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%% maxwidth is the original width if it is less than linewidth

%% otherwise use linewidth (to make sure the graphics do not exceed the margin)

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\else

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\fi

}

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\newcommand{\hlkwd}[1]{\textcolor[rgb]{0.737,0.353,0.396}{\textbf{#1}}}%

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\makeatletter

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\ifinner\ifhmode%

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\begin{minipage}{\columnwidth}%

\fi\fi%

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\colorbox{shadecolor}{##1}\hskip-\fboxsep

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\usepackage{siunitx}

\usepackage{rotfloat}

\usepackage{titling}

\usepackage{booktabs}

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\usepackage{hyperref}

\usepackage{titling}

\usepackage{blindtext}

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\begin{center}\large#1\end{center}

\vskip0.5em}%

}

\usepackage{geometry}

%\setlength{\voffset}{-0.75in}

\setlength{\headsep}{3pt}

\title{Why Populism? How Parties Shape the Electoral Fortune of Populists}

\author{

Darin Self\thanks{Corresponding author}\\

Cornell University\\

\texttt{ds2237@cornell.edu}

\and

Allen Hicken\\

University of Michigan\\

\texttt{ahicken@umich.com}

}

\date{July 6, 2016}

\usepackage{setspace}

\IfFileExists{upquote.sty}{\usepackage{upquote}}{}

\begin{document}

\begin{titlingpage}

\maketitle

\begin{abstract}

Much of the literature on populism is limited to regionally specific context. Because of this approach, theories of populism have not been adapted to explain cross-regional similarities or differences (such as the prevalence of exclusive populist parties in Europe but inclusive parties in Latin America). Using cross-regional data and exploratory case studies from multiple regions, we provide evidence that the prevalence of populism in a given party system is a function party institutionalization within the party system. In laying out our theory we identify three ways in which populist parties enter party systems and contest elections: populist entry, populist targetting, and populist capture.

\end{abstract}

\end{titlingpage}

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\section{Introduction}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%need to weave throughout our argument that we should not talk about populism without talking about parties. - This is especially crucial for the Latin American approach to populism

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

Recent events, such as the referendum for Great Britain to leave the European Union, the near election of a FP\"{O} candidate in Austria, and the Republican Party nomination of Donald Trump, have driven a wide spread discussion of populism and its (perceived) growing strength. Elected officials and pundits within this discussion often speak of the rise populism as a recent phenomenon, but this view is inaccurate. The presence of populism in West, Central, and Eastern Europe and Latin America is nothing new. For decades now, populist parties such as the FP\"{O} in Austria or the FN France have made steady electoral gains, while in Latin America populist parties and figures such as MAS with Evo Morales in Bolivia or Hugo Ch\'{a}vez's in Venezuela surged to power in the 2000s. So, while the recent incidents of populism in electoral democracies is notable, it is not unprecedented.

\par

The presence of populism in Latin America and Europe is reflected in a large literature in populism. However, most of the work to date has focused on populism within a given region, with little work which draws comparisons directly between populism in the Latin American and European context. The study of populism in Europe primarily focuses on radical-right populist parties \citep{}. In this context, populism or populists that have managed electoral gains or survived multiple electoral rounds boast organized and coherent parties. Populism in Latin America differs greatly when juxtaposed to populism in Europe. Research on populism in Latin America focuses on individual populist leaders that are associated with parties that are far weaker and more ephemeral than their populist counterparts in Europe \citep{}. Comparative work on populism can make better use of cross-regional comparisons in order to highlight key mechanisms which explain the variance in the electoral fortunes of populist parties.

\par

The variance in electoral performance of populist parties, whether between regions or within a single region, has largely been ignored in the literature. Previous work on populism in the European context has largely focused on the presence, survival, or professionalization of populist or radical right parties \citep{}. European populist parties have had limited electoral success - usually functioning as exclusionary peripheral parties garnering only small shares of electoral support. However, in recent years populist parties such as Syriza (Greece), Podemos (Spain), and FP\"{O} (Austria) have become major parties, winning control of the government (countryXXX), and nearly capturing presidency the presidency . While these examples remain exceptional cases, populist parties throughout Europe have gained ground over the past decade.

\par

By contrast, populists and populist parties have been far more pervasive and successful in Latin America, frequently winning presidential elections and captuting majorities in legislatures - something most populist parties in Europe have been unable to do \footnote{Winning a majority in the legislature is something no populist party in Western Europe has been able to accomplish although Syriza fell one seat short of gaining a majority in September 2015 election.}. The the most notable cases of populism are found in Venezuela (with Hugo Ch\'{a}vez) and Bolivia (with Evo Morales). Indeed, Chavez, with his particular Chavismo, is the quintessential case of populism \citep{hawkins2010venezuela}. Populist parties in Latin America also differ from their European counterparts in that they are far less institutionalized Populist parties in Latin America tend to serve as instruments of a strong populist leader coming only to life with the rise of a populist leader and then fading into obscurity after the end of their rule. Alberto Fujimori's Cambio 90 party is a case in point. Founded by Fujimori himself, Cambio 90 quickly came to dominate the legislature by riding Fujimori's coattails. This success, however, was shortly lived and the party unraveled and quickly faded into obscurity when Fujimori was removed from power.

\par

While populism has found success in Latin American, it is anything but ubiquitous in the region\footnote{See Figure \ref{distribution} which maps the distribution of the prevalence of populism in both Latina American and Western European party systems. For this graph populism is measured according to \citet{hawkins2015mapping} criteria.}. The intra-regional variation of populism in Latin America is quite striking. Recent work by \citet{hawkins2015mapping} weights electoral results for parties in Latin America and Western Europe by the strength of their populist rhetoric. The strongest populist parties, by their criteria, are found in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Peru. These results should come as no surprise and serve as a face validity check on their methods. Yet even though some of the party systems where populism is most prevalent are found in Latin America rather than Western Europe, so too are some of the party systems where populism is the least prevalent. Using the same technique, \citet{hawkins2015mapping}\footnote{See Figure 3 in \textit{Mapping Populist Parties in Europe and the Americas}} found that some of the least populist party systems in the two regions are found in Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

\par

\begin{figure}[H]%

\centering

\captionsetup{justification=centering}

\parbox{3in}{\includegraphics[width=80mm]{fig1.jpg}}%

\qquad

\caption{Distribution of Populism in Latin American and Western European Party Systems}%

\label{distribution}%

\end{figure}

\par

What explains variation of populism both within and between regions? As far as we are aware, no work has attempted to produce a theoretical or empirical explanation for why populism is more prevalent in Latin America, why it has slowly gained ground in Europe, or why there is significant variation in the electoral success of populist parties within these regions. In this piece we lay the groundwork for identifying a cause of populism. In doing so we build on existing theoretical and empirical work to extend the comparative analysis of populism beyond a singular region. We argue that the extent to which increasingly more populist parties win greater shares of the electorate is a function of the strength and institutionalization of political parties and the party system. We expect that as individual political parties or party systems become more institutionalized, the ability for populist parties to succeed will diminish thus diminishing the payoff for any single party to become more populist. By contrast, where party systems weaken and deinstitutionalize this opens the political space for populist parties and appeals.

\par

By studying populism through the lens of political parties we hope to answer four related questions. First, why is populism much more pervasive in party systems outside of Western Europe? One key feature that distinguishes Western European party systems from their counterparts in other regions in the degree of party system institutionalization. We argue that institutionalized party systems provide comparatively less fertile soil for the seeds of populism. Second, what explains why economic shocks give rise to populism in some contexts but not others? We argue that the party system is an important intervening variable between shocks and populist support. Third, what explains why anti-elite sentiment distrust of institutions correlates with populism in many, but not all cases? We argue that the explanation lies in the of political parties—where parties are institutionalized there is less space for proto-populists to take advantage of popular disillusionment. Lastly, why do some populist parties adopt inclusive strategies while others pursue exclusive strategies? We contend that where party institutionalization is high, populist are forced to appeal to limited segments of the population - leading them to develop more exclusive strategies.

\par

%probably shouldn't actually equate populism with personalisim directly here. There is overlap with the concept though.

Political parties affect the prevalence of populism because they serve as instruments to coordinate elite action and link elites to the broader population. However, the mere presence of political parties does preclude the presence of populism. We argue that populism can enter and interact with political parties in three ways: populist entry, populist adaptation, and populist capture. *Populist entry* occurs when the \textit{party system} is sufficiently weak that new parties can enter and immediately compete with, or even outmatch, other parties in the system. *Populist adaptation* occurs as populist parties adapt and evolve through electoral cycles in order to compete with well-established and institutionalized parties. Lastly, *populist capture* occurs when factionalism within a party allows a populist to take control of an existing, yet seemingly stable, party. We discuss these means of populist contestation in greater detail later after discussing the concept of populism.

%When political parties are underinstitutionalized, weak, or absent, more personalistic forms of political rule will emerge \citep{bernhard2015party}.

%insert table of most populist parties/country

\section{Populism: A Slippery Concept}

Populism is one of the most contested concepts in political science and is notoriously difficult to apply consistently \citep{roberts1995neoliberalism, roberts2003social, hawkins2015mapping, weyland2001clarifying}. Populism has frequently been associated with robust redistributive policies that are set against global liberalism (e.g. Argentina's Per\'{o}n or Ecuador's Ibarra). However, the resurgence of populism in the 1980s and 1990s challenged the classical conceptualization of populism as populist leaders did not limit themselves to leftist policies \citep{weyland2001clarifying}. Debate on the formulation of populism as a concept has, quite fittingly, centered on two opposing notions of what populism is. On one side of the argument authors propose a concept rooted in the form of organization and mobilization \citep{weyland2001clarifying, roberts2014populism} while on the other is an approach cemented on discourse \citep{mudde2007populist, hawkins2015mapping}.

\par

The organizational approach to populism posits that populism is not simply tied to policy programs but instead to the nature of political organization. Under this framework, populists gain electoral support by creating large, cross-cutting, hierarchical, yet unorganized bases \citep{weyland2001clarifying}. \citet{roberts2015populism} argues that populism is a top-down, elite dominated form of political mobilization that can exploit social movements for electoral and political gain. Roberts' conceptualization of populism is founded in the Latin American experience where populists step over the ashes of political parties whose downfall was brought on by elite defection or economic crisis. In these instances populists need only to push open an unlocked door into a party system where opponents are no longer able to mobilize the masses through a party apparatus.

\par

While this conceptualization would appropriately identify Correa, Fujimori or Ch\'{a}vez as populists, it excludes someone like Evo Morales who rises to power from a grass-roots movement rather than subjugating the masses as an elite. This concept further encounters problems when applied to the European cases where political parties remain crucial to electoral success and the elite subjugation of the masses is less pronounced.

\par

Seeking to explain populism in Europe,

\citet{mudde2007populist} writes from a tradition of populism that appears quite different than the experience of populism in Latin America. The European experience with populism has a number of key distinctions that require a different conceptualization of populism. First, and perhaps most importantly, European populists differ significantly from their Latin American counterparts in that they tend to develop institutionalized party organizations. Another crucial distinction is the tendency of these parties to be rightist parties with a strong exclusive nationalistic bent.

\par

To conceptualize populism in Europe, \citet{mudde2007populist} and \citet{mudde2013exclusionary} frames populism as a discursive concept. In this framework, populism is a view of the world, expressed through discourse, with two opposing forces; the people - who embody the moral good - and the corrupt elite who conspire against the people. Building off of Mudde's ideational concept, \citet{hawkins2012measuring} define populism as a "\textit{Manichaean approach to the political world that equates the side of Good with the putative “will of the people” and the side of Evil with a conspiring elite}".

\par

Another recent ideational conceptualization of populism has been proposed by \citet{ostiguy2009high}. \citet{ostiguy2009high} differs with Hawkins, Mudde, and others in that populism is not a construct of how the world is viewed but how the populist relates to the people. \citet{ostiguy2009high} argues that populists relate to the people by flaunting the low - behaving or speaking in a way that sets them apart from the elite and allows them to be more closely related to the people. By way of example, consider two well-known Western politicians: David Cameron and Donald Trump. Cameron, an Oxford educated British politician speaks and behaves like a cultural elite and adheres to conventional rules and procedures. Trump, by contrast, flaunts the low and appeals to "the people" by using coarser language and rhetoric filled with insults towards elites while dismissing and denigrating traditional rules and institutions.

\par

For the purposes of this study we adopt an ideational conceptualization of populism. We do this because it provides greater flexibility in comparing populists across regions of the world than otherwise possible with a material-organizational approach. By adopting a material-organizational conceptualization of populism, we would limit ourselves to elite dominated mass movements which are rarer in areas of the world where politics are well organized via political parties. We also do not favor one ideational conceptualization over the other. A \textit{prima facie} check of populists suggests that there is significant overlap between the Manichean \citep{hawkins2012measuring} and flaunting-the-low \citep{ostiguy2009high} types of populists. In their attempt to construct a Manichean framing of the world, many populists seek to relate culturally to "the people" to set themselves apart from the elite against whom they are engaged in political battle.

\section{Populism's Party Problem}

%%%Needs heavy reworking%%%%

Many explanations for the rise of populism have been put forward – a number of which center on economic-focused explanations. In this view populist is an outgrowth of or backlash against globalization (CITE), neoliberalism (CITE), or economic crisis (CITE). While populist discourse often refers to economic grievances, we agree with others that populism is a chiefly political phenomena (CITE) and that this phenomena centers is closely linked with the nature of political parties. While we among the first to explicitly link populism to party systems, other scholars have certainly noted the role that parties play in the rise of populism, particularly in Latin America. Ken Roberts, for example, notes that the use of bait-and-switch tactics by party elites lead to programmatic delinkage between society and parties and contributed to the rise of populist politicians \citep{roberts1995neoliberalism, roberts2012politics, roberts2013market}. While we use a different conceptualization of populism than Roberts, we likewise see populism as a function of weak/weakened parties and party systems. Thus, economic explanations are only indirectly related to populism in that if economic phenomena weaken political parties, populism is more likely to exist.

\par

To outline how populism is a function of parties and party systems we treat populism as a strategy to garner electoral votes. We view party-based appeals and populism as two alternative (though not necessarily mutually exclusive) strategies for mobilizing voters. In this way, populism can be seen as a substitute or a compliment to political parties as an instrument for organization and mobilizing voters. In consolidated democracies, political parties serve as the most effective instrument for political organization and electoral mobilization. However, in many polities other strategies (such as clientelism) are more effective at mobilizing voters.

\par

Where political parties are more institutionalized (i.e. cohesive, organized, with professionalize staff, an establish brand), the payoffs for using populist rhetoric to build a constituency diminish as that rhetoric is less capable of inducing electoral loyalty compared to more enduring and material connections to voters. To demonstrate how populism is a function of parties and party systems we outline three ways through which populists contest elections vis-\'{a}-vis parties in party systems: Populist Entry, Populist Adaptation, and Populist Capture.

\par

To begin with, it is helpful to think about how much political space there is for would-be populists. The hostility of the electoral environment shapes both the likelihood that populists will compete and be successful, and the form that populist competition will take. We distinguish between two factors that affect the hostility of electoral environment: the level of party institutionalization, and the level of electoral permissiveness/restrictiveness. (See Figure XXX) Holding all else constant (the economic environment, the popularity of existing parties, etc.) the combination of these two factors shape the competitive environment and thus the strategy of would-be populists.

\subsection{Low environmental hostility: Populist Entry}

When institutionalization and barriers to entry are low the environment for populist parties is ideal. Populists can easily enter the system and mobilize voters who are at best only weakly attached to existing political parties \citet{tavits2006party, tavits2008party, tavits2013post}. In short, we argue that environments with low hostility populism provide the best opportuntity for populist parties, and hence, we should expect populist parties to be more prevalent and more successful in these environments, ceteris paribus.

\par

In cases where environmental hostility is low and political entrepreneurs enter the party system using a populist strategy we expect these parties to be inclusive populist parties. Because electoral volatility is high and societal linkages to pre-existing parties are weak, it is within the interest of the entering populist party to build a coalition or base that is cross-cutting and inclusive of many factions of disaffected segments of society in order to maximize its electoral gains. The incentives for an inclusive should increase with the restrictiveness of the electoral system. See, for example, the cases of Ch\'{a}vez's PSUV, Morales' MAS, Iglesias' Podemos, or Syriza under Tsipras.

High Environmental Hostility: Few populist parties

At the other extreme, should a would-be populist seek to enter a system where environmental hostility is very high because of non-permissive institutions and high levels of institutionalization, forming their own party is unlikely to succeed. Winning a significant portion of the electorate will be difficult because it requires the new party to peel away a large number of voters that are strongly linked to existing parties. In addition, due to the highly restrictive nature of the electoral system they face the likely prospect of complete electoral failure with few to no seats. Given the hostile nature of the electoral environment populists should be least likely to emerge under these conditions.

\par

While rare, when we do see populist emerging in hostile environments the path to power is likely to be an intra-party one. Namely, populist leaders or factions come to capture and existing party. Populist capture occurs when a populist (likely a party outsider) attempts to gain control of the party and party elites are unable to prevent the populists' rise. However, the high degree of party cohesion in institutionalized parties makes it likely that party elite will be able to coordinate to prevent such capture. Where parties are cohesive and organizationally robust, elites are able to coordinate to select candidates that fit their brand while preventing the rise of outsiders.

\subsection{Moderate Environmental Hostility: Populist Capture or Populist Targetting}

What are our expectations where the environmental only moderately hostile—either a combination of weak parties with a restrictive electoral system, or strong parties with a permissive electoral system. Let’s start with a system where parties weakly institutionalized but the electoral system makes new party entry difficult. The restrictive nature of the electoral system still makes new party entry difficult, but compared to highly institutionalized environments we should be much more likely to observe populist capture. A lack of party cohesion makes it more likely that populist wings will exist within the party and party factionalism undermines the capacity of party elites to coordinate against the populist.

\par

The recent experience in the United States is an illustration of this dynamic. Both political parties are fairly under-institutionalized. Each party is factionalized and contains within it a populist wing. In addition, the parties have divested control of candidate selection to primary voters and their delegates. Both parties faced significant challenges from the populist wings of the party and the high degree of factionalism made elite coordination against the populist challengers difficult.

\par

What about situations where parties are institutionalized but the electoral environment is permissive? How do populist parties enter and survive in systems with institutionalized party systems? If a populist party is able to enter a party system with high levels of institutionalization, it is unlikely to be able to sway large segments of the electorate. First, existing parties already have stable and strong links to society. Second, well institutionalized parties should boast a professional and well organization that is effective at mobilizing voters.

Because of this, these populist parties must focus on targeting limited segments of society that do not yet have strong links to existing parties. This tends to lead populist parties in these systems to be more exclusive in their appeals. If they wish to compete against existing parties they must broaden their appeal beyond niche segments of society and this will generally require that parties reduce the strength of their populist discourse.

\section{Alternative Approaches}

Our argument points to parties and party systems as a cause of populism. We argue that environmental hostility shapes the strategies which political entrepreneurs may take to garner shares of the electorate. Under our reasoning, the presence of stronger and more institutionalized parties reduces the ability of entrepreneurs who select a populist strategy to gain electoral traction. Thus, when parties or party systems are weak, populism is more prevalent in the system. We must also consider, however, that populism is actually a cause of party weakness or de-institutionalization.

\par

Populism as a cause of party weakening or party system de-institutionalization is a problem of endogeneity that is crucial to address. In our model, we argue that political parties are influential political institutions that are the best instruments for organizing and mobilizing voters. It is plausible that populism is actually a superior form of political mobilization, and that the rise of especially talented populists, such as Hugo Ch\'{a}vez, *causes* the collapse of the party system rather than the other way around. Whether party weaknesses cause populism or the populism undermine political parties is an empirical question that we seek to answer.

\par

Our argument also implies a puzzle that we must grapple with: \textit{if weak parties or party systems allow populism to rise, why isn't populism ubiquitous in weak party systems?}. If populism is such a potentially powerful electoral tool, why then do we not observe more populism - especially where parties are weak? One part of the explanation lies with moderating effect of the electoral environment, as discussed above. However, we also stress that populism is, in itself, one of many strategies politicians can use. Politicians may form parties, rely on personal wealth, use force, rely on clientelist networks, or use populism. None of these strategies are mutually exclusive and political entrepreneurs may make use a mix of any set of strategies as they believe to be the most advantageous. The use of populism as a strategy, then, is dependent upon alternative forms of political organization and mobilization strategies. Should alternative forms exist, political entrepreneurs may substitute to or away from populism depending on the instruments available to them.

%This may be best illustrated in the Philippines where Rodrigo Duterte employed populist rhetoric to build a national constituency when he could no longer rely on local familial networks to win the presidency. Have to think about this a bit more.

%Another potential point of endogneiety is presidentialism

%Allen - do we want to focus on this?? Darrin: Let’s tackle this after APSA.

%Other alternative explanations such as economic crisis, de-linking, rise of nationalism, etc

\section{Research strategy}

We argue that the prevalence of populism in a party system is a function of the level of environmental hostility of the party system. As the average level of hostility increases within the system, the average level of electoral success of populist parties within the system should decrease. In circumstances where the average level of party institutionalization is high and institutions are non-permissive (i.e. environmental hostility is high and SMDP is used), populism should be rare. Where institutionalization is low but institutions are restrictive then polulism should emerge within existing parties via populist capture. Where electoral institutions are permissive but parties highly institutionalized then populist parties should be relatively small, and focused on the exclusive targeting of small portions of the electorate. Finally, the environment which is most conducive to populist parties is one with weak parties and a permissive electoral system. While we theorize that party institutionalization is causally linked with populism, our goal in this paper is to establish the plausibility of this argument, rather than to precisely estimate a causal effect.

\par

Our intention is to present evidence of a link between average party institutionalization and the presence of populism in any given party system. To establish this link we follow a two-step a research design. The first step will make use of quantitative data. The purpose of this quantitative data is to move beyond mere description and demonstrate a cross-regional correlation between party institutionalization and populism. Because of data limitations and the difficulty of identifying the exogenous relationship between party institutionalization and populism we stop short of estimating any causal relationship via this cross-national quantitative data.

\par

. The use of case studies fills two purposes. First, using cases studies provides a more nuanced view of the causal mechanisms through which variance in party institutionalization may lead to changes in the level of populism within a party system. Second, case studies allow us to address the issue of endogeneity - reverse causality. As previously mentioned, it is reasonable to believe that the rise of populism, or a particular populist, may lead to the deinstitutionalization of individual parties or the party system as a whole. By using exploratory case studies we pay particular attention to the timing of changes in the institutionalization of parties within a party system and the system as a whole vis-\`{a}-vis changes in the electoral fortunes of populists.

\section{Data}

\textit{Populism}\\

We measure populism using new data generated by \citet{hawkins2015mapping}. \citet{hawkins2015mapping} treat populism as discursive and define it as discourse which treats politics as a dualistic struggle between the (morally good) people and the (morally evil or corrupt) elite. To measure populism, \citet{hawkins2015mapping} use a holistic grading of entire party manifestos and selected speeches. Using this technique, Kirk Hawkins and his research team trained graders (usually student research assistants) on their conceptualization of populism and then worked through exercises using a number of example texts. Each grader reads an entire text and assigns a score to the text for its level of populism. To measure populism, \citet{hawkins2015mapping} use three point scale, ranging from 0 to 2, where 0 indicates very little to no populism present, 1 indicates the presence of populist rhetoric but is tempered by non-populist elements, and 2 indicates that a text is extremely populist\footnote{For sampling technique see \citet[pg. 6]{hawkins2015mapping}}.

\par

After grading is completed, scores are then aggregated through a multi-step process. First, equal weights are assigned to the scores for the party manifesto and the average of the scores of the party speeches. Second, the average level of populism is then calculated for the party system to allow cross-regional comparison. The final indicator which is used as our measure of populism uses a formula which sums the products between each country's populism score and its vote share. Thus, this measure of populism indicates how prevalent populism is in a party system. \footnote{The formula used for this is $P\_c = \frac{\sum(p\_i x v\_i)}{2}$}.

\\

\textit{Party System Institutionalization} \\

%%Allen can you add in something about the party strength measure?? DONE%%

To measure the average strength of the parties within the system, we use new data collected by the \textit{Varieties of Democracy Project} (Hereafter V-Dem). Our primary measure of average party institutionalization, is V-Dem’s index of Party Institutionalization, which we will refer to as \textit{PSI}. PI is an index of five party system-related components, and is created in two stage process. The first stage is the aggregation of ordinal ratings provided by multiple country experts (five or more) for the five individual components (party organization, branches, linkages, distinct party platforms, and legislative party cohesion \footnote{The specific questions used to measure these components can be found at the V-Dem website. \url{https://v-dem.net/media/filer\_public/17/fe/17fe9954-d9aa-4961-aa73-f967929ebab9/v-dem\_codebook\_v43.pdf} \\ See section 2.16 Party institutionalization index}. In the second stage, the outputs of these first stage analyses are aggregated into the PI index using Bayesian factor analysis techniques.\footnote{We draw on Bernhard et. al. (2015) for this summary of process: The individual components of the index are aggregated from the responses that experts provided to the relevant questions on the V-Dem survey. These multiple ordinal rating were then aggregated into a unified, continuous and reliable variable using Bayesian item response theory (IRT) models. Because individual raters might vary with regard to the way they interpret the questions, and in terms of reliability and consistency, these models are useful because they incorporate the information encoded in the variation in raters’ perceptions, and in reliability levels across and within coders into the estimation process (Bollen and Paxton 2000, Jackman 2004).

%Allen can you send me these papers so I can drop them into the Bib?

\par

IRT models assume that the variable being measured is latent, that it cannot be measured directly and that each coder’s response includes a degree of error. The model uses patterns of disagreement across ratings to estimate coder level errors, and down weighs the ratings provided by coders who are deemed less informative. The Bayesian framework allows us to estimate country-year level parameters that capture the latent variable of interest, along with thresholds differentiating the levels of the variable.

For a more detailed discussion see Pemstein et al. (2015).} For more details on the characteristics of the PI index (its strengths and weaknesses) see Bizzarro et. al. (2016). The V-Dem data includes observations for 193 countries with fairly regular coverage from 1900 to 2014.

\par

As an alternative way to operationalize institutionalization we employ a measure of party strength developed by Bizzarro et. al. 2016). Party strength is an index that measures the extent to which political parties within a polity are characterized by: (1) permanent national party organizations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) centralized mechanisms of candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, (5) minimal party switching (where elected members of a party change their party affiliation in between elections), and (6) programmatic (rather than clientelistic) linkages to their social base. The six indicators are aggregated through simple addition to form a Party Strength index, reflecting the expectation that each element of the index is partially substitutable.

\par

We use these two measure of institutionalization to explore the correlation between the average institutionalization or strength of parties within the party system and the level of populism within the party system. As previously stated, the data available on party system level populism is limited to the Americas and Western Europe in the years near 2010. Because of the limited quantitative data available on populism we average the past 10 years of \textit{PSI} for each of the 26 countries available in the \citet{hawkins2015mapping} dataset.

\\

\textit{Case Selection}

As previously mentioned when introducing our research design, we use exploratory case studies to investigate the mechanisms through which party institutionalization potentially affects the presence of populism within a given party system as well as the direction and timing of this relationship. To explore the link between party institutionalization and populism we have selected six cases in two regions: the Americas and Western Europe. (In future iterations of this paper we intend to include cases from Southeast Asia). We have selected these regions to be consistent with our cross-national analysis and because countries within these regions provide variation in terms of the robustness of parties and party systems as well as the prevalence of populism.

\par

From the Americas we have selected Bolivia, the United States, and Venezuela. In Bolivia because Evo Morales captured the MAS party, melded it with his significant grass-roots movements, and entered and came to dominate a relatively weak party system. In addition to Bolivia, we have selected the United States. The United States has a restrictive electoral system with moderately institutionalized parties. We focus on the 2016 election to demonstrate how populism can enter a seemingly stable party system through a under-institutionalized party - namely the Republican Party. Finally, Venezuela is the quintessential story of populism in Latin America. Following significant political upheaval during the 1990s, Hugo Ch\'{a}vez entered a weakened party system with a new and weakly-institutionalized political party using his own brand of strong populism - Chavismo. These cases stand in strong contrast to countries in the region such as Mexico. Mexico provides a significant counter example to the three previous cases. Despite its proximity to countries that have been dominated by populism, economic difficulties, and internal instability, Mexico boasts some of the strongest parties in all of the Americas and has a profound lack of populism.

\par

In addition to the Americas we draw on cases from Western Europe. Western Europe is commonly associated with relatively strong and institutionalized party systems. In Western Europe we have selected Austria, France, and Spain. Austria and France each demonstrate how populist parties are largely disadvantaged in well-institutionalized party systems. In both cases populist parties entered as fringe parties and struggled to garner electoral success. Despite their initial struggles, Austria's FP\"{O} and Frances FN parties have found greater electoral success as only as they have evolved and diluted their populist brand. In Spain despite massive economic upheaval, long established political parties have been able to maintain a significant hold on the electorate despite the rise of the new populist party, Podemos.

\par

\section{Cross-regional evidence}

Prior to addressing the timing of populism entry, adaptation, or capture in party systems, we first focusing on establishing evidence for a cross-national trend that supports our hypothesis that party and party system institutionalization is critical to understanding variation in populism. As previously mentioned, we have merged data from \textbf{V-dem} with cross-national data on populism from \citet{hawkins2015mapping}. We present the summary statistics in Table \ref{descriptive}. In this table we also include the average vote share of all political parties in the party system that received at least a single percentage of the vote in either an executive or legislative election.

\begin{table}[!htbp] \centering

\caption{Sample Summary Statistics}

\label{descriptive}

\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{5pt}}lccccc}

\\[-1.8ex]\hline

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Statistic & \multicolumn{1}{c}{N} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{Mean} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{St. Dev.} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{Min} & \multicolumn{1}{c}{Max} \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Vote Share & 26 & 21.429 & 9.624 & 11.875 & 49.850 \\

Populism & 26 & 15.433 & 17.028 & 0.000 & 76.785 \\

PI & 26 & 0.840 & 0.153 & 0.485 & 0.985 \\

Party Strength & 26 & 0.456 & 0.427 & $-$0.450 & 1.134 \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

\end{tabular}

\end{table}

\par

To provide evidence for a relationship between party and/or party system institutionalization we plot \textit{PSI} and \textit{Populism} in Figure \ref{distribution}. Figure \ref{distribution} shows a trend downward and to the right demonstrating that as \textit{PSI} increases, \textit{Populism} decreases. In addition to this trend, a critical finding is the disparity between regions. American countries, colored darker, are found to have less institutionalized party systems and a higher presence of populism.

\begin{figure}[H]%

\centering

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\parbox{5in}{\includegraphics[width=125mm]{fig2.jpg}}%

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\caption{Party System Institutionalization and Populism}%

\label{distribution}%

\end{figure}

\par

The presence of populism also varies more in the Americas with Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela each having high levels of populism while Mexico, the United States, and Uruguay each have low levels of populism. Compare this with Europe which has very little variance. Each European party system is highly institutionalized and has low levels of populism\footnote{Because of data availability Greece and Spain were omitted from this sample. We suspect that the variance of \textit{Populism} would increase should these be included.}. This can also be seen in Table \ref{breakdown}. Table \ref{breakdown} shows that parties, on average, populist parties in Latin America gain greater vote shares than their European counterparts - likely a function of more electoral systems that employ plurality rules and have a lower number of effective parties in their systems.

\begin{table}[!htbp] \centering

\caption{Breakdown of Populism and Party System Attributes by Region}

\label{breakdown}

\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{5pt}} ccc}

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\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Variable & Americas & Europe \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Vote Share & $22.575$ & $15.085$ \\

Populism & $16.441$ & $7.495$ \\

PI & $0.725$ & $0.947$ \\

Party Strength & $0.104$ & $0.720$ \\

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\end{tabular}

\end{table}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%explain this table%%%%%%%%

%check on the t-test and interpretation

%wanted to establish that there is something to estimate but we can't provide an unbiased estimate

\begin{table}[!htbp] \centering

\caption{Difference of Means - Populism Score}

\label{ttest}

\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{5pt}} cccc}

\\[-1.8ex]\hline

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Variable & Estimate & T-stat & p-Value \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

PI & $14.590$ & $4.370$ & $0.0002$ \\

Party Strength & $14.980$ & $4.480$ & $0.0001$ \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

\end{tabular}

\end{table}

\subsection{Timing Populist Gains in Party Systems}

As previously mentioned, the possibility of reverse causality (populism causing party and party system de-institutionalization) is theoretically plausible yet still an empirical question. In addition to brief case studies we use time-series plots of \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party Strength} to investigate the timing of the rise of populist parties and address the issue of endogeneity. In each figure we plot the time-series of \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party strength} next to each other for comparison of within country time trends for each of the indicators\footnote{The range for each indicators are different. \textit{PSI} is an indicator ranging from 0-1 with global mean of 0.5 while \textit{Party Strength} ranges from ~-1.5 to ~1.5. Because of a difference in ranges the y-axis differ.}. In each figure we plot the time-series for each indicator for each country for approximately 25 years\footnote{In the European cases of Austria and France we extend the time horizon by 10 years to account for the first times that the FN in France and FP\"{O} in Austria became relatively competitive parties} along with the global average for democracies\footnote{We select democracies for countries scoring greater than 6 on Polity IV's composite democratic index.}\footnote{To calculate the average we selected all country years where \textit{polity2} $\geq$ 6 and calculate the year average for \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party Strength}} in order to compare the country-year trend with the global-year trend. We also highlight the years of the significant presence of populism in the party system with a gray background\footnote{The United States is an exception in this case. Because we treat the capture of the Republican Party nomination by Donald Trump as the beginning of a populist period in the United States we highlight the time after the Global Financial Crisis which began in 2008. We argue in the case study that the rise of the Tea Party created significant coordination problems for elites in the Republican Party which was a necessary condition for Donald Trump's capture of the Party nomination}.

\par

A few general findings stand out when looking at these figures. First, changes in \textit{PSI} seem to have no discernible temporal relationship with the rise of populism. In the European, Venezuelan, and U.S. cases \textit{PSI} is fairly stable prior to the rise of populism. Only in Bolivia do we observe any decrease in the level of \textit{PSI} prior to a populist period. Unlike \textit{PSI}, however, in many cases we do observe a decrease in \textit{Party Strength} prior to the beginning of a populist period. In the cases where there is an increase or stability in \textit{Party Strength} (Bolivia,and Venezuela), the average party strength in each of these systems is below the global democratic average of \textit{Party Strength}. This observation supports our argument that populism is more likely to be present or increase its presence in systems with weak political parties. In instances where parties are strong (France and Austria) and the party system is well institutionalized, populist periods in these cases\footnote{In both the French and Austrian cases these periods began where their respective populist parties passed or approach 10\% in the legislative or executive elections.} began after small decreases in \textit{Party Strength}.

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\section{Case Studies}

Because of a lack of quantitative data we include a number of brief case studies to provide greater depth in the timing and type of populism present in the Americas, Europe, and Southeast Asia. We use these case studies to walk through the causal mechanisms of how parties and party systems influence the presence of populism in party systems. We also use these case studies to show how the strength of populism fluctuates over time and is a function of environmental hostility.

\subsection{Populist Entry}

%%%%%Brief overview of populist entry and how its most common outside of Western Europe

\textit{Venezuela} \\

We begin our cases studies with the prototypical populist case - Venezuela's Hugo Ch\'{a}vez. Prior to Ch\'{a}vez's ascendancy to the presidency in the late 1990s, the party system of Venezuela had experienced decade-long collapse, despite previously being one of the most stable party systems in the region. If Venezuela had boasted one of the most institutionalized party systems, how did it come to collapse?

\par

Following years of economic experimentation with ISI, Venezuela faced dire straits. Under pressure of the IMF Venezuela began to implement neo-liberal economic reforms in order to qualify for assistance. These reforms were implemented by the AD (\textit{Acci\'{o}n Democratica}) party after winning the 1998 election, despite promises to avoid austerity and return prosperity to the country \citep{dietz2007thaw}. This move equates to what Ken Roberts terms a "bait-and-switch" tactic that served to programmatically dealign political parties \citep{roberts2013market}. The factures in the party system began to show immediately in the next presidential election as Rafael Caldera split from his previous party \textit{COPEI} to run independently\footnote{It is critical to note that all of this occurred well before Ch\'{a}vez's contested an election.}. Thus, in a few short years neo-liberalism opened the first major cracks into the Venezuelan party system.

\par

After his failed coup and subsequent pardon, Hugo Ch\'{a}vez set to work organizing "Bolivarian Circles". These circles were loosely tied, non-hierarchical, civic organizations that would later be critical to Ch\'{a}vez in mobilizing the electorate \citep{hawkins2003populism, roberts2006populism}. Despite the presence and use of these circles, however, Ch\'{a}vez never set out to fully institutionalize these organizations into a well institutionalized political party, instead leaving them to function as a quasi-party that would help mobilize voters.

\par

If Ch\'{a}vez lacked an institutionalized party, how was he able to defeat political parties which had had such a strong hold on the party system? The initial cracks to the party system arose after to the bait-and-switch tactics of parties in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Not only did the introduction of IMF reforms cause parties to renege on electoral promises, but neo-liberal reforms severely weakened corporatist linkages. In addition to these reforms, however, economic decline - especially the decline of oil revenue - also undermined parties ability to make use of clientelistic linkages. Thus, the weakening of both corporatist and clientelistic linkages pulled the rug from under the Venezuelan party system \citep{roberts2003social, roberts2007latin}.

\par

Due to the collapse of Venezuela's political parties, Ch\'{a}vez faced little institutionalized opposition. Thus, Ch\'{a}vez had little incentive to build his own institutionalized party and was able to combine extreme populist rhetoric with the loosely organized MVR to easily defeat his weakened opposition \citep{hawkins2003populism}. The course of Venezuela's party collapse as the harbinger to the rise of Ch\'{a}vez is depicted in Figure \ref{venezuelaPSI} below. In the late 1980s and early 1990s both \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party Strength} begin to decline weakening both parties and the party system already relatively weakly institutionalized.

\\

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\parbox{3in}{\includegraphics[width=75mm]{venezuela1.jpg}}%

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\includegraphics[width=75mm]{venezuela2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{Venezuelan Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{venezuelaPI}%

\end{figure}

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\noindent

\textit{Bolivia} \\

Another participant in Latin America's populist revival \citep{roberts2007latin} is Evo Morales and his \textit{MAS} party in Bolivia.\* The story of Bolivia's party system is similar to that of Venezuela's. Following years of state-led economic intervention, neo-liberal reforms played a critical role in undermining the foundation upon which political parties rested by significantly weakening organized labor unions \citep{crabtree2013mnr, roberts2013market}. From the mid-1980s, when neo-liberal reforms were first introduced, to Evo Morales' victory in a presidential election, the electoral and party system in Bolivia was fraught with instability.

\par

Following the neo-liberal reforms in the mid-1980s, elections were contested by multiple parties which frequently used coalitions to form governments \citep{crabtree2013mnr}. Problems of instability were not helped as Bolivia introduced a new electoral system in 1995 which led to further upheaval in the composition of parties \citep{centellas2009electoral}. Indicative of this instability was the rise of new parties or previously peripheral parties which garnered significant portions of the vote. The presence and success of new or previously peripheral parties demonstrates the low level of environmental hostility in the Bolivian party system. Indeed, net electoral volatility rose from 27.5 from 1980-2000 to 50.7 during 2000-2010 demonstrating the collapse of the Bolivian party system \citep[pg. 1441]{roberts2013market}. Extremely low level of environmental hostility due to the collapse of the Bolivian party system set the stage of the rise of Evo Morales following the water and gas wars of the early 2000s.

\par

Evo Morales rose to prominence as an organizer of coca unions. Following his capture of the previously defunct MAS party, Morales capitalized on opportunities during the Water and Gas Wars to build a larger movement that extended beyond coca growers \citep{webber2011rebellion}. Using a new form of ethno-populism, Morales fused together a new movement-party that cross-cut across multiple ethnicities which had previously acted more autonomously. Thus, using populism, Morales was able to overcome the lack of an institutionalized political party and exploit the weakness in the Bolivian party system.

\par

Unlike other cases which we explore in this piece, the average Bolivian political party became strong prior to the rise of Morales to the presidency as demonstrated in Figure \ref{boliviaPI}. This rise in \textit{Party Strength}, however, follows earlier declines in \textit{Party Strength} and \textit{PSI}. Overall the Bolivian case fits our expectations for a situation in which populism can succeed. With a relatively weak institutionalization and a permissive electoral system and new parties were able to enter and contest elections with some success. The most intriguing finding from Bolivia, however, is absence of a decline in \textit{PSI} or \textit{Party Strength} \textit{immediately} prior to the rise in presence of populism in the party system.

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\includegraphics[width=75mm]{bolivia2.jpg}

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\caption{Bolivian Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{boliviaPI}%

\end{figure}

\noindent

\textit{Spain} \\

Both Bolivian and Venezuelan party systems are institutionalized to near the global democratic average but are relatively weaker vis-\'{a}-vis party systems in Europe where party systems are well institutionalized. Thus, it is not surprising to observe populist entry in these cases. While that may be the case, do we observe populist entry even in institutionalized party systems? The case of Spain illustrates that such entry is possible. Figure \ref{spainPSI} shows that both \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party Strength} are well above the global democratic average in Spain. Following the merger of parties that created the PP (\textit{Partido Popular}) Spain has been a fairly stable two-party system with the PP and PSOE (\textit{Partido Socialista Obrero Espa\~{n}ol}) garnering a strong majority of the vote.

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\includegraphics[width=75mm]{spain2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{Spanish Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{spainPI}%

\end{figure}

\par

The conditions in Spain since the 2008 global financial crisis were similar to those that led to the rise of successful populists in Bolivia and Venezuela. Following the financial crisis, unemployment rose steadily to an extremely high level as can be seen in Figure \ref{spain\_unem}. Yet this large and persistent economic malaise didn't immediately lead to any breakdown in the Spanish party system. Instability only began after the center-left PSOE agreed to austerity measures. Like other cases of populism in Latin America, the actions of a leftist party agreeing to austerity measures was a bait-and-switch tactic with the potential programmatically de-aligned the party with many of its followers \citep{roberts2013market}. Following the move by the PSOE to introduce austerity measures, large protests movements arose. Despite the magnitude of the protests, for the most part the two-party system stayed intact in the subsequent 2011 election with no new parties challenging the PP or PSOE, though the PSOE was dealt a major blow, losing 15\% of the vote from the previous election.

\par

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\parbox{3in}{\includegraphics[width=100mm]{spain\_unem.png}}%

\caption{Spanish Unemployment (2006-2016)}%

\label{spain\_unem}%

\end{figure}

While the party system remained intact during the 2011 election, the next four years prior to the 2015 election saw the rise of two entry parties - one of which, Podemos, is very populist. Podemos arose from the anti-austerity movements and was founded by political scientist Pablo Iglesias. Iglesias brought to Spain experience working with populist governments in Venezuela \citep{pais\_fundacion\_2014} and Bolivia \citep{iglesiashuff}.

\par

Iglesias' purpose in creating a new party was to introduce a leftist party that embodied the will of the people. His populist philosophy can be seen in his scholarly work in which he cites Ernesto Laclau's seminal work \citep{laclau2005populist} on populism frequently \citep{errejon2007regreso, iglesias2008devolviendo, iglesias2009multitud, iglesias2014clases}. The conditions for a new party were extremely ripe following the bait-and-switch of the PSOE and the sustained economic crisis. As can be seen in Figure \ref{spainPSI} both \textit{PSI} and \textit{Party Strength} decreased prior to the 2015 elections. In both the local and national elections of 2015, Podemos, and another new party (Ciudadanos) made major gains shifting the system from two major parties to four with Podemos the third largest party.

\par

Because of the fragmentation in the party system of the 2015 election, no government was formed and elections were held again in mid-2016. As can be seen in Table \ref{spainvotes} the new parties' (Podemos and Ciudadanos) as well as PSOE's electoral gains were largely unchanged with the center-right PP making modest gains. Spain demonstrates how populist parties can enter into a well institutionalized system. For populist parties to enter a well institutionalized system to the extent of Spain, the country likely must undergo fairly extreme economic duress \textit{and} some ruling party must shift from their programmatic alignment with their voting base. Spain demonstrates that these conditions opened the door for a new populist party to enter but, as to this day, this new populist party's success appears to have a relatively low ceiling, as expected by the theory. It remains to be seen whether a party, such as Podemos, can rely heavily on strong populist rhetoric and compete with institutionalized parties.

\begin{table}[!htbp] \centering

\caption{Elections Results in Spain (2011-2016)}

\label{spainvotes}

\begin{tabular}{@{\extracolsep{5pt}} cccc}

\\[-1.8ex]\hline

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

Party & 2011 & 2015 & 2016 \\

\hline \\[-1.8ex]

PSOE & 0.2876 & 0.22 & 0.2266 \\

PP & 0.4463 & 0.2871 & 0.3303 \\

Podemos+ & NA & 0.2068 & 0.211 \\

Cs & NA & 0.1394 & 0.1305 \\

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\end{tabular}

\end{table}

\noindent

\textit{Thailand}

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\begin{minipage}{1.75in}%

\includegraphics[width=75mm]{thailand2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{Thai Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{thailandPI}%

\end{figure}

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\textit{Philippines}

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\end{minipage}%

\caption{Philippines Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{philippinesPI}%

\end{figure}

\subsection{Populist Adaptation}

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

%brief overview of adaptation

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

\textit{Austria} \\

To demonstrate how environmental hostility restrains the presence of populism in a party system we have selected the case of Austria. Whereas in Latin America populists have won large majorities, the success of populists in Europe, where parties and party systems are more institutionalized, is far more limited. In the case of Austria we focus on the FP\"{O} which is commonly referred to as a radical right party. Although many refer to the FP\"{O} as a populist party, it falls at the midpoint in the index of populism created by \citet{hawkins2015mapping}. This means that while the FP\"{O} certainly employs populist rhetoric, it is not heavily reliant on the idea of the people against a corrupt elite as its mobilizing message.

\par

The FP\"{O} was founded in 1956 by former members of the Nazi party but was only a very minor party for most of its early life. The fortunes of the FP\"{O} changed, however, during the 1980s following a weakening in the strength of parties (as can be seen in Figure \ref{austriaPSI} and a change in leadership. In 1986 J\"{o}rg Haider became chairman of the FP\"{O} and quickly changed course. In an attempt to broaden the appeal of the FP\"{O}, J\"{o}rg Haider abandoned the previous agenda and retooled the party with a populist-nationalist blend which included a move to the right and strong anti-immigrant sentiment.

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\parbox{3in}{\includegraphics[width=75mm]{austria1.jpg}}%

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\includegraphics[width=75mm]{austria2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{Austrian Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{austriaPI}%

\end{figure}

\par

The move to a populist-nationalist approach in order to broaden the appeal of the FP\"{O} seemed to pay off. In the years following J\"{o}rg Haider's ascendancy in the party, FP\"{O} became a major party within the Austrian system. Unlike the case in France, which we discuss hereafter, the move to a populist strategy was successful because of lower levels of environmental hostility in the Austrian system. Even though the Austrian party system, boasted two major and well institutionalized political parties (the SP\"{O} and the \"{O}VP) the nature of Austria's electoral system reduces environmental hostility. The presence of proportional representation in Austria reduces the pressure towards a two-party system and allows greater space for additional parties. In the case of the FP\"{O}, J\"{o}rg Haider was able to find space in the electoral market by using a more expansive appeal with populism after a slight weakening in the strength of the other parties. In this way lower environmental hostility has allow the FP\"{O} to become a major party which uses a mix of populist-nationalism as its primary message.

\noindent

\textit{France}\\

In addition to the FP\"{O} in Austria, two parties in France demonstrate how populist parties can adapt in highly institutionalized party systems. When speaking of populism in France, many scholars have focused their attention on the FN (\textit{Front national}) largely because it reached previously unseen success during presidential elections in the early 2000s. The FN entered the French party system after the mid-1980s -following a decline in the average strength of political parties (as can be seen in Figure \ref{francePI}). This decline in party strength was the result of increased polarization within the system \citep{knapp2004parties}, weakening links between parties and the population \citep{grunberg2008french}, and the difficulties of parties to adapt to European integration \citep{bornschier2009evolution}. These factors led to a small but sufficient gap within the system that allowed a new populist party, the FN, to enter.

\begin{figure}[H]%

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\includegraphics[width=75mm]{france2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{French Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{francePI}%

\end{figure}

\par

Although the FN was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in 1972, the FN first found limited electoral success (approached 10\% of the vote in the National Assembly) in 1986 and 1988. During the 1990s, the FN became more ethno-centric in order to expand its base while at the same time building links to labor unions and making use of state networks \citep{schain1999national}. Despite FN's stability, their fortunes declined during the mid-2000s as Nicolas Sarkozy and the UMP moved to the right to co-opt some of FN's positions. Problems further arose for the FN as the PS and UMP coordinated actions against the FN. This resulted in the FN's poorest electoral performance in 2007 with the party only garnering 4.3\% of the vote in the National Assembly and 10.4\% in the presidential election.

\par

Following the late 2000s decline, Jean-Marie retired and his daughter, Marine, became president of the party. Marine differs from her father in that she is a professional and is less xenophobic in her speech. Essentially, Marine "flaunts the low" \citep{ostiguy2009high} less than her father thus reducing the populist nature of the FN. Marine also immediately moved to adapt and re-calibrate the FN to better compete in the party system. Part of her reforms included removing extremely xenophobic agendas from the party platform and moving the party to the right \citep{shields2013marine} in a move to "de-demonize" the party \citep{mayer2013jean}. After Marine's move to remake the party, the FN quickly reclaimed much of its lost support in the 2012 election. Unlike the case in Austria, the FN had to become more inclusive and less populist because of the less permissive electoral environment.

\par

Although the FN is commonly referred to as a populist party, the party's manifesto and speeches by Marine Le Pen are not heavily populist. \citet{hawkins2015mapping} score the FN much lower on their scale of populism than many parties commonly thought of as populist. Not only is the FN not very populist by this measure relative to parties outside the system, the FN is less populist than the Left Front party.

\par

The Left Front party is a relatively newcomer to the French party system and is more populist (according to Hawkins and Silva) than the FN but has had more limited success. The Left Front, as the FN, demonstrates the need to peripheral and populist parties in well institutionalized system to adapt. The Left Front is a party formed from two weaker parties, the French Communist Party and the Left Party, who adapted by forming a coalition party in order to continue to survive in the French party system. The French case demonstrates that despite the adaptation of both the FN and Left Front, it is very difficult for populist parties to survive where environmental hostility is high. In this case, both parties learned and adapted but, as we learned in the case of the FN, adaptation included the professionalization and moderation away from their previous level of populism.

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\subsection{Populist Capture}

%quick review of what populist capture is

\textit{United States}

Populist capture is more rare than populist entry or adaptation because it occurs where environmental hostility is high and the electoral system is restrictive. In very recent history, however, we have seen a populist capture a political party in the United States by a political outside - Donald Trump. The rise of Donald Trump did not happen overnight and the dynamics that lead to his capture of the Republican Party were in motion well before he even began his foray onto the political scene during the 2012 presidential election.

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As can be seen in Figure \ref{usaPI} the average strength of political parties in the U.S. party system began to decline \textit{before} the 2008 financial crisis\footnote{We have denoted the time from the 2008 financial crisis to 2015 with gray shading.}. In their paper, \citet{miller2008transformation} argue that political parties within the U.S. party system were going to face a realignment. This realignment would occur because the socio-economic ideology of those within the Republican Party were beginning to diverge - a phenomenon possibly exacerbated by the 2008 financial crisis.

\begin{figure}[H]%

\centering

\captionsetup{justification=centering}

\parbox{3in}{\includegraphics[width=75mm]{usa1.jpg}}%

\qquad

\begin{minipage}{1.75in}%

\includegraphics[width=75mm]{usa2.jpg}

\end{minipage}%

\caption{U.S. Party System Institutionalization and Party Strength}%

\label{usaPI}%

\end{figure}

\par

Following the 2008 financial crisis in the 2010 election, the introduction of the Tea Party into the Republican Party created significant problems of elite coordination which would eventually prevent the Party from preventing the rise of Donald Trump. The Tea Party wave of 2010 introduced a new set of elites within the Republican Party who held candidate, policy, and legislative preferences that were relatively more distant than the previous set of Republican elites. Due to the increased distance of preferences between elites coordination became more difficult. This can be seen in the lack of coherent policy responses by the Republican party vis-\'{a}-vis the Democratic minority and President. Instead of coherent policy responses, Republicans opted for "obstructionism". While many may view this as a selected strategy on the part of the Republicans, we view this as a result of a party paralyzed by the inability to coordinate elite preferences on policy\footnote{This is further demonstrated by the ouster of Speaker of the House John Boehner who eventually could not hold the differing factions of the Republican Party together.}.

\par

The presence of the Tea Party faction in the Republican Party not only increased government volatility\footnote{In the forms of a government shutdown and ouster of Speak Boehner} but set the stage for an open contest for their party nomination for the U.S. presidency. The presence of 17 declared candidates for the Republican nomination is signals a complete lack of coordination on the part of Party elites to select a small set of candidates\footnote{Contrast this with the Democratic Party which held the number of candidates low effectively excluding challengers to Secretary Clinton}. This created an optimal situation for a populist to capture the Republican Party.

\par

The presence of 17 candidates made any coordination against Donald Trump extremely difficult and increased the likelihood of success of a populist campaign strategy instead of a more party style campaign. Donald Trump effectively employed populism to stand out among all candidates by flaunting the low; frequently using non-elite style of behavior and rhetoric to stand apart from the career politicians. In response to his populism, Republican were unable to coordinate their attacks or electoral strategy. After winning the Republican nomination, Trump built on his flaunting of the low populism and introduced elements of Manichean populism; frequently referring to the Democratic Party, Hillary Clinton, and any non-supportive Republican elite as corrupt.

\par

The electoral payoff of using populism instead of a more institutionalized campaign and party apparatus remains to be seen but the strategy seems to appear less well suited for a presidential election as opposed to a presidential primary in the U.S. system\footnote{As of today Donald Trump trails Hillary Clinton significantly in all national polls and most of the polls fielded in critical swing states}. At the point of writing, it appears that Donald Trump will lose by a significant margin in the presidential election (the average margin of victory since WWII excluding LBJ 1964, Richard Nixon 1972, and Ronald Reagan 1984 is 5.7\%). Despite the presence of an unpopular nominee from the Democratic Party, the populist strategy of Donald Trump appears ill-suited to compete against an institutionalized Democratic Party and Clinton campaign.

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