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Appendix

Coding Scheme for Presence of Populism

We measure populism using data from Hawkins and Silva (2015) (Hereafter **HS**). **HS** treat populism as discourse which treats politics as a dualistic struggle between the (morally good) people and the (morally evil or corrupt) elite. To measure populism, **HS** begin by coding party manifestos and selected speeches. To do this, Kirk Hawkins and his research team trained graders (usually student research assistants) on their conceptualization of populism and then worked through exercises using a number of example texts. **HS** uses a holistic approach where each grader reads an entire text and assigns a score to the text – as a whole– for its level of populism. Coders score the level of populism of the text using a three point scale, ranging from zero to two. Zero indicates very little to no populism present, one indicates the presence of populist rhetoric but is tempered by non-populist elements, and two indicates that a text is extremely populist.

After coding is completed, scores are then aggregated through a multi-step process. First, equal weights are assigned to the scores for the party manifesto and the average of the scores of the party speeches. Second, the average level of populism is then calculated for the party system using the averaged scores from the speeches and manifestos. This approach allows **HS** to develop a cross-regional comparison of populism. The final step includes weighting populism scores by the vote share for each party in the election corresponding to the speeches and manifestos.

Party Institutionalization

To measure the average institutionalization of the parties within the system, we use new data collected by the *Varieties of Democracy Project* (Hereafter V-Dem), ¹. Our primary measure of average party institutionalization is V-Dem's index of Party Institutionalization, which we will refer to as *PI*. *PI* is an index created using Baysesian factor analysis of five party-related components: party organization, branches, linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative

¹It is critical to understand that we are not measuring *party system institutionalization* as conceptualized in Mainwaring, Scully, et al. (1995). Instead of focusing on *party systems*, we focus on the institutionalization of individual parties *within* the system rather than the system itself

party cohesion.

PI is created in two stage process. The first stage is the aggregation of ordinal ratings provided by multiple country experts (five or more) for the five individual components (party organization, branches, linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative party cohesion. ² In the second stage, the outputs of these first stage analyses are aggregated into the PI index using Bayesian factor analysis techniques. ³. *PI* is normalized on a 0 to 1 scale, with higher values associated with higher levels of institutionalization. The V-Dem data includes observations for 193 countries with fairly regular coverage from 1900 to 2014.

A summary of the statistics is provided below in Table 1. This table presents the averages of the vote share for all parties which gain greater than 1% of votes, the mean score of populism, mean of party institutionalization (PI), and the average level of party strength.

Table 1
Sample Summary Statistics

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Variable	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max			
Vote Share	25	21.69	9.72	11.88	49.85			
Populism	25	15.90	17.21	0.00	76.78			
PI	25	0.84	0.15	0.45	0.98			
Party Strength	25	0.69	0.14	0.39	0.90			

Case Selection

We implement a two-stage research strategy consisting of quantitative and qualitative tests of our theory. For the quantitative stage, we select 25 of the 26 countries coded by Hawkins and Silva (2015) and drop Belgium because they only code the French speaking Walloon parties. We present the summary statistics for each country in Table 2.

In addition to quantitative analysis we select six cases as exploratory cases studies – Austria, Bolivia, France, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela. To select cases for analysis, we

See section 2.16 Party institutionalization index

The specific questions used to measure these components can be found at the V-Dem website. https://v-dem.net/media/filer_public/17/fe/17fe9954-d9aa-4961-aa73-f967929ebab9/v-dem_codebook_v43.pdf

³For further discussion of the process please refer to AUTHOR (pg. 10)

Table 2
Summary Statistics by Country

Country	Year	Populism	PI	Strength	Log District Mag
Argentina	2011	19.8	0.74	0.59	2.37
Austria	2008	11.82	0.92	0.79	1.24
Bolivia	2009	51.94	0.68	0.58	1.10
Brazil	2010	10.28	0.75	0.55	2.94
Canada	2006	21.51	0.89	0.71	0.00
Chile	2009	16.44	0.89	0.74	0.69
Colombia	2010	11.21	0.62	0.43	1.62
Ecuador	2009	40.73	0.56	0.52	1.68
France	2012	10.93	0.94	0.75	0.00
Germany	2009	7.34	0.98	0.88	2.36
Ireland	2011	9.27	0.89	0.68	1.35
Italy	2008	13.93	0.87	0.6	3.11
Mexico	2012	0.06	0.94	0.73	2.81
Netherlands	2012	7.5	0.95	0.86	5.01
Norway	2009	0.00	0.94	0.79	2.21
Paraguay	2008	3.54	0.65	0.51	1.49
Peru	2011	19.74	0.45	0.39	1.65
Portugal	2011	5.53	0.92	0.77	2.35
Spain	2011	13.31	0.95	0.87	1.91
Sweden	2010	5.84	0.85	0.90	2.63
Switzerland	2007	17.61	0.96	0.74	2.04
United Kingdom	2010	4.20	0.96	0.73	0.00
Uruguay	2009	5.00	0.94	0.77	1.65
United States of America	2012	13.12	0.96	0.64	0.00
Venezuela	2010	76.78	0.67	0.64	0.43

select on the dependent variable. Why do we select on the dependent variable? Remember, we argue that institutional hostility is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition that shapes the outcomes for populists. This means we should observe certain types of populism under different conditions of institutional hostility but that the presence of populism is not given under these conditions. Even when institutional hostility is low, the level of populism may be low or unobserved due to other factors. The cases selected serve as strict tests of our hypotheses and categorization of how populism manifests itself. While each case includes a positive case of populism, these cases vary in a number of ways. First, these cases vary in the level of populism within the party system, the level of populism across time as well as the level of party strength or institutionalization, and electoral institutions.

References

Hawkins, K. A., & Silva, B. C. (2015). Mapping populist parties in europe and the americas. Mainwaring, S., Scully, T., et al. (1995). *Building democratic institutions: Party systems in latin america*. Cambridge Univ Press.