Outline

1. Intro
   1. Increase of populism in Europe and recent wave in Latin America
      1. Largely ignored in SEA/EA
   2. Electoral success of populists vary widely
      1. Largely limited in Europe until recent Austrian election
         1. Still limited in control of government
            1. Podemos may change this
      2. Much higher success in Latin America
         1. Numerous populist governments
         2. Even within this region varies greatly to 0 in Mexico to full plurality in Venezuela
      3. Table of most “populist” parties in each country by region
         1. Note that this is around 2012 because of coding
            1. Omits latest elections
   3. Classic argument is about counter to liberalism or economic difficulty
      1. Presence of populism with and without economic crisis/neoliberal reforms
         1. Roberts pointed to programmatic de-linking (form of de-institutionalization)
2. Brief overview of populism as a term
   1. Material vs Ideational definitions
      1. Material
         1. Manner of organization (top-down)
         2. Economic policy
         3. Anti-elite
      2. Ideational
         1. Amorphous ideology
         2. Flaunting the low
         3. Consolidating around thin-centered ideology
            1. Divided in moral terms
   2. Populism isn’t tied to leftist (short-term) economic policies
      1. Charisma
      2. Elite or grass roots dominated
         1. Roberts 1995 & 2015, Weyland 2001
            1. These guys still see no coherent ideology
   3. What’s a common denominator?
      1. Prima facie check shows that parties are stronger where populism is more limited
3. Why aren’t current explanations of populism sufficient?
   1. Economic hardship
      1. Populist parties have existed and thrived(??) even when economic hardship is missing
   2. Popular discontent
      1. Populist parties/leaders have stayed in power in LA
   3. Globalization losers or neo-liberal reforms
      1. Populism strong in some parts of LA but missing in critical cases like Chile
         1. Chile hit hardest by neo-liberal reforms yet populist parties never really took off
      2. Counter-argument will focus on how rise with populism in Europe correlates with increased Europeanization – Euro creep
   4. Variation of electoral success within and across regions
   5. Mudde hypothesis
      1. Nativist argument
         1. Not present in LA except maybe in Bolivia
      2. Institutions
         1. Does ok with SMDP in LA
   6. Inclusive vs. exclusive populism
      1. Why are some populist parties/movements heterogeneous while others are highly exclusive?
4. Our contribution
   1. Potentially explains variation between regions
   2. Presence of populism vis-à-vis economic performance
   3. Presence (or lack) of populism when trust in political institutions is low
   4. Potentially explains populism’s rise in Europe prior to neo-liberal reforms following 2008 and Euro crisis
      1. Spain/Greece vs all others
   5. Inclusive vs. exclusive populism
5. Our argument
   1. Three ways in which populism operates within the party context
      * 1. Function of environmental hostility
        2. Individual parties’ ability to select and constrain candidates prevents hyper-personalism where populism is a type of personalism
           1. Dampen or bound the push for personal reputation
      1. Populist entry
         1. When barriers to entry are low entry is easier
         2. Assuming barriers to entry are low because of unstable or weak links between parties and voters – populists can exploit this space for electoral gains
         3. Populists can be inclusive in these cases
            1. Build broad and cross-cutting constituencies

If parties have been de-linked from society likely that there is some political or economic crisis

Economic shocks

Bait and switch tactics

Television

* + 1. Populist adaptation
       1. Barriers to entry are high
          1. Parties cannot be non-professional and expect to perform well (Art)

Parties in the system learn and adapt over time

Professionalize

Tailor message

May mean tempering populism (Austria)

* + - * 1. Will be more exclusive

Other parties in system are strong

May co-opt populist parties

Force populist parties to only occupy restricted space

* + 1. Populist capture
       1. Barriers to entering party system are extremely high
          1. No room even for a niche party
       2. Need critical weaknesses in individual parties
          1. Presence of factionalism that prevents coordination amongst party elites
  1. Problems to address
     1. Endogeneity (move to sub-section of theory)
        1. Populism causing weak parties
           1. Populism is a superior form of political mobilization

We’ve overestimated the cause of parties

* + - 1. Presidentialism
    1. If weak parties/systems allow populism to rise why isn’t populism ubiquitous in weak party systems?
       1. Dependent upon alternative forms of political organization available to office seekers
          1. e.g. Philippines – weak parties increases probability that there is populist but office seekers could use familial networks (substitute to a party) to organize/mobilize

1. Empirical part
   1. Data
      1. Populism Measure
      2. PSI and PI
   2. Americas + Western Europe
   3. Timeline of ideal cases of showing trends
      1. Venezuela
      2. Ecuador or Argentina
      3. France
   4. Cases
      1. Justify case selection
         1. Which is?
         2. Should we have cases where there is no populism?
            1. Mexico (super strong parties)
      2. Populist Entry
         1. Thailand
            1. Party centered populism where party system was underinstitutionalized

New rules incentivized party building

* + - * 1. Was Thaksin anti-elite or structure discourse around dichotomous people vs elite??

I’m not convinced Thaksin was really a populist but I don’t know how he structured his discourse

* + - * 1. Thaksin had a hard time because you can’t criticize the monarchy

Battle over “true” love of Monarchy?

* + - 1. Bolivia
         1. Able to easily enter the scene
         2. Using Bolivia to show that populism is just a function of elite mobilization

Grass roots

* + - * 1. Morales rose through fractured party

Split in that party then Morales left and built up MAS

* + - 1. Philippines
         1. Ephemeral parties
         2. Low bar for entry for any party
         3. Low incentive to build party (this has been pretty constant though)

Aquino wasn’t populist because used family (substitute for a party)

Run off of personality

* + - * 1. Duterte

Used familial connections to win local mayoral position

Family structure was not sufficient to win national election

Flaunts the low

* + 1. Populist adaptation
       1. France
          1. Extreme populist with the founder
          2. Moderate success for most of its life
          3. Under Marine Le Pen

Expelled father

Softened exclusionary tone

Increased electoral success

* + - * 1. Dip in PSI precedes NF’s rise in France
      1. Austria
         1. PR / semi-presidential so institutions are very permissive
         2. PSI actually increases slightly
         3. FPO (the populist party-most successful Rad-right populist in Europe)

Not actually scored as highly populist

Not using Manichean discourse

Very nationalist – this may be a key distinction that would be interesting to tease out

\*\*Some argument to be made about strength of populism??\*\*

Perhaps if anti-establishment rhetoric is strong requires choice between institutions (which may be functioning correctly) vs populist.

Difference between nationalist and populist approaches (overlapping concepts)

FPO rose as a response to immigrant issue (Muller 2002)

* + 1. Populist capture
       1. United States
          1. Set up with the Tea Party

Set and distribution of elite preferences matter

Elite coordination becomes more difficult as distribution changes (bi-modality in GOP?)

* + - * 1. Captured a weak party

Caused by fracturing due to Tea Party (values split exacerbated by financial crisis)

Presence of two dominate factions made coordinated action against Trump harder

17 candidates!

* + - * 1. Trump’s ceiling appears to be 40% in the polls

Amazing for an executive

* + - * 1. Trump brings in other celebrities

Lack of organization – need more “appeal” because his brand is insufficient

Its relative

Clinton campaign is very organized. If he campaign wasn’t institutionalized his approach would likely be more effective