

# Simulate a Live Attack for Kubernetes (lite)



The Wiz Runtime Sensor collects runtime events on Kubernetes workloads and translates them to detections.

Below are a set of commands that can be run on most environments to help you quickly test the Runtime Sensor detections. These commands do not require the deployment of a custom container image.

**!** This scenario uses non-malicious commands for the simulation and should be safe to execute in your environment. Some of these commands will make changes to the container in which they are run, so we recommend using a dedicated target container in test or demo environments only.

[Step 1](#): Deploy the Runtime Sensor evaluation pod

[Step 2](#): Run attack-simulation commands

[Step 3](#): Clean-up (remove the Runtime Sensor evaluation pod)

## Prerequisites

- Kubernetes version 1.20 or higher, where the Runtime Sensor was successfully deployed on a cluster.
- Access credentials with permissions to deploy a pod and execute commands on it.
- Access to the Kubernetes cluster API from your machine with the ability to run `kubectl` commands.
- A local installation of `kubectl`.
- Wiz Sensor [installed on the Kubernetes cluster](#).

## Deploy the Runtime Sensor evaluation pod

1. [Download](#) the `wiz-privileged-demo-pod.yaml` file.
2. Deploy the target pod on your Kubernetes cluster:

```
kubectl apply -f wiz-privileged-demo-pod.yaml
```

3. Initiate an interactive shell with the pod:

```
kubectl exec -it wiz-demo-pod -- bash
```

## Run attack-simulation commands

In this step, you will run a series of commands on the target pod via the shell you just created and review the events generated by the Runtime Sensor. The Runtime Sensor detections are represented under the [Explorer > Cloud Events](#) page in your Wiz portal.

## Suspicious access to process memory

### Command to execute

Execute the following command: `/usr/bin/cat /proc$/mem 2> /dev/null`

### Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- Process memory dump was detected ([T1003.007 OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem](#))

The screenshot displays the Wiz Cloud Events interface. On the left, a sidebar shows the 'Cloud Events' section with a filter for 'Resource is one of 5 options'. The main panel shows a list of events, with the top event being 'Process memory dump was detected' by the 'Wiz Sensor'. This event is expanded, showing a 'Process Tree' and detailed information about the process that triggered the event.

**Process Tree:**

- sensor-cluster-ng-60a3ee3f-Node (Virtual Machine)
  - [1] /usr/lib/systemd/systemd --system --deserialize 37 (Process)
    - wiz-demo-pod (Container)
      - [32293] /usr/bin/containerd-shim-runc-v2 -namespace moby -id 5cf56e58713cb21520f... (Process)
        - [3525] bash (Process)
          - [6611] cat /proc/65/mem (Process)

**Process Details (for [6611] cat /proc/65/mem):**

Name	cat
File path	/usr/bin/cat
File hash	860ccd6fb4365bd628f8e8d732c20ce407c55b21
User ID	0
User Name	root
Ran at	Jan 22, 2024 5:14:27.566 PM
Command line	cat /proc/65/mem

- Process memory data file was accessed ([T1003.007 OS Credential Dumping: Proc Filesystem](#))

English ▲

## Dropper detection

## Command to execute

Execute the following command:

```
/usr/bin/curl https://www.wiz.io/ --retry 5 --output /tmp/test-drop &&  
/usr/bin/chmod +x /tmp/test-drop
```

## Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- Suspected drop and execute-ingress tool with payload decode or file/folder permission change commands were executed ([T1222.002 File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification](#))
- File created/modified by an ingress tool that established a remote connection ([T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#))

The screenshot displays the Wiz Cloud Events interface. On the left, a sidebar shows 'Cloud Events' with filters for 'GROUP BY' and 'Event Name'. The main panel shows a 'Cloud Event' titled 'File created/modified by an ingress tool that established a remote connection'. Below the title, there are buttons for 'Raw Event Details', 'Give Feedback', and 'Share Link'. The 'Process Tree' section shows a hierarchy of processes: 'sensor-cluster-ng-60a3ee3f-Node' (Virtual Machine) -> '[1] /usr/lib/systemd/systemd --system --deserialize 37' (Process) -> 'wiz-demo-pod' (Container) -> '[32293] /usr/bin/containerd-shim-runc-v2 -namespace moby -id 5cf56e58713cb21520f...' (Process) -> '[3525] bash' (Process) -> '[25046] curl https://www.wiz.io/ --retry 5 --output /tmp/test-drop' (Process). The 'curl' process details are expanded, showing: Name: curl, File path: /usr/bin/curl, File hash: cd571a766fd42c8471b5de13f287bd21d900ba8c, User ID: 0, User Name: root, Ran at: Jan 22, 2024 5:43:10.827 PM, and Command line: curl https://www.wiz.io/ --retry 5 --output /tmp/test-drop.

- Ingress tool was executed ([T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer](#))

## Evasion via hidden files

### Command to execute

```
/usr/bin/mkdir -p /tmp/.testdir && cp /usr/bin/whoami /tmp/.testdir/test &&  
/usr/bin/chmod +x /tmp/.testdir/test && /tmp/.testdir/test
```

## Expected detection(s) in Wiz

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- Process was executed from hidden location ([T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories](#))
- Hidden directory was created ([T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories](#))

## Possible credential manipulation


### Command to execute

Execute the following command:

```
/usr/bin/echo test >> /etc/shadow
```

### Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- Unrecognized write to user management file ([T1078.003 Valid Accounts: Local Accounts](#))



## Evasion via renamed binaries (living-off-the-land variant)

### Command to execute

Execute the following command:

```
ls -l /bin/*sh | grep -v \\.sh | xargs -I {} /usr/bin/cp -f {} {}.lot1
```

### Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- File created or modified in bin folder ([T1554 Compromise Client Software Binary](#))

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## Possible container escape via mount with cgroups

### Command to execute

Execute the following command:

```
/usr/bin/mkdir -p /tmp/test && /usr/bin/mount -t cgroup /tmp/test 2>/dev/null
```

### Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- Mount with type cgroup was executed inside a container ([T1611 Escape to Host](#))

## Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking

### Command to execute

```
/usr/bin/touch /etc/ld.so.preload && /usr/bin/echo test >> /etc/ld.so.preload
```

### Expected detection(s) in Wiz

- Library preload configuration file was added/modified ([T1574.006 Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking](#))

## Clean up (remove the Runtime Sensor evaluation pod)

To remove the pod, run:

```
kubectl delete -f wiz-privileged-demo-pod.yaml
```

 Updated 3 months ago

← Attack Simulations for Runtime Sensors

Simulate a Live Attack for Kubernetes →

Did this page help you?  **Yes**  **No**

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