engage with interests with those characteristics, this concealment would bias downward their effects, making it more difficult to detect evidence for my expectations.

C.1.4 Trump

Upon taking office, the Trump administration terminated the Obama administration's voluntary disclosure policy for White House visitor log records. However, facing a lawsuit concerning this change, the Trump administration entered into a legal settlement requiring them to release visitor logs records for four units in the Executive Office of the President (EOP) subject to FOIA, rather

^{SI.12} “White House Visitor's Log Records from January 20, 2001 - January 20, 2009,” *George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum*, <https://georgewbushlibrary.smu.edu/Digital-Library---2/FOIA-Requests-2014/2014-0237-F-Digitized>.

^{SI.13} Personal correspondence with an archivist at the George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, January 16, 2020.

^{SI.14} Norm Eisen, “Opening Up the People's House,” *The White House*, September 4, 2009, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/09/04/opening-peoplesquos-house>; “White House Voluntary Disclosure Policy Visitor Access Records,” *The White House*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/VoluntaryDisclosure>.

^{SI.15} Because the Obama visitor logs do not include a unique identifier for each appointment, I use information in the logs that are ostensibly identical for all persons in the same appointment, such as the time and date of the appointment and the name of the person scheduling the appointment, to create appointment identifiers.

than PRA, due to their independent statutory authority and Senate-confirmed leadership: the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.^{SI.16}

While visitors to these offices are also included in the Clinton and Obama logs, the absence of records from the White House Office (WHO) itself makes it difficult to compare engagement in the Trump administration to the Clinton and Obama administrations. Further, engagement through these EOP offices is likely different than that conducted by WHO. One key difference is that these offices have higher proportions of career civil servants; whereas nearly all officials in WHO at the pleasure of the president, over 80% of the personnel in these offices during the Clinton and Obama administrations are career civil servants. While civil servants are susceptible to presidents' influence (Moe 1985), they entertain other motivations extending beyond the life of any administration, such as career advancement and making good public policy (Carpenter 2001; Lewis 2008), that might incentivize them to engage with interests differently than members of WHO.

Because comparisons between the the Clinton and Obama visitor logs and more limited Trump visitor logs may be misleading, I do not incorporate the Trump visitor logs into my analysis. However, they may prove useful for future researchers studying other aspects of the presidency.

C.1.5 Biden

The Biden administration revived the Obama administration's practice of releasing its visitor logs on a rolling basis through a voluntary disclosure policy.^{SI.17} At the time of this writing, the White House has released records for in-person visits taking place between January 20, 2021 and October 31, 2021. However, these voluntary disclosures do not include information about virtual meetings, which have largely taken the place of in-person White House meetings amid the COVID-19 pandemic.^{SI.18} Members of Congress and ethics watchdogs have expressed concern over this decision, and House Democrats are trying to pressure the White House to release information about virtual meetings through language in a committee report.^{SI.19} Should this effort fail to secure the release of virtual meetings records, FOIA requests (and likely court proceedings) similar to those filed against the Trump administration when it suspended disclosure altogether are likely. If these virtual meeting records ultimately remain out of public view, researchers interested in using the Biden administration's visitor logs will need to consider if and how the prominence of virtual meetings during this period constrains the inferences they can draw.

^{SI.16} Josh Gerstein, "Trump Administration Agrees to Post Visitor Logs for Some White House Offices," *Politico*, February 15, 2018, <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/15/trump-visitor-logs-white-house-413016>.

^{SI.17} "Biden-Harris Administration Reinstates Visitor Log Policy, Will Be First Administration to Post Records from First Full Year in Office," *The White House*, May 7, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/disclosures/2021/05/07/biden-harris-administration-reinstates-visitor-log-policy-will-be-first-administration-to-post-records-from-first-full-year-in-office/>

^{SI.18} Leonard, Ben. "Biden Administration Releases First Batch of White House Visitor Logs." *Politico*, May 7, 2021, <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/07/biden-releases-white-house-visitor-logs-485822>. Comparing the number of visitors in the White House visitor logs for the first full month available in the Obama administration's records (October 2009) to the analogous month of the Biden administration (October 2017) illustrates this dramatic difference in the number of in-person visitors (74,013 in October 2009 versus 2,858 in October 2017).

^{SI.19} Markay, Lachlan. "House Targets Secret White House Visitors." *Axios*, July 1, 2021, <https://www.axios.com/house-secret-white-house-visitors-c6899b95-9f37-47ab-9207-a03603bdcdb24.html>.

C.1.6 What Types of Visits are Included?

The Clinton and Obama administrations' WAVES records include information about all visits made to the White House, the Old Executive Office Building, or the New Executive Office Building by persons without permanent access passes (e.g., White House staff, members of the White House press corps, etc.), with the exception of those visits omitted by FOIA and administration-specific disclosure policies (see Sections C.1.1 and C.1.3 above). While the WAVES records help identify which people visit the White House, they typically do not provide information about the purpose of the visits, such that we do not know the substance of the presidential engagement embodied by the visit. While some of these visits may focus on policy discussions or outreach strategies, which have direct political implications, many correspond to more ceremonial functions, such as tours and social events. The Obama WAVES records, but not the Clinton WAVES records, include a "Description" field, but this field is used infrequently and often includes minimal detail. Of the 5,901,105 unique visits in the Obama WAVES records, 30.4% of the visits (1,795,098) have blank Description fields, and most Description field entries are vague or uninformative.^{SI.20} Further, the Description field for the majority of visits (60.8%, or 3,592,392) mention "tour," but almost never provide information about the context for the tour (i.e., if it was a standard tourist visit or a tour purposefully provided by the White House for a specific constituency).

In my empirical analyses, I treat all WAVES records from the Clinton and Obama administrations as instances of presidential engagement irrespective of record-level details, where available, that might provide insight on its purpose (i.e., the Description field for the Obama records). I do so because the very act of providing White House access to an organized interest representative, no matter the purpose, is presidential engagement from the perspectives of both the White House and interests. From the White House's perspective, because providing access of any kind requires staff time and effort to arrange, access signals that the interest is sufficiently important to the White House's coalition-building efforts to justify those costs. From interests' perspective, access of any kind—even if devoid of political or policy substance—is valuable because it allows them to build rapport with White House personnel and provides a tangible achievement they can tout to members, donors, and other constituencies to create a perception of influence. Several of my interviewees from both the White House and organized interests expressed the importance for interests of even social or ceremonial White House access. One former White House staffer conveyed that access to many social or ceremonial events, such as the White House Easter Egg Roll, is often in high-demand, both from White House staff who want to provide access to interests and from interests who want that access (Interviewee I). Another White House staffer indicated that interests value access to ceremonial events because "they're trying to... market influence. If they get invited to the Rose Garden, they're... going to make some public display around that, whether... it's a press statement, or telling their members, or putting it in their annual report" (Interviewee C). From the other side, a lobbyist told me that his colleagues routinely accept White House invitations so that they can "run up and down the halls taking pictures of themselves in the White House... even though the president's policies would put them out of business" (Interviewee K).

However, utilizing all WAVES records, including those associated with tours and social events, could induce measurement error if doing increases the risk of false positive matches. For instance, if individuals who share a lobbyist's name but are not lobbyists themselves attend White House tours as part of vacations in Washington, DC, these visits would be erroneously treated as instances of

^{SI.20} Another 31.4% of the visits (1,854,603) merely say "Group Tour," and many of the other common entries indicate changes to the date/time of a previously scheduled visit.

presidential engagement with that lobbyist’s client. Thus, if there are specific types of visits that are unlikely to be instances of presidential engagement (i.e., visits by lobbyists), removing them when creating the measure of presidential engagement would reduce the risk of false positives. To assess whether this measurement error, if present, might alter my results, I re-estimate my model using the Obama WAVES records in the main paper (Figure 4) with a measure of engagement that excludes all records with the word “tour” in its Description field, as tours are a type of visit that likely include many persons who are not lobbyists (e.g., recreational tourists).^{SI.21} This alternative specification yields coefficient estimates substantively similar to those obtained with the original specification, suggesting that using all WAVES records does not alter my conclusions (see Table SI.7 for a side-by-side comparison of these specifications).^{SI.22}

C.2 Lobbying Disclosure Act Reports

In Supplemental Information Section A, I describe LDA reporting requirements and information interests must provide on LD-2 reports. Here, I focus on the lobbyists listed in these reports and how I use them to identify instances of engagement in the White House visitor logs.

Under LDA, lobbyists are individuals who, in working on behalf of a client, make a “lobbying contact,” or an “oral, written, or electronic communication” regarding public policy, with more than one “covered official,” which includes most members of the executive and legislative branches, and spend 20 percent or more of their time working for the client on lobbying activities per reporting period.^{SI.23} While this policy ensures that LD-2 reports will provide the names of persons who are primarily responsible for clients’ lobbying activities, one concern about using lobbyists listed on LD-2 reports to identify instances of presidential engagement is that other persons affiliated with interests who are not identified as lobbyists may attend White House meetings. For instance, a company’s CEO might attend a White House meeting, but, because the scope of her work for the company is sufficiently broad, she might not meet the definition of “lobbyist” under the LDA and thus not be identified on the company’s LD-2 report. If such non-lobbyists represent their clients at the White House often, we might be concerned about a high instance of false negatives, or cases where White House engagement is not detected because the individuals who visited the White House on behalf of the interest were not registered lobbyists. A related concern is that lobbyists’ names provided on LD-2 reports and standardized by CRP may differ from their full legal names which the White House enters into WAVES for the Secret Service to conduct background checks. Because the names of lobbyists are provided on LD-2 forms through text entry boxes, filers may use versions of the lobbyists’ names other than their legal names. This concern may be acute for female lobbyists, who disproportionately experience name changes due to changes in marital status.

Measurement error stemming from these concerns should be minimal for two reasons. First, organized interests often send more than one person to White House meetings, and because I identify measure engagement at the organized interest-level rather than the visitor-level, I detect each instance of presidential engagement with an interest so long as at least one member of the

^{SI.21}I am cannot do this with the Clinton WAVES data because it does not include a Description field.

^{SI.22}The measures of presidential engagement obtained when using all WAVES records and when excluding all identified tours are also similar; the median and mean numbers of instances of presidential engagement experienced by each interest-quarter observation are 0 and 1.42 when using all WAVES records and 0 and 0.93 when excluding tours, and the correlation coefficient for the two measures is 0.94.

^{SI.23}Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. §1601) https://www.senate.gov/legislative/Lobbying/Lobby_Disclosure_Act/TOC.htm.

interest’s contingent is a registered lobbyist whose CRP standardized name is their legal name. Second, I asked my respondents who reported that their interests had meetings at the Obama and Trump White Houses to indicate which of the following types of employees attended these meetings: “executive officers,” “registered lobbyists,” “government affairs employees who were not registered lobbyists,” or “other” persons. 76.5% and 72.4% of respondents indicated that registered lobbyists attended meetings, and 71.1% and 68.7% reported that executive officers (who are often listed as lobbyists on LDA reports) attended meetings during the Obama and Trump administrations, respectively. These responses suggest that most instances of engagement should be detected by matching registered lobbyists’ names to the White House visitor logs. Together, my measurement of engagement at the interest-level and lobbyists’ knowledge of what types of interest representatives typically attend White House meetings mitigates error associated with interest representatives’ status as registered lobbyists and the forms of their names used across data sources.

C.3 White House Visitor Logs-LDA Reports Matching Procedure

Because the White House visitor logs themselves do not identify instances of presidential engagement, I use the names of registered lobbyists to detect which White House visits are instances of engagement. Unfortunately, no key exists to match registered lobbyists to the names of visitors in the logs, and the spelling and punctuation of the name of the same individual in the White House visitor logs and the LDA filings may vary, making the string-matching task difficult. To account for differences in lobbyists’ names across data sources, I preprocess the names to remove punctuation and use both exact and approximate string matching, which identifies a match when the difference between strings is below a specified tolerance threshold.^{SI.24} Specifically, I use the `fuzzyjoin` package in R and match names with the Damerau-Levenshtein distance metric at four different thresholds—zero edits (i.e. exact matching), one edit, two edits, and three edits. Sometimes, the same visitor log entry may match to multiple LDA lobbyists; when this occurs, I retain only the match with the smallest edit distance.^{SI.25} Once I identify the “best” matches for each period, I aggregate instances of White House engagement up to the organized interest-level.^{SI.26} The number of visits and unique appointments which match with names of organized interest representatives in contemporary LDA filings at each edit distance threshold are provided in Table SI.4.

Using measures of engagement with different thresholds entail trade-offs. When the threshold is low, such as when using only exact matches, some false negatives (e.g., instances of engagement not counted because of minor differences) are inevitable. However, when the threshold increases, the rate of false negatives declines as the rate of false positives (e.g., visits incorrectly identified as

^{SI.24}In some cases, approximate string matching may mitigate concerns about the use of different names for the same individual across data sources mentioned above. For instance, if a lobbyist’s standardized LDA name uses a nickname, approximate matching may account for the difference between the nickname and the full legal name provided in the White House visitor logs (e.g., if a lobbyist’s full legal name is “Calvin Ripken” but the standardized name CRP draws from LD-2 forms is “Cal Ripken,” appearances of “Calvin Ripken” in the White House visitor logs would not be matched with the lobbyist “Cal Ripken” under exact string matching, but would be matched when using the Damerau-Levenshtein distance metric and allowing for up to three edits, which in this case would be the addition of the letters “v,” “i,” and “n.”). However, approximate string matching cannot mitigate cases where the names provided by both data sources are distinct, such as when surnames change due to changes in marital status.

^{SI.25}If multiple matches have the same edit distance, I randomly retain one match.

^{SI.26}To avoid overcounts stemming from multiple lobbyists from the same organization attending the same meeting, I use my appointment identifiers (see Supplemental Information Footnotes SI.11 and SI.15) to group matches for the same organization and retain only one matched entry per appointment; thus, instances of presidential engagement are counted at the meeting-level, rather than the visitor-level.

Table SI.4: Number of Lobbyists Matched with Visitors in the White House Visitor Logs

	Number of Visits (%)	Number of Appointments (%)
<u>Clinton</u>		
Exact matches	21,435 (1.7%)	15,333 (1.9%)
Edit distance ≤ 1	28,324 (2.2%)	20,553 (2.5%)
Edit distance ≤ 2	67,971 (5.3%)	52,181 (6.4%)
Edit distance ≤ 3	375,674 (29.0%)	296,989 (36.5%)
<u>Obama</u>		
Exact matches	71,893 (1.2%)	40,731 (2.5%)
Edit distance ≤ 1	97,516 (1.7%)	50,118 (3.1%)
Edit distance ≤ 2	281,580 (4.8%)	117,305 (7.3%)
Edit distance ≤ 3	1,748,113 (29.6%)	653,653 (40.9%)

This table provides the number and proportion of visits and unique appointments in the Clinton and Obama visitor logs with visitor names that matched the names of registered lobbyists in contemporaneous LDA reports at each edit distance threshold.

instances of engagement) increases. Recognizing these trade-offs, the analyses in the main paper use a measure of presidential engagement which includes only exact matches, but I re-estimate my models using the more permissive tolerance levels in Supplemental Information Section E.

C.4 Measuring Engagement and Engagement Quality

As I describe in Supplemental Information Section C.1.6, all instances in which an organized interest representative enjoys White House access constitute presidential engagement. However, the circumstances of engagement can vary widely, from a one-on-one meeting in the Oval Office with the president to a back row seat at a packed briefing led by a staff assistant and anything in between. Importantly, even if the White House wanted to offer the highest “quality” of engagement to every interest, it faces clear logistical barriers to providing every interest with red-carpet treatment; the president and each staffer can only hold so many meetings each day, rooms can only hold so many people at a time, only so many people can be seated at the president’s table at a state dinner, etc. Consequently, the White House must choose which interests experience what quality of engagement opportunities, and the quality of engagement the it provides interests may further reflect of its engagement priorities (beyond the choice to engage at all).

While there are multifarious contextual details which can indicate engagement quality, I describe on pages 17-18 of the main paper that my interviewees emphasized the visatee, or the person within the White House who met with the interest representative, as a key signal of quality. Accordingly, I utilize the identity of the visatee provided for each White House visitor log record to classify meetings as “high-quality” or “low-quality” instances of engagement. The president, at the pinnacle of the White House and the broader executive branch, is unambiguously a high-quality visatee. I also classify the vice-president and first lady as high-quality visatees; while they have little formal power, the vice-president is a constitutional officer and both roles are proximate to the president and afford a high degree of respect and credibility in and out of the White House.^{SI.27} However, determining which EOP staff in the White House complex are “senior advisers” who provide high-

^{SI.27}No other members of the first or second families appear in the WAVES records for either administration.

quality engagement is less straightforward. One tactic would be to consult organizational charts and deem staff above a certain level in the hierarchy to be senior adviser; however, official organizational charts are seldom publicized and it can be difficult to compare the rank of staff in different White House offices.^{SI.28} Instead, I use information about staff salaries provided by the White House^{SI.29} and the Office of Personnel Management^{SI.30} to determine which visitees constitute senior advisers, and thus high-quality engagement. After matching this salary information with the names of visitees in the Clinton and Obama WAVES records, I classify all meetings with visitees whose salaries fall within the top quartile of all EOP salaries for the time period in which the meeting took place as high-quality engagement, and all other meetings as low-quality engagement.

I use staff salaries to determine seniority for several reasons. First, salaries correspond to staffers' proximity to the president and the breadth of their managerial and policy portfolios and powers. Staff at the upper levels of EOP, such as the Chief of Staff, Director of the Domestic Policy Council, and the Director of OMB, tend to hold supervisory roles, have ultimate authority and responsibility for the actions of their respective units, and enjoy more direct interactions with the president, and their salaries are commensurate with these powers. Second, EOP salaries are in large part determined by the Executive and General Schedules, and the hierarchy of commissioned titles which presidents bestow on staffers typically correspond with levels in these schedules. For instance, presidents can employ 25 staffers at the top rank, Assistant to the President, whose salaries are capped at level II of the Executive Schedule, and another 25 staffers at the next-highest rank, Deputy Assistant to the President, whose salaries are capped at level III of the Executive Schedule.^{SI.31} Thus, in staffing the White House, the persons presidents choose for more senior roles by necessity receive higher compensation. Third, unlike coding alternatives, such as organizational charts, staff salaries are an easy-to-use unidimensional scale that facilitates comparisons across within and across EOP units (see Footnote SI.28). Fourth, my use of staff salaries to denote seniority reflects strategies employed by other recent studies considering the role of staff in Congress and the executive branch (e.g., Brown and Huang 2020; McCrain 2021). Finally, and perhaps most

^{SI.28}For instance, the White House Transition Project (WHTP) sometimes issues reports using organizational charts, but these charts are themselves created by the WHTP from publicly-available materials and may not reflect the White House's *true* hierarchy (e.g., Kumar, Martha Joynt. "White House Staff and Organization: Ten Observations." *The White House Transition Project*, Report 2017-10, http://www.whitehousetransitionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/WHTP2017-10_Ten_Observations_on_WH_Staff-_9-6-2017.pdf). Additionally, these charts do not account for non-White House Office EOP staff who appear in my data.

^{SI.29}The Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994 requires the White House to issue an annual report on the salaries of persons employed by or detailed to the White House Office. Annual reports from the Clinton administration come from the Clinton Presidential Library ("Reports on White House Personnel, 1995-2000 - Collection Finding Aid." *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/44117>). Annual reports from the Obama administration come from the White House website ("White House Salaries." *The White House*, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/21stcenturygov/tools/salaries>). These reports also contain salary information for staff in the Office of Policy Development (the Domestic Policy Council and National Economic Council).

^{SI.30}Outside of the White House Office, Office of Policy Development, and the Office of the Vice-President, the salary information for all other EOP units is maintained by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In 2017, BuzzFeed News published quarterly OPM reports it received through FOIA (Singer-Vine, Jeremy, "We're Sharing a Vast Trove of Federal Payroll Records," *Buzzfeed News*, May 24, 2017, https://www.buzzfeed.com/jsvine/sharing-hundreds-of-millions-of-federal-payroll-records?utm_term=.oe3w86gYqa#.yi5wM9oY5Q). Using these reports, I extracted the salary information for all EOP staff included therein. Unfortunately, neither data sources contain salary information for the relatively small staff in the Office of the Vice-President; therefore, any meetings where staff from that office are identified as the visatee are considered low-quality engagement.

^{SI.31}United States Code Title 3, Chapter 2, §105, <https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title3/chapter2&edition=prelim>.

Analysis of July 1, 1996 Report

Staff Support

Salary Range: \$20,500 to \$35,999

	Males	Females	Totals
Black	6	14	20
White	41	83	124
Asian/Pac.	3	2	5
Hispanic	2	2	4
Native Am.	0	0	0
Detaillees	0	1	1
	52	102	153

Titles

Staff Support
Directors (Volunteers, Interns, COS/Scheduling Correspondence,
White House Conference Center)
Deputy/Associate Directors
Deputy Press Secretary

Junior Program Staff

Salary Range: \$36,000 to \$50,999

	Males	Females	Totals
Black	3	10	13
White	34	45	79
Asian/Pac.	0	0	0
Hispanic	0	4	4
Native Am.	0	0	0
Detaillees	1	2	3
	38	61	96

Titles

Special Assistants to the President (9)
Supervisor
Director
Executive Assistant
Special Assistant Counsel
Associate Director
Senior Advisor to the Counselor

Lower Level Senior Staff

Salary Range: \$51,000 to \$85,999

	Males	Females	Totals
Black	4	10	14
White	17	30	47
Asian/Pac.	0	2	2
Hispanic	1	4	5
Native Am.	0	1	1
Detaillees	3	4	7
	25	51	69

Titles

Deputy Assistants to the President (6)
Special Assistants to the President (27)
Associate Counsels
Special Associate Counsels
Senior Advisors
Deputy/Associate Directors
Directors
Deputy Press Secretary
Executive Assistant

Senior Staff

Salary Range: \$86,000 to \$133,600

	Males	Females	Totals
Black	2	4	6
White	37	29	66
Asian/Pac.	0	1	1
Hispanic	1	2	3
Native Am.	0	0	0
Detaillees	6	3	9
	46	39	76

Titles

Chief of Staff
Assistants to the President/Equivalents (22)
Senior Advisor to the President
Senior Advisors to the COS
Counselor to the President
Associate Counsels, Attorney Advisors
Director of AIDS Policy
Special Counsels/Special Associate Counsels

Grand Totals

	Males	Females	Totals
Black	15	38	53
White	129	187	316
Asian/Pac.	3	5	8
Hispanic	4	12	16
Native Am.	0	1	1
Detaillees	10	10	20
	151	253	414

Figure SI.2: Clinton Administration Analysis of White House Staff Salaries, Prepared for July 1, 1996 Report to Congress This analysis was found at the Clinton Presidential Library in the file corresponding with FOIA request 2014-0939-F ("Reports on White House Personnel, 1995-2000 - Collection Finding Aid." *Clinton Digital Library*, <https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/44117>). The file contained similar reports for the years 1996, 1997, and 1999. The document shows how the White House perceived staffers' salaries as indicative of their seniority.

importantly, the White House itself thinks of salaries as synonymous with, or at least a close proxy for, seniority. I discovered in the Clinton Presidential Library's file containing the administration's annual reports to Congress on staff salaries that for most years the White House submitted these

Table SI.5: Number of Visitees Identified in the White House Visitor Logs

	Number of Matched Visits (%)	Number of Matched Appointments (%)
Clinton		
Exact matches	13,754 (64.2%)	9,099 (59.3%)
Edit distance ≤ 1	18,014 (63.6%)	12,219 (59.5%)
Edit distance ≤ 2	41,218 (60.6%)	30,147 (57.8%)
Edit distance ≤ 3	222,960 (59.3%)	170,208 (57.3%)
Obama		
Exact matches	35,443 (49.2%)	25,248 (62.0%)
Edit distance ≤ 1	42,383 (43.5%)	29,587 (59.0%)
Edit distance ≤ 2	91,485 (32.5%)	60,771 (51.8%)
Edit distance ≤ 3	490,017 (28.0%)	311,562 (47.7%)

This table provides the number and proportion of visits and unique appointments in the Clinton and Obama visitor logs with visitee names that either corresponded to the president, vice-president, or first lady or matched the names of EOP staff whose salaries were reported by the White House or the Office of Personnel Management among those visits and appointments whose visitors were matched names of lobbyists on LDA reports at each of the edit distance thresholds (see Supplemental Information Section C.3 for more details).

reports (1996, 1997, 1999, and 2000), it also compiled a summary of staff compensation by gender and ethnicity that binned staffers into four categories by salary range (from lowest to highest): Staff Support, Junior Program Staff, Lower Level Senior Staff, and Senior Staff. In Figure SI.2, I provide a copy of the first analysis the Clinton administration prepared for its July 1, 1996 report.

As was the case when matching lobbyists' names with the names of visitors in WAVES records, name variations and typographical errors across White House and OPM salary data and the names of visitees in WAVES records presented some challenges in the matching process. After matching these records for contemporaneous time periods on the basis of exact matching (i.e., the name strings in both records were identical), I utilized a combination of approximate string matching and visual checks to match as many visitees with staff salary information as possible.^{SI.32}

In Table SI.5, I report for how many of the visits and appointments I matched with the names of lobbyists provided by LDA reports (i.e., the visits and appointments reported in Table SI.4) I can identify the visitee corresponding with the visits and appointments using designations provided for the president, vice-president, or first lady and salary data provided by the White House and OPM. In general, I can ascertain the visitee's identity in more than half of the visits and appointments whose visitor names matched with those of lobbyists. When I ascertain the visitee's identity as the president, vice-president, first lady, or a staffer whose salary falls in the top quartile among all EOP staff, I code the instance of engagement as high-quality. In cases where I ascertain the visitee's identity as a staffer whose salary falls outside of the top quartile among all EOP staff or cannot ascertain the visitee's identity, I code the instance of engagement as low-quality.^{SI.33}

^{SI.32}For each WAVES record, I tried to match its visitee with a staffer listed in the most recent White House or OPM salary report. Because these reports are issued annually and quarterly, respectively, they do not account for staffer entries and exists between reports' issuance. Consequently, I extended each staffer's first and last reported salary to the preceding and following time periods (i.e., a White House Office staffer hired on January 1, 1999, would not have a salary reported until July 1, 1999, so including that staffer in all attempted matches in the prior year, July 1, 1998–June 30, 1999, would match with all times they appeared as the visitee for meetings after their start date).

^{SI.33}Some cases where I cannot ascertain the identity of the visitee may be high-quality engagement. To the extent

D Estimation Strategy

D.1 Model Specification

As noted on pages 21-22 of the main paper, the data structure poses several challenges to inference including repeated observations of organized interests, industries, and time periods; a key time-invariant covariate of interest measured at the industry-level; and, for the engagement quality analysis, multiple non-independent outcomes. This complexity makes Bayesian multilevel models an appropriate empirical approach (Gelman and Hill 2006; Shor et al. 2007). Here, I present a representative specification of the multilevel models I estimate.

For the representative specification, I focus on the logistic regression model used with the data from the Clinton administration to generate Figure 3. This specification can be modified with few adjustments to represent those used for other analyses, such as those for the Obama administration, examining a count outcome with a negative binomial distribution, or utilizing a bivariate distribution for the outcome to jointly model high- and low-quality engagement.^{SI.34, SI.35} To recognize the nesting structure of the data, each organized interest-time period observation—the central unit of observation—is subscripted i, t to correspond with its respective organized interest and time period, respectively. Each organized interest-time period observation is further nested in an organized interest j and a time period p , and each organized interest is further nested in an industry k . Given these subscripts, the model specification is:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Pr(\text{engagement}_{i,t} = 1) = & \text{logit}^{-1}(\alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{engagement}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \cdot \log(\text{lobby_exp})_{i,t-1} + \\
 & \beta_3 \cdot \text{any_contribs}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-4} + \\
 & \beta_4 \cdot \text{any_contribs}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-4} \cdot \log(\text{contrib_amt})_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-4} + \\
 & \xi \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_j[i] + \gamma_p[t]) \text{ for all } i \text{ in } 1, \dots, N \\
 \alpha_j \sim & N(\mu_{\alpha,0} + \mu_{\alpha,1,k[j]}, \sigma_{\alpha}^2) \text{ for all } j \text{ in } 1, \dots, J \\
 \mu_{\alpha,1,k} \sim & N(\delta_{\mu_{\alpha,1,0}} + \delta_{\mu_{\alpha,1,1}} \cdot \text{pty_align}_k, \sigma_{\mu_{\alpha,1}}^2) \text{ for all } k \text{ in } 1, \dots, K \\
 \gamma_p \sim & N(\mu_{\gamma,0}, \sigma_{\gamma}^2) \text{ for all } p \text{ in } 1, \dots, P
 \end{aligned}$$

that this occurs, my coding rule—high-quality if the visitee could be ascertained as the president, vice-president, first lady, or a senior staffer, low-quality if otherwise—would introduce noise when comparing the qualities of engagement (i.e., some high-quality engagement may be mis-coded as low-quality engagement, but not vice versa).

^{SI.34}The only difference between the model specifications for the Clinton and Obama presidencies concerns the number of previous periods for which campaign contributions are considered in the present period, t . As noted on pages 19-20, the measures of organized interests' contribution activity (whether they make contributions and the amount contributed) are calculated by looking at the interest's campaign finance activity for the preceding two-year period (i.e., a quasi-electoral cycle). Because observations for the Clinton presidency are semiannual, or twice a year, these measures account for the preceding four periods. However, because observations for the Obama presidency are quarterly, or four times a year, these same measures account for the preceding eight periods. Thus, the comparable model for the Obama presidency subscripts the variables for campaign finance activity to look back over the preceding eight time periods (i.e., $\text{any_contribs}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-8}$ and $\text{contrib_amt}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-8}$).

^{SI.35}The bivariate specification estimates coefficients for same set of explanatory variables in the equations for high- and low-quality access and accounts for repeated observations nested within the same interest, industry, and time period across across the equations for both outcomes by explicitly modeling the correlation among the varying intercepts estimated for each interest, industry, and time period across outcomes.

The outcome measure, $\text{engagement}_{i,t}$, is a binary indicator for whether the president engaged with organized interest-time period observation i, t . The key covariates in the model are $\text{lobby_exp}_{i,t-1}$, the amount of lobbying expenditures reported by interest j in the preceding period; $\text{any_contri}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-4}$, a binary indicator for whether interest j made campaign contributions to any candidates for federal office in the preceding four periods (i.e., the preceding two years); $\text{contrib_amt}_{i,t-1 \rightarrow t-4}$, the amount of contributions made by interest j to candidates for federal office in the preceding four periods; and pty_align_k , a trichotomous indicator of the partisan alignment of the industry k of which interest j is a member. To account for the dynamic nature of presidents' provision of access to interest j across periods, the model includes a lagged measure of the dependent variable, $\text{access}_{i,t-1}$. The model also includes a series of binary indicators drawn from interests' LDA filings for whether they retained their own in-house lobbyists or relied solely on lobbying firms and for which of 80 possible issue areas they reported lobbying on in the preceding period ($\xi \mathbf{Z}_{i,t-1}$). Finally, the model includes varying intercepts for the unique organized interests ($\alpha_{j[i]}$), industries ($\mu_{\alpha,1,k[j]}$), and time periods ($\gamma_{p[t]}$) in which each observation i is nested.

D.2 Estimation Process

I estimate these models with the R package **brms** (Bürkner 2017), an interface for Stan (Carpenter et al. 2017). All models are fitted using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm (Hoffman and Gelman 2014) with 4 chains and 2000 iterations per chain (1000 for warmup, 1000 for sampling). Inferences are based on the 4000 posterior samples. All models report no divergent transitions during the sampling phase and indicate convergence with \hat{R} statistics of ≤ 1.10 for all parameters.

E Empirical Analyses

In this section of the Supplemental Information, I discuss how the figures in the main paper are generated, present the summaries of the models from which these figures are derived, and provide summaries from alternative model specifications.

E.1 Calculating and Testing Hypotheses with Predicted Probabilities

Figures 3 and 4 present predicted probabilities of presidential engagement as organized interests' resources and partisan alignment with the president vary. These probabilities are calculated from the models summarized in Table SI.6 using an observed-value approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013). Under this approach, I fix the values of all covariates except the covariate whose effect I seek to demonstrate at their observed values, and then vary each covariate of interest independently across the levels indicated on the far left of the figures. For instance, in Figure 3, the top three predicted probabilities are calculated by fixing all covariates except for lobbying expenditures at their observed values and varying lobbying expenditures across its first, second, and third quartile values.

To determine if the shifts in the value of each covariate of interest represent distinguishable changes in the probability of engagement, we cannot rely on visual comparisons of the probabilities plotted in the left panes, but rather must assess the differences between the distributions of predicted probabilities calculated for each set of variable values (see Shikano 2019, for more on Bayesian hypothesis testing). For example, focus on the difference between the probability of engagement when interests are situated in a Democratic industry rather than a Republican industry during

the Obama administration. As indicated in the left pane of Figure 4, the predicted probability of engagement when situated in a Democratic industry is 0.33, while the predicted probability when the industry’s partisan alignment is Republican is 0.30. To determine whether this 0.03 difference is statistically distinguishable at the 95% level, I use the parameter estimates in each of the 4000 posterior samples to calculate the difference between the predicted probabilities when partisan alignment is set to Democratic versus Republican, holding all other covariates at their fixed values. The 4000 differences calculated using each posterior sample provides a distribution of the difference in the predicted probability of engagement for interests when situated in a Democratic versus a Republican industry. The bottom-most point and line in the right pane of Figure 4 indicates the mean and 95% credible interval of this distribution of differences; because the credible interval does not include zero, we can conclude that the difference in the probability of engagement for interests when situated in a Democratic versus a Republican industries is distinguishable.

E.2 Alternative Model Specifications

To demonstrate the robustness of my results to alternative measurement perspectives and modeling choices, I conduct a series of alternative analyses presented on the following pages.

First, as discussed in Supplemental Information Section C, I re-estimate the models presented in the main paper with measures of engagement which allow for higher string matching tolerance thresholds and which both include and exclude visits identified as tours. I present the alternative models for the Clinton and Obama administrations in Table SI.8. In general, the coefficients for organized interests’ resources and partisan alignment maintain the same signs and similar magnitudes when using an outcome measure of engagement with an edit distance thresholds of ≤ 1 and ≤ 2 , though a few coefficients do not maintain statistical significance. As the engagement measure becomes more noisy at an edit distance threshold of ≤ 3 , the coefficient estimates become more noisy. Separately, in Table SI.7, I present a side-by-side comparison of the Obama-era model presented in Figure 4 of the main paper and Table SI.6 of the Supplemental Information, which includes all visits in its measure of presidential engagement, with an alternative specification whose presidential engagement measure utilizes only visits that were not identified as tours in the “Description” column of the Obama administration’s WAVES records. Both specifications yield similar coefficient estimates and facilitate the same substantive conclusions.

Second, because presidents can engage with interests more than once per period, I repeat my analyses with negative binomial models measuring engagement as a count. The results from these models, presented in Table SI.9, are substantively similar to those presented in the main models.

Third, given the coarseness of my industry-level partisan alignment measure, I leverage two interest-level preferences measures—CFscores (Bonica 2013) and IGscores (Crosson, Furnas, and Lorenz 2020)—to investigate whether my results hold with more granular measures of preferences. While these measures provide ideology scores for each interest (negative values indicating liberalism, positive values indicating conservatism), they have some limitations. First, these measures provide scores for only $\approx 10\%$ of the interests in my analyses. Second, the subset of interests with scores is not random, such that sample selection may yield inferences that do not generalize to the full population of interests. For instance, because CFscores are generated using campaign contributions, only interests that make campaign contributions have ideology scores. Again, only interests who take positions on congressional bills and whose positions are recorded by Maplight have IGscores. Thus, interests who partake in these types of activities likely have distinct characteristics from interests who do not, such as broader membership bases from which they can raise campaign funds

and to whom they demonstrate their political action through bill position-taking.

In Table SI.10, I present the alternative specifications that use these preference measures rather than my trichotomous indicator of partisan alignment. The results from these alternative specifications are substantively similar to those presented in the main paper.

E.3 Calculating and Testing Hypotheses with Differences in Coefficient Estimates

To compare the effect sizes associated with lobbying expenditures, campaign contributions, and partisan alignment across high- and low-quality engagement, I provide in Figure 5 the differences in the distributions of the coefficient estimates corresponding to each of those measures for high- and low-quality engagement obtained from the bivariate multilevel logistic regression models fitted for each presidency (see Table SI.11 for model summaries). These differences are calculated by taking the 4000 posterior samples of each parameter estimate of interest, subtracting the parameter estimate from the part of the model using low-quality engagement as its outcome from the parameter estimate from the part of the model using high-quality engagement as its outcome, yielding for each covariate of interest a distribution of 4000 posterior differences.^{SI.36} Figure 5 plots the means and 95% credible intervals for each of these differences, and inferences concerning statistical distinguishability are made by assessing whether the credible intervals include zero.

For instance, take lobbying expenditures, denoted “ $\log(\text{Lobbying Expenditures})_{t-1}$ ” in Table SI.11 and whose differences are indicated by the first two points and credible intervals in Figure 5. For the bivariate model for each administration, two parameters are estimated for lobbying expenditures—one for the effect of lobbying expenditures on high-quality engagement, the other for the effect of lobbying expenditures on low-quality engagement. To compare the effect sizes of these pairs of parameters from the Clinton and Obama models, we take the pair of parameter estimates from each of the 4000 posterior samples and subtract the parameter estimate corresponding with low-quality engagement from that corresponding with high-quality engagement; this yields for the Clinton and Obama models a distribution of 4000 posterior differences for the effect of lobbying expenditures on the two different qualities of engagement. The first and second points and 95% credible intervals in Figure 5 reflect these distributions, whose means are nearly zero and whose credible intervals are so small that they cannot be seen in the figure. Because the credible intervals include zero, we deem the difference not statistically distinguishable.

^{SI.36}The covariates corresponding with policy resources (lobbying expenditures) and partisan alignment (industry alignment with the Republican or neither party) utilize only one parameter from each equation in the bivariate regression models. However, because electoral resources are modeled with two covariates—whether an interest made contributions to candidates for federal office in the past 2 years and how much they contributed in that time—I utilize estimates of both parameters when calculating these differences. In other words, to calculate the differences for each posterior sample, I subtract the sum the parameter estimates from the low-quality engagement equation for whether an interest made contributions and how much they contributed from the sum of the analogous parameter estimates from the high-quality engagement equation.

Table SI.6: Main Paper Models

	Clinton	Obama
Intercept	-1.50*	-2.65*
	[-2.00; -0.98]	[-2.81; -2.49]
Any Visits _{t-1}	1.25*	0.84*
	[1.16; 1.32]	[0.82; 0.86]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.06*	0.09*
	[0.05; 0.07]	[0.09; 0.09]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4}	-1.20*	
	[-1.80; -0.60]	
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-4})	0.14*	
	[0.08; 0.19]	
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}		-0.95*
		[-1.28; -0.62]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})		0.12*
		[0.09; 0.15]
Aligned with Neither Party	-0.24*	-0.16
	[-0.46; -0.03]	[-0.36; 0.04]
Aligned with Republicans	-0.23*	-0.19*
	[-0.40; -0.07]	[-0.35; -0.03]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.01	1.49
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.22	0.25
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.51	0.26
Num. interests	9484	24009
Num. industries	92	92
Num. time periods	5	27
Num. obs.	31673	306766

This table provides the summaries of the models used to generate the predicted probabilities of presidential engagement during the Clinton and Obama administrations presented in the main text. The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model using data from the presidency indicated by the column heading. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package **brms**, which interfaces with **rstan** to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 2000 iterations per chain (1000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

Table SI.7: Main Paper Model With and Without Tours (Obama White House Only)

	All Visits	Excluding Tours
Intercept	-2.65* [-2.81; -2.49]	-2.94* [-3.10; -2.77]
Any Visits _{t-1}	0.84* [0.82; 0.86]	0.77* [0.75; 0.80]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.09* [0.09; 0.09]	0.09* [0.09; 0.10]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}	-0.95* [-1.28; -0.62]	-1.04* [-1.35; -0.72]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})	0.12* [0.09; 0.15]	0.13* [0.10; 0.16]
Aligned with Neither Party	-0.16 [-0.36; 0.04]	-0.21 [-0.44; 0.02]
Aligned with Republicans	-0.19* [-0.35; -0.03]	-0.28* [-0.46; -0.10]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.49	1.45
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.25	0.29
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.26	0.19
Num. interests		24009
Num. industries		92
Num. time periods		27
Num. obs.		306766

This table compares the model summaries obtained using data from the Obama administration when utilizing all White House visits to identify instances of presidential engagement (first column, identical to model summary in Table SI.6) versus using only those visits not identified as tours using the “Description” column in the Obama era WAVES records (second column). The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model using data from the presidency indicated by the column heading. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package `brms`, which interfaces with `exttrstan` to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 2000 iterations per chain (1000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

Table SI.8: Main Paper Models with Different String Matching Tolerance Thresholds

	Clinton			Obama		
	≤ 1 Edit	≤ 2 Edits	≤ 3 Edits	≤ 1 Edit	≤ 2 Edits	≤ 3 Edits
Intercept	-1.25*	-1.02*	-1.21*	-2.37*	-1.95*	-1.97*
	[-1.77; -0.77]	[-1.59; -0.48]	[-1.84; -0.60]	[-2.56; -2.17]	[-2.16; -1.73]	[-2.21; -1.73]
Any Visits _{t-1}	1.20*	1.73*	2.15*	0.91*	1.18*	1.54*
	[1.11; 1.28]	[1.64; 1.81]	[2.03; 2.27]	[0.89; 0.94]	[1.15; 1.21]	[1.50; 1.58]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.06*	0.05*	0.05*	0.09*	0.10*	0.09*
	[0.05; 0.07]	[0.04; 0.06]	[0.04; 0.06]	[0.09; 0.10]	[0.09; 0.10]	[0.08; 0.09]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4}	-0.93*	-0.20	0.41			
	[-1.52; -0.35]	[-0.90; 0.48]	[-0.56; 1.42]			
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-4})	0.11*	0.04	-0.03			
	[0.06; 0.17]	[-0.03; 0.10]	[-0.12; 0.06]			
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}				-0.81*	-0.74*	-0.68*
				[-1.14; -0.49]	[-1.14; -0.33]	[-1.27; -0.08]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})				0.11*	0.10*	0.09*
				[0.08; 0.14]	[0.06; 0.13]	[0.03; 0.14]
Aligned with Neither Party	-0.21	-0.20	-0.07	-0.13	-0.11	-0.17
	[-0.42; 0.01]	[-0.43; 0.03]	[-0.36; 0.22]	[-0.34; 0.08]	[-0.31; 0.09]	[-0.44; 0.09]
Aligned with Republicans	-0.24*	-0.22*	-0.14	-0.13	-0.05	-0.10
	[-0.41; -0.07]	[-0.40; -0.04]	[-0.38; 0.10]	[-0.29; 0.03]	[-0.22; 0.11]	[-0.31; 0.10]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.07	1.02	1.17	1.53	1.79	2.12
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.22	0.24	0.31	0.25	0.24	0.30
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.47	0.49	0.61	0.35	0.46	0.46
Num. interests		9484			24009	
Num. industries		92			92	
Num. time periods		5			27	
Num. obs.		31673			306766	

The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model using data from the Clinton and Obama presidencies with the strong matching tolerance threshold indicated by the column heading. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package **brms**, which interfaces with **rstan** to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 2000 iterations per chain (1000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

Table SI.9: Main Paper Models with Count Outcomes

	Clinton	Obama
Intercept	-0.82* [-1.23; -0.44]	-1.90* [-2.05; -1.75]
Any Visits _{t-1}	0.02* [0.01; 0.02]	0.07* [0.07; 0.07]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.05* [0.05; 0.06]	0.07* [0.07; 0.07]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4}	-1.24* [-1.64; -0.84]	
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-4})	0.14* [0.10; 0.18]	
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}		-0.47* [-0.64; -0.30]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})		0.06* [0.05; 0.08]
Aligned with Neither Party	-0.20 [-0.41; 0.01]	-0.21* [-0.41; -0.02]
Aligned with Republicans	-0.19* [-0.36; -0.03]	-0.24* [-0.38; -0.09]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.27	1.41
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.24	0.24
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.36	0.19
Num. interests	9484	24009
Num. industries	92	92
Num. time periods	5	27
Num. obs.	31673	306766

This table provides the summaries of models analogous to those used to generate the predicted probabilities of presidential engagement during the Clinton and Obama administrations presented in the main text, but which use counts of the number of times presidents engage with each interest in the specified time period rather than a binary indicator of engagement. The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the Bayesian multilevel negative binomial regression model using data from the presidency indicated by the column heading. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package `brms`, which interfaces with `rstan` to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 2000 iterations per chain (1000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

Table SI.10: Main Paper Models with Alternative Preference Measures

	Clinton		Obama	
Intercept	-1.57*	-1.47*	-3.11*	-2.09*
	[-2.17; -0.96]	[-1.98; -0.98]	[-3.51; -2.72]	[-2.35; -1.83]
Any Visits _{t-1}	0.96*	0.54*	0.91*	0.86*
	[0.65; 1.26]	[0.26; 0.82]	[0.82; 0.99]	[0.79; 0.92]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.12*	0.10*	0.19*	0.10*
	[0.08; 0.16]	[0.07; 0.13]	[0.17; 0.22]	[0.08; 0.11]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4}	-1.39*	-2.00*		
	[-2.65; -0.12]	[-3.45; -0.56]		
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-4})	0.12*	0.21*		
	[0.01; 0.24]	[0.08; 0.34]		
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}			-1.82*	-1.90*
			[-2.42; -1.23]	[-2.53; -1.25]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})			0.17*	0.21*
			[0.12; 0.22]	[0.15; 0.26]
CFscore	-0.60*		-0.41*	
	[-1.11; -0.11]		[-0.68; -0.14]	
IGscore		-0.39*		-0.27*
		[-0.62; -0.16]		[-0.39; -0.15]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.54	1.67	1.48	1.42
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.65	0.47	0.45	0.49
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.32	0.28	0.32	0.29
Num. interests	865	937	1229	1492
Num. industries	81	87	82	87
Num. time periods	5	5	27	27
Num. obs.	3697	4122	27636	34271

This table provides the summaries of models analogous to those used to generate the predicted probabilities of presidential engagement during the Clinton and Obama administrations presented in the main text, but which use alternative measures of organized interests' preferences. The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model using data from the presidency indicated by the column heading. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package **brms**, which interfaces with **rstan** to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 2000 iterations per chain (1000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

Table SI.11: Access Quality Models

	<u>Clinton</u>		<u>Obama</u>	
	High Quality	Low Quality	High Quality	Low Quality
Intercept	-2.66*	-1.75*	-4.03*	-2.74*
	[-3.48, -1.91]	[-2.76, -0.90]	[-4.23, -3.84]	[-2.90, -2.57]
Any High-Quality Visits _{t-1}	0.52*	0.39*	0.48*	0.36*
	[0.44, 0.60]	[0.31, 0.47]	[0.45, 0.52]	[0.33, 0.39]
Any Low-Quality Visits _{t-1}	0.51*	0.87*	0.57*	0.77*
	[0.43, 0.59]	[0.79, 0.94]	[0.54, 0.61]	[0.74, 0.79]
log(Lobbying Expenditures) _{t-1}	0.05*	0.06*	0.08*	0.08*
	[0.05, 0.06]	[0.05, 0.07]	[0.08, 0.09]	[0.08, 0.08]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4}	-1.74*	-1.33*	-	-
	[-2.36, -1.10]	[-1.96, -0.70]	-	-
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-4} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-4})	0.19*	0.15*	-	-
	[0.13, 0.24]	[0.09, 0.21]	-	-
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8}	-	-	-0.88*	-0.84*
	-	-	[-1.19, -0.57]	[-1.13, -0.55]
Made Natl Contributions _{t-1} to _{t-8} : log(Contribution Amount _{t-1} to _{t-8})	-	-	0.10*	0.11*
	-	-	[0.08, 0.13]	[0.09, 0.14]
Aligned with Neither Party	-0.27*	-0.22*	-0.17	-0.16
	[-0.49, -0.04]	[-0.43, -0.01]	[-0.38, 0.04]	[-0.37, 0.04]
Aligned with Republicans	-0.26*	-0.24*	-0.23*	-0.20*
	[-0.45, -0.08]	[-0.43, -0.07]	[-0.39, -0.08]	[-0.35, -0.06]
$\sigma_{organization}$	1.24	1.26	1.32	1.46
$\rho_{\sigma_{organization,high},\sigma_{organization,low}}$		1.00		0.92
$\sigma_{industry}$	0.24	0.23	0.26	0.25
$\rho_{\sigma_{industry,high},\sigma_{industry,low}}$		0.82		0.94
$\sigma_{timeperiod}$	0.70	0.76	0.39	0.30
$\rho_{\sigma_{timeperiod,high},\sigma_{timeperiod,low}}$		0.14		0.23
Num. interests		9484		24009
Num. industries		92		92
Num. time periods		5		27
Num. obs.		31673		306766

This table provides the summaries of the bivariate models used to generate the differences in the effects of electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment across “high” and “low” qualities of access presented in the main text. The cell entry for each covariate presents the posterior mean and 95% credible interval from the bivariate Bayesian multilevel logistic regression model using data from the presidency and for the quality of access indicated by the column headings; the first and second columns correspond to high- and low-quality access as estimated jointly for the Clinton administration, and the third and fourth columns correspond to high- and low-quality access as estimated jointly for the Obama administration. Coefficients denoted with * are those whose 95% credible intervals do not include zero. The models are fitted with the R package **brms**, which interfaces with **rstan** to perform estimation using the NUTS (No-U-Turn Sampler) algorithm in Stan. Each model is fitted with 4 chains for 5000 iterations per chain (4000 iterations for warm-up, 1000 iterations for sampling). The table omits the following observation-level control variables: whether an organized interest employs lobbyists of its own and whether an organized interest indicates lobbying on each of 80 issues on its LDA filing in the previous time period.

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