

Citadel Protocol Specification

Dusk Network

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Contents

1	General Overview	2
1.1	What is Citadel	2
1.2	Document Organization	2
2	Definitions	2
2.1	The Roles Involved	2
2.2	The Elements Involved	2
3	Protocol Workflow	3

1 General Overview

1.1 What is Citadel

A Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) protocol serves the purpose of allowing users of a given service to manage their identities in a fully transparent manner. In other words, every user can know which information about them is shared with other parties, and accept or deny any request for personal information.

Citadel is a SSI protocol built on top of Dusk Network. Users of a service can get a *license*, which represents their *right* to use such a service. In particular, **Citadel** allows for the following properties:

- **Proof of Ownership:** users can prove ownership of a license that allows them to use a given service.
- **Proof of Validity:** users can prove that a license has not been revoked and hence, it is a valid license.
- **Unlinkability:** no one can link any activity with other activities done in the network.
- **Decentralized Nullification:** when users use a license (i.e. they prove its ownership to use a service), everyone in the network learns that this happened, so it cannot be used again.
- **Attribute Blinding:** users can decide what information they want to share, hiding any other sensitive information and providing only the desired one.

1.2 Document Organization

In Section 2 we define all the object types and entities involved in the protocol. In Section 3 we roll out the protocol with full details.

2 Definitions

2.1 The Roles Involved

- **User:** an entity that interacts with the wallet to request licenses and prove ownership of those.
- **Service Provider (SP):** an entity offering an off-chain service that receives requests for licenses, and upon acceptance, issues them.
- **Session Service Provider (SSP):** the entity that provides the service upon verification that a service request is correct. The SSP may be the same as the SP entity or a different one.

2.2 The Elements Involved

- **Request:** a request includes the encryption of a stealth address belonging to the user, where the license has to be sent to, and a symmetric key. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
(rp_k, R) enc nonce	StealthAddress PoseidonCipher BlsScalar	It is a request stealth address of the SP. It is a ciphertext of size 6. Randomness needed to compute enc.

- **License:** a license is an asset that represents the right of a user to use a given service. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
(lp_k, R) enc nonce pos	StealthAddress PoseidonCipher BlsScalar BlsScalar	It is a license stealth address of the user. It is a ciphertext of size 4. Randomness needed to compute enc. It is the position of the license in the Merkle tree of licenses.

- **LicenseProverParameters:** a prover needs some auxiliary parameters to compute the proof that nullifies a license when used. Some of the items of this table are related to the session and session cookie elements. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
lpk	JubJubAffine	The license public key.
lpk'	JubJubAffine	A variation of the license public key computed with a different generator.
sig _{lic}	Signature	The signature of the license.
com ₀ ^{hash}	BlsScalar	A hash commitment of the public key of the SP.
com ₁	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the attributes.
com ₂	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the c value.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SSP together with some randomness.
sig_session_hash	dusk_schnorr::Proof	The signature of the session hash signed by the user.
merkle_proof	PoseidonBranch	Membership proof of the license in the Merkle tree of licenses.

- **Session:** a session is a public struct known by all the validators. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SSP together with some randomness.
nullifier _{lic}	BlsScalar	The nullifier of a given license.
com ₀ ^{hash}	BlsScalar	A hash commitment of the public key of the SP.
com ₁	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the attributes.
com ₂	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the c value.

- **SessionCookie:** a session cookie is a secret value known only by the user and the SSP. It contains a set of openings to a given set of commitments. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
pk _{SSP}	JubJubAffine	The public key of the SSP.
r	BlsScalar	Randomness for computing the session hash.
nullifier _{lic}	BlsScalar	The nullifier of a given license.
pk _{SP}	JubJubAffine	The public key of the SP.
attr	JubJubScalar	The attributes of the user.
c	JubJubScalar	The challenge value.
s ₀	JubJubScalar	Randomness used to compute the com ₀ ^{hash} .
s ₁	BlsScalar	Randomness used to compute the com ₁ .
s ₂	BlsScalar	Randomness used to compute the com ₂ .

3 Protocol Workflow

The workflow is depicted in Figure 1, and described with full details as follows.

1. **(user)** send_license_req : compute a license stealth address (lpk, R) belonging to the user, using the user's own public key, and also an additional key $k_{lic} = H^{BLAKE2b}(lsk)G$, by computing first the user's lsk. Then, compute the request stealth address (rp_k, R) and k_{DH} using the SP's public key. And finally send the following request to the network:

$$req = ((rp_k, R), enc, nonce)$$

,

where

$$enc = Enc_{k_{DH}}((lpk, R) || k_{lic}; nonce)$$

.

2. **(SP)** get_license_req : continuously check the network for incoming license requests.
3. **(SP)** send_license : upon receiving a request from a user, define a set of attributes attr representing the license, and compute a digital signature as follows:

$$sig_{lic} = sign_single_key_{sk_{SP}}(lpk, attr)$$

.




Figure 1: Overview of the protocol messages exchanged between the user, the Dusk Network, and the SP.

Then, send the following license to the network:

$$\text{lic} = ((\text{lpk}, R), \text{enc}, \text{nonce}, \text{pos})$$

,
where

$$\text{enc} = \text{Enc}_{\text{k}_{\text{lic}}}(\text{sig}_{\text{lic}} || \text{attr}; \text{nonce})$$

.

4. **(user)** `get_license` : receive the license by scanning the incoming transactions.
5. **(user)** `call_nullify_license` : when desiring to use the license, nullify it by executing a call to the license contract. The following steps are performed:
 - The user issues a transaction that calls the license contract, which includes a ZKP that is computed out of the gadget depicted in Figure 2.
 - The network validators will execute the smart contract, which verifies the proof. Upon success, the following session will be added to a shared list of sessions:

$$\text{session} = \{\text{session_hash}, \text{nullifier}_{\text{lic}}, \text{com}_0^{\text{hash}}, \text{com}_1, \text{com}_2\}$$

,
where $\text{session_hash} = H^{\text{Poseidon}}(\text{pk}_{\text{SSP}} || r)$.

6. **(user)** `req_service` : request the service to the SSP, establishing communication using a secure channel, and providing the `sc`.
7. **(SSP)** `get_session` : receive a `session` from the list of sessions, where $\text{session.nullifier}_{\text{lic}} = \text{sc.nullifier}_{\text{lic}}$.
8. **(SSP)** `grant_service` : grant or deny the service upon verification of the following steps:
 - Check whether the values $(\text{attr}, \text{pk}_{\text{SP}}, c)$ included in the `sc` are correct.
 - Check whether the opening $(\text{pk}_{\text{SSP}}, r)$ included in the `sc` matches the `session_hash` found in the `session`.
 - Check whether the openings $((\text{pk}_{\text{SP}}, s_0), (\text{attr}, s_1), (c, s_2))$ included in the `sc` match the commitments $(\text{com}_0^{\text{hash}}, \text{com}_1, \text{com}_2)$ found in the `session`.

Furthermore, the SSP might request the user to nullify the license they are using (e.g. this is a single-use license, like entering a concert). This is done through the computation of $\text{nullifier}_{\text{lic}}$. The deployment of this part of the circuit has two different possibilities:

