# Evaluating the Validity and Robustness of Instrumental-Variable Analyses


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
#### The Problem

- Is voting habit forming? (Davenport et al., 2010)
  - $\circ$  Z: instrument (encouragement to vote at t = 1)
  - $\circ$  A: treatment (voting at t = 1)
  - $\circ$  *Y*: outcome (voting at t=2)
  - *U*: unobserved confounder (e.g. political interest)
- We want to investigate the effect of A on Y:




1. Exogeneity:  $(Y(a), A(z)) \perp Z$ :


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
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- LATE =  $E[Y(a_1) Y(a_0)| compliers]$  is identifiable if one assumes 1, 2, and 3 (Imbens & Angrist, '94)



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- Those assumptions indeed have observable implications (Pearl, '95; Balke & Pearl, '97)
  - These are useful for falsification tests

#### • Framework:

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  - We can evaluate bounds when assumptions are relaxed

## **Evaluating IV Assumptions**

#### **Testing**

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$$\theta \in [0, 0.2],$$

$$\psi \in [0, 0.01]$$

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
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#### Sensitivity

$$\theta \in [0, 0.2],$$
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#### **Applications**



## Testing Assumptions

• In 1995, Pearl derived *Instrumental Inequalities* (Pearl, '95):

$$\max_{a} \sum_{y} [\max_{z} P(y, a|z)] \le 1, \text{ under assumptions } 1, 2$$

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- Smaller violations may go undetected
- Note: if exogeneity is satisfied (e.g. by random assignment),
   this is a test of the exclusion restriction

#### **Generalized IV Falsification Test**

• Kedagni and Mourifie (2020) proved that if a model satisfies exclusion restriction and exogeneity, then:

$$\max_{z} P(y_{1}, a|z) + \max_{z} P(y_{1}, a'|z) \leq 1$$

$$\max_{z} P(y_{1}, a|z) - \min_{z} P(y_{1}|z) - \min_{z} P(y_{1}, a|z) + P(y_{0}, a'|z) \leq 0$$

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• There are no other observable implications (sharpness)

## **Monotonicity Falsification Test**

If we also assume monotonicity (Balke & Pearl, '97'):

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- The test is sharp (Kitagawa, 2015)

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  - Both are based on the principles of automated partial id.
  - One states a causal question, introduces data and assumptions, and gets sharp bounds on the estimand

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- Sensitivity analysis: optimize bounds over possible  $\theta$  and  $\psi$  using Autobounds.

# **Empirical Applications**

#### **Simulation**

- We simulate a scenario with  $N=10^6$  units:
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- Sensitivity Analysis:
  - Proportion of violating units is at least 0.03
  - LATE can be signed in (0.03, 0.07)
  - LATE can't be signed above 0.07


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
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- Just because we did not detect violations, it does not mean they are not there, so we proceed with sensitivity analysis

- Sensitivity Analysis:
  - How robust are those results to violations of no defiers?
  - ATE is not much affected
  - $\circ$  LATE is positive if the proportion of defiers is < 1%
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# More Complex Scenarios

#### Judge IV Design and Issues

- Use judge random assignment as natural experiment:
  - E.g. estimate the effect of pre-trial detention on conviction
  - $\circ$  Z: judge random assignment
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#### Judge IV Design and Issues


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- ullet Reanalysis of Stevenson (2018): positive effect of 0.13
- Our paper: derive results for many-valued instrument
- Today: compare two judges at a time (more severe to more lenient)


#### Reanalysis of Stevenson (2018)

- Comparison between the most extreme judges  $(z_0/z_n)$ :
  - $\circ$  "No defiers" assumption is rejected (p-value < 0.01)
  - $\circ$  The bounds cross in the region where  $\theta$  is 0.0015, with LATE equal to -0.84
  - $\circ$  High negative LATE contradicts the main result of the paper, suggesting small violations cause high bias to the LATE estimate, even when evaluated at the minimum  $\theta$



#### Reanalysis of Stevenson (2018)

- Comparison between somewhat extreme judges  $(z_2/z_n)$ :
  - "No defiers" is not rejected for this case
  - $\circ$  No pre-existent violation, so LATE is identifiable at 0.044
  - $\circ$  LATE is unsigned if we allow for small heta deviation (close to 0)



#### **Conclusions**

- IV assumptions often characterized as untestable
- We can empirically evaluate key assumptions
  - Falsify monotonicity/exclusion restriction
  - Sensitivity analysis for defiers and E.R. violations
- Show we can reject assumptions in practice
- In applications, IV results extremely sensitive to minor violations
- Extensions:
  - Characterize robustness in the IV literature
  - Use framework for other models, e.g. factorial experiments

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