



What is game theory?

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**How** do we study it?

What is game theory?


**How** do we study it?

Where is research headed?









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Sociology


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


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### Different agendas





study of interacting decision makers

- study of interacting decision makers
- interdisciplinary field

- study of interacting decision makers
- interdisciplinary field
- different agendas

# How?

ightharpoonup choices, C


- ▶ choices, C
- ▶ preferences, ≥

- ▶ choices, C
- preferences,  $\succeq$  utility function,  $u:C\to\mathbb{R}$

$$c_1 \succeq c_2 \iff u(c_1) \geq u(c_2)$$











 $R \mapsto 1$ 





 $ightharpoonup C = \{ ext{stabilizing controller } K\}$ 

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
r(t) & e(t) \\
\hline
 & K \\
\hline
 & P \\
\hline
\end{array}$$

 $ightharpoonup C = \{ \text{stabilizing controller } K \}$ 

- $u(K) = -\tau_r(K)$

# **Optimality**

#### Decision maker:

- ightharpoonup choices, C
- ightharpoonup utility function, u

# **Optimality**

#### Decision maker:

- ▶ choices, C
- utility function, u

#### Goal of decision maker:

$$\max_{c \in C} u(c)$$

• players,  $\{i\}$ 

- ightharpoonup players,  $\{i\}$
- $\blacktriangleright$  choices for player i,  $C_i$

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- ▶ joint choices,  $C = \prod_i C_i$  $c \in C = (c_i, c_{-i})$

- ightharpoonup players,  $\{i\}$
- $\blacktriangleright$  choices for player i,  $C_i$
- ▶ joint choices,  $C = \prod_i C_i$  $c \in C = (c_i, c_{-i})$
- utility function for player  $i, u_i : C \to \mathbb{R}$

# **Optimality?**

Goal of decision maker i:

$$\max_{c \in C} u_i(c_i, c_{-i}) \left( \neq \max_{c \in C} u_i(c_i) \right)$$

	C	D
C	2,2	-1,3
D	3, -1	0,0

	$\mathcal{C}$	D
C	2	<b>-</b> 1
D	3	0

	C	
C	2	
D	3	

	C	
C	2	
D	3	

Best response,  $BR_i: C_{-i} \rightrightarrows C_i$ 

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
C \\
C & 2 \\
D & 3
\end{array}$$

Best response,  $BR_i: C_{-i} \rightrightarrows C_i$ 

▶  $BR_1(C) = \{D\}$ 

	D
C	-1
D	0

Best response,  $BR_i : C_{-i} \rightrightarrows C_i$ 

 $\blacktriangleright \ \mathsf{BR}_1(C) = \{D\}$ 

	D
C	-1
D	0

Best response,  $BR_i: C_{-i} \rightrightarrows C_i$ 

▶ 
$$BR_1(C) = \{D\}, BR_1(D) = \{D\}$$

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- ▶  $BR_1(C) = \{D\}, BR_1(D) = \{D\}$
- ▶  $BR_2(C) = \{D\}, BR_2(D) = \{D\}$

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  - no unilateral deviation is profitable
  - $\rightarrow \forall i, \forall a_i \in A_i,$

$$u_i(a_i^*, a_{-i}^*) \ge u_i(a_i, a_{-i}^*)$$

# Existence of Nash equilibria

Every n-player game has a Nash equilibrium.

history-dependent strategy

- history-dependent strategy
- imperfect information

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- imperfect information
- cooperation

- history-dependent strategy
- imperfect information
- cooperation
- large populations



# Back to the agendas

descriptive

# Back to the agendas

- descriptive
- predictive

# Back to the agendas

- descriptive
- predictive
- manipulative

interacting decision maker

- interacting decision maker
- best response

- interacting decision maker
- best response
- Nash equilibrium

# Learning

Controls  $\Rightarrow$  Game Theory:

# Learning


Controls  $\Rightarrow$  Game Theory:


stability and robustness

# Learning

#### Controls $\Rightarrow$ Game Theory:

- stability and robustness
- derivative control





#### Decentralized control

Game Theory  $\Rightarrow$  Controls:

#### Decentralized control

Game Theory  $\Rightarrow$  Controls:

network formation

#### Decentralized control

#### Game Theory $\Rightarrow$ Controls:

- network formation
- communication limitations

# Dynamic Games

# Dynamic Games

network security

# Dynamic Games

- network security
- learning in repeated games

learning

- learning
- decentralized control

- learning
- decentralized control
- dynamic games

# Questions?

Comments?