Ethics in Data Science (Part 2, Disclosure)

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Lecture 12.1.2 (v1.0.1)

Signposting

- Part 1 covers ethics and the law,
- This is part 2 covering Privacy and disclosure,
- Part 3 covers Fairness and interpretability.

Protecting Privacy: Anonymity

- It is not enough to **anonymise** data by removing identifiers. It may be de-anonymised.
- For example: the Netflix competition was **partially de-anonymised** by comparing to public datasets, IMDB ratings, etc., resulting in a lawsuit. Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008
- Formally: **quasi-identifiers** are statistically valuable information that can be combined with additional data to produce identifiers.

Statistical disclosure attacks

- Statistical disclosure describes how **legitimate access** to a database can be used to extract confidential information regarding identity, attributes, or membership.
- It works by:
  - Assuming that users can query **statistical**, anonymised properties,
  - Making repeated queries, specific information can be extracted using the **intersection of answers**,
  - Disclosure attacks are therefore a form of **elevation of access rights**: obtaining access that was not intended to be given.

Example of statistical disclosure attacks

- By knowing specific details, or observing large-scale results, additional information can be extracted about identifiers.
  - **attribute disclosure**: e.g. If we know when Mr R moved out of an area, we can obtain his salary by querying the average salary in the region before and after he moved.
  - **identity disclosure**: e.g. By making a large number of queries containing different attribute ranges, we can associate each identifier with a particular attribute value.
  - **membership disclosure**: e.g. Similarly, we might obtain information about whether an identifier is in a particular group such as “HIV patient”.

Protecting against statistical disclosure

- The main lines of defense are:
  - Limiting the **volume** of queries, i.e. not permitting more than M queries per actor.
  - Limiting the **detail** of queries, i.e. ensuring that all values are shared by at least k entries (Formally: k-anonymity).
  - Limiting the **accuracy** of queries, i.e. adding noise to reported answers.

Quantifying vulnerability to statistical disclosure attacks

- There is a robust theory called **differential privacy**[1] which formalises the vulnerability of a dataset/release mechanism to disclosure:
  - A dataset allows querying a summary statistic, A.
  - Adversary proposes two datasets S and S' that differ by only one row or example, and a test set Q.
- A is called ϵ-differentially private iff:

$$\left| \log \frac{\Pr(A(S) \in Q)}{\Pr(A(S') \in Q)} \right| \leq \epsilon,$$

  - i.e. the change in log-probability is bounded.
- A is called (ϵ, δ)-differentially private iff:

$$\Pr(A(S) \in Q) \leq \exp(\epsilon) \Pr(A(S') \in Q) + \delta,$$

  - where δ is typically smaller than any polynomial.
- i.e. $\delta = 0$ leads to ϵ-differential privacy.

[1] The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy by Dwork and Roth (2014).

Continuous outcomes: the Laplace mechanism

- Continuous outcomes are particularly tricky because the answer can reveal location via the scale of the noise.
- To address this, **heavy tailed** distributions are favoured, to place finite weight on "all" values.
- i.e. Instead of reporting $f(x)$ we report:

$$\mathcal{M}_L(x, f(\cdot), \epsilon) = f(x) + \Delta$$

  - Where $\Delta \sim \text{Lap}(x|b) = (1/2b)\exp(-|x|/b)$,
  - $b = \Delta f/\epsilon$ is chosen in terms of the desired sensitivity $\Delta f = \max_{x,y:|x-y|=1} |f(x) - f(y)|$.
  - This is analogous to a standard deviation for the L-1 norm.
- i.e. we add noise scaled to the output at the scale of variation, but which can induce any value with non-vanishing probability.

Beyond simple differential privacy

- Privacy means maintaining **plausible deniability** so that *any outcome could have happened*, for any specific case.
  - However, protecting from disclosure attacks using audit is provably not possible in general.
- **Correlated** (worst case, repeated) queries raise particular problems:
  - It is possible to "learn" the noise, average it out, and obtain the true value.
- **Audit** of queries is clearly essential to prevent these and other attacks.
- A partial solution is to consider creating **correlated noise** in the response,
  - So if you ask a similar question, you get similar noise.
- But what if the individual exists in k different databases?
  - It turns out that we can still describe ϵ-privacy in this case, though our controls are more limited.
  - We essentially have to allow for k independent noise observations.

Example: Randomized response

- Consider the question, "Have you taken drugs this week?"
- We want to know population-level answers without revealing whether anyone specifically answered "yes".
- We apply the following algorithm:
  1. Flip a coin.
  2. If **tails**, respond truthfully.
  3. If **heads**, flip a second coin and respond "Yes" on heads, and "No" on tails.
- This protocol is $(\ln 3, 0)$-differentially private (see Worksheet).
  - Intuition: We compute the odds ratio of the truth, given the answer.
  - If someone is reported to have said "Yes", there is a 3:1 odds that they really did take drugs this week.

Practice for sharing anonymised data

- The ONS suggest that:
- *The question to ask is – could an intruder discover any **protected information** from (provided information)? This breaks down into the following three questions:*
  1. *Can **any individual be identified** from the table, with any degree of certainty?*
  2. *If so, is any **new information revealed** about them (attribute disclosure)?*
  3. *Is any information revealed about any **other living person** connected with them?*
- *Common SDC techniques include:*
  - ***collapsing categories** to reduce the sparsity of the table (for example, aggregating single year ages to five-year groups, or five-year age groups to 10-year groups) (non-perturbative)*
  - ***aggregating the data** over a greater period of time, or a larger geographical area (non-perturbative)*
  - ***rounding** to a specific base to avoid very small numbers (usually three or five) (perturbative)*
  - ***suppressing very small numbers** (usually numbers less than three) (perturbative)*

Discussion

- Each form of anonymisation implies a slightly different question, changing the baseline.
- This sort of privacy protection msut be considered alongside the usual forms of data security.
- The **consequences** of a data reveal are complex and contingent:
  - It may stop at learning that a single actor has an uninteresting value of a feature.
  - It may instead set of a cascade of consequential knowledge leading to a complete reveal of the whole database.
  - Typically, outside information is involved in the worst such problems.
- High profile failures include:
  - Linking voter registration to "anonymised" medical data Sweeney 1997,
  - Linking "anonymised" Netflix data back to individuals Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008.

Reflection

- What is the difference between "anonymising" data and protecting privacy?
- What role does cyber security, statistics, and other measures have in protecting privacy?
- What are the main approaches to protecting privacy?
- What impact does protecting privacy have on the utility of databases?
- By the end of the course, you should:
  - Be able to define ϵ and (ϵ, δ)-privacy,
  - Be able to state the methods by which privacy is protected,
  - Understand the value and limitations of the approach at a high level.

Signposting

- Still to come:
  - 12.1.3 Ensuring algorithms are fair and interpretable.
- References:
  - The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy by Dwork and Roth (2014).
  - ONS policy on disclosure control.
  - Sweeney 1997. Weaving technology and policy together to maintain confi-dentiality. Journal of Law, Medicines Ethics, 25:98–110.
  - Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008. Robust de-anonymization of largesparse datasets (how to break anonymity of the netflix prize dataset). IEEE Sec. and Priv.
  - Statistical Disclosure Attacks by George Danezis.