

Beyond the Credit Cycle: A Path-Dependent Asset-Liability Macro Primer

<https://www.capitalflowsresearch.com/>

The Traditional Credit Cycle Framework

Traditional macro investing often relies on the credit cycle concept – a recurring sequence of boom and bust in credit markets. This framework typically breaks the cycle into four broad phases:

1. **Expansion (Recovery)** – Credit begins to grow after a prior downturn. Interest rates are low, lending picks up, and economic activity strengthens.
2. **Euphoria (Bubble)** – Credit growth accelerates and lending standards slip. Investors and borrowers become overly optimistic. Leverage builds up as people believe the good times will last indefinitely.
3. **Contraction (Downturn)** – Eventually, cracks appear. Rising interest rates or losses reveal that risks were underestimated. Lending slows, some borrowers can't roll over their debts, and credit starts to tighten.
4. **Panic (Crisis)** – Confidence evaporates. Lenders pull back sharply, liquidity dries up, and weaker borrowers or institutions fail. Asset prices plunge, and central banks often intervene to stop a complete collapse.

In theory, this cycle repeats over time as boom conditions sow the seeds of the next bust. For example, low interest rates fuel a credit boom and “confidence runs high” during the boom, until rising rates and loan losses flip the mood to “suspicion and fear,” causing credit to suddenly contract and panic to set in. The traditional view sees this process as almost inevitable and somewhat predictable in its progression.

Why the Traditional Credit Cycle Often Falls Short

In practice, however, the neat expansion–euphoria–contraction–panic sequence rarely plays out so smoothly. Relying solely on the classic credit cycle framework can be misleading and not very predictive. Some key shortcomings include:

- **Poor Timing Precision:** The credit cycle tells us booms *eventually* end in busts, but “historical precedent doesn’t help us predict at what exact date a boom will end.” Even if warning signs (rapid credit growth, financial innovation, rising leverage, etc.) all appear, these indicators “are not precise” – a crisis may be inevitable *someday*, but “the only mystery is when it will arrive”. In other words, the framework is better at describing phases after they happen than timing the turning point beforehand.
- **Over-simplification:** Real financial systems are complex. Not every cycle hits all the textbook phases in order, and crises can erupt from idiosyncratic shocks (like a pandemic) that don’t fit the classic mold. The traditional model can lull investors into expecting a gradual progression, when reality might jump from calm to crisis rapidly or skip phases.
- **Policy Intervention:** Modern central banks and governments actively intervene to prevent deep panics. Aggressive rate cuts, bailouts, and quantitative easing (QE) can prolong an expansion or halt a contraction suddenly. This short-circuits the classic cycle. For example, authorities may prevent a full “panic” phase by backstopping markets (as seen in 1998, 2008, 2020, etc.), meaning the expected cleansing bust might never fully materialize in the traditional sense.
- **One-Size-Fits-All Mentality:** The credit cycle view tends to treat each boom-bust as similar, rooted in credit excess. But each cycle can differ in cause and character – one might be driven by housing debt, another by corporate leverage, another by emerging-market carry trades. Solely focusing on generic phases can cause investors to miss structural vulnerabilities unique to the current environment.

In summary, while the credit cycle gives a broad narrative of financial booms and busts, it fails to provide a forward-looking edge. It’s a static, after-the-fact description that often misses real-time warning signals and the nuances of each situation. To navigate today’s markets, we need a more granular, dynamic approach.

A Path-Dependent, Asset-Liability Regime Framework

As an alternative, many macro strategists now favor a “path-dependent, asset-liability regime” framework for understanding financial market risks and opportunities. This approach focuses on the structure of balance sheets in the economy – who holds what assets, who owes what liabilities, and how those assets and liabilities are mismatched in terms of duration, liquidity, and currency. The core idea is that the specific *path* the economy and policy take will interact with these balance sheet structures to produce outcomes, rather than an inevitably repeating cycle.

Key characteristics of this modern framework:

- **Path-Dependency:** Outcomes depend on *how we got here*. For example, *when* and *how fast* interest rates move matters tremendously. A financial system that has grown accustomed to 0% interest rates for a decade will react very differently to a sudden 5% rate shock than one that experienced gradual increases. The “path” (the sequence of events and policy moves) can either build up vulnerabilities or alleviate them. Small differences in the path can lead to very different outcomes (reflexivity) – if investors *expect* trouble, they might deleverage early, possibly averting a crisis, whereas complacency can let risks build unchecked.
- **Asset-Liability Focus:** Instead of looking only at aggregate debt levels or credit growth, this approach dissects the asset-liability mismatches on balance sheets. A classic insight is that “crises erupt from the mismatch between short-dated liabilities and long-dated assets, not merely from headline debt levels”. In other words, *how* debt is funded often matters more than *how much* debt there is. If banks or firms borrow short-term (liabilities that can come due or be withdrawn quickly) to finance long-term assets (loans or investments that can’t be easily liquidated), they are vulnerable to a sudden loss of financing. The framework pays close attention to these duration mismatches and liquidity risks.
- **Regime Analysis:** It recognizes that the financial system can be in different regimes depending on prevailing conditions – e.g. a “low-rate, high-liquidity regime” vs. a “rising-rate, tightening-liquidity regime.” In each regime, the behavior of borrowers, lenders, and markets will differ. For instance, a decade of ultra-low rates (as in the 2010s) encouraged heavy borrowing and yield-seeking investments; the regime change of rapidly rising rates (2022–2023) then created a totally new stress environment. A path-dependent analysis explicitly tracks these regime

shifts.

- **Forward-Looking Triggers:** By examining who will need to refinance debt when, at what rates, and with what cash flows, this approach anticipates stress points before they hit. It's essentially a form of contingency planning. One practitioner describes it as *"wiring redundancy triggers in advance so the next liquidity squeeze becomes an execution checklist, not a surprise"*. Instead of waiting for the "panic" phase, investors using this framework try to foresee which specific balance sheets (banks, corporations, households, even countries) are likely to come under pressure given the current path.

Why is this framework superior? It offers a dynamic, structural view of the financial system, versus the static story of the credit cycle. By analyzing balance sheet structures and how they evolve, it captures feedback loops and reflexivity that the traditional model glosses over. For example, if many companies have debts maturing in the next 12 months, a slight uptick in interest rates or drop in earnings can set off a wave of distress – a highly path-dependent outcome. Traditional models might have simply noted "we're in an expansion phase" and missed that lurking rollover risk. The asset-liability perspective would flag it ahead of time.

Interest Rates, Duration Mismatches, and Refinancing Risk

A core insight of the asset-liability approach is that interest rate changes and liquidity conditions interact with balance sheet structures to drive booms or busts. Several factors work together dynamically:

- **Interest Rates and Policy:** Central bank policy (raising or lowering rates, QE or QT) acts as a critical trigger. When the Fed aggressively hikes rates, it "moves the liquidity clock" forward – short-term funding costs jump and liquidity is withdrawn, which *shortens* the runway for borrowers who need to roll debts soon. Conversely, when the Fed cuts rates or injects liquidity, it extends the runway, making it easier for borrowers to refinance. However, policy alone doesn't cause defaults or crises – it's policy *colliding* with balance sheet realities that does. If rates rise but most debt is long-term fixed-rate, an economy can absorb it for a while; if a lot of debt is short-term or floating-rate, the pain is immediate.

- **Balance Sheet Duration Mismatches:** This refers to the gap between the maturity of assets and liabilities. For example, a bank might hold 10-year mortgages (assets) funded by deposits that customers can withdraw anytime (liabilities). Or a company might finance a 5-year project with a 1-year bridge loan. These mismatches mean the liabilities come due faster than the assets produce cash. Such a structure works fine *until* interest rates rise or lenders get nervous. Then the borrower must refinance at higher cost or sell the asset at a discount. As one analysis puts it, when short-term funding (liabilities) significantly underpins long-term investments (assets), a shock – like a rate spike or drop in collateral value – forces “premature liquidation...igniting the classic deleveraging spiral”. In other words, fire sales and credit crunches are often traceable to these structural mismatches.
- **Refinancing (Roll-Over) Risk:** Every debt has a maturity. A forward-looking approach maps out when large amounts of debt must be rolled over. If a wave of bonds or loans is coming due in, say, 2025, one must ask: will the conditions in 2025 allow smooth refinancing? If interest rates are much higher than when the debt was originally taken, or if investors have become risk-averse, some borrowers won't be able to refinance except at punitive rates (if at all). This can lead to defaults or the need for external intervention. Crucially, if companies have termed out (extended) their debt during good times, they might sail through a period that *looks* like a classic end-of-cycle with few problems – *until* that debt wall eventually hits. This is why simply looking at aggregate debt is not enough; the maturity profile and refinancing schedule are critical. A policy move like a sudden rate hike can “do the opposite” of extending the runway – it shortens the time before marginal borrowers hit the wall, especially if their maturities are near.
- **Policy Regimes and Feedback:** The stance of policymakers (tightening, neutral, easing) creates a backdrop for these mechanics. In a loose policy regime (low rates, ample liquidity), even risky borrowers can often refinance and carry on (masking underlying fragilities). This can lead to build-up of hidden risks – e.g. companies might take on more debt because easy money is available, or banks might not worry about liquidity because the central bank backstop is assumed. In a tight policy regime (high rates, liquidity withdrawal), those hidden risks can surface quickly. Importantly, the modern framework recognizes feedback loops: if tightening causes stress, policymakers might reverse course, which then changes the outlook again. These shifts are part of the *path*. We saw, for instance, that aggressive hiking cycles can sometimes coexist with surprisingly low default rates *for a while*, because no major maturities coincided with the hikes. But if high rates persist into

the period when debts must be rolled, defaults can spike. The interplay is dynamic.

Abstract Example: Imagine a real estate firm that borrowed heavily via 1-year commercial paper to finance long-term property investments. During a period of low interest rates and Fed easing, this firm rolls over its short-term debts easily each year (cheap and plentiful funding) – it's the expansion/euphoria phase for them. A traditional credit cycle view might just note that credit is booming. Now suppose interest rates climb rapidly in a tightening regime: suddenly the firm's annual refinancing comes at a much higher rate, and lenders are more cautious. The firm's interest expense jumps, and it struggles to refinance all its paper – some lenders balk unless paid a premium. The firm starts selling properties at markdowns to raise cash, pushing real estate prices down. Seeing this, banks and investors become even more reluctant to lend to any such firms (credit conditions tighten across the sector). This could cascade into a broader property bust *even if overall credit growth wasn't excessive*. The path-dependent lens would have flagged this risk early by noting the duration mismatch (short liabilities funding long assets) and the upcoming refinancing needs under a different rate regime. The traditional credit cycle lens, focused on broad aggregates, might have missed the trigger until the contraction was well underway.

Macro Conditions and the Yield Curve

The yield curve – which plots interest rates across maturities (short-term to long-term Treasury yields) – is a vital signal in macro investing. Its shape is influenced by current growth/inflation conditions and expectations of future policy. Different macro conditions produce different yield curve shapes:

- **Strong Growth & Rising Inflation (Tightening Policy):** When the economy is running hot (high growth, inflation above target), the central bank (Fed) tends to raise short-term interest rates to cool things off. In the early phase of hiking, long-term rates may also rise (investors demand higher yields due to inflation expectations), but short-term yields often rise faster. This causes the curve to flatten and can even invert if short rates climb above long rates. An inverted yield curve is a classic harbinger of a slowdown because expensive short-term credit “chokes” borrowers and signals weaker future growth/inflation (hence lower long-term yields). In short, a flattening or inverted curve in a tightening cycle indicates that monetary policy is restrictive and the market expects a downturn ahead.

- **Slowing Growth or Recession (Easing Policy):** When economic growth falters or a recession hits, inflation typically declines and the Fed cuts short-term rates to stimulate the economy. Short-term yields plummet. Long-term yields usually fall as well (due to lower inflation outlook and flight to safety), but if the Fed is cutting aggressively, short-term yields drop much more. The curve thus steepens from an inverted state – this is often the process of *dis*-inversion as a recession and rate cuts arrive. A steepening yield curve in this context is a “bull steepening” (because bond prices are rising as yields fall). It signifies much easier credit ahead (short rates way down) but also reflects a weak economy. Indeed, historically “every major recession saw a bull steepening” of the curve as the Fed slashed rates. A steep curve born of recessionary cuts typically means borrowing costs will be low (helping recovery), but it’s also a sign of distress – short rates are only zero because the economy is in trouble.
- **Moderate Growth, Moderate Inflation (Neutral/Stabilizing Policy):** In a more benign environment – say growth is steady but not booming, inflation is around target – the yield curve tends to have a gentle upward slope (normal yield curve). Short rates are at neutral levels, and long rates are only slightly higher, reflecting mild term premia. If the Fed is on hold, the curve might slowly flatten as an expansion matures (investors anticipate future cuts eventually). But generally, if neither a boom nor bust is on the immediate horizon, the curve shape might not send a strong signal – it stays in a middling range.
- **Stagflation or Policy Cross-Currents:** A more peculiar scenario is high inflation with weak growth. The Fed faces a dilemma: inflation calls for higher rates, but the economy is soft. The yield curve could respond in conflicting ways – sometimes long rates rise (if investors fear inflation isn’t under control, demanding more yield) even as growth is weak, leading to an unusual bear steepening during a stagnating economy. Or, if markets believe the Fed will ultimately prioritize growth and cut rates despite inflation, the curve might invert even with high inflation. This kind of regime can produce volatile, twisting yield curve moves as expectations shift. (A “twist” means short and long ends move in opposite directions – more on that shortly.)

In essence, the yield curve’s behavior is a product of both current policy and future expectations. A useful rule of thumb:

- **Flattening curve** (especially if driven by rising short rates) = policy tightening, future growth expected to slow.
- **Steepening curve** (especially if driven by falling short rates) = policy easing, often in response to economic weakness, which *can* be positive for future growth after the downturn.
- **Steep curve** when economy is strong = often early-cycle optimism (low short rates + rising long rates with growth) – easy credit fueling expansion.
- **Inverted curve** = warning of possible recession as tight policy is in effect.

Next, we break down specific yield curve regimes and what they signal:

Yield Curve Regimes: Steepening, Flattening, and Twists

Analysts often categorize yield curve changes with terms like “bull steepening”, “bear flattening”, etc. These terms describe *how* the curve is changing:

- **Bull Steepening:** The yield curve steepens because short-term yields are falling (bond prices up at the short end) faster than long-term yields. “Bull” refers to bond prices rising (yields falling). This typically happens when the Fed is aggressively cutting rates in a weak economy. Short yields plunge, while long yields also drop but less sharply. The result is a much steeper curve. Implication: Often seen in recessions or crisis response periods – it signals easier credit ahead and is bullish for government bonds. However, it reflects economic deterioration, so riskier assets (like stocks) often underperform during these episodes. *Example (abstract):* The central bank slashes overnight rates from 5% to 0% due to a crisis, while 10-year yields fall from 5% to 3%. The 2-year yield drops more than the 10-year, steepening the curve (and bond investors gain most on short-maturity bonds).
- **Bear Steepening:** The curve steepens because long-term yields are rising faster than short-term yields (or short rates may even be rising slightly while long rates jump). “Bear” indicates bond prices falling (yields up). This occurs when investors demand more yield for long-term bonds due to expectations of higher inflation or deficits, often in an improving or overheating economy. It can happen if the market thinks the central bank is behind the curve on inflation. Implication: Often seen in early expansions or inflation scare periods – it can signal optimism on growth *and*

worry about inflation. It tends to be a more “risk-on” environment: equities and other cyclical assets do well, while long-duration bonds suffer. *Example:* The economy is rebounding strongly; the Fed has only inched up short rates from 0% to 1%, but 10-year yields leap from 2% to 4% on inflation fears. The curve steepens (long minus short increases) in a bearish way for bonds.

- **Bull Flattening:** The curve flattens with long-term yields dropping more than short-term yields (yields are falling overall, but the long end is leading the rally). This can happen when short-term rates are already low (or at zero) and economic conditions are soft – so longer-term bonds rally on expectations of low growth/inflation. *Implication:* Signals a cautious outlook. It often occurs when the market expects weak growth ahead but the central bank hasn’t (or cannot) cut short rates much further. It might precede a bull steepening if a recession and rate cuts fully materialize. *Example:* Short-term yield is ~0% (near the lower bound), and 10-year yield falls from 2% to 1% due to a growth scare. The curve flattens because the long end moved more. (Think of a period of tepid growth and hints of deflation – investors pile into long bonds for safety, while short rates were low to begin with.) In 2016, for instance, Fed policy was at 0% and global growth was weak – with short yields stuck near zero, any bond rally occurred mainly in long maturities, causing a bull flattening.
- **Bear Flattening:** The curve flattens with short-term yields rising more than long-term yields. This is the classic case during a central bank tightening cycle. The Fed hikes the front-end aggressively, but longer-term rates rise less (or even begin to fall if markets think the tightening will cause a future recession). *Implication:* Often a late-cycle signal. It means financial conditions are tightening and the economy may be squeezed soon. If it goes to an extreme (yield curve inversion), it’s a strong recession warning. *Example:* The Fed raises the 2-year yield from 1% to 4% in a year, while the 10-year moves from 3% to 4% (barely rising because investors foresee a slowdown). The curve flattens dramatically. In 2022, for example, the Fed’s rapid rate hikes caused short yields to surge, flattening the curve as “front-end rates went higher” but long-end inflation expectations actually eased.
- **Twists:** A yield curve twist refers to the curve pivoting around an intermediate point – one end rises while the other falls. For instance, if short-term yields drop (due to Fed cuts) while long-term yields rise (due to, say, inflation fears or heavy long-term issuance), that’s a steepening twist – the curve steepens at the short end but flattens at the long end. Conversely, if short rates rise but long rates fall (perhaps the Fed hikes even as growth prospects weaken), that’s a flattening twist. Twists

often result from policy actions targeted at specific maturities or unusual shifts in investor preferences. They can cause heartburn for portfolio managers because they change the curvature of the yield curve, not just the overall slope. Implication: The effect of a twist depends on its cause. For example, a twist where short yields fall and long yields rise might mean the central bank is easing (good for near-term borrowers) but markets worry about long-run inflation or supply (pushing long yields up). A real-world instance was a week in 2014 when “Treasury experienced a yield curve twist... short-term yields dropped while long-term yields rose” amid shifting Fed speak and growth data. Twists can create mixed signals – they often reflect transition periods or policy interventions (like Operation Twist, where the Fed explicitly bought long-term bonds and sold short-term bonds to twist the curve).

In summary, yield curve regimes provide a forward-looking gauge of market conditions: is the market anticipating growth or recession? Easing or tightening? However, context is key – one must note *which part of the curve is moving and why*. The path-dependent framework integrates this by asking: *What does the curve shift imply about the current regime and the stress/opportunity on balance sheets?* For instance, a sharp bear flattening tells the asset-liability analyst that short-term funding is getting very expensive – a warning to watch those with near-term rollover needs. A bull steepening tells them that relief is coming (lower rates), but likely because many are in pain (so look for potential opportunities in distressed assets or safe havens). It’s a more nuanced approach than simply calling the cycle stage.

Traditional vs. Modern Approach: A Side-by-Side Comparison

To crystallize the difference between the old and new ways of thinking, below is a comparison of Traditional Credit Cycle Thinking versus the Path-Dependent Asset-Liability Framework:

Traditional Credit Cycle Approach

Path-Dependent Asset-Liability Framework

Focus: Broad phases of credit expansion and contraction (e.g. “boom” vs “bust”).

Focus: Detailed balance sheet structure (who holds short-term vs long-term assets/liabilities, leverage, liquidity) at each point in time.

Key Assumption: Cycles progress through predictable stages driven by borrower psychology and aggregate credit growth.

Key Assumption: Outcomes are driven by structure and timing – the alignment (or mismatch) of assets and liabilities and the *path* of rates/policy determine stress points.

Outlook: Often backward-looking – identifies phases after they’ve occurred (e.g. calling a peak only once euphoria is obvious).

Outlook: Forward-looking – identifies upcoming pressure by examining maturity schedules, rate sensitivity, and who’s vulnerable *before* a crisis hits.

Model Type: Relatively static and generic. One cycle is much like the last; uses static indicators (debt ratios, credit growth rates) to judge where we are.

Model Type: Dynamic and regime-based. Recognizes that today’s conditions may not mirror past cycles; incorporates feedback loops (policy responses, reflexive behavior of investors).

Risk Blind Spots: Can miss specific fragilities. Example: May note “high leverage in the system” but miss that “crises erupt from short-term funding mismatches” more so than from debt volume. (I.e. *how* debt is structured matters, but the traditional view might not delve into that.)

Risk Focus: Zooms in on mismatch risks and timing. Who needs cash when? What if interest costs rise? It explicitly flags things like a “growing mismatch between assets and liabilities... and rise in short-term borrowing” as a key crisis indicator.

Policy Role: Tends to treat policy as an external intervention that *follows* the cycle (e.g. central bank eases in the panic).

Policy Role: Treats policy as part of the regime. Easy policy can prolong a boom and build imbalances; tight policy can trigger stress *depending on* the state of balance sheets. It notes, for instance, that a rate hike only causes defaults if it collides with near-term maturities and stretched borrowers.

Reflexivity: Limited – assumes a somewhat deterministic cycle (people get overconfident, then fearful). Feedback mostly comes when the cycle turns (e.g. panic feeds on itself).

Reflexivity: High – acknowledges that expectations and behavior can change the outcome. e.g. If markets fear a crisis, funding might withdraw early (making a self-fulfilling downturn), or policymakers might step in preemptively (averting the worst). The framework plans for multiple scenarios (“redundancy plans for every scenario” rather than one narrative).

Use in Investing: Provides a general map (“we might be late cycle, so be cautious”) – helpful but rough. Often lagging; by the time it declares “panic,” the damage is done.

Use in Investing: Provides a specific risk dashboard (“X sector has Y billion in debt coming due next quarter with rising rates – watch for stress there”). This enables proactive positioning, hedging vulnerabilities or seizing opportunities (e.g. buying distressed assets when others are forced to sell).

Embracing Dynamic Analysis and Reflexivity

Financial markets are complex, adaptive systems – they are not clockwork cycles that repeat on schedule. A dynamic, path-dependent asset-liability approach embraces this reality. It encourages investors to analyze the structure underlying market moves (Who is leveraged? In what way? How exposed to interest rates or liquidity drying up?) and to appreciate the reflexive interplay between market behavior and economic outcomes.

In practical terms, this means focusing less on asking “*Where are we in the cycle?*” and more on “*What stresses or imbalances exist right now, and how could they unfold given different policy paths?*”. It means favoring scenario analysis over static forecasts. For example, instead of simply assuming a recession will follow an yield curve inversion because “that’s what history shows,” a path-dependent analyst will examine *why* the curve is inverted (e.g. aggressive hikes) and *where* the vulnerabilities lie (e.g. heavily indebted companies that have to refinance soon). If those companies have mostly locked in fixed rates for 5 more years, the expected recession might *not* materialize as quickly or severely – unless something else intervenes. In contrast, if many firms or banks are caught with funding mismatches, a minor policy tightening could rapidly snowball into a crisis even if aggregate credit looked fine ex-ante.

Ultimately, the path-dependent asset-liability framework offers a forward-looking advantage: it is about seeing the likely *pathways* ahead – both risks and opportunities – rather than just the rear-view mirror of past cycles. It incorporates macro factors (growth, inflation, Fed policy) *and* microstructural factors (balance sheet health, market plumbing) to build a more resilient understanding. For a macro-investing enthusiast, this primer’s lesson is to think in terms of structures and feedback, not just phases. By doing so, one can better navigate the financial system’s twists and turns – which are never quite the same twice, and always *path-dependent* by nature.

The information on this website/Substack is for information purposes only. It is believed to be reliable, but Capital Flows does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. The information on the website/Substack is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase of stock or any financial instrument. The information and materials contained in these pages and the terms, conditions and descriptions that appear, are subject to change without notice.

Unauthorized use of Capital Flows websites and systems including but not limited to data scraping, unauthorized entry into Capital Flows systems, misuse of passwords, or misuse of any information posted on a site is strictly prohibited. Your eligibility for particular services is subject to final determination by Capital Flows and/or its affiliates. Investment services are not bank deposits or insured by the FDIC or other entity and are subject to investment risks, including possible loss of principal amount invested. Your use of any information which is proprietary to Capital Flows or a third-party information provider shall only be used on individual devices without any right to redistribute, upload, export, copy, or otherwise transfer the information to any centralized interdepartmental or shared device, directory, database or other repository nor to otherwise make it available to any other entity/person/third party, without the prior written consent of Capital Flows.