General Topics

Insecure Design, Components with known Vulnerabilities, Integrity, Logging & Monitoring, WAFs

Rough Overview

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Basic Principles and Resources
- 3. Architecture & Basic Web Procedure
- 4. Authentication and Session Management
- 5. Authorization
- 6. Server and Backend Attacks
- 7. Remaining Client Attacks
- 8. >> General Topics <<
- 9. Conclusions

Design Flaw / Insecure Design	Implementation Defect

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Client-side security checks only	

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Design Flaw / Insecure Design	Implementation Defect
Client-side security checks only	Error in a regex for input validation
Credential recovery solely relies on "security questions"	Reset link is guessable
Firmware update integrity isn't ensured	Digital signature uses outdated/vuln. algorithm

A secure design can still have implementation defects leading to vulnerabilities that may be exploited.

An insecure design cannot be fixed by a perfect implementation as by definition, needed security controls were never created to defend against specific attacks.

How can we prevent design flaws?

Remember our secure design principles?

Economy of Mechanism Fail-safe Defaults Complete Mediation Least Privilege Least Common Mechanism Separation of Privilege Open Design Psychological Acceptability

- Saltzer and Schroeder, 1975 -

http://web.cs.wpi.edu/~guttman/cs557_website/papers/saltzer1975.pdf https://adam.shostack.org/blog/the-security-principles-of-saltzer-and-schroeder/ Earn or give, but never assume, trust.

Use an authentication mechanism that cannot be bypassed or tampered with.

Authorize after you authenticate

Strictly separate data and control instructions, and never process control instructions received from untrusted sources.

Define an approach that ensures all data are explicitly validated.

Use cryptography correctly.

Identify sensitive data and how they should be handled.

Always consider the user.

Understand how integrating external components changes your attack surface.

Be flexible when considering future changes to objects and actors.

- IEEE Center for Secure Design, 2014 -

Secure Design Patterns

Utilize well proven public design patterns, e.g.

- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/patterns/
 - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/patterns/federated-identity
 - ...
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/architecture/framework/security/
- https://www.opensecurityarchitecture.org/cms/library/patternlandscape
- https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/search?q=architectural%20pattern
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/

Yes, a lot of them are actually for network / system design But they are very useful anyway

Secure Design Patterns

Create your own company-wide design patterns for e.g.

- Authentication
- Session Management
- Authorization
- Input- and Outputhandling
- Logging and Monitoring
- •

Did anybody say Threat Modeling?

Check out my Threat Modeling 101

https://www.slideshare.net/SBA-Research/sba-live-academy-threat-modeling-101-eine-kurze-aber-praxisnahe-einfhrung-by-daniel-schwarz-senior-security-analyst-bei-der-condignum-gmbh

It's an engineering technique you can use to help you identify threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures that could affect your application.

You can use threat modeling to shape your application's design, meet your company's security objectives, and reduce risk.

- Microsoft -

https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl/threatmodeling

The 4 basic questions:

- 1. What are we working on?
- 2. What can go wrong?
- 3. What are we going to do about it?
- 4. Did we do a good enough job?

Simplest approach:

just brainstorm in your team

think about worst-case szenarios and what you could do about it

second simplest approach:

use some "tools" to structure your thoughts

little example:


- We're creating a pizza order system
- Customers can save
 - their address
 - their personal pizza configurations
 - their credit card
- Payment is done via an external payment-provider

The 4 basic questions:


- 1. What are we working on?
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- 4. Did we do a good enough job?

- 1. What are we working on?
 - list your assets, users and external entities
 - draw a diagram
 - DFDs and the C4 model could be a good starting point

Assets	User	Ext. Entities
credit card data	anonymous	payment- provider
usernames	customer	
passwords	admin	
pizza prices		
pizza configurations		




https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/learn/modules/tm-introduction-to-threat-modeling/2-step-1-design-phase https://c4model.com/



- 2. What can go wrong?
 - Design Principles, OWASP Top 10 ...
 - STRIDE
 - Spoofing
 - Tampering
 - Repudiation
 - Information Disclosure
 - Denial of Service
 - Elevation of Privileges

- 3. What are we going to do about it?
 - Think about "how" the scenarios can happen and how to prevent it
 - Use resources like OWASP ASVS

It's even cheaper to invest in a secure design



https://deepsource.io/blog/exponential-cost-of-fixing-bugs/

Design vs. Architecture

WTF is the difference?

Design vs. Architecture

An application consists of multiple building blocks

Design

Every decision to combine these building blocks in a specific way

Architecture

The most significant design decisions (high cost of change)

All architecture is design, but not all design is architecture.

- Grady Booch

https://static.architectis.je/software-architecture-for-developers.pdf

Goal	Exploit design flaws to do all kinds of bad stuff
How	
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

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Insecure Design

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OWASP Top 10	A04:2021-Insecure Design
(Primary) Violated Principle	

Insecure Design

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OWASP Top 10	A04:2021-Insecure Design
(Primary) Violated Principle	"Earn or give, but never assume, trust."

3rd party components

It's ok to use 3rd party components

- libraries
- frameworks
- etc.

Just be aware you also include their problems

• e.g. Commons Collection in 2015

And act appropriately

Goal	Compromising an application by exploiting a publicly known vulnerability in one of it's included components (libraries, frameworks etc.)
How	
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Solution	Be aware of all components you have in use
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary)	

Violated Principle

Goal

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
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Solution

Check all components for publicly known vulnerabilities
Tools can help you with this task, e.g.
GitHub Dependabot
OWASP Dependency Check
Sonatype Nexus IQ / Lifecycle

Synopsys Black Duck Software Composition Analysis etc...

OWASP Top 10



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Perform checks as early as possible in the development lifecycle

OWASP Top 10

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OWASP Top 10	
(D:)	


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OWASP Top 10	A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Components

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OWASP Top 10 A06:2021-Vulnerable and Outdated Com	ponents

(Primary) Violated Principle

"Understand how integrating external components changes your attack surface"

let's talk about integrity



Goal	Manipulate the application itself or the application's data.
How	
Solution	
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	

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OWASP Top 10		
(Primary) Violated Principle		

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Review process (e.g. 4 eyes principle) for all code changes

Solution

OWASP Top 10

Goal

Manipulate the application itself or the application's data.

How

Diverse manipulation options along the whole application lifecycle

Review process (e.g. 4 eyes principle) for all code changes

Strict access control for CI/CD pipeline and servers / DBs

Solution

OWASP Top 10

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Manipulate the application itself or the application's data.

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Diverse manipulation options along the whole application lifecycle

Review process (e.g. 4 eyes principle) for all code changes

Strict access control for CI/CD pipeline and servers / DBs

Obtain 3rd party components from trusted sources only

Solution

OWASP Top 10

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Strict access control for CI/CD pipeline and servers / DBs

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Use TLS for all communication

Solution

OWASP Top 10

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OWASP Top 10	


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OWASP Top 10	A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures
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(Primary)	

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OWASP Top 10	A08:2021-Software and Data Integrity Failures

(Primary)
Violated Principle

"Define an approach that ensures all data are explicitly validated."



Goal	Hide attacks and go unnoticed.	
How		
Solution		
OWASP Top 10		
(Primary) Violated Principle		

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Solution	
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Solution	Define which events are security relevant and therefore should be logged e.g. failed authentication attempts, access control violation attempts, input validation failures, CSP reportings etc.
OWASP Top 10	
(Primary) Violated Principle	


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	Use consistent log formats throughout your organization
	Centralize logs in a tamper-proof system
	Implement appropriate monitoring, alarm thresholds and response processes -> and also test them!
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OWASP Top 10	A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring	Failures
(Primary) Violated Principle		

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OWASP Top 10	A09:2021-Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
(Primary) Violated Principle	"Earn or give, but never assume, trust."



Web Application Firewalls

Monitors and filters HTTP traffic

mainly operates on predefined ruleset and/or learning mode

Do not rely on a WAF as your primary defense mechanism

many circumvention techniques, exploits etc. available

Valid usage

- additional protection (2nd line of defense) against common web application attacks, e.g. SQLi, XSS, Bruteforcing etc.
- quick temporary fixes
- centralized AV scan for file uploads
- protection of legacy applications
- web application IDS

Always configure them properly!

Key messages

- A secure design is worth the money
 - Include Threat Modeling in your SSDLC!
- Explicitly ensure the integrity of your software (components) and your critical data
- Be aware of your included 3rd party components and their current security status
- Implement structured, consistent and centralized logging and monitoring
- Use WAFs for the right purpose