

Counterfeit Fingerprint Detection of Outbound HTTP Traffic with Graph Edit Distance

1st Given Name Surname
 dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
 name of organization (of Aff.)
 City, Country
 email address

2nd Given Name Surname
 dept. name of organization (of Aff.)
 name of organization (of Aff.)
 City, Country
 email address

Abstract—Malware and backdoor usually hide their malicious activities to communicate with C&C server through HTTP protocol. Various techniques for stealth, e.g., using fake header, are developed which directly leads security system’s failure to detect hacker’s activities. This paper focuses on profiling fingerprints of browsers running on different client-side host to detect anomaly among outbound HTTP traffics at behavioral and semantic level. Patterns describing fake header are also elaborately designed using graph structure and become significant features in the proposed method for the subsequent detection. Performance of proposed approach are evaluated with data from realistic environment and compare to state-of-the-art. Results show that the proposed method delivers accuracy up to 99%, also for the counterfeit fingerprint’s detection it even achieve 100% recall, while the alternative approach totally failed under this scenario.

Index Terms—Anomaly Detection, Data Exfiltration, Data Leakage, Application Fingerprinting, Network Security

I. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, malware usually uses HTTP protocol to connect suspicious host for data leakage and exfiltration, because it’s a common network channel that Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems (IDS/IPS) never block the HTTP traffics. Therefore, malware tries to hide their penetrations in the HTTP traffic to evade the detections in Figure 1. In the previous research, there are many botnet using HTTP protocol to communicate with the C&C server for waiting command instead of IRC channel [1]. However, the proposed method in the past that uses fingerprint to detect malware hide in outbound HTTP traffics [2], and which can’t efficiently detect malware when hacker generates counterfeit fingerprints.

The main idea concept of fingerprint is around the HTTP headers. But, as we know, hacker can use exploit tool or library to easily modify the contents of a HTTP header. Previous research also indicates that malware uses modified HTTP header to evade the latest detections system [3], and which points out most malware using browser-like user-agent since browser’s connection behavior is various and complex. Therefore, we represent the problem define as following:

• Problem Definition

To evade intrusion detections, malware could make counterfeit fingerprint (e.g., user-agent, accept language, and so on) in a HTTP header. But, referrer correlation (e.g., domain and referrer fields of HTTP header) usually is





Fig. 1: A process of an attacking scenario. The common C&C architecture can be divided into push and pull styles. However, they both have the same goal: to avoid the detection system. Hackers would use advanced technology to avoid system detection by counterfeit HTTP header.

fixed when browser connects common domain, therefore, correlation would be changed when malware connects C&C server even using fake HTTP header. The detail is shown as Figure 2.


To resolve this problem, we propose an approach based on deviation estimating when given referrer correlation graphs in training and testing phases, and the contributions of this work are briefly summarized as followings:

- We propose a solution to detect outbound anomalous HTTP connections, which is based on browser fingerprint and referrer correlation techniques. Furthermore, our approach automatically generates fingerprints from network traffic, filter anomalous communications from the monitored hosts, and then identify counterfeit fingerprint in normal traffics which are filtered by fingerprints [2].
- We proposed a counterfeit fingerprint detection to resolve counterfeit problem, which identifies fake contents of HTTP header based on graph edit distance. Besides, we also have implemented a system based on our approach in python, and the current state of the art regarding client-side anomaly detection which is already in collaboration with other institution and enterprise.
- We have evaluated and compared DECANter [2] with real-world datasets. In the performance results, we show that our approach is better, especially the counterfeit fingerprint is harder to evade our approach.

In the remaining parts of this report, Section 2 surveys related work, and Section 3 describes the detail components



(a) Normal Referrer Correlation Graph



(b) Malicious Referrer Correlation Graph

Fig. 2: Difference between normal and malicious referrer correlation graphs. The ellipse nodes represent the webpage, and rectangular nodes represent the sources that the web page needed. In (a), this figure shows a page's normal referrer graph in first reference layer. Our system would use these reference graphs to construct the referrer correlation graph. In (b), the red rectangular node means the unusual URL which does not appear in the correlation graph of the training set. It is caused by malware forge the "Referrer" field in the HTTP headers.

of the proposed approach. The effectiveness, performance, and case studies of the proposed framework are evaluated and discussed in Section 4. At last, Section 5 concludes this project.

II. PROPOSED APPROACH

This section gives the details about our proposed method which aims at detecting counterfeit fingerprints from applications' outbound HTTP traffics.

A. System Overview

Before going further, all PCAP files collected by an enterprise's host is network activities generated by a set of applications such as browsers $B = \{b_1, \dots, b_n\}$, and which are all installed in hosts. Each browser b_i has several PCAP files which contain specific network characteristics, and our proposed approach possibly create a fingerprint f_{b_i} for each browser. The PCAP files of a host H include union of all browser fingerprints which is defined as $H = \cup_j^n f_{b_i}$.

TABLE I: Fields and Values of Database in a PCAP File

Field	Value for Instance
<i>Domain</i>	www.yongchang-yc.com.tw
<i>User-agent</i>	Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; Win64; x64) ...
<i>Accept-Lang</i>	zh-TW,zh;q=0.9,en-US;q=0.8,en;q=0.7
<i>Referrer</i>	www.yongchang-yc.com.tw

The proposed counterfeit fingerprint detection process consists of training and testing phases. In training phase, we assume enterprise hosts aren't compromised. This method mainly arises from the first one that is a data-driven and unsupervised flow responsible for a browser's fingerprint [2] and referrer correlation construction. This step takes the fields of a PCAP file as input and classifies browser traffics, and then construct fingerprints and referrer correlation graphs. In the testing phase, given a browser outbound HTTP traffic reconstructed by fingerprint and referrer correlation graph, and the second step filters benign browser traffics through fingerprint matching. Continuously, compare its and trained referrer correlation graph using Graph Edit Distance (GED) for counterfeit fingerprint detection. The proposed method is depicted in figure 3 and following paragraphs describe the details of each component.

B. Browser Traffic Extractor

For most cases of client-side attacking, hackers whose general goal is to steal valuable data before malware connects to C&C server. As a result, PCAP files, that contain specific network characteristics of an application (e.g., browser) for each host in the enterprise. To generate fingerprint for each browser, our approach first extracts various entities from PCAP files. Table I shows 4 heterogeneous fields which can be extracted from each one-line log, including domain (*Domain*), user-agent (*User-agent*), accept language (*Accept-Lang*), and referrer (*Referrer*). The reason for choosing these 4 fields for browser traffic classification can be summarized as followings and fingerprint construction is represented in next subsection.

In previous research [2], Bortolameotti et al. identified two types of HTTP applications (e.g., *browser* and *background*). This subsection aims to filter logs of a PCAP file according to the *User-agent*, because we focus on counterfeit fingerprints of browser network activities. To identify browser activities, the browser flags we defined are "Firefox", "Chrome", "Safari", "OPR", "Opera", "MSIE", "Gecko", "Trident", and "AppleWebKit", and which are used for string matching in field *User-agent*. Furthermore, in the testing phase, an implementation time-slot t is a fixed time window of T minutes, and the filtered logs is passed to the next module after t ends.

C. Fingerprint Constructor

Single feature (e.g., *User-agent*) isn't effective enough to filter normal network activities [2] [4]. Therefore, we consider multiple features such as *User-agent* and *Accept-Lang* for fingerprint generation, and *Domain* and *Referrer* would be used for constructing the correlation graph in other subsection. In our assumption, hacker can't be so lucky to



Fig. 3: An overview of our counterfeit fingerprint detection system. Five subsystems are depicted: (1) data preprocessor subsystem, (2) fingerprint constructor subsystem, (3) fingerprint matching subsystem, (4) referrer correlation graph constructor subsystem, and (5) graph similarity estimator subsystem. The system only takes the PCAP files of outbound HTTP traffics as input. In training phase, subsystem (1) and (2) passively extract the benign fingerprint from an application's outbound HTTP traffic, and subsystem (3) could use fingerprints to classify benign traffic in the testing phase. We note that referrer correlation extraction in the subsystem (4) is a key step, in the sense that if it can extract discriminative features for counterfeit fingerprint detection, the detection in the subsystem (5) is relatively straightforward.

guess all parameters of *User-agent* and *Accept-Lang* at the same time. In this subsection, we denote a set of *User-agent* $U = \{u_1, \dots, u_n\}$, and a set of *Accept-Lang* $L = \{l_1, \dots, l_m\}$ where $|U| = n$ and $|L| = m$. Furthermore, our approach makes fingerprint $f = (u_i, l_j)$ where $i = 1 \sim n$, $j = 1 \sim m$, and $|f| = n \times m$. Matching testing browser fingerprint to knowns which is trained and stored in database, and we would briefly show the similarity estimation in following module.

D. Fingerprint Matching Module

Matching fingerprint we used is an easy comparison in this module [2]. In training phase, we take fingerprints f_{b_i} for each browser b_i . If our approach constantly runs in testing mode, we must obtain other browser b_j fingerprints f_{b_j} . Then, we use edit distance to estimate fingerprint matching result $d(f_{b_i}, f_{b_j})$ which is shown as in Equation 1.

$$d(f_{b_i}, f_{b_j}) = \sum_k |f_{b_{i_k}} - f_{b_{j_k}}| \quad (1)$$

E. Referrer Correlation Graph Constructor

A call graph models a connection between URLs as a directed graph whose vertices, representing the domain name is interconnected through directed edges which have reference correlation. According to fields *Domain* and *Referrer*, a vertex could be represented as domain name which is extracted from a URL of the field, and an directed edge shows the reference correlation from *Referrer* to *Domain*. The example directed graph is depicted in figure 4. According to [5], call graphs are formally defined as a directed graph G with vertex $V = V(G)$,




Fig. 4: An Example of a referrer correlation graph generated from a browser traffic. The ellipse nodes represent the webpage that users have viewed by clicking the hyperlink in the browser. The rectangular nodes represent the sources that the web page needed. The arrow edge means which node is referred by the web page.

representing the domain name, and edge $E = E(G)$, where $E(G) \subseteq V(G) \times V(G)$, in correspondence with the reference correlation.

A candidate set $S = \{st_1, st_2, \dots, st_{ns}\}$ that contains all domain names filtered by fingerprint matching module and derived from D_i . Note that ns is the total number of derived domain names in D_i . Given the dataset D_i containing i^{th} domain name; $i = 1, \dots, ns$, and its referrer correlation based on the dataset should includes an $1 \times ns$ adjacency vector (ADJ), as following:

$$ADJ(i) = [tp_{i,1} \quad \dots \quad tp_{i,j} \quad \dots \quad tp_{i,ns}]$$

where for each i and j , $tp_{i,j}$ represents a directed edge which is referrer correlation from j^{th} domain name to i^{th} candidate domain.

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i, j = 1, \dots, ns, \\ tp_{i,j} = \# \text{connections from } st_j \text{ to } st_i \text{ in } D_i \end{aligned}$$

F. Graph Similarity Estimator

Our proposed approach relies on appropriate estimating deviation from domain name's new referrer correlation to its benign one. In this paper, domain name's referrer correlation is summarized as patterns represented by adjacency vector, as a result, deviation measuring can be realized by using graph edit distance (GED) to quantify similarity (or dissimilarity) between different vectors. The formal graph edit distance between two graphs G_1 and G_2 , written as $GED(G_1, G_2)$ can be defined as following:

$$GED(G_1, G_2) = \min_{(e_1, \dots, e_k) \in P(G_1, G_2)} \sum_{i=1}^k cost(e_i), \quad (2)$$

where $P(G_1, G_2)$ denotes the universal set of editing paths isomorphically transforming G_1 into G_2 , and $cost(e_i)$ is the cost of each graph editing operation, e_i .

With respect to referrer correlation graph in our method, calculation of GED on two graphs can then be implemented by following equation (3):

$$GED(ADJ(a), ADJ(b)) = \sum_{j=1}^{ns} |tp_{a,j} - tp_{b,j}|, \quad (3)$$

where $ADJ(a)$ and $ADJ(b)$ are adjacency vectors of two referrer correlation graphs, as well as $tp_{a,j}$ and $tp_{b,j}$ are the corresponding references in $ADJ(a)$ and $ADJ(b)$, respectively. The ns is the number of candidate domain names after fingerprint matching.

III. EXPERIMENT RESULTS

In this section, we would describe the datasets that we used to perform our experiments. For starting our experiments we have used two different datasets, simulated and real-world data. The simulated data is enable to evaluate the detection performance of our system and compare with DECANTer [2].

A. Experimental Settings

In the following, we briefly present the datasets we used for evaluation in our system. The dataset information is represented in table II.

• Real-world Data

The outbound HTTP traffics we collect from more than hundreds of machines in a technology industry. Users of these machines include accountants, engineers, sales executive, and administrative personnel. Since the users vary from different occupations that lets data become various and complexity. The real world dataset has split into two sets, one is training and the other is testing. Training set has covered first few days and testing set is the traffics of last days. In training set, Industry flow_01 contains 1,690,869 HTTP requests. and the testing set Industry flow_02 contains 68,234 HTTP requests in this real-world dataset.

• Simulated Data

In this paper, our goal is a detection of counterfeit fingerprint which would pretend to be browser activities in outbound HTTP traffics. However, this kind of attack is secret and hidden penetration, and hard to collect in the real world. Therefore, we build a botnet malware and monitor its outbound HTTP traffics. As we know, early botnets generally used Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel to communicate C&C server. In recent years, botnets also start to communicate C&C server through HTTP protocol. Furthermore, we need to build a botnet with the spoofing headers which can evade other detection systems. That is why we collect three different simulated botnet traffics. In Dataset_01, it has no spoofing headers from infected host's outbound HTTP traffics. Dataset_02 consists of the botnet traffics with simple spoofing, and which means our botnet sending the requests to web-like user agent through HTTP protocol. Finally, Dataset_03 is totally modifying the headers information, and the malware investigates which browser is used by the user or host, and fills the field User-Agent with that specific browser. Moreover, it also fills up some common requests header fields, like Accept, Accept-Encoding, Accept-Language, and Referrer.

B. Evaluation Metrics

Essentially, Our system is a flow filter aim to identify the suspicious requests with the headers field. Four well-known metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of proposed method are adopted as followings: "true positive"(TP) means the number of normal requests which belong to normal traffic. "False negative"(FN) is the number of normal traffic and its results are wrongly predicted. Similarly, "true negative"(TN) means the number of abnormal traffic and the system predict it as malicious requests, while "false positive"(FP) is the number of abnormal traffic that the system predicts it as normal traffic. Based on the accumulation of TP, FN, TN , and FP , one extended metrics (*accuracy*) popularly used in

TABLE II: Overview of the Datasets. We collect five datasets which industry series sets were real-world flows and the remaining of three were simulated data. Since the real-world traffic cannot be properly labeled, we treat real-world data as benign traffic. These data are captured by tcpdump and then using the scapy module to extract the HTTP header information we need.

Dataset	Features	Types	All Samples	Benign Samples	Malicious Samples
Industry_flow01	Packets	Traffic Flows	1,690,869	1,690,869	N/A
Industry_flow02	Packets	Traffic Flows	68,234	68,234	N/A
Dataset_01	Packets	Botnet	1,444	1,094	350
Dataset_02	Packets	Botnet	1,342	1,102	240
Dataset_03	Packets	Botnet	1,045	877	168

machine learning problems are also adopted here to evaluate proposed method and listed in equations below. Note that the optimal *accuracy* of 1.0 means all of the malware are successfully picked out by the proposed approach.

$$Accuracy = \frac{TP + TN}{TP + TN + FP + FN} \quad (4)$$

C. Effectiveness Analysis

Just as we know, malware can easily modify the HTTP header, therefore, we build three kind of malware to evaluate our approach. With these botnets, they all have the same purpose, and which would steal some sensitive information (such as OS information, system account, and the password) and send requests to the C&C server periodically waiting for commands to execute. The difference between them is the degree of the spoofing HTTP headers. The botnet in Dataset_01 doesn't spoof any HTTP headers, and we fill up with the empty to the User-Agent field. The botnet in dataset_02 only simply sets the User-agent as a common browser which calls Internet Explore (IE). In the Dataset_03, botnet would specifically detect the victim's browser version and system language, and then fill them into the HTTP header. In addition, for the reference field in a HTTP header that we point to the default website. For testing system's robustness, we merge dataset Industry_flow 02 to each simulated data. It may greatly increase the complexity of the detection task. The result is shown in table III, we can see that our system and DECANTeR [2] both have the great performance with Dataset_01 and Dataset_02. However, we can notice that our system has a better performance for botnets in Dataset_03 based on advanced spoofing methods.

In the training stage, We build each fingerprint through the clean data for both systems. For with no User-Agent request headers, which filled in '-' in User-Agent field, we will use the domain and IP to create the fingerprints. Moreover, this concept is just like the idea of the whitelist, and malware can't evade our system detection through the settings of HTTP header with empty User-Agent. The result shows that two detection systems both got an excellent performance in the Dataset_01. Some malware would use a web-like User-Agent to camouflage themselves as a browser to avoid the system detection. In Dataset_02, the malware would modify the HTTP header field User-Agent to IE, and disguise itself as a browser and communicate with C&C server. For this validation set, both systems also got a good score when a malware disguises

itself as a browser, and our system would firstly check the request whether whitelist has this fingerprint or not. If yes, the system will compare the difference with these fingerprints. So, unless the malware can guess or use some advanced technology to get the browser information and the language of the OS system used by the victim, and then using this information to forge the HTTP header fields. Otherwise, it is not easy to avoid the first stage of our detection system.

For advanced spoofing methods, the malware can detect the victim's system information such as browser version and system language, and then malware would modify the HTTP header fields when sending requests to C&C server. For this reason, it is not robust with only the first phase of detection (e.g., DECANTeR [2], DUMONT [6], and WebTap [7]). Therefore, in addition to creating the fingerprints, we also established the referrer correlation graph during the training phase. For the traffic with the labeling as normal through the first phase by the detection system, and we can carry out the second phase of detection, the detection system would compare the graph edit distance between each referrer correlation graphs. The idea of this detection stems from the fact that we think when humans are browsing the websites, they would click the hyperlink to where they want to browse, and these referrers of the requests can be generated as a referrer correlation path. On the other hand, malware that disguised as a browser cannot link out such a path. We apply this concept to use GED to calculate the difference between these referrer correlation graphs. The results show that our approach is better than DECANTeR [2], and it could detect the malware sending requests in Dataset_03 which using advanced spoofing methods to evading detection system.

D. Limitation and Future Work

There are two main problems in our approach, however, they are infrequent in practice. First problem is the duration of model training or fingerprint constructing that need a non-compromised environment. Because, our approach is an extension of DECANTeR [2], and which needs to generate an application's fingerprint for anomaly detection in a clean environment. Therefore, we also have to perform our approach at the same scenario for benign fingerprint and correlation model construction. The second problematic situation may happen (e.g., TLS) that is due to a lack of browser referrer contents, and this situation may difficultly construct a referrer correlation graph. Moreover, we couldn't extract any information from an encrypted PCAP file when it was encapsulated

TABLE III: Overview of Evaluation. For testing the robustness, we add the real-world traffic into each simulated data. We compare the performance of our system and DECANter [2] against different data sets. The accuracy is calculated by equation (4) and the detail result will show below.

Dataset	System	HTTP Requests	Evaluation Metrics				Accuracy	Counterfeit Fingerprint Detection Rate
			TP	TN	FP	FN		
Dataset_01+Industy_flow02	DECANter [2]	69,678	69,328	350	0	0	1.0000	N/A
	Our System		69,328	350	0	0	1.0000	N/A
Dataset_02+Industy_flow02	DECANter [2]	69,576	69,336	240	0	0	1.0000	N/A
	Our System		69,336	240	0	0	1.0000	N/A
Dataset_03+Industy_flow02	DECANter [2]	69,279	69,109	0	168	2	0.9975	0%
	Our System		69,109	168	0	2	0.9999	100%

in TLS unless we use a TLS proxy for traffic decryption. Fortunately, this could be resolved by a tool (e.g., Burp Suite) for interception of TLS requests.

In the further work, the counterfeit fingerprint not only appears in browser network activities but also usually used in background application for evading detections, and which is briefly described in DECANter [2]. Therefore, we will resolve counterfeit fingerprint in each background application based on the same idea concept with this paper in the future.

IV. RELATED WORK

Many studies [8] [9] [10] [11] focus on the C&C connection detection for identifying Botnet, such as: IRC, HTTP, SMTP in the phases of probe, penetrate, escalate, expand of cyber killer chain. And Livadas et al. [12] [13] represent a machine learning based approach to detect botnet by using the network traffic. The approach is focused on chat-like protocols such as IRC. Malware clustering is capable to generate the malware signatures of communication on the network. Several studies generate the signatures via clustering approaches from known botnet traffics [14] [15]. Perdisci et al. [16] [17] proposed a technique that using URL similarities, and extracts sub-tokens from URLs to clusters malware sample. And using the cluster to identify malicious traffic on the network. Rafique and Caballero [18] proposed a tool which calls FIRMA that generates a set of signatures for each malware family by aggregates malware samples into families based on similar protocol features.

Anomaly-based detections leverage different kinds features to identify variant malware traffics such as detail of service [19], context of Web attacks [20], and encrypted data exfiltration [21]. Although most of these works use pre-defined features from expert knowledge: DNS Tunneling Detector by DL uses neither specified features instead of known malicious samples to model training [22]. Other works need a large amount of samples to train the models [23] [24] [25] [26], in addition, several work incorporates network and host features to desing the detection [27] [7]. To solve false positive of malicious samples, some studies [28] have the mixed real-world data with simulated data. Furthermore, Eslahi et al. [29] proposed an approach to reduce the false positive rate in HTTP-based botnet detection. However, most kinds of these works still suffer high false positive problems result in being impractical.

Many studies use the HTTP headers to detect suspicious traffic is mainly focused on the User-Agent. As Kheir et al. work [30], they use the general signatures which call of User-Agents to filter out the same signature cluster as labeled as legitimate and the left is labeled as malicious. The biggest problem with this approach is that it can only detect specific malware with used constant User-Agent field to connect or send through HTTP protocol. And the report [31] shows that it is not only used in web browsing but also other types of applications like variant malware attacks. In 2017, Bortolameotti et al. [2] proposed DECANter system to identify the outbound HTTP traffics whether anomalous or not. The proposed method note only intends to create detection model without from sets of known malware samples, but also without additional knowledge of threats or known malware samples. Therefore, we try to fix this problem in this paper.

V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection for HTTP-based browsers based on fingerprint and referrer correlation. Our approach never needs malware activities in training phase, and it could disable the bias issue which is common and usual in specific malware (e.g., ransomware). Furthermore, we also could deal with data leakage and exfiltration performed by malware in our approach. In general, existing solutions focus on model network traffic to identify specific malware, or need to analyze network payload for realizing how the sensitive data stole by hackers. But, our method is never limited by them, and also compare to existing system DECANter [2], and which shows a better detection performance result. Contributions of our work can be summarized as followings:

- **Well Problem Modeling**

The proposed approach collects real-world traffics, and makes learning client-side intrusion threats from them as a computable problem, with well-defined adjacent vector and corresponding graph.

- **Automatic and Accurate Threat Detection**

System simultaneously considers heterogeneous entities such as user-agent, domain, language, and referrer. And various relationships among those entities are also designed to describe different attacking scenarios. Based on that, adjacent vector and correlation graph are then adopted to give complementary detections. Experiment shows that system outperforms our approaches in terms

of accuracy (100%) and recall (100%) respectively, especially a covert attacking threat counterfeit fingerprint, can be successfully detected.

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