#### 5. Diff-in-Diff and Panel Data

 When we have longitudinal data we can try to tackle selection bias/OVB when the unobserved omitted factors are stable over time

#### Setting:

- We can measure the outcome variable for a set of objects (people, firms, ...) at least two points in time
- The key variable of interest (the "treatment") changes over time
- We study the association between the *change* in the treatment variable and the *change* in the outcome variable
- Here:

Consider Difference-in-Difference and Fixed Effects Models

#### 5.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimation

- Consider again the potential outcome framework and introduce a time dimension t = 1,2 such that potential outcomes are  $Y_{1i}(t)$  and  $Y_{0i}(t)$
- Suppose no one is treated at time t=1 and thus  $Y_{0i}(1)$  is observed for all
- But some people receive the treatment at date t = 2

$$Y_{C_i i}(2) = \begin{cases} Y_{1i}(2) & if \quad C_i = 1 \\ Y_{0i}(2) & if \quad C_i = 0 \end{cases}$$

We are again interested in estimating the ATT

$$E[Y_{1i}(2) - Y_{0i}(2)|C_i = 1]$$

#### Note:

- We still cannot observe the counterfactual outcome  $Y_{0i}(2)$  for the treated
- But we can observe  $Y_{0i}(1)$ , that is their outcome before the treatment
- When does this help us the estimate the causal effect?

### Now impose the following assumption:

#### **The Parallel Trends Assumption**

When

$$E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 1] = E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 0]$$

then the treated and untreated units have parallel time trends.

#### Intuition:


- The treated and untreated units may differ in their levels of performance
- But (without treatment) expected outcomes increase by the same amount from period 1 to period 2

### When this assumption holds...

we can estimate the ATT even with non-random assignment!

# **The Parallel Trends Assumption:**

The same trends without the treatment



#### Note:

Now use this common trend assumption

$$E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 1] = E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 0]$$

To obtain the expected counterfactual outcome in period 2

$$E[Y_{0i}(2)|C_i=1] = E[Y_{0i}(1)|C_i=1] + E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i=0]$$

Such that the causal effect:

$$E[Y_{1i}(2) - Y_{0i}(2)|C_i = 1]$$

$$= E[Y_{1i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 1] - E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 0]$$

- → The causal effect is thus just the difference between the
  - performance increase in the group that receive  $C_i = 1$  and
  - performance increase in the group that receive  $C_i=0$
- Key idea: Estimate the counterfactual outcome by assuming that the treated units follow the same time trend

To illustrate the effect it is convenient to rearrange

$$E[Y_{1i}(2) - Y_{0i}(2)|C_i = 1]$$


$$= E[Y_{1i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 1] - E[Y_{0i}(2) - Y_{0i}(1)|C_i = 0]$$

$$= (E[Y_i(2)|C_i = 1] - E[Y_i(2)|C_i = 0])$$

$$-(E[Y_i(1)|C_i = 1] - E[Y_i(1)|C_i = 0])$$

- → The causal effect is just the difference between
  - the difference in performance between the groups in t=2
  - the difference in performance between the groups in t=1
- Therefore, it is called the difference-in-difference estimator ("Diff-in-Diff", "DiD")

# The Diff-in-Diff Estimator



#### **Your Task**

## **Diff-in-Diff (Simulated Sales Training Evaluation VIII)**

- Download the following notebook: <u>https://github.com/dsliwka/EEMP2023/blob/main/SalesSimDiD.ipynb</u>
- Go through the simulation code and understand how the data is generated
- Note:
  - tgroup is the group to be trained (it will have value 1 in both periods for those agents who are trained in period 2)
  - training only has value 1 when the agent is indeed trained (in period 2)
- Now plot sales by tgroup and year
   Use: sns.barplot with x='year', y='sales', hue='tgroup'
- Compute average sales by year and group & compute Diff-in-Diff df.groupby(['tgroup','year']).sales.mean()
- Save the notebook in your Google Drive

#### **Regression Diff-in-Diff**

- Note: we can estimated the causal effect  $\rho$  from just working with the differences and replace the expectations with the respective averages
- Typically it is more convenient to simply run a regression
  - Let  $TREAT_i$  be a dummy indicating whether an observation comes from the treated group (dummy=1 also before the change!)
  - Let  $POST_t$  be a dummy indicating whether an observation comes from a period after the treatment has been implemented
- Then we can regress

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta \cdot TREAT_i + \gamma \cdot POST_t + \rho \cdot (TREAT_i \cdot POST_t) + \epsilon_{it}$$

- The coefficient  $\tilde{\rho}$  of the interaction term  $TREAT_i \cdot POST_t$  yields an estimate of the causal effect
- Note:
  - Regression DiD also provides statistical tests
  - And it can be applied if there are more than two periods


#### **Your Task**

#### **Diff-in-Diff (Simulated Sales Training Evaluation VIII)**

- Open the notebook that simulated the sales panel data (SalesSimDiD.ipynb)
- Now perform a regression DiD using Statsmodels
- Note: it is convenient to generate a dummy variable post which takes value 1 only in year 2
- Interpret the regression coefficients
- Save the notebook

#### A note on the common trend assumption

- The common trend assumption can of course not be tested in the treatment period (we don't know the counterfactual)
- But: if you have more periods before the intervention it is very useful to check whether it holds in these periods



# Outlook: Synthetic Control Method/Synthetic Difference-in-Differences See Abadie (2021), Arkhangelsky et al. (2021)

- In Synthetic Control methods you create an artificial control group
- Basic idea: for each "treated" unit generate a "synthetic" control unit
  - The synthetic control unit's "outcome" is the weighted average of several other (real) units
  - Weights are derived by minimizing the difference in time trends prior to intervention


# Study

#### **Dismissal Protection and Hiring**


- Bauernschuster (2013) studies the effect of a firm-size threshold of the
   German dismissal protection law in 2004 on the hiring behavior of small firms
- From 1999 until the end of 2003 the dismissal protection law applied only to establishments with more than five (full time equivalent) workers
- In 2004, this threshold was shifted up to ten full-time equivalent workers
- Dismissal protection regulation was abandoned for workers hired after December 31, 2003 by establishments with 6 to 10 FTE employees
- Bauernschuster studies the effect on hiring applying a diff-in-diff strategy
  - "Treatment group": establishments with 6-10 employees
  - "Control group": establishments with 11-20 employees
- Uses data from the IAB establishment panel (on which the LPP is based)
- Dependent variables are hiring rates and total number of hirings per establishment in the first half of the year

### **Dismissal Protection and Hiring (continued)**

## The Dynamics of Hiring



**Fig. 2** Dynamics of hirings in treatment and control group. The *left figure* shows average hiring rates for treatment (*black line*) and control groups (*grey line*) over time. The *right figure* shows average absolute hirings for treatment (*black line*) and control groups (*grey line*) over time. The treatment group comprises



establishments with more than five and up to ten full-time equivalent workers while the control group consists of establishments with more than ten and up to 20 full-time equivalent employees. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel

Bauernschuster (2013)

# **Dismissal Protection and Hiring (continued)**

Table 1 DiD estimates on hirings

Parameter	Hiring rate (1)		Hiring rate (2)		Hiring rate (3)		
	Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error	Coefficient	Standard error	
DiD 2004	0.013**	0.007	0.016**	0.007	0.020**	0.009	
DiD 2005	0.021**	0.009	0.021**	0.009	0.020**	0.009	
Treatment group	-0.020***	0.006	-0.019***	0.007	-0.024***	0.006	
Year 2004	-0.009*	0.004	-0.013***	0.004	-0.014***	0.006	
Year 2005	-0.012**	0.005	-0.013***	0.005	-0.013*	0.006	
Control set 1	No		Yes		Yes		
Control set 2	No		No		Yes		
N	1,749		1,658	1,658		1,285	
$R^2$	0.0059		0.0725		0.1197		

The table reports the results of OLS difference-in-differences regressions with hiring rates as the dependent variable. The treatment group comprises establishments with more than five and up to ten full-time equivalent workers while the control group consists of establishments with more than ten and up to 20 full-time equivalent employees. The baseline year is 2003. Specification (1) includes no further controls. In specification (2), we additionally control for capital stock, works council, collective labor agreement, age, and industry (control set 1). In specification (3), we add the ratio of female workers, ratio of unqualified workers, ratio of apprentices, wage per worker in the previous year, value added per worker in the previous year as well as net hirings in the previous year as further controls (control set 2). Standard errors are clustered at the establishment level. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. Data source: IAB Establishment Panel

Bauernschuster (2013)

### **5.2 Fixed Effects**

- In the DiD approach we controlled for the group that the agent belonged to (i.e. the treated or untreated)
- The key idea was to at the same time take out
  - "level effects", i.e. differences between the groups that are there at the outset and stay constant over time
  - and "time effects", i.e. differences between the periods that are driven by the same underlying time trends in the groups
- We can also apply the same logic, but control for
  - level effects at the level of an individual subject rather than a group of subjects
  - time effects across multiple periods
  - as well as time-varying further control variables
- Then we estimate a so-called Fixed Effects Model

• Again use potential outcome framework (with time index t = 1, ..., T)

$$Y_{C_{it}it} = \begin{cases} Y_{1it} & if \quad C_{it} = 1 \\ Y_{0it} & if \quad C_{it} = 0 \end{cases}$$

- Let  $X_{it}$  be again a vector of **observed time varying** covariates
- Consider a situation where there is a vector of **unobserved** factors  $A_i$  that affect  $Y_{Cit}$  but **do not depend on time** 
  - This may for instance be a person's ability or personality, or
  - a firm's location or the quality of its management...
- When these unobservable factors  $A_i$  are correlated with  $C_{it}$  such that

$$Cov[A_i, C_{it}] \neq 0$$

we have an omitted variable bias when regressing  $Y_{it}$  on  $C_{it}$ 

**But:** Assume now that  $E[Y_{0it}|A_i,X_{it},t,C_{it}]=E[Y_{0it}|A_i,X_{it},t]$ 

We thus make the following key assumption

$$E[Y_{0it}|A_i, X_{it}, t, C_{it}] = E[Y_{0it}|A_i, X_{it}, t]$$

#### Note:

- The assumption states that  $C_{it}$  is as good as randomly assigned conditional on  $A_i$  and  $X_{it}$
- That is, if we compare two individuals who share the same values for  $X_{it}$  (observable) and  $A_i$  (unobservable), we assume that their potential outcomes do not differ
- This is a sensible identifying assumption whenever any unobserved determinants of the treatment (that also may affect the outcomes beyond the treatment) are constant over time

Consider now the following linear model

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \rho C_{it} + X'_{it}\beta + A'_{i}\gamma + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

• Thus the causal effect of the treatment C is again a constant  $\rho$ , i.e.

$$E[Y_{1it}|A_i, X_{it}, t] - E[Y_{0it}|A_i, X_{it}, t] = \rho$$

• We can now replace  $lpha_i=lpha+A_i'\gamma$  and thus rewrite the model as

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \rho C_{it} + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it}$$

- Then running a regression will estimate the causal effect  $\rho$  of C on Y as  $E[Y_{0it}|A_i,X_{it},t,C_{it}=1]=E[Y_{0it}|A_i,X_{it},t,C_{it}=0]$
- This is a fixed effects model:
  - The  $\alpha_i$  are parameters to be estimated (i.e. estimating a dummy for every person/firm/object)
  - The  $\lambda_t$  are time effects that are also estimated (i.e. estimating a dummy for every period)

## Study

## Lazear's (2000) study on Performance Pay at Safelite

- Safelite is a large auto glass company in the US
- Business: replace broken windshields.
- New compensation scheme in January 1994: Piece rate scheme (PPP) replaced hourly-wage scheme in 1994
- The piece rate scheme was phased in over 19 months, starting from the headquarter town.
- The gradual implementation of piece rate allows for within-worker variation identifying the incentive effect of piece rate on effort.
- But: also high turnover rates; many workers also hired after the introduction of the PPP
- In the following:
  - Unit of observation = Worker in a given month;
  - Productivity measure: Average windshields installed by the worker on a given day.

# **Safelite: Regression analysis**

TABLE 3-REGRESSION RESULTS

Regression number	Dummy for PPP person- month observation	Tenure	Time since PPP	New regime	$R^2$	Description
1	0.368 (0.013)				0.04	Dummies for month and year included
2	0.197 (0.009)				0.73	Dummies for month and year; worker- specific dummies included (2,755 individual workers)
3	0.313 (0.014)	0.343 (0.017)	0.107 (0.024)		0.05	Dummies for month and year included
4	(0.202 (0.009)	0.224 (0.058)	0.273 (0.018)		0.76	Dummies for month and year; worker- specific dummies included (2,755 individual workers)
5	0.309 (0.014)	0.424 (0.019)	0.130 (0.024)	0.243 (0.025)	0.06	Dummies for month and year included

Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficients.

Dependent variable: In output-per-worker-per-day.

Number of observations: 29,837.

# Safelite (continued): What do the worker fixed effects do here?

- Regression without worker fixed effects (row 1)
  - this gives us an estimate of the causal effect of the treatment on the average performance of all workers working at a given point in time
  - (when believe that the treatment is as good as randomly assigned conditional on the time period which seems very plausible here)
- However: if we are interested in the causal effect of the treatment on the performance of an *average given worker* this is a "biased" estimate
  - This is the case when the ability of workers depends on the treatment
  - For instance, when the PPP allows to hire better workers
  - Then  $E[Y_{0it}|t,C_{it}=1]>E[Y_{0it}|t,C_{it}=0]$ i.e. workers hired under the PPP would be better even without the PPP
  - In this respect the conditional independence assumption is violated
  - There is a classical selection bias and the PPP dummy should give a too high estimate for the causal effect of the PPP on a given worker

#### What do the worker fixed effects do here?

- The worker fixed effects model (row 2) takes this problem into account
- It imposes the weaker assumption that


$$E[Y_{0it}|A_i,t,C_{it}] = E[Y_{0it}|A_i,t]$$

- When  $A_i$  captures the workers unobserved ability this assumption states that for workers of the same ability the counterfactual performance is independent of the treatment
- The fixed effects model estimates the unoberved abilities of the workers (using that a worker's performance is observed over many months)
- It thus estimates the causal effect of the PPP conditional on worker's abilities
- Note: The model without fixed effects is here not wrong, it estimates something different
  - Without worker fixed effects it estimates the total effect on performance which includes a *selection* and an *incentive effect*
  - With worker fixed effects it estimates the pure incentive effect

# Study

#### **Estimating the Value Added of Managers**

- How much do individual managers matter for firm behavior and performance?
- Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use
  - Manager-firm matched panel dataset, where they can track individual top managers across different firms over time.
  - Estimate how much of the unexplained variation in firm practices can be attributed to manager fixed effects (controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying firm characteristics)
- Mühlheusser/Schneemann/Sliwka/Wallmeier (2017) consider the case of soccer coaches
  - Coaches frequently move between teams
  - Allows to disentangle the effect of the coach from the strength of the club by estimating models with manager and team fixed effects
  - Data on 20 seasons of the German Bundesliga



#### **Estimating Fixed Effects Models**

- Estimating the coefficients of individual dummy variables seems demanding in large panels (1000 employees = 1000 fixed effects)
- However, if we are not interested in knowing the specific values of the individual fixed effects, we can estimate the model in a simpler manner
- Consider

$$Y_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \rho C_{it} + X'_{it}\beta + \epsilon_{it}$$

• Now take the average across all time periods  $\overline{Y_i} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} Y_{it}$ 

$$\overline{Y}_i = \alpha_i + \overline{\lambda} + \rho \overline{C}_i + \overline{X}_i' \beta + \overline{\epsilon}_i$$

and substract this from  $Y_{it}$ 

$$Y_{it} - \overline{Y}_i = \lambda_t - \overline{\lambda} + \rho \Big( C_{it} - \overline{C}_i \Big) + (X'_{it} - \overline{X}'_i) \beta + \epsilon_{it} - \overline{\epsilon}_i$$

 $\rightarrow$  The  $\alpha_i$  are eliminated!

$$Y_{it} - \overline{Y}_i = \lambda_t - \overline{\lambda} + \rho \Big( C_{it} - \overline{C}_i \Big) + (X'_{it} - \overline{X}'_i) \beta + \epsilon_{it} - \overline{\epsilon}_i$$

#### Hence,

- replace the outcome variable by its deviation from the mean over time
- replace the explanatory variables by their deviations from their means over time
- Regress the "de-meaned" outcome on the "de-meaned" explanatory variables
- $\rightarrow$  This gives us an estimate of  $\rho$
- ightarrow We can estimate ho and eta without having to estimate the  $lpha_i$
- This model is sometimes also called the **within-estimator**: It estimates the effect of  $\rho$  on Y from the within person variation in C

#### **Python**

### **Fixed Effects Regressions in Python**

- Panel regressions in Python can be done with library linearmodels
- Install by !pip install linearmodels
- Import by from linearmodels import PanelOLS
- In order to run a panel regression use a MultiIndex DataFrame that is a DataFrame that uses two indices
  - one index for the entity variable (the omitted time constant variable)
  - one index for the time variable

- Note: It is convenient to use a different DataFrame for the panel regressions
- Then fit the model by

```
reg = PanelOLS.from_formula('y ~ x + EntityEffects + TimeEffects', data=dfp).fit()
```

Then print the output with print(reg)
 (Note the different notation to statsmodels: can directly print the results)

#### **Python**

### **Fixed Effects Regressions in Python**

- It is likely that observations of the same entity (firm, person etc.) are not independent
- Hence, when you run a fixed effects panel regression it makes sense to estimate clustered standard errors where the cluster is determined by the respective entity
- In PanelOLS you can do this by adding a cov\_type="clustered" option in the fit()-method:

```
reg = PanelOLS.from_formula('y ~ x + EntityEffects + TimeEffects', data=dfp).fit(cov_type="clustered", cluster_entity=True)
```

#### **Your Task**

#### **Fixed Effects**

- Open the notebook in which you estimated the association between Management Practices and ROCE
- For a part of the observations the data set contains panel data (consider the variables account\_id containing a firm identifier and year)
- Bloom et al. (2012) report the following table, where the third colums shows

the result of a fixed effects regression

- Replicate the regression using PanelOLS
- You may also replicate it using a simple OLS with dummies for each firm (recall  $+\subset(...)$ )
- Note: Further relevant variables are
  - emp: number of employees
  - ppent capital(property, plant & equipment)
  - You can generate logs by using
     np.log(x) directly in the formula

	(1)	(2)	(3)	
Sector	Manufact.	Manufact.	Manufact.	
Dependent variable	Log (Sales)	Log (Sales)	Log (Sales)	
Management	0.523***	0.233***	0.048**	
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.022)	
Ln(Employees)	0.915***	0.659***	0.364***	
	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.109)	
Ln(Capital)		0.289***	0.244***	
		(0.020)	(0.087)	
Country controls	No	Yes	NA	
Industry controls	No	Yes	NA	
General controls	No	Yes	NA	
Firm fixed effects	No	No	Yes	
Organizations	2,927	2,927	1,453	
Observations	7,094	7,094	5,561	

### **Your Task**

# **Fixed Effects (Simulated Sales Training Evaluation IX)**

- Open again the SalesSimDiD notebook
- Define the time and entity indices
- Run a fixed effects regression
- Save the notebook

#### **But note important caveats:**

- 1. When you want to interpret the results of a Fixed Effects regression causally, a key underlying assumption is again the **common trend assumption** 
  - That is "treatment" and "control" units follow the same underlying time trend
  - This is a key identifying assumption
- 2. When the treatment  $C_{it}$  hardly varies over time it is hard to evaluate the causal effect effect  $\rho$ 
  - In the extreme when  $C_{it}$  is completely stable then  $C_{it} = \overline{C}_{it}$
  - Not identifying a significant effect in the data then does not necessarily imply that there is no such effect
- 3. Fixed effects can only eliminate time-constant omitted variables
  - If the treatment is correlated with time varying unobserved variables omitted variable issues remain