

CWEs Mapped to Security Verification Section of Aker Paper

Count	CWE	IP Level	Firmware Level	System Level
1	CWE-276: Incorrect Default Permissions		~	~
2	CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary ('Confused Deputy')			X
3	CWE-1189: Improper Isolation of Shared Resources on System-on-Chip (SoC)			X
4	CWE-1191: Exposed Chip Debug and Test Interface With Insufficient or Missing Authorization		~	~
5	CWE-1193: Power-On of Untrusted Execution Core Before Enabling Fabric Access Control		~	~
6	CWE-1220: Insufficient Granularity of Access Control	X	X	X
7	CWE-1221: Incorrect Register Defaults or Module Parameters	X	X	X
8	CWE-1243: Sensitive Non-Volatile Information Not Protected During Debug			
9	CWE-1244: Improper Access to Sensitive Information Using Debug and Test Interfaces	X	X	X
10	CWE-1257: Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions			
11	CWE-1258: Exposure of Sensitive System Information Due to Uncleared Debug Information	X	X	X
12	CWE-1259: Improper Restriction of Security Token Assignment	X	X	X
13	CWE-1260: Improper Handling of Overlap Between Protected Memory Ranges			X
14	CWE-1262: Register Interface Allows Software Access to Sensitive Data or Security Settings		X	X
15	CWE-1264: Hardware Logic with Insecure De-Synchronization between Control and Data Channels	X	X	X
16	CWE-1266: Improper Scrubbing of Sensitive Data from Decommissioned Device	X	X	X
17	CWE-1267: Policy Uses Obsolete Encoding	X	X	X

18	CWE-1268: Policy Privileges are not Assigned Consistently Between Control and Data Agents	X	X	X
19	CWE-1269: Product Released in Non-Release Configuration	X	X	X
20	CWE-1270: Generation of Incorrect Security Tokens	X	X	X
21	CWE-1271: Uninitialized Value on Reset for Registers Holding Security Settings	X	X	X
22	CWE-1272: Sensitive Information Uncleared Before Debug/Power State Transition	X	X	X
23	CWE-1273: Device Unlock Credential Sharing			
24	CWE-1274: Insufficient Protections on the Volatile Memory Containing Boot Code	X	X	X
25	CWE-1280: Access Control Check Implemented After Asset is Accessed	X	X	X
26	CWE-1282: Assumed-Immutable Data is Stored in Writable Memory	X		
27	CWE-1283: Mutable Attestation or Measurement Reporting Data		X	X
28	CWE-1290: Incorrect Decoding of Security Identifiers		X	X
29	CWE-1292: Incorrect Conversion of Security Identifiers		X	X
30	CWE-1326: Missing Immutable Root of Trust in Hardware	X		

Aker Security Property Templates and Relevant CWE Mappings

SP No.	Related CWEs	SP Requirement	SP Specification Template	SP Type	Total SPs After Expanding	Verification Level
1	1258 , 1266 , 1270 , 1271 , 1272 , 1280	C cannot receive/send data from/to P which originates while the ACW is actively being reset.	<pre>//# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP01_RECEIVE_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_P` when (ARESETN == 0) ==> `signal_to_C`); //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP01_SEND_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_C` when (ARESETN == 0) ==> `signal_to_P`);</pre>	IFT	38	IP
2	1221 , 1258 , 1266 , 1269 , 1271 , 1280	C receives the default AXI signals while the ACW is actively being reset.	<pre>//# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP02_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_to_C` == `default_AXI_value` unless (ARESETN != 0));</pre>	Trace	11	IP
3	1221 , 1258 , 1266 , 1269 , 1271 , 1280	The ACW outputs the default AXI signals to P while the ACW is actively being reset.	<pre>//# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP03_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_to_P` == `default_AXI_value` unless (ARESETN != 0));</pre>	Trace	27	IP
4	1221 , 1258 , 1259 , 1266 , 1267 , 1269 , 1271 , 1274 , 1280 , 1282	The configuration/anomaly registers are cleared and set to contain the default values while the ACW is actively being reset.	<pre>//# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP04_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`reg` == `default_value`</pre>	Trace	38	IP

			<pre> unless (ARESETN != 0 && `acw_w/r_state` != 2'b00)); </pre>			
5	1269 , 1272 , 1280	The TE can read from but not write to anomaly registers.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP05_READONLY_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_TE` when (S_AXI_CTRL_AWADDR == `reg_addr`) ==> `anomaly_reg`); </pre>	IFT	4	Firmware
6	1258 , 1270 , 1272 , 1280	C cannot receive/send data from/to P which originates while the ACW is in reset mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP06_RECEIVE_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_P` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b00) ==> `signal_to_C`); //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP06_SEND_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_C` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b00) ==> `signal_to_P`); </pre>	IFT	38	IP
7	1221 , 1258 , 1269 , 1272 , 1280	C receives the default AXI signals while the ACW is in reset mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP07_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_to_C` == `default_AXI_value` unless (`acw_w/r_state` != 2'b00)); </pre>	Trace	11	IP
8	1221 , 1258 , 1269 , 1272 , 1280	The ACW outputs the default AXI signals to P while the ACW is in reset mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP08_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(</pre>	Trace	27	IP

			<pre> `signal_to_P` == `default_AXI_value` unless (`acw_w/r_state` != 2'b00)); </pre>			
9	1221 , 1258 , 1259 , 1267 , 1269 , 1271 , 1272 , 1274 , 1280 , 1282	The configuration/anomaly registers contain the default values until they are modified by the TE (config.) and/or ACW (illegal req. metadata tracking).	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP09_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`unauthorized_signal` when (`reg` == `default_value`) ==> `reg` unless (`reg` == `default_value`)); </pre>	IFT	8,768 (all 231 unauthorized sigs) 2,876 (76 non-acw sigs) 1,432 (38 sigs from C)	Firmware
10	1270 , 1272 , 1280	C cannot receive/send data associated with an illegal address from/to P which originates while the ACW is in supervising mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 4 SP10_RECEIVE_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_P` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b01) && (`AR/AW_ADDR_VALID_FLAG` == 0) ==> `signal_to_C`); //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 4 SP10_SEND_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_C` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b01) && (`AR/AW_ADDR_VALID_FLAG` == 0) ==> `signal_to_P`); </pre>	IFT	38	IP
11	1270 , 1272 , 1280	C cannot receive/send data from/to P which originates while the ACW is in decouple mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP11_RECEIVE_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_P` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b10) ==> </pre>	IFT	38	IP

			<pre> `signal_to_C`); //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP11_SEND_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_from_C` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b10) ==> `signal_to_P`); </pre>			
12	1221 , 1269 , 1272 , 1280	C receives the default AXI signals while the ACW is in decouple mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP12_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_to_C` == `default_AXI_value` unless (`acw_w/r_state` != 2'b10)); </pre>	Trace	11	IP
13	1221 , 1269 , 1272 , 1280	The ACW outputs the default AXI signals to the P while the ACW is in decouple mode.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP13_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`signal_to_P` == `default_AXI_value` unless (`acw_w/r_state` != 2'b10)); </pre>	Trace	27	IP
14	1272 , 1280 , 1283	The anomaly registers are updated with illegal request metadata after the ACW detects an illegal request.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 3 SP14_DEFAULT_GENERIC: assert iflow(`authorized_signal` when (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b01) ==> `anomaly_reg` unless (`acw_w/r_state` == 2'b10)); </pre>	IFT	12	IP
15	1221 , 1272 , 1280	An interrupt to TE is generated after the ACW detects an illegal request.	<pre> //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP15_R_INTERRUPT: assert iflow(`INTR_LINE_W/R` == 1 unless (`acw_w/r_state` != 2'b10)); </pre>	Trace	2	Firmware

16	441 , 1189 , 1260	Any C cannot receive/send data from/to any region not contained within its ACW's LACP.	<pre>//# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP16_RECEIVE_GENERIC: assert iflow(`unauthorized` ==> `sig_from_C`); //# of Generic Signals to Replace = 2 SP16_SEND_GENERIC: assert iflow(`sig_from_C` ==> `unauthorized`);</pre>	Trace	76	System
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