Authoritarian Legacies and Democratic Party Building

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Abstract

Previous work on authoritarian regimes posits that these regimes bequeath a variety of legacies to their democratic successors. This paper investigates the extent to which antecedent conditions of authoritarian regimes, specifically choices over how to structure the authoritarian regime, building a ruling party, and allowing (circumscribed) multi-party competition, shapes the degree of party institutionalization that emerges after democratization. Using data on party and antecedent authoritarian regime characteristics, we find little evidence that the structure of the authoritarian regime as a whole is associated with variation in post-democratization party development. We do find, however, ample evidence that, independent of the antecedent regime type, the extent to which authoritarian parties are institutionalized affects the degree to which subsequent democratic parties institutionalize.[1]

[1]**Do not cite without author permission**

Introduction

In 1998, after decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia's New Order regime came to an abrupt end. Despite the tumultuous end of the New Order regime, the three parties that were allowed to function during the authoritarian period survived democratization. Even amidst the social and political upheaval that plagued Indonesia following the New Order, these three parties anchored electoral competition and continue to function as important parties in Indonesia's party system today. While Indonesia's parties and party system are far from highly institutionalized, they stand in far better shape than those found in its neighbor – the Philippines. Unlike in Indonesia, there was little space for partisan competition under the Marcos dictatorship. The regime actively undermined party building attempts by the opposition and made little investment in a party of its own. After the fall of Marcos the Philippines experienced a proliferation of new and returning parties, each of which failed to institutionalize – leaving the party system utterly inchoate.[2] The juxtaposition of these two cases highlights that the development of *democratic* political parties may be tied to some *authoritarian* past. In this work we explore the ways and extent to which authoritarianism influences the development of democratic political parties.

This is certainly not the first attempt to identify authoritarian legacies. Other scholars have pointed to ways in which democracy may be affected by some authoritarian past. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994, 1997), for example, argue that there is a continuity of institutions across authoritarian and democratic regimes. The

[2]Prior to Marcos, the Philippines had a relatively stable party system but underwent complete deinstitutionalization as Marcos moved to build a patrimonial regime.

structure of the authoritarian regime, or the composition of institutions, affects the dynamics of how political conflict is contested during democratic transition. Other scholars argue that it is not the structure of the *regime* that matters, but rather the manner in which *parties* are organized and professionalized during the authoritarian period that affects the development of subsequent democratic political parties (Grzymala-Busse, 2002).

We contribute to this literature on authoritarian legacies by investigating these two potential links between authoritarian and democratic regimes: 1) whether the structure of the regime (i.e. military or party) affects subsequent democratic party development, and/or 2) whether building parties under authoritarianism, independent of regime type, explains variance in party institutionalization post-democratization. Using cross-sectional data and regression analysis, We find that the degree of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period explains post-democratic party institutionalization, while regime type itself has no such explanatory power. On average, institutionalized authoritarian parties are associated with more institutionalized parties post-democratization *independent of antecedent authoritarian regime type*. This holds for military, dominant-party, single-party, multi-party, or personalistic authoritarian regimes that precede democracy.

Political parties are considered key institutions necessary for democratic stability and consolidation. These findings help clarify why some post-authoritarian democracies are better able to navigate the difficult terrain of democratization than others. This research also demonstrates that work on authoritarian legacies can benefit from more precisely identifying the specific institutional pathways through which author-

itarian legacies persist, rather than relying on more general characteristics of regime types. Focusing on the general composition of authoritarian institutions masks how various institutions *within* these regimes shape the subsequent democratic environment.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we build two theories that provide a possible explanation for how authoritarian legacies may affect the institutionalization of democratic political parties. After developing the observable implications of these theories we outline the research design used to test our hypotheses. Following this, we present the results of the empirical exercises and follow-up with a discussion of the implications of our findings. We then draw some conclusions based on this research and offer some steps forward.

Democratic Parties and Their Authoritarian Precursors

Most democracies do not emerge *de novo* and often inherit actors and institutions, such as political parties, from their authoritarian predecessor. This is especially the case in the post-WWII era as more authoritarian regimes began to allow or employ parties. Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) and Gandhi and Reuter (2013) find that, of autocratic regimes that existed from 1950-2006, over 50% maintained single or hegemonic party systems. These parties, or the individuals that sustained them, often survive democratization and continue to participate within the democratic system. When these actors and organizations continue to participate within the democratic regime they can become critical factors that influence the formation, development, and survival these democratic systems.

This analysis focuses on how authoritarian legacies influence post-authoritarian democratic party building. Working from Huntington (1968) and Panebianco (1988), we define party institutionalization as the extent to which parties build stable organizations, prioritize party interests over individual elites' short term interests, and are linked to society.[3]

In this section, we develop two theories which outline pathways through which authoritarian legacies may influence subsequent democratic party institutionalization. The first concerns the regime type or the manner in which political competition was institutionalized during the authoritarian period. The second pathway is focused on the extent to which authoritarian regimes allow, develop, or inherit, political parties. We begin by discussing the first pathway and how this may influence the development of democratic political parties.

How Authoritarian Political Institutions Persist

Regimes are configurations of different institutions (such as the state, parties, legislatures, courts, and security forces) which structure political competition. In authoritarian regimes, how political competition is structured during authoritarian rule may influence how elites and masses contest politics post-democratization. Both Levitsky and Way (2010) and Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argue that the capabilities of authoritarian incumbents to stem the tide of democratization come from the institutions built during authoritarian regimes. Where institutions improve incumbents' ability to coordinate and outmaneuver the opposition, democratization often stalls. Even

[3]To be clear, the focus of this analysis is on party institutionalization – not party *system* institutionalization.

when democratization occurs, autocrats may work to embed authoritarian institutions within the nascent democratic institutional framework (Geddes, 1999b).

Another feature of authoritarian regimes that can cast a post-transition shadow is the pattern of political competition.Bratton and Van de Walle (1994, 1997) argue that autocrats promote certain mechanisms and patterns of political contestation within the authoritarian regime. These mechanisms influence who has access to power and resources and this in turn affects how politics are contested at the elite and mass level. They further contend that the institutions which structure political contestation during authoritarianism persist even after democratization and can weaken democracy's foundation (ibid.).

While these authors identify different types of authoritarian legacies, (institutions and patterns of competition) they do not explicitly link these legacies to the subsequent development of democratic institutions such as parties. LeBas (2011) takes up this challenge and argues that the way in which authoritarian regimes structure alliances, in a bid to maintain power, impacts the ability of these allies to organize and form stable parties after democratization.

This focus on authoritarian regime type has generated a number of typologies to describe the variance of institutions within authoritarian regimes. Two of the most influential have been developed by Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). These typologies categorize authoritarian systems into personalistic, military, party (GWF), dominant party (WTH), and multi-party authoritarian regime types.[4] We posit that *the level of post-democratization party in-*

[4]Along with other minor/combinations of regime types.

stitutionalization depends, in part, upon whether the antecedent authoritarian regimes channeled political conflict through political parties.

So how might authoritarian regime type shape the paths of democratic party building? Regimes that concentrate significant power in the hands of individuals, sometimes referred to as neo-patrimonial (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) or personalistic Geddes (1999b) regimes, often fail to develop cohesive and professional organizations that are linked to society and can help solve collective action and social choice issues.[5] Instead, elites in these regimes actively undermine the formation and development of institutions that may challenge their power. Upon democratization, given the lack of robust organizations with societal links, political contestation is likely to center around powerful individuals who have significant means to contest politics, to the detriment of creating institutionalized political parties.

Like personalized regimes, military regimes should be associated with lower levels of party institutionalization post-democratization (relative to regimes with parties). These regimes inhibit party institutionalization because they seek to control politics via military institutions and coercion rather than managing conflict via parties. The politicization of the military may have a significant impact on how politics is conducted within the political arena beyond the end of the regime. With the military playing a primary role in politics, officers see themselves as legitimate participants in the political arena. Stepping in and directly participating in politics becomes normalized and, possibly, expected. This norm can easily persist into the democratic period. The militarization of politics, then, provides an alternative to parties for

[5]Aldrich (1995) argues that parties emerge to solve these two dilemmas at the elite level.

actors seeking access to power. The result is less investment in party building as politically ambitious actors pursue power by developing reputations through military careers or via alliances with the military.

This theory suggests, then, that actors emerging from either personalist or military regimes are likely to continue along the path charted during the authoritarian period. Even should actors choose to divert from this path and begin building parties, their capacity to do so should be relatively more limited. Building parties is a difficult undertaking and fails more often than succeeds (Levitsky, Loxton, Van Dyck, and Domínguez, 2016). Regime elites and their opponents emerging from these authoritarian regimes are more likely to lack the necessary material and/or ideational resources necessary to building institutionalized democratic parties. This leaves these democracies with weaker parties relative to parties that emerge following party-based authoritarian regimes.

For democracies that follow authoritarian regimes with political parties, whether single or dominant, post-democratization party building should fare better.[6] First, actors who otherwise would undermine party-centered political competition are more likely to be marginalized or depoliticized. For example, under party rule, the security apparatus is more likely to be subjected to civilian control and less politicized than under military or personalized regimes. Security actors are more likely to continue to be sidelined politically entering the democratic period if they were depoliticized during the authoritarian period. Similarly, under party-based authoritarian rule

[6]In single party regimes only the regime party is legally allowed (e.g. Vietnam). Under dominant party regimes opposition parties are allowed but the party of the regime dominates the political arena (e.g. Singapore)

personal power is de-emphasized in favor of party institutions. This diminishes the influence of individual political actors, potentially making it more difficult for actors to relying solely on personal clout to win political office.

A second reason why democratic party building should fare better following party-based authoritarian rule is the presence of a norm of contesting politics via political parties. Whether in single party regimes or (restricted/dominant) multi-party regimes, actors learn to build and then contest power via parties. Following democratization, political actors are likely to continue to contest power via familiar means (i.e. parties) rather than turning towards forms of contestation that are more unfamiliar and risky.

Lastly, party-based authoritarian rule centers political life around the party. This means opponents to the regime are likely to mobilize against the party – sometimes in the form of opposition parties. Should authoritarian parties survive democratization, this creates a focal point for partisan competition during the democratic period as well. The presence of an authoritarian successor party in the democratic system induces the opposition to coalesce and build parties themselves in order to compete (LeBas, 2011; Riedl, 2014). We explore he influence of authoritarian successor parties more fully in the next section.

Party Institutionalization under Authoritarianism

As discussed above, one way in which authoritarianism may influence post-democratization party development is via the presence of institutionalized authoritarian parties which survive democratization. The survival and success of authoritarian parties should be



Figure 1: Distribution of Party Institutionalization Across Regime Types

given greater consideration in the development of democratic parties. Preliminary work by Loxton (2018) shows that of 68 countries that underwent a democratic transition from 1974 to 2010, 47 produced a prominent authoritarian successor party.[7] Of these 47 cases, there are 38 in which the authoritarian successor party returned to power. The empirical reality of authoritarian successor parties surviving and thriving in democracies suggests that, in order to understand party institutionalization within democracies, we must look at the role authoritarian parties have on the parties that exist in democratic party systems.

We argue that where authoritarian successor parties (ASPs) adapt and survive a democratic transition they then serve as an anchor and focal point to party com-

[7]Loxton (2018) codes an Authoritarian Successor Party as prominent if it wins at least 10% of the vote in an election following democratization.

petition within the democratic context.[8] We hypothesize that the existence an ASP brings added stability to the fledgling party system, both through its own level of institutionalization but also by providing incentives for competitors to develop stronger, more institutionalized parties in order to compete with the ASP.

First, authoritarian successor parties carry a robust organization and strong brand with them into the democratic period, provided of course they choose not to run from their past. The continuation of the party brand helps reduce the costs to voters when identifying party positions (Lupu, 2014) across the parties competing in the new electoral marketplace. The robust organization enables the party to continue to attract candidates and mobilize voters, even though the playing field is no longer tilted in its favor. In other words, where there are ASPs there is likely at least one party in the system with a fair degree of institutionalized.

As second way that ASPs may boost party institutionalization post-democratic transition is by inducing other parties to coordinate and invest in party building. Even prior to the democratic transition institutionalized authoritarian parties may prompt the opposition to coordinate and form their own opposition party(s) in order to compete. But, the lack of a free and fair electoral environment necessarily limits the amount that opposition actors are willing to invest in party building. However, post transition, with a level electoral playing field, opposition forces have the incentive to coalesce and form stable coalitions (Riedl, 2014) to compete against a more institutionalized authoritarian successor party. In effect, the existence of an institutionalized authoritarian party increases the "environmental hostility" (Tavits, 2013,

[8]This may be true of well-institutionalized opposition parties as well.

p. 159) of the political system, which then induces opposition parties to become more institutionalized in a bid to compete and win elections.

Our ASP argument is distinct from the authoritarian regime type argument discussed in the previous section. Specifically, we argue that the affect of ASP on democratic party institutionalization is *independent* of the authoritarian regime type. For example, party-based authoritarian regimes that do not give rise to ASPs are less likely to generate institutionalized parties than party-based regimes which do birth ASPs. Similarly, we expect that ASPs will have a positive effect on party institutionalization under democracy, even if the the prior authoritarian regime type is primarily coded as military or personal. In other words, it is the *survival* and *adaptation* of authoritarian parties within a democratic system that produces the salutary effects on institutionalization, rather than the prior authoritarian regime type.

But what factors shape whether authoritarian successor parties are able to successfully transition to democracy? The attributes discussed in the existing literature touch on a number of factors. For example, Grzymala-Busse (2002) argues that parties which are highly professionalized during authoritarian rule are better able to remain cohesive and adapt to democratization without becoming fatally tied to the ideological preferences of past elites. More generally, the level of organizational capacity developed during authoritarian rule affects the probability that an authoritarian party will survive a transition to democracy. During authoritarian rule elites and voters have incentives to form alliances and remain loyal to the ruling party, but ruling parties vary in the "thickness" of these organizations. In other words, some authoritarian leaders choose to institutionalize parties, while others do not. The

more institutionalized the ruling party, the more likely it is that the party will be successful post-transition.

Ruling parties are in a good position to make the kinds on investments that help the party compete after democratization (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). For example, ruling parties can draw on state and economic ties to create large, robust support networks (Kitschelt and Singer, 2015), including financial support networks (Ishiyama and Cheng, 2006). Additionally, these parties have the ability to build local bases of support (e.g. local branches) — opportunities that may be denied the opposition due to legal restrictions or lack of resources(Slater and Wong, 2013). Overall, recent work demonstrates that successful authoritarian successor parties tend to be those that are cohesive, have territorial organization, boast clientelistic networks, and rely on developed economic ties (Loxton, 2015a,b). We hypothesize that where authoritarian regimes invest in party organization during the authoritarian period, those parties will be more likely to persist into the democratic period. Further, the presence of the ASPs will be associated with higher levels of party institutionalization post-democratization.

The theory developed herein leads to four observable implications.

1. **Regime type**: Compared to regimes that eschew party building, authoritarian regimes which channel political conflict through parties will have higher levels of party institutionalization.

2. **Prior Institutionalization**: Higher levels of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period will be associated with higher levels of party institutionalization following democratization.

3. Higher levels of institutionalization in authoritarian eras will be positively related to the presence of ASPs post-transition.

4. The level party institutionalization will be higher in democracies where ASPs are present.

The first two hypotheses concern the overall pattern we expect to see, a while the latter two focus on the mechanisms. In this version of the paper we focus on hypotheses 1 and 2, leaving the investigation of the ASP mechanism to future iterations.

Caveats and Alternative Explanations

Before outlining the research design we discuss some challenges inherent in linking democratic party outcomes to an authoritarian past. First, as we alluded to, even if some authoritarian regimes allow parties to operate, the political system, by definition, is not entirely open and fair (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 2010). As Mainwaring, Scully, et al. (1995) notes, in autocracies only the ruling party is usually granted much autonomy which limits the analytic utility of speaking of a party *system* within this context. Even where autocrats allow opposition parties (e.g. Suharto's Indonesia or Putin's Russia), autocrats game the system to prevent opposition parties from competing on the same terms as the ruling party. This may create the appearance of stable institutionalized parties. However, the stability of the party system may be more of a function of the authoritarian regime than the level of intrinsic party

institutionalization.[9]

Although authoritarian regimes restrict full party and party system institutionalization, it is still analytically useful to examine the degree to which individual parties, both pro-regime and opposition parties, develop thick organizations with roots embedded in society. Because *inter-party* competition is circumscribed, this analysis focuses on individual party institutionalization.

A second challenge flows from the fact that authoritarian parties themselves may not be fully autonomous organizations. While this is true, our measure of party institutionalization should reflect differences in organizational autonomy, so that less autonomous ruling parties are viewed as less institutionalized than their more autonomous counterparts. What's more, even if authoritarian parties are not fully autonomous there is variation in the extent to which they possess ideological, ideational, and material resources that can can survive democratization.

Finally, even if authoritarian *parties* are able to rely on inherited institutionalization, our question is not just about individual authoritarian successor parties, but about all parties in the democratic system. We argue that the presence of ASPs should spur other parties to invest in party building (see also Tavits (2013); Riedl (2014). However, it is possible we are wrong–that the institutionalization of a single party within a system does not necessarily lead to the institutionalization of the party system or other parties within the system (Randall and Svåsand, 2002). In the end this is an empirical question — one which we explore below.

[9]Typically, institutionalization is measured using metrics that capture the stability of a party or party system (e.g. party age or vote share). However, because the stability of parties may be artificial or endogenous, these metrics are not valid measures of institutionalization within authoritarian party systems.

Identifying Authoritarian Legacies

As previously mentioned the focus of this paper is to identify how authoritarian legacies influence the development of democratic political parties. Identifying the effect of an authoritarian legacy at the macro level of party systems is best accomplished using an observational approach. Drawing on cross-section of data about antecedent regimes and the degree of authoritarian party institutionalization, we use OLS regression to estimate the effect of these legacies. In these models we include both potential channels of an authoritarian legacy to test whether one has an effect independent of the other, whether the effect of one is larger than the other, or whether there is any measurable effect whatsoever on party institutionalization.

We use a cross-section instead of a panel for two reasons. First, both explanatory variables are constant as they are indicators of some past characteristic. Second, the outcome variable, party institutionalization, is also fairly stable over time. Because the high level of autocorrelation of the response variable would bias the estimates, we limit the data to cross-sections within specified points of time following democratization (e.g. one year, five years, etc).

The unit of analysis in this study is the party system in a given democracy which was preceded by an authoritarian regime. Although the unit of analysis is the party system, we do not measure the institutionalization of the system as a whole. The latter generally includes an information about the pattern of *inter-party* competition. Instead, we focus on the level of *intra-party* institutionalization, and leave for other work the effects of authoritarian legacies on the pattern of inter-party competition (Mainwaring et al., 1995). Party institutionalization is the extent to which parties

develop complex and stable organizations and establish links to society. Ideally, we would measure the level of institutionalization for each party within the system but this is not possible due to data limitations.

Instead, to measure party institutionalization, we use an index recently developed by Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self (2017) – *Party Institutionalization* – which was developed using data from the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al., 2017) (henceforth V-dem). V-dem uses expert surveys to code a number of dimensions thought pertinent to democracy. For *Party Institutionalization*, experts were asked to code a number of factors relevant to parties. This included coding the degree to which parties have permanent national organizations, whether parties have local branches, whether parties use clientelistic or programmatic linkages, whether parties have distinct platforms, and the degree of legislative party cohesion. Using Bayesian Factor Analysis Bizzarro, Hicken, and Self (2017) create a metric of party institutionalization (normally distributed from 0-1) which estimates the average level of party institutionalization within a given party system across all regime types – both democratic and authoritarian.

To measure the effect on *Institutionalization* of our first authoritarian legacies channel, the antecedent regime type, we use two datasets that categorize authoritarian regime types – *Regime*.[10] *Regime* is a dichotomous variable and is drawn from either the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius,

[10]For this study we do not use categories or data developed in Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) because they frame authoritarian power as a question of military vs civilian vs monarchy. This ignores the various ways through which authoritarian control can be exercised through civilian means.

2013) (henceforth **WTH**)[11] or the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014) (henceforth **GWF**)[12]. Table 1 provides a breakdown of the types of authoritarian regimes in both **GWF** and **WTH**, and includes the number and duration of regime types, regime failures, how many regimes democratized, and whether or not a regime is still a democracy.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Regime Types

	Dataset:					
	WTH			*GWF*		
Regime	Military	Multi-party	One-party	Military	Party	Personal
Total	95	135	58	63	80	81
% Total	32.99	46.88	20.14	28.12	35.71	36.16
Duration	11.31	11.01	13.97	7.07	21.38	11.94
Failed	81	83	46	61	55	56
Democratize	20	50	10	43	24	21
% Democratize	21.05	37.04	17.24	68.25	30.00	25.93
Still Democracy	10	31	7	20	16	16
% Still Democracy	50.00	64.58	70.00	42.55	66.67	61.54
Demo Duration	12.74	7.37	13.08	13.08	8.09	13.64

The second potential channel for an authoritarian legacy is through the prior level of party institutionalization. To measure the level of prior party institutionalization we compute the average level of party institutionalization for up to 10 years prior to democratization (henceforth *Prior PI*) and link this to the subsequent democratic regime.

[11]From **WTH** we use democracies with antecedent authoritarian regimes coded as One-party, Multi-party, and Military.

[12]From **GWF** we use democracies with antecedent authoritarian regimes coded as Military, Party, and Personal.

To reduce the potential of omitted variable bias, we also control for a number of other factors that may influence *Institutionalization*. The first control accounts for the level of economic development using the log of GDP per capita drawn from the V-dem dataset for the given year. We also control for the length of the antecedent authoritarian regime, and a count of previous regimes within the country. These last two controls are calculated using changes based on regime failures as coded in their respective datasets.

Empirical Models

We begin the empirical analysis with saturated OLS models where data is restricted into a cross-section of the first year of democracy for all regimes. These saturated models compare a given category of *Regime* (e.g. One-party or Military) to all other categories found in *Regime* for either **WTH** or **GWF**. We start by using data drawn from the first year of democratization because we expect the affect of authoritarian legacies to be strongest at the beginning of a democratic regime. We replicate these models for later years in democracy to determine if this effect varies over time. Using this data, we first model the effect of *Regime* on *Institutionalization* to test whether there is a correlation between the two variables. We then introduce *Prior PI* to measure how this affects *Institutionalization* contingent on *Regime*, and then introduce the remaining controls in a third model to estimate the effect of *Regime* and *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization*.

Below, we present the results for the three most prominent regime types in **WTH** and **GWF** by model stage in Tables 2 and 3. The first stage models in Table 2 sup-

port the hypothesis that *Regime* affects *Institutionalization*. This effect, however, runs counter to our expectations when controlling for the prior level of institutionalization and other factors. These models estimate *Party* regimes have a weak negative effect on post-democratization *Institutionalization* while the effect of military regimes is expected to be positive.

For the models using **WTH** coding of authoritarianism, found in Table 3, we again find evidence that the prior level of institutionalization explains much of the variation in post-democratization party institutionalization. In these models, this effect is found to be stronger in systems following Military regimes. As with the models using **GWF** data, we again find that *Institutionalization* is expected to be higher following Military regimes but negative following either single or multi-party regimes – although these findings are statistically weak.

This evidence suggests that, relative to all other regime types, Military regimes (using both **WTF** and **GWF**) are associated with slightly higher levels of *Institutionalization*. This runs counter to our expectations and deserves more analysis. We expect there may be heterogeneous effects which picks up the effect care-taker military regimes with short durations that do not disrupt the previous party system. As expected, Personal regimes are associated with lower levels of *Institutionalization* while all codings of party regimes weakly correlate with lower levels of *Institutionalization*.

Table 2: Saturated Models - GWF

	Dependent variable:								
	Party Institutionalization								
	Party	Personal	Military	Party	Personal	Military	Party	Personal	Military
Regime	0.09^{*}	-0.18^{***}	0.04	-0.02	-0.16^{***}	0.13^{***}	-0.11^{*}	-0.10^{**}	0.13^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Prior PI				0.45^{***}	0.40^{***}	0.53^{***}	0.31^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.32^{***}
				(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)
GDP-PC							1.12^{***}	1.01^{***}	0.99^{***}
							(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.18)
Prior Duration							0.002	0.0005	0.002
							(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime Number							-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
							(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.49^{***}	0.56^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.36^{***}	0.42^{***}	0.27^{***}	-1.85^{***}	-1.59^{***}	-1.67^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.35)
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104	104
R^2	0.03	0.10	0.01	0.17	0.25	0.23	0.42	0.43	0.45

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 3: Saturated Models - WTH

	Dependent variable:								
	Party Institutionalization								
	One	Multi	Military	One	Multi	Military	One	Multi	Military
Regime	−0.03	−0.01	0.03	−0.06	−0.10**	0.18***	−0.10	−0.09*	0.16**
	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Prior PI				0.41***	0.49***	0.57***	0.38***	0.46***	0.52***
				(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)
GDP-PC							0.06**	0.06**	0.05*
							(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Prior Duration							0.001	−0.0004	0.0003
							(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime Number							−0.02	−0.01	−0.01
							(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.54***	0.55***	0.53***	0.38***	0.40***	0.25***	−0.05	−0.07	−0.09
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Observations	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77	77
R^2	0.003	0.001	0.004	0.21	0.24	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.35

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

While regime type explains some of the variation, accounting for the prior level of institutionalization of *authoritarian* parties is more strongly correlated with the development of *democratic* political parties. No matter the regime type, the results from the models presented in Tables 2 and 3 find a strong effect for *Prior PI* across the regime types within each dataset. This suggests that the extent to which a party institutionalizes during authoritarianism affects post-democratization party institutionalization *independent* of the antecedent authoritarian regime. For data using **GWF** the effect of *Prior PI* is fairly stable across each regime type. When using **WTH**, on the other hand, the effect of *Prior PI* is larger for democratic party systems following Multi-party or Military regimes than it is following One-party regimes.

The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are estimated using data from the first year post-democratization. To measure whether these effects are consistent across time, we re-specify the third set of models from above for each type of *Regime*, but change the cross-section to use the second, fifth, and tenth year following democratization. We also specify a fourth model in which we take the average of all variables for all available years and model the effect of *Regime* on *Institutionalization*. We present the coefficients in Figure 2.

With the re-specified models, we again find evidence that *Regime* has a discernible effect on *Institutionalization* for military regimes following democratization but that this effect is not necessarily consistent across time or between coding. In addition to the positive finding in the initial models, using **GWF** we find that military regimes lead to higher levels of *Institutionalization* in the 2^{nd} and 5^{th} years and when all



Figure 2: Effect of Regime Type on Institutionalization Over Time

years are combined. This effect, however, is no significant at the 10 year mark.

This is not the case when using **WTH**. Recall that in the initial models, military regimes were associated with higher *Institutionalization* in the first year. These models identify that this effect does not exist in other intervals following the first year yet is significant when using all years. These models also find that Multi-party regimes lead to lower levels of *Institutionalization* in the 2nd year and when collapsing all years together.

While there are mixed results concerning the effect of *Regime* on *Institutionalization*, we continue to find evidence that the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* is both substantively large and statistically significant. Tables reporting all coefficients for the models found in Figure 2 can be found in Appendix I. These tables show that the coefficients for *Prior PI* are significant independent of *Regime*.

In addition to modeling the effect of *Regime* and *Prior PI* across different post-transition windows we also model the effect of a given regime vis-à-vis some other

specified regime. For this exercise we take the three most frequent regime types found in each dataset and compare them to each other, controlling for the effect of *Prior PI*. We present the results with a coefficient plot in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Relative Effect of Regime Type on Institutionalization in First Year

When setting each category of *Regime* relative to the others, we again find little evidence that there is any discernible effect of *Regime* on *Institutionalization*, once we control for the independent effect of *Prior PI*. For most regimes drawn from **GWF** the coefficients are near zero. However, we find that for **WTH**, Multi-party regimes are expected to have lower levels of *Institutionalization* when compared to Military regimes. Furthermore, when using **GWF** we find that Military regimes have higher levels of *Institutionalization*, but only when compared to Personal regimes. That no party regime type is associated with higher levels of *Institutionalization* relative to other regime types runs counter to the expectations derived from our theory.



Figure 4: Estimated Effect of Prior Party Institutionalization on Institutionalization

In addition to plotting the effects of *Regime* on *Institutionalization*, in Figure 4 we do the same for the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization*. Figure 4 illustrates heterogeneity in the effect of *Prior PI* given specific comparisons of *Regime*. The effect of *Prior PI* is strongest when comparing One-party to Multi-party regimes (**WTH**) and Military to Personal regimes (**GWF**). The effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* attenuates when One-party regimes (**WTH**) are compared to Military regimes as well as when Party regimes (**GWF**) are compared to Military. In all cases, however, the effect of *Prior PI* on *Institutionalization* is statistically significant and substantially large.

Implications of the Findings

Our findings clearly show evidence of authoritarian legacies. We find that institutions, patterns and characteristics that are established under authoritarian rule continue to shape political life after a transition to democracy. Our results also indicate *which* institutions matter for the development of strong democratic parties. Contra Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) we find mixed evidence at best that authoritarian regime types shape how political conflict is institutionalized following democratization . By contrast, there is abundant evidence that the level of party institutionalization during the authoritarian period explains much of the variation in party institutionalization post-democratization. This effect is *independent* of the antecedent authoritarian regime type.

Why does the antecedent regime type only weakly correlate with the variation in post-democratization party development in some circumstances? One possibility is that regime typologies developed by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) and Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (2013), while useful, do not reflect the dimensions that are most germane for explaining party development after a transition. Even the designation of party-based regimes merely reflects the relative position of parties within a given authoritarian regime vis-à-vis other institutions which organize authoritarian power. In other words, these typologies reveal how central a party or parties were to authoritarian rule, but they do not provide any information about how strong or developed the party or parties themselves were. Our results suggest that characteristics of the parties themselves matter more than overall regime type.

While outside the main focus on the paper these findings also shed light on some

why certain authoritarian regimes survive longer than others. Many authors have suggested that regimes which use parties survive longer for a number of reasons (Geddes, 1999b; Magaloni, 2006; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). The longer survival rate may be because parties induce cooperation, provide a mechanism for co-optation, improve information gathering, function as a way to distribute patronage, build mass support, or serve as a mechanism to provide credible commitments. Our results suggest that the extent to which parties are capable of performing these functions likely varies, and that this variation may be independent of regime type. Future work might explore whether the mere presence of parties is sufficient or if performing these functions is dependent upon the institutionalization of the parties.

Returning to the findings, what are some potential counter-arguments or critiques? One potential critique this research design is that it does not account for how the authoritarian regime ended. Controlling for how authoritarian regimes ended was not possible because the datasets do not code for the manner of regime death.[13] When building the theory, we argued that the investments into building a party are likely to survive democratization. When they do, they serve to boost party institutionalization. However, it may be the case that when an authoritarian regime fails, it fails violently or with extreme and widespread animosity towards the incumbents. In these cases, opponents to the authoritarian regime may purge, one way or another, the political system from any actors or influences from the prior authoritarian regime. We acknowledge that this may be the case but argue it is the exception rather than

[13]Due to resource constraints we were unable to code for this as well as reconcile the inevitable disagreement over historical records.

the rule. This critique should only hold in cases where prior authoritarian actors and parties are eliminated altogether from the system. Even then, this does not guarantee that the opponents to the regime don't carry over some features of party politics under autocracy that improve their ability to build parties post-transition. In any event, to extent this is the case, this should add noise to our data and make it all the more difficult to detect an effect. That we still find a strong and consistent effect is therefore reassuring.

We also acknowledge that While the results of our study suggest that antecedent party institutionalization matters, institutionalization is a multi-faceted concept that is difficult to operationalize. We believe our measure of *Institutionalization* is an improvement over prior measures but it is true that use of the index means we can't precisely identify exactly which dimensions of party institutionalization matter most or how these dimensions may interact. Prior to testing the hypotheses, we argued that prior party institutionalization should matter because these parties are more professionalized, have established sources of both material and ideational resources, have deeper roots in society, and may have distinct party brands. The index used to measure party institutionalization is a multi-dimensional index that accounts for five factors thought important for party institutionalization (party cohesion, local branches, how parties link to constituencies, distinct party platforms, and presence of permanent party organizations) (Bizzarro et al., 2017) but cannot be used to identify which of these factors are most important in creating an authoritarian legacy.

While the exact mechanisms are not identified, the evidence presented herein makes it clear that political parties are affected by authoritarian legacies. Where

authoritarian parties are more institutionalized, parties in subsequent democratic regimes are substantially more institutionalized. These parties are far more institutionalized than in cases where democracies emerge from authoritarian regimes that either used no parties, or where parties were feeble and merely served as window dressing.

This should impact the way we study democratization and democratic consolidation. Schattschneider (1942) argued that democracy without parties is "unthinkable". There is a consensus that when parties fail, democracy is also imperiled (Bernhard et al., 2015). This research sheds greater light as to why some parties, and ergo some democracies, may fail. Where democracies emerge following an authoritarian period in which parties were banned or severely constrained, the ability for these democracies to develop well-functioning parties seems less likely. This, in turn, reduces the prospects of democratic consolidation (ibid).

Finally, our results suggest a further interesting policy implication. In the wake of a democratic transition there are sometimes moves to dismantle the institutions of authoritarian rule, including authoritarian parties. This is understandable. However, our results suggest that, when such dismantling targets existing authoritarian parties, such moves may be counterproductive.

Conclusion

The argument that democracies are affected by authoritarian legacies is not new. Previously, other scholars have argued that authoritarian legacies affect the path of democratization (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Bunce and Wolchik, 2011), the creation

of reserve domains (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Geddes, 1999b), the way political conflict is institutionalized (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994, 1997), or how the opposition coordinates and coalesces following democratization (LeBas, 2011). However, our understanding about how these legacies affect the specific institution of political parties was unclear.

Does regime type affect democratic party development? Under what circumstances do these regimes encourage or inhibit party formation and development following democratization?

This exercise identified found inconsistent evidence that authoritarian regime type is associated with patterns of post-democratization party development. Instead, we find that the strongest explanation for post-democratization party development is the extent to which political parties institutionalized during the authoritarian period. Independent of regime type – whether dominant party, neo-patrimonial, or military – if parties institutionalized during the authoritarian period, subsequent democratic parties are also more institutionalized.

While the persistence of party institutionalization through democratization is not necessarily counter-intuitive, we are the first to uncover empirical evidence that this is the case. In addition, our finding that party institutionalization is independent of regime types is a novel contribution to the discussion of authoritarianism and authoritarian legacies.

These results point to the importance of looking beyond regime *types*. Regime typologies attempt to simplify broad amalgamations of institutional sets in non-democracies to ease the analysis of complex regimes. By doing this, however, we

ignore the extent to which institutions vary within these authoritarian regimes. These institutions vary in how developed or strong they are and how, by extension, they affect the behavior and pattern of institutions post-democratization.

Moving forward, scholars of authoritarianism and authoritarian legacies should move beyond these general typologies.[14] Scholars should instead continue to identify how individual institutions, and their interactions, matter for the behavior of authoritarian regimes and authoritarian legacies. This research has shown that developing a cross-national index of the nature of a specific institution provides greater understanding of the lasting impact of authoritarian rule.

[14]This is not to say that this research has not been fruitful. For example, Geddes (1999a) findings of variation in authoritarian regime survival by regime type has spurred significant research into authoritarianism and its impact should not be undersold.

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Appendix I

Table 4: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
GWF:Party	−0.10	−0.09	−0.04	−0.07
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Prior PI	0.28***	0.21**	0.19*	0.27***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
GDP-PC	1.04***	1.08***	1.06***	1.02***
	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Prior Duration	0.001	0.002	0.002*	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime Number	−0.01	−0.01	0.002	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	−1.62***	−1.71***	−1.70***	−1.65***
	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.34)
Observations	83	63	52	81
R^2	0.38	0.39	0.43	0.44

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 5: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
GWF:Personal	-0.13^{**}	-0.07	-0.12	-0.09^{*}
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.05)
Prior PI	0.23^{**}	0.16	0.17^{*}	0.23^{**}
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
GDP-PC	0.88^{***}	0.98^{***}	0.83^{***}	0.94^{***}
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.28)	(0.19)
Prior Duration	-0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime Number	-0.01	-0.01	0.002	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-1.27^{***}	-1.48^{***}	-1.19^{**}	-1.45^{***}
	(0.44)	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.38)
Observations	83	63	52	81
R^2	0.40	0.39	0.46	0.45

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 6: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
GWF:Military	0.14^{**}	0.12^{*}	0.11	0.12^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Prior PI	0.29^{***}	0.21^{**}	0.22^{**}	0.29^{***}
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.09)
GDP-PC	0.88^{***}	0.90^{***}	0.87^{***}	0.93^{***}
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.17)
Prior Duration	0.001	0.002	0.002^{*}	0.002^{*}
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Regime Number	-0.02	-0.01	-0.003	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-1.37^{***}	-1.41^{***}	-1.38^{***}	-1.54^{***}
	(0.38)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.34)
Observations	83	63	52	81
R^2	0.41	0.41	0.46	0.47

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 7: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
WTH:One-party	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.05)
Prior PI	0.21**	0.17	0.09	0.23***
	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)
GDP-PC	0.10***	0.15***	0.16***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Prior Duration	0.0002	−0.001	−0.0002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Regime Number	−0.03	−0.04*	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	−0.19	−0.55**	−0.64*	−0.26
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.37)	(0.18)
Observations	70	51	38	68
R^2	0.33	0.40	0.44	0.43

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 8: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
WTH:Multi-party	-0.13^{***}	-0.10^{*}	-0.07	-0.16^{***}
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Prior PI	0.34^{***}	0.27^{**}	0.17	0.39^{***}
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.10)
GDP-PC	0.09^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.15^{***}	0.10^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Prior Duration	-0.001	-0.001	-0.0004	0.0000
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Regime Number	-0.02	-0.04	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.13	-0.44^{*}	-0.54	-0.21
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.38)	(0.17)
Observations	70	51	38	68
R^2	0.41	0.44	0.45	0.55

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors

Table 9: Saturated Models Across Time

	Dependent variable:			
	Party Institutionalization			
	2 Years	5 Years	10 Years	All Years
WTH:military	0.11^{*}	0.09	0.03	0.15^{**}
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Prior PI	0.33^{***}	0.27^{**}	0.14	0.38^{***}
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.12)
GDP-PC	0.09^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.16^{***}	0.09^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Prior Duration	0.0005	−0.0005	−0.0000	0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Regime Number	−0.03	-0.04^{*}	−0.03	-0.02^{*}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Constant	−0.19	-0.50^{*}	-0.62^{*}	-0.31^{*}
	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.18)
Observations	70	51	38	68
R^2	0.38	0.42	0.43	0.51

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Standard errors report robust standard errors