Quantum Communication

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Quantum communication, and indeed quantum information in general, has changed the way we think about quantum physics. In 1984 and 1991, the first protocol for quantum cryptography and the first application of quantum non-locality, respectively, attracted a diverse field of researchers in theoretical and experimental physics, mathematics and computer science. Since then we have seen a fundamental shift in how we understand information when it is encoded in quantum systems. We review the current state of research and future directions in this new field of science with special emphasis on quantum key distribution and quantum networks.

I. INTRODUCTION

Quantum communication is the art of transferring a quantum state from one place to another. Traditionally, the sender is named Alice and the receiver Bob. The basic motivation is that quantum states code quantum information - called qubits in the case of 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces - and that quantum information allows one to perform tasks that could only be achieved far less efficiently, if at all, using classical information. The best known example is Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3]. Actually, there is another motivation, at least equally important to most physicists, namely the close connection between quantum communication and quantum non-locality [4, 5], as illustrated by the fascinating process of quantum teleportation [6].

Quantum communication theory is a broad field, including e.g. communication complexity [7] and quantum bit-string commitment [8]. In this review we restrict ourselves to its most promising application, QKD, both point to point and in futuristic networks.

There are several ways to realize quantum communication. We list them below from the simplest to the more involved. Since "flying qubits" are naturally realized by photons, we often write "photon" for "quantum system", although in principle, any other quantum system could do the job.

- 1 photon: Alice encodes the state she wants to communicate into a quantum system and sends it to Bob, sections III & IV.

- 2 photons: Exploit entanglement to prepare the desired quantum state at a distance, section II.

- 3 photons: Teleport the quantum state from Alice to Bob, section V.

- 4 photons: Teleport entanglement, also called entanglement swapping, section VI & VII.

We will review quantum communication not with this complexity in mind but from a more intuitive perspective, starting from the basic ingredient, namely entanglement and its non-locality, continuing in section III with weak


FIG. 1: Revealing non-locality. Alice and Bob independently perform experiments x and y, on an entangled state at space like separated locations, and study the correlations for the results a and b.

laser pulse QKD and its security (section IV), before discussing quantum teleportation in section V. We end by reviewing quantum relays and repeaters (section VI), the latter requiring quantum memories (section VII). Along the way, we underline future challenges.

II. ENTANGLEMENT & NON-LOCALITY

Entanglement is the essence of quantum physics. To understand this statement already stressed by Schrödinger in 1935 [9], it is worth presenting it in modern terms inspired by quantum information theory. In Science in general, all experimental evidence takes the form of conditional probabilities: if observer A_i performs the experiment labelled x_i, she observes a_i and in general one writes the probability for all of the possible results $P(a_1 \ldots a_n | x_1 \ldots x_n)$. Such conditional probabilities are often called *correlations*. For simplicity, we restrict the discussion here to the bi-partite case, denoting their correlation $P(a, b | x, y)$.

The correlations $P(a, b | x, y)$ carry a lot of structure. Apart from being non-negative and normalized, the local marginals are independent of the experiment performed by independent observers: $\sum_a P(a, b | x, y) = P(b | y)$ is independent of the experiment x performed by Alice. As a trivial example of independent observers, imagine two physicists performing different experiments in labs in distant countries, in which case the independence of the

marginals is obvious. There is however another more interesting situation. Suppose the two parties perform similar experiments, but at two space-like separated locations, thus preventing any communication, as is the case in Fig. 1. It is therefore natural to assume that the local probabilities depend only on the *local state of affairs* and, as the local state of affairs may be unknown, one merely denotes them by a generic symbol λ. Note that the local state of affairs at Alice's site and at Bob's site may still be correlated. This is why computer scientists call λ *shared randomness*. Given the local state of affairs, the correlations factorize to *local correlations*, $P(a, b|x, y, \lambda) = P(a|x, \lambda) \cdot P(b|y, \lambda)$, which necessarily satisfy some (infinite) set of inequalities, known as Bell Inequalities [5, 10]. Let us emphasize that there is no need to assume predetermined values to derive Bell Inequalities, it suffices to assume that the probabilities of results of local experiments depend only on local variables.

Almost all correlations between independent observers known in Science are local. The only exceptions are some correlations predicted by quantum physics when the two observers perform measurements on two (or more) entangled systems. This implies that in some cases, a quantum experiment performed at two distant locations can't be completely described by the *local state of affairs* [5], a very surprising prediction of quantum physics indeed!

Einstein, among others, was so surprised by this that he concluded that it "proves" the incompleteness of quantum mechanics [11]. Following Bohr's reply to the famous EPR paper, the debate became philosophical. John Bell resolved this with the introduction of the experimental question of Bell Inequalities [5, 10, 12] and remarkably, by 1991 it had become applied physics [2]. Indeed, it was realized that the non-existence of a local state of affairs guaranties that Alice and Bob's data have no duplicate anywhere else in the world, in particular not in any adversaries' hands. The intuition is clear: since there is no λ, no one can hold a copy of λ, hence no one can compute the probabilities for Alice and Bob's data, $P(a|x, \lambda)$ and $P(b|y, \lambda)$. Consequently, Alice and Bob's data have some secrecy. This is the essence of QKD, but clearly, this intuition needs elaboration (see section IV).

Let us conclude this section with a brief review of the experimental and theoretical status of quantum nonlocality. Today, no serious physicist doubts that Nature exhibits quantum non-locality. Despite the depth of such a conclusion (whose revolutionary aspect is often not fully appreciated), it has turned out to be exceedingly difficult to realize an experiment between space-like separated parties with detection efficiencies high enough to avoid the detection loophole [13]. While the detection loophole was closed in an ion trap experiment, the close proximity of the ions ensured that these were not space-like separated [14]. Only a couple of experiments have managed to perform space-like separated tests with entanglement [15] distributed over ten kilometres both in fiber [16, 17, 18] and free space [19], though without

closing the detection loophole. Also on the theory side, it is surprisingly poorly understood why the most well known Bell inequality, the CHSH-inequality, named after its discoverers [12], seems the most efficient one despite the existence of infinitely many other Bell inequalities (however, see [10]). In particular, we still have no practical way to tell whether a given quantum state is able to exhibit non-locality or not. This limited understanding is especially frustrating once one realizes that the experimental violation of a Bell inequality is the *only* direct evidence for the presence of entanglement. Indeed, all the other entanglement witnesses require that one knows the dimension of the relevant Hilbert space [20].

III. QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION: FROM ENTANGLEMENT TO WEAK LASER PULSES

One simple way to think about entanglement for the non specialist is that some composite systems, like pairs of photons, are able to provide the same random answer when asked the same question. Let us emphasize that the answer (measurement result) is random, but it is precisely the same randomness that manifests itself at two distant locations, provided that Alice and Bob perform the same experiment (or experiments related by a simple transformation). It then suffices that Alice and Bob independently choose to perform a series of experiments, drawn from a pre-established list of possible experiments, and, after recording all their data, they post-select those corresponding to the cases in which they happened, by chance, to have chosen to perform the same experiment. In these cases, they asked the same question and thus obtained the same random answer. This provides them with a cryptographic key. We'll analyze the secrecy of such keys in section IV. In this section we would like to concentrate on practical ways to implement QKD.

The first choice that the quantum telecom engineer has to face is that of the wavelength. While most quantum optics experiments since the invention of the laser have used silicon-based detectors, limited to wavelengths below $1\,\mu$m, for long distance quantum communication one should also consider wavelengths suitable for fiber optic communication, 1.3 & $1.5\,\mu$m (although space communication to satellites is a serious and fascinating alternative [21] that we can't review here). Nowadays, there are several options for detectors compatible with optical fibers, ranging from detectors based on superconduction transitions to commercially available APDs (Avalanche PhotoDiodes).

The second choice concerns the degree of freedom in which to encode the qubits. An obvious first choice is the state of polarization, except that polarization is unstable in standard fibers, especially in aerial fiber cables. In 1989 Jim Franson proposed the use of energy-time entanglement [22], with the initial objective to test a Bell inequality, though later adapted to quantum communication. Fig. 2 illustrates Franson's idea, consisting of a

FIG. 2: The Franson interferometer for testing the energy-time entanglement of the entanglement resource (ER). The correlations between each of Alice and Bob's results {0,1} depends on both the phase measurement settings {x,y}.


FIG. 3: Simplifying the Franson scheme: a) The ER from Fig. 2 is moved to Alice's side; b) The ER is placed before Alice's interferometer - the interfering paths are different but we don't need the extra photon except as a herald; c) Remove ER and replace single heralded photon with attenuated pulsed diode laser.

CW laser that pumps a χ^2 nonlinear crystal, where each photon from the pump laser has a probability of, at best, 10^{-6} to be down-converted into a pair of photons, depending on the crystal [23]. Each of the two photons has an uncertain energy (i.e. an uncertain wavelength), where *uncertain* should be understood in the quantum mechanical sense. However, through energy conservation, the sum of the two photon's energy equals the well defined energy of the pump laser photon. Moreover, both photons are created at the same time (again through energy conservation), but this time is "quantum uncertain" within the long coherence-time of the pump laser. We see a nice analogy with the case presented by EPR: the energy and the age of each photon are uncertain, but the sum of the energies and the difference of their ages are both sharply defined. Look now at the two unbalanced interferometers and detectors on both sides of Fig. 2, which have replaced our abstract operations and measurements from Fig. 1, and consider the cases where both photons hit a detector simultaneously. Recalling that the photons were produced simultaneously, this can happen in two ways: both photons propagate through the short arm of their interferometers; or both take the long arms. If the imbalance of both interferometers are alike and much smaller than the pump laser coherence length, then these two paths are indistinguishable. According to quantum physics, one should thus add the probability amplitudes and expect interference effects. These are 2-photon interferences and have been used to violate the Bell CHSH-inequality [16, 24, 25]. This configuration is thus suitable for QKD, but it is not practical using today's technology, hence let's simplify it [26].

First, let's move the source from the center to the emitter, as in Fig. 3a, thus limiting the number of sites to two. Now the photons don't arrive simultaneously at their detectors but, for an appropriate difference of arrival times, the same reasoning as above applies: one still has interferences between the short-short and the long-long 2-photon paths. The second simplification consists of moving the source to the left of Alice's interferometers, Fig. 3b. Now the two interfering paths are the short-long and long-short paths. As before, they are indistinguishable and thus lead to interferences, though now one of the two photons is not really used (except possibly as a herald). This leads to the third and major simplifi-

cation: replace this 2-photon source with a simple weak laser pulse, Fig. 3c. The story about the interfering paths remains the same, but the source is now very simple and reliable: a standard telecom laser-diode with enough attenuation. The 60 to 100 dB attenuation (requiring a well calibrated attenuator) assures that only a very small fraction of the laser pulses contain more than one photon. It is essential to understand that, provided this fraction of multi-photon pulses is known, the security of such weak laser pulse QKD system is in no way compromised [27, 28]. Moreover, using the recent idea of decoy states, weak laser pulse QKD obeys the same scaling law as ideal single-photon QKD [50, 51, 52].

Today, all practical QKD systems use this simplification [29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43] and the major challenge for QKD (besides the distance, to which we return in section VI) is the secret bit rate. Given that the source is not an issue, there remain two ways to improve this. First, we can make technical improvements, for example to the detectors whose maximal count rates are severely limited by dark counts and after-pulses [44, 45], by using better InGaAs APDs, up-conversion detection schemes [43, 46] or superconducting detectors [47, 48]. Second, the historical protocols, like BB84 and Ekert91 [1, 2], were invented for the sake of presenting a beautifully simple idea, but today's many new protocols have been designed with the aim of optimizing their implementation using weak laser pulses [38, 41, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53] or mesoscopic systems [54]. It is likely that more efficient protocols are yet to be discovered by teams combining telecom engineers and quantum physicists.

IV.   SECURITY OF QKD

The intuition as to why QKD provides perfectly secret bits is quite straightforward (section II). However, the details of the proofs are very involved and many questions remain open, especially concerning optimality [28, 55, 56].

We would, however, like to highlight just a few key concepts. We can characterize bounds on the security by comparing Shannon's mutual information [57] for Alice and Bob $I(A : B)$ and for Alice and an adversary, traditionally called Eve, $I(A : E)$. It is intuitive (and can be proven [58, 59]) that if Bob has more information than Eve on Alice's data, $I(A : B) > I(A : E)$, then Alice and Bob can *distill* a secret key out of their data. This first intuition is, however, incomplete. Eve's information should, in full generality, be treated as quantum information: there is no way to know whether she performed measurements on her quantum systems (resulting in classical information) before the key is used. As our goal is to provide a secret key whose security does not rely on assumptions about Eve's technology, whether classical computer power or quantum technology, this remark has to be taken seriously. Fortunately, the quantum analog of Shannon's mutual information [60] and its consequences have recently been resolved [55] .

A second limitation to the above intuitive idea is the so called man-in-the-middle attack: how can Alice and Bob be sure they really talk to each other? The answer is known and requires that they start from an initial short common secret, so as to be able to recognize each other. It has been shown that QKD provides much more secret key than it consumes. In this sense, QKD should be called *Quantum key expansion.*

A third, less studied difficulty are side-channels: how can Alice be sure she doesn't inadvertently code more than one degree of freedom? For example, it might be that her phase modulator introduces a measurable distortion of the pulse envelope, in which case Eve could measure the encoded bit indirectly and remain undetected. A related danger are Trojan horse attacks, in which Eve actively profits from the quantum channel (i.e. the optical fiber) to probe inside Alice and/or Bob's systems. Not too much is known to counter such attacks, except by emphasizing that real systems should be well characterized (see e.g. [61, 62]).

Before we end here, let us briefly elaborate on the widely used terminology *unconditionally secure.* Note that there is nothing like this: security proofs rely on assumptions and some assumptions are difficult to check in realistic systems. The historical reason for that terminology comes from classical cryptography where computer scientists use it to mean "not conditioned on assumptions about the adversary's classical computation power", a meaning quite foreign to quantum physics.


FIG. 4:   Quantum teleportation. Alice performs a BSM, a joint measurement, on the unknown qubit $|\phi\rangle$ and one photon from the entangled state $|EPR\rangle$. The result does not reveal the state of the qubit but is sent to Bob who performs a result-dependent operation U to complete the teleportation.

V.   QUANTUM TELEPORTATION

Quantum teleportation is the most fascinating manifestation of quantum non-locality: an "object" dissolves here and reappears at a distance [6]! Well, not the entire object, "only" its quantum state, that is its ultimate structure, is transferred from here to there without ever existing at any intermediate location. The energy-matter must already be present at the receiver side and must be entangled with the transceiver. Quantum teleportation attracts a lot of attention from physicists and journalists, and rightly so. Mathematically, quantum teleportation is very simple, but understanding requires clarifying some often confused concepts concerning quantum non-locality.

The entire process requires 3 steps. Consider Fig. 4 where one first has the distribution of entanglement, usually photon pairs sent through optical fibers (for ions see [63, 64]). The "quantum teleportation channel" is then established and - in principle - one could remove the fibers. Next, the sender performs a so-called Bell-State-Measurement (BSM) between his photon from the entangled pair and the qubit photon that carries the quantum state to be teleported [65, 66]. Technically, this is the most difficult step and usually only a partial BSM is realized (see however [67, 68]). The BSM provides no information at all about the teleported state, but tells us something about the relationship between the two photons [69].

This ability to acquire information only about the relationship between two quantum systems is typical of quantum physics: it is another manifestation of entanglement, but in this case not present between the incoming photons to be measured. The entanglement lies in the eigenvectors of the operator representing the BSM. Hence, entanglement plays a dual role in teleportation. Finally, the third step consists of Alice informing Bob of the result of her BSM and Bob performing a result-

dependent unitary rotation on his system. Only after this operation is the teleportation process finished. Note that the size of the classical information sent by Alice to Bob is infinitely smaller than the information required to give a classical description of the teleported quantum state, but it is the need for this message that ensures that teleportation is a sub-luminal process.

The BSM provides a fundamental limit to these experiments. It has been proven that no BSM with an efficiency greater than 50% is achievable with linear optics [70]. To perform these partial BSMs, the two photons should arrive on a beam-splitter simultaneously within their coherence time. Since single-photon detectors have a large timing jitter, the timing has so far always been set by bulky and expensive femto-second lasers. Moreover, the length of the optical fibers should be stabilized within a coherence length of the photons, typically a few tens of microns, an unrealistic requirement over tens of kilometres. Consequently, some of the next steps will require detectors with improved jitter [43, 71] as well as compact sources of entangled photons with significantly increased single-photon coherence. Alternatively, this limitation has been overcome in some experiments by using continuous variables [72, 73] or hyperentanglement [74], while others have used generalized quantum measurements to probabilistically distinguish 3 out of the 4 Bell states [75] (it is an open question whether all 4 could be distinguished using passive linear optics). The intense interest in BSMs is due to the key role it plays not only in teleportation, but more importantly its role in long distance quantum communication and specifically entanglement swapping.

VI. ENTANGLEMENT SWAPPING, RELAYS AND QUANTUM REPEATERS

What happens if one photon from an entangled pair is teleported, i.e. if entanglement itself is teleported? This process, known as entanglement swapping, allows one to entangle photons that have no common past [76]! The general idea consists of first establishing entanglement between not-too-distant nodes, then teleporting the entanglement from one node to the next. This is called a *quantum relay* [77] and the general principle is illustrated in Fig. 5a. So far only very few groups have demonstrated this process ([78, 79, 80]), but this is an active field of research as it has the potential to increase the distance for QKD.

However, the distances achievable with quantum relays are still limited. The reason is that in order to be able to swap the entanglement of A-B and B-C to A-C, one first has to establish the entanglement between A-B and B-C. However, the probability that all photons propagate between A and B and between B and C is precisely the same probability that a photon propagates from A directly to C. Hence, there is no hope that entanglement swapping by itself helps to increase the bit rate. Still,


FIG. 5: Quantum networks. a) Quantum relay: ERs and quantum channels joined via a BSM. b) Quantum repeater: An ER + quantum memories (QM) provides a chaining element that can be concatenated for longer quantum communication distances. Inset illustrates the difference between a "heralded QM" (i) and a possible modification for a QM without heralding (ii).

quantum relays may be useful for some intermediate distances, because in principle they allow one to mitigate the detrimental effects of detector dark-counts [77, 81, 82].

To efficiently overcome the distance limitation one needs *quantum repeaters*, which require both quantum relays and quantum memories [83, 84]. The basic idea is that if the entanglement distribution has succeeded between nodes A and B, but failed between B and C, one stores the A-B entanglement in quantum memories and restarts the B-C entanglement distribution. One can imagine concatenating entangled systems to further increase this distance (see Fig. 5b). Ideally, one would also like the quantum memories to contain a rudimentary (few qubit) quantum computer, able to realize the 2-qubit gates for purification or distillation techniques [85, 86] to concentrate the entanglement contained in each of two pairs of qubits into a single highly entangled qubit pair. In practice, we are a long way from here but have started to think about interim possibilities. In a first instance, one may have a quantum memory where one doesn't know if it is loaded. In this case one could place the sources closer to one of the quantum memories in each chaining element of figure 5b. The motivation behind the asymmetric sources is that if one has one photon directly absorbed by the quantum memory one can be more sure that it is loaded than if it had been transmitted, and possible absorbed/lost in the fiber. This thinking is reminiscent of the simplifications that we made with respect to Fig. 2 and the evolution from Franson's intereferometer to weak pulse encoded QKD.

The development of a fully operational quantum repeater and a realistic quantum network architecture are grand challenges for quantum communication. Despite some claims, nothing like this has been demonstrated so far and one should not expect any real-world demonstration for another 5-10 years.

VII. QUANTUM MEMORIES

If one is to successfully build quantum repeaters then one will need a quantum memory that is able to store a qubit for a period sufficient to allow several rounds of communication between the nearby nodes, i.e. typically several ms. In Fig. 5b we denote the quantum memory by some absorbing medium, but more importantly, also with a heralding mechanism so we know when it is loaded. Furthermore, it should either be possible to perform a Bell state measurement between two stored qubits, or be able to trigger the release of photons carrying the qubits with a jitter small enough to achieve this, and all of this at wavelengths and bandwidths compatible with existing fiber optic networks. Today, the best quantum memory by far is a simple fiber loop (though it does not have all the above mentioned specifications). Storing qubits in some atoms, either in traps or in some solid-state devices, is a huge challenge. But the potential applications both for fundamental experiments (e.g. long-distance loophole-free Bell tests) and for a world-wide quantum-web motivates many physicists. Moreover, it is likely that the successful techniques will also find applications in other types of quantum information processors.

Currently there is an increasing number of groups working towards quantum memories from a range of different perspectives. The different approaches have so far been motivated by the degree of freedom chosen to encode the quantum state. We have already seen some progress: for continuous variable systems in atomic vapour [87]: atomic ensembles [88, 89, 90]; polarization of atom-photon systems [91]; others are using NV cen-

ters in diamonds [92]; as well as rare-earth ions in fibers and crystals [93, 94]. Indeed this last case is interesting, as most proposals have focused on storing a single mode, or single quantum state, whereas the rare-earth systems offer the possibility of storing multiple modes, many quantum states, which could have significant practical implications. These and many more approaches are currently being actively pursued within national and international collaborative programmes around the world [95, 96, 97, 98].

VIII. CONCLUSION

The field of quantum communication has established itself over recent years thanks to its driving force, Quantum Key Distribution and to the fascinating process of quantum teleportation, not to mention continuous variable [99] and satellite quantum communication [21] and linear optics quantum computation [100]. It will be an important part of physics in the decades to come, with great challenges in quantum memories and repeaters for world-wide applications. It is an ideal teaching tool and is attracting bright young physicists who are learning to build the bridge between quantum physics and communication technologies.

Acknowledgments

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