

# Citadel Protocol Specification

Dusk Network

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# 1 General Overview

## 1.1 What is Citadel

A Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) protocol serves the purpose of allowing users of a given service to manage their identities in a fully transparent manner. In other words, every user can know which information about them is shared with other parties, and accept or deny any request for personal information.

**Citadel** is a SSI protocol build on top of Dusk Network. Users of a service can get a *license*, which represents their *right* to use such a service. In particular, **Citadel** allows for the following properties:

- **Proof of Ownership:** a user of a service is able to prove ownership of a license that allows them to use such a service.
- **Proof of Validity:** users can prove ownership of a valid license, that has not been revoked.
- **Unlinkability:** no one can link any activity with other activities done in the network.
- **Decentralized Nullification:** when a user spends a license, everyone in the network learns that this happened, so it cannot be spent again.
- **Attribute Blinding:** the user is capable of deciding which information they want to leak, blinding any other sensitive information and providing only the desired one.

## 1.2 Document Organization

In Section 2 we define all the object types and entities involved in the protocol. In Section 3 we roll out the protocol with full details.

# 2 Definitions

## 2.1 The Roles involved

- **User:** An entity that interacts with the wallet to request licenses and prove ownership of those.
- **Service Provider (SP):** An entity offering an off-chain service that receives requests for licenses, and upon acceptance, issues them.
- **Session Service Provider (SSP):** It provides the service upon verification that a service request is correct. It can be the same individual that the SP or another one.

## 2.2 The Elements involved

- **Request:** A request includes the encryption of a stealth address belonging to the user, where the license has to be sent to, and a symmetric key. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
( $rpk, R$ )	StealthAddress	It is a request stealth address of the SP.
enc	PoseidonCipher	It is a ciphertext of size 6.
nonce	BlScalar	It is a randomness needed to compute enc.

- **License:** A license is an asset that represents the right of a user to use a given service. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
( $lpk, R$ )	StealthAddress	It is a license stealth address of the user.
enc	PoseidonCipher	It is a ciphertext of size 4.
nonce	BlScalar	It is a randomness needed to compute enc.
pos	BlScalar	It is the position of the license into a Merkle tree of licenses.

- **LicenseProverParameters:** A prover needs some auxiliary parameters to compute the proof that nullifies a license when desired to be spent. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
lpk	JubJubAffine	The license public key.
lpk'	JubJubAffine	The license public key prime.
sig <sub>lic</sub>	Signature	The signature of the license.
com <sub>0</sub> <sup>hash</sup>	BlsScalar	A hash commitment of the public key of the SP.
com <sub>1</sub>	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the attributes.
com <sub>2</sub>	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the $c$ value.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SSP plus some randomness.
sig_session_hash	dusk_schnorr::Proof	The signature of the session hash.
merkle_proof	PoseidonBranch	Membership proof of the license in the Merkle tree of licenses.

- **Session:** A session is a public struct known by all the validators. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SSP plus some randomness.
nullifier <sub>lic</sub>	BlsScalar	The nullifier of a given license.
com <sub>0</sub> <sup>hash</sup>	BlsScalar	A hash commitment of the public key of the SP.
com <sub>1</sub>	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the attributes.
com <sub>2</sub>	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen Commitment of the $c$ value.

- **Session Cookie:** A session cookie is a secret value known only by the user and the SSP. It contains a set of openings to a given set of commitments. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
pk <sub>SSP</sub>	JubJubAffine	The public key of the SSP.
$r$	BlsScalar	Randomness for computing the session hash.
nullifier <sub>lic</sub>	BlsScalar	The nullifier of a given license.
pk <sub>SP</sub>	JubJubAffine	The public key of the SP.
attr	JubJubScalar	The attributes of the user.
$c$	JubJubScalar	The challenge value.
$s_0$	JubJubScalar	The randomness used to compute the commitment 0.
$s_1$	BlsScalar	The randomness used to compute the commitment 1.
$s_2$	BlsScalar	The randomness used to compute the commitment 2.

### 3 Protocol Workflow

The workflow is depicted in Figure 1, and described with full details as follows.




Figure 1: Overview of the protocol messages exchanged between the user, the Dusk Network, and the SP.

1. **(user)** `send_license_req` : Compute a license stealth address  $(lpk, R)$  belonging to the user, using the user's own public key, and also an additional key  $k_{lic} = H^{BLAKE2b}(lsk)G$ , by computing first the user's  $lsk$ . Then, compute the request stealth address  $(rpkm, R)$  and  $k_{DH}$  using the SP's public key. And finally send the following request to the network:

$$req = ((rpkm, R), enc, nonce)$$

where

$$enc = Enc_{k_{DH}}((lpk, R) || k_{lic}; nonce)$$

2. **(SP)** `get_license_req` : Continuously check the network for incoming license requests.
3. **(SP)** `send_license` : Upon receiving the request from a user, define a set of attributes `attr` representing the license, and compute a digital signature as follows:

$$sig_{lic} = sign\_single\_key_{sk_{SP}}(lpk, attr)$$

Then, send the following license to the network:

$$lic = ((lpk, R), enc, nonce, pos)$$

where

$$enc = Enc_{k_{lic}}(sig_{lic} || attr; nonce)$$

4. **(user)** `get_license` : Receive the license by scanning the incoming transactions.
5. **(user)** `call_nullify_license` : When desiring to use the license, nullify it by executing a call to the license contract. The following steps are performed:
  - The user issues a transaction that calls the license contract, which includes a ZKP that is computed out of the gadget depicted in Figure 2.
  - The network validators will execute the smart contract, which verifies the proof. Upon success, the following session will be added to a shared list of sessions:

$$session = \{session\_hash, nullifier_{lic}, com_0^{hash}, com_1, com_2\}$$

$$\text{where } session\_hash = H^{Poseidon}(pk_{SSP} || r).$$

6. **(user)** `req_service` : Request the service to the SSP, establishing communication using a secure channel, and providing the `sc`.
7. **(SSP)** `get_session` : Receive a `session` from the list of sessions, where `session.nullifier_{lic} = sc.nullifier_{lic}`.
8. **(SSP)** `grant_service` : Grant or deny the service upon verification of the following steps:
  - Check whether or not the values  $(attr, pk_{SP}, c)$  included in the `sc` are correct.
  - Check whether or not the opening  $(pk_{SSP}, r)$  included in the `sc` match the `session_hash` found in the `session`.
  - Check whether or not the openings  $((pk_{SP}, s_0), (attr, s_1), (c, s_2))$  included in the `sc` match the commitments  $com_0^{hash}, com_1, com_2$  found in the `session`.

Furthermore, the SSP might request the user to nullify the license they are using (i.e. this is a single-use license, like entering a concert). This is done through the computation of `nullifier_{lic}`. The deployment of this part of the circuit has two different possibilities:

- If we set  $c = 0$  (or directly remove this input from the circuit), the license will be able to be used only once.
- If the SSP requests the user to set a custom value for  $c$  (e.g. the date of an event), the license will be able to be reused only under certain conditions.




Figure 2: Arithmetic circuit for proving a license's ownership.