

How Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Palestinian Political Participation

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Abstract: *Do exclusionary policies mobilize minority political participation? We theorize that the threat of exclusionary policies creates and resurfaces grievances that facilitate mobilization. To test our theory, we leverage Donald Trump's announcement of a peace plan for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which posed a threat to the citizenship status of Palestinian citizens of Israel residing in the Triangle area adjacent to the West Bank. First, using more than 170,000 posts from public Facebook groups and pages, we show that Trump's announcement was indeed a more salient political event for Triangle residents. Then, employing locality-level election data as well as records detailing the origin of citizens' joining a Jewish-Arab social movement, we use a difference-in-difference design to demonstrate that the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's plan increased mobilization in the Triangle area. Our evidence from three distinct data sources suggests that threats of exclusion can mobilize minority political behavior.*

Verification Materials: The data and materials required to verify the computational reproducibility of the results, procedures, and analyses in this article are available on the *American Journal of Political Science* Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/EGXUBU>.

Exclusionary policies—broadly conceptualized as laws and regulations that disproportionately restrict the rights of minority groups—are common in democratic countries around the world. They range widely in severity, from restrictions of religious expression such as France's headscarf ban (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020) to recent Indian reforms that will likely deprive many Muslims of their rights to citizenship (Wagner and Arora 2020). Such policies have long been adopted in socially diverse societies (Fouka 2019, 2020) and are often promoted by majority group politicians in order to increase homogenization or assimilation (Barak-Corren, Feldman, and Gidron 2018).

There are theoretical reasons to believe that exclusionary policies can politically mobilize or demobilize minority citizens (Hobbs and Lajevardi 2019; Oskooii 2018; Walker 2020a). However, it remains un-

clear whether the *threat* of an exclusionary policy in and of itself shapes minority political behavior. This gap is consequential; politicians often declare their policy intentions well before those policies materialize in the real world. Additionally, mobilization prior to the implementation of negative policies may help prevent those policies from ever becoming reality. Therefore, it is important to examine the political consequences of *proposed* exclusionary policies before they are implemented.

In this article, we test how the threat of an exclusionary policy undermining Palestinian citizenship status in Israel affected Palestinian political behavior. While threats to citizenship status represent a particularly severe exclusionary policy, a wide range of minority groups have faced such threats globally in recent years, including ethnic Vietnamese Cambodians (Sperfeldt 2020), Indian Muslims (Wagner and Arora 2020), economic migrants

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in the Arab Gulf States (Babar 2020), the Roma in Europe (Van Baar, Ivasiuc, and Kreide 2019), and the Rohingya of Myanmar (Alam 2018). Since restrictions of Palestinian rights in Israel are ubiquitous and take many forms, we leverage a particularly severe exclusionary policy to better understand how threats of exclusion affect minority political behavior.

Building on existing studies of political participation and mobilization (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Gurr 1970; Jasper 2011; Petersen 2002; Simmons 2014), we theorize that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy will mobilize members of minority communities to engage in politics.¹ Specifically, we argue that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can create, or resurface, political grievances (Beissinger 2011; Jasper 2011; Simmons 2014). In turn, these grievances increase citizens' mobilizing emotions such as anger (Valentino et al. 2011; Van Zomeren 2013), indignation (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), and resentment (Petersen 2002), which inform instrumental (Alimi 2007; Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019; Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Goldstone and Tilly 2001) and expressive motivations for collective action (Pearlman 2018; Schuessler 2000, 2021).

To test the observable implications of our theory, we focus on Palestinian citizens of Israel (PCIs), who have long suffered from formal and informal exclusion and discrimination (Enos and Gidron 2018; Weiss 2020). In January 2020, several weeks before a third round of successive elections in Israel, Donald Trump declared a new peace plan for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which posed a threat to the citizenship status of PCIs residing in the Triangle area—a cluster of PCI villages adjacent to the West Bank (Landau and Tibon 2020). We leverage the timing of this threat, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs residing in different localities across the country, to identify the effects of a threat of exclusionary policy on minority formal and informal political behavior. We demonstrate that the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's proposed policy mobilized PCIs in the Triangle area relative to those outside of the Triangle area. In our analyses of three unique data sources, we identify increases in political discourse on Facebook, turnout in national elections, and mobilization to a Jewish–Arab social movement in response to the threat of exclusion. Together, our evidence suggests that threats of exclusion are a cause of minority political participation.

¹As we emphasize in the conclusion, an important scope condition for our argument is that mobilization will likely only occur in instances where minorities are eligible to vote and do not face severe and violent repression.

We make two contributions to the existing literature. First, we build on recent studies that consider the social effects of exclusionary policies (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020; Fouka 2020) and provide evidence that the threat of an exclusionary policy, even before it is implemented, can affect minority political behavior. Second, we contribute to the literature on the causes of political participation (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Schuessler 2021), and specifically the determinants of turnout (Bryan et al. 2011; Davenport 2015; Valentino et al. 2011) and social movement mobilization (Beissinger 2011; Pearlman 2013; Simmons 2016a), by demonstrating that the proposal of exclusionary policies can increase minority mobilization.

Exclusion and Political Behavior

A growing literature suggests that exclusionary policies have substantial effects on minority group members' social behavior (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020; Fouka 2019). Additional research demonstrates how exclusionary legislation can increase the perceived legality of discrimination (Barak Corren, Feldman, and Gidron 2020). Despite this, little is known about how exclusionary policies might affect minority political participation.

Early work attributes cross-sectional variation in Latinos' political knowledge and self-reported turnout to state-level exclusionary policy atmospheres (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Pantoja and Segura 2003). Other research regarding exclusionary policies (operationalized as daily mentions of the Patriot Act in national news outlets) suggests that exclusionary policies mainly mobilize educated minorities (Cho, Gimpel, and Wu 2006). Similarly, survey evidence suggests that exposure to the criminal justice system and immigration enforcement can increase perceptions of injustice and systemic inequality among minorities and, in turn, increase political mobilization (Walker 2020a, 2020b; Walker, Roman, and Barreto 2020). These patterns suggest that the threat of exclusionary policies may have a mobilizing effect on minority citizens.

Evidence regarding the political effects of perceived discrimination similarly highlights the mobilizing potential of exclusionary policies. Though some studies link perceived discrimination with suppressed political participation (Diehl and Blohm 2001; Schildkraut 2005), or no changes in partisanship (Hopkins et al. 2020), other research suggests that discrimination can increase minority identification with specific parties (Kuo, Malhotra, and Mo 2017). This mixed pattern is examined by Os-kooii (2016), whose theory draws a distinction between

personal and political discrimination, suggesting that the former decreases political engagement whereas the latter increases political engagement (Oskooii 2016, 2020). Seeking to adjudicate between these competing findings, we explore whether and why the threat of exclusionary policies affects political behavior.

Theoretical Expectation: Threats of Exclusion Mobilize Minorities

We theorize that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can create or rekindle political grievances (Beissinger 2011; Jasper 2011; Simmons 2014) that increase mobilizing emotions (Petersen 2002; Valentino et al. 2011; Van Zomeren 2013), as well as other instrumental and expressive motivations for collective action (Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Pearlman 2018; Schuessler 2000, 2021). Our theoretical expectations are rooted in a rich literature on the determinants of collective action (Jasper 2011; Petersen 2002; Schuessler 2000; Valentino et al. 2011; Wood and Goodwin 2001) and an understanding that similar motivations may drive diverse forms of political participation, including voting and protest (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Bueno de Mesquita and Shadmehr n.d.). Though the empirical focus of our article is in identifying the causal effect that a threat of an exclusionary policy has on minority political participation, in this section we elaborate on the theoretical mechanisms which we expect to generate this effect.

Threats of Exclusion Ignite Grievances

Theories of mobilization suggest that grievances motivate political behavior (Beissinger 2011; Gurr 1970; Ivarsflaten 2008; Simmons 2014; Snow and Soule 2010). Existing research differentiates between structural and incidental grievances (Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019). The former relates to defining characteristics of a society (e.g., inequality), and the latter relates to specific events (e.g., the legislation of an exclusionary law). Incidental grievances have been shown to be effective in mobilizing citizens (Beissinger 2011; Bray, Shriver, and Adams 2019) since they increase the salience of structural grievances (Beissinger 2011) and generate moral outrage (Wood and Goodwin 2001).

Incidental grievances often relate to different social phenomena, including government failure, corruption, economic hardships, and exclusion (Cammatt and Salti 2016). Social movement scholars argue that specific dy-

namics and events translate into mobilizing grievances because they directly impact citizens' well-being, community, and identity (Simmons 2014, 2016a, 2016b). Exclusionary policies are often designed to adversely affect minority citizens and their communities. Therefore, we expect them to generate and resurface grievances among minorities.

Grievances, Emotions, and Motivations for Collective Action

Situational grievances can mobilize citizens through multiple channels relating to emotions, as well as expressive and instrumental motivations. Indeed, grievances can trigger emotional responses among minority group members (Van Zomeren 2013; Young 2021), and existing research demonstrates that a host of emotions, including anger (Bishara 2015; Young 2021), indignation (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015), anxiety (Gadarian and Albertson 2014), fear (Jasper 2011), and resentment (Petersen 2002), mobilize citizens.² These emotions are often presented as "approach emotions" because they lead citizens to act in response to a given unsatisfying feature of their surroundings (Pearlman 2013; Petersen 2002; Van Zomeren 2013).

Emotions often operate in tandem, and identifying the independent effects of particular emotions is not the main objective of our article. However, existing research shows that anger is a central mobilizing emotion (Bishara 2015; Valentino et al. 2011; Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013; Young 2021). Anger can be especially mobilizing for citizens who have experienced inequality and repression in the past (Young 2021). Similarly, indignation and resentment are powerful emotions (Costalli and Ruggeri 2015; Petersen 2002), and when they are associated with situational grievances, they can motivate minority citizens to overcome collective action problems and participate in the political process (Jasper 2011).

Political scientists have acknowledged that emotions are one of many mechanisms that translate grievances into political action (Aytaç and Stokes 2019; Bueno de Mesquita and Shadmehr n.d.). In line with this understanding, we expect emotions as well as instrumental and expressive motivations to account for increases in political participation. Indeed, minorities' grievances in response to the threat of an exclusionary policy might compel them to participate in the political process in order to resist exclusion, and lead to policy change. These

²In addition, Dornschneider (2020) demonstrates that beliefs about widespread emotions can also contribute to mass mobilization.

types of motivations are often described as instrumental (Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Davenport 2015; Jasper 2011; Nuamah and Ogorzalek 2021). Similarly, minorities' grievances might compel them to engage in politics to vocalize their opinions and express their identities and values (Schuessler 2000, 2021). Such motivations are expressive and likely operate along instrumental and emotional mechanisms to mobilize minority citizens.

Observable Implications

Rather than identifying the independent effect of emotional, instrumental, or expressive motivations for political participation, our main goal in this article is to test whether—as our theory suggests—the threat of an exclusionary policy affects political behavior. We focus on three forms of political behavior: participation in political conversations in online social networks, voting, and enrollment in a social movement. Our main expectation is that the threat of an exclusionary policy will politically mobilize minority group members and lead them to engage in politics at higher rates. We emphasize that this expectation should hold in cases where minorities are eligible to vote and do not face a threat of constant and severe violent repression. In the remainder of the article, we use three sources of evidence to test the observable implications of our theory. However, before turning to our analyses, we provide a brief discussion of our empirical case.

Palestinian Citizens of Israel, the Triangle Area, and Trump's Deal of the Century

PCIs are the group of Palestinian Arabs who remained within the borders of Israel established in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War (Bashara 1993). Currently, just under 2 million PCIs live in Israel, remaining primarily concentrated in three locations: the northern part of Israel, the Triangle areas near the “green line,” and the southern part of Israel, populated mainly by Bedouin Arabs (Rekhes 2009). The legal rights and obligations of PCIs have varied over time.

In the new Israeli state immediately following the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, PCIs were considered a security risk and were ruled under military law, thus lacking many of the rights other Israeli citizens enjoyed (Lustick 1980). Beginning in 1966, martial law was lifted and PCIs came to hold *de jure* the same citizenship rights as other Jewish Israeli citizens. However, to date, *de facto* discrimina-

tion against PCIs is pervasive in a wide variety of contexts (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011), including government spending and criminal justice (Fishman, Rattner, and Turjeman 2006; Grossman et al. 2016; Peleg and Waxman 2011; Rokem, Weiss, and Miodownik 2018). Indeed, bias and discrimination have been identified in multiple arenas where Jewish state and nonstate actors discriminate against PCIs (Bar and Zussman 2020; Zussman 2013).

Of particular interest in this study are exclusionary practices and policies that have targeted PCIs directly. In the last two decades, several such policies have been proposed and passed in Israel's legislature. These policies have been described by Jewish legislators as a means to strengthen Israel's national Jewish identity in response to the potential “demographic threat” posed by PCIs. These laws have posed a symbolic and material threat to PCIs' status as full citizens of the Israeli state. Perhaps most prominent is the “nation-state” law, passed in 2018. At its core, this law reiterated the Jewish nature of the state of Israel and demoted the Arabic language from an official language to one with “special status” (Fuchs 2020).

PCI responses to repression and exclusionary policies have varied since the creation of the Israeli state. Initially, under military rule, PCIs were politically demobilized (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011). However, since the 1970s, and especially during the 1990s, PCIs mobilized to advocate for their civil liberties and protest the Israeli occupation (Haklai 2011; Smootha 2010). Existing research attributes increased PCI mobilization within Israel to the lifting of military rule (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011), institutional changes relating to political fragmentation (Haklai 2011), and persistent inequality (Smootha 2010). Related literature on Palestinian mobilization in the West Bank further points to repression by Israeli government and Palestinian Authority (El Kurd 2019a; Høigilt 2013, 2015), checkpoints (Gade 2020), social cohesion (Pearlman 2011), educational institutions (Zeira 2019a, 2019b), and socioeconomic class (El Kurd 2019b) as determinants of mass mobilization.

The Triangle Area

PCIs across Israel have been subject to a general exclusionary climate. However, PCIs living in the Triangle area have further dealt with propositions that make their citizenship a bargaining chip in peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority. Specifically, to obtain control of West Bank Jewish settlements and decrease the share of Palestinians within Israel's borders, some Israeli policy makers have proposed a land swap in which Israel would exchange control of Triangle localities for

control of settlements (Ghanem and Mustafa 2011). This proposition has been promoted in recent years by Avigdor Lieberman—a right-wing politician—whose political party Yisrael Beiteinu made such land swaps a major part of their platform in the 2006 Israeli elections (Roffe-Ofir 2006). Naturally, Yisrael Beiteinu's platform raised the profile of land swaps and increased anxiety among PCIs living in communities along the green line, as indicated by public opinion data presented in the Appendix (Section A, p. 1).

Trump's Deal of the Century

With Trump's peace plan, Triangle residents' fears about land transfers would again be stoked. On January 28, 2020, slightly more than a month prior to a third round of Israeli national elections, Donald Trump convened a press conference together with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reveal his 181-page "Peace to Prosperity" plan. Trump's plan, referred to by many political pundits as "The Deal of the Century," laid out a new American vision for future political arrangements between Israelis and Palestinians. The ultimate goal, as mentioned in the deal, was to provide "Palestinians . . . with a path to a dignified national life, respect, security and economic opportunity" while safeguarding Israeli security (White House 2020). Several factors made this plan anathema to PCIs from the get-go. It was devised without the consultation of Palestinian officials; (Shaban 2018); it came after several Trump administration controversies, including moving the American Embassy to Jerusalem and withdrawing financial support from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (Shaban 2018), and it differed from earlier U.S. positions on Israeli–Palestinian negotiations on the important dimension of boundaries and West Bank settlements (Asseburg 2019).

The "Peace to Prosperity" plan details a set of proposed policies to address different aspects of Palestinian–Israeli relations. These policies are all-encompassing, touching on borders, the status of Jerusalem, economic development, security apparatuses, possible connections between the West Bank and Gaza, regional trade, port facilities, natural resources, the status of prisoners and refugees, and education (White House 2020). In the plan, Trump's administration laid out the "carrot" of massive investment in Palestinian territories, conditional on the satisfaction of a series of requirements relating to demilitarization and abandonment of international legal action against Israel and the United States. Many additional aspects of the plan caused Palestinian negotiators dismay. For instance, the plan proposed a cluster of neighbor-

hoods and villages on the outskirts of Jerusalem as a future capitol, and it suggested that Palestinian refugees will be unlikely to return to Palestinian land (Shaban 2018; White House 2020). Importantly for the main objective of our article, Trump's plan also referenced the potential transfer of 10 localities in the Triangle area from Israeli to Palestinian control (Landau and Tibon 2020; Appendix Figure A2, p. 3, maps these 10 localities).

Trump's plan immediately evoked strong reactions and protests among Jews and Palestinians in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza (Ben Kimon 2020; Blumental 2020). Palestinians almost unanimously rejected the proposal as one-sided (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research [PSR] 2020). In contrast, Israeli reactions were mixed. Many left-wing Israelis rejected the proposal, claiming that it violates liberal values and diminishes the possibility of a two-state solution (Kremnitzer 2020). On the right, some Israelis welcomed the proposal, as it provided an unprecedented opportunity to annex significant portions of the West Bank, whereas others rejected the deal because it legitimized the idea of a future Palestinian state (Ben Kimon 2020). Public opinion polls implemented several months after Trump's announcement suggest that only 5% of Palestinians and 47% of Israeli citizens supported Trump's proposed plan. The same polls suggest that 47% of Israelis and 19% of Palestinian citizens of Israel support the potential transfer of 10 localities in the Triangle area from Israeli to Palestinian control (PSR 2020).

Anecdotal evidence suggests that the threat to the Israeli citizenship status of Triangle residents evoked stark dissent among PCIs, especially those residing in the Triangle area. Indeed, the "Deal of the Century" and the fate of PCIs residing in the Triangle area became key dimensions of the Arab Joint List's campaign during the third round of elections for the Israeli Knesset. Moreover, following Trump's declaration, several protests erupted in the Triangle area (Khouri 2020), and some analysts argue that Trump's declaration was a mobilizing factor for Palestinian voters (Rodinsky 2020).

Triangle Residents' Reactions to the Deal of the Century

Beyond anecdotal evidence, to what degree did the announcement of the "Deal of the Century" mobilize Triangle residents? Before we examine the effect of the announcement on voting behavior and social mobilization, we first establish that the announcement was salient for Triangle residents. To assess the

relative importance of the announcement for Triangle versus non-Triangle residents, we collected more than 170,000 posts from public Facebook groups and pages associated with the 10 Triangle localities and 10 non-Triangle localities matched to be similar to their Triangle counterparts on population and voting patterns.³ Using social media is particularly viable in our context; 77% of the Israeli population used social media in 2019 (Taylor and Silver 2019), and political discourse is common on the platform among Jewish and Arab Israelis alike. As a result, while of course by no means representative, Facebook data can provide real-time behavioral measures of the salience of political issues.

Facebook does not provide location metadata of individual users for privacy reasons. However, public Facebook groups and pages associated with towns and cities across the country are popular, enabling us to distinguish between Triangle and non-Triangle localities. To identify public pages and groups associated with each locality, we searched Facebook using Arabic-language keywords for each locality name. We excluded pages that were associated with businesses, schools, sports teams, and weather, as well as pages with fewer than 1,000 followers. This left us with 71 pages from the 10 Triangle localities and 88 pages from the non-Triangle localities. These pages are primarily devoted to discussing community issues, with names like “Um al-Fahm City” or “Kafr Qasim Community Page.” The “Um al-Fahm City” page is displayed in Figure 1.

After identifying these public Facebook pages and groups, we added them to the CrowdTangle database⁴ and then used the CrowdTangle API to download all posts from the time each page was created until November 2020. This resulted in a data set of 73,302 posts from the Triangle pages and groups and 99,674 posts from the non-Triangle pages and groups.


To determine the relative salience of the “Deal of the Century” in Triangle versus non-Triangle localities, we used a dictionary-based approach to identify the weekly proportion of posts in our data that referenced Trump or the “Deal of the Century.” To identify these topics in our data, we use a word2vec model (Mikolov et al. 2013), trained on the entire corpus of posts in our data set.⁵ In particular, we begin with a set of Arabic seed words that

³We elaborate on the matching procedure in Appendix Section D.1 (p. 26).

⁴CrowdTangle tracks data from public content across Facebook pages and groups, as well as verified profiles and public Instagram accounts. Researchers can access all posts from pages or groups that they manually add to the CrowdTangle platform.

⁵We chose to train our word2vec model on the entire corpus of posts in our data set—rather than using common pretrained em-

FIGURE 1 Umm al-Fahm City Community Facebook Page




Notes: This is one of the public community Facebook pages and groups in our data set associated with the Umm al-Fahm locality (one of the 10 Triangle localities).

we identify as being relevant to the concept of interest (“Trump” and “Deal of the Century”). We then used word embeddings to identify other words that are semantically related to our seed words in the data.⁶ These dictionaries are then limited to the 100 most similar words, and we remove overly general or irrelevant terms.

Manual reading of posts that are identified by our dictionary-based approach as referencing Trump or the “Deal of the Century” reveals that the vast majority of these posts are relevant. They include posts containing messages from community elites denouncing the deal, calls for local protests against the deal, and posts highlighting how the deal represents betrayal by Arab countries. Examining the relative volume of these posts over time in Triangle versus non-Triangle localities reveals that Trump and the “Deal of the Century” were indeed more salient in Triangle localities. As Figure 2 suggests, discussion of the deal peaked on the day of the announcement and remained elevated in Triangle localities (relative to non-Triangle localities) for months afterward. The findings reported in Figure 2 establish that the announcement of Trump’s “Deal of the Century” garnered more attention in Triangle localities than non-Triangle localities. This is in line with our expectation, given that

beddings such as Arabic Wikipedia—because there is a great deal of language specific to Facebook, including hashtags and online slang, that we wanted to be sure to capture in our dictionary-based approach.

⁶Semantic similarity here is based on these words appearing in similar contexts, and it can be computed using cosine similarity on the word-embedding space (Gurciullo and Mikhaylov 2017).


FIGURE 2 Salience of Trump and the “Deal of the Century” in Public Facebook Posts

Notes: The top panel shows the difference in the weekly relative salience of Trump and the “Deal of the Century” in public posts on Facebook groups and pages associated with 10 Triangle and 10 non-Triangle localities. The bottom panel shows the weekly relative salience for Triangle and non-Triangle localities separately. Data were collected with the CrowdTangle API. The vertical line labeled “Deal of the Century” marks Trump’s announcement.

Trump’s plan imposed a threat to the citizenship status of Triangle residents. We now turn to test whether—as our theoretical framework predicts—Triangle residents mobilized politically in response to threats to their citizenship status.

Empirical Strategy and Results

Testing our main theoretical expectations regarding the mobilizing effects of Threats of exclusionary policies is challenging for two reasons. First, exclusionary policies

FIGURE 3 Timeline of Elections and Trump's Announcement

Notes: This Figure depicts the timing of three recurring national elections in Israel vis-a-vis the announcement of Trump's "Deal of the Century".

often target and threaten groups as a whole, limiting researchers' ability to find a suitable counterfactual conducive for causal inference. Second, oftentimes exclusion and perceptions of discrimination are endogenous to political attitudes and behaviors (Hopkins et al. 2020), making it hard to determine whether exclusion is a cause or an effect of suppressed political participation.

To sidestep these challenges and identify the effects of exclusionary policies on minority political participation, we focus on reactions to Donald Trump's "Deal of the Century." Specifically, we make use of the fact that the deal imposed a specific threat to the citizenship status of PCIs from the Triangle area (Landau and Tibon 2020). The timing of Trump's declaration, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs across Israel, allows us to employ a difference-in-difference design and recover the effects of exclusionary policies on voting and mass mobilization.

As we acknowledge above, PCIs have been subject to many forms of exclusion since the inception of Israel. We leverage the "Deal of the Century," as it provides us with important analytical leverage to identify how threats of exclusion shape political behavior. Although our analyses do not directly examine how all forms of exclusion shape political behavior, they do provide evidence that informs our understanding of exclusion and PCI mobilization within Israel.

Study 1: Threats of Exclusionary Policies and Voting

Voting in Israel. Our analysis of voting behavior in response to exclusionary policies focuses on three successive rounds of elections taking place between April 9, 2019, and March 2, 2020 (see Figure 3). Successive elections were the result of political gridlock, which inhibited the ability of parties to form governing coalitions (Levinson 2019). This gridlock led to a unique electoral dynamic in which parties and voters participated in very similar elections time after time.

Surprisingly, general turnout rates increased from one cycle to the next, reaching 71.52% in the third


election. Political participation in PCI communities was no exception to this general trend. Indeed, turnout steadily increased in all Arab communities over the three successive elections. We now turn to consider whether voting behavior in PCI communities, and specifically in the Triangle area, was affected by the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's "Deal of the Century."

Identification Strategy. We leverage two unique attributes of our case in order to identify the effects of exclusionary policies on minorities' voting behavior. First, the potential consequences of Trump's proposed plan impacted PCIs living in different geographic locations in diverging ways, as only Triangle residents were subject to a threat to their citizenship. This differential impact, is conducive to a difference-in-difference design.

Second, the declaration of Trump's proposed plan took place weeks before a third round of successive election in Israel. Importantly for our analysis of voting records, the three recurring elections in Israel, taking place over less than 1 year, provide a unique opportunity to follow PCI voting patterns in very short time intervals. The brief intervals between elections in Israel during 2019–20, along with the differential impact of Trump's proposed plan, allow us to trace and compare within-locality changes in voting behavior and then attribute any over-time differences across Triangle and non-Triangle localities to the threat to citizenship imposed by Trump's plan. Unlike other longitudinal analyses of voting behavior where several years separate each electoral cycle, in our case, time-varying factors such as changing residential patterns, economic development, or government investment are unlikely to confound our estimates.

Leveraging these factors, we adopt a difference-in-difference design that traces local changes in voting, within and outside the Triangle area. In our main analyses, we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities,⁷ which are most comparable to treated localities within the

⁷This is defined by national classification devised by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018.

FIGURE 4 Turnout over Time in Triangle and Non-Triangle Localities

Notes: This plot compares average turnout rates in the 10 Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan, with 145 mixed and non-Jewish localities, over three election cycles between 2019 and 2020.

Triangle area that are populated exclusively by PCIs. We consider this to be the most suitable empirical approach, and we demonstrate the robustness of our findings to additional analyses of all Israeli localities.

By comparing within-locality change in voting behavior across treated (Triangle) and controlled (non-Triangle) localities, we identify the effect of a salient exclusionary policy on PCI voting behavior. However, this empirical approach requires two central identifying assumptions. The first is the common parallel trends assumption, and the second relates to the lack of unobservable time-varying differences between treated and controlled localities between the second and third rounds of elections.

In Figure 4, we plot the average of our main outcome of interest—turnout—for both treated and controlled localities during the three recurring elections in 2019–20. This figure clearly demonstrates the existence of parallel trends in the pretreatment period.⁸ In addition, we take two steps to address our second assumption regarding unobservable time-varying differences between treated and controlled localities. First, to minimize time-varying differences across localities, we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities, omitting all Jewish localities from our main analyses. Second, we rule out the possibility

that two potential time-varying confounders contaminate our main effect. The time-varying confounders we consider are (1) the number of voting stations in treated and controlled localities and (2) the number and placement of PCI candidates from treated and controlled localities in the Joint Arab List during each election, which might serve as alternative explanations for increased turnout (for more information, see Appendix Section B.2, pp. 5–7). Taken together, these diagnostics further enhance our confidence that the underlying assumptions of our empirical approach are reasonable, and that employing a difference-in-difference design is suitable in this case.

Estimation Strategy. We adapt an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the electoral effects of the threat to citizenship imposed on PCI Triangle residents because of Trump's proposed plan. In our preferred specification, which was preregistered prior to the third Israeli election in 2020, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_{ic} = \gamma \text{Triangle} + \eta \text{post} + \zeta \text{population} + \psi \text{Triangle} * \text{post} + \varepsilon_{ic}, \quad (1)$$

where y_{ic} denotes turnout in locality i during cycle c , γ is an indicator taking the value of 1 for the 10

⁸In the Appendix (pp. 8–13), we further demonstrate parallel trends of vote share for different parties, and unparallel trends for the full sample, which enhance the intuition behind our preregistered choice to focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities.

TABLE 1 “Deal of the Century” Effect on Turnout

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Triangle	0.068 (0.028)			
Post	0.097 (0.006)			
Triangle \times Post	0.024 (0.016)	0.024 (0.016)	0.048 (0.013)	0.117 (0.015)
Population Control	Yes	No	No	No
Cycle Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Locality Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities
Preregistered	Yes	No	No	No
N	405	465	465	3,639

Notes: Table 1 reports our main models estimating the effects of threats of exclusion on PCI turnout in Israeli national elections.

Triangle localities mentioned in Trump’s plan,⁹ η is an indicator taking the value of 1 for all observations following Trump’s declaration, ζ is a time-invariant control for population (published by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics in 2018), and ε_{id} is the model’s error term, which in our main specification is clustered at the locality level. Most importantly, our main quantity of interest is ψ , the difference-in-difference estimator, representing the effects of being a locality mentioned in Trump’s plan after it was declared. While cross-sectional differences between Triangle and non-Triangle localities are an interesting avenue for research, our difference-in-difference design attempts to control for such variation to recover the effects of a threat of exclusion.

Results. We report our main results in Table 1. This table includes our preregistered specification (Model 1) as well as three additional specifications: one with cycle and locality fixed effects (Model 2), one with these fixed effects along with an alternative treatment indicator that takes a value of 1 for all 16 Triangle localities regardless of whether they were mentioned in Trump’s plan (Model 3), and one with these fixed effects that includes all Israeli localities in the analysis (Model 4).¹⁰ Across all models, it is

apparent that Triangle localities experienced an increase in turnout following the declaration of Trump’s plan.

Specifically, according to our preregistered specification (Model 1), the threat to citizenship status of PCI Triangle residents increased turnout in Triangle localities by approximately 2.4%. However, this finding should be interpreted with some caution, as it is not precisely estimated with conventional levels of statistical significance ($p = .129$, two-tailed test).¹¹ In Model 2, we employ cycle and locality fixed effects, and the results remain largely similar.¹² When considering all 16 Triangle localities as treated regardless of whether they were mentioned in Trump’s plan (Model 3) and observing all Israeli localities (Model 4), results remain robust and are both statistically and substantively significant at conventional levels. In Appendix Section B.3 (pp. 14–16), we demonstrate that our results are also consistent when employing a battery of pretreatment controls from the 2008 census and when excluding Jerusalem (where a majority of Palestinian residents are not enfranchised to vote in national elections).


¹¹In Appendix Section B.4 (p. 17), we further discuss the statistical significance of our main findings. Specifically, we show that according to preregistered simulations and power calculations, our design is sufficiently powered to detect statistically significant effects that are larger than 2.5%. The fact that the point estimates in our main models presented in Table 1 are just below that sheds light on the precision of our estimated effects.

¹²The n-size for Models 2–4 is larger than our main specification because of the presence of 20 localities without 2018 population data in the main specification.

⁹Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara, and Jaljulia.

¹⁰Note that fixed effect specifications do not include Triangle and post indicators.

FIGURE 5 Mobilization over Time in Triangle and Non-Triangle Localities



Notes: This figure presents monthly counts of registration for the social movement's listserv in Triangle (red) and non-Triangle (blue) localities.

More broadly, turnout in all non-Jewish localities increased by around 10% from the first to last cycle of elections. This 10% increase across all non-Jewish localities may be influenced by several dynamics, including national GOTV campaigns, voters' intention to put an end to recurring elections, or exposure to enhanced competitions, which increases partisanship and polarization (Bassan-Nygate and Weiss, 2022). However, the analyses presented in Table 1 suggest that the threat to citizenship imposed on PCI residents in the Triangle area accounted for a portion of electoral mobilization during the final round of Israel's 2020 election.

Study 2: Threats of Exclusionary Policies and Mobilization

Our analysis of voting records suggests that exclusionary policies modestly shape minority voting behavior. But did the threat to citizenship imposed on PCIs from Triangle localities affect other forms of political participation? To answer this question, we analyze the administrative records of a growing Jewish-Arab social movement. These records include information about the date and locality of origin of people expressing interest in joining the organization's listserv.

Jewish-Arab Mobilization in the Shadow of Conflict.

The records we analyze were collected by a social movement founded in 2015 in an effort to protest intergroup solidarity during a cycle of violence in Israel-Palestine.

The organization was originally founded by a host of activists from diverse affiliations. Their primary goal is to unify Israelis and PCIs from different social backgrounds and advocate for social justice reforms relating to an array of issues, including supporting higher minimum wages, ending police brutality, promoting peace, and addressing climate change.

One of the most salient characteristics of the organization is its firm commitment to intergroup cooperation in social and political struggles. This is evident from the organization's communications, which are written in Hebrew and Arabic, as well as from the movement's leadership, which is composed of both Jewish and PCI activists. The organization routinely organizes protests, community information sessions, and online campaigns to promote equality and social justice in Israel.

The Organizational Listserv. The organization operates through eight different geographical chapters in Israel (Northern Galilee, Western Galilee, Nazareth, Sharon-Triangle, Negev, Haifa, Tel-Aviv, and Jerusalem), as well as in six different university campuses across the country (Ben Gurion University, Hebrew University, Tel-Aviv University, Haifa University, Oranim College, and Sapir College). Activities in each location are organized via local WhatsApp groups. In addition, the organization maintains an email-based listserv through which it updates all affiliates about ongoing activities and campaigns across the country.

TABLE 2 “Deal of the Century” Effect on Mobilization

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Triangle	0.000 (0.001)			
Post	0.012 (0.002)	0.017 (0.002)	0.017 (0.002)	0.006 (0.000)
Triangle × Post	0.020 (0.004)	0.022 (0.004)	0.013 (0.004)	0.028 (0.004)
Population Control	Yes	No	No	No
Week Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Month Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Locality Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cluster	Locality	Locality	Locality	Locality
Sample	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Non-Jewish	Full
Treatment	10 Localities	10 Localities	16 Localities	10 Localities
Preregistered	No	No	No	No
N	177,660	203,980	203,980	1,597,624

Notes: Table 2 reports our main models estimating the effects of threats of exclusion on PCI mobilization to a Jewish-Arab social movement.

Potential activists can opt in to the listserv online or when recruited to join the organization in protests and other social events. For organizational purposes, the social movement keeps detailed records regarding the activists who join their listserv. The information they collect includes the names, email addresses, phone numbers, and origin of people who join the organization's listserv.¹³ We leverage the detailed records provided by the organization¹⁴ in order to create a panel data set counting the daily registrations for the movement's listserv in all Israeli localities between January 6, 2017, and August 13, 2020. Following our empirical approach from Study 1, in our main analyses we focus on mixed and non-Jewish localities. Our data set for these localities is composed of 203,980 observations and 8,975 registrations. Since most locality-days take a value of 0 registrations, we construct our main outcome measure as a binary variable taking the value of 1 for any locality-day in which a local resident registered for the organization's listserv.

Identification Strategy. To analyze our data, we employ a difference-in-difference design, similar to our analysis of voting records. However, when analyzing local regis-

trations, our data are aggregated at the locality-day rather than locality-cycle level. In Figure 5, we present monthly sign-up rates in Triangle and non-Triangle localities. We aggregate our data by month for ease of presentation. Figure 5 demonstrates that in the period under investigation, registration for the social movement's listserv in non-Triangle localities was more common than in Triangle localities. Additionally, trends in monthly registration are initially fairly stable, but they start shifting immediately after Trump's declaration. Indeed, in the month of February, for the first time in the social movement's history, registration in Triangle localities was higher than in non-Triangle localities.

Estimation Strategy. To estimate how the potential threat to Triangle residents' citizenship affected political mobilization, we adapt an OLS regression. In our preferred specification, we estimate the following equation:

$$y_{id} = \gamma \text{Triangle} + \eta \text{post} + \zeta \text{population} + \psi \text{Triangle} * \text{post} + \varepsilon_{id}. \quad (2)$$

In this model, y_{id} takes a value of 1 if a resident from locality i registered for the social movement's listserv during day d , γ is an indicator taking the value of 1 for the 10 Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan, η is an indicator taking the value of 1 for all observations following Trump's declaration, ζ is a population control, and ε_{id} is the model's error term, which in our main specification is

¹³However, some people can choose to provide only partial information.

¹⁴Our data does not include identifiable information such as names, email addresses or phone numbers.

clustered at the locality level. Most importantly, our main quantity of interest is ψ , the difference-in-difference estimator, representing the effects of being a locality mentioned in Trump's plan after the plan was declared.

Results. In Table 2, we report our main results, with models that mirror those in Table 1. In Model 1, we present a baseline difference-in-difference model with a control for population. Model 2 adds time (year, month, and week) and locality fixed effects and removes the population control. Model 3 includes the same fixed effects and an alternative treatment indicator for all Triangle localities. Lastly, Model 4 includes those fixed effects in an analysis of all Israeli localities. Across all models, we find evidence that the threat to citizenship imposed on Triangle locality residents mobilized PCIs in the Triangle area. Our results across all models are precisely estimated at conventional terms ($p < .05$, two-tailed test). In Appendix Section C.2 (pp. 20–25), we demonstrate that our results are largely robust to a host of alternative specifications.

Conclusion

In this article, we consider how the threat of an exclusionary policy affects minority political behavior. We theorize that the threat of being targeted by an exclusionary policy can resurface grievances, creating emotional, instrumental, and expressive motivations that in turn increase political participation. To test the observable implications of our theory, we turn to the Israeli case and focus on a particular threat to citizenship imposed on a subset of Palestinians residing in the Triangle area due to Donald Trump's proposed "peace plan" for the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Leveraging the timing of this threat to citizenship, as well as its differential consequences for PCIs residing in different localities across the country, we identify the effects of a threat of exclusionary policy on minority political behavior using three distinct data sources.

We demonstrate that communities threatened by Trump's announcement increased discussion of Trump and the "Deal of the Century" on Facebook, turned out to vote at modestly higher rates, and were more likely to enroll in a growing Jewish–Arab social movement. By identifying the mobilizing effects of exclusionary policies, we make two central contributions to the existing literature. First, we build on recent studies that consider the social effects of exclusionary policies (Abdelgadir and Fouka 2020; Fouka 2020) and provide evidence that the threat of an exclusionary policy, even before it

is implemented, can affect minority political behavior. Second, we contribute to the literature on the causes of turnout (Bryan et al. 2011; Burden and Wichowsky 2014; Davenport 2015; Valentino et al. 2011) and social movement mobilization (Pearlman 2013; Simmons 2016a) by demonstrating that threats of exclusion are a potent cause of minority political participation.

Despite these contributions, our findings are not without limitations. First, results from our preregistered specification regarding increased turnout in the Triangle are imprecisely estimated. We expect this to be a result of the decision to focus our analyses on non-Jewish localities, which are most comparable to the 10 Triangle localities mentioned in Trump's plan. We therefore cautiously interpret our findings from three different data sources pointing to one similar direction to suggest that the threat of an exclusionary policy can mobilize minority voters.

Second, our outcome in Study 2—enrollment in a social movement's listserv—might be viewed as a relatively low-cost form of political mobilization. For this reason, this outcome cannot reveal the extent to which minorities confronted with threats of exclusion are more likely to engage in costlier forms of contention, such as protests. However, information and networks are an important precondition for political mobilization (Larson et al. 2019; Siegel 2009). Therefore, our finding suggests that in response to an exclusionary policy, Triangle residents took a first step of mobilization and increased their enrollment in an information-sharing network of political activists.

Lastly, we theorize about the threats of exclusionary policies broadly defined. However, our evidence comes from empirical analyses that identify the effects of a threat of one exclusionary policy relating to PCIs' citizenship status in Israel. In many regards, policies that can potentially revoke minorities' citizenship status are an extreme form of exclusion, which warrants careful empirical attention. However, future research should consider the extent to which threats of other exclusionary policies, within and outside of Israel, generate similar mobilizing effects—regardless of whether they are ultimately implemented.

Our evidence suggests that in instances where minorities are eligible to vote and are permitted to protest without massive repression, mobilization might follow because of exclusion. Whether such mobilization leads to policy change is an interesting avenue for future research. However, historical accounts of PCI mobilization during the October 2000 protests suggest that PCI mobilization motivated the Israeli government to convene an inquiry committee that proposed a set of policy changes

to address PCI grievances (Rekhes 2009). We encourage researchers to systematically investigate such dynamics in Israel and beyond.

Our approach of leveraging three distinct data sources together suggests that the threat of being targeted by exclusionary policies can mobilize majority groups to engage in both formal and informal political participation. We hope that future work will replicate our findings in other divided societies and examine the impact of a broader set of exclusionary policies to improve our understanding of how these findings may generalize in diverse contexts.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section at the end of the article.

Appendix A: Land Swaps and Public Opinion Data

Appendix B: Voting Analyses

Appendix C: Mobilization Analysis

Appendix D: Social Media Analysis