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**Using Surveys to Measure the Populist Attitudes of Political Elites and Voters:  
A Greek Pilot Study of Supply and Demand**

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**\* FIRST DRAFT – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION \***

***Introduction***

In this paper we present the findings of research designed to test if and how populist attitudes among political elites as well as voters (supply and demand) can be measured by including a battery of items in a survey questionnaire producing particular indices. Combining these two perspectives regarding populist attitudes may enhance our ability to assess the position of each political actor and its constituency within the political system. From this point of view, our inquiry unfolds along two complementary axes: (a) do parties (supply side) that are identified as 'populist' present a distinct discursive profile that can be quantitatively measured towards the public/voters?, and (b) do the voters of populist and other parties (supply side) present attitudes that can be clearly related to a populist or a non-populist outlook?

In particular, in a bid to enrich the work published in the available populism literature with insights from a predominantly discursive approach inspired by the so-called Essex School, we have used statements which (a) are constructed around the nodal point 'the people', and (b) reflect a perception/representation of society as divided between two hostile camps: the people against the elite. Our first research question is the following: *Can we use this theoretically informed battery and the resulting populism indices to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties and voters?* A second one follows: *Can we use these and additional survey items to discriminate between left-wing and right-wing populism?*

As far as the supply side (candidates survey) is concerned, we have asked respondents to indicate their level of agreement with each of these statements on a five point Likert scale and used their responses to create an index of populist attitudes for each respondent. Then we have summarized these populism indices by political party in order to create a populism index for each political party. In order to test our research questions/hypotheses, we first register reflexively the existing consensus separating Greek political parties into populist and non-populist. Then we compare our survey-based populism indices with this accepted wisdom. If the index associated with a populist party is significantly stronger than the index pertaining to a non-populist party, then our battery could be seen as a promising way of measuring party populism. The findings presented in this paper are based on the Greek part of the Comparative Candidate Survey, which is conducted as a web survey. Unfortunately, the dataset does not offer the opportunity for a comparative analysis between countries, but it can serve as a

useful pilot study to check the quality of the statements used in the populism battery.

The results produced by the Candidate Survey provide crucial information regarding the *supply side* of populist attitudes in the Greek context, since candidates actively construct and/or transmit appeals to the electorate, (re)producing interpellations in a more or less coherent manner, depending on the political party they represent. In the second part of this paper, passing from *top-down interpellation to bottom-up identification processes*, we also focus on the *demand side* operative within the context of political antagonism; that is populist attitudes and stances expressed/endorsed by voters. The data on Greek voters analyzed in this paper come from the Greek voting advice application HelpMeVote (Andreadis 2013). Voting advice applications constitute special types of opt-in web surveys that help users find their proximities with political parties. In the period before an election, these applications can become very popular attracting thousands or even millions of users.

### ***State of the art: The development of the populist attitudes battery***

The first version of these survey items has been developed by Hawkins and Riding (2010). Following their argument that populism is not an ideology, but a worldview that ‘identifies Good with a unified will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite’ they have avoided to develop neutral statements of the core ideas of populism. Instead they have tried to develop questions that incorporate both the ideas and the language in which they are expressed. Their first battery of populist attitude items was included in the 2008 AmericasBarometer surveys conducted by the Latin American Public Opinion Project at Vanderbilt University and consisted of nine items. The first three items were developed by other researchers and are based on the conceptualisation of populism as a movement involving charismatic leadership and negative attitudes towards the institutions of representative democracy. The next six items have been developed by Hawkins and Riding and constitute their attempt to measure populist attitudes as the expression of a struggle between the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt’ elite.

**POP101. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our president [prime minister] limits the voice and vote of opposition parties. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP102. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our presidents [prime ministers] should govern without the Congress. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP103. When the Supreme Court [Constitutional Tribunal] hinders the work of our government, it should be ignored by our presidents [prime ministers]. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP106. Our presidents [prime ministers] must follow the will of the people because what the people want is always right. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP107. The people should govern directly and not through elected representatives. How much do you agree or disagree?**

**POP109. In today's world there is a battle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree or disagree that such a battle between good and evil exists?**

**POP110. Once the people decide what is right, we must prevent opposition from a minority. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP112. The biggest obstacle to progress in our country is the dominant class or oligarchy that takes advantage of the people. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

**POP113. Those who disagree with the majority represent a threat to the interests of the country. How much do you agree or disagree with that view?**

After rescaling the items to a 0-100 scale, Hawkins and Riding find high levels of populist attitudes among the general public: the mean values range between 35 for POP103 (ignore Supreme Court) to 68.2 for POP109 (choose good or evil). Their factor analysis shows that POP106, POP109, POP110, POP112 and POP113 load on the same factor. Based on this finding they produce an additive populism index as the mean value of these populism questions, i.e.  $[\text{Populism\_index}] = (\text{POP106} + \text{POP109} + \text{POP110} + \text{POP112} + \text{POP113})/5$ .

In the same paper Hawkins and Riding use a subsample of 1,000 respondents from the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Elections Studies (CCES), an Internet survey conducted by Yougov/Polimetrix and the 2008 Utah Colleges Exit Poll (UCEP), a sample of 950 respondents that was collected during the November 2008 general elections. The same datasets and a similar analysis were used later in a paper by Hawkins, Riding & Mudde (2012).

Both questionnaires included the following populism items:

**POP1 Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.**

**POP2 The politicians in Congress need to follow the will of the people.**

**POP3 The power of a few special interests prevents our country from making progress.**

**POP4 The people, not the politicians, should make the most important policy decisions.**

The UCEP questionnaire also included three items on pluralism:

**PLU1 Democracy is about achieving compromise among differing viewpoints.**

**PLU2 When our opposition presents new and challenging viewpoints, there is something we can learn by listening.**

**PLU3 Freedom depends on diversity.**

In addition, the CCES included the following four questions designed to gauge stealth democracy.

**SD1 Elected officials would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important problems.**

**SD2 What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.**

**SD3 Our government would run better if decisions were left up to successful business people.**

**SD4 Our government would run better if decisions were left up to non-elected, independent experts rather than politicians or the people.**

Running a factor analysis on the UCEP data they have found that POP1, POP2, POP3 and POP4 load on the same factor and after running a second factor analysis on the CCES data they have found that POP2, POP3, POP4, SD1 and SD2 load on the same factor as well. Using the average values of these variables as populism indices in regression models they have also found that wealth and higher education have a negative impact on populist attitudes. At the same time these attitudes are strongly associated with ideological extremism, and, as far as right-wing populism in USA is concerned, with anti-immigrant policies.

Building on the aforementioned studies, Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2013) have tested a battery of items to measure populist attitudes and to investigate whether these attitudes can be linked with party preferences on a representative data set of 586 Dutch respondents. This battery consists of three types of questions with a target to measure (1) populist attitudes, (2) pluralist attitudes, and (3) elitist attitudes. The questions used are the following:

**POP1 The politicians in the Dutch parliament need to follow the will of the people.**

**POP2 The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.**

**POP3 The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.**

**POP4 I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.**

**POP5 Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.**

**POP6 Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.**

**POP7 What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.**

**POP8 Interest groups have too much influence over political decisions.**

**PLU1 In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints.**

**PLU2 It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups.**

**PLU3 Diversity limits my freedom.**

**E1 Politicians should lead rather than follow the people.**

**E2 Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people.**

**E3 Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts.**

After performing principal component analysis on these questions they have found that most of the questions load high on the expected factor. More specifically they have found six populist statements loading high on the populist dimension: POP1 through POP5 and POP7. According to the authors, items POP1 through POP4 reflect the idea that there is a division between the people and the political elite, while the questions POP5 through POP7 capture the so-called Manichean dimension, i.e. the tension between 'good' and 'evil'. Comparing the populist index between voters of different parties they find that voters who score high on the populist scale have a significantly higher preference for the Dutch populist parties: the Party for Freedom and the Socialist Party.

These 6 items were proposed for the CSES Module 5 (2016-2021) by Agnes Akkerman (Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands), Kirk Hawkins (Brigham Young University, USA), Cas Mudde (University of Georgia, USA), Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (Diego Portales University, Chile) and Andrej Zaslove (Radboud University, The Netherlands). The first draft questionnaire will be ready in October 2015 and it will give the opportunity to have the items utilized in many countries (Module 4 has collaborators from 55 countries across the globe).

### ***Enter the Essex School: Discourse theory and surveys***

#### **POPULIST VS. NON-POPULIST PROFILES**

The above batteries are largely inspired by definitions of populism like the one provided by Cas Mudde (2007; see also Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012), that over-stress the importance of a moralist signification of the antagonism between 'the people' and the 'elite', where the former is perceived as 'good' or 'pure' and the latter is regarded as 'corrupt' and 'evil'. What is more, definitions like the one given by Mudde (right now probably the most widely utilized in the comparative study of populism; see, for example, De la Torre 2015), maintain that 'the people' of populism is always perceived as 'homogeneous', since populism is regarded as the inverse of pluralism. Our approach builds on the merits of the aforementioned model, but tries to produce a truly minimal definition of populism, bracketing the significance of moral investment and idealization. The reason for such bracketing is that attributions of purity and idealization – probably remnants of a religious imagery re-emerging in secular form – can be encountered in a variety of discourses applied to very different nodal points. De la Torre is right to point out that such narratives of redemption epitomize 'the saga of the people, the proletariat, the indigenous, or the nation' (De la Torre 2015: 10). Interestingly enough, today the 'markets' are also routinely invested with such imagery of purity to the extent that *market sovereignty* increasingly replaces *popular sovereignty* as the overarching legitimizing mechanism of austerity policies in Europe and beyond. No wonder that for many influential critical political theorists the turn to moralistic discourse, 'the displacement of politics by morality', constitutes a

defining characteristic of anti-populist consensual politics positioned beyond left and right; here moral condemnation is revealed as a neoliberal strategy of exorcising the populist challenge (Mouffe 2002: 1, 14). If this is indeed the case then this criterion cannot form part of a minimal definition of populism.

At any rate, however, the way we have chosen to formulate our questions attempts to facilitate further an evolving dialogue between the 'new mainstream' in populism studies and a discursive approach based on 'minimal criteria' and inspired by the Essex School (Towshend 2003). It is true that the theoretical and methodological corpus of the Essex School has not been thus far adequately combined with or tested through quantitative measures of analysis. Thus, combining the Essex School theoretical and methodological toolkit with quantitative methods, and especially ones that are based on surveys, constitutes a timely priority. What is more, such connections have already been emerging within different research paradigms that nevertheless clearly relate to formalist discourse-oriented methods. Thus, if we turn our gaze to analysts like Kirk Hawkins we will immediately find both a link to post-structuralist approaches to discourse analysis and a commitment to rigorous quantitative methods that purport to 'measure' and analyze populism. Here is Hawkins' definition of populism:

Populism is a set of fundamental beliefs about the nature of the political world – a worldview or, to use a more rarefied term, a 'discourse' – that perceives history as a Manichaean struggle between Good and Evil, one in which the side of the Good is 'the will of the people', or the natural, common interest of the citizens once they are allowed to form their own opinions, while the side of Evil is a conspiring elite that has subverted this will. Wholesale institutional change [...] is required in order to restore the will of the people [...] (Hawkins 2010: 5).

Hawkins's approach does, of course, partly rely on the contents of populist 'fundamental beliefs' and on the moralistic imagery discussed above. And yet, at the same time, it visibly incarnates a turn towards a more formal/structural orientation in researching populism. Very often this is directly related to the adoption of a conceptual vocabulary borrowed from discourse studies and even direct references to the work of the Essex School of discourse analysis. Interestingly enough, Hawkins is quick to draw the readers' attention to the significance of discourse-oriented approaches to populism, and especially those that are working within the constructionist paradigm, like Ernesto Laclau. In his words,

for better guidance we must turn to the constructivists and discourse theorists [...] including especially those who study populist discourse [...]. Their work here is much more advanced and provides most of the descriptive material we need to create a better definition and measurement of populism (Hawkins 2010: 10).

Theorists inspired by the Essex School (see Laclau 1977, 1980, 2005a, 2005b; Panizza 2005; Stavrakakis 2004; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014) have indeed gradually constructed a distinct model of defining populism, based on two minimal discursive criteria. In particular, they maintain that in order to qualify a movement

or party as 'populist', the discursive practices associated with the agents under examination should:

- (a) involve a polarized representation of society as divided between two main blocs (in opposition to consensual and/or technocratic discourses highlighting the continuity of the social fabric): i.e. the establishment, the power block versus the underdog.
- (b) claim to represent one of the poles implicated in this uneven dualist distribution, the one associated with the excluded/subordinated part, namely 'the people' (in some languages reference is made to a whole series of equivalent signifiers performing this representational operation; in Spanish, for example, the populism of PODEMOS refers to 'la gente' as well as to 'el pueblo', etc.)

According to this line of argument, both indications need to be present for a discourse or a movement to be classified as 'populist'; otherwise no useful differential classification can emerge to the extent that far too many political discourses could be associated with only one of the two without, of course, being populist.

#### RIGHT-WING VS. LEFT-WING POPULIST PROFILES

A second concern of Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, but also of the POPULISMUS project at large, has to do with the varying contents of populist discourses and the different significations of the 'people' and the 'elite', or 'the people' and its 'other(s)'. For example, when studying the recent Greek experience one immediately realises that the content of SYRIZA's discourse, regarding who the 'people' are, could not be furthest from the populist right and extreme-right rhetoric of other parties, which are often described as populist as well. What becomes thus visible, is two very different conceptualizations of the 'people' circulating in the Greek public sphere: the first, put forward mainly by SYRIZA, seems to be active, pluralist, inclusive, democratic and emancipatory; the second, characteristic of extreme or extremist right-wing parties, is rather passive, racially and ethnically pure, anti-democratic and authoritarian (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis 2014: 135). For example, the Independent Greeks (ANEL), a populist and nationalist right-wing party (currently SYRIZA's government coalition partner), understand the people as the 'Greek people', as a predominantly national people. In addition, and although, in their view – and like SYRIZA – the Greek people need to be actively empowered, on the other hand, however, even within their own party, they adopt a very vertical and leader-centric organisational strategy which does not leave enough room for open, pluralist processes. Moving to the (neo-nazi) extreme-right, one finds Golden Dawn, which also portrays 'the people' as a 'national people'; actually a racially pure and ethnic people, very close to a Greek version of Aryanism. The crucial difference here is that there is practically no element of popular emancipation or democracy at all. All decisions have to obey extremely hierarchical channels and are effectively controlled by the absolute authority of the leader along the lines of the *Führerprinzip*. In this sense, and although Golden Dawn is sometimes referred to as a populist party (Anastasakis 2013, Halikiopoulou & Vasilopoulou 2013), it would be a huge category mistake to

designate Golden Dawn, an extremist para-military organization/party with clear Nazi-like characteristics, as predominantly 'populist': any references to the 'people' within its discourse remains peripheral, ultimately reduced to a nativist and racist conception of the nation, which functions as the nodal point of its discursive articulation.

Up to now, the above contradiction between left and right-wing articulations of populism has been conceptualized mainly with reference to different geographical regions. Thus, Noam Gidron & Bart Bonikowski describe very eloquently the diverging paths of European and Latin American populisms:

In Europe, an exclusionary right-wing variant of populism emerged in the 1980s [...] targeting mostly immigrants and national minorities [...] In Latin America, on the other hand, populism in recent years has been mostly associated with an inclusionary vision of society, bringing together diverse ethnic identities into shared political frameworks [...] (Gidron & Bonikowski 2014: 5).

Other approaches have also focused on the differences between left-wing and right-wing varieties of populism, following a similar pattern. For example, Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser also elaborate their distinction in geographical terms, with Latin America being recognised as the locus of left-wing *inclusionary* populism, while Europe is presented as the locus of right-wing *exclusionary* populism. Even though such geographical classifications might have held some truth-value up until a few years ago, it is obvious that today such schemas need to be re-formulated. In other words, such a distinction can be fruitfully utilised in the relevant research only if we put aside the geographical criterion and stick to the political and discursive one and thus investigate the specificities of left-wing populism(s) versus the specificities of right-wing populism(s), that is to say negotiating the very boundary between the two, without a priori attributing them to particular historical or geographical contexts. Turning our gaze to Europe, Luke March, in his seminal study of radical left European parties, has indeed stressed the distinct character of European left-wing populism. As he has pointed out, European left-wing populism 'emphasizes egalitarianism and inclusivity rather than the openly exclusivist anti-immigrant or anti-foreigner concerns of right-populism (i.e. its concern is the demos not the ethnos)' (March 2011: 122).

Moreover, the antithesis between right-wing and left-wing populisms, as represented by the divide 'inclusion versus exclusion', but also marking the complex relationship between people and nation or demos and ethnos, should be examined within the scope of ideological/discursive frames and differentiations and their influence on political behaviour. For example, it has been recently argued that what actually shapes the behaviour of right-wing or left-wing populists in parliamentary politics is their ideologico-political commitments, and not 'populism' per se. In an extensive comparative study of the parliamentary behaviour of the Dutch Socialist Party and the Party for Freedom, which stand as examples of left-wing and right-wing populist parties respectively, Simon Otjes and Tom Louwerse have shown that their choices were dictated by their left-wing or right-wing ideology and not by their 'populism' (Otjes and Louwerse 2013: 16). The PVV's voted in a much more similar way to the mainstream centre-right VVD,



while the SP's behaviour was closer to the Labour Party and the Green Left. The most significant issues where these differences played out was immigrant rights and law and order. Katsambekis (2014, 2015) has observed a similar pattern within the Greek political system, concerning especially SYRIZA and ANEL.

Now, the above research hypotheses and orientations have been mostly based on the qualitative analysis of discursive materials. By testing these findings through quantitative means, we purport to further consolidate certain theses on two levels: (a) regarding the distinctive character of populist and non-populist parties, and (b) regarding the sharp (?) difference between populist parties of the Left and the Right.

Hence, we are expecting to see, first, a central position attributed to 'the people' within the discourse of parties designated as populist, while assuming that 'the people' would occupy a less significant position in non-populist ones; second, a strong antagonistic conception of society that represents the 'people' and the 'elites' as two rival camps in the first group; and third, a more inclusivist and pluralist conception of 'the people' on the left of the political spectrum, against a rather exclusivist and homogenising one on the right (examining attitudes towards immigration and specific social groups, like homosexuals, etc. would be crucial here). Last but not least, affinities between parties regarding inclusivity/exclusivity and thus views on immigration should be more significant with regards to their positioning on the ideologico-political spectrum (Left-Right) and not with regards to their populist or non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL should be closer to ND, and SYRIZA should be closer to PASOK/DIMAR).

### ***The Greek Candidate Study***

Although the initial idea was to include in this paper findings from the analysis of data of the Greek Study on Candidates for the European Parliament 2014, the recent elections in Greece on 25 January 2015 has provided an opportunity to include the battery in the questionnaire of the Greek Candidate Study 2015 which targets a much larger group and gives the opportunity to collect a large N sample that is adequate for most statistical methods.

The Greek Candidate Study is part of the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) which is a joint multi-national project with the goal of collecting data on candidates running for national parliamentary elections in different countries using a common core. The core CCS candidate questionnaire focuses on campaigning, issues and ideology, as well as democracy and representation. In Greece CCS is run as a mixed-mode survey and the first mode is always a web-survey (Andreadis 2010). The first time the Candidate Study was conducted in Greece was for the parliamentary elections of 2007 (Andreadis & Chadjipadelis 2008). It has been conducted again in 2009, and 2012. The data of these studies are available from the website of the Hellenic National Election Studies (<http://www.elnes.gr>) and have been used in many national and international publications (e.g. Andreadis 2012, Freire et al 2014, Teperoglou, Chadjipadelis & Andreadis 2010, Teperoglou et al 2014).

What concerns us here is CCS as conducted for the Parliamentary election of 2015. In order to study the effect of the length of the questionnaire, the candidates of the sample were divided into two groups by random sampling. In the first group

invitations were sent via email to participate in the survey, which includes the entire questionnaire (85 questions). Regarding the second group, invitations were also sent via email to participate in the survey; however, this time the email included only a part of the questionnaire (20 questions). The rest of the questions were sent later in a subsequent successive phase. In the second case the questionnaire is clearly smaller and the time required for completion is significantly reduced (approximately five minutes – which is emphasized in the invitation to participate in the survey – instead of 35 minutes which is the time required to complete the entire questionnaire). Hence, we have the opportunity to examine the importance of the duration of the survey and whether the size of the questionnaire is an inhibiting or a stimulating factor for completion, or even for participation in the survey *per se*.

More specifically, the first invitations to participate in the surveys were sent on 16 February 2015 to the candidate MPs of the first group and on 18 February 2015 to the candidate MPs of the second group. A few days later, on 27 February 2015 the first reminder was sent to the candidate MPs of both groups. The findings included in this paper comprise the results of a preliminary analysis of the data collected until 8 April 2014. The data collection effort continues (e.g. a second reminder was sent on the 19th of April 2015). The figures based on the final dataset may be slightly different, but the main findings presented in this paper cannot be altered (the vast majority of the questionnaires are usually completed after the initial invitation; each subsequent reminder produces a small number of additional completed questionnaires).

### ***The battery of items used in the Greek Candidate Studies***

For the Greek part of the study we have used 6 items that were included in the battery proposed to CSES plus 2 additional items developed within the POPULISMUS project by Yannis Stavrakakis and his team. The only item that had to be changed because it was not suitable for candidates was the question: ‘I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician’ that was changed to ‘People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician’. The questions were included as 5-point Likert items using the following coding 1: Strongly disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Neither agree nor disagree, 4: Agree, 5: Strongly agree. The battery of the eight items was thus formulated as follows:

**POP1. The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.**

**POP2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.**

**POP3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.**

**POP4. People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.**

**POP5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.**

**POP6. What people call ‘compromise’ in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles.**

**POP7. Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment.**

**POP8. Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.**

### ***Findings from the Greek Candidate Study 2015***

The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has never agreed to participate in the Greek Candidate Study. Golden Dawn (XA) usually replies that all candidates share the same opinion. In 2012 the leadership had agreed to answer one questionnaire centrally. For the Greek Candidate Study 2015 we were able to find the email addresses and send invitations only to a very limited number of candidates running with KKE and Golden Dawn. As a result we have only one completed questionnaire from KKE and four completed questionnaires from Golden Dawn candidates. Since these figures are not adequate for any statistical processing we have excluded these parties from our analysis. This is not anticipated to create substantial problems for our analysis to the extent that these two parties articulate a discourse that escapes the populism/anti-populism axis: although they both endorse an antagonistic confrontational discursive schema (fulfilling the first criterion of a discursive approach to populism), the role of the 'people' is only secondary in their discourse as it stands as a convenient synecdoche of an essentialized trans-historical notion of 'class' (KKE) and an ethnically and racially pure conception of the 'nation' (Golden Dawn).

All in all, our effort has resulted in 318 completed questionnaires (in fact the dataset includes 30 additional responses from KINIMA candidates but since this party is not represented in the new Greek Parliament we have excluded these cases from the analysis presented in this paper as well). The distribution per party is presented in Table 1 while the distribution of the answers to each populism question per party is presented in the Appendix.

**Table 1. Number of candidates per party in the sample**

	Frequency	Percent
SYRIZA	55	17.3
ND	50	15.7
RIVER	91	28.6
PASOK	48	15.1
ANEL	74	23.3
Total	318	100

Before we can continue with the analysis of the results we need to verify that the eight items we have used are closely related to each other. We need to test the internal consistency of the items mainly for two reasons. The first reason is that there are two new items (developed by the POPULISMUS project) that have not been tested before. The second reason is that the remaining six items have only been tested on voters so far. This is the first time these items are used on candidates, thus we need to check if the reliability of the scale remains intact among the candidates. Cronbach's alpha for the eight items included in the Greek

Candidate Study gets the value of 0.814, suggesting that the eight items have relatively high internal consistency (for most social science research studies value of .70 or higher is considered acceptable.). This value is very similar to the value that Akkerman, Mudde, and Zaslove (2013) have found in their study (0.82), in which they have used the first 6 items. Of course, increasing the number of items, Cronbach's alpha is increased too, thus the average inter-item correlation may be a little lower in our study but still shows very high internal consistency. As Table 2 indicates the item with the lower correlation (0.388) with the whole set of items is the item 'Elected officials talk too much and take too little action', which is also the item that its removal has the lowest impact on the Cronbach's Alpha of the remaining items. The aforementioned figures indicate that the specific item has the weakest correlation with the rest of the items.

**Table 2. Additional tests on Cronbach's Alpha**

	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.	.550	.791
The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	.632	.777
The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	.466	.802
People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	.483	.800
Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	.388	.811
What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	.637	.777
Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment	.571	.787
Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making	.519	.796


Based on these findings we have decided to build two populism indices. The first populism index is constructed as the mean value of the eight items and the second populism index is constructed as the mean of the seven items after excluding the item 'Elected officials talk too much and take too little action'.

As Table 3 and Diagram 1 indicate, according to populism index 1 the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER – parties generally assumed to be non-populist, something also consistent with our discursive framework – score below 3.5 while the candidates of both SYRIZA and ANEL – parties generally assumed to be populist, something also consistent with our discursive framework – score over 3.5. As their 95% confidence intervals indicate, SYRIZA and ANEL candidates do not differ significantly on the first populism index and they form a common group with

regard to this index. Similarly PASOK, ND and RIVER candidates do not differ significantly on the same index and they form a second group. But between the two groups there are significant statistical differences, with the second group (the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER) scoring significantly lower on this scale.

**Table 3. Populism Index 1 by political party**

Party	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
PASOK	2.95	2.78	3.13
ND	3.17	2.97	3.36
RIVER	3.19	3.06	3.31
SYRIZA	3.77	3.62	3.92
ANEL	4.02	3.89	4.15
Total	3.44	3.37	3.52



**Diagram 1. Populism Index 1 by political party**


In Table 4 and Diagram 2 we present the scores using the second populism index. The general conclusion is the same as before. There are two groups of candidates that differ significantly: on the one hand there are the candidates of PASOK, ND and RIVER with lower scores and on the other hand there are the candidates of SYRIZA and ANEL with higher scores.

There is one difference when we use the second instead of the first populism index: the scores of the opposition parties are lower while the score of ANEL remained the same and the score of SYRIZA is larger. It seems that the item 'Elected officials talk too much and take too little action' has been interpreted in a way that equates 'elected officials' with members of the current government. Such an interpretation could explain the lower average score of SYRIZA candidates and the unchanged average score of ANEL candidates when the item is included, because they may want to protect the ministers of their coalition government (such as the Finance Minister Varoufakis who has been accused of spending most

of his time giving interviews). At the same time, the same interpretation could also explain the higher average scores of the opposition parties when the item is included, because through their responses to this item they find a way to criticize the members of the current government.

**Table 4. Populism Index 2 by political party**

Party	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
PASOK	2.91	2.73	3.09
RIVER	3.05	2.91	3.18
ND	3.08	2.88	3.29
SYRIZA	3.80	3.64	3.96
ANEL	4.02	3.88	4.15
Total	3.39	3.30	3.47



**Diagram 2. Populism Index 2 by political party**

Greece is not only one of the few countries with both left-wing and right-wing successful populist parties. In addition, it currently has a coalition government formed by a left-wing and a right-wing populist party. This allows for very interesting comparisons of left-wing and right-wing populist candidates. In order to study if there are differences between the (assumed) left-wing populism of SYRIZA candidates and the (assumed) right-wing populism of ANEL candidates we have run a t-test for each of the items to compare between the candidates of these parties.

As Table 5 indicates, the candidates of SYRIZA and ANEL differ significantly on three items: As far as the item 'People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician' is concerned, SYRIZA candidates' score is 3.07 and ANEL candidates' score is 3.44. The p value of the t-test is  $p=0.041$  indicating a significant difference between the two groups. It seems that anti-elitism is stronger among ANEL candidates than among SYRIZA candidates. Further analysis is needed here to see if the candidates of SYRIZA who score lower are the more

experienced candidates of SYRIZA who have run in previous elections. One preliminary hypothesis here is that this might occur because SYRIZA's officials have a longer history within party politics and other forms of representative institutions (like trade unions) within a larger and more coherently organized structure (around 80% of SYRIZA's cadres come from Synaspismos, which was founded in 1992, while a lot of them also originate from the Greek Communist Party / KKE), and thus are inclined to value more the significance and necessity of professional or at least somehow experienced and thus 'specialized' politicians. On the other hand, ANEL are a very leader-centric party that was practically built around the persona of their leader, Panos Kammenos, a former ND MP, in 2012, and exhibits practically no internal organization and democratic procedures. Its cadres have not thus developed the sense of militancy that the cadres of SYRIZA have built with the party and also with a broader idea of doing politics that has its roots in the communist and eurocommunist traditions.

**Table 5. Populism Index 2 by political party**

	Party	Mean	SD	p
The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.	SYRIZA	4.31	.696	
	ANEL	4.38	.680	.578
The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	SYRIZA	4.08	.882	
	ANEL	4.04	1.020	.838
The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than ....	SYRIZA	4.02	1.027	
	ANEL	3.88	1.008	.450
People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	SYRIZA	3.07	.920	
	ANEL	3.44	1.112	.041
Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	SYRIZA	3.56	.884	
	ANEL	4.06	.838	.002
What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	SYRIZA	2.74	1.046	
	ANEL	3.65	1.140	.000
Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment	SYRIZA	3.98	.978	
	ANEL	4.25	.894	.124
Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude ...	SYRIZA	4.37	.681	
	ANEL	4.46	.627	.454

The second item with large difference is the one indicating that 'Elected officials talk too much and take too little action'. Here, SYRIZA candidates' score is 3.56 and ANEL candidates' score is 4.06. The p value of the t-test is  $p=.002$ . If the aforementioned argument that SYRIZA candidates respond to this question trying to protect the ministers of the government who have been accused of spending a lot of time giving interviews, the difference between SYRIZA and ANEL seems reasonable because the vast majority of ministers who have been criticized on these grounds come from SYRIZA.

The last item with large difference is the item: 'What people call compromise in politics is really just selling out on one's principles'. In this respect, SYRIZA candidates' score is 2.74 and ANEL candidates' score is 3.65. The p value of the t-test is less than 0.001. This finding is consistent with Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove (2013) who find a similar distinction between left-wing and right-wing



populism. In particular, they have observed that the voters of the left wing SP are more willing to listen to the opinions of others and they argue that this finding is consistent with the idea that right-wing populism is exclusionist, while left-wing populism is more inclusivist. Another – supplementary – explanation here is that the differing views on ‘compromise’ stem from different political cultures that have developed in different circumstances and along different time-spans. As already mentioned, SYRIZA’s cadres have a long trajectory within party politics and have been accustomed with the internal processes that one usually finds in the contemporary radical left, where different factions (from social-democrats to Trotskyists) have to deliberate in internal bodies and make certain compromises in order to reach a commonly accepted decision.

In order to further explore the similarities and differences between right-wing and left-wing populism on the supply side in Greece we have run a factor analysis with the aforementioned eight populism items and a series of questions that have been used in the Greek Voting Advice Application HelpMeVote 2015 and they were included in the Greek Candidate Study 2015. Appendix 2 displays the two main factors that have been extracted.

The first factor includes items that belong to three categories. Firstly, there are items that discriminate between ‘pro-European’ and ‘anti-Troika’ candidates. The factor loadings are positive for the items that express ideas related to euroscepticism and anti-Troika (e.g. ‘The economy of Greece would have been better if we had our own currency instead of Euro’) and negative for the pro-European and pro-Troika items (e.g. ‘It is better for Greece to be in the European Union rather than outside’). The same factor also includes the items that refer to economic left/right. More specifically statements against privatizations (e.g. ‘Banks and utilities must be under public control’) have also positive loadings. Finally the first factor includes the populism items with large positive scores (the only exceptions is the aforementioned item ‘Elected officials talk too much and take too little action’ which appears to fit better on the second factor. This means that populism in Greece is closely associated with euroscepticism and economic statism or state interventionism.

The second factor reflects the GAL: (Green, Alternative, Libertarian) vs TAN: (Traditional, Authoritarian, Nationalist) dimension (Hooghe, Marks, & Wilson 2002). This factor is based on socio-cultural issues. Positive loadings appear for the items that promote the ideas of security and national identity, the exclusion of immigrants and other groups such as homosexuals. Negative scores appear for pro-immigrant statements and items promoting personal freedom rights. After saving the factor scores for each candidate in the next two tables we present the positions of the candidates per political party on these two factors.

**Table 6. Factor 1 scores by political party**

Party	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
PASOK	-.680	-.910	-.450
RIVER	-.668	-.800	-.535
ND	-.482	-.691	-.272
ANEL	1.021	.891	1.151
SYRIZA	1.058	.805	1.312



Table 6 clearly shows that with regard to populism, euroscepticism and state interventionism there are two different groups of candidates. PASOK, RIVER and ND candidates – generally assumed to be anti- or non-populist – form the first group which is pro-European and indeed non-populist. On the other hand ANEL and SYRIZA candidates – generally assumed to be populist – form a different group which indeed seems to hold populist attitudes and endorses euroscepticism and state interventionism.

**Table 7. Factor 2 scores by political party**

Party	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
SYRIZA	-1.358	-1.628	-1.087
PASOK	-0.325	-0.575	-0.075
RIVER	-0.140	-0.279	-0.001
ND	0.635	0.429	0.842
ANEL	0.776	0.576	0.977

On the other hand, Table 7 shows that there is a chasm separating SYRIZA and ANEL with regard to their attitudes toward issues such as crime and immigration. The scores of SYRIZA and ANEL candidates on the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) vs Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) factor are -1.358 and 0.776 respectively, providing additional support to the ideas that right-wing populism is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusionary and pluralist.

#### ***From supply to demand: HelpMeVote analysis***

It should have become clear up to this point that the candidate survey establishes a clear, indeed a sharp distinction between populist and non-populist parties within the Greek political system. This means that on the supply-side one indeed finds evidence that supports the different categorization of certain parties within the political system along the lines of our theoretical framework. Now, it remains to be seen if such populist or non-populist outlooks match the demand-side; in other words, do these candidates/politicians represent actually existing demands and attitudes that are expressed from their voter constituency? For this line of inquiry, we will be drawing here on preliminary voter data, that nevertheless provides a significant glimpse of what we should be expecting to find in a voter survey (in fact, in order to replicate – using voter data – the analysis that was applied to candidates, a voter survey to be conducted later will include the whole battery of the 8 populist attitudes items). In this paper we thus present a preliminary analysis using data from HelpMeVote 2015. HelpMeVote 2015 was completed more than 570000 times in the period from its official launching (07/01/2015) until the Election Day (25/01/2015) (Andreadis 2015). The findings presented in this section have resulted from the analysis of this particular dataset. The main difference from the candidate study is that HelpMeVote included only the following 3 populism items:

- **Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment.**
- **The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.**
- **I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.**

As Appendix 3 shows the two main factors of the demand side are very similar to the main factors extracted by the candidates' data. In addition, Table 8 shows that as far as the first factor is concerned, the voters of KKE and Golden Dawn are on the same side with SYRIZA and ANEL.

**Table 8. Factor 1 scores by political party**

	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
KKE	1.000	.986	1.015
GD	.670	.654	.685
SYRIZA	.626	.621	.630
ANEL	.624	.608	.640
Potami	-.834	-.844	-.824
PASOK	-.895	-.912	-.879
ND	-.984	-.991	-.978


Table 9 verifies the GAL/TAN chasm between SYRIZA and ANEL on the demand (voters') side. In addition, KKE voters appear to be on the same side with SYRIZA, while Golden Dawn voters are on the same side with ANEL.

**Table 9. Factor 2 scores by political party**

	Mean	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
GD	1.430	1.419	1.442
ANEL	.807	.791	.823
ND	.462	.455	.468
PASOK	-.124	-.141	-.106
Potami	-.287	-.297	-.277
SYRIZA	-.369	-.376	-.362
KKE	-.499	-.515	-.483

For a more detailed presentation of the differences between voters of populist and non-populist parties and between voters of left-wing and right-wing populist parties we can refer to the following diagrams:


## The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions



**Diagram 3. Populist attitudes by political party**


Diagram 3 shows very clearly the difference between voters of populist and mainstream parties: The majority of SYRIZA and ANEL voters agree with the statement: 'The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions'. The same applies to voters of KKE and Golden Dawn. On the other hand, the majority of ND, PASOK and RIVER voters either disagree or hold a neutral position.

## Banks and utilities must be under public control




**Diagram 4. Public control of the economy by political party**

Diagram 4 shows a difference between voters of populist and mainstream parties and a similarity of populist parties: The majority of SYRIZA and ANEL voters agree with the statement: 'Banks and utilities must be under public control'. The same applies to voters of KKE and Golden Dawn. On the other hand, the majority of ND, PASOK and River voters disagree with this statement. An interesting point here is that there is no difference between left-wing and right-wing populism. The voters of the right-wing populist parties in Greece do not support liberal economic policies. On the contrary, they express strong opinions in favour of public control of the economy and against privatizations.



**Diagram 5. Attitudes towards immigrants by political party**

Diagram 5 shows a significant difference between voters of left-wing and right-wing populist parties: The majority of ANEL (as well as Golden Dawn) voters support that immigrants who come to Greece should be required to adopt Greek customs. On the other hand, the majority of SYRIZA (as well as KKE) voters disagree with this idea. It is interesting that the populist parties occupy the extreme positions and they are clearly separated by the mainstream parties, which are located in the middle. What is also very clear in this diagram is that voter attitudes regarding this issue are strictly determined by their ideological/political commitment in terms of a Right/Left polarity, since they are distributed along a perfect sequence from the extreme right to the extreme left.



**Diagram 6. Attitudes towards immigrants by political party**

Diagram 6 shows a significant difference between voters of left-wing and right-wing populist parties: The majority of ANEL (as well as Golden Dawn) voters support that same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law. On the other hand, the majority of SYRIZA (as well as KKE) voters disagree with this idea. Again, voter attitudes seem very closely aligned to their ideologico-political position on the Left/Right spectrum. The main difference with (the similar) Diagram 5 is that the voter of the RIVER leave the middle position and appear at the top of the list. This can be explained by the fact that the RIVER has run a rather liberal campaign on such issues, while one of its founding members is openly gay and strongly supported the right of same sex couples to marriage and child adoption. On the other hand, the party's position on immigration is more ambivalent, since it advocates strong controls on immigration flows within the country or even the deportation of immigrants when they lose their jobs.

### **Conclusion**

In this paper we have used candidates' responses on a battery of populist attitudes items and we have created an index of populist attitudes for each respondent. We have demonstrated that this index can be used to discriminate between populist and non-populist parties. More specifically our findings show that the candidates of the parties that have been categorized as populist using discourse analysis (in dialogue with the 'new mainstream' in populism studies) score significantly higher than the candidates of the mainstream parties, usually designated as non-populist or anti-populist.

In addition, we have found that the Greek candidates – *as well as voters with populist attitudes* – also seem to support ideas associated with euroscepticism and state interventionism. Euroscepticism can be explained by the argument that in the eyes of the Greek populists (candidates and voters) the political elite of the

European Union acts against the popular will and is held responsible for Greece's socio-economic collapse during the years of the crisis. This assumption is further strengthened by the fact that the notorious 'troika', the ad hoc body consisting of technocrats from the three institutions that until recently supervised the austerity programme in Greece, consists by 2/3 of European Union officials. State interventionism is expected by a left-wing party but it seems that in the Greek political system which has been significantly affected by the financial crisis, right-wing populists are also in favour of public control of the economy. Again, this is probably a side-effect of the severe crisis that Greece has undergone during the past five years, and for which certain sectors of the 'greedy' market/private economy (mainly the banks and the bankers) have been held responsible.

A quite telling development concerning the swing of the right-wing populist vote towards state-interventionism after recent developments in Greece, is that of the electoral collapse of the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) party, which was until very recently a significant political actor within the populist radical right (polling 5.63% in 2009), adopting a neoliberal agenda in favour of the private sector and against state intervention. However, after the crisis escalated in Greece, and especially after LAOS participated in a coalition government (November 2011) that implemented harsh austerity measures, its popular support dropped dramatically and it thus failed to enter parliament both in the 2012 and 2015 general elections.

Our second task was to investigate if we can use these and additional survey items to discriminate between left-wing and right-wing populism. Using the candidate data we have found that the candidates of the left-wing populist party SYRIZA are more willing to listen to other opinions and to compromise than the candidates of the right-wing populist party ANEL. Using additional survey items (both for candidates and voters) we have shown that right-wing populism is exclusionary and identity-focused, while left-wing populism is more inclusive and pluralist. Indeed inclusivist and pluralist attitudes are stronger on the left of the political spectrum than on the right, and thus affinities are bigger with regard to positioning on the ideologico-political spectrum (Left-Right) and not with regard to a populist or non-populist profile (e.g. ANEL appear closer to the mainstream right or centre-right ND, and SYRIZA closer to the centre or centre-left, PASOK and RIVER).

Regarding the demand side, we see in the HelpMeVote diagrams that in the questions regarding the populist attitude of voters, four parties, KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, GD, seem to be placed on the same side, presenting a populist profile. The same happens also with regard to the public control of banks and utilities. We also observe that on certain issues the voters of the extremist GD appear very close to the ones of ANEL, while at the same time the voters of the communist KKE appear very close to the ones of SYRIZA. There are three hypotheses here that could be put forth and will need further investigation using the complete battery of the 8 populist attitudes items that were utilised in the candidate survey:

(a) There could be indeed a populist outlook within the constituencies of GD and KKE that finds expression in these parties due to specific ideologico-political commitments. This would explain why in Diagram 3 all four parties (KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, GD) seem to be placed on the same side. Of course Diagram 3 is based only on one of the 8 questions that we have used for the populism index of the

candidates. For a more detailed analysis we will return to the comparison of KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, GD after collecting data from the voter study.

(b) The findings in diagrams 5 and 6, regarding attitudes towards immigration and same-sex marriages, merely confirm that regarding specific policy areas, as in parliamentary behaviour (Otjes & Louwerse 2013), left-wing or right-wing commitments are much more important in shaping voter behaviour, than populism *per se*.

(c) Last but not least, regarding the finding that voters of KKE, SYRIZA, ANEL, and GD seem to favour public control of banks and utilities, we might need to include the parameter of an 'anti-establishment' vote here, which will need further clarification and differentiation from a proper 'populist vote'. GD and KKE are strongly anti-establishment without being, strictly speaking, populist. The one is extremist, anti-democratic and neo-Nazi, while the other adopts an orthodox Marxist-Leninist analysis of society, strictly grounded in a perception of society based on class divisions and not on the standard populist 'people vs the establishment' cleavage, which they denounce as reformist.

From a discourse-theoretical perspective it is clear that in both cases references to the people remain peripheral and always refer to another privileged signifier: nation or class. In classical Saussurean terms, while in populism proper the signifier 'the people' operates as an empty signifier without a fixed signification – this is what accounts for the hegemonic success of populist discourse, from an Essex School point of view – in these two cases such emptiness is severely limited by its attachment to fixed signifieds such as the 'nation' and 'social class'. These are revealed as the nodal points of these discourses, something that disqualifies the two parties from being categorized under the rubric of populism proper. At best, their appeals to the 'people' could be associated with a *thin* version of populism as 'a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people' to be clearly distinguished from *thick* populism (Jagers & Walgrave 2007: 322), which would require additional characteristics like the ones pertaining to an Essex School definition. It remains an open question to what extent such a differentiation can be captured by additional questions to be introduced to the populism battery discussed in this paper.

To sum up, what this pilot study shows is that there is indeed open ground for the mutual cross-fertilization of qualitative discursive methods and quantitative techniques like surveys in the study of populism. Based on a definition that understands populism through the isolation of 'minimal criteria' we were able to formulate corresponding questions to test our hypotheses both on the supply-side and on the demand-side, enriching and re-focusing mainstream orientations. What is more, our findings have revealed differences among populist parties that were not evident through qualitative discourse analysis, namely the willingness of SYRIZA's candidates to accept compromise more easily than the ones of ANEL. On this level, we should go back to our qualitative data and inquire under this new light for evidence of such signals in public discourse materials. This also means that surveys do not merely test hypotheses already formulated within a theoretical/qualitative context. They also generate feedback that can lead to

further investigations on the discursive level, adding a reflexive element in our research strategy.

Regarding future research, our attempt here is indicative of the merits of adopting a multiple-methods strategy in researching, understanding and 'measuring' populism on the levels of discourse and voters'/candidates' attitudes. Additional methods that could be adopted here, in order to arrive at an even wider scope of inquiry/justification, are mainly *computer assisted discourse analysis* and *in-depth analysis of patterns of parliamentary behaviour*. Our discursive methodology provides the concrete basis for a strategy that simultaneously utilises these four different research approaches and can serve both as the source for the formulation of questions/hypotheses on each level, and as a reflexive tool for the analysis of the respective outcomes.



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### ***Appendix 1***

**The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA		1.9%	7.4%	48.1%	42.6%
ND		18.0%	18.0%	36.0%	28.0%
RIVER	1.1%	17.8%	30.0%	38.9%	12.2%
PASOK		21.3%	12.8%	48.9%	17.0%
ANEL		1.4%	6.8%	43.8%	47.9%
Total	.3%	11.8%	16.2%	42.7%	29.0%

**The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA		7.7%	11.5%	46.2%	34.6%
ND	6.1%	40.8%	20.4%	20.4%	12.2%
RIVER	11.4%	36.4%	23.9%	21.6%	6.8%
PASOK	8.5%	38.3%	19.1%	31.9%	2.1%
ANEL	1.4%	9.6%	12.3%	37.0%	39.7%
Total	5.8%	26.2%	17.8%	30.7%	19.4%

**The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA	3.6%	5.5%	12.7%	41.8%	36.4%
ND	4.5%	22.7%	25.0%	38.6%	9.1%
RIVER	4.6%	26.4%	28.7%	28.7%	11.5%
PASOK		31.8%	15.9%	40.9%	11.4%
ANEL	1.5%	9.2%	20.0%	38.5%	30.8%

Total	3.1%	19.0%	21.4%	36.6%	20.0%
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**People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA	3.6%	21.8%	43.6%	25.5%	5.5%
ND	10.0%	38.0%	26.0%	18.0%	8.0%
RIVER	3.3%	25.3%	40.7%	20.9%	9.9%
PASOK	23.4%	53.2%	17.0%	4.3%	2.1%
ANEL	4.2%	18.1%	25.0%	34.7%	18.1%
Total	7.6%	29.2%	31.7%	21.9%	9.5%

**Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA	2.0%	10.0%	28.0%	50.0%	10.0%
ND	2.0%	2.0%	32.7%	44.9%	18.4%
RIVER		2.2%	13.2%	51.6%	33.0%
PASOK	2.1%	29.8%	21.3%	36.2%	10.6%
ANEL	1.4%	2.9%	14.5%	50.7%	30.4%
Total	1.3%	7.8%	20.3%	47.7%	22.9%

**What people call 'compromise' in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA	10.0%	34.0%	34.0%	16.0%	6.0%
ND	12.0%	56.0%	14.0%	10.0%	8.0%
RIVER	20.0%	48.9%	18.9%	7.8%	4.4%
PASOK	30.4%	45.7%	10.9%	6.5%	6.5%
ANEL	2.8%	19.4%	12.5%	40.3%	25.0%
	14.6%	40.3%	17.9%	16.9%	10.4%

**Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA	2.1%	8.3%	10.4%	47.9%	31.3%
ND	6.1%	42.9%	22.4%	20.4%	8.2%
RIVER	7.9%	20.2%	31.5%	32.6%	7.9%
PASOK	10.6%	31.9%	29.8%	17.0%	10.6%
ANEL	1.4%	4.1%	9.6%	38.4%	46.6%
	5.6%	19.9%	21.2%	32.0%	21.2%

**Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making.**

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
SYRIZA		1.9%	5.6%	46.3%	46.3%
ND	2.0%	8.0%	16.0%	62.0%	12.0%
RIVER	2.3%	14.9%	21.8%	42.5%	18.4%
PASOK		11.1%	24.4%	48.9%	15.6%
ANEL		1.4%	2.8%	44.4%	51.4%
Total	1.0%	7.8%	14.0%	47.7%	29.5%

## Appendix 2

### The two main factors of the supply side in Greece

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Memoranda of Understanding with the Troika were necessary to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece.	-0.866	-0.011
With the Memoranda we accumulate debts without any visible benefits.	0.84	0.086
Banks and utilities must be under public control.	0.799	-0.045
The economy of Greece would have been better if we had our own currency instead of Euro.	0.776	0.264
We have every right to cancel the debt without consulting anyone else	0.764	0.18
The probability of GRexit should not be considered as a disaster	0.726	0.2
The Memorandum has not caused the economic crisis; the economic crisis has resulted in the Memorandum	-0.726	-0.116
It is better for Greece to be in the European Union rather than outside.	-0.696	-0.161
We ought to have done many of the changes provisioned in the Memoranda on our own long ago.	-0.688	0.161
The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	0.68	0.088
Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment	0.642	0.097
It must be possible to operate non-governmental, non-profit institutions of higher education.	-0.64	0.375
The national health system can become more efficient through partial privatization.	-0.638	0.258
We should have more flexible forms of work in order to combat unemployment.	-0.573	0.28
What people call "compromise" in politics is really just selling out on one's principles.	0.561	0.366
There should be legislation to limit protests	-0.53	0.308
The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people.	0.529	0.151
We should not apply any law that we feel is unfair.	0.524	0.164
Political forces representing the people should adopt a more confrontational attitude in order to make their voice heard and influence decision-making	0.517	0.09
The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people.	0.49	0.034
The decision power of the European Parliament should be increased on all matters of internal and foreign policy.	-0.406	-0.124
People can be better represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	0.396	0.177
The government should take measures to reduce income inequalities	0.392	-0.071
The police should use stricter enforcement measures to	-0.315	0.572

protect the property of citizens.		
Immigrants are good for [country's] economy.	-0.3	-0.549
The existence of multiculturalism in Greece is a positive phenomenon.	-0.297	-0.602
The church and the state should be completely separated.	-0.255	-0.466
Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law.	0.219	0.677
The right for temporary leaves from prison is more important than the risk of escape	0.155	-0.455
The reduction of corporate taxes would have a positive impact on the development of the economy.	-0.146	0.47
Elected officials talk too much and take too little action.	0.134	0.399
The requirements for asylum and citizenship must be tightened.	0.125	0.742
Defense spending should not be reduced to avoid becoming a vulnerable country.	0.079	0.571
Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.	-0.036	-0.277
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.	-0.029	0.421
Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [country]	-0.016	0.53



### Appendix 3

#### The two main factors of the demand side in Greece

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Memoranda of Understanding with the Troika were necessary to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece.	-0.774	0.033
We have every right to cancel the debt without consulting anyone else	0.721	0.001
With the Memoranda we accumulate debts without any visible benefits.	0.709	0.013
The probability of GRexit should not be considered as a disaster	0.693	-0.059
The economy of Greece would have been better if we had our own currency instead of Euro.	0.659	0.092
Banks and utilities must be under public control.	0.642	-0.093
We ought to have done many of the changes provisioned in the Memoranda on our own long ago.	-0.617	0.173
It is better for Greece to be in the European Union rather than outside.	-0.581	0.032
Popular demands are today ignored in favour of what benefits the establishment	0.579	-0.101
The national health system can become more efficient through partial privatization.	-0.547	0.222
The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	0.545	-0.063
The Memorandum has not caused the economic crisis; the economic crisis has resulted in the Memorandum	-0.481	-0.064
There should be legislation to limit protests	-0.458	0.429
We should not apply any law that we feel is unfair.	0.448	-0.042
I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician	0.442	-0.017
It must be possible to operate non-governmental, non-profit institutions of higher education.	-0.418	0.15
We should have more flexible forms of work in order to combat unemployment.	-0.351	0.209
The decision power of the European Parliament should be increased on all matters of internal and foreign policy.	-0.342	0.022
The government should take measures to reduce income inequalities	0.304	-0.138
The police should use stricter enforcement measures to protect the property of citizens.	-0.288	0.643
The right for temporary leaves from prison is more important than the risk of escape	0.269	-0.442
The requirements for asylum and citizenship must be	-0.155	0.728

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tightened.		
People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences.	-0.149	0.444
Defense spending should not be reduced to avoid becoming a vulnerable country.	-0.104	0.548
Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.	-0.063	-0.421
Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [country]	-0.05	0.512
The existence of multiculturalism in Greece is a positive phenomenon.	-0.049	-0.717
Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law.	0.042	0.661
Immigrants are good for [country's] economy.	-0.027	-0.642
The church and the state should be completely separated.	-0.008	-0.48
The reduction of corporate taxes would have a positive impact on the development of the economy.	-0.277	0.226

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