Populism - need to identify cases where there were steep declines in PSI but no rise of populism

1. Populist leaders
   1. Fujimori (Peru: 1990-2000)
      1. Roberts 1995
      2. Weyland 2001
      3. Barr 2009
      4. Roberts 2015
   2. Cardenas (Mexico: 1934-1940)
      1. Roberts 1995
      2. Weyland 2001
   3. Haya de la Torre (Peru: 1962, 1979)
      1. Roberts 1995
   4. Peron (Argentina: 1946-1955, 1973-1974)
      1. Roberts 1995
      2. Weyland 2001
   5. Menem (Argentina: 1989-1999)
      1. Weyland 2001
   6. Collor (Brazil: 1990-1992)
      1. Weyland 2001
   7. García (Peru: 1985-1990, 2006-2011)
      1. Weyland 2001
   8. Caldera (Venezuela 1969-1974, 1994-1999)
      1. Just the 1994-1999
         1. Weyland 2001
         2. Barr 2009
   9. Pérez (Venezuela 1974-1979, 1989-1993)
      1. Weyland 2001
   10. Bucaram (Ecuador 1996-1997)
       1. Weyland 2001
   11. Chávez (Venezuela: 1999-2013)
       1. Barr 2009
       2. Roberts 2015
       3. Zúquete 2008
       4. Hawkins 2010
   12. Correa (Ecuador: 2007-)
       1. Roberts 2015
       2. Levitsky and Loxton 2013
       3. Weyland 2013
   13. Podemos (Spain: 2014-)
       1. Gómez-Reino and LLamazares 2015
   14. Syriza (Greece: 2012-)
       1. Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2015
       2. Stravrakakis and Katsambekis 2014
       3. Andreadis, Stavrakakis, and Katsambekis 2015
   15. Movimento Cinque Stelle (Italy: 2009-)
       1. Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2015
   16. Austrian Freedom Party (Austria: 1986)
       1. Right wing
       2. Mudde 2014
       3. Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013
   17. National Front (France:)
       1. Right wing
   18. UKIIP (UK:
       1. Rooduijn 2015
       2. Right wing
   19. Partij voor de Vrijheid (Netherlands:
       1. Rooduijn 2015
       2. Right wing
   20. Swiss People’s Party (Switzerland:
       1. Mudde 2014
       2. Right wing
   21. Danish People Party (Denmakr:
       1. Mudde 2014
       2. Right wing
2. Populism
   1. Personalist leader with broad base of support (Roberts 1995)
      1. Exploit and accelerate erosion of institutional forms of representation
      2. Personalistic and paternalistic leader
      3. Heterogeneous/multi-class base of support
      4. Top-down process of mobilization
      5. Amorphous ideology (usually anti-elitist)
      6. Economic project that is widespread to create material incentives for support
   2. Cannot reduce populism to economic strategies (Weyland 2001)
      1. Shapes patters of political rule
      2. Weak commitment to substantive policies, ideas, or ideologies
      3. Organize mass numbers
      4. Political strategy
      5. Based on individual
   3. High vs low dimension of political competition (Ostiguy 2009/2015)
      1. Exists when party systems haven’t been built around left-right divides
      2. Populism is neutral to left-right
      3. Flaunting of the low
   4. Three factors that determine populism (Barr 2009)
      1. Appeals designed to build support
         1. Anti-establishment
            1. Not simply anti-incumbent
         2. Power is in hands of an elite and not tied to the people (common citizen)
         3. Manichean discourse conforms to reality in the mind of supporters
      2. Position of candidate with respect to party system
         1. Outsider who gains prominence independently or with newly competitive political party
            1. (So there is a decrease in PSI and possible flux in ENEP as volatility increases to make space for new party or candidate)
      3. Linkages between citizen and candidate
      4. Populism reflects the specific combination of appeals, location and linkages that suggests a correction based on enhanced accountability rather than increased participation.
         1. Mass movement
   5. Populism vs Social Movements (Roberts 2015)
      1. Share political opportunity structures
      2. May occur sequentially but cannot coincide
      3. Social movements are bottom up
         1. Mobilize and stick together via civil organizations
      4. Populism is top down
   6. Discourse Gómez-Reino and Llamazares 2015
      1. Social and political conditions following global recession created favorable conditions for rise of populist discourse and new parties
      2. Previous populist parties were ethno-centric
      3. Podemos rises in the wake of austerity imposed by a leftist government
      4. Anti-elite
      5. Manichean structure of society
      6. Heterogeneous base
3. Discursive or ideological conceptualization of populism allows for both participatory or plebiscitary forms of mobilization and institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of organization
   1. Here is a focal point – if populism is polymorphic then there shouldn’t be an observable variation of the rise of populism and institutionalization
4. Populism and euro-skepticism
   1. Euro-skepticism and populism should go well together because of the source of economic austerity and difficulty
   2. If source of euro-skepticism is ethnic or national can this still be considered populist?
      1. Far-right exclusionary parties?
5. Thin-ideology
   1. a coherent set of basic assumptions about the world and the language that unwittingly expresses them (Hawkins, Riding, and Mudde 2012 <- microfoundations of Populism)
   2. Manichaean view of the world (Good vs Evil)
      1. Hawkins 2010 and Mudde 2007
      2. Laclau
      3. De la Torre 2000
   3. Reduced form in Andreadis et al
      1. Polarized view of world
      2. Claim to represent the uneven dualist distribution
   4. Thin-ideology that considers society to be essentially divided between two antagonistic and homogenous groups, pure people and corrupt elite, and wants to reflect the true will of the people
      1. Mudde 2000, 2004, 2007, 2013, 2014, 2015
6. De La Torre
   1. Manichean discourse
   2. Leader socially constructed symbol of redemption
   3. Coalition of emergent elites with popular sectors
   4. Leaders have an ambiguous relationship with democracy
   5. Case study of Bucaram shows that he couldn’t create alliances with institutional players
7. Inclusionary (left-wing) vs exclusionary (right-wing) (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013)
   1. Latin America vs Europe
   2. Lack of research on these regions
      1. Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013 create sub-type of populism
         1. Spain and Greece buck this trend of exclusionary populism in European parliaments
      2. Ideational approach
         1. Strictly focusing on ideational presents problems when explaining material outcomes
8. Causes
   1. Economic hardship
      1. Hernandez and Kiesi (2015)
         1. Incumbent punishment
         2. Long-term structural changes in society that de-align party system
      2. Kriesi et al 2006
      3. Kriesi et al 2008
   2. Programmatic dealignment (bait-and-switch)
      1. Roberts ####
   3. Discontent with political actors/institutions
      1. Rooduijn 2015
9. As an IV
   1. Populist Radical Right have not increased electoral volatility
10. Issues
    1. Thin-ideology and ideational approach
       1. Difficulty in explaining material outcomes
       2. Material politics, especially in the context of parties, is about organization.
       3. This populism does little to help us understand institutionalization
       4. If populism is orthogonal to pluralism there is an implicit relationship with institutionalization
          1. Pluralism requires strong institutions
             1. Populism seeks to remove these
       5. Not necessary to capture demand side
          1. Individuals can still certainly find deep distrust with institutions
             1. This *opens* the door for populism

Why then politicians use populist discourse or engage in populism as a strategy is a more falsifiable question

* 1. Critical issue in comparing LA to WE
     1. In LA populism is associated with mass mobilization
  2. External supply side (Mudde book)
     1. Electoral opportunity structure is insufficient
        1. Only looking at populist radical right
           1. Could remove populist and probably find the same thing
     2. Doesn’t even entertain the idea of programmatic de-linking