

Simple LTC Good LDPC Codes

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Abstract

We propose a new simple construction based on Tanner Codes, which yields a good LDPC testable code.

ex1. Find a simple description of the work-function algorithm in the case of uniform metric space.

ex2. Consider the following 3-point metric space, $w(a, b) = 1$ and $w(\cdot, c) = M$. The initial configuration is $\{b, c\}$ (2 servers). Show that randomized competitive ratio, for some value of M is $> H_2 = 1 + \frac{1}{2}$.

ex3. Show that randomized marking algorithm cannot be c -competitive against the adaptive online adversary, for $c = o(k)$.

Solution. Assume by contradiction that there is a constant $c > 1$, and a randomized algorithm which is an c -competitive in the adaptive online setting. According to theorem that shown at class, If there exists an α competitive alg for an online problem in the non-adaptive setting and in addition there exists a β competitive algorithm for the same problem against adaptive online adversary, then it holds that there exists an algorithm which is $\alpha\beta$ competitive against an offline adaptive adversary. Combine the fact that randomized can't help against such adversary we obtain that the deterministic competitive ratio is lower than $\alpha\beta$. As we know that a k -lowerbound for the deterministic regime and also a log k solution using randomization against a non-adaptive adversary, we obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha\beta &\geq k \\ \Rightarrow \frac{k}{c} \log k &\geq k\end{aligned}$$

But for any $k \leq \log 2^c$ we obtain the opposite direction. Which mean that there is a range of valid k that obtains a better ratio than the lower bound. And that is a contradiction.

ex4 - Ski Rental. At each step, the adversary decides either continue or stop. Stop terminate the game. If it continues, the online algorithm decides, either rent or buy. Rent costs 1 Buy costs $M > 1$. Design a primal-dual randomized online ski-rental algorithm with better than 2 competitive ratio.

ex5. Prove Yao's minimax principle.

$$\begin{aligned}\forall \text{rand. } \tilde{\text{alg}} \exists \sigma \\ \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] &\geq c \cdot c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) \\ \Leftrightarrow \exists \text{rand. } \tilde{\sigma} \forall \text{alg} \\ \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] &\geq c \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}]\end{aligned}$$

Solution. First direction, assume through contradiction that there exists a deterministic algorithm such that for all distributions $\tilde{\sigma}$:

$$\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] < c \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}]$$

And that holds, in particular, for distribution $\tilde{\sigma}$ which supported by a single σ . Hence, by the fact that any deterministic algorithm is also a randomized algorithm, set it to be $\tilde{\text{alg}}$ and that immediately yields a contradiction. It left to show the second direction, By the monotonic property of random variables we have that for any distribution $\tilde{\sigma}$:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] \\ &\geq c \cdot \mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] \\ \mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] \\ &\geq c \cdot \mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] \\ \mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] \\ &\geq c \cdot \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}]\end{aligned}$$

And by the fact that inequality of expectation between random variables follows an existence of atomic event on which the inequality holds, we obtain that there must exist at least a single σ such that:

$$\mathbf{E} [\mathbf{E} [c_{\text{alg}}(\sigma) : \text{alg} \sim \tilde{\text{alg}}] : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}] \geq c \cdot \mathbf{E} [c_{\text{base}}(\sigma) : \sigma \sim \tilde{\sigma}]$$

And that ends the proof.