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1. COMPUTATIONAL INDISTINGUISHABILITY IN THE PRESENSE OF EAVESDROPPER

- 1.1 Let $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n, b)$ represents the experiment $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n)$, where the fixed bit b is used rather than being selected uniformly.

Show that a private key encryption scheme $\Pi(n)$ has an [indistinguishable encryption in the presence of an eavesdropper](#), if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , there is a negligible function $\varepsilon()$ such that, for all n ,

$$\left| \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n, 1) = 1] \right| \leq \varepsilon(n).$$

2. PSEUDORANDOM GENERATOR

- 2.1 Define $G(s) = s \parallel \bigoplus_{i=0}^{n-1} s_i$, where n is the length of string s and s_i represent the i^{th} bit of s . Show that G is not a pseudo-random generator.
- 2.2 Define $G(s) = s \parallel s$, where $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$. Prove that G is not a pseudorandom generator.
- 2.3 Let $G(s) = s \parallel \text{reverse}(s)$, where $\text{reverse}(s)$ denotes the reverse of string s . Show that G is not a pseudorandom generator.