

Reading the Ottinger piece, I was struck by the social construction and

negotiation of expertise/knowledge production and the overlap with Johnson's

vague framework. In New Sarpy, the activists had tests demonstrating poor air quality. The

residents had stories of chronic health problems that were caused by the pollution

produced by the refineries. The refinery employees had numbers and models that didn't

always match the citizen data.

The contradiction here between lab experience and lived experience is a potent one. Rather than address the discrepancy in data, and wrestle with the real conflicts between people's health and company profits, the corporation fell back on Community Advisory Panels. These panels shifted acceptable forms of protest away from activism and towards respectful and reasoned (and maybe ineffective) conversations.

A refinery spokesperson explained the rationale for this in part by saying that the refinery operates a community license (24). That license is granted via an unspoken and later spoken, agreement by the community not to protest, but to work cooperatively with the refinery. This can be interpreted as a form of community consent, mentioned in Johnson's third ethical principle. By withdrawing their more visible forms of protest, participating in conversations with refinery employees, and ultimately accepting the settlement, the New Sarpy community consented to the presence of the refinery and the risks it brought.

Johnson argues that engineers must work according to their own ethical codes, and in service of the public good. When an engineering task is *not* for the public good, or elevates extant risk, the public must be notified and must consent.

Nikki,  
you make some  
great points, and I really  
like the connection  
you make about  
consent, but  
there are  
places  
you could  
be more  
specific /  
clearer...  
So, for  
once,

v. good!

For individual engineers "[t]he hard part about being moral is not just acting on one's conscience, but figuring out what one's conscience ought to be" (111). We provide engineers with codes of ethics, but generally still expect them to be able to determine when an incident (or project or risk) falls outside those codes. Individual engineers must develop discernment according to their own conscience, their interpretation of the code of ethics, and any personal boundaries they may have.

*vague... do you mean conscience?*

Individual ethical codes are subsumed by corporate ethical codes and individual engineers are then free to follow orders and act according to the Guns for Hire logic, believing that the corporation has: acted as the proper moral agent, obtained consent from the community and factored in the public good. Corporate Social Responsibility has made it easier for engineers to abandon their own moral agency and surrender critical thinking about what a corporation is doing.

*not sure what you mean*

This explanation makes sense when thinking about the advocacy of the refinery's codes of ethics and the seemingly universal faith that everyone had in the corporation's ability to act ethically. I don't believe that corporations are people, and I don't believe that large groups of people, bound together by a need for capital, can develop a moral code and moral agency (although I do think that corporations should be required to act according to a set of rules that account for community and individual welfare).

This week, I would like to discuss how CSR intersects with individual ethical codes, and whether this intersection can provide a heuristic for individual engineers to examine their own beliefs.

*seems to me many of the community members were hoodwinked/distracted...*

*I would say it has created a toolkit that engineers can use many times discretion to always point to some "good!"*