

List of all strategies used from [21]

1. Adaptive - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [25]
2. Adaptive Tit For Tat: 0.5 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [38]
3. Aggravater - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
4. Alexei: (D,) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [42]
5. ALLCorALLD - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [2]
6. Alternator - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [30, 11]
7. Alternator Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
8. AntiCycler - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
9. Anti Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [18]
10. AON2 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [19]
11. Adaptive Pavlov 2006 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [24]
12. Adaptive Pavlov 2011 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [25]
13. Appeaser - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
14. Arrogant QLearner - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
15. Average Copier - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
16. BackStabber: (D, D) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
17. Better and Better - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
18. Black - Stochastic - Memory length: 5 - [10]
19. Borufsen - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
20. Bully - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [31]
21. Bush Mosteller: 0.5, 0.5, 3.0, 0.5 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [20]
22. Calculator - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
23. Cautious QLearner - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
24. Cave - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
25. Champion - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
26. Colbert - Deterministic - Memory length: 4 - [10]
27. CollectiveStrategy - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [26]
28. Contrite Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [41]
29. Cooperator - Deterministic - Memory length: 0 - [33, 30, 11]
30. Cooperator Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
31. Cycle Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
32. Cycler CCCCCD - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [21]

33. Cycler CCCD - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [21]
34. Cycler CCD - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [30]
35. Cycler DC - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [21]
36. Cycler DDC - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [30]
37. Cycler CCCDCD - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [21]
38. Davis: 10 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
39. Defector - Deterministic - Memory length: 0 - [33, 30, 11]
40. Defector Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
41. Desperate - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [40]
42. Delayed AON1 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [19]
43. DoubleCrosser: (D, D) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
44. Doubler - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
45. DoubleResurrection - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [15]
46. EasyGo - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [25, 28]
47. Eatherley - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
48. EugeneNier: (D,) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [42]
49. Eventual Cycle Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
50. Evolved ANN - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
51. Evolved ANN 5 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
52. Evolved ANN 5 Noise 05 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
53. Evolved FSM 4 - Deterministic - Memory length: 4 - [21]
54. Evolved FSM 16 - Deterministic - Memory length: 16 - [21]
55. Evolved FSM 16 Noise 05 - Deterministic - Memory length: 16 - [21]
56. EvolvedLookerUp1_1_1 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
57. EvolvedLookerUp2_2_2 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
58. Evolved HMM 5 - Stochastic - Memory length: 5 - [21]
59. Feld: 1.0, 0.5, 200 - Stochastic - Memory length: 200 - [9]
60. Firm But Fair - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [16]
61. Fool Me Forever - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
62. Fool Me Once - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
63. Forgetful Fool Me Once: 0.05 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
64. Forgetful Grudger - Deterministic - Memory length: 10 - [21]
65. Forgiver - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
66. Forgiving Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
67. Fortress3 - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [7]
68. Fortress4 - Deterministic - Memory length: 4 - [7]
69. GTFT: 0.33 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [17, 32]

70. General Soft Grudger: $n=1, d=4, c=2$ - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
71. Getzler - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
72. Gladstein - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
73. Soft Go By Majority - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10, 30, 11]
74. Soft Go By Majority: 10 - Deterministic - Memory length: 10 - [21]
75. Soft Go By Majority: 20 - Deterministic - Memory length: 20 - [21]
76. Soft Go By Majority: 40 - Deterministic - Memory length: 40 - [21]
77. Soft Go By Majority: 5 - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [21]
78. ϕ - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
79. GraaskampKatzen - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
80. Gradual - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [13]
81. Gradual Killer: (D, D, D, D, D, C, C) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
82. Grofman - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
83. Grudger - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [40, 25, 13, 12, 9]
84. GrudgerAlternator - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
85. Grumpy: Nice, 10, -10 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
86. Handshake - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [34]
87. Hard Go By Majority - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [30]
88. Hard Go By Majority: 10 - Deterministic - Memory length: 10 - [21]
89. Hard Go By Majority: 20 - Deterministic - Memory length: 20 - [21]
90. Hard Go By Majority: 40 - Deterministic - Memory length: 40 - [21]
91. Hard Go By Majority: 5 - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [21]
92. Hard Prober - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
93. Hard Tit For 2 Tats - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [37]
94. Hard Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [39]
95. Harrington - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
96. Hesitant QLearner - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
97. Hopeless - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [40]
98. Inverse - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
99. Inverse Punisher - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
100. Joss: 0.9 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [37, 9]
101. Kluepfel - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
102. Knowledgeable Worse and Worse - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
103. Level Punisher - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [15]
104. Leyvraz - Stochastic - Memory length: 3 - [10]
105. Limited Retaliate: 0.1, 20 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
106. Limited Retaliate 2: 0.08, 15 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]

107. Limited Retaliate 3: 0.05, 20 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
108. Math Constant Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
109. Naive Prober: 0.1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [25]
110. MEM2 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [27]
111. Michaelos: (D,) - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [42]
112. Mikkelson - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
113. MoreGrofman - Deterministic - Memory length: 8 - [10]
114. More Tideman and Chieruzzi - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
115. Negation - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [39]
116. Nice Average Copier - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
117. N Tit(s) For M Tat(s): 3, 2 - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [21]
118. Nydegger - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [9]
119. Omega TFT: 3, 8 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [36]
120. Once Bitten - Deterministic - Memory length: 12 - [21]
121. Opposite Grudger - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
122. π - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
123. Predator - Deterministic - Memory length: 9 - [7]
124. Prober - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [25]
125. Prober 2 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
126. Prober 3 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
127. Prober 4 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
128. Pun1 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [6]
129. PSO Gambler 1.1.1 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
130. PSO Gambler 2.2.2 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
131. PSO Gambler 2.2.2 Noise 05 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
132. PSO Gambler Mem1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [21]
133. Punisher - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
134. Raider - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [8]
135. Random: 0.5 - Stochastic - Memory length: 0 - [38, 9]
136. Random Hunter - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
137. Random Tit for Tat: 0.5 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [21]
138. Remorseful Prober: 0.1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 2 - [25]
139. Resurrection - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [15]
140. Retaliate: 0.1 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
141. Retaliate 2: 0.08 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
142. Retaliate 3: 0.05 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
143. Revised Downing: True - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]

144. RichardHufford - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
145. Ripoff - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [5]
146. Risky QLearner - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
147. SelfSteem - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [14]
148. ShortMem - Deterministic - Memory length: 10 - [14]
149. Shubik - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
150. Slow Tit For Two Tats 2 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [28]
151. Sneaky Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
152. Soft Grudger - Deterministic - Memory length: 6 - [25]
153. Soft Joss: 0.9 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [28]
154. SolutionB1 - Deterministic - Memory length: 3 - [4]
155. SolutionB5 - Deterministic - Memory length: 5 - [4]
156. Spiteful Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
157. Stalker: (D,) - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [14]
158. Stein and Rapoport: 0.05: (D, D) - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
159. Stochastic Cooperator - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [1]
160. Stochastic WSLs: 0.05 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [3]
161. Suspicious Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [18, 13]
162. Tester - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
163. TF1 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
164. TF2 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
165. TF3 - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
166. ThueMorse - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
167. ThueMorseInverse - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
168. Thumper - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [5]
169. Tideman and Chieruzzi - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
170. Tit For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [9]
171. Tit For 2 Tats - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [11]
172. Tranquilizer - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [9]
173. Tricky Cooperator - Deterministic - Memory length: 10 - [21]
174. Tricky Defector - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
175. Tricky Level Punisher - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [15]
176. Tullock: 11 - Stochastic - Memory length: 11 - [9]
177. Two Tits For Tat - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [11]
178. VeryBad - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [14]
179. Weiner - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
180. White - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]

181. Willing - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [40]
182. Winner12 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [29]
183. Winner21 - Deterministic - Memory length: 2 - [29]
184. Win-Shift Lose-Stay: D - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [25]
185. Win-Stay Lose-Shift: C - Deterministic - Memory length: 1 - [22, 37, 32]
186. WmAdams - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
187. Worse and Worse - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
188. Worse and Worse 2 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
189. Worse and Worse 3 - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [28]
190. Yamachi - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [10]
191. ZD-Extortion: 0.2, 0.1, 1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [35]
192. ZD-Extort-2: 0.1111111111111111, 0.5 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [37]
193. ZD-Extort3: 0.11538461538461539, 0.3333333333333333, 1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [33]
194. ZD-Extort-2 v2: 0.125, 0.5, 1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [23]
195. ZD-Extort-4: 0.23529411764705882, 0.25, 1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [21]
196. ZD-GTFT-2: 0.25, 0.5 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [37]
197. ZD-GEN-2: 0.125, 0.5, 3 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [23]
198. ZD-Mem2 - Stochastic - Memory length: 2 - [LiS2014]
199. ZD-Mischief: 0.1, 0.0, 1 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [35]
200. ZD-SET-2: 0.25, 0.0, 2 - Stochastic - Memory length: 1 - [23]
201. e - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
202. Dynamic Two Tits For Tat - Stochastic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
203. Meta Hunter: 6 players - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]
204. Meta Hunter Aggressive: 7 players - Deterministic - Memory length: ∞ - [21]

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