Citadel Protocol Specification

Dusk Network

June 26, 2023

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1 General Overview

1.1 What is Citadel

A Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) protocol serves the purpose of allowing users of a given service to manage their identities in a fully transparent manner. In other words, every user can know which information about them is shared with other parties, and accept or deny any request for personal information.

Citadel is a SSI protocol built on top of Dusk Network. Users of a service can get a *license*, which represents their *right* to use such a service. In particular, Citadel allows for the following properties:

- Proof of Ownership: users can prove ownership of a license that allows them to use a given service.
- Proof of Validity: users can prove that a license has not been revoked and hence, it is a valid license.
- Unlinkability: activities from the same user in the network cannot be linked to each other by other parties.
- **Decentralized Session Opening:** when users use a license to open a session to use a service, everyone in the network learns that this happened, so it cannot be used again.
- Attribute Blinding: users can decide what information they want to share, hiding any other sensitive information and providing only the desired one.

1.2 Document Organization

In Section 2, we define all the object types and entities involved in the protocol. In Section 3, we roll out the protocol with full details.

2 Definitions

2.1 The Roles Involved

- User: an entity that interacts with the wallet to request licenses and prove ownership of those.
- License Provider (LP): an entity that receives requests for licenses, and upon acceptance, issues them.
- Service Provider (SP): the entity that provides a service upon verification that a service request is correct. The SP may be the same as the LP entity or a different one.

2.2 The Elements Involved

• Request: a request includes the encryption of a stealth address belonging to the user, where the license has to be sent to, and a symmetric key. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
(rpk, R_req)	StealthAddress	It is a request stealth address for the LP.
enc	PoseidonCipher[6]	It is the encryption of a license stealth address for the user
		and a symmetric key.
nonce	BlsScalar	Randomness needed to compute enc.

• License: a license is an asset that represents the right of a user to use a given service. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
(lpk, R_lic)	StealthAddress	It is a license stealth address of the user.
enc	PoseidonCipher[4]	It is the encryption of some user attributes and the signa-
		ture of these attributes.
nonce	BlsScalar	Randomness needed to compute enc.
pos	BlsScalar	It is the position of the license in the Merkle tree of licenses.

• LicenseProverParameters: a prover needs some auxiliary parameters to compute the proof that proves the ownership of a license. Some of the items of this table are related to the session and session cookie elements. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
lpk	JubJubAffine	The license public key of the user.
lpk'	JubJubAffine	A variation of the license public key of the user computed
		with a different generator.
sig _{lic}	Signature	The signature of the license attributes.
com_0^{hash}	BlsScalar	A hash of the public key of the LP.
com_1	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen commitment of the attributes.
com_2	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen commitment of the c value.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SP together with some
		randomness.
sig_session_hash	dusk_schnorr::Proof	The signature of the session hash signed by the user.
merkle_proof	PoseidonBranch	Membership proof of the license in the Merkle tree of li-
		censes.

• Session: a session is a public struct known by all the validators. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
session_hash	BlsScalar	The hash of the public key of the SP together with some
		randomness.
session_id	BlsScalar	The id of a session open using a given license.
com_0^{hash}	BlsScalar	A hash of the public key of the LP.
com_1	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen commitment of the attributes.
com_2	JubJubExtended	A Pedersen commitment of the c value.

• **SessionCookie:** a session cookie is a secret value known only by the user and the SP. It contains a set of openings to a given set of commitments. The structure is as follows:

Element	Type	Info.
pk _{SP}	JubJubAffine	The public key of the SP.
$r_{session}$	BlsScalar	Randomness for computing the session hash.
session_id	BlsScalar	The id of a session open using a given license.
pk _{LP}	JubJubAffine	The public key of the LP.
attr	JubJubScalar	The attributes of the user.
c	JubJubScalar	The challenge value.
s ₀	JubJubScalar	Randomness used to compute com_0^{hash} .
s ₁	BlsScalar	Randomness used to compute com_1 .
s ₂	BlsScalar	Randomness used to compute com_2 .

3 Protocol Workflow

In Citadel, each party involved in the protocol keeps static keys, as we detail now. Let $G, G' \leftarrow \mathbb{J}$ be two generators for the subgroup \mathbb{J} of order t of the Jubjub elliptic curve. The keys of each party are the following.

- Secret key: $\mathsf{sk} = (a, b)$, where $a, b \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_t$.
- Public key: pk = (A, B), where A = aG and B = bG.

The workflow of the Citadel protocol is depicted in Figure 1, and described with full details as follows.

- 1. (user) request_license : compute a license stealth address (lpk, R_{lic}) belonging to the user, using the user's own public key, as follows.
 - (a) Sample r uniformly at random from \mathbb{F}_t .
 - (b) Compute a symmetric Diffie-Hellman key $k = rA_{user}$.
 - (c) Compute a one-time public key $lpk = H^{BLAKE2b}(k)G + B_{user}$.
 - (d) Compute $R_{lic} = rG$.

Compute also an additional key $k_{lic} = H^{Poseidon}(lsk)G$, by computing first the license secret key $lsk = H^{BLAKE2b}(k) + b_{user}$. Then, compute the request stealth address (rpk, R_{req}) using the LP's public key, as follows.




Figure 1: Overview of the protocol messages exchanged between the user, the Dusk Network, and the SP.

- (a) Sample r uniformly at random from \mathbb{F}_t .
- (b) Compute a symmetric Diffie–Hellman key $k_{req} = rA_{LP}$.
- (c) Compute a one-time public key $rpk = H^{BLAKE2b}(k_{req})G + B_{LP}$.
- (d) Compute $R_{req} = rG$.

And finally send the following request to the network:

$$req = ((rpk, R_{req}), enc, nonce),$$

where

$$enc = Enc_{k_{reg}}((Ipk, R_{lic})||k_{lic}; nonce).$$

- 2. (LP) get_license_request : continuously check the network for incoming license requests, by checking if $\operatorname{rpk} \stackrel{?}{=} H^{\operatorname{BLAKE2b}}(\tilde{\mathsf{k}}_{\operatorname{req}})G + B_{\operatorname{LP}}$, where $\tilde{\mathsf{k}}_{\operatorname{req}} = a_{\operatorname{LP}}R_{\operatorname{req}}$.
- 3. (LP) issue_license: upon receiving a request from a user, define a set of attributes attr representing the license, and compute a digital signature as follows:

$$sig_{lic} = sign_single_key_{sk_{SP}}(lpk, attr).$$

Then, send the following license to the network:

$$lic = ((lpk, R_{lic}), enc, nonce, pos),$$

where

$$enc = Enc_{k_{lic}}(sig_{lic}||attr; nonce).$$

- 4. (user) get_license: receive the license by scanning the incoming transactions, and checking if $lpk \stackrel{?}{=} H^{BLAKE2b}(\tilde{k}_{lic})G + B_{user}$, where $\tilde{k}_{lic} = H^{BLAKE2b}(lsk)G$.
- 5. (user) use_license: when using the license, open a session with a specific SP by executing a call to the license contract. The following steps are performed:
 - The user issues a transaction that calls the license contract, which includes a ZKP that is computed out of the gadget depicted in Figure 2. Notice that here, the user signs session_hash using lsk. Likewise, the user here will need to compute lpk' = lskG'.

• The network validators will execute the smart contract, which verifies the proof. Upon success, the following session will be added to a shared list of sessions:

$$\mathsf{session} = \{\mathsf{session_hash}, \mathsf{session_id}, \mathsf{com}_0^{\mathit{hash}}, \mathsf{com}_1, \mathsf{com}_2\},$$

where $session_hash = H^{Poseidon}(pk_{SP}||r_{session})$, and $r_{session}$ is sampled uniformly at random from \mathbb{F}_t .

6. (user) request_service: request the service to the SP, establishing communication using a secure channel, and providing the session cookie that follows.

$$sc = \{pk_{SP}, r_{session}, session_id, pk_{LP}, attr, c, s_0, s_1, s_2\}$$

- 7. (SSP) get_session: receive a session from the list of sessions, where session.session_id = sc.session_id.
- 8. (SSP) grant_service: grant or deny the service upon verification of the following steps:
 - Check whether the values (attr, pk_{LP} , c) included in the sc are correct.
 - Check whether the opening $(pk_{SP}, r_{session})$ included in the sc matches the session_hash found in the session.
 - Check whether the openings $((pk_{LP}, s_0), (attr, s_1), (c, s_2))$ included in the sc match the commitments $(com_0^{hash}, com_1, com_2)$ found in the session.




Figure 2: Arithmetic circuit for proving a license's ownership.

Furthermore, the SP might want to prevent the user from using the license more than once (e.g. this is a single-use license, like entering a concert). This is done through the computation of session_id. The deployment of this part of the circuit has two different possibilities:

- If we set c=0 (or directly remove this input from the circuit), the license can be used only once.
- If the SP requests the user to set a custom value for c (e.g. the date of an event), the license can be reused only under certain conditions.

4 Protocol Implementation

4.1 Participants

Protocol implementation involves realization of the protocol building blocks as well as providing means of data communication between them. Building blocks are placed at the following locations, which correspond to protocol participants:

- User software.
- License Provider software.
- Service Provider software.
- License contract.

Data communication between protocol participants is realized in the following modes:

- Calling a contract state changing method.
- Calling a contract state querying method (not modifying the contract state).
- Storing data directly in blockchain.
- Retrieving data from blockchain.
- Delegating ZK proof calculation.
- Calling off-chain.

The following diagram illustrates an interaction between protocol participants and indicates the communication means used.

Citadel Protocol Implementation




Figure 3: Interaction between protocol participants

On the diagram, we can see various communication modes being used. Initially, the user submits to the blockchain a transaction which contains request as a payload. Subsequently, the License Provider, which continuously scans the blockchain, detects transactions containing requests and filters out requests which are addressed to it. The License Provider can obtain requests via other routes as well, for example via http or email, passing requests on the blockchain is only one of many possible ways of submitting a request, one that has the advantage of passing a payment along with the request. Once the License Provider gets a hold of a request, it can perform appropriate verification, and upon successful verification, it can issue a license. Issuing a license involves a smart contract transaction call. Smart contract transaction call is a blockchain transaction, yet to not confuse the reader, we show it on the diagram with details of blockchain involvement omitted. The

user obtains licenses via a contract query. For privacy reasons, the user obtains a bulk of licenses not pertaining exclusively to her and filters it out by herself. To economize the volume of data transfers, block-height range is passed to allow for transfer of a subset of available records. All modes of communication used so far were on-chain. Communication between the user and the Service Provider, on the other hand, is off-chain. When the Service Provider wants to establish a session, it calls a contract to obtain a session for the given session id. The diagram illustrates the following flow of data and interactions between participants:

- User submits request to a License Provider by issuing a blockchain transaction.
- License Provider scans the blockchain and obtains the request.
- License Provider, upon necessary verification, issues a license.
- License Provider sends license to the License Contract via a smart contract call transaction.
- User obtains licenses for a given block-height range.
- User filters out licenses addressed to her/him.
- User calculates a proof (the proof calculation might be delegated).
- User calls use-license to redeem a license, via a smart contract call.
- License Contract attempts to verify the proof and, if verified, adds a new session to a list of sessions.
- User requests a service from a Service Provider (off-chain).
- Service Provider asks contract for a session.
- Service Provider grants service to the user (off-chain).

4.2 License Contract

License contract maintains state consisting of the following data:

- List of sessions.
- Map of licenses and their positions in the Merkle tree.
- Merkle tree of license hashes.

Contract provides the following methods:

- issue-license: adds a license to a Merkle tree of licenses.
- qet-licenses: provides a list of new licenses added in a given block-height range.
- use-license: attempts to verify the proof and, if verified, adds a new session to a list of sessions and nullifies the license in the Merkle tree.
- get-session: finds a session in a list of sessions and returns it to the caller.

4.3 License ZK Proof Calculation

License ZK proof calculation will either be performed by the user or delegated to a node. At the time of writing, the details of delegation are not yet known, they will be filled in here once the information becomes available.