

IDS Rules



IDS

- IDS = Intrusion Detection System
- We're looking deeper into the packets than a firewall would
 - Looking at source/destination/protocol
 - Looking at the contents of the packets (data) too
- Use signatures for known bad
- Anomaly detection
 - Something looks different than normal?
 - Maybe it's bad...

IDS Software

- Snort
 - Open source IDS/IPS
 - Created in 1998
 - Currently developed by Cisco
- Suricata
 - Open source IDS/IPS
 - First standard release in 2010
 - Developed by the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF)

Snort vs. Suricata

- Price: Well, they're both open source, so... Free!
- Snort has been the de-facto standard IDS
- Suricata is multi-threaded
 - Not everyone agrees this is better
- Suricata includes lots of protocol extractors
 - Example: Rule can look at just the HTTP Request type rather than the whole packet
- Suricata can (mostly) use Snort rules

IDS Rules

- Many rules come with Snort and Suricata
- You can write your own rules, but you can't write them for everything
 - All the vulnerabilities
 - All the exploits
 - All the policy violations
- Free rulesets
- Paid rulesets

```
# This Ruleset is EmergingThreats Open optimized for suricata-2.0-enhanced.

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Adobe
flow:to_client,established; content:"PDF-"; depth:300; content:"this.media.newP
reference:url, www.metasploit.com/redmine/projects/framework/repository/revision
reference:url, vrt-sourcefire.blogspot.com/2009/12/adobe-reader-medianewplayer-a
user; sid:2010495; rev:13; metadata:affected_product Web_Browsers, affected_pro
Web_Client_Attacks, signature_severity Major, created_at 2010_07_30, updated_at

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possi
flow:established,to_client; content:"|0d 0a|%PDF-"; depth:600; content:"/F(Java
reference:cve,2009-3956; reference:url, doc.emergingthreats.net/2010664; referenc
001_Stratsec_Acrobat_Script_Injection_Security_Advisory_v1.0.pdf; classtype:att
affected_product Web_Browser_Plugins, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment
2010_07_30, updated_at 2016_07_01;)

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Foxi
flow:to_client,established; content:"PDF-"; depth:300; content:"Launch"; distan
reference:url, www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/570177; reference:url, www.h-online.com/se
979286.html; reference:url, www.sudosecure.net/archives/673; reference:url, www.h
vulnerability-971932.html; reference:url, blog.didierstevens.com/2010/03/31/esca
Used-to-Install-Zeus.trace.1301-.asn; reference:url, doc.emergingthreats.net/201
```

Rulesets

- ET = Emerging Threats
- ET Open
 - Primarily Suricata
 - Free
- ET Pro (Proofpoint)
 - Primarily Suricata
 - License fee per sensor
- Snort Community
 - Snort only
 - Free
 - Community-contributed
- Snort Subscriber (Talos)
 - Snort only
 - License fee per sensor
- Snort Registered
 - Snort only
 - Same as Snort Subscriber, but 30 days delayed

IDS Rules

- There's a bunch
- Typically broken up into categories
 - DNS rules
 - Trojan rules
 - Worm rules
 - Games rules
- <http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/suricata/rules/>

What's in a rule?

- Syntax can vary from platform to platform
- All will have similar components, though
- IDS rules are similar to firewall rules to start
- Let's look at Suricata specifically

Here's a rule

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from_server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- Detects bad telnet logins
- Let's break it down

Action

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL  
TELNET Bad Login"; flow:from_server,established;  
content:"Login incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- If the rule matches, what should we do?
 - Alert
 - Log the traffic, and let it through
 - Pass
 - Just let it through
 - Drop
 - Stop the packet, do not inform the receiver or sender (IPS mode)
 - Reject
 - Stop the packet, inform the receiver and sender (IPS mode)

Protocol

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- What protocol to match on?
 - TCP, UDP, ICMP
 - IP
 - Essentially "any"
- Suricata specific
 - HTTP, FTP, TLS, SMB, DNS

Source and Destination IPs

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- IPv4, IPv6 addresses
- Can also negate addresses
- \$HOME_NET and \$EXTERNAL_NET
 - Defined in the IDS's configuration
 - \$HOME_NET defaults to private addresses
 - \$EXTERNAL_NET is basically !\$HOME_NET

Source and Destination Ports

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from_server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- Can do ranges, negations
 - 80, 82 Ports 80 and 82
 - 80:82 Ports 80 through 82, inclusive
 - 1024: Ports 1024 and higher (until 65535)
 - !80 Any port but port 80
 - Any All the ports

Direction

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- Which way the signature has to match
- Packets must flow in that direction
- Most are an arrow to the right
 - ->
- Can also do bi-directional
 - <>

Try It 1

- Example...
 - alert proto \$HOME_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL_NET any
- Example_1.pcap
 - Packet 26
- Example_2.pcap
 - Packet 2
- Example_3.pcap
 - Packet 10

https://files.dakotastate.net/ids_pcaps.zip

Try It 1 - Answers

- Example...
 - alert proto \$HOME_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL_NET any
- Example_1.pcap
 - Packet 26
 - alert tcp \$HOME_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL_NET 80
- Example_2.pcap
 - Packet 2
- Example_3.pcap
 - Packet 10

Message

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
  (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
  flow:from_server,established; content:"Login
  incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
  classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
  metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
  2010_09_23;)
```

- Descriptive Message
- Type of malware
 - Trojan, Ransomware, DDoS, etc.
- Action of the malware
 - Checking, Activity, Exfil...

Different Types of Rules

- ET Rulesets include (but not limited to...)
 - Activex.rules
 - Attack_response.rules
 - Botcc.rules
 - Chat.rules
 - Dns.rules
 - Dos.rules
 - Drop.rules
 - Files.rules
 - ftp.rules
 - Icmp.rules
 - Misc.rules
 - Netbios.rules
 - scan.rules
 - Shellcode.rules
 - Smtp.rules
 - Snmp.rules
 - telnet.rules
 - Tor.rules
 - Trojan.rules
 - Policy.rules
 - User_agents.rules
 - Worm.rules
- Some note of this will go in the rule message

Message Examples

- ET TELNET External Telnet Login Prompt from Cisco Device
- Rule Creator
 - ET == Emerging Threats
- Ruleset/Category
 - TELNET
 - MALWARE
- Description
 - External Telnet Login Prompt from Cisco Device
 - Malware Type: Ransomware, DDoS, Adware, etc...
- Be consistent and descriptive
- This is SUPER important for logging and analysis!

Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin

Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
 - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin

Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
 - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
 - No – not descriptive at all
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin

Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
 - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
 - No – not descriptive at all
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin
 - No – Zeus checking in isn't a policy violation

Flow

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL  
TELNET Bad Login"; flow:from_server,established;  
content:"Login incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- More than source and dest ip
- Client is the originator of the connection
- Server is the responder
- `to_server == from_client`
- `from_server == to_client`
- Most TCP rules will also contain “established”
 - UDP rules will just state the direction

Try It 2

- msg:"DSU *Category Description*";flow: *flow_direction*;
- You are writing a signature for a WannaCry DNS Lookup
 - _____
- You are writing a signature for an executable payload from the Neutrino Exploit Kit as it enters the network
 - _____

Rule Headers

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
  (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
  flow:from_server,established; content:"Login
  incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
  classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
  metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
  2010_09_23;)
```

- Do not affect how the rule matches packets
- Message to describe the rule
- Aid the analyst

Rule Headers

- **Classtype**
 - Provide some classification to the rules
 - Priority levels assigned in the `classification.config` file (`/etc/suricata/classification.config` on our VM)
 - Some examples...
 - Not-suspicious
 - Unknown
 - Successful-dos
 - Successful-admin
 - Suspicious-login
 - Policy-violation
 - Optional field
- **SID – Signature Identifier**
 - Some allocated ranges
 - 1000000-1999999 are for your local custom use
 - Ranges above are reserved for ET Open, ET Pro, Original Snort GPL, Dynamically updated rules, etc.
 - Required field

Rule Headers

- Rev
 - Revision
 - Increments as changes are made to the signature over time
 - Optional field
- Metadata
 - Really any key/value pair that you want
 - Optional field
 - Some examples...
 - Date created
 - Tags
 - Performance impact
 - Attack target

Contents

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad
Login"; flow:from_server,established; content:"Login incorrect";
nocase; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- Unique packet contents
- Can have multiple content sections
- Many options
 - Nocase
 - Distance
 - Dsize
 - Isdataat
 - ...and more...
- Excellent guide: https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/wiki/Payload_keywords

Contents

- Contents can be string based
- `content:"test";`
- Contents can be hex based
- `content:"|00 2a 26 4a|";`
- Or both!
- `content:"This | 20 | is | 20 | fun";`

Content Modifiers

- ```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
 (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
 flow:from_server,established; content:"Login
 incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
 classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
 metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
 2010_09_23;)
```
- There are many, but we're going to start with just one.
  - Nocase;
  - The previous content match is not case sensitive.

## Try It 3

- Write the full rule so far (as much as we have learned) with content for the following:
- Example\_1.pcap
  - Packet 26
- Example\_3.pcap
  - Packet 10
- Example\_4.pcap
  - Packet 10