

Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Party Building

Darin Self
Cornell University
ds2237@cornell.edu

Allen Hicken
University of Michigan
ahicken@umich.edu

June 10, 2020

Abstract

Previous work on authoritarian regimes posits that regimes bequeath a variety of legacies to their democratic successors. This paper investigates the extent to which antecedent conditions of authoritarianism, specifically choices over how to structure the regime, building ruling parties, and allowing (circumscribed) multi-party competition, shapes the degree of party institutionalization after democratization. Using data on party and antecedent authoritarian regime characteristics, we find that the extent to which political parties are institutionalized during authoritarian eras shapes the degree of party institutionalization post-democratization. We also find that ruling authoritarian successor parties have a detrimental effect on party development post-democratization while reactive successor parties have a positive effect on party development. We demonstrate how the institutionalization of democratic political parties, a key factor concerning the stability and consolidation of democracy, is dependent on aspects of a country's prior authoritarian experience and the way former authoritarian elites participate in party politics following democratization.

In 1998, after decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia's New Order regime collapsed. Despite the tumultuous end of the New Order regime, the three parties that were allowed to function during the authoritarian period survived democratization. Even amidst the social and political upheaval that characterized Indonesia following the New Order, these three parties anchored electoral competition and continue to function as important parties in Indonesia's party system today. While Indonesia's parties and party system are far from highly institutionalized, they are in far better shape than those found in its neighbor – the Philippines. Unlike in Indonesia, there was little space for partisan competition under the Marcos dictatorship. The regime actively undermined party building attempts by the opposition and made little investment in a party of its own. After the fall of Marcos the Philippines experienced a proliferation of new and returning parties, each of which failed to institutionalize – leaving the party system utterly inchoate.¹ The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights the possibility that the development of political parties under *democracy* may be tied to some *authoritarian* past. In this work we explore the ways and extent to which authoritarianism influences the development of democratic political parties.

This is certainly not the first attempt to identify authoritarian legacies. Others have pointed to ways in which authoritarian institutions can cast a shadow into democratic periods. Bratton and Van de Walle, for example, argue that there is a continuity of institutions across authoritarian and democratic regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). The structure of the authoritarian regime, specifically the composition of institutions, affects how political conflict is contested during democratic transitions. Other scholars argue that it is not the structure of the *regime* that matters, but rather the manner in which *parties* are organized and professionalized during the authoritarian period that

¹Prior to Marcos, the Philippines had a relatively stable party system but underwent complete deinstitutionalization as Marcos moved to build a patrimonial regime.

affects the development of subsequent democratic political parties (Grzymala-Busse 2002).

We contribute to this literature on authoritarian legacies by investigating these two potential links between authoritarian and democratic regimes: 1) whether the structure of the regime (e.g. military or party) affects subsequent democratic party development, or 2) whether building parties under authoritarianism, independent of regime type, helps explain variance in party institutionalization post-democratization. Drawing on data about pre- and post-transition institutional characteristics, we find that the degree of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period is associated with the level of post-democratic party institutionalization, while regime type itself has no such explanatory power. On average, institutionalized authoritarian parties are associated with more institutionalized parties post-democratization, *independent of antecedent authoritarian regime type*. This holds whether the regimes that precede democracy are military, dominant-party, single-party, multi-party, or personalistic authoritarian regimes.

We also find, however, that the type and presence of authoritarian successor parties matters for the development of parties post-democratization. In cases where a well-institutionalized ruling party² survives democratization and is part of the new democratic party system, party development is hampered – suggesting that the presence of these parties undermines robust party development during democracy. We find no such negative effect for what Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) terms *reactive successor parties* – parties developed in reaction to democratization. On the contrary, we find that these parties have a positive effect on overall levels of party institutionalization during democratic rule.

Understanding how authoritarian legacies persist into democracy will help better explain variation in democratic consolidation. Political parties are key institutions for democratic stability and consolidation (Bernhard et al. 2015). These findings help clarify why some post-authoritarian democracies are better able to navigate the difficult terrain of democra-

²See Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) for a discussion on the differences between *ruling* and *reactive* successor parties and coding of cases.

tization than others.³ This research also demonstrates that work on authoritarian legacies can benefit from more precisely identifying the specific institutional pathways through which authoritarian legacies persist, rather than relying on more general characteristics of regime types. Focusing on the general composition of authoritarian institutions masks how variation in different institutions *within* these regimes shape the subsequent democratic environment.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we flesh-out two approaches to studying how authoritarian legacies may affect the institutionalization of democratic political parties. From these approaches we develop a theory of authoritarian legacies focused on the degree to which political conflict is channeled through political parties. After developing the observable implications of this theory we outline the research design used to test our hypotheses. Following this, we present the results of the empirical analyses and follow-up with a discussion of the implications of our findings. We then draw some conclusions based on this research and offer some steps forward.

Democratic Parties and Their Authoritarian Precursors

Most democracies do not emerge *de novo* and often inherit actors and institutions, such as political parties, from their authoritarian predecessor. This is especially the case in the post-WWII era as more authoritarian regimes began to allow or employ parties. Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) and Gandhi and Reuter (2013) find that, of the autocratic regimes that existed from 1950-2006, over 50% maintained single or hegemonic party systems. These parties, or the individuals that sustained them, often survive democratization and continue to participate within the democratic system. When these actors and organizations continue to participate within the democratic regime they can become critical factors that influence

³We do not argue that these findings explain variation in the *quality* of democracy. Instead, our findings explain why some parties are more institutionalized following democratization. Indeed, some institutionalized ex-authoritarian parties may play a direct role in undermining the quality of democracy (see Levitsky and Way (2010) and Miller (2019)).

the development of the democratic party system and, ultimately, the survival of democracy.

This analysis focuses on how authoritarian legacies influence post-authoritarian democratic party building—specifically the extent to which parties institutionalize. Working from Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988), we define party institutionalization as the extent to which parties build stable organizations, prioritize party interests over individual elites' short term interests, and are linked to society.⁴ Party institutionalization is generally associated with stronger, better-functioning democracies. Institutionalization affects the volatility of the party system (Mainwaring 2018), the quality of representation, (Caul 1999) the incentives for governments to provide broad public goods (Bizzarro et al. 2018), and ultimately, the stability of democracy itself (Bernhard et al. 2015).

In this section, we consider two approaches to studying how authoritarian legacies may influence subsequent democratic party institutionalization. The first focuses on regime type or the manner in which political competition was institutionalized during the authoritarian period. The second approach focuses on the extent to which authoritarian regimes allow, develop, or inherit, institutionalized parties. We review both approaches below.

Democratic Legacies of Authoritarian Institutions: Regime Type

We argue that the structure of authoritarian institutions may promote or hinder the development of political parties after a transition to democracy. The key determinant of this autocratic legacy is the degree to which political conflict is channeled through political parties. We will discuss the logic behind this argument shortly, but to begin with, we identify two different, though related, theoretical approaches to studying autocratic legacies.

The first approach focuses broadly on the type of authoritarian regime. Regimes are configurations of different institutions (such as the state, parties, legislatures, courts, and security forces) which structure political competition. In authoritarian regimes, how politi-

⁴To be clear, the focus of this analysis is on party institutionalization – not party *system* institutionalization.

cal competition is structured during authoritarian rule may influence how elites and masses contest politics post-democratization. For example, Levitsky and Way (2010) and Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argue that the capabilities of authoritarian incumbents to stem the tide of democratization come from institutions built during authoritarian regimes. Where institutions improve incumbents' ability to coordinate against the opposition, democratization often stalls. When democratization does occur, autocrats may work to embed authoritarian institutions within the nascent democratic institutional framework (Valenzuela 1990; Geddes 1999b; Albertus and Menaldo 2018). In a similar vein Bratton and Van de Walle argue that there is a continuity of institutions across authoritarian and democratic regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). The structure of the authoritarian regime, the composition of institutions, and especially the patterns of competition shape the dynamics of political contestation during and after democratic transition (*ibid*).

Since the institutional turn in comparative authoritarianism much has been written on the presence of political institutions in these regimes. During authoritarian rule, investing in and developing institutions may facilitate greater cohesion amongst ruling elites and grant the regime greater durability (Geddes 1999b; Gandhi 2008; Brownlee 2007). However, even though regimes with parties are more durable – they still fail. We focus specifically on what happens *after* democratization occurs given how parties were developed or maintained during authoritarian rule, and argue that regimes with parties at their center should be positively associated with higher levels of institutionalization after a democratic transition.

The focus on authoritarian regime type has generated a number of typologies to describe the variance of institutions within authoritarian regimes. Two of the most influential have been developed by Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). These typologies categorize authoritarian systems into personalistic, military, and party (**GWF**), and dominant party, military, and multi-party authoritarian regime types (**WTH**), respectively.⁵ Most relevant for our purposes is the extent to which authoritarian

⁵Along with other minor categories and combinations of regime types.

regimes make use of/allow for party institutions. Party regimes are so classified because they are more likely to channel political contestation and conflict through political parties. To the degree this is the case, *we argue that party-based regimes should be associated with higher levels of post-democratization party institutionalization.*

However, it is possible that regime type is too crude a proxy for the importance of political parties within an authoritarian regime. First, the categories of regimes laid out by **GWF** and **WTH** are something like ideal types. In practice, however, there are many regimes that mix features of different regime types. In fact parties are present in the majority of authoritarian regimes (Self 2018).⁶ This makes classifying regimes and drawing inferences from that classification challenging, to say the least. Second, within party regimes, the strength and importance of parties varies widely. Thus, in addition to regime type we are interested in the level of party institutionalization within authoritarian regimes.

The Legacy of Authoritarian Institutions: Party Institutions

This second approach to studying authoritarian legacies builds on work that draws a more explicit link between party life under autocracy and the subsequent development of political parties under democracy. For example, Grzymala-Busse argues that the manner in which parties are organized and professionalized during the authoritarian period affects the ability of communist successor parties to survive the transition to democracy (2002). Similarly, Miller explores how programmatic, organizational, and policy attributes translate into a post-transition advantage for ruling parties (2019). Frantz and Geddes find that the way regimes treat political parties during authoritarian interludes — by repressing, replacing or co-opting — shapes the kinds of parties that emerge when democracy returns (2016). Finally, LeBas and Reidl both argue that the way in which authoritarian regimes structure

⁶Even monarchies and military regimes employ political parties. For example, Egypt's monarchy used the Wafd party to incorporate landholders prior to the 1952 revolution while Indonesia's military used Golkar to consolidate its rule in the 1970s and 1980s.

alliances, in a bid to maintain power, impacts the ability of these allies to organize and form stable parties after democratization (LeBas 2011; Riedl 2014). Drawing on this work we argue that the *level of party institutionalization under authoritarian governments should be positively associated with the level of party institutionalization after a democratic transition*.

So how might the nature of party institutions under autocracy, whether we focus on regime type or party institutionalization, shape the path of democratic party building? We identify four possible, and related mechanisms:

1. Sidelining of alternative actors/institutions
2. Norms of party competition
3. Opposition incentives
4. Authoritarian successor parties

Sidelining of alternative actors/institutions. Regimes that concentrate significant power in the hands of individuals, sometimes referred to as neo-patrimonial (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994) or personalistic Geddes (1999b) regimes, often fail to develop cohesive and professional organizations that are linked to society and which can help solve collective action and social choice issues (Aldrich 1995). Instead, elites in these regimes actively undermine the formation and development of institutions that may challenge their power. Upon democratization, given the lack of robust organizations with societal links, political contestation is likely to center around powerful individuals with the means to contest politics, to the detriment of creating institutionalized political parties.

Likewise, military regimes should be associated with lower levels of party institutionalization post-democratization (relative to regimes with institutionalized parties). As the military seeks control of politics via military institutions and coercion rather than managing conflict via parties, this undermines the incentives to invest in party building (if parties aren't banned outright). The politicization of the military may also have a significant impact

on how politics is conducted within the political arena beyond the end of the regime. The danger is that when the military is the dominant autocratic organization, military officers come to see themselves as legitimate participants in the political arena. Stepping in and directly participating in politics becomes normalized and, possibly, expected. This norm can easily persist into the democratic period. The militarization of politics, then, provides an alternative to parties for actors seeking access to power. The result is less investment in party building as politically ambitious actors pursue power by developing reputations through military careers or via alliances with the military.

This suggests, then, that actors emerging from authoritarian regimes in which parties were weak or non-existent, e.g either personalist or military regimes, should be less likely to invest in democratic party building. Even should actors choose to begin building parties, their capacity to do so should be relatively more limited. Building parties is a difficult undertaking and fails more often than it succeeds (Levitsky et al. 2016). Regime elites and their opponents emerging from these authoritarian regimes are more likely to lack the material and/or ideational resources necessary for building institutionalized democratic parties. This leaves these democracies with weaker parties relative to those that emerge following party-based authoritarian regimes.

By contrast, for democracies that follow authoritarian regimes with institutionalized political parties, whether single or dominant, post-democratization party building should fare better.⁷ To begin with, actors who otherwise might have undermined party-centered political competition are more likely to be marginalized or depoliticized. For example, under party rule, the security apparatus is more likely to be subject to civilian control and less politicized than under military or personalized regimes and thus more likely to continue to be sidelined politically entering the democratic period. In addition, under party-based authoritarian rule

⁷In single party regimes only the regime party is legally allowed (e.g. Vietnam). Under dominant party regimes opposition parties are allowed but the party of the regime dominates the political arena (e.g. Singapore).

personal power is de-emphasized in favor of party institutions. This diminishes the influence of individual political actors, potentially making it more difficult for actors to rely solely on personal clout to win political office.

Norms of party competition. A second mechanism connecting authoritarian and democratic party institutions is the development of norms and expectations of party competition. In authoritarian regimes where political parties are more institutionalized, actors learn to invest in political parties and use them as the primary vehicle to contest power. This is reinforced as voters come to see elections and parties as normal and legitimate. This can create a norm of contesting power via party competition, even if there is only a single party, or if the playing field is far from level. These norms are likely to carry over following democratization, as political actors continue to contest power via familiar means (i.e. parties) rather than turning towards forms of contestation that are more unfamiliar.

Opposition incentives. The third mechanism involves the incentives of members of the opposition within authoritarian regimes. Party-based authoritarian rule centers political life around the party — specifically, the ruling party. This means that, where allowed, opposition to the regime is also likely to take place via party competition, with strong incentives for the opposition to try and a) coordinate, and b) invest in party building. In fact, these opponents, along with defectors from the ruling party, sometimes try and mimic the institutional apparatus of the ruling party (Dettman 2018; Weiss 2020). This experience with coordination and the investment in party building are assets that can aid in party institutionalization post-transition.

Authoritarian successor parties. As discussed above, one way in which authoritarianism may influence post-democratization party development is via the presence of institutionalized authoritarian parties which survive democratization. A number of scholars have focused on authoritarian successor parties, most recently, Loxton, Reidl, and Miller in separate studies (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; Riedl 2014; Miller 2019). Loxton shows that of 68 countries that underwent a democratic transition from 1974 to 2010, 47 produced a

prominent authoritarian successor party.⁸ Of these 47 cases, there are 38 in which the authoritarian successor party returned to power. In a later study, Miller (2019) traces the post-democratization fates of 84 ruling parties and finds that 52 eventually returned to power. The empirical reality of authoritarian successor parties surviving and thriving in democracies suggests that in order to understand party institutionalization within democracies, we must look at the role of authoritarian successor parties and the effect they have on the other parties that operate in democratic party systems.

We argue that where authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) adapt and survive a democratic transition they then serve as an anchor and focal point to party competition within the democratic context.⁹ We hypothesize that the existence of an ASP brings added stability to the fledgling party system, both through the ASP's level of institutionalization but also by providing incentives for competitors to develop stronger, more institutionalized parties in order to compete with the ASP.

First, authoritarian successor parties can carry a robust organization and strong brand with them into the democratic period, provided of course they are not completely discredited and choose not to run from their past (Grzymala-Busse 2002). The continuation of the party brand helps reduce the costs to voters of identifying party positions in the new electoral marketplace (Lupu 2014). A robust organization enables the party to continue to attract candidates and mobilize voters, even though the playing field is no longer tilted in its favor. In other words, where there is an ASP there is likely to be at least one party in the system with a fair degree of institutionalization.

As second way that ASPs may boost party institutionalization post-democratic transition is by inducing other parties to coordinate and invest in party building. Even prior to the democratic transition, institutionalized authoritarian parties may prompt the opposition

⁸Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) codes an Authoritarian Successor Party as prominent if it wins at least 10% of the vote in an election following democratization.

⁹This may be true of well-institutionalized opposition parties as well.

to coordinate and form their own opposition party(s) in order to compete (Weiss 2020), though the lack of a free and fair electoral environment necessarily limits the amount that opposition actors are willing to invest in party building. However, post transition, with a level electoral playing field, opposition forces have the incentive to try and coordinate to form stable coalitions to compete against a more institutionalized authoritarian successor party (Riedl 2014). In effect, the existence of an institutionalized ASP increases the “environmental hostility” (Tavits 2013, p. 159) of the political system, which then induces opposition parties to become more institutionalized in a bid to win elections. The presence of an authoritarian successor party in the democratic system creates a focal point for partisan competition and induces the opposition to coalesce and build parties themselves in order to compete (Loxton and Mainwaring 2018; LeBas 2011; Riedl 2014).

Note, this ASP mechanism is distinct from authoritarian regime type. Specifically, we argue that the affect of ASP on democratic party institutionalization is *independent* of the authoritarian regime type. For example, party-based authoritarian regimes that do not give rise to ASPs are less likely to generate institutionalized parties than party-based regimes which do birth ASPs. Similarly, we expect that ASPs will have a positive effect on party institutionalization under democracy, even if the prior authoritarian regime type is primarily coded as military or personal. In other words, it is the *survival* and *adaptation* of parties found in the previous authoritarian system that then are present within a democratic system that produces the salutary effects on institutionalization, rather than the prior authoritarian regime type *per se*.

But what factors shape whether authoritarian successor parties are able to successfully transition to democracy? While this is not our focus, the existing literature touches on a number of factors. For example, Grzymala-Busse argues that parties which are highly professionalized during authoritarian rule are better able to remain cohesive and adapt to democratization without becoming fatally tied to the ideological preferences of past elites (2002). More generally, the level of organizational capacity developed during authoritarian

rule affects the probability that an authoritarian party will survive a transition to democracy (Miller 2019). During authoritarian rule elites and voters have incentives to form alliances and remain loyal to the ruling party, but ruling parties vary in the "thickness" of these organizations. In other words, some authoritarian leaders choose to institutionalize parties, while others do not. The more institutionalized the ruling party, the more likely it is that the party will be successful post-transition.

Ruling parties are in a good position to make the kinds of investments that help the party compete after democratization (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). For example, ruling parties can draw on state and economic ties to create large, robust support networks (Kitschelt and Singer 2015), including financial support networks (Ishiyama and Cheng 2006). Additionally, these parties have the ability to build local bases of support (e.g. local branches) — opportunities that may be denied the opposition due to legal restrictions or lack of resources (Slater and Wong 2013). Overall, recent work demonstrates that successful authoritarian successor parties tend to be those that are cohesive, have territorial organization, boast clientelistic networks, and can draw on programmatic experience and developed economic ties (Loxton 2015a, 2015b; Miller 2019). We expect that where authoritarian regimes invest in party organization during the authoritarian period, those parties will be more likely to persist into the democratic period. Furthermore, the presence of the ASPs will be associated with higher levels of party institutionalization post-democratization.

Finally, these arguments imply the possibility of an interaction between ASPs and the level of party institutionalization under autocracy. The effect of ASPs on party institutionalization should be strongest where those parties are highly institutionalized. Likewise, the effect of prior party institutionalization on democratic party institutionalization should be strongest where ASPs are present.

The theory developed herein leads to five observable implications. The first two hypotheses concern the independent effects of regime type and prior party institutionalization on party institutionalization under democracy. The remaining hypotheses are designed to

test possible causal mechanisms. While we can't directly test all of our mechanisms due to data limitations, we do have the data to allow us to investigate the effect of restrictions on opposition parties and the role of authoritarian successor parties.

1. **Regime type:** Compared to regimes that eschew party building, authoritarian regimes which channel political conflict through parties (party-based regimes) will have higher levels of party institutionalization following democratization.
2. **Prior Institutionalization:** Higher levels of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period will be associated with higher levels of party institutionalization following democratization.
3. **Opposition Restrictions:** Greater restrictions on opposition parties during the authoritarian period will be associated with lower levels of party institutionalization following democratization.
4. **ASP:** The level of party institutionalization will be higher in democracies where ASPs are present.
5. **ASP-Prior Institutionalization Interaction:** The interaction of prior party institutionalization and the presence of an ASP should be positive.

Caveats and Alternative Explanations

Before outlining the research design we discuss some challenges inherent in linking democratic party outcomes to an authoritarian past. First, as we alluded to, even if some authoritarian regimes allow parties to operate, the political system, by definition, is not entirely open and fair (Levitsky and Way 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010). As Mainwaring notes, in autocracies usually only the ruling party is granted much autonomy, which limits the analytic utility of speaking of a party *system* within this context (Mainwaring, Scully, et al. 1995; Mainwaring 2015). Even where autocrats allow opposition parties (e.g. Suharto's Indonesia or Putin's

Russia), they game the system to prevent opposition parties from competing on the same terms as the ruling party. This may create the appearance of stable institutionalized parties, however, the stability of the party system may be more of a function of the authoritarian regime than the level of intrinsic party institutionalization.¹⁰

Although authoritarian regimes restrict full party and party system institutionalization, it is still analytically useful to examine the degree to which individual parties, both pro-regime and opposition parties, develop thick organizations with roots embedded in society. Because *inter-party* competition is circumscribed, this analysis focuses on individual party institutionalization rather than the pattern of inter-party competition.

It is also possible that if we observe an effect of authoritarian legacies on institutionalization post-transition that this is merely a mechanical reflection of the presence of ASPs. However, recall our argument is not just about individual authoritarian successor parties, but about all parties in the democratic system. ASPs are one mechanism, but we also argue that the presence of ASPs alters the incentives other parties within the system have to develop their own parties (see also Tavits (2013) and Riedl (2014)). In the end this is an empirical question — one which we explore below.

Data and Methods: Identifying Authoritarian Legacies

The focus of this paper is to identify how authoritarian legacies influence the development of democratic political parties. Identifying the effect of an authoritarian legacy at the macro level of party systems is best accomplished using an observational approach. Drawing on a cross-section of data on antecedent regimes and the degree of authoritarian party institutionalization, we use OLS regression to estimate the effect of these legacies. We investigate the

¹⁰Typically, institutionalization is measured using metrics that capture the stability of a party or party system (e.g. party age or vote share). However, because the stability of parties may be artificial or endogenous, these metrics are not valid measures of institutionalization within authoritarian party systems.

effects of prior regime type, prior levels of party institutionalization, the space for opposition parties, and the presence of authoritarian successor parties, to test whether any of these channels has a direct, independent effect on subsequent democratic party systems.

We use a cross-section of data instead of a panel for two reasons. First, all three of our primary explanatory variables are constant given that they are indicators of some antecedent characteristic (regime type or prior institutionalization) or contemporary characteristic (presence of an ASP). Second, the outcome variable, party institutionalization, is also relatively stable over time.¹¹ Because of the structure of the data, we limit the data to cross-sections within specified windows following democratization (e.g. one year, five years, etc.) and average time-variant variables over the lifespan of the regime.

The unit of analysis in this study is the party system in a given democracy. Countries are included in the sample if their democratic period was preceded by an authoritarian regime. Although the unit of analysis is the party system, we do not measure the institutionalization of the system as a whole. Party *system* institutionalization generally includes information about the pattern of *inter-party* competition. Instead, we focus on the level of *intra-party* institutionalization, and leave for future work the effects of authoritarian legacies on the pattern of inter-party competition (Mainwaring, Scully, et al. 1995). Party institutionalization is the extent to which parties develop complex and stable organizations and establish links to society. Thus, as a concept, it concerns two dimensions of party behavior: the nature of the party organization and the relationship between the party and voters and/or elites. Ideally, we would measure the level of institutionalization for each party within the system but this is not possible due to data limitations.

Instead, to measure party institutionalization, we use an index recently developed by Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self (2017) – *Party Institutionalization* – which uses data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2017) (henceforth V-Dem). V-Dem uses

¹¹See Appendix A for a graph depicting the trend of party institutionalization by regime type pre- and post-democratization.

expert surveys to code several dimensions thought pertinent to democracy. For *Party Institutionalization*, experts were asked to code several factors relevant to parties. This included coding the degree to which parties have permanent national organizations, whether parties have local branches, whether parties use clientelistic or programmatic linkages, whether parties develop their own distinct platforms, and the degree of legislative party cohesion. Each of these five indicators is derived from a measurement model that maps coders' scores into a continuous latent variable using a Bayesian IRT model.(Pemstein et al. 2018) The five indicators are then standardized and combined additively to form an index. Finally, the index is converted to its cumulative density function to create a metric of party institutionalization, normally distributed from 0–1. The index estimates the average level of party institutionalization within a given party system across all regime types — both democratic and authoritarian (Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self 2017). Thus, our dependent variable in this exercise is *Institutionalization* for democracies which have followed authoritarian regimes.

To measure the effect of the antecedent regime type on *Institutionalization* we generate a variable (*Regime*) from two datasets that categorize authoritarian regime types — the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset by Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (henceforth **WTH**) (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius 2013)¹² or the Autocratic Regimes Dataset by Geddes, Wright, and Franz (henceforth **GWF**) (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).¹³ Both datasets determine whether a country maintains an authoritarian or democratic regime in any given year.¹⁴ If the regime is non-democratic, they categorize the type of authoritarian regime. Thus, using these two datasets, we can measure the extent to which previous authoritarian

¹²From **WTH** we use democracies with antecedent authoritarian regimes coded as One-party, Multi-party, and Military.

¹³From **GWF** we use democracies with antecedent authoritarian regimes coded as Military, Party, and Personal.

¹⁴We provide summary statistics as well as documentation of all cases included in the sample from these two datasets in Appendix A.

regime type correlates with party institutionalization during democratic periods.

Our second explanatory variable meant to capture the effect of authoritarian legacy is the prior level of party institutionalization. To measure the level of prior party institutionalization we compute the average level of *Institutionalization* for up to 10 years prior to democratization (henceforth *Prior PI*) and link this to the subsequent democratic regime.

As discussed previously, over 50% of autocratic regimes boast some type of political party, but the character of those parties varies widely. Indeed, as Figure 1 illustrates, the level of prior party institutionalization varies across regimes types as coded by **GWF** and **WTH**. Figure 1 demonstrates that the variables of regime type and party institutionalization are not perfect substitutes. There *is* a correlation between regime type and the prior level of party institutionalization — party-based regimes have higher levels of institutionalization on average. However, the confidence intervals are fairly large, consistent with the fact there is a lot of variation within each regime category. Parties still exist in regimes in which the party is not the dominate actor (e.g. military or personal), and within party regimes the parties vary in the degree of their institutionalization. Thus, using the measure of party institutionalization allows for a more direct measure of autocratic party institutionalization.




Figure 1: Distribution of Party Institutionalization Across Regime Types

One of the mechanisms which we highlighted earlier is the extent to which opposition parties are sidelined during authoritarian rule, preventing their development. While a measure of regime type may partially capture this mechanism it does so only imperfectly. To

measure the extent to which opposition parties were sidelined and, thus the incentives they had to participate in the electoral arena, we create a measure of restrictions on opposition parties, again drawn from V-Dem. The variable (*Restrictions*) is drawn from Self (2018) and is an index of three separate indicators: the extent to which there are legal barriers to party entry, which, if any, parties are banned, and the degree of opposition party autonomy from the ruling party/regime. Using these three indicators, we use Factor Analysis and extract predicted values to create a single indicator of *Restrictions* which is normalized from 0-1.

Finally, to measure the presence of an authoritarian successor party we use data from Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) and code all cases present in **GWF** for whether the post-transition democratic party system includes an *ASP*. We include *ASP* in the models on its own (the effect of having an authoritarian successor party, controlling for *Prior PI*), but we also include the interaction of *ASP* with *Prior PI*. This enables us to test whether the effect of *Prior PI* is stronger where there is an *ASP*. If the effect of institutionalization is primarily transmitted via an *ASP*, we should observe that the marginal effect of *Prior PI* is more positive and significant when *ASP* equals 1. Finally, following Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) we also differentiate between two types of *ASPs* — *ruling* and *reactive* — and investigate whether the effect of authoritarian successor parties is contingent on the *type* of *ASP*. Ruling parties are created long prior to a transition to democracy, while reactive parties are created in anticipation of a transition to democracy (*ibid.*).

To address the potential of omitted variable bias, we also control for a number of other factors that may influence *Institutionalization*. The first control accounts for the level of economic development using the log of GDP per capita, from the Maddison Data Project (Bolt et al. 2018). We also control for the length of the antecedent authoritarian regime, the number of previous regimes (democratic or autocratic episodes) within the country, and the number of elections held during democracy. The duration of the previous regime and count of previous regimes are calculated using changes based on regime failures as coded in the **WTH** and **GWF** datasets. The number of elections held during the democratic period is a

rolling count and comes from V-Dem.

We also use a measure of how democratic the state is using the Polyarchy index from V-Dem. Polyarchy captures five dimensions of democracy: elected officials, free and fair elections, freedom of expression, associational autonomy, and inclusive citizenship (Teorell et al. 2019). While parties are often thought of as key for democracy, there is sufficient conceptual and measured differences between *Institutionalization* and *Polyarchy* which allows us to control the level of democracy without introducing multi-collinearity into our models.

In addition to these measures, we also control for whether the country was a former member of the Soviet Union or a Soviet satellite state (coded by authors). We include these controls to measure any effect that Soviet imperialism may have on the development of party systems in Central and Eastern Europe or Central Asia.

Lastly, we control for the district magnitude of the electoral system to account for the permissiveness of the electoral environment. We use a measure of district magnitude provided by Selway and Self (2016). Selway and Self's measure of district magnitude has two chief advantages over comparable measures. First, it accounts for electoral systems with multiple tiers. Second, it includes data from electoral autocracies and marginal democracies which are excluded from other datasets.¹⁵

Empirical Analysis

We begin the empirical analysis with OLS models where the dependent variable is *Institutionalization* in the first year of democracy for all regimes. These models compare a given category of *Regime* (e.g. One-party or Military) to all other *Regime* categories. We start

¹⁵Selway and Self measure the average district magnitude using the following formula:

$$AvgDistrictMag = \frac{(Seats_1/Districts_1)}{Seats_1/(Seats_1 + Seats_2)} + \frac{(Seats_2/Districts_2)}{Seats_2/(Seats_1 + Seats_2)}$$

by using data drawn from the first year of democratization because we expect the affect of authoritarian legacies to be strongest at the beginning of a democratic regime. We replicate these models for later years under democracy to determine if the effect attenuates over time. We first model the effect of *Regime* on *Institutionalization* and then examine the effect of *Prior PI*, holding the effect of *Regime* constant. Finally we include the level of democracy (*Polyarchy* and *Restrictiveness*) in a third set of model and estimate the effect of *Regime* and *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization*, conditioned on these two additional variables.

We present the results for the three most prominent regime types in **WTH** and **GWF** in Tables 1 and 2. The results of the test of Hypothesis 1 are relatively weak. Using **GWF** data (Table 1) we see the hypothesized positive and significant relationship between party regimes and *Institutionalization* for Model 1, but once we include *Prior PI*, the positive effect of having a party-based regime disappears. By contrast, we find strong support for Hypothesis 2 — *Prior PI* has a large, positive effect on *Institutionalization* across all regime types. The level of institutionalization in a autocratic regime does indeed appear to have a positive effect independent of the antecedent regime type. Lastly, contra our hypotheses we find no relationship between *Restrictions* and subsequent party institutionalization.

For the models using **WTH** data, (Table 2), we again find evidence that the prior level of party institutionalization is significantly correlated with variation in post-democratization party institutionalization *independent* of regime type, consistent with Hypothesis 2. By contrast, we find no support for the regime type hypothesis. In fact, we find that Multi-party regimes are associated with *lower* levels of *Institutionalization* post-democratization while Military regimes are weakly correlated with slightly higher levels of *Institutionalization*. As with **GWF** we find little to no relationship between the degree opposition parties are restricted and subsequent party institutionalization under democracy.¹⁶

¹⁶The findings presented in Tables 1 and 2 are robust to the type of transition — specifically, controlling for whether the democratic transition was elite or mass-driven. A table for these results can be found in Appendix C.

Table 1: Saturated Models - GWF

	<i>Dependent variable: Party Institutionalization</i>								
	Party	Personal	Military	Party	Personal	Military	Party	Personal	Military
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Regime	0.10** (0.05)	-0.17*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.05)	-0.14** (0.06)	0.11** (0.05)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Prior PI				0.38*** (0.10)	0.33*** (0.09)	0.45*** (0.10)	0.27*** (0.08)	0.24*** (0.08)	0.26*** (0.08)
Polyarchy						0.57*** (0.13)	0.55*** (0.13)	0.57*** (0.14)	
Restrictions						-0.14 (0.11)	-0.16 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.11)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89	89
R ²	0.04	0.10	0.001	0.16	0.22	0.20	0.64	0.61	0.62

Controls included are Logged GDP, Prior Regime Duration, Number of Regimes, dummy of whether country is Former Soviet Union, dummy for whether country is former Soviet Satellite State, Count of Elections, and Average District Magnitude. P-values are reported as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table 2: Saturated Models - WTH

	Dependent variable: Party Institutionalization								
	One-party	Multi-party	Military	One-party	Multi-party	Military	One-party	Multi-party	Military
	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Regime	0.06 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.09** (0.04)	0.15** (0.06)	-0.12 (0.08)	-0.11** (0.05)	0.11* (0.06)
Prior PI					0.35*** (0.10)	0.39*** (0.09)	0.48*** (0.10)	0.31*** (0.11)	0.29*** (0.10)
Polyarchy							0.37*** (0.13)	0.42*** (0.14)	0.43*** (0.12)
Restrictions							-0.27** (0.12)	-0.06 (0.13)	-0.17 (0.10)
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70	70
R ²	0.01	0.01	0.0003	0.20	0.25	0.28	0.49	0.49	0.50

Controls included are Logged GDP, Prior Regime Duration, Number of Regimes, dummy of whether country is Former Soviet Union, dummy for whether country is former Soviet Satellite State, Count of Elections, and Average District Magnitude. P-values are reported as: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure 2: Effect of Prior PI on Institutionalization by Regime Type

These results suggest that, as expected, regime type is too crude a category. It is the level of party institutionalization under authoritarianism, regardless of regime type, that strongly correlates with the development of democratic political parties. No matter the regime type, the results from the models presented in Tables 1 and 2 show a strong effect for *Prior PI* across each dataset. Figure 2 plots the coefficients for *Prior PI* for each major regime type, using both datasets. Again, the results suggest that the extent to which parties institutionalize during authoritarian periods shapes post-democratization party institutionalization, *independent* of the antecedent authoritarian regime type and that the estimated effect is consistent across the various regime types.¹⁷

As discussed, the results in Tables 1 and 2 are estimated using data from the first year post-democratization. To measure whether these effects are consistent or attenuate over time, we re-specify the third set of models from each table, but change the dependent variable to the level of *Institutionalization* in the second, fifth, and tenth year following democratization,

¹⁷These results are robust to replacing the saturated models with those which estimate the effect of a given regime vis-à-vis some other specified regime. We found no consistent evidence for the effect of regime type, but do find strong and consistent support for the effect of *Prior PI*. The results from these robustness tests are available upon request.

respectively.¹⁸ We also specify a fourth model in which we take the average of all variables for all available years and model the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization*. We present the coefficients in Figure 3.¹⁹




Figure 3: Effect of Prior PI on Institutionalization Over Time

With these re-specified models, we again find evidence of the positive effect of *Prior PI*. However, we can see that the effect does attenuate somewhat over time. The effect of *Prior PI* is positive and significant in the first and second years (as well as on average), post transition. However, in years 5 and 10 the coefficients are smaller in magnitude and the confidence intervals approach or cross zero.

We turn now to the role of authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) in building democratic party systems. We argued that one possible mechanism connecting authoritarian and democratic party systems is the presence of ASPs. We hypothesized that ASPs should be positively associated with party institutionalization, and that the interaction of *ASP* and *Prior PI* should be positive — the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* is strongest

¹⁸In these models we do not break out regime type as we do in Tables 1 and 2. Instead, we use a control for regime type which is a categorical variable of the major regime types available in **GWF** and **WTH**.

¹⁹Corresponding tables for all figures are available in Appendix B.

where there are also ASPs, and the effect of ASPs is strongest where the level of institutionalization under autocracy was high. To test these hypotheses we first replicate previous models but include a control for whether an authoritarian successor party was present.

We present the results in Figure 4 using both the **GWF** and **WTH** datasets. The figure displays coefficient plots for both *ASP* and *Prior PI* for the first, second, fifth, and tenth years after democratization, along with the average effect across all years of the democratic period. When we control for *Prior PI* we find no evidence that *ASP* has any independent effect, positive or negative, on *Institutionalization* at any point of time post-transition. By contrast, even after controlling for ASPs, the coefficient for *Prior PI* remains positive and significant through the second year post-democratization using both **GWF** and **WTH**, and through the fifth year with **WTH**. Thus, we find additional strong support for the second hypothesis but no support for the independent effect of ASPs (our fourth hypothesis).




Figure 4: Effect of Prior PI and Authoritarian Successor Parties on Institutionalization Over Time

This does not necessarily mean, however, that ASPs do not affect the development of democratic parties. There may be other factors that condition this relationship. Specifically, we hypothesized that the effect of ASPs was conditional on how institutionalized political parties were during the autocratic era. We expect ASPs to matter most when the level of

Prior PI is high. We also test whether the effect of *ASP* is contingent on the *type* of *ASP*, i.e. *ruling successor parties* compared to *reactive successor parties*.

To test these propositions we interact *ASP* with *Prior PI* while controlling for all other variables. In the first stage, we include all *ASPs*, both *reactive* and *ruling* and compare them to systems in which there is no *ASP*. Figure 5 presents the results for the models where we pool across all years of democracy.²⁰ Using this sample we find a positive interaction between *Prior PI* and *ASP*, consistent with hypothesis 5. The results presented in Figure 5 demonstrate two things. On the right-hand side of Figure 5 we see that the presence of an *ASP* increases the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization*. On the left, we see that the effect of *ASP* on *Institutionalization* increases and is positive once *Prior PI* is above 0.25.




Figure 5: All Authoritarian Successor Parties and Prior Level of Party Institutionalization

It may be, however, that the *type* of *ASP* matters for how parties develop following democratization. Loxton and Mainwaring (2018) identifies two types of *ASPs*; those that were *ruling* parties during the authoritarian period and those that are founded in reaction to democratization (*reactive*). To test for a difference between these types of parties we create a dichotomous variable that takes on a value of 1 where there was a *ruling party* *ASP* and 0 otherwise. We then interact *Ruling ASps* with *Prior PI* and examine the marginal effects.

²⁰Regression tables and additional figures are available in Appendix B.

We plot these marginal effects in Figure 6. We observe no marginal effect for ruling ASPs when compared to all other types of parties. This null effect suggests that ruling ASPs do not alter how *Prior PI* affects *Institutionalization* following democratization.




Figure 6: Ruling ASPs vs All Other Parties

However, this result comes from a comparison of systems with *Ruling ASPs* to all other party systems, including those without an ASP. We might argue, however, that a more appropriate test would be a direct comparison between only *ruling* and *reactive* ASPs. Accordingly, we now reduce the sample to only party systems with an ASP — both *reactive* and *ruling* and model the interactive effect of *Ruling ASP* and *Prior PI*. We plot the results in Figure 7. With this sample we find that *ruling* parties have a negative marginal effect on *Institutionalization* when directly compared to *reactive* ASPs and that this effect becomes stronger as the *ruling* party is more institutionalized. This means that well-institutionalized successor parties that ruled during the authoritarian period inhibit the development of parties post-democratization when compared to *reactive* successor parties.

These results are consistent with the argument that a strong authoritarian party, which survives democratization, uses its institutional strength to undermine the development of challenger parties (e.g. Miller 2019). Building on the findings in Self (2018) who found that stronger parties are better at staving off democratization, it would appear that the

stronger parties that are unable to stop democratization, may undermine the development of challenger parties to shore up their power. This is consistent with the logic discussed by Slater and Wong (2013) who argued that strong authoritarian parties agree to a democratic transition because they expect to be able to dominate electoral politics under democracy.




Figure 7: Ruling ASPs vs Reactive ASPs

This finding also helps explain why, in some cases, it appears that the presence of an ASP can catalyze party development in opposition parties, as argued by Riedl (2014) and LeBas (2011), but in other cases it can hinder these parties' development. It appears that less-institutionalized ASPs do have a positive effect on post-democratization party building. These parties set the baseline conditions for party competition, help establish clear party brands, yet do not have the strength to undermine or hamper the development of rival parties. This can be seen in the case of Indonesia. Golkar, the successor party, was fairly institutionalized but lacked the degree of institutionalization necessary to dominate the party system on its own. Instead, other parties mimicked its institutional structure which has resulted in a party system with a similar level of institutionalization amongst its most prominent parties.

Compare the case of Golkar to the Colorado Party in Paraguay where the party was far more institutionalized than the opposition parties. The Colorado Party democratized from

a position of strength – knowing it could dominate elections for the foreseeable future. The party has since used its position of strength to set the rules in its favor — allowing the party to continue to dominate the party system.

If *ruling* ASPs have a negative marginal effect on *Institutionalization* when compared to *reactive* ASPs, do *reactive* ASPs have a different effect on *Institutionalization* when compared to systems without an ASP? We build a model where we sample on *reactive* parties and compare them to systems without an ASP and plot the results in Figure 8. Using this sample we find that *reactive successor parties* have a positive marginal effect on *Institutionalization* when compared to systems without an ASP and that this effect increases as *Prior PI* increases. This suggests that ASPs have a positive effect on *Institutionalization* when former authoritarian elites have an electoral vehicle, but one that does not have the out-sized advantages that *ruling* ASPs often possess. These *reactive* ASPs join a system where they are competing on similar terms as their partisan rivals and thus do not appear to undermine the development of other parties.




Figure 8: Reactive Successor Parties vs All Other Parties

As a final test we look at whether the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* is contingent on the type of democratic transition. We might presume that the organizational and reputational assets parties develop under authoritarianism are more likely to survive a

pacted, top-down democratic transition compared to bottom-up democratization. On the other hand, if Slater and Wong (2013) are right, then top-down transitions may signal a belief by authoritarian elite that they can control and dominate post-transition politics, including defeating or subduing potential party rivals. We thus use data from **GWF** on the type of democratic transition and create a binary indicator of whether the transition was top-down or bottom-up initiated.²¹ Using this data we model the interactive effect of the democratization process and the prior level of party institutionalization. If bottom-up democratization disrupts or distorts the legacy of authoritarian party politics then the interaction coefficient should be positive. If top-down democratization allows ruling parties to shape the democratic party system in their favor then we should observe a negative interaction.

We estimate this relationship and plot the marginal effects in Figure 9. The results are striking. We find a significant negative coefficient on the interaction term. The right-hand side plots the marginal effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* when democratization is elite-driven. The effect of *Prior PI* is actually weaker under top-down democratization, though the effect is still positive and significant. Similarly, this analysis also shows that the effect of elite-driven democratization on *Institutionalization* is negative and becomes more so as *Prior PI* becomes stronger (left-hand side). This shows that when elites push for democratization and are endowed with a strong party, there are negative consequences for the subsequent party development. This is more evidence in support of the story highlighted above, with *ruling* parties having detrimental effects for democratic party development. It also appears that if there isn't popular pressure against the regime the incumbent party inhibits robust party development. This fits with a story of an incumbent ruling party manipulating the conditions of party competition under democracy for its benefit.

²¹Using **GWF** transitions coded as 2 (election loss), 4 (popular uprising), or 6 (revolution/civil war) are considered bottom-up. Cases coded as 1 (elite), 3 (incumbent resignation), 5 (coup), 7 (foreign invasion), or 8 (succession) are considered top-down processes. All other cases are dropped.




Figure 9: Marginal Effect of Type of Democratization Given Prior Institutionalization

Implications

Our findings show clear evidence of authoritarian legacies. We find that the institutions, patterns, and characteristics that are established under authoritarian rule continue to shape political life after a transition to democracy. Our results also indicate *which* institutions matter for the development of strong democratic parties. Contrary to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) we find little evidence that authoritarian regime type shapes how political conflict is institutionalized within a party system following democratization. By contrast, there is abundant evidence that the level of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period explains much of the variation in party institutionalization post-democratization. This effect is *independent* of the antecedent authoritarian regime type yet modified by the *type* of authoritarian successor party.

Why doesn't the antecedent regime more strongly correlate with the variation in post-democratization party development? As we mentioned earlier, one possibility is that regime typologies developed by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013), while useful for many purposes, do not reflect the dimensions that are most germane for explaining party development after a transition. The designation of party-

based regimes merely reflects the relative position of parties within a given authoritarian regime vis-à-vis other institutions which organize authoritarian power. In other words, these typologies reveal how central a party or parties were to authoritarian rule, but they do not provide information about how developed the party or parties themselves were. Our results suggest that characteristics of the parties themselves matter more than overall regime type.

We identified several possible mechanisms connecting autocratic and democratic party systems. Due to data constraints we were only able to investigate empirically two of these mechanisms — opposition incentives and the presence of an authoritarian successor party. We found no support for the opposition incentives operationalized as restrictions on the opposition. The story for ASPs is more complex. While we find no support for an independent effect of an ASP on party institutionalization post-transition, we did find some evidence that the presence of an ASP and the level of party institutionalization under autocracy interact to shape the level of party institutionalization under democracy. We find that strong *ruling* ASPs are associated with low levels of party institutionalization post-democratization. Strong ruling parties which survive democratization appear to undermine the development of other parties. On the other hand, *reactive* ASPs are associated with increases in party institutionalization. As mentioned before, we argue that this is due to these elites bringing with them expertise as well as distinct brands without also carrying into democracy a party which will work to undermine the development of other parties out of self-interest.

This finding is important to evaluate in the context of recent work done by Riedl (2014) and LeBas (2011), Slater and Wong (2013), and Miller (2019). Parties which democratize from a position of strength can pose a danger to the development of other parties and to democracy itself. While parties can certainly raise the bar and induce opponents to coalesce, as Riedl (2014) and LeBas (2011) suggest, this can become a negative factor if the surviving party is *too* strong to where it can use its strength to undermine its competitors.

Our findings also have implications for the way we study democratization and democratic consolidation. Schattschneider famously argued that democracy without parties is

“unthinkable”(1942). There is a consensus that when parties are weak, democracy is also imperiled (Bernhard et al. 2015). This research sheds greater light as to why some parties, and ergo some democracies, may fail. Where democracies emerge following an authoritarian period in which parties were banned or severely constrained, the ability for these new democracies to develop well-functioning parties seems less likely. This, in turn, reduces the prospects of democratic consolidation. Yet, where authoritarian successor parties are too strong, democracy may also suffer (see. Miller 2019).

Finally, we acknowledge that while the results of our study suggest that antecedent party institutionalization matters, institutionalization is a multi-faceted concept that is difficult to operationalize. We believe our measure of *Institutionalization* is an improvement over prior measures but it is true that use of the index means we can’t precisely identify exactly which dimensions of party institutionalization matter most or how these dimensions may interact. This is something we hope to explore in more detail in future work, but as a first cut we analyzed the separate components used to construct this *Prior PI* index (results are provided in the appendix due to space issues). We find that two components are associated with increases in *Institutionalization* when using both **GWF** and **WTH** data — distinct party platforms and the level of party cohesion. In light of the findings regarding ASPs and the difference between *reactive* and *ruling* parties, this is intuitive. It is not necessarily the survival of a party organization *per se* but the presence of clear and distinct options that induces politicians, both incumbents and challengers, to invest in party building.

Conclusion

The argument that democracies are affected by authoritarian legacies is not new. Previously, other scholars have argued that authoritarian legacies affect the path of democratization (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bunce and Wolchik 2011), the creation of reserve domains (Valenzuela 1990; Linz and Stepan 1996; Geddes 1999b), the way political conflict is institutionalized (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997), or how the

opposition coordinates and coalesces following democratization (Riedl 2014; LeBas 2011). However, our understanding about how these legacies affect the specific institution of political parties was unclear. Does regime type affect democratic party development? Under what circumstances do these regimes encourage or inhibit party formation and development following democratization?

We find strong evidence that the level of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period has a strong, positive association with post-democratization party development. Independent of regime type — whether dominant party, neo-patrimonial, or military — if parties institutionalized during the authoritarian period, subsequent democratic parties are also more institutionalized. We also find some evidence that the legacy of party institutionalization under autocracy depends on whether the successor party is a former ruling party which survives democratization or a party which was built in reaction to democratization. This holds significant implications for the literature emerging on authoritarian successor parties and authoritarian legacies.

While the persistence of party institutionalization through democratization is not necessarily counter-intuitive, we are the first to uncover empirical evidence that this is the case. In addition, our finding that party institutionalization is independent of regime types is a novel contribution to the discussion of authoritarianism and authoritarian legacies.

Our results also point to the importance of looking beyond regime type. Regime typologies attempt to simplify broad amalgamations of institutions in non-democracies to facilitate the analysis of complex regimes. By doing so, however, we ignore the extent to which institutions vary within a given type of authoritarian regime. These institutions vary in how developed or strong they are and how, by extension, they affect the behavior and pattern of institutions post-democratization. Moving forward, scholars of authoritarianism and authoritarian legacies should be willing to move beyond these general typologies as the research question requires.²² Scholars should instead continue to identify how individual

²²This is not to say that this research has not been fruitful. For example, Geddes' (1999a)

institutions, and their interactions, matter for the behavior of authoritarian regimes and subsequent authoritarian legacies.

findings of variation in authoritarian regime survival by regime type has spurred significant research into authoritarianism and this impact should not be undersold.

References

- Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 2018. *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108185950.
- Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why parties? The origin and transformation of party politics in America*. Vol. 15. Cambridge Univ Press.
- Bernhard, Michael, et al. 2015. “Institutional subsystems and the survival of democracy: do political and civil society matter?” *V-Dem Working Paper* 4. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b2/08/b208c64e-53e1-4203-bb34-5f3adc8674c0/v-dem_working_paper_2015_4.pdf.
- Bizzarro, Fernando, Allen Hicken, and Darin Self. 2017. “The V-Dem Party Institutionalization Index: a new global indicator (1900-2015)”. *V-Dem Working Paper Series* 48. <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2968265>.
- Bizzarro, Fernando, et al. 2018. “Party strength and economic growth”. *World Politics* 70 (2): 275–320.
- Bolt, Jutta, et al. 2018. “Rebasing Maddison: new income comparisons and the shape of long-run economic development”. https://irs.princeton.edu/sites/irs/files/Rebasing%5C%20Maddison_May_2017.pdf.
- Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 1994. “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa”. *World politics* 46 (04): 453–489.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie J, and Sharon L Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating authoritarian leaders in postcommunist countries*. Cambridge University Press.

Caul, Miki. 1999. "Women's representation in parliament: The role of political parties".

Party Politics 5 (1): 79–98.

Coppedge, Michael, et al. 2017. "Varieties of Democracy: Codebook v7". *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project*. <https://www.v-dem.net/en/reference/version-7-1-july-2017/>.

Dettman, Sebastian. 2018. "Dilemmas of Opposition: Building Parties and Coalitions in Multiethnic Malaysia". In *Presented at Annual Southeast Asia Research Group Meeting*. http://seareg.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/SEAREG_Dettman_final.pdf.

Frantz, Erica, and Barbara Geddes. 2016. "The legacy of dictatorship for democratic parties in Latin America". *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 8 (1): 3–32.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political institutions under dictatorship*. Cambridge University Press Cambridge.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ora John Reuter. 2013. "The incentives for pre-electoral coalitions in non-democratic elections". *Democratization* 20 (1): 137–159.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999a. "Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game theoretic argument". In *annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta*, vol. 2. https://eppam.weebly.com/uploads/5/5/6/2/5562069/authoritarianbreakdown_geddes.pdf.

— . 1999b. "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual review of political science* 2 (1): 115–144.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set". *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (02): 313–331.

Grzymala-Busse, Anna M. 2002. *Redeeming the communist past: The regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press.

- Ishiyama, John, and Tun-jen Cheng. 2006. “Strategizing party adaptation: The case of the Kuomintang”. *Party Politics* 12 (3): 367–394.
- Kitschelt, Herbert, and Matthew Singer. 2015. “Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Legacy Parties under Conditions of Democratic Party Competition”. Kellogg Institute for International Studies. <https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2017/09/Kitschelt-Singer-09-28-FARP-manuscript-HKMMS.pdf>.
- LeBas, Adrienne. 2011. *From protest to parties: party-building and democratization in Africa*. Oxford University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2002. “The rise of competitive authoritarianism”. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 51–65.
- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A Way. 2010. *Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the cold war*. Cambridge University Press.
- Levitsky, Steven, et al. 2016. *Challenges of party-building in Latin America*. Cambridge University Press.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred C Stepan. 1996. “Toward consolidated democracies”. *Journal of Democracy* 7 (2): 14–33.
- Loxton, James. 2015a. “Authoritarian Successor Parties”. *Journal of Democracy* 26 (3): 157–170.
- . 2015b. “Authoritarian Successor Parties: A Framework for Analysis”. Kellogg Institute for International Studies. <https://kellogg.nd.edu/documents/8706>.
- Loxton, James, and Scott Mainwaring. 2018. *Life after Dictatorship: Authoritarian Successor Parties Worldwide*. Cambridge University Press.
- Lupu, Noam. 2014. “Brand dilution and the breakdown of political parties in Latin America”. *World Politics* 66 (04): 561–602.

Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. “Political order and one-party rule”. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13:123–143.

Mainwaring, Scott. 2015. “Party system institutionalization: Reflections based on the Asian cases”. *Party system institutionalization in Asia: Democracies autocracies and the shadows of the past*: 204–227.

— . 2018. *Party Systems in Latin America: Institutionalization, Decay, and Collapse*. Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, Timothy R Scully, et al. 1995. *Building democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin America*. Cambridge Univ Press.

Miller, Michael K. 2019. “Don’t call it a comeback: Autocratic ruling parties after democratization”. *British Journal of Political Science*: 1–25.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political parties: organization and power*. Cambridge University Press.

Pemstein, Daniel, et al. 2018. “The V-Dem measurement model: latent variable analysis for cross-national and cross-temporal expert-coded data”. *V-Dem Working Paper* 21. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/60/a5/60a52aaaf-008c-4d80-82ca-3bca827fbeb9/v-dem_working_paper_2019_21_4.pdf.

Riedl, Rachel Beatty. 2014. *Authoritarian origins of democratic party systems in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Schattschneider, Elmer Eric. 1942. *Party government*. Transaction Publishers.

Self, Darin. 2018. “Survival Through Strength: How Strong Party Organizations Help Authoritarian Regimes Survives”. In *Presented at 2018 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. <https://dsself.github.io/files/apsa2018.pdf>.

- Selway, Joel, and Darin Self. 2016. “Datasets, Definitions, and Coding Decisions: Assessing the Effect of Electoral Rules.” In *Presented at 2016 Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. <https://dsself.github.io/publication/mpsa2016>.
- Slater, Dan, and Joseph Wong. 2013. “The strength to concede: ruling parties and democratization in developmental Asia”. *Perspectives on Politics* 11 (03): 717–733.
- Tavits, Margit. 2013. *Post-communist democracies and party organization*. Cambridge University Press.
- Teorell, Jan, et al. 2019. “Measuring polyarchy across the globe, 1900–2017”. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 54 (1): 71–95.
- Valenzuela, Julio Samuel. 1990. *Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: notion, process, and facilitating conditions*. Vol. 150. University of Notre Dame.
- Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 2013. “Authoritarian regime types revisited: updated data in comparative perspective”. *Contemporary Politics* 19 (1): 19–34.
- Weiss, Meredith. 2020. *The Roots of Resilience: Authoritarian Acculturation in SE Asia*. Cornell University Press.