

# Plonk Audit Report



Prepared for Dusk by Porter Adams

## PLONK Intro

PLONK is the Zero-Knowledge system used within the Dusk protocol. It is the latest and most advanced ZK system, and is a core feature of the Dusk network.

Standing for Permutations over Lagrange-bases for Oecumenical Noninteractive arguments of Knowledge, Dusk uses a pure Rust implementation of it.

---

**Codebase:** <https://github.com/dusk-network/plonk/tree/master>

**Commit:** E18f02b66ee7da9dcfc8042e02a7a1fc2eb776f8

**Time of audit:** November 29 through December 9, 2023

**Scope:** Everything under /plonk/src including

- commitment\_scheme/\*
- composer/\*
- constraint\_system/\*
- fft/\*
- proof\_system/\*
- And several more files all under /src

---

### Summary:

1. There were two low severity findings.
2. Overall, the codebase was very well written. Documentation, testing, and in-line comments were some of the best I've ever seen. The only area I saw for improvement was general code cleanliness. There were approximately 12 TODOs, 3 FIXMEs, 5 pieces of dead\_code, and 3 deprecated functions.

---

## Findings:

---

### 1. Leading\_coefficient() may unexpectedly be zero [Severity: Low]

Polynomials are stored as a vector of BlsScalars.

A polynomial is the zero polynomial if 1) it is empty or 2) all coefficients in the vector are zero.

We don't want to store extra zero coefficients if we don't need to, so almost every function on polynomials makes sure to call `self.truncate_leading_zeros()` after each operation.

However, there are two exceptions: in `add_assign` and in `sub_assign`, if two polynomials have the same degree, then `truncate_leading_zeros()` is not called.

It's possible for the highest coefficients to cancel out, leaving us with a non-zero polynomial that still has a "zero" leading coefficient.

```
200  v  impl<'a> AddAssign<&'a Polynomial> for Polynomial {
201  v      fn add_assign(&mut self, other: &'a Polynomial) {
202          if self.is_zero() {
203              self.coeffs.truncate(0);
204              self.coeffs.extend_from_slice(&other.coeffs);
205          } else if other.is_zero() {
206              } else if self.degree() >= other.degree() {
207                  for (a, b) in self.coeffs.iter_mut().zip(&other.coeffs) {
208                      *a += b
209                  }
210              } else {
211                  // Add the necessary number of zero coefficients.
212                  self.coeffs.resize(other.coeffs.len(), BlsScalar::zero());
213                  for (a, b) in self.coeffs.iter_mut().zip(&other.coeffs) {
214                      *a += b
215                  }
216                  self.truncate_leading_zeros();
217              }
218          }
219      }
```

( fft/polynomial.rs line 206 )



In `fft/polynomial.rs`, the `leading_coefficient()` function should return the largest non-zero coefficient of the polynomial. Currently, this function is marked as `dead_code` and not used anywhere in the repository, but future developers of this library could easily make a mistake here.

#### **Recommendation:**

Either fix `leading_coefficient()` to ignore leading zeros, or change `add_assign` and `sub_assign` to call `truncate_leading_zeros` in the case of two polynomials with the same degree.

---

## Findings:

---

### 2. Inconsistent gate ordering [ Severity: Low ]

Within the proof system, variables are not always listed in the same order.

One place where this could lead to a problem is in the arithmetic proving and verifying keys.

The arithmetic prover key has “q\_c before q\_4”, but the arithmetic verifier key struct stores “q\_4 before q\_c”, even though the verifier key serialization stores “q\_c before q\_4”. In the function `from_bytes`, the arithmetic verifier key does correctly swap q\_c and q\_4, so there are no bugs present currently.

However, swapping the order throughout the codebase is very unexpected and may lead to bugs in the future.

```
... 61 | fn from_bytes(buf: &[u8; Self::SIZE]) -> Result<VerifierKey, Self::Error> {
62 |     let mut buffer = &buf[..];
63 |     let q_m = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
64 |     let q_l = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
65 |     let q_r = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
66 |     let q_o = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
67 |     let q_c = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
68 |     let q_4 = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
69 |     let q_arith = Commitment::from_reader(&mut buffer)?;
70 |
71 |     Ok(VerifierKey {
72 |         q_m,
73 |         q_l,
74 |         q_r,
75 |         q_o,
76 |         q_4,
77 |         q_c,
78 |         q_arith,
79 |     })
80 | }
81 | }
```

### Recommendation:

Pick one ordering and stick to it throughout the library. In particular, please serialize things in the same order they are stored in the struct.

---

## Solutions:

---

### Dusk Team Resolution:

We are happy to report that both audit findings were of very low severity and had no impact on the current security of the protocol.

It is to be noted though that, if not careful, they could very well have turned into bugs in the future and we are very grateful that Porter pointed us to them.

This way we had the chance to fix them before they have the chance to become a problem.

### Remedies:

Merged Pull Request #799:      Fix inconsistent gate ordering

Merged Pull Request #800:      Fix leading coefficients might be zero



## About the Author




### Porter Adams

Porter is a Security Blockchain Engineer at Matter Labs.

He has over 10 years of experience in software engineering and security, with a specific focus on blockchain, cryptography, and zero-knowledge, and has a wealth of expertise building, assessing, and securing protocols.

With sought-after expertise in the security space, he currently works as a Blockchain Security Engineer at Matter Labs, and previously served as a Blockchain Security Expert at Kudelski Security, as well as Lead Cryptographer and Engineer for several top organizations.



Prepared for Dusk by Porter Adams