

# IDS Rules



# IDS

- IDS = Intrusion Detection System
- We're looking deeper into the packets than a firewall would
  - Looking at source/destination/protocol
  - Looking at the contents of the packets (data) too
- Use signatures for known bad
- Anomaly detection
  - Something looks different than normal?
    - Maybe it's bad...

# IDS Software

- Snort
  - Open source IDS/IPS
  - Created in 1998
  - Currently developed by Cisco
- Suricata
  - Open source IDS/IPS
  - First standard release in 2010
  - Developed by the Open Information Security Foundation (OISF)

# Snort vs. Suricata

- Price: Well, they're both open source, so... Free!
- Snort has been the de-facto standard IDS
- Suricata is multi-threaded
  - Not everyone agrees this is better
- Suricata includes lots of protocol extractors
  - Example: Rule can look at just the HTTP Request type rather than the whole packet
- Suricata can (mostly) use Snort rules



# IDS Rules

- Many rules come with Snort and Suricata
- You can write your own rules, but you can't write them for everything
  - All the vulnerabilities
  - All the exploits
  - All the policy violations
- Free rulesets
- Paid rulesets

```
# This Ruleset is EmergingThreats Open optimized for suricata-2.0-enhanced.

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Adobe  
flow:to_client,established; content:"PDF-"; depth:300; content:"this.media.newP  
reference:url,www.metasploit.com/redmine/projects/framework/repository/revisions  
reference:url,vrt-sourcefire.blogspot.com/2009/12/adobe-reader-medianewplayer-a  
user; sid:2010495; rev:13; metadata:affected_product Web_Browsers, affected_pro  
Web_Client_Attacks, signature_severity Major, created_at 2010_07_30, updated_at

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possi  
flow:established,to_client; content:"|0d 0a|PDF-"; depth:600; content:"/F(Java  
reference:cve,2009-3956; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/2010664; referenc  
001_Stratsec_Acrobat_Script_Injection_Security_Advisory_v1.0.pdf; classtype:att  
affected_product Web_Browser_Plugins, attack_target Client_Endpoint, deployment  
2010_07_30, updated_at 2016_07_01;)

alert http $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"ET WEB_CLIENT Possible Foxi  
flow:to_client,established; content:"PDF-"; depth:300; content:"Launch"; distanc  
reference:url,www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/570177; reference:url,www.h-online.com/sec  
979286.html; reference:url,www.sudosecure.net/archives/673; reference:url,www.h  
vulnerability-971932.html; reference:url,blog.didierstevens.com/2010/03/31/escap  
Used-to-Install-Zeus.trace.1301-.asp; reference:url,doc.emergingthreats.net/201
```

# Rulesets

- ET = Emerging Threats
- ET Open
  - Primarily Suricata
  - Free
- ET Pro (Proofpoint)
  - Primarily Suricata
  - License fee per sensor
- Snort Community
  - Primarily Snort
  - Free
  - Community-contributed
- Snort Subscriber (Talos)
  - Snort only
  - License fee per sensor
- Snort Registered
  - Snort only
  - Same as Snort Subscriber, but 30 days delayed

# IDS Rules

- There's a bunch
- Typically broken up into categories
  - DNS rules
  - Trojan rules
  - Worm rules
  - Games rules
- <http://rules.emergingthreats.net/open/suricata/rules/>

# What's in a rule?

- Syntax can vary from platform to platform
- All will have similar components, though
- IDS rules are similar to firewall rules to start
- Let's look at Suricata specifically



# Here's a rule

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
  (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
  flow:from_server,established; content:"Login  
  incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
  classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
  metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
  2010_09_23;)
```

- Detects bad telnet logins
- Let's break it down

# Action

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL  
TELNET Bad Login"; flow:from_server,established;  
content:"Login incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- If the rule matches, what should we do?
  - Alert
    - Log the traffic, and let it through
  - Pass
    - Just let it through
  - Drop
    - Stop the packet, do not inform the receiver or sender (IPS mode)
  - Reject
    - Stop the packet, inform the receiver and sender (IPS mode)

# Protocol

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
flow:from server,established; content:"Login  
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
2010_09_23;)
```

- What protocol to match on?
  - TCP, UDP, ICMP
  - IP
    - Essentially "any"
  - Suricata specific
    - HTTP, FTP, TLS, SMB, DNS



# Source and Destination IPs

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
flow:from server,established; content:"Login  
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
2010_09_23;)
```

- IPv4, IPv6 addresses
- Can also negate addresses
- \$HOME\_NET and \$EXTERNAL\_NET
  - Defined in the IDS's configuration
  - \$HOME\_NET defaults to private addresses
  - \$EXTERNAL\_NET is basically !\$HOME\_NET



# Source and Destination Ports

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";
flow:from server,established; content:"Login
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at
2010_09_23;)
```

- Can do ranges, negations

- 80, 82      Ports 80 and 82
- 80:82      Ports 80 through 82, inclusive
- 1024:      Ports 1024 and higher (until 65535)
- !80      Any port but port 80
- Any      All the ports

# Direction

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
flow:from server,established; content:"Login  
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
2010_09_23;)
```

- Which way the signature has to match
- Packets must flow in that direction
- Most are an arrow to the right
  - ->
- Can also do bi-directional
  - <>

# Try It 1

- Example...
  - alert proto \$HOME\_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL\_NET any
- Example\_1.pcap
  - Packet 26
- Example\_2.pcap
  - Packet 2
- Example\_3.pcap
  - Packet 10

[https://files.dakotastate.net/ids\\_pcaps.zip](https://files.dakotastate.net/ids_pcaps.zip)

# Try It 1 - Answers

- Example...
  - alert proto \$HOME\_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL\_NET any
- Example\_1.pcap
  - Packet 26
  - alert tcp \$HOME\_NET any -> \$EXTERNAL\_NET 80
- Example\_2.pcap
  - Packet 2
- Example\_3.pcap
  - Packet 10



# Message

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
flow:from server,established; content:"Login  
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
2010_09_23;)
```

- Descriptive Message
- Type of malware
  - Trojan, Ransomware, DDoS, etc.
- Action of the malware
  - Checking, Activity, Exfil...

# Different Types of Rules

- ET Rulesets include (but not limited to...)

- Activex.rules
- Attack\_response.rules
- Botcc.rules
- Chat.rules
- Dns.rules
- Dos.rules
- Drop.rules
- Files.rules
- ftp.rules
- Icmp.rules
- Misc.rules
- Netbios.rules
- scan.rules
- Shellcode.rules
- Sntp.rules
- Snmp.rules
- telnet.rules
- Tor.rules
- Trojan.rules
- Policy.rules
- User\_agents.rules
- Worm.rules

• Some note of this will go in the rule message

# Message Examples

- ET TELNET External Telnet Login Prompt from Cisco Device
- Rule Creator
  - ET == Emerging Threats
- Ruleset/Category
  - TELNET
  - MALWARE
- Description
  - External Telnet Login Prompt from Cisco Device
  - Malware Type: Ransomware, DDoS, Adware, etc...
- Be consistent and descriptive
- This is SUPER important for logging and analysis!

# Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin



# Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
  - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin

# Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
  - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
  - No – not descriptive at all
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin

# Good or Bad?

- DSU TROJAN Mirage User Agent
  - Good!
- DSU INFO IP Lookup
  - No – not descriptive at all
- DSU POLICY Zeus Variant Checkin
  - No – Zeus checking in isn't a policy violation

# Flow

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL  
TELNET Bad Login"; flow:from_server,established;  
content:"Login incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- More than source and dest ip
- Client is the originator of the connection
- Server is the responder
- to\_server == from\_client
- from\_server == to\_client
- Most TCP rules will also contain "established"
  - UDP rules will just state the direction



## Try It 2

- msg:"DSU *Category Description*";flow: *flow\_direction*;
- You are writing a signature for a WannaCry DNS Lookup
  - \_\_\_\_\_
- You are writing a signature for an executable payload from the Neutrino Exploit Kit as it enters the network
  - \_\_\_\_\_

# Rule Headers

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
(msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
flow:from server,established; content:"Login  
incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
2010_09_23;)
```

- Do not affect how the rule matches packets
- Message to describe the rule
- Aid the analyst

# Rule Headers

- **Classtype**
  - Provide some classification to the rules
  - Priority levels assigned in the classification.config file (/etc/suricata/classification.config on our VM)
  - Some examples...
    - Not-suspicious
    - Unknown
    - Successful-dos
    - Successful-admin
    - Suspicious-login
    - Policy-violation
  - Optional field
- **SID – Signature Identifier**
  - Some allocated ranges
    - 1000000-1999999 are for your local custom use
    - Ranges above are reserved for ET Open, ET Pro, Original Snort GPL, Dynamically updated rules, etc.
  - Required field

# Rule Headers

- Rev
  - Revision
  - Increments as changes are made to the signature over time
  - Optional field
- Metadata
  - Really any key/value pair that you want
  - Optional field
  - Some examples...
    - Date created
    - Tags
    - Performance impact
    - Attack target



# Contents

```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login"; flow:from_server,established; content:"Login incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9; metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at 2010_09_23;)
```

- Unique packet contents
- Can have multiple content sections
- Many options
  - Nocase
  - Distance
  - Dsize
  - Isdataat
  - ...and more...
- Excellent guide: [https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/wiki/Payload\\_keywords](https://redmine.openinfosecfoundation.org/projects/suricata/wiki/Payload_keywords)

# Contents

- Contents can be string based
- `content:"test";`
- Contents can be hex based
- `content:"|00 2a 26 4a|";`
- Or both!
- `content:"This | 20 | is | 20 | fun";`

# Content Modifiers

- ```
alert tcp $HOME_NET 23 -> $EXTERNAL_NET any  
  (msg:"GPL TELNET Bad Login";  
  flow:from_server,established; content:"Login  
  incorrect"; nocase; fast_pattern:only;  
  classtype:bad-unknown; sid:2101251; rev:9;  
  metadata:created_at 2010_09_23, updated_at  
  2010_09_23;)
```
- There are many, but we're going to start with just one.
  - Nocase;
  - The previous content match is not case sensitive.

## Try It 3

- Write the full rule so far (as much as we have learned) with content for the following:
  - Example\_1.pcap
    - Packet 26
  - Example\_3.pcap
    - Packet 10
  - Example\_4.pcap
    - Packet 10